


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COMMENTARIES OF RUY FREYRE DE ANDRADA



COMMENTARIES OF RUY
FREYRE DE ANDRADA



THE BROADWAY TRAVELLERS

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**COMMENTARIES OF RUY
FREYRE DE ANDRADA**

**In which are related his
exploits from the year 1619**

RUY FREYRE DE ANDRADA

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COMMENTARIOS
DO GRANDE
CAPITAM RY

Freyre de Andrada.

EM QUE SE RELATAM SUAS PROEZAS DO
Anno 1619. em q' partiu deste Reyno por Ceral de mar
de Ormuz, & Costa da Persia, & Arabia ate sua morte.

Tirados de humas relaçoẽs, & papéis verdadeyros
por industria de Paulo Craesbeeck.

DEROIDO AO SENHOR LOYRENÇO SKITTE
Senhor de Kongebro, & Sátra. Assistente pella Rainha de
Suecia na Corte de Portugal, &c.



*De
Feliz. Custodio
da Silva*

EM LISBOA.

Com todas as licenças necessarias.

Por Paulo Craesbeeck, & a sua custa Anno 1617.

TITLE PAGE OF ORIGINAL EDITION OF 1647

[Frontispiece

THE BROADWAY TRAVELLERS

EDITED BY SIR E. DENISON ROSS
AND EILEEN POWER




COMMENTARIES OF
RUY FREYRE
DE ANDRADA

*In which are Related his Exploits from the
Year 1619, in which he left this Kingdom of
Portugal as General of the Sea of Ormuz, and
Coast of Persia, and Arabia, until his Death*

Edited with an Introduction by

C. R. BOXER

Socio da Associação dos Arqueólogos Portugueses



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TO
EDGAR AND VICTORIA PRESTAGE

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PREFACE

THE *Commentarios do Grande Capitão Ruy Freyre de Andrade*, first published at Lisbon in 1647 by Paulo Craesbeeck, has never (so far as I know) been translated into any language, nor has it had a subsequent edition in Portugal. Copies of the original edition are extremely rare, and the work is less known than many manuscripts.

The book deals with a period singularly interesting to English readers as it describes at length the operations leading up to the capture from the Portuguese of the celebrated city and island of Ormuz, in the Persian Gulf, by an Anglo-Persian force.

Hence the publication of an English edition of this work should be of interest and value to all those who are concerned with the history of the rise of our Indian Empire; the more so since up till now there has been no account available in print of the Portuguese version of the affair; and it is always interesting to know what was taking place "on the other side of the hill."

It is not certain who was the author of the *Commentarios*, but it was probably the publisher Paulo Craesbeeck, who claims to have composed the volume from various "trustworthy papers." Unfortunately however these papers are anything but reliable in many places, since their version of what occurred is often contradicted, not only by the English accounts, but by other contemporary Portuguese authorities. But even making due allowance for this, the commentaries do contain a great many details which are not to be found elsewhere, and they throw a flood of light on the siege of Ormuz. A work like this offers the temptation of

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almost unlimited annotation, but I have endeavoured to keep myself within bounds, and have only included such quotations from English and Portuguese sources as are necessary either to confute or to confirm the more dubious statements of the Portuguese Chronicler. Amongst the Appendices I have included several unpublished Portuguese documents, but the most valuable material is to be found in the journal of Edward Monnox printed in Appendix X., who was present throughout the operations. Purchas has printed an abridged version of this journal in his "Pilgrims" [*cf.* 1910 ed., vol. x.], but he omitted a great deal of it, and that not the least interesting part, so the publication of this journal in full provides a very interesting supplement to the Portuguese account.

Sir E. Denison Ross asked me to undertake this work for the "Broadway Travellers" Series early in 1928, but the Hakluyt Society had also made arrangements for Professor Edgar Prestage, Professor of Portuguese History and Literature at the University of London, to translate it for their series about the same time. However, Professor Prestage on learning that I had already collected a considerable mass of unpublished material relating to the subject in the India Office at London, very kindly waived his claim, and the council of the Hakluyt Society equally courteously stood aside in favour of the "Broadway Travellers." I originally meant to translate the volume into contemporary seventeenth-century English, but I fear this is one of the good intentions that has perished by the way, although I hope that the general style of the book smacks more of the seventeenth century than our own age. Translation is a thankless task at all times, and in this case it was not helped by the flowing and watery style favoured by the Portuguese writer, whose punctuation moreover was capricious in the extreme. Nor were his shortcomings helped by the carelessness of the proof reader and the negligence of the printer, but I

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trust that those who are able to compare this translation with the original will not find it altogether wanting.

Whilst not doubting that the work would have been better done by the hand of so accomplished a Portuguese scholar as Professor Prestage, yet I trust that the amount of material I have collected from printed and manuscript sources, will render this book a useful contribution to the long and glorious history of both England and Portugal in Asia.

* * * * *

In the preparation of this work I have received much encouragement and assistance from various friends, to whom I take this opportunity of rendering my thanks. To Sir William Foster and to Sir E. Denison Ross I owe a great debt for their interest and advice prior to my actually commencing the work. Capitão de Fregata Quirino da Fonseca and Mr. R. C. Anderson have given me valuable help in wrestling with some of the more knotty points of seventeenth-century Portuguese naval technicalities, and have saved me from committing several blunders; those which remain in this connection are my own. To Miss Anstey of the India Office for her careful and conscientious copying of Monnox's Diary printed in Appendix X. Senhor Frazão de Vasconcellos has been of very great assistance to me in directing my researches in the Archives at Lisbon, whilst he has been indefatigable in supplying biographical details of the chief Portuguese officers concerned. In this connection I have also received aid from Senhor Laranjo Coelho, the erudite Director of the Tonne de Tombo in Lisbon. But to none am I under a greater obligation than to Professor Prestage, who has not only stood aside in order to let me produce the book, but who has been of invaluable help in elucidating some of the obscure words and phrases which are to be met with in the original text.

C. R. BOXER.

LINCOLN,
January 31, 1929

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INTRODUCTION

“ ‘The sword of the Lord and of Gideon’ had served the Portuguese very well as a motto for acquisition ; but in the contemptuous neglect by them of the arts of peace, and in the absence of any genius for colonization, it did not facilitate retention.”—CURZON, *Persia and the Persian Question*.

THIS sweeping, if eloquent, statement is often quoted by writers on the history of the Persian Gulf as a perfect summing-up of the reasons for the expulsion of the Portuguese therefrom. It would be idle to deny that it contains a considerable amount of truth, yet it does our Lusitanian predecessors but scant justice, and makes no allowance for the spirit of their age, or for the difficult positions in which they often found themselves. It is not unusual to taunt the Portuguese with a complete lack of genius for colonization, but this is only another way of saying that their methods are radically different from our own. The nation which built up the state of Brazil, without that ruthless extermination of the native Indians which only too often disgraced our own record in North America, may have something to teach us after all. The faults of the Portuguese during their rule in the Persian Gulf were neither few nor small, and their access to and fall from power in particular were disgraced by senseless massacres of the inhabitants which nothing can excuse, but it should not be forgotten that during their tenure of power in the Gulf they kept it free of the curse of Piracy (save for a few isolated Turkish raids) as we have done since the eighteenth century, and that tyrannous in many ways as they undoubtedly were, they allowed no one else to misrule, and in some respects their

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Government was lenient and broad-minded. Travellers of all nations have testified to the abounding prosperity of Ormuz under their rule and the flourishing state of the trade carried on therein; whilst even allowing for some exaggeration in certain of the accounts, the immense booty gained by the Anglo-Persian force on the capture of the city in 1622 clearly shows the wealth of Ormuz even in its decline, and proves that the occasional observation of some travellers that Ormuz was not so prosperous as it had been under native jurisdiction was merely the time-honoured plaint of "things are not what they were." For ourselves, the fall of Ormuz marked the dawn of a new and decisive era in the history of our Indian trade and gave promise of the brightest hopes for the future—hopes which if they were sadly disappointed at the outset were realized in due course to the full; for it cannot be gainsaid that the capture of this island laid the foundations of that preponderating influence in the Persian Gulf which we have possessed ever since.

To the Portuguese, on the other hand, the blow was indeed a bitter one, and largely contributed to accelerate their inevitable ruin; yet in the darkest hours of the decadence of their power, there were some who were not found wanting in the hour of trial, and whose heroic actions worthily upheld the prestige acquired by their "conquistador" ancestors of the early sixteenth century. Nor is the story of the taking of Ormuz Castle merely an echo "of old unhappy far-off things, and battles long ago," for the direct consequences of this act are with us to this day, and the story of the operations previous to the capture of the place affords several illuminating examples of the dangers which arise from the neglect of the Principles of Warfare, whether by land or sea.

At the end of the first decade of the seventeenth century, the Portuguese had been established as the paramount power in the Persian Gulf for over a hundred

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years, yet the great Shah Abbas I. had not been long on the throne of Persia before he began to cast covetous eyes upon the rich Lusitanian territories, whose chief centres at this period were Ormuz, Muscat and Bahrein. The war with Turkey occupied most of his attention for a considerable period after his accession in 1587, but with the recapture of Nehavend and Tabriz, the Osmanali had been fairly driven out of the N.W. Persian Provinces by 1605, and the Shah was in a better position to turn his arms against his Christian opponents. As early as 1602 the Khan of Shiraz had wrested the valuable pearl-fishery of Bahrein, off the North Arabian coast, from the hapless "King" of Ormuz, who was a vassal of the King of Spain and Portugal,¹ in time of peace, and although the Shah disclaimed complicity in this affair, yet the island was not restored to the Portuguese. The Persians followed up this aggression by continually filching away portions of the dominions of the King of Ormuz on the mainland, and finally, in 1607, they occupied two wells near Bandar Abbas (Gombroon or Comorão) from which Ormuz drew much of its water, and although they subsequently retired on payment of some customs dues which they alleged were due to them, yet they retained two small forts that they had built close to the Portuguese mud fort on the shore. This, incidentally, was in a very weak state of defence, the walls being in a ruinous condition, whilst there were few cannon in the fortress. Despite the fact that from 1600 onwards successive Viceroy and captains had written home concerning the aggressions of the Shah, and the ill-preparedness for war of the forts of Ormuz and Gombrun, no steps were taken to amend matters before it was too late, although the King wrote repeatedly that this was to be done; hence it is not surprising that when the Khan of Lar laid siege to the Fort of Gombrun in 1615, with an army said to amount to 14,000 men, it fell after a trifling resist-

¹ At that period (1580-1640) under one crown.

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ance.¹ A fleet under Miguel de Sousa Pimentel, which the Viceroy had despatched to its relief, arrived just too late, and Pimentel retired to Muscat without making an effort to restore the situation.²

By the loss of their fort at Gombrun, the Portuguese were deprived of their last foothold on the mainland and the Persians became yearly more aggressive. It was with the idea of patching up a peace with Persia that the King decided upon the despatch of an embassy to the court of the Shah in 1614. The Ambassador selected was a certain Spanish nobleman named Don Garcia de Silva y Figueroa, partly in consequence of a request from the Shah that no more friars should be sent him as ambassadors, but some gentlemen of note "for he would better know how to treat with such an one, and His Majesty would be better served, because a religious man out of his cell was like a fish out of water." This Envoy's instructions were to arrange a treaty with the Shah, whereby the monopoly of the Persian silk trade would be granted to the Portuguese, and he was also to press for the restoration for Bahrein, Gombrun and other territories claimed by the Portuguese Monarch through the alleged rights of his vassal king of Ormuz. The Shah was not (apparently) loath to grant the monopoly of the silk trade to the Portuguese, since in 1616 he despatched Sir Robert Sherley³ to the court of

¹ Over the loss of Bahrein and Gombrun, and the abortive preparations made for the recovery of the same, see the *Livros das Monções* series, Lisbon, 1880-93 *passim*, and especially Tomo I., pp. 11, 13, and 322-31, Tomo II., pp. 100-5, Tomo III., pp. 173-4, and Tomo IV., pp. 151-3.

² Pimentel had been in China in 1613 as commander of a force of galleons destined to protect the Japan trade against Dutch aggressions. He had committed many enormities whilst stationed at Macau.

³ Robert Sherley, together with his brother Anthony, were two great English adventurers of the seventeenth century. Arriving at the Court of Shah Abbas in 1598, they took service with the Persian monarch and rendered him many and important services in diplomacy and war. They both undertook extensive missions to Europe, Robert from 1608-13 and again from 1617-27, being knighted on his first visit to England in

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Madrid with the object of concluding a treaty by which the whole monopoly of the silk trade would be given to Portugal (the object being to divert its transit by way of Turkey), provided that the Portuguese would send yearly a fleet with spices, pepper, Indian goods, and specie in payment thereof. Sherley actually succeeded in concluding an agreement on these lines, and the King wrote to Don Garcia de Figueroa, and to the Captain of Ormuz, on the 14th March, 1619, informing them of this; he added, however, that the actual carrying out of this agreement was to be made entirely dependent upon the restoration of Bahrein and Gombrun by the Shah to the King of Ormuz.¹ This agreement never became operative, because when Don Garcia de Silva y Figueroa demanded the restoration of the disputed territories at his final interview with the Shah at Ispahan in 1619, the latter flew into a rage and swore that, so far from restoring what he had already taken, he would drive the Portuguese from their Fortress at Ormuz; at the same time he ordered a *farmān* to be made out, granting the sole trade in silks by the sea route to the English. Don Garcia having been thus unsuccessful in his mission left the Persian court for Ormuz, whence he embarked for Goa in April, 1620.²

As early as 1613 the Portuguese began to take alarm at the prospect of their English rivals opening a trade with Persia and interfering with their own monopoly of commerce in the Gulf. The English at this time had their hands full at Surat, whilst subsequently King

1611 by James I. His wife was a Circassian, and he himself was Master-General of the Persian army during the Turkish campaigns of 1602-05. [*V. Sir A. Wilson, Persian Gulf*, pp. 128-142.]

¹ For details of this abortive agreement and the King's observations thereon see *Livros das Monções*, Livro 11, folios 126-7, and Livro 12, folios 140-150. [India Office, Port. Records.]

² After a previous unsuccessful attempt and a narrow escape from shipwreck, D. Garcia y Figueroa finally left Goa for Portugal in 1623 on board the ship *São Thomé*, but died on the voyage, off the Azores. His *Comentarios* were published in two vols. at Madrid in 1903.

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James I.'s Ambassador to the great Moghul, Sir Thomas Roe, opposed the extension of their trade to Persia. But the East India Company's Factors at Surat were wiser and resolved to despatch a ship thither in 1616, and accordingly the first English vessel, the *James*, was despatched from Surat to Persia. The Portuguese attempt to intercept the vessel proved abortive, and in 1619 a factory was established at Jask which became the centre of the company's commercial activities in Persia for the next three years.

Despite the arrival of Robert Sherley in Lisbon in 1618, and the agreement concluded with him in the following year, the King seems to have thought that the prospect of obtaining a satisfactory peace with Persia was not very good, because he decided upon the despatch of a strong naval expedition to Ormuz in the spring of 1619, with the dual object of forcibly ejecting the intruding English "corsairs" from the Persian Gulf and of protecting Ormuz against a possible invasion by the Persians in the event of the treaty not being ratified. The officer selected to command this expedition was a certain Ruy Freire de Andrade, who was described by one of his English rivals as "a proper tall Gentleman, swarthie of colour, sterne of Countenance, few of words, and of an excellent spirit." The force placed under his orders consisted of two galleons and three urcas [hulks in the contemporary English] carrying a total force of 178 guns and more than 2,000 men, between soldiers and sailors.¹ Since his voyage to Ormuz is fully described in the course of this work (pp. 1 to 14), it is only necessary to state here that he reached Ormuz in June, 1620, after a long and painful voyage, during which he had lost one urca by shipwreck off the Kerimba islands of the East African coast,

¹ For Ruy Freire see Appendix XI., Personalia. His orders for the expedition are printed (for the first time) in Appendix I., pp. 211-218. Other documents dealing with his outward voyage will be found in Luciano Cordeiro's *Dois Capitães da Índia*.

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as well as several hundreds of men who had perished from the privations they had undergone during the detention of a part of the squadron at Moçambique in the winter of 1619.

On arrival at Ormuz, Ruy Freire made several additions and alterations to his force, and then sailed to Jask in November, 1620, with a view to intercepting the English ships which were expected to arrive there in December with their annual cargo of goods for Persia. His force comprised two galleons, one urca, and a pataxo or pinnace carrying over 1,000 men; shortly after this squadron had taken up its station off Cape Jask, three strange ships hove in sight on December 16th. These were the *Hart* and *Eagle* of the East India Company's outward bound fleet together with a Portuguese prize which they had taken. Ruy Freire at once weighed in pursuit, and as the English thought it likely that he would overhaul them, they turned off the prize and steered for Surat. On their way thither they fell in with their two consorts the *London* and *Roebuck* under Captain Shilling, and the united force then headed for Jask Roads determined to try a bout with the redoubtable *Pride of Portugall*, who had sworn upon the Sacrament in Lisbon to root out the English and their trade from the Gulf. The rival squadrons came in sight of each other off Jask on Christmas Day, but battle was not joined until the 27th, when the Portuguese suffered a heavy defeat after the action had raged for nine hours without intermission. On the next day the wind was in favour of the Portuguese, but they made no attempt to interfere with the English who stood in to Jask, and after landing their goods took on board about 520 bales of silk. Ruy Freire remained in the offing, and on January 1st, 1621, he received a supply of men and munitions which had been sent him in some frigates, or small craft, from Ormuz. Thus reinforced he again prepared to give battle, but contrary winds and gales prevented the

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action from being fought until January 7th, when the English attacked their adversaries and utterly routed them after a stubborn contest.¹

The Portuguese confess to a loss of 160 dead and 200 wounded in this last action alone, whilst the English losses amounted to only eight all told, including Shilling, who died of his wounds some days after the last action. The disproportion between the respective fleets is truly amazing and can only be accounted for by the extraordinarily poor gunnery of the Portuguese, for that they did not lack courage (in the first fight at all events), is clearly shown by their standing up under such heavy punishment for so long despite the fact that they were inflicting little or no loss on their opponents. Their heavy casualty list on the last day's action is accounted for by the fact that Ruy Freire foolishly persisted in fighting at anchor and with his vessels linked to each other with hawsers, with the natural result that when the fire of the English cut one of these hawsers "3 of Ruy Frere his 4 galliones ley bord and bord one foule of another, not a man scarce appearinge in the one of them and verie seldom a shott cam from them." [V. Appendix X., p. 301.] Ruy Freire was a brave and resolute officer by the admission of his own enemies, but he evidently experienced difficulty in getting his men to fight after the hammering they had

¹ Senhor Luciano Cordeiro in his interesting and valuable *Como se perdeu Ormuz*, pp. 34-40, accepts unquestioningly the version of the *Commentarios*, and besides giving the English losses as over 200, he also, like the *Commentarios*, attributes Ruy Freire's ill-success to his fleet being scattered by a storm, during which the English slipped into Jask and escaped with the silk. This was evidently the excuse sent home by Ruy Freire or his supporters, and the best comment thereon is in Monnox's words—"Now if this was a storme it was onlie the thundring of our shott that was so terrible bothe to this brave Captain and his associates that he nor they durst not looke oute of their shipps holds to see what weather it was." [V. Appendix X., p. 301.] Besides the accounts given in Appendices IX. and X., the English versions printed by Foster and Purchas, [v. Bibliography] supply a complete refutation of Senhor Cordeiro's arguments.

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received in the first engagement, and whilst his courage cannot be called into question, yet his faulty tactics were largely responsible for the humiliating discomfiture of the Portuguese, to which the poor quality of the crews (mostly *Gujarāt* and half-caste seamen) no doubt chiefly contributed.¹

Be this as it may, Ruy Freire made his way back to Ormuz unmolested, since the English had exhausted nearly all their powder and shot and in consequence of Shilling's death deemed it best to return to Surat. After refitting his shattered Armada as best he could, Ruy Friere turned his attention to the second object for which he had been sent out by the King, *i.e.*, the task of securing Ormuz from the possible Persian invasion. The Royal orders for this purpose included an instruction to build a fortress at the eastern extremity of the island of Kishm, or Qishm, presumably in order to protect some wells that were situated there and which would take the place of those lost at Gombrun in 1615. Ormuz is a sterile and waterless island and dependent for its water-supply on the neighbouring coasts and islands, so at first sight the plan seems to be a practicable one, but in reality it was an unfortunate move, as Kishm was claimed by the Persians and the construction of a fortress there would naturally form a valid *causus belli* for the Shah, and involve an open rupture with Persia—a thing which was not at all desirable at that time, since the Dutch and English aggressions gave the Portuguese authorities at Goa sufficient trouble and anxiety, without their having another dangerous enemy on their hands. Furthermore, so long as the Portuguese held the command of the sea in the Gulf (as in despite of their defeats off Jask they still did), they could always land and

¹ Unfortunately the Portuguese accounts of the actions off Jask in 1620-21 are extremely meagre. Faria y Sousa barely mentions the fight as having taken place, and I know of no other contemporary version except that of the *Commentarios*. When last in Lisbon I made extensive researches amongst the MSS. of the Torre de Tombo and Bibliotheca Nacional for an account of the battle, but without success.

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obtain water under the protection of their ships and fleets wherever and whenever they wished; whilst once their command of the sea was lost, it would be of little use to have a fort dominating the wells at Kishm when they could not transport the water to Ormuz unmolested. All these considerations and many others equally valid were pointed out to Ruy Freire by the aged Fernão de Albuquerque, then Governor of India, and by Dom Luiz de Sousa, the veteran Captain of Ormuz Castle;¹ but the hot-headed Ruy Freire, by producing the Royal orders to build the fort on Kishm, overruled these objections in the Council held at Ormuz to discuss the affair, and supported by the King of Ormuz he persuaded the council to undertake the Expedition. No doubt the arrival of the two galleons *Todos os Santos* and *Nossa Senhora de Victória* from Goa in May helped to confirm him in the resolution which he had taken.

On the 7th of May, 1621, Ruy Freire left Ormuz for Kishm at the head of an expeditionary corps of some 2,000 "veteran" Portuguese soldiers and 1,000 Ormuzian Lascarins, embarked in thirty galliots, a galley, the urca *Nossa Senhora de Conceição* and the pataxo *Sao Lourenço*. This fleet anchored off the eastern point of the island on the same evening, and the men were disembarked at daybreak on the following morning; the Persians attempted to oppose the disembarkation with a force of 3,000 men who were speedily driven off with great slaughter, and Ruy Freire at once set about the construction of the Fort which he built "of a great height and thickness, with halfe-Moones and Flanckers very artificially, which in five moneths and a halfe hee had finished; a thing wonder-

¹ The King had repeatedly written to Goa ordering that the fortifications of Ormuz were to be strengthened, and was assured in reply that steps were being taken to effect this. He does not appear to have been satisfied with this answer, as in a letter dated March 5, 1620, he ordered proceedings to be instituted against D. Luiz de Sousa. [*Livros das Monções*, Livro 12, folio 95.]

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full in so short a time to be effected," as a contemporary English account puts it.

The Persian force which was occupying the island was speedily reinforced from the mainland when the news of the Portuguese landing reached Gombrun, and Ruy Freire soon found himself closely besieged by a powerful force variously estimated as anything from 9,000 to 25,000 men. The siege was opened on the 20th of June by Imām Qūli Khān,¹ who had been placed in charge of the operations by his uncle the Khān of Shiras. A full description of the long and eventful siege of Kishm Fort, which lasted from June, 1621, till February, 1622, will be found on pp. 38 to 110 of the present work, so it is unnecessary to go into the details of the siege here; it will suffice to say that Ruy Freire held his own and wrought immense havoc all along the neighbouring Persian coasts by means of the plundering flotillas of light craft that he sent out from Ormuz and Kishm at intervals, and which burnt and sacked nearly all of the ports and villages between Kung and Jask.

The chief object of these destructive raids, which were conducted with wanton barbarity and disgraced by the slaughter of all women and children who were found, was to destroy the local shipping in order to prevent the Khan of Shiras from collecting a sufficient number of craft by which he could transport his forces over to Ormuz, and also to impede the passage of reinforcements from the mainland to Kishm, and to stifle the pearl-fisheries.

Needless to say, however, this barbarous method of procedure only served to render the wretched inhabitants more bitter against the Portuguese, and despite all the efforts of Ruy Friere, they succeeded in

¹ I am aware that most English writers have described Imām Qūli as the Khan of Shirás, and that some contemporary writers also describe him as such. Monnox, however, always makes a difference, as do some others. See further on this question, p. 45 n. 1.

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hiding up the creeks and rivers a large number of boats (400 according to the English account) which they voluntarily produced when the time came for the invasion of Ormuz, "for the Arabians could wish all the Portugals throats cut by the reason of their great hinderances in burning of their Boats and Townes, and Slavery which they daily did sustain."

Nevertheless, although this needless barbarity largely defeated its own object, yet Ruy Freire still held command of the sea and was thus enabled to reinforce the fort to Kishm with men and munitions from Ormuz as often as he pleased. The Persians, on the other hand, had lost heavily in their numerous unsuccessful assaults on the fort, and at length began to see that they would not be able to take this stronghold until they or their allies held the command of the sea, and accordingly they decided to compel the English to assist them in their operations against the Portuguese.

At this juncture a fleet of nine English ships arrived at Jask on the 24th of December, 1621, from Surat. This squadron was under the joint command of Richard Blyth and John Weddell in the *London* and *Jonas* respectively, the Vice-Admiral being Nicholas Woodcock in the *Whale* and the Rear Admiral Isaac Stevenson in the *Dolphin*; the remainder of the force was composed of the ship *Lion*, and the four pinnaces *Shilling*, *Rose*, *Robert*, and *Richard*. At two consultations which had been held at Surat on the 24th and 30th of November, 1621, prior to the sailing of the squadron, it had been resolved to act against the Portuguese not only defensively but also offensively, this decision being grounded upon the commissions granted by King James I. and by the President and Council at Surat.¹

¹ The latter, however, repudiated the action of Weddell and Blythe in besieging Ormuz, and asserted that their commission contained no authority for them to do so. A copy of the original commission is included in Monnox's MS. Journal in the India Office, but this portion

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Accordingly as soon as the Fleet reached Jask, the Khan of Shiraz at once applied to the commanders for assistance against the Portuguese, hinting broadly that should they refuse his request, their trading privileges would be withdrawn and the silk confiscated. Blyth and Weddell were in a quandary. They must have felt that their force was more than sufficient to cope with Ruy Freire's four galleons at Ormuz, but on the other hand, to risk an attack upon the Fortresses of Kishm and Ormuz was to hazard considerable loss in any case, and quite possibly utter defeat. Again, the idea of joining a "heathen" power against a Christian state whose relations with England were peaceful in Europe, whatever might have been the case in India, was one which was repulsive to many of those present, and the readiness with which on a not dissimilar occasion, King James had executed Raleigh at the request of Gondomar did not augur too well for those of his subjects who chose to break the peace with Spain. On the other hand, the war in which the Persians had involved themselves with the Portuguese had been largely brought about by the favours granted to the English merchants, and if these refused to aid the Persians it would in all probability have meant the loss of their silks and the destruction of the trade which had so painfully been built up and from which so much was expected. The question was long and earnestly debated, but eventually, largely owing to the efforts of Edward Monnox, the Company's indefatigable agent in Persia, it was resolved to grant the Khan's request and to remove once for all the Portuguese supremacy in the Persian Gulf by co-operating with the Persians in their attack on Kishm and Ormuz. This decision was come to at Kuhistak on January 5th, 1622. An agreement was quickly drawn up with the Khan, the terms

of the journal is so damaged as to be undecipherable. From the Summary given by Purchas (x., p. 342) it seems that they meant the squadron to confine its attacks to Portuguese shipping.

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of which are summarised on page 257 of the present work, and the fleet prepared to set sail. But before it could do so, the commanders experienced considerable difficulty in getting their men to join them in this expedition, as they practically all refused to serve "alleaging it was no merchandizing buisnesse, nor were they hired for any such exploit." However, by means of threats and persuasions (including the promise of a month's extra pay) they were eventually induced to do so. At first sight it may seem somewhat strange that the men should be reluctant to have "t'other odd bout" with the Portuguese, whom they had already trounced so soundly at Jask a year before, but this reluctance was not unnatural in view of the fact that if they were maimed or killed, neither they nor their families would receive any compensation.

Leaving Kuhuistak¹ on the 29th January, 1622 (after having taken the silk on board in case the Persians should attempt to play them false), the fleet stood over to Ormuz hoping that the galleons would come out to fight them. The Portuguese, by their own account, had decided to send them out, but the signal agreed upon to recall Ruy Freire from Ormuz to assume the command of them miscarried, and owing to the faint-heartedness of the "almirante" Luiz de Brito they declined to accept the challenge and made no move. The English therefore proceeded on the 2nd of February to Kishm, "where we arrived in fit time to save both the lives and reputations of the Portugals, not able long to hold out against the Persian siege, and willing rather to yield to us."² At first the Portuguese "weived us with naked swords; yet one more wiser then the rest, hunge out a napkin or white cloth, whereupone in

¹ Not Jask, as stated by Sir A. Wilson and most other writers. The fleet had moved to Kuhuistak as the roads round Jask were unsafe for the silk caravans owing to the depredations of the Portuguese and robbers.

² Most other writers are agreed that Ruy Freire could have held out much longer, as he could always obtain relief from Ormuz up till the appearance of the English fleet.

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Christianlike compassion Edward Monnox was sent on shoare to parlie with them." He was duly admitted to Ruy Freire "And beinge sett together in the courte of guard, the sayd Rufrero began with a longe storye of the antient love and amytie betwene the two nations, English and Portugalls, and the noble acts that the English had done in asistinge the Portugalls to expulse the Moores out of their countrey; to which the said Monox replied hee came not to treat of busynisses of such antequitye, but hee came to treat of satisfaxione and revenge for the warre begun and attempted by himselfe, the their present Rufrero, against our last years fleete in the roade of Jasques, to the losse of worthy commander and our Kings sworne servante, besydes other of His Majistis subjects." Ruy Freire retorted that whatever he had done, had been in accordance with his orders—"And after much otheir conference to the like cfecte, which would be over tedyouse in this place to relate,¹ the sayd Monox replied, notwithstanding hee deserved smale favour at our hands, yet oute of a Christyen feelinge of their present estate, we weare willinge [to] shewe them mercye and to free them from the hands of the Pertians and Moores." Ruy Freire was disposed to these conditions, but demanded that the same terms should be extended to his MoslemOrmuzian auxiliaries. This Monnox at first declined to do, as by the terms of the treaty with the Persians they were entitled to all the Mohamedan prisoners, and that therefore these auxiliaries would have to be surrendered to the Khan. "Then sayd Rufrero: 'Rather then wee will doe that, wee will ende our lives together'; which answer of his seemed to be utered with such vehemencie as if he resolved to doe as hee spake; which Monox

¹ For a letter of Ruy Freire to the English on this subject dated February 11, 1622, see Appendix X., p. 304. The *Commentarios* give a demonstratibly false and unreliable account of these negotiations between the English and Ruy Freire, for the true course of which see the English commander's letter of February 17, 1622, printed in Foster, vol. 1622-3, pp. 31-5.

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perceaveinge, tould him hee would goe unto the Pertian Generall, named Emoumelybeage [Imām Qulī Beg] and sollicite him in there behalfe; with whom hee soe fare prayayled " as to obtain a promise that their lives would be spared, provided that they were not allowed to go to reinforce the garrison of Ormuz. " But Mr. Monox retorninge to the castle to acquent Rufrero with what he had don, he absolutely refused any such agreement." Upon this the English commenced a bombardment of the fort from their ships, during which they fired over 1,000 rounds and killed about thirty-five of the enemy. But they did not make very extensive breaches in the walls of the fort, so that they resolved to land some heavy guns and batter it from the shore. This they accordingly did, and soon demolished most of the adobe fortress walls, whereby the enemy " was content to listen to a second parley, wherein wee for the gayninge of the castle were content to suffer them to departe souldyerlike with bagge and baggage."¹ Ruy Freire had indeed made strenuous efforts to induce his men to follow him in a last sally upon the enemy, but the garrison, although forward enough in slaughtering defenceless women and children during the raids on the neighbouring villages, and although they had bravely defended the fort against the attacks of the numerous but ill-armed Persian army, had not heart enough to resist a numerous and well-equipped European enemy, the more so since the latter heavily outgunned them. They therefore mutinied against Ruy Freire (largely at the instigation of their priests) and surrendered the place to the English, delivering up Ruy Freire and one or two of his Captains as hostages for the fulfilment of the conditions, whilst the luckless

¹ The English had only five casualties in the short siege of Kishm. One of them was a Dutchman named Abraham, " but the man whom wee shall finde the greatist misse of is Mr. Baffin, that was killed outright with a muskit on shoare, plyinge a peece of great ordnance against the Castle." For a detailed account of the celebrated Polar navigator's death, see p. 96 note 2.

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Moslem auxiliaries were handed over to the Persian Khan who "formerly had promysed them mercie, but falsely murdered them most unhumanly." Both sides violated the terms of surrender, for the English besides handing over the auxiliaries to the Khan, also disarmed the Portuguese soldiers (who amounted to under 300 out of the 2,000 with which the fort had originally been garrisoned), whilst the majority of the Portuguese proceeded to Ormuz instead of to Sohar and Muscat, as had been agreed upon in the first instance.

After the occupation of the fort on the 11th of February, 1622, the fleet stood over to Gombrun, leaving four Englishmen at Kishm to represent the Company's share of the joint occupation amongst the 600 soldiers of the Persian garrison. At Gombrun they were royally feasted by the grateful Khan of Shiras, as the English had obtained for him in eight days what he had failed to secure in as many months. He was anxious that Ruy Freire and some of his Captains should be delivered up to him so that he could present them to the Shah, but Blyth and Weddell had other designs and despatched him to Surat on board the *Lion*, in company with the pinnaces *Rose* and *Richard* carrying other prisoners, writing the President and Council—"Wee send you herewith for a present Captain Rufrero, with six more of his principall captaynes and gentlemen, which we refer to your disposure, wherein we knowe you will be careful of our poore afflicted countriemen who suffer messerable bondage under their ensultinge enymies to the sothwards."¹

On Saturday, February 19th, the remaining six English ships accompanied by an enormous Persian flotilla of small craft carrying some 3,000 men, set sail

¹ This refers to the crew of the *Unicorn* captured near Macao, in June, 1620. The English contemplated exchanging Ruy Freire for these captives, and although he subsequently escaped (see pp. 174-7), yet he wrote to the Factor at Surat saying "he had pawned his honnor . . . to send us ther Vize Royes mandate for all our peoples enlargemente." [I.O., O.C. 1047.]

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for Ormuz and anchored at a distance of some six miles from the Castle on the same evening. The next day the Persians under the command of the Imām Qūlī Khan, were landed without incident and marched towards the city. No attempt had been made to prevent their disembarkation, and only a feeble attempt to make a stand was made by the Portuguese in the town itself; a small party barricaded themselves in the Maidan or market place, "but the Persians soone made way, and the Portugals like so many sheepe tooke their heeles into their Castle." The Persians and English then occupied the City, and it was agreed between them that the English should bombard the galleons drawn up under the Castle from their ships and a battery on land, whilst the Persians were to attack the Castle from the City.

A full description of the siege of Ormuz from the Portuguese side is to be found on pp. 116-170 of this work, whilst the best contemporary English version—that of Monnox, who was present throughout—is printed in full for the first time in Appendix X., pp. 254 *et seq.* A careful comparison of these two sources will elucidate all the details of the operations, and it is unnecessary therefore to do here anything more than give a brief summary of the chief events of the siege.¹

The part played by the English was described by Weddell, Blyth and Monnox in a letter to the Company at Surat as follows. "Our endeavors, both from the shore with our ordinance and other stratagems of fire, hath beene cheefely to bring destruction to his armado, which one after another (blessed be God) wee have effected in such sorte that wee have scene the ruyne of

¹ For other contemporary English accounts see Foster, vol. 1622-3, pp. 76-78, and the narratives of Pinder and Wilson, printed in Purchas, vol. x., which work also contains an abridged copy of Monnox's journal of the siege. Purchas's version is only about half the length of the original, which therefore contains much new matter in Appendix X. of the present work. The most valuable Portuguese sources for the siege are the documents printed in Cordeiro's *Como se perdeu Ormuz*.