


Collected Writings of Ronald Dore

R. P. Dore

Collected Writings of Modern Western Scholars on Japan



COLLECTED WRITINGS OF RONALD DORE



Ronald Dore

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*The Collected Writings of Modern
Western Scholars on Japan
Vol. 8*

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COLLECTED WRITINGS OF RONALD DORE

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□ Introduction

THERE ARE OBVIOUSLY two ways of writing an introduction to a collection like this – the autobiographical or the topical, an exercise in ‘reflexive’ examination of what I think I’ve been up to, or an essay on Japan and how it has changed. That would be a real choice if only I had an uplifting and exciting autobiographical story to tell. Imagine how it might go: how I discovered, perhaps, Okakura’s *Book of Tea* in an uncle’s library at the age of five, or of how I was haunted throughout childhood by the image of a Sharaku print. How there grew from those beginnings a firm determination to spend my life studying this fascinating exotic culture, overcoming all obstacles, defying all attempts at dissuasion, in order to learn about, and finally get to, the land of my imaginings.

But, alas, the real story would just be a chapter of accidents: the luck of being in the right place at the right time when an enthusiastic English teacher came into the classroom a few months after Pearl Harbor, waving a piece of paper about special courses in exotic languages to prepare for military intelligence work. ‘You should apply for this Dore. Anthony Eden read Persian at Oxford and look where he’s ended up.’ The luck of being put on the Japanese course despite making Turkish my first choice (I did know where Turkey was on the map, and we had ‘done’ the Eastern Question at school). The luck of being so clumsy that when we were finally inducted into the army and were doing our basic training, I tripped over my rifle, injured a knee, went to hospital, got behind the draft and so was still available to be mobilized to teach expanded later courses when my chums had gone off to India. The luck of being introduced not just to the Japanese language, but also to Japanese sense and sensibility by splendid teachers, notably Frank and Otome Daniels. The luck of being able to take an external London BA in Japanese while seconded to the staff of the School of Oriental Studies with all the pedagogic authority of a sergeant-major. The luck of being given the perfect PhD subject, going on my demob leave to catalogue the W.G.Aston library in Cambridge and coming across his copy of

Hakuseki's account of his seventeenth-century education. The luck of being born in those happy days when the fact that I never got that PhD was no obstacle to getting a university job. The luck of being nudged into taking my dabblings in sociology seriously when I discovered that all the Language and Literature jobs that I had vaguely been aiming for were filled, and the only one left was one curiously titled 'Japanese Institutions'. The luck of belonging to the age when air travel was vastly expensive so that one went to Japan by boat, and having invested seven weeks in getting there tended to settle down for a while: hence the chance, in two trips in the 1950s, to spend over three bachelor years immersing myself in Japanese life. The luck of finding wonderfully didactic landladies, kindly academic mentors and fellow-students, girl friends with good accents.

And so it could go on. Perhaps a good transition from Dore talk to Japan talk would be to quote my first diary entry on arriving in Japan and having the chance to use in earnest the Japanese I had been learning for eight years:

23 March 1950. Landed at Kobe on the 21st. Wonderful sight, coming slowly into the harbour at dawn, despite the vast stretch of factory chimneys belching out smoke all the way up to Osaka. They are completely overtopped by the vast mountains behind the town, steep and hairy with firs, but lots of grassland which gives them a smooth texture and shows up at its best when the evening sun casts shadows over all the crevices and hollows. Even in the middle of the town you can't forget nature: it's there every time you look up. Tokyo very different.

It was the spring festival (*higan no chujitsu*) the day we arrived, and the streets were practically deserted. They were working the ship as soon as we dropped anchor, though. (One of the stevedores said 'ee' for 'ii'. I thought it was supposed to be only in Tokyo they did that.)

Festively decorated streets. At least, most – though not all of – the shops were flying a *hinomaru* and some other flag. Neighbourhood flag? Seemed to be different in each street, anyway. I gathered from a news broadcast that there was some sort of *Kokki Aigo Kai* (Society for the Protection and Promotion of the National Flag) holding meetings in Osaka. [Fifty years later and headmasters are still committing suicide, torn between obedience to a fly-the-flag law which conservative patriots have finally acquired the clout to enact, and the pressure of a residual teachers' union which sees the Rising Sun flag as a symbol of a long-since discarded, and wholly wicked, imperialism.]

Also heard on the wireless, a lovely cultured academic voice discussing Western painting from the neolithic cave drawings up to the Sistine Chapel,

Encounter with customs official. The typical 'Nip' of the wartime posters, goggle glasses, lots of teeth. We needed a 'Japan general' pass to replace our 'Kobe only' ones. I explained this in Japanese against his insistent desire to ask how many cigarettes and how much foreign money I had. I was cut short by: 'I speak English. You speak English please'. Which I did. Twice. 'All right. You can go'. 'Yes, but where?' 'Where?' 'Where do

I get the pass?’ It took about three more repetitions before the message got home.

Afternoon walk through Motomachi. Still some women brightly kimonoed for the festival, but most of the men – bits of ex-army uniform, scruffy cast-offs – clearly have not bought an item of clothing for years.

Today to Edmund Blunden’s farewell lecture at the Toodai. Place has a general air of unchecked dilapidation. The entrance to the main hall smelt and looked a bit like a country cattle market reserved for auctioning prize steers. Very pleasant and very skilled singing of English ballets and madrigals by a student choir organized by English teacher ex-Cambridge Madrigal Society. The Japanese sitting next to me had wonderfully good English. The best I’ve heard from any Japanese, I think. Ex-F.O. now in the Economic Stabilisation Agency (Kakitsubo??) He was not impressed by the fact that I know Japanese, not impressed by my interest in the country – almost ‘more fool me’. A very salutary experience. It made me realise that I generally have a feeling of condescension to the Japanese I talk to. Why? The fact that we often talk in English, perhaps, and therefore they are the ones at a disadvantage? But does it work the other way round when I speak in Japanese? We shall see. I noticed today, however, that I was talking in Japanese to a Professor on a footing of equality – or at least that was how it felt to me – which I certainly would not have felt had I, a young student, been talking to an English professor. Is it because of the universal deference of the Japanese which one takes at face value – which it is probably insulting to presume on, rather than giving the same deference back. Or do I have some sense of racial superiority acquired way way back?

To return to Kobe two days ago, in one corner of Motomachi there were groups of students from Kobe-daigaku gathering signatures for a petition to protest against the dismissal of a certain Professor Komatsu. Slogans like: ‘The hand of authority has no place in the world of learning’ I asked one of them who Prof. K was. He became all flushed and bothered and passed me on to another. Can I speak in Japanese? He cleared his throat, apparently about to speechify. I cut in with *amari muzukashii nihongo ja dame desu yo* (‘Not too difficult Japanese, please’) which flummoxed him completely and he simply gave me the pamphlet, a mimeographed sheet absolutely cluttered with characters. Strong emotions about the wickedness being done, but no explanation.

Redman said last night – a propos the ‘Can I speak in Japanese?’ – that you can speak to a Japanese in fluent Japanese and the fact won’t register. It is just another aspect of the Japanese feeling of separateness, when they are talking to an Englishman they are a representative of ‘we Japanese’. They will not criticise other Japanese as they would to a fellow Japanese, but they might apologise for having such a bad man among them. R attributed this to the long period of Tokugawa isolation. I said more likely to be the experience since Meiji brought the preoccupation with *bummei kaika* – civilization and enlightenment – and the need to catch up with the West. ‘We are behind. We must pull ourselves up to their standard. We must always show that we are gentlemen too.’

Thus, there had already surfaced in my first few days in Japan a number of the themes that, as some of the essays which follow show, I

have subsequently worried over like dog with bone, but never managed to pick clean, or, to change the metaphor, delved into but never got to the bottom of. I suppose ordinary life-cycle theory might have told me even in 1950 that I would gradually shift from scholarly analysis to polemics and punditry, and I suppose it was predictable that, like my friends among my septuagenarian Japanese contemporaries, I would today be scornful of the ways of the young. But I could hardly have imagined in concrete detail the sort of things that I would recently be writing on the 'catch-up' issue. For example, the following:¹

When I read Prime Minister Koizumi's first policy address to the Diet and was struck by the fact that he used the word *kaikaku* (reform) 36 times in the course of 25 minutes, I wrote a, perhaps somewhat mischievous, article for the *Financial Times* about Japanese 'reform fixation'. The word *kaikaku* as a kind of mantra, a word that guarantees your claim to be seriously public-spirited, and hence deserving of the public's confidence. It is a word rich in historical overtones. Take Mizuno Tadakuni's *Tenpō Reforms* of the 1840s. These, too, were supply-side reforms of the economy. By disbanding the 'convoy-system' (as Japanese scornfully call it today), of the officially licensed guilds, the *kabunakama*, Mizuno attempted to stimulate competition and so bring down prices and help impoverished samurai. Unfortunately, when the *kabunakama* were destroyed, the country's production and financial structures broke down, resulting in quite the opposite effect of that intended: Prices rose and the samurai became even poorer. After two or three years he had no alternative but to permit the revival of the *kabunakama*.

Reading all the recent discussion of structural reform, I have been struck by two points. First is the elementary one that what the Japanese economy is currently suffering from is insufficient total demand; it is not a supply-side problem. Second, most of the discussion confuses two different senses of 'structural reform'. On the one hand is reform of the industrial structure (rationalization of declining sectors, fostering growth sectors). On the other is structural reform of the economic system as such – cross share-holdings, corporate governance, long-term relational trading, the 'main bank' system, lifetime employment, and so forth: all those characteristics which differentiate Japanese from Anglo-Saxon capitalism that Noguchi Yukio called 'The 1940 system'.²

On the latter – reform of the Japanese 'way of doing business, running firms and doing deals' – it seems to me that differences on how much reform is needed arise not so much from differing perceptions of facts as from different value systems. Koizumi-style reform appears to have two distinct objectives, the validity of which is in dispute. One is to turn employee-favouring corporations into shareholder-favouring corporations, and thereby increase the stock market's role in the economy. The other is to shift from a bureaucracy-led economy to a market-led, politician-led economy.

1. The Japanese original from which this is extracted is in *Chuo Koron*, December 2001.
 2. In his *Yonjū-nen taisei* [The 1940 Setup] (Tokyo: *Toyo Keizai*, 1995)

The reader will have easily guessed that I think both are great mistakes. I can see that rates of dividend payments on shares will have to be raised. In future demographic trends almost certainly mean that capital gains will be smaller. The age of mild but steady asset inflation, which gave them those capital gains lasted for forty years after the war until it got out of hand in the bubble, but now that the population is hardly expanding, it is probably over. So the owners of capital may have to take a somewhat bigger share out of current production if they are to get a decent return on capital. But there is absolutely no reason why, just because of this, all the features of 'Japanese-style management' – job-guarantees in lifetime-careers, managers promoted from inside, insider control, indirect bank financing, all-employee enterprise unions, curbs on hostile takeovers, and so on – should be abandoned to reshape companies on the Anglo-Saxon pattern.

As regards the second objective, that of getting away from a bureaucracy-led economy, of course both the degree and the manner of government intervention need to be changed continuously in response to changes in the economic environment. But this does not necessarily mean reducing government to the bare minimum or privatizing everything. The current major practical issue here is the assault on the public corporations, most of which are run by retired bureaucrats. Probably about 30 per cent justifiable as appropriate and necessary reform in response to changes in circumstances over the years, but I suspect the remaining 70 per cent represents dogmatic belief in privatization plus 'bureaucracy bashing' on the part of envious politicians.

And in fact, all three of the pamphlets/books which Koizumi, the present Prime Minister, has written or had ghosted for him, have, as leitmotif, his hatred of bureaucrats. In some respects this politician with the bouffant hair-do and the love of rock music, the constant TV presence with an 80 per cent support rating and the jaw-jutting determination confidently to do something, though he knows not exactly what, is a long way from the 1955 politicians whose naïve election addresses, directed at an impoverished electorate, are analysed in this volume. But yet his struggle to consolidate democracy and destroy the pretensions of benevolent authoritarianism, has a long, long tradition. It starts with Itagaki's popular rights movement in the 1870s, through the formation of the first parties in the 1890s, and such highlights as the 1918 election of the 'people's premier' Hara Kei. It gathered pace, briefly, in the following decade of 'Taisho democracy' when Koizumi's own grandfather, the tattooed populist local builder, first established the Koizumi political dynasty. Then, after the disastrous interlude when the military cowed the civilian wing of the bureaucracy (often with the madly enthusiastic support of the politicians) the next signpost was Tanaka Kakuei becoming Prime Minister, an event whose election signalled the end of the ruling party's submission to the ex-bureaucrats – the Yoshidas and Ikedas and Satos and Ohiras who had made the facade of parliamentary government work since the war. It reached its most recent stage, two years ago, with the revolution in the parliamentary procedures for detailed

examination of legislation in committee. Whereas the bureaucrats had hitherto played the major role in explaining the intention of new laws, they were now banned from speaking: politicians are required to master their brief, or, to repeat in rapid and unhappy succession: 'I require notice of that question.' (I asked a jovial METI bureaucrat who was solemnly waffling about the need for political reform, what he had in mind. More of this kind of bureaucrat-excluding reform? He roared with embarrassed laughter. 'So what other reforms have there been?' He paused briefly before grinning: 'They've put the Diet on TV and they've expanded the "No Smoking" areas!')

It will be obvious from some of the essays in this book (notably the one from the *Tocqueville Review*) that it is benevolent autocracy that gets my vote, not democracy, even if I cannot think of any better way than elections for curbing the inevitable tendency of auto-bureaucrats to grow complacent and corrupt. On the whole, Japan's Sir Humphreys are as clever as ours, a bit less devious, but as genuinely concerned with the public interest as ours used to be before Mrs Thatcher shook them up with formulaistic performance pay and the notion that there was no such thing as society, only selfish individuals. And Japan's politicians are a good deal worse than ours, though I do remember some well-meaning members of the Socialist Party, back in the days of the '1955 system' when that party used to get a third of the votes and had settled down to a limited-veto-power sort of symbiosis with the ruling conservatives. Some of them had interesting biographies including prison before and during the war. Now the tiny dwindling rump of that party has been absorbed into an opposition which seems to contain more supporters of Koizumi's push for the Anglo-Saxonization of Japanese capitalism (see my rant above) than his own party. I can no longer pick my way through the baffling terrain of Japanese ideological politics.

Not that there's much genuine ideology about. The Koizumian reformers all claim to be in pragmatic pursuit of economic efficiency. If there is a claim to higher ideals at all it is to the patriotism of national competitiveness, or to slogans such as consumer sovereignty and personal responsibility. In fact, of course, there is a good deal of plain old class conflict underlying the attempt to shift from an economy shot through with relations of give-and-take cooperation, to one based on arms-length adversarial bargaining – as between shareholder and manager, bank and customer, assembler and sub-contractor, manager and worker. The younger breed of top managers wonder why their predecessors considered the minor perks and privileges of chauffeur-driven cars and lavish entertainment budgets to be adequate compensation for their modest salaries and suburban houses, when their American counterparts take their magnificent yachts and ranches for granted. The young economics professors with their PhDs from Chicago and Stanford are very different from their fathers and grandfathers, my contemporaries, of the first-generation professional middle-class. Grandpa, from a rural background,

barely managed to pay off the mortgage on a modest house by the time he died. Grandson has got substantial financial assets to manage: of course he doesn't demur when the corporate governance experts proclaim that, in 'true' capitalism, firms should be run exclusively for the benefit of shareholders, not their employees.

But class conflict needs two sides, and the competitive educational system, which so efficiently siphons off those with the best brains and the most energy for the positions of power, influence and affluence, makes sure that the people who are losing out from these changes do not find an effective voice. The polls show support for Koizumi even among the unemployed, even among the idle taxi-drivers and even (or especially) among the bar girls, whose income has been cut in half by the depression. It is only partly the fault of the reformers that the unemployed now number three-and-a-half million with another estimated four million discouraged workers who don't even look for a job because they know that jobs aren't there. ('Only partly' their fault because the Koizumian attacks on the pension system have a lot to do with the basic demand problem of excess saving.) But it is wholly their fault that they are concentrating so exclusively on the wrong problems; not trying to cure the deflationary spiral but making it worse by 'structural reforms' that will bring bankruptcy and worse deflation. They are operating for a non-existent cancer when the patient has flu.

That is partly because the American doctor says it's cancer. Only last week the Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs showed where his priorities lay when he sounded laid back about inevitable unemployment, while expressing extreme alarm about what 'the markets' would think of Moody's down-grading of Japan's sovereign debt. Perhaps that was because he had just been lectured by the Deputy Secretary of the US Treasury and the head of the Presidential Council of Economic Advisors who had come to Tokyo to tell them that that they must get on with clearing up the banks' bad loans. (Nothing whatever to do, of course, with the fact that when the banks do package up and sell off these loans at 15 per cent it seems to be almost exclusively the American vulture funds that are interested in buying them.) It is some consolation, for those of us who still see a lot of merit in the way Japan moderates competition, still has a decent welfare state and still runs firms as something like employee communities, that the apparently supine deference to American economic advice is mixed with a good deal of resentment which prevents the advice being followed. There is resentment, too, mixed in with the (more genuine) admiration for American military power, even if it has much less effect in making Japan hesitate about doing America's bidding. 'Deferent face and rebellious belly' is a phrase with a long history in China and Japan.

Not that there is a great deal of deference shown to anybody by the Chinese these days, and that fact will undoubtedly have a powerful effect in shaping Japan's next half-century. As for the last half-century during

which these essays were written, this curmudgeonly apology for a preface should not be allowed to obscure my gratitude to all those Japanese friends who have guided me to the right books, told me the crucially revealing stories, allowed me to steal their ideas, laughed me out of my wilder speculations, and in many other ways made an indispensable contribution to my enjoyment of Japan and to my ability to write what seems to me sense about it. And for all my regret that so many Japanese seem hell-bent on 'reforming' away many of those characteristics which for me made Japan such a decent society, thanks to those friends and to the warm responsiveness of the people one meets on the street, in restaurants, shops and offices – or at least most of them – I still greatly enjoy my visits there

Ronald Dore
Grizzana, 3 January 2002

Part I

Japanese Politics

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1 □ The Ethics of the New Japan

THE IMPERIAL RESCRIPT ON EDUCATION was probably the most widely known document of pre-war Japan. With its stress on those of the Confucian virtues – loyalty and filial piety – which the Japanese have traditionally chosen to emphasize, and on the infallibility of the Emperor as the source of all virtue, it provided a moral justification for the existing authoritarian social and political structure. Read on important school occasions in an atmosphere of great solemnity which gave it a scriptural sanctity, it was used, together with the ethics course¹ in the school curriculum, as a means of fostering the desired moral and political attitudes among the people. Indeed, after the initial heyday of utilitarianism in the 1870s, the moral training afforded by these means was generally held by Japanese educators and politicians alike to be the most important function of the national education system.

At the end of the war the ethics course was removed from the curriculum,² but the Imperial Rescript, though discreetly shut away in school safes and no longer read on ceremonial occasions, remained officially in force while the Occupation tried to reach a decision concerning the relative merits of having the Emperor issue a new, democratic rescript, abolishing the old one outright, or leaving it as it was.³ Japanese opinion was divided on the matter. In 1946 the Japanese Education Reform Council voted in favour of a proposal that the old Rescript should be replaced by something more in keeping with the spirit of the times, but the proposal was not carried into effect. At that time the present Minister of Education, Teiyu Amano, voted against the proposal and in favour of outright abolition of the Rescript.

Eventually, in June 1948, the Rescript was rescinded by a resolution of both Houses of the Diet, and although the Education Reform Council and other bodies have occasionally discussed the question of a substitute, none has been issued. Meanwhile, to replace the old ethics course, a

social-studies course has been introduced into the primary and secondary curricula on lines recommended by the American Educational Mission, covering the ground of the old history and geography courses as well as elementary economics and civics. At least a partial object of the decentralization of the educational system was to prevent any future use of the schools as a centrally-controlled vehicle of nationalist propaganda.

During the last year or two there has been an increasing demand for the restoration of specific moral instruction to the curriculum and for the formulation of a substitute for the old Rescript. Broadly speaking, three arguments have been used. First, there is the general argument that any national system of education should concern itself with moral instruction and that this is particularly so in Japan, where the moral implications of religious institutions are so slight. Further, it is argued, national unity and the smooth working of any political system require that everyone subscribe to certain basic moral assumptions. In Western society this is provided by the Christian tradition and the universal subscription to certain Christian ideals. In pre-war Japan it was provided by the Imperial Rescript, which formed the 'moral prop' of the nation (an oft-used phrase). The disappearance of the Rescript has left a vacuum which must be filled by a new formulation of a system in harmony both with those elements in Japan's tradition that need to be preserved and with the new democratic institutions of the post-war period.

Second, there is the specific argument that Japanese society is entering a period of moral degeneration characterized by the '*après-guerre* spirit', the 'misinterpretation of democracy', or 'the confusion of liberty with license'. The symptoms are the decline in general standards of honesty, the increase in crime and juvenile delinquency, gambling, street-walking, the revolt of the young against their parents, drug-taking, suicide, adolescent sex-crimes and messianic cults – of which the sensationalism of the Japanese press provides a constant supply of examples. The only way to stop the rot, it is suggested, is to restore moral instruction to the schools and, since these post-war phenomena are generally associated with the post-war ideology of democracy and freedom, the implication is that this moral instruction should take the form of a return to traditional Japanese values.

Third, there is the argument that the defeat has destroyed the pride of the mass of the people in their own country and that it is necessary to do something to restore a sense of patriotism. Often the qualification is added that a new definition of patriotism is required to distinguish it from a spirit of aggressive nationalism. The government has shown its concern with this question. In 1950 the Minister of Education made statements encouraging the singing of the national anthem and the flying of the Rising Sun on occasions of national importance. The monthly journals in that year were filled with articles concerning the 'new patriotism' and its relation to the old patriotism, to nationalism and to national sovereignty.

The discussions seem to have entered a new phase with the creation of the Auxiliary Police Reserve in August 1950, when right-wingers pointed out with concern, and left-wing writers with malice, that there was little value in an army which lacked a firm ideological basis to provide a fighting morale. In that month the Prime Minister summoned a meeting of the Bunkyo-shingikai (Culture Study Group), which he had established in the previous year to advise him on educational matters. This group comprised a small number of men of the type usually described in Japan as 'old liberalists':⁴ Nosei Abe, former Minister of Education and President of the Gakushuin University; Seiichiro Takahashi, former Minister of Education and Curator of the National Museum; Shinzo Koizumi, former President of Keio University; Tsunego Baba, former editor of *Yomiuri*; and Tetsuro Watsuji, emeritus professor of philosophy at Tokyo University. The meeting was called to study the question of the government affording the people leadership on the problem of patriotism, and a government announcement was foreshadowed for early September. Owing, apparently, to disagreement within the group over the policy to be pursued, and to opposition from outside to the whole idea of the government taking any action in this matter, the announcement was never made.

Opposition to the demand for a new formulation of a national ethic and for a reintroduction of moral instruction in schools has been strong in educational circles and has been concerned largely with noting the danger that such developments might again be used for nationalistic purposes. It has been an underlying premise of these arguments that, despite the decentralization of educational control, advice from the Ministry still tends to carry as much weight with the local authorities as did the directives of pre-war days. It has been argued that any prescription of private morality as by the rulers for the ruled is contrary to the spirit of democracy and that the ideals towards which the Japanese people must strive have been sufficiently formulated in the new Constitution. It is denied that rationally-held, explicit moral codes are in any society a chief determinant of behaviour, or that the Imperial Rescript ever acted, in fact, as the 'moral prop' of the nation. It is held that the best means of moral and civic training lies in the day-to-day contact between teacher and pupil, helped by such devices within the school as the 'Home Room' hour for the discussion of personal problems, and organizations for student self-government.

Rumours that the government was about to reintroduce a new ethics course grew until, on 8 February 1951, the Minister of Education announced that the government had decided against such a step and that its policy was to encourage the carrying on of moral training throughout the school activities. The government would, he said, issue a teacher's guide to moral training within the framework of the existing curriculum. Such a document was later drafted by a special committee established by the Ministry and seems to have gained wide acceptance.

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The question of specific moral instruction in schools was thus disposed of for the time being, but the question of a substitute for the Imperial Rescript remained. In September 1951, the Minister of Education told reporters that he was preparing a draft, for official publication and distribution to schools, of 'his personal views as Minister'. The anti-Rescript group thereupon began sharpening its swords.⁵ On 17 November *Yomiuri* published what purported to be a copy of this draft, entitled 'An Outline of Ethical Practice for the Japanese People'. This draft was reportedly being circulated among the Culture Study Group and Ministry of Education officials, and was to be published on the day of the promulgation of the Peace Treaty.⁶

Opposition, however, proved so strong that ten days later the Minister announced his decision not to proceed with publication of the document, which is, therefore, now of only historical interest. Nevertheless, a translation of it, together with a summary of the reactions which it provoked, may provide a useful indication of recent trends in political and educational thinking in Japan. Since, in a document of this sort, translation cannot always catch the emotional overtones of some of the terms employed, an attempt has been made in footnotes to indicate certain of the associations of key words which have a long history in Japanese thought.

AN OUTLINE OF ETHICAL PRACTICE FOR THE JAPANESE PEOPLE⁷ *Preamble*

In order that Japan may become a sovereign and independent nation,⁸ it is a fundamental necessity that the people should first awaken to the spirit of sovereignty and independence. This spirit can be realised only if the people firmly establishes its moral principles and energetically devotes itself to its task on a basis of morality.⁹

But what is this 'spirit of morality'? It means being aware of the dignity of one's own personality¹⁰ and letting nothing interfere with that awareness. It means living in a spirit of harmony¹¹ which, as well as one's own individual dignity, respects also the personality of others. Nations, too, must seek harmony, rather than being concerned solely with their own interests, and must recognize also the interests of other nations. In order that individuals may live in a spirit of justice and impartiality, the nation also must proceed with justice and impartiality. For the individual, justice and impartiality consist in giving his devoted service to the nation, and, conversely, for the nation, justice and impartiality consist in considering the interests of individuals, in giving its devoted service to the cause of mankind. To be aware of the dignity of one's own personality and at the same time to respect others is to give due importance to harmony. This is what morality is.

The spirit of justice and impartiality and of harmony is the foundation of morality and the fundamental spirit uniting the individual, the nation and mankind. Let us make sure that this spirit is kept vividly alive among our people.

Section I. The Individual

1. The dignity of the individual personality. Inasmuch as we are human beings, we cannot but recognize the dignity of the individual personality.
2. Freedom. The true essence of man lies in the fact that he is free. True freedom lies in not being the slave of instinctive animal self-indulgence or impulsive desires.
3. Righteousness. In all circumstances unrighteousness and lack of faith must be avoided. He who is ever righteous is the light of the world.
4. Responsibility. We must always bear responsibility, both to ourselves and to others. Without responsibility there can be no freedom.
5. Thought. In order to speak righteously one must think deeply. Deep thinking is different from wavering indecision.
6. Love. Consideration of the welfare of others with warmth in one's heart is the means of living a really human life.
7. Purity. It is important to be receptive to all that is wholesome. Let us keep pure hearts in pure bodies.
8. Endurance. We must always bear fortitude in our hearts. It is easy for men in adversity to fall into reckless despair, but the way of man lies in bearing up against adversity and in continuing to observe the principles of right conduct without banishing love from his heart.
9. Wisdom. We must try to obtain profound wisdom. Those whose wisdom is rich and profound are able to live their lives profoundly.

Section II. The Family

1. Husband and wife. Marriage is a beautiful moral relationship¹² which springs from the nature of man. Husbands must love their wives, and wives respect and love their husbands. It is easy to tire of marital love, but fidelity and respect can conquer this condition and bring the love of husband and wife to fulfilment.
2. Parents and children. Just as parents love and care for their children, so should children show dutiful regard for their parents. In order that they may give place to their children and allow them to create the succeeding age, parents have the responsibility for ensuring healthy growth for their budding lives. And since creation is impossible except on the basis of tradition, respect and love for parents is the happy duty¹³ of the child.
3. Brothers and sisters. Brothers and sisters should love and cooperate with one another. Affection between brothers and sisters is the basic pattern for just human relations in a just society.
4. Discipline. It is in the family that the education of the child is most directly achieved. Each child must be trained to fulfil his function in the family. Peace and order in the family depend on each member of it playing his part in full love and sincerity.¹⁴
5. Relations between families. Each family should strive to maintain peaceful relationships with other families and should not think solely of its own profit. Only in this way is a good society possible.

Section III. Society

1. Public opinion. We are social beings. In order to create a good society, we must listen with respect to the opinions of others. To pay due attention

to the opinions of others is not to be ready to follow any lead. Good public opinion can be created only if all maintain a spirit of integrity and possess powers of criticism.

2. Common sense. In order that society may progress, we must be prepared to abandon meaningless old customs and to live always anew. But this must not lead to the superficiality which is ever following the fashion of the moment. We must always judge with a healthy common sense, that we may contribute to the development of society.

3. Public spirit. The preservation of social order is the foundation of daily life.

4. Mutual aid. We must help one another with loving hearts. It is by mutual help among its members that society is bound into one.

5. The common welfare. We must work for the common welfare and not act in the interests of party or faction. When there is a conflict of interests, a solution must be sought in a spirit of harmony, with regard for the well-being of society as a whole. Struggles between conflicting interests must never be pushed so far that they involve the destruction of society itself.

6. Culture. A good society seeks the creation of a good culture. When a society forgets culture, it reverts to primitive barbarism. But if culture is thought of solely in its pleasure-giving aspect, society will fall into decadence.

Section IV. The State

1. The State. We must strive to preserve the independence and continuity of a firmly-founded State and to create a high level of culture. As a people we were all born in the same land, live our lives in the same land, share a common history, speak a common language. The State is the parent body of the individual; without the State there would be no individuals. It is wrong for the State to think of individuals solely as means to an end, and it is wrong for individuals to think of the State solely as a means to an end. The two are in a close and indivisible relationship.

2. Tradition and creation. This State has its own traditions, and if we are to create a new age, we must be firmly rooted in these traditions. Creation can take place only on the basis of tradition, and tradition can come alive only through creation.

3. The national culture. Each nation must create its own individual culture. When it has created a truly individual culture, then, and then only, can it create world culture also.

4. Patriotism. The fortunes¹⁵ of a country depend on the patriotism of its people. We are responsible for taking over the State from our forefathers and passing it on to our descendants. To create a good State is to make a contribution to the world. True patriotism is the same as love for humanity.

5. Politics. Politics must not be conducted in the interests of party or faction or class.¹⁶ When a clash of interests arises between class or party, a solution must be sought by mutual exchange of opinion, with full regard for the interests of the nation as a whole.

6. The Emperor. We possess an Emperor who is a symbol of the State, wherein lies the peculiar nature of our national polity.¹⁷ It is a special characteristic of our country that there has always been an Emperor throughout its long history. The position of the Emperor partakes of the

nature of a moral focus as the symbol of the State.

7. The ethics of the State. Morality is the lifeblood of the State. The State, in essence, is founded more deeply on its moral than on its political or economic character. The Emperor possesses an objective moral quality. Thus the position of the Emperor symbolizes the fundamental character of the State.

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Before considering the reactions provoked by the publication of the 'Outline', it may be of interest to add certain remarks concerning the document itself.

First of all, the document differs in many respects from anything which would have issued from the Ministry of Education before the war. Albeit in the vaguest terms, the individual is given his place in society and his duties are no longer summarized in terms of loyalty and filial piety or of correct behaviour in the traditional five human relationships of Confucianism. Stress is laid on the importance of international harmony and, in line with the 'We, the Japanese people . . .' with which the new Constitution begins, 'we' figures largely in these precepts in an attempt to give them the air of a communal affirmation of faith rather than of a codex legislated by rulers for the ruled. (The tone of the Preamble, however, is not without the traditional flavour.)

The document makes much use of vague terms. There is no indication, for instance, of what constitutes a good society in political or economic terms. A good culture is even less well defined, except that it lies somewhere between barbarism and decadence. What acts constitute 'unrighteousness' or 'self-indulgence' or 'respect'? Many of the precepts are of the nature more of slogans designed to attach positive emotional colour to certain words and phrases than of meaningful propositions or precise imperatives. The potentialities of such vagueness are, of course, obvious. Practically anything could be made of a document like this if it were used as teaching material in schools. Its purport would depend entirely on the type of illustrations which teachers gave of the virtues and concepts involved.

An attempt is made in some passages to bolster certain elements of the traditional structure of Japanese society against the threats of Western individualism and egalitarianism. The family is still the intermediate link between the individual and the State. Society is a collection not of individuals but of families. Husbands are not required to respect their wives, but only to love them. The phrase translated 'give place to their children' (II,2) immediately suggests to a Japanese the transfer of the headship of a family from father to son, and thus implies the traditional Japanese 'continuing family' type of structure. The basic pattern for social relationships is the relation between brothers and sisters – always a traditional theme of Japanese society.¹⁸ Though, at first sight, it may seem to be a principle of universalistic ethics, the type of relationships which it

suggests to the ordinary Japanese is not that motivated by universally diffused human kindness, nor is it the specific contractual relationship between equals typical of modern capitalist society. It is, rather, a through-thick-and-thin relationship of mutual indebtedness which knits together those bound by links of common interest or emotional identification against the outside world; it is sort of an in-group morality. Moreover, since age is still important as a criterion of status in Japanese society, the general notion of brother-and-sisterhood implies a relationship not between equals but between an (elder) superior and a (younger) inferior.

Another dominant theme is the emphasis on self-restraint and endurance. This is perhaps inevitable in view of the fact that the 'Outline' is partly a result of a demand for something to check the decline in moral standards as evidenced in the crime, gambling, vice and lavish spending which is so deplored in Japan today. One would not wish to doubt the sincerity of the Minister's motives, but it is not, perhaps, irrelevant to recall that the army used a similar moralistic appeal – for all decent Japanese to rally to the defence of traditional values against the decadence of urban bourgeois society – as a means of gaining popular support, particularly in the rural areas, when seeking control in the late 1920s and the 1930s. Particularly noticeable is the fact that freedom, in this scheme of things, is given no positive value and is characterized entirely in terms of restraint. One is reminded of the Hegelian idea of freedom as the right to obey the laws of the State; and that the similarity is not coincidental is suggested not only by the Minister's own personal background but also by the political philosophy which seems to underlie the whole document.

This, indeed, is its most disturbing aspect. In the section devoted to society, honourable mention is given to some of the notions which have figured largely in post-war democratization propaganda – public opinion, the common good, etc. – but it is not clear how society is related to the State. It is clear, however, what the State is in Mr Amano's scheme of things. It is a metaphysical entity which transcends the individual; it 'considers' the interest of individuals, and is capable of 'thinking' of individuals as tools. True, it is as wrong for the State to use individuals as means to an end as it is for individuals to use the State as a means to an end, but the statement 'without the State there are no individuals' has no reciprocal. The opposition of 'party and factional' interests to the interests of the whole, given this conception of the State and without any further definition of the interests of the whole in terms of the interests of the constituent individuals, leaves the door open to totalitarianism. The State is essentially moral in character rather than an organ for the resolution of conflicting political and economic interests, and it is this moral character which the Emperor symbolizes. What this means is anybody's guess, but would it be unfair to suppose that this political philosophy could be used only too easily to create a situation exactly similar to that of pre-war

Japan, when a dominant group could suppress 'party and factional' movements for social reform by appeal to a higher morality – the duty of loyalty to the Emperor? The higher morality in its new form would be the principle of morality itself, as exemplified in the transcendent State, as symbolized by the Emperor. It is also to be noted in this section that the claim to racial uniqueness as exemplified by the continuity of the Imperial family is back again, though a shadow of its former self.

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The 'Outline' received a hostile press. On 18 November 1951, the day after the publication of what it claimed was a copy of the draft 'Outline', *Yomiuri*¹⁹ assumed a derisive tone. The document, it declared, recalled the seventeen-point moral code of Shotoku-Taishi issued in 604, and the resemblance was made even more striking by the attempt to bolster up the Emperor system. Would it not have been easier to issue Shotoku-Taishi's code as it stood? The newspaper objected to the 'musts' and 'oughts', and suggested that, if the Minister of Education really thought that the State was moral in character, he should start by trying to infuse a little morality into the corrupt political life which went on around him.

On the following day *Yomiuri* drove the attack home with a leader entitled 'The Amano Outline: A Declaration of War on Democratisation'. It was not surprising, the writer asserted, to find in the work of a Kantian scholar many traces of German idealist philosophy, but the general form of the document, with its progression from the individual, through the family, to the State, reminded one most of all of the Confucian 'Greater Learning', while the final paragraphs were the very embodiment of the Confucian doctrine of the ruler and the State founded in morality, a doctrine which 'for millennia in China and for centuries in Japan has been a powerful instrument of popular oppression for the very reason that it bears no relation whatever to actualities'. The attack concentrated on the position given to the Emperor, and concluded: 'Here we are presented with what is, in fact, no more than a post-war edition of the Rescript on Education. If this revival of an anachronistic ideology, which in the past was fully exploited as a means of oppression at home and of aggression against our neighbours abroad, is not a declaration of war on democracy, what is it?' The leader also contained the following passage, all the more noteworthy for its appearance in the right-wing *Yomiuri*: 'What has this *a priori* idealism, for ever in pursuit of abstract concepts, to contribute to 'the practice' of living today, at a time when, in hand with the democratization of education, the emphasis of school education is being placed on understanding and adapting to society as it exists, and when social security has long ceased to be a mere idea and has become a 'practical problem?'

The position accorded the Emperor was again the chief point of criticism made by *Asahi* on 18 November. There would be no objection,

it wrote, if the Emperor were to be made the centre of the people's affections, but, 'whatever paragons we get as Emperors', to attribute to them an 'objective moral quality' is hardly a plausible idea and makes possible the misuse of the Emperor's position by ambitious politicians. The Emperor of this 'outline' and the Emperor of the Imperial Rescript on Education are not essentially very different. Apart from that, *Asahi* found the document 'as innocuous as distilled water – and as insipid'. The objection was to the linking of morality with the Emperor and to the idea of its being issued 'as from the Heavens above' in the name of a Minister. No one doubted the Minister's sincerity, but if he thought that these things needed saying, he should publish a pamphlet at his own expense.

In response to questions in the Upper House, the Minister confirmed that it was his intention to issue such a document as representing 'his private view as Minister', and reiterated his view that the Emperor was the 'moral focus' of the nation. As a result of opposition both in the Diet and among the public, the Education Committee of the Upper House on 26 November summoned nine witnesses to comment on (a) the document as issued in *Yomiuri*, and particularly the passages relating to the Emperor; (b) the propriety of its being issued as a personal statement by the Minister of Education; and (c) the moral state of the nation and the whole question of the necessity for such a measure. The witnesses included the Librarian of the National Diet Library and former Minister of Education, two head-teachers, three professors of Tokyo University, the president of an insurance company, and two representatives of educational bodies.²⁰ On the next day the Minister told reporters that, in view of the opposition which had been aroused, he would like to 'go back to the beginning and start thinking all over again' about the content and the timing and method of publication of the document. If public opinion proved to be against it, he would be prepared to abandon the plan altogether. He wanted more time to consider the matter.²¹

Writing in *Shukan Asahi* on 16 December, the Minister reiterated this decision and explained his motives in preparing the outline. He recalled that he had himself repeatedly opposed the creation of a substitute for the Rescript on Education because he objected in principle to the authoritarian legislation of private morality, and because he did not believe that memorized moral precepts had any effect on conduct. It was only after he had become Minister and had left the study for the world of politics that he had become aware of the widespread concern about moral standards and of the extent to which the discrediting of certain traditional values had, for some people, destroyed the validity of all traditional values. He had become convinced of the need for something, not to be learned by heart as the old Rescript had been, but for people to stop and think about and refer to in moments of crisis. It had been far from his intention to give orders to the people; he had merely thought that people would find his 'Outline' useful in filling a felt need. However, he was

prepared to bow to public opinion. He also explained the passage which he had affirmed in the Upper House, concerning the Emperor as the moral focus of the nation. He apologized, for not having made himself clear. What he had meant was that the Emperor was not a centre of power nor an object of worship; he was the object of affection. Now, affection was not political, not religious, not economic, not cultural; the only thing it could be was moral. It was in that sense that he had used the term: he meant a 'moral focus' and not a 'focus of morality'.

With the Minister's conciliatory withdrawal, a truce has been called in what one writer called 'the moral battle of Showa', but the issue is not dead. A leading article in *Tokyo Shimbun* on 30 November, while applauding the Minister's respect for public opinion, reaffirmed the need for something to halt the decline in moral standards and to restore a sense of patriotism (appropriate quotation here from Rudyard Kipling²²), and suggested the formation of a committee to consider the drafting of some sort of moral code, perhaps on the basis of that already drafted by the Minister. If such a document could be produced in consultation with a wide range of responsible opinion, there would be no objection to its publication even in the face of opposition. There was no reason for taking into account 'the sort of opposition which tends to come on these occasions from certain groups who wish thereby to get themselves labelled progressives'. It would be well to bear in mind also that, at the same time as he was under fire from the left for his 'Outline', Amano was being severely criticized also by right-wing politicians for his failure to make heads roll after the demonstration against the Emperor by students of Kyoto University. There were proposals, to which he showed himself sympathetic, that the Minister of Education should be given powers of control over the appointment of university presidents.

In view, however, of the publicity given to the tendency of the present Japanese government to 'put everything in reverse' one would prefer the emphasis of this report to lie on the opposition to the 'Outline' and its success. The controversy is, at least, an illustration of the fact that there can be no simple answer to the question: has democracy taken root in Japan? There is no indication in the Japanese press of what part, if any, the Occupation played in the affair; but, given the general climate of opinion in Japan today, there is no reason for doubting the sincerity of the opponents of anything which smacks of a return to 'the old Japan'. Whether they will hold their own or be overwhelmed by the march of events, only the future can decide.

NOTES

1. See Robert King Hall, *Shushin: The Ethics of a Defeated Nation*, New York, 1949.
2. An interesting description of the circumstances surrounding the abolition of the ethics course is given in Hall *op. cit.*, pp. 14-16.

3. See Robert King Hall, *Education for a New Japan*, New York, 1949, pp. 166-7.
4. A rather difficult category to define. The term seems to be used to denote a group of writers, bureaucrats and elder statesmen in the aristocratic rather than the popular tradition who were opposed, for a variety of reasons, to the militarists' policy in the 1930s. Perhaps the only unifying characteristic of this group is that its members believed, in the 'thirties', in the desirability of civilian control over the military.
5. See, for example, an article by Kenzo Nakajima and others in *Bungei Shunju*, December 1951.
6. The authenticity of the 'leak' was later confirmed by the Minister.
The Minister, Teiyu Amano, was until recently a popular headmaster of the First High School in Tokyo, a school with a traditionally liberal, if not radical, bias. He would come into the category of 'old liberalist' and was formerly best known as a Kantian philosopher. He has written many works on philosophy and ethics, including some recent popular ethical treatises. He is not a member of the Liberal Party, and first entered politics at the time of his appointment in May 1950.
7. *Kokumin jissen yoryo*: literally, 'outline for putting into practice by the people'. The Minister later explained as the reason for his choice of the title that he wished to stress that it was not, like the old Rescript, something only to be memorized and to bear no relation to conduct. He confessed that he did not much like the title, but all of the other suitable titles he could think of he had already used for his own books. (*Shukan Asahi*, 16 December 1951.)
8. *Kokka*: In ordinary Japanese no distinction is made between the nation as a group of people and the state as an institution of government; both are rendered by the word *kokka*. Perhaps this usage is a reflection of the German metaphysical theories of the State which have been dominant in Japan since the Meiji period, when this term came into common use. The ambiguity of the term becomes important in such phrases as 'the individual should give his devoted service to the *kokka*'. In this translation 'state' has been generally used, but 'nation' where the context seems to demand it.
Two other words can sometimes be translated 'nation' though neither is systematically used in contradistinction to *kokka* as the State. They are *kokumin*, the word employed in the title, which, however, corresponds more closely to the 'people' as opposed to the government; and *minzoku* (not used in this document), which has the basic meaning 'race' and, with its implied stress on the biological uniqueness of the Japanese people, a high emotional content.
9. *Dogi*: Three terms are used for 'morality' or 'morals': *dogi*, which is used throughout the Preamble and again in the final section, has traditional Confucian associations; *dotoku*, which is used twice at the end, is a more common word and has largely lost its Confucian associations, owing to its use as a translation of 'morality' in Western philosophical writings; *rinri*, which occurs once, in the title of Section IV, 7, corresponds fairly exactly to 'ethics' as a consistent, philosophically-derived moral system.
10. *Jiko no jinkaku no songen ni mezameru*: The meaning of this is extremely obscure – literally, 'awaken to the dignity of one's own character'. *Jinkaku* is normally used in the sense of 'character' as in 'a man of character'. This passage seems to be an obfuscation of the idea expressed in the Constitution: 'everyone shall be respected as an individual'.
11. *Wa*: This, as an independent word, is generally used in Confucian contexts – e.g., *fufu no wa*, the Confucian ideal of marital harmony.
12. *Jinrin-kankei*. *Jinrin* is the Confucian term for the five basic moral relationships (master-servant, parent-child, husband-wife, elder brother-younger brother, friend and friend) and has practically no use outside of these contexts.
13. *Gimu*: This is a very solemn word, by contrast to which the 'responsibility' (*sekinin*) laid on the parent is rather less onerous.
14. *Makoto*: The central concept of Shinto ethics as elaborated by Kamo no Mabuchi in the eighteenth century. For an exposition of *makoto* as the core of the national spirit, see Robert King Hall, *Kokutai no Hongi*, Cambridge, Mass., 1949) pp. 100-102.
15. *Kobo*: 'Rise or fall', with primarily military associations.

16. *Mibun*: This, rather than 'class' means something more akin to 'place', 'status', 'station' (to which it has pleased God, etc.). It is the word traditionally used for class status in the feudal period and largely retains those associations.

17. *Kokutai*: A central concept of the pre-war nationalistic metaphysics. Some of the properties of *kokutai* (variously translated 'national ethos', 'national entity', 'national polity', 'structure of the State', etc.) are that the position of the Emperor is of central importance to it, that it is sacrosanct and valid for all time, and that only Japan has it. See Hall, *Kokutai no Hongi*, cited, *passim*.

18. A useful short account of some of its consequences is given in T. Kawashima, *Nihon-shakai no kazokuteki kosei* (The Familial Structure of Japanese Society), Tokyo, 1948.

19. The particular virulence of *Yomiuri*, which has recently tended to the extreme right wing, is an illustration of the vagaries of newspaper politics in Japan. The background of the 'leak' and the policy of *Yomiuri* should make an interesting story in view of the fact that Tsunego Baba, a former editor and still, apparently, a powerful influence in *Yomiuri*, is a member of the Culture Study Group. One cannot avoid the suspicion that personalities may be involved as much as principles.

20. Only the president of the insurance company, Ichiro Yano, expressed sympathy with the views in question, and even he thought that the 'Outline' would not be most effective if published as planned. 'Some people might think it totalitarian, and then it would have the opposite effect to that intended.' It would be better published privately, he said. (*Asahi*, evening edition, 26 November 1951.)

Both of the head-teachers were opposed in principle to the publication of such a document. Akira Noguchi, president of the Secondary School Headmasters' Association and a member of the drafting committee of the Ministry of Education's 'Teacher's Handbook on Moral Training', said that the policy of moral training in schools as conceived in the 'Handbook' was based on the creation of positive independent individuals who were capable of evolving their own morality and of making their own contribution to a democratic society. The Minister of Education wished to create a mould into which everyone should be forced to fit. (*Ibid.*)

All of the witnesses except Yano objected to the Emperor's position as the moral focus of the State. Noguchi called it 'the first step towards deification of the Emperor'. (*Ibid.*) Tokujiro Kanamori, Librarian of the National Diet Library, was reported as having said: 'According to the Constitution, the Emperor exercises only those powers which are invested in him by the will of the people; according to this, the Emperor is the embodiment of morality whom the people have only to revere, or his pronouncements are invested with a moral authority which the people have only to obey. Empirically speaking, it does seem that the Emperor is the centre of the affections of the vast majority of the people of this country. But this is a fact; it is not a norm.' He objected also to the statement that the State is the parent body of the individual as tending to deny 'the essential existence of the individual'. (*Mainichi*, evening edition, 26 November 1951.)

Mataichi Kido, professor of journalism at Tokyo University, said that the basic problem of morality was political. Until there is political and economic stability, there can be no improvement in moral standards, and a moral code in the form of imperatives would have no effect whatsoever. (*Asahi*, evening edition, 26 November 1951.)

Several of the witnesses found the last two paragraphs incomprehensible, and all protested against the proposal that the document should be published as the personal view of the Minister of Education and yet be issued through government channels.

21. *Asahi*, evening edition, 27 November 1951.

22. It is a common feature of discussions concerning the value of tradition, royalty, patriotism, or ceremonial in Japan for an advocate of anything which might be construed as 'anti-democratic' to point to an English example and thus to show that he is really on the side of the angels.

2 □ Japanese Election Candidates in 1955

THE YEAR 1955 saw, with the merger of the Liberal and Democratic Parties and the reunification of the two wings of the divided Socialist Party, a new polarization of political forces in Japan. It is thus opportune to consider what constitutes the 'leftness' of the Left and the 'rightness' of the Right in Japanese Politics. The following article, while, by no means an exhaustive review of the character of Japanese political divisions, seeks to shed some light on them by a study of the way in which the candidates of the five main parties engaged in the general election of February 1955 presented themselves and the issues involved to the electorate.

Electoral speeches in Japan are distributed not by the candidates themselves but by the Electoral Administration Committee of each constituency on a single sheet giving equal space to each candidate. It is one of the hazards of political life in Japan that such addresses are easily collected and collated and a reduced size volume containing the election addresses of all candidates engaged in the 1955 election has recently been published in Tokyo.¹ It provides fascinating reading and useful material for the student of Japanese politics.

The accompanying table shows the main results of a statistical analysis of the election addresses of all Communist, Left-wing and Right-wing Socialist candidates, a half of the more numerous Liberal Party candidates and three-sevenths of the candidates of the Democratic Party. It thus excludes from consideration some of the more extravagant and colourful independents and one-man parties such as the bearded proponent of 'Restoration of Imperial Rule – Formation of an Imperial Army' or the founder and sole candidate of the Constitutional National and Industrial Reconstruction Imperial Subjects' Party (a geisha-restaurant proprietor in favour of birth control and the abolition of the geisha-restaurant tax). Since these appear to have made little impression on the electorate (both of those mentioned received less than one half of

one per cent of the votes cast in their constituencies), something may be lost in the way of local colour but little of any practical significance.

Japanese Election Candidates in 1955

	Liberals	Democrats	Right-wing Socialists	Left-wing Socialists	Communists
No. of candidates studied	124	122	122	121	97
1. Average age	49	52	46	45	41
2. Education	%	%	%	%	%
Elementary	1	3	10	8	5
Secondary	15	16	19	36	25
University	74	78	57	48	35
Not reported	10	3	14	9	35
Language; percentage of candidates using:	%	%	%	%	%
3. Colloquial verbal forms	8	12	20	31	28
4. 3 or more 'Chinese' adjectives	12	5	3	1	0
Content; percentage of candidates referring to:	%	%	%	%	%
5. A personal 'benefactor'	6	4	6	0	0
6. Money grants and legislation of purely local interest	52	39	18	18	22
7. Danger of war	3	13	24	30	60
8. Atom bombs	6	7	28	36	76
9. Danger of Communist revolution	13	8	7	0	0
10. Rearmament	35	42	88	96	100
11. America	30	39	63	84	100
12. Constitutional revision	31	30	80	86	88
13. State economic planning (favourably)	31	44	39	34	7
14. Increased loan facilities	64	46	75	42	8
15. Decreased taxation	76	58	72	54	21
16. Social services	90	80	92	84	36
17. Specifically war pensions only	6	7	0	0	0
18. Insurance for non-employees	12	8	45	50	2
19. Proportion of space devoted to foreign policy	% 8	% 9	% 10	% 14	% 31
20. Index of party consistency	66	56	56	59	78
21. Frequency per candidate of use of words:					
Stability (<i>antei</i>)	2.0	1.6	2.2	1.1	1.0
Japan	2.6	2.5	2.8	3.8	4.9
Fatherland (<i>sokoku</i>)	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4
Democracy, democratic (<i>minshu-shugi, -teki</i>)	0.6	1.1	1.4	1.3	2.8
Independence (<i>dokuritsu</i>)	0.9	1.4	1.1	1.3	3.7
Race (<i>minzoku</i>)	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	1.1
Peace (<i>heiwa</i>)	0.6	1.2	2.5	4.3	6.5

One who is used to modern British election addresses is immediately struck in many of these documents by the differing conventions governing the appeal for votes in the two countries. There are, of course, many addresses which in content and manner differ in no way from those now usual in Britain. There is the quiet, sweetly reasonable approach, the alarmist approach summoning up visions of economic collapse, atomic warfare or Communist revolution, the almost aggressive 'you've-only-yourself-to-blame-we-told-you-so' approach, the moral approach appealing to symbols of justice and human dignity, the indignant approach (which, in this case, found plenty of material for outraged feelings in the political scandals of the last months of the Yoshida government). But the more traditionally Japanese candidate, particularly in agricultural constituencies, reveals the political conventions of a different culture. He describes himself with a modesty so exaggerated as to leave no doubt that he is obeying a polite convention (the most usual formula for referring to a previous electoral defeat is to ascribe it to the 'lack of virtue' of the candidate himself which betrayed the earnest hopes of his mass of loyal supporters) and concludes by begging 'earnestly and humbly' for the 'favour' of the elector's vote. I recall a candidate in a rural constituency who, at the conclusion of his speech at an election meeting emphasized the humility of his appeal by falling to his knees and making the most abject of forehead-to-the-ground bows to his audience. Such candidates appeal to the emotions of their electors not primarily by arousing 'party' political passions but on an entirely personal basis. They are asking the 'favour' of the voter's support in a hard fight (many emphasize the closeness of their chances, one with a Churchillian reference to the 'blood, tears and sweat' of his campaign) which will determine whether they personally will gain the honour of victory or suffer the 'shame' of defeat. One goes so far as to summon up a picture of his aged mother, whose sole wish is to die in the knowledge that her son's virtue has been recognized.

This rather innocent acknowledgement of personal ambition, now considered 'bad form' in British politics, recurs at all levels of Japanese political life. The Minister of Justice in the present Cabinet, a candidate for office on many previous occasions who had never hitherto quite made the grade, recently expressed his pleasure at his appointment in a radio interview. He felt, he said, like a wrestler who after many years of being runner-up had at last won the championship title. In elections, particularly in agricultural districts, this approach does not seem to operate to the candidate's disadvantage. The humility creates a good impression and the appeal for a vote as a personal favour touches off a reaction of sympathetic generosity. The distribution of money by such a candidate through his network of local 'powerful men', despite the gradual progress of a new ethic (with the backing of all the organs of public opinion) which condemns such practices as corrupt, still fits into this context as an indication of the 'sincerity' of the candidate, an earnest

that he is not a man so lacking in a due sense of obligation as to give nothing in return for the expected personal favour. It is the persistence of this ethic according a positive moral value to the proper exchange of personal favours which makes bribery still effective despite the secrecy of the ballot.

This form of appeal, though not easily susceptible to clear definition for counting purposes, appears to predominate in the addresses of conservative candidates. Another related feature which can be more easily dealt with is reference to the candidate's 'benefactor'. Often the purpose is to emphasize the candidate's intimacy with senior political leaders; often the benefactor is the retired local politician whose *jiban* (his network of vote-organizing personal connections) the new candidate is taking over. The term used (*ihatsu wo tsugu*) in these addresses for taking over a *jiban* is borrowed from the Buddhist Church and means, etymologically, taking over the 'robes and begging bowl' of the previous candidate. In any case, as well as claiming a share in someone else's larger halo, this device also appeals to the voter's sense of values by emphasizing the candidate's 'uprightness' as a man who is mindful of personal obligations. As the accompanying Table (item 5) shows, mentions of such benefactors appear more frequently in the addresses of right-wing candidates.

An attempt was made to secure two statistical indices of the style in which the address was written. Item 4 in the Table was intended as a measure of what might be called pomposity. It shows the proportion of candidates in each of the parties whose address contained three or more 'high-flown' Chinese adjectives of the *zetsudai naru* type – adjectives which have a literary or an oratorical flavour and can be used more effectively to impress an audience with a sense of the dignity or the depth of feeling of the user than to convey precise ideas. Such adjectives are used more sparingly by left-wing candidates. The second index (item 3) shows the proportion of candidates of each party using colloquial verb endings (*desu*) rather than the literary or speech-making forms (*de aru* or *de arimasu*). Colloquial forms convey the familiarity of the personal chat, the literary forms the more formal dignity of the platform manner. Conservative candidates more often prefer the latter, but it is worth noting that in all parties colloquial forms are used more often by younger than by older candidates. Curiously, the success rate of candidates using colloquial forms (44 per cent) is lower than that of candidates who adopt a more formal approach (50 per cent). The difference does not quite reach the level of 'statistical significance' but (except for Liberal candidates among whom the 'colloquial' group was very small) it holds for the candidates of each party separately as well as for all candidates taken together, and this suggests that it is due to more than mere chance. The familiar fireside approach would appear to be not very effective in Japan. The electorate prefers its politicians to maintain a certain aloofness consonant with their position as leaders of the nation.

A word may be interpolated here concerning the candidates themselves. As might be expected, the average left-wing candidate is more youthful than his right-wing opponent. There is, however, no clear tendency in any party for older candidates to be more successful, a somewhat surprising fact in a country where Confucian respect for elders is still an important principle of social organization. In the Liberal Party, indeed, the chances of election were markedly better for younger than for older candidates, possibly because of the special circumstance that younger party members (being less likely to have held office) were less identified with the corruption which brought about the downfall of Yoshida's Liberal government. The success rate, generally, is lowest among candidates aged 50-60 – men whose formative political years came in the period of the thirties when militarism was at its height and parliamentarism at its lowest ebb. The data on educational records are incomplete, but they suggest that the number of 'self-made men' in the right-wing parties is small. It is natural that the 'worker's parties' should contain a higher proportion of men with only elementary or middle-school education, but the fact presents an interesting contrast with the findings of public opinion surveys which indicate that there is a higher proportion of Socialist Party supporters among university graduates than among those who have received only elementary school education.

Some facts revealed by statistical analysis of the policy content of the election addresses are worth attention. The important role played by foreign affairs in the 1955 election was a subject of frequent comment. It is reflected in the fact that candidates on an average devoted some 10 per cent of the space allotted to them to foreign policy issues, a proportion which was only about 1 per cent lower in predominantly agricultural constituencies. The official policy of the Democratic party at the election was almost as critical as that of the Socialists of the 'one-sided dependence on America' of the former Liberal Government and it was party central strategy to make the promise to establish normal diplomatic relations with Russia a prominent issue in the campaign. (Hatoyama himself devoted nearly a half of his election address to foreign policy.) That Hatoyama did not entirely carry his party with him is indicated by the fact that Democratic candidates were rather more reluctant to give emphasis to these views than, say, Left-wing Socialists were to air their own more clearly neutralist views (item 19). It is also perhaps significant that references to America are more common among her enemies than among her friends (item 11).

The figures for the proportion of candidates referring to rearmament and the related issue of Constitutional reform (items 10 and 12) show clearly that conservative parties were less confident about the vote-getting attractions of their advocacy of these measures than left-wing parties were in the value of their opposition to them.

Promises of reduced taxes came, as between the two conservative parties, more frequently from Liberal candidates who could expect to be

the future Opposition party than from Democratic candidates who had every prospect of forming a Government (item 15). As between the two Socialist Parties the candidates of the Left-wing seemed more conscious than those of the Right that expansion of the social services and other elements of the Socialist parties joint programme would probably not be compatible with reduced taxation.

In its highest proportion of promises of improved loan facilities for businessmen the Right-wing Socialist Party revealed one direction in which it hoped to gain new supporters (item 14). In the matter of social services (item 16) all parties displayed an approximately equal enthusiasm, though there were more Socialists who specifically advocated an extension of the present schemes covering employees only to all sections of the community (item 18), and a few members of conservative parties who mentioned specifically only war pensions (item 17). On this, as on other issues, the Communists showed themselves somewhat indifferent to attempts to paper over the 'inherent contradictions' in the present capitalist regime. Japanese Communists tend to be purists.

An Englishman accustomed to thinking of the opposition between 'state control' and 'free enterprise' as basic to any definition of Right and Left can find in the figures for item 13 an instructive lesson in the difference between a country whose industrial revolution took place in a period when *laissez-faire* liberalism dominated political thinking and one in which the State has taken the lead in the development of industry. Phrases such as 'industrial reconstruction under State planning' and 'planned State development of home resources' occur with almost equal frequency in the addresses of all (except the Communist) parties. In the matter of agricultural policy there is little difference between the parties: higher agricultural prices, cheaper fertilisers, better loan organizations, less taxation appear with roughly equal frequency. Apart from the demand by a fifth of the Left-wing Socialist candidates for the redistribution of forest land and a last dying plea by a solitary candidate for compensation to be given to landlords dispossessed by the American-inspired land reform, land ownership and tenancy has, since reform took place, ceased to be an issue – a very important difference between pre-war and post-war Japan.

As an index of party consistency or party discipline a scale was devised using the percentage of each party who referred to each of twenty-five selected issues (item 20). The scale is such that a score of 100 by any party would indicate absolute consistency – candidates of that party either unanimously mentioned or unanimously refrained from mentioning each of the issues selected. A score of zero would mean that for each issue the candidates of that party were equally divided between those who did and those who did not refer to it. By this measure the Communist Party, not unnaturally, reveals itself as most faithful to a party line. There is little to choose between the other parties in this respect; the apparently greater discipline of the Liberal Party would appear to be due to a consistent

tendency to *refrain* from mentioning policy issues at all.

Another method of analysis adopted was to count the occurrence of certain words which have heavily laden emotional connotations in the political atmosphere of present-day Japan. The pre-war symbols – ‘imperial’, ‘national polity’, ‘spiritual’ – sound today like echoes from remote antiquity, revived only by the crankish fringe of the Right who lose their election deposits willingly in the pursuit of lost causes. Politicians who wish to get elected have had to change over to the new currency of ‘democracy’, ‘freedom’ and ‘individual rights’. Even ex-Admiral Zenshiro Hoshina, whose election was noted with alarm by those still fearful of a return to the pre-war regime, headlined himself as in favour of ‘World Peace in Democracy and Freedom’. There is, in fact, little to choose between the major parties in the frequency with which their candidates use the word ‘democracy’ or ‘democratic’, although it still seems to come less easily to the lips of the Liberals, and is used with considerably greater abandon by the Communists. Of those ‘hurrah-words’ which most closely relate to the evocation of nationalist feeling ‘Japan’, ‘independence’ and *minzoku* (which has sometimes to be translated ‘race’ and sometimes ‘nation’, as in ‘Asiatic nationalism’) are all used with much greater frequency by the Left, particularly by the Communists for whom ‘racial independence’ is a central anti-American slogan. (‘Japan’ is not perhaps a fair test since its frequency in part simply reflects the emphasis placed on foreign policy issues, though this in itself, of course, is, in large measure a reflection of the appeal made to nationalist sentiment.) One word, ‘fatherland’ (*sokoku*) still provides common ground for nationalist sentiment on the right and on the left, being used most by Liberals and Communists and less by parties in between. ‘Peace’, though not exactly a rude word to the Right, is very much a monopoly of the Communist Party. The only word counted which is clearly used more by the Right than by the Left is ‘stability’ or ‘stabilization’ (*antei*), a final reassurance for the discouraged that there are perhaps some elements in the definition of ‘conservatism’ common to all political situations.

Perhaps the most interesting way of looking at these figures is to consider them in the light of the party mergers which have taken place since the elections were held. What indications do they give of the compatibility of the partners in the marriages which have been arranged? On some of the items listed the Democratic Party is slightly closer to the Socialists than the Liberals. But of the ten counts on which the difference reaches the level of ‘statistical significance’ all except three can be explained in terms of the fact that the Liberals were the former, and the Democrats the prospective, Government party. The Liberals had more to boast of in the matter of local legislation benefiting their constituents (item 6); the Democrats could not afford to be so lavish with promises of social benefits (items 14 to 16) and the Democrats were using ‘satellite foreign policy’ as a stick to beat the Liberals (item 7 and the words ‘independence’ and ‘peace’). There is not much to suggest any

fundamental differences between the policy or character of the parties or the outlook of their members which should threaten the unity of the new Liberal-Democratic Party. The threat comes rather from factionalism based on personal rivalries and loyalties.

The story is different in the case of the Socialist Parties, however. During this election the two parties, having both pledged themselves to eventual reunification, fought on an agreed common platform. Nevertheless, in many respects the Right-wing Socialists occupy an intermediate position between the Left-wing and the conservative parties. In fact, if those items (14 to 16) are discounted in which the Right-wing Socialists show themselves closer to the Liberal Party than are the Democrats, the indices shown in the table discriminate the Right-wing Socialists from their Left-wing fellows slightly more frequently than from the Democrats, though still not as frequently as the Left-wing Socialists are discriminated from the Communists.

These rough statistical indicators do not, of course, tell anything like the whole story of Japanese political alignments, but they are enough to raise doubts as to whether the forces of the Left in Japan have yet grouped themselves in any very lasting form.

NOTES

1. Kokkai Shiryo Kyokai (ed.), *Zenkoku Sōsenkyo Kōhō Shuroku*, Tokyo: Gihodo, 1955.

3 □ Elitism and Democracy

THE EAST IS HAVING AN IMPACT on the West. No sooner has the great ideological divide between capitalism and socialism evaporated with the collapse of the controlled economies of Easter Europe, than a new debate arises about the conflict between different kinds of capitalism. In the World Bank and the IMF, Japanese delegates protest at the way in which developing countries and the ex-Communist countries are being required to conform to American notions of capitalist efficiency – as described and prescribed by neo-classical economists, a tribe within which Americans predominate.¹ There is, Japanese representatives in these bodies are beginning to say, an ‘East Asian model of economic development’ – a more collectivist and less individualistic model in which the state plays a not-insignificant role – which amounts to a different form of capitalism.

The conflict/contrast/competition between different kinds of capitalism is, indeed, rapidly becoming a popular theme. The *Nikkei* publishes articles about it by leading Todai professors and senior Finance Ministry bureaucrats.² The American Aspen Institute has organized a conference on it. Michel Albert, a leading French planner-turned-insurance-director, has written a book (*Capitalisme contre capitalisme*³) about it.

There is no doubt that the East Asian model is going to have an impact on the way Western countries seek to run their economy, though before one equates this with the spread of Confucian influence, remember that Germany, the prime subject of Albert’s book, is also counted, along with Japan, as one of the most prominent examples of a successful and at the same time more collectivist and more public-interest-sensitive form of capitalism.

And if East Asia is going to affect the way the West thinks about the economy, might it not affect, also, the way it thinks about democracy?