

JUDGING LYOTARD

edited by
ANDREW BENJAMIN



**WARWICK STUDIES IN
PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE**
EDITED BY ANDREW BENJAMIN

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JUDGING LYOTARD

Best known for his book *The Postmodern Condition*, Jean-François Lyotard is one of the leading figures in contemporary French philosophy. This is the first collection of articles to offer an estimation and critique of his work.

While the various chapters deal with different aspects of Lyotard's writings, they are all concerned with the question of judgement. The importance to Lyotard of judgement, and how it is itself to be judged, is a recurrent theme throughout the entire range of his work. It is perfectly evident in his continuing engagement with the work of Kant. Lyotard's own essay, '*Sensus communis*', which opens this volume, investigates through Kant the presuppositions of judgement. Other essays variously consider how in his writings Lyotard has rendered problematic existing forms of aesthetic, ethical, legal and political judgement.

Judging Lyotard is an important collection that will reintroduce Lyotard to English-speaking audiences. It is of particular interest to students of philosophy, critical theory and literary studies.

Andrew Benjamin is the general editor of the Warwick Studies in Philosophy and Literature. He is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Warwick. His books include *Art, Mimesis and the Avant-Garde* and *Translation and the Nature of Philosophy*, which are also published by Routledge.

WARWICK STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE

General Editor: Andrew Benjamin

It used to be a commonplace to insist on the elimination of the 'literary' dimension from philosophy. This was particularly true for a philosophical tradition inspired by the possibilities of formalization and by the success of the natural sciences. And yet even in the most rigorous instances of such philosophy we find demands for 'clarity', for 'tight' argument, and distinctions between 'strong' and 'weak' proofs which call out for a rhetorical reading. Equally, modern literary theory is increasingly looking to philosophy (and other theoretical disciplines) for its inspiration. After a wave of structuralist analysis, the growing influence of deconstructive and hermeneutic reading continues to bear witness to this. While philosophy and literature cannot be seen as subsidiaries of each other, even if philosophy is thought of as 'a kind of writing', much of the most exciting theoretical work being done today exploits their tensions and intertwinings.

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CONTENTS

<i>Notes on contributors</i>	vii
INTRODUCTION <i>Andrew Benjamin</i>	ix
1 <i>SENSUS COMMUNIS</i> <i>Jean-François Lyotard</i>	1
2 LYOTARD AND THE PROBLEM OF JUSTICE <i>Anne Barron</i>	26
3 ON THE CRITICAL 'POST': LYOTARD'S AGITATED JUDGEMENT <i>Richard Beardsworth</i>	43
4 THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION: REFLECTIONS ON LYOTARD'S <i>THE POSTMODERN CONDITION</i> <i>John Keane</i>	81
5 HABERMAS vs LYOTARD: MODERNITY vs POSTMODERNITY? <i>Emilia Steuerman</i>	99
6 THE POSTMODERN KANTIANISM OF ARENDT AND LYOTARD <i>David Ingram</i>	119
7 'CES PETITS DIFFÉRENDS': LYOTARD AND HORACE <i>Geoffrey Bennington</i>	145

CONTENTS

8	PAGANS, PERVERTS OR PRIMITIVES? EXPERIMENTAL JUSTICE IN THE EMPIRE OF CAPITAL	168
	<i>Bill Readings</i>	
9	<i>LES IMMATÉRIELLES</i> AND THE POSTMODERN SUBLIME	192
	<i>Paul Crowther</i>	
	<i>Index</i>	206

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INTRODUCTION

Andrew Benjamin

These essays attempt to set out the stakes of judgement. They are to that extent already a judgement. However, with the work of Jean-François Lyotard the specificity of judgement—its sense and its dictate—is itself opened up to philosophical adjudication. It is thus that Lyotard's own text, '*Sensus communis*', continues his attempt to articulate his own philosophy via a systematic engagement with Kant. Here it takes the form of an investigation of the site and the presuppositions of judgement. The status of the community and the nature of judgement figure, in a different way, in the chapters to come.¹

Part of the strategy of the papers collected here is to sanction the rehearsal of *différends*. The rehearsal involves their display. Time and again the confrontations and strategies marked out by the proper names, Lyotard, Habermas, Rawls or those implicated in the 'topics' (perhaps *topoi*) of postmodernism, liberalism, democracy, sublime, and *différend*, are presented and repeated. It goes without saying that these presentations resist neutrality. However, more is involved here than the absence of an assessment seeking its ground in an illusory objectivity. There are assessments. Judgement is taking place. The difference is that what is at stake here are the actual stakes of assessment themselves. It is thus that the political is given centrality. Identifying this point of convergence does not entail the effective presence of any essential sense of unanimity. The source of animation is to be located elsewhere. It is found in the problematic status of judgement itself.²

Anne Barron undertakes 'to explore the *différend* between Lyotard and Rawls'. The importance of this task is clear. At work within this particular confrontation is both the general question of subjectivity

INTRODUCTION

and the specific problem of the legal subject. Lyotard's own writings on justice do not need to emerge in the aporias of liberalism but in the concept of subject and thus of legislation they entail. The problem of power is thereby encountered. Richard Beardsworth offers a long and scrupulous reading of Lyotard's writings on judgement. His work shows an awareness that, inherent in its own activity, is the question of judgement itself. It is this awareness that provides his paper with its acuity. The limit that he identifies in Lyotard's conception of the political opens up the question of the extent to which a politics of judgement is possible.

John Keane is also concerned with the political. However, the argument he offers involves a reading of Lyotard which contends that the *The Postmodern Condition* can give rise to a philosophical allegiance—perhaps in spite of itself—to the project of 'the renewal and deepening of modernity's democratic potential'. A fundamental part of Keane's undertaking is a reinterpretation of this potential. It is thus that he is able to bring the two domains together. The importance of Keane's paper is that it offers a translation of *The Postmodern Condition* into the language of democratic theory. Emilia Steuerman offers a questioning reading of how and to what extent the concerns of Habermas and Lyotard differ. While part of the importance of her paper lies in its presentation of an extremely well-informed summation of this confrontation, it is her conclusion that is of central interest. In it she argues that, rather than there being a point of absolute dislocation between their undertakings, Lyotard can be read as offering a 'radicalization' of the project of modernity. What is at issue here is not compatibility but the possibility of a complementarity that would itself be the result of interpretation and judgement. It is a position similar to Steuerman's that informs Paul Crowther's rigorous interpretation of the philosophical stakes of *Les Immatériaux*, the exhibition organized by Lyotard and held at the Centre Georges Pompidou in 1985. Crowther has attempted to show that a critical reading of the way Lyotard distinguishes (or fails to distinguish) between the sublime and the avantgarde, both in relation to this exhibition and to some of his more general writing on art, can reveal how the aesthetic can be linked to the emancipatory. The aesthetic even in Lyotard's hands can, according to Crowther, come to complement the project of modernity.

David Ingram, in a detailed paper that engages with Hannah Arendt as well as Lyotard, is concerned with the use they both make of Kant. Ingram does not seek to challenge the recourse to Kant as

INTRODUCTION

such but rather is concerned with the use made of it. In other words what is at issue here is the reading of Kant. In drawing on the work of Jean-Luc Nancy, Ingram gestures towards a far more Heideggerian Kant than does either Arendt or Lyotard. For Ingram it is as though Lyotard takes the fragmented as an end in itself. On the other hand, he wants to argue that even in the 'postmodern condition' the copresence of indeterminacy and determinacy still 'remain aspects of one and the same Being'.

The papers by Geoffrey Bennington and Bill Readings take the work of Lyotard outside its own explicit concern and into the domain of literature and film. It goes without saying that they are both acutely aware of the question of genre and thus of the place of a boundary or border raised by their specific undertakings. Bennington uses the occasion of Corneille's *Horace* to take up the specific case of the *différend*. After a meticulous reading of the function of the *différend*—a term announced within Corneille's own text—in the play's logic, Bennington concludes with a reworking of the question of judgement. Now, it is posed back to Lyotard in terms of the question of how is judgement to be judged? The dramatic problem that arises here is the extent to which this question can be answered within the terms that Lyotard himself has provided.

Bill Readings's focus is Herzog's film *Where the Green Ants Dream*. Readings is concerned with the representation as it comes to be played out in Herzog's film of justice and injustice to Aborigines in contemporary Australia. Central to his undertaking are the presuppositions at stake in the problematic of representation. Indeed, Readings argues that the attempt to represent—limiting justice to 'a correspondence to models'—would involve an injustice. Justice becomes linked therefore to experimentation and thereby to the avant-garde. It is thus that his remarkable reading becomes an argument 'for a refiguration of the political'. Here, as in all the other papers, the political returns as and in the motif of judgement. The same will always have to be said of judgement.

Concluding these introductory notes by returning to Lyotard may seem to involve stepping beyond the confines of the contents of the chapters to come. If, however, Lyotard is taken as a name for a particular type of philosophical thinking, then it could always be argued that judging Lyotard returns to the philosophical problem announced in Heraclitus—namely thinking justice in relation to conflict. The return in this case would be the reiteration of the possibility of an ethics and a politics of heterology that resisted any

INTRODUCTION

delimitation by the Same. It is thus that it would bring with it the repetition of an-other philosophical task. While with Lyotard—the thinking marked out by the proper name—this is a task thought through Kant’s writings, it also marks—by marking out—a philosophical adventure whose range remains to be fixed. Lyotard’s work involves the centrality of a philosophical thinking that can itself be made part of a more generalized subversion of the Same. The name has become complex. It is thus that, because of the doubling of this mark, the name itself can never be self-referential. While it may change what is at stake, it can still be argued that this doubling demands judgement, hence judging Lyotard, therefore Judging Lyotard.

NOTES

- 1 A note on texts. The problematic status of translation and thus of translations has meant that where a given contributor has wanted, his or her translations have been maintained. In the case of *Le Différend* there should be no difficulties in moving from the French to the English because the book consists of numbered paragraphs and sections. In the case of other texts, where necessary dual references have, for the most part, been supplied. A number of these papers have been published before and therefore it is a pleasure to acknowledge the permission of the editors of *Paragraph*, *The Review of Metaphysics* and *New Formations* for permitting the republishing of the papers by Lyotard, Ingram and Steurman.
- 2 Part of the interest that these papers hold is their use of the ‘same’ material; be this the ‘same’ line from one of Lyotard’s texts or shared sources, e.g. Nancy’s ‘Lapsus Judicii’. Their reiteration throughout the papers raises the question not of their evaluation but of how they are to be evaluated. It is this point that needs to be generalized.

SENSUS COMMUNIS¹

Jean-François Lyotard

These will be notes and remarks rather than an exposé: their community, in the sense of their reciprocal action which today we often call system, will remain to be established. Although they're quite 'common' in the sense of trivial, this time. This preference is certainly imposed on me by lack of preparation but also by the subject. The lack of preparation proceeds from the subject. No one will ever be prepared for this *sensus*. Every community will forget and will have forgotten this *sensus*. *Sensus communis* isn't *intellectio communis*, *gesunde Verstand*, good sense, sound understanding, that of communication through the mediation of the concept. Even less is it *intellectio communitatis*, the intelligence of the community. It's a question of a community which is unintelligent still—but that *still* presents a problem. Unintelligent, therefore, that's to say, proceeding without intellect. And unintellected, too, that's to say one whose concept, *ex hypothesi*, will always be missed. And if we are condemned to think it, think of it, by means of a concept (this is required by the exposé, the exposition, the Kantian *Exponieren*: 'to reduce a representation of the imagination to concepts'² then the said 'community' of sense, and through sense alone, can be situated or put in place negatively in the field of the *intellectio* by the exposé, in the mode of critical thought when it deals with taste: pleasure but without interest, universality but without concept, finality but without representation of an end, necessity but without argument. Lack of preparation is the very fact of my subject, *sensus communis*, because it demands it. It demands that the intellect be at a loss. That it have got nothing ready. Without a show of readiness. Of which it's incapable, because it is spontaneous activity, *Selbsttätigkeit*. This *sensus* and this *communis* appear to be ungraspable at their exposition. The concept's other. So a good opportunity for metaphysics.

The understanding ought to stay disarmed, right up to its touch of this sense. Immunized against itself, to let itself be touched by, and to touch this *commun*. But its 'spontaneity', that activity whose principle is only in itself, its authoritarian munificence, the generosity of its office, of its *munus*, which is to synthesize by itself, off its own bat, cannot accept the sharing out of the munitions, the putting into common ownership of syntheses. The understanding will always find itself again in the community, it will refer the community back to its own power. It can only, at most, declare of its own accord that no, there is a synthesizing outside it, another way of synthesizing. But even in the apparent disavowal that the understanding makes of its activity, in the apparent modesty of this negative analytics (as one speaks of negative theology), its arrogance in distributing roles, in being master of communities can only continue to betray itself. Let's make no mistake about it: if thought, in so far as it is philosophical, consists in thinking by concepts, then with the *sensus communis*, philosophy touches on that thought which is not philosophical, touches on it precisely because it cannot handle it. And it's that that should be understood in *sensus*. It is by chance that the adverb *sensim*, which should mean 'so that it can be felt', mostly means 'imperceptibly'? A *sensus* imperceptible to the *intellectus*. A community imperceptible to the community or argumentable syntheses. With the question of this sense we are, in particular, at the confines of literature and philosophy, of art and philosophy. These confines were called *Aesthetics* in eighteenth-century Europe. It's a matter of tact or tangent, at least for philosophy. Philosophy has difficulty in making contact with the *sensus*. It wants, by vocation, by hypothesis, to keep itself intact from the *sensus*, or the *sensus* itself takes off at a tangent. But also it wants to think everything, to think according to its rules, intellection, and make no exception for the unintelligent and the untouchable.

So philosophy can only, as I can only in making this exposition, register that the concept, my concept, doesn't manage to touch the *sensus communis*. This sense is too near, or too far. More likely, this difficulty isn't even a matter of distance, of interval. This *sensus* isn't indeed situated in that space and time which the concept uses to know objects, in the space-time of knowledge. Nor in the space-time which sensibility in the first *Critique* gets ready (precisely) for knowledge by means of the schemata. For if there is a *sensus communis* it is made necessary by another necessity, another universality, and another finality than those which knowledge requires. So that even using these

words gives rise to amphiboly. For the cognitive community (the scientific one in its most determinate modality), these words necessity, universality, finality, are names of categories which can be defined and exhibited, applicable in the space-time of experience. For the community of sense, and by sense, they designate those movements of the imagination (called by Kant reflection), which proceed obscurely (but this obscurity is called so by the understanding). Kant says: in comparison, through *Vergleichung*. It's this comparing that puts the intelligence in disarray, makes it unprepared in the face of the *sensus* which rounds it off, and that's what cannot be forestalled. It has to be said clearly: the *sensus* doesn't give rise to an experiencing, in the Kantian sense. The aesthetics of the beautiful isn't the aesthetics of truth. Taste teaches nothing about the object, it has no object, no referent. If there are forms in play in these two aesthetics, those of the first *Critique* are finalized towards knowledge, those of the third towards pure pleasure. And everything leads one to think that these last, more purely reflexive, more constitutive or productive, are diverted and tamed by the former. So it's *not* really impossible to forestall the *sensus communis*. The mind will always have got itself prepared (after the fact, naturally), will always be able to comment on it, take it with itself into the mental community, into its authority, and begin it again. And yet with this common sense it's indeed a question of something 'uncommon', out of the ordinary, of something singular according to intelligence.

We often give to the judgment, if we are considering the result rather than the act of its reflection, the name of a sense, and we speak of a sense of truth, or of a sense of decorum, of justice, etc. And yet we know, or at least we ought to know, that these concepts cannot have their place in sense.

(KUK §40, beginning; CŹ p. 135)

Although in short we know that this sense isn't a sense at all. However, Kant adds, even to that common understanding, to that minimal intelligence presupposed in every man, to the least privileged intelligence, the most vulgar but the most distinctive of the human mind, must be rendered this 'mortifying [*krankende*] honour' of being called 'common sense'. Mortification: the understanding is demoted to a sense. Honour: this descent to the lowest is perhaps a new ascent to the well-springs of the capacity to judge, presupposed in every activity, intellectual even, and voluntary.

That may be what's at stake in the *Critique of the Aesthetical Judgement*. There would be judgement before the concept, and even before the schema, before that operation of synthesis, which is however very elementary, which brings together the pure diversity of sense-data (their matter) into unities which are apprehensible, reproducible, recognizable, and offers them as an experience to the grasp, to the *Ergreifen*, to the *Begreifen* of the categories of understanding. Some judgement, then, for Kant in the synthetic act which would not consist in determining regularities, as in the cognitive law, nor even in preparing them in sensible matter, by constructing spatio-temporal sequences which form objects in experience. A kind of non-denotative synthesis, not turned towards the object, and thus called strictly subjective, that is exclusively felt (there's the *sensus*, which is feeling). This sentimental synthesis, this judgement which is feeling, deserves to be attributed to a *sensus*, unlike good sense. For with this *sensus* we are sent back to the most humble, the most 'common' level of judgement, in a 'state of mind' which as yet owes nothing (nothing as yet, or already nothing) to knowledge and its intrigues.

And in the same way (turning now towards the other elder sister, the other great faculty, not the theoretical this time but the practical), there would be judging, synthesizing, independent of desire, whether it be empirical, as need or penchant, or transcendental, as pure will. That is to say, unlike every desire (I would add, although it's not Kantian: whether it is conscious or unconscious), a judgement not having 'knowledge' of its end. One could say: a blind judgement, quite blind, without even that 'clairvoyance' about what it hasn't got which is necessarily supposed by the psychoanalytical hypothesis of the 'fulfilling of desire' in the symptom, and by the accompanying hypothesis that the said symptom can be deciphered thanks to this aim (even if it were to be illusory) for fulfilment. A judging blind to every end, but for this very reason, not a symptom. Or, as Kant says, 'disinterested'. Without interest in liberty nor in pleasure in the usual sense. A state of mind that owes nothing as yet (nothing as yet or already no more) to the intrigues of willing, whatever it be. This feeling (since this *sensus* is sentimentality), when it is a question of tasting beauty, is precisely a feeling of pleasure, but a pleasure which doesn't come to fill up a lack not to fulfil any desire at all. A pleasure before any desire. This aesthetic pleasure is not the purpose of a purposiveness experienced (or not experienced) beforehand as desire. It has nothing whatsoever to do with an end or purpose. It *is* finality,

purposiveness itself, which had no end, no purpose in front of it and no lack behind it. So an instantaneous purposiveness, immediate, not even meditated by the diachronic form of the internal sense, nor by our way of remembering and anticipating. Certainly we (understanding, and reproductive imagination, memory) remember this instant and we will try to reiterate it. We will try to integrate it, to give it a place in our intrigues, our narratives, our explanations, all our arrangements of every kind. But it will have been independent of them. On the occasion of a form, which itself is only an occasion for feeling, the soul is seized by a small happiness, unlocked for, unprepared, slightly dynamizing. It is an animation of an *anima* there on the spot, which is not moving towards anything. It's as if the mind were discovering that it can do something other than will and understand. Be happy without ever having asked for it or conceived it. An instant which will seem very long, measured by the clock of intrigue, but which is not in the purloin of its timekeeping; a flash made of delayings (you tarry near beauty), a form, a little synthesis of matters in space-time, made sense, *sensus*. A sense that has to be thought of as absolutely singular. The occasion is the case. And it would be this absolutely singular *sensus* which would be *communis*. So the finality, the purposiveness is end-less, purposeless, without a concept of its end. This is why the feeling of the beautiful has nothing to do with perfection, with this completion that *Vollkommenheit* connotes.

Here, it is no longer the philosophy of intellect which can't touch this *sense*, it is our occupational willing, our philosophy of will, of the infinite will established in the west at least from Descartes and Hobbes down to Nietzsche and Freud, to make no mention of the political all-comers bearing very diverse names. What can a *communitas* be which isn't knitted into itself by a project? this philosophy whispers to us. Which has no Idea of what it wants to be and must be? Not having the Idea of its unity even as a horizon? These are false questions, directed by a line we haven't questioned: by the prejudice according to which what comes first is the diverse, chaos (matter, according to Kant himself and many others), and according to which a principle is needed to unify it even if only into elementary forms. A gravitation, an interaction, I don't know, which can make a One out of this multiplex. Desire, the will: this is one of the names of this principle of interaction and integration. And pleasure of happiness: this will be when the desired, the will having been achieved, the synthesis is made between what one is and what

one wants or desires to be. Even if it is explained to us that that doesn't exist, that it's always missed, that this happiness of fulfilment is a trap—that changes nothing about the principle that community is the desire experienced by diversity.

And as we know, this picture tells a story. With the willing of the will, there is displayed a time, memory, and project, heritage and programme. A narrative.

But if there really is a *sensus communis*, then it is a pleasure which hasn't been, will not have been, obtained by desire or willing, which hasn't come to a conclusion, or belted together the two ends of an odyssey, not even for a moment. It will not have the character of a return, of a knot. And the *common* of this *sensus* will not have been a matter of project. This feeling creates no chronology, nor even a simple diachrony. It's not a question of an historical and social community which people of taste or artists, any more than people of science and will, form or want to form. It's not a question of 'culture', or pleasure shared in, through and for culture. And there is no progression promised to this pleasure of the beautiful, precisely because it isn't desired.

As you see, that makes a lot of 'no's and 'not's.

I quoted from paragraph 40 of the third *Critique*: 'We often give to the judgement, if we are considering the result rather than the act of its reflection, the name of a sense.' Sense and result. *Sensus* is reflection, the faculty of judging reflexively, but considered afterwards, and not when it's operating, it is a little like an instance of sensibility. Now at the end of the same paragraph:

I say that...the aesthetical judgment rather than the intellectual may bear the name of a sense common to all (*eines gemeinschaftlichen Sinnes*), if we are willing to use the word 'sense' of an effect of mere reflection upon the mind, for then we understand by sense the feeling of pleasure.

(*KUK\$W;CJ* p. 138)

The faculty of judgement acts reflexively, according to Kantian vocabulary. The result of this operation (but probably it isn't an 'operation'), its effect on the mind, is the feeling of pleasure. The *sensus* is, then, like the seat of a capacity for pure reflection. A seat established afterwards. We know that Kant doesn't feel happy about assigning a place of residence to the intermediate faculty in the layered geography of the faculties—doubly layered (faculties of the

soul, faculties of knowledge), each faculty being endowed with its a priori principle and with its domain or territory of reference—in this transcendental geography; the intermediate faculty: that is, the ‘go-between’ whose mission it is to make the link between intellection and desire, between theoretical understanding and practical reason. This capacity to negotiate is called, in the soul, the faculty of pleasure and pain, and in knowledge is called simply the faculty of judging.

Yet one judges everywhere, in every domain, and in all of them there is some *sensus* at work, a state of mind, even if it knows and wills. For the one that knows, Kant only explains things occasionally. There is, however, and this is transcendently required, a feeling of pleasure, a euphoria associated with knowledge, that is, with the co-operation of sensibility and understanding required by knowledge, a subjective euphoria from the subsuming of an intuition under a concept, which guarantees objectivity. This is transcendently required to such an extent that Kant has recourse to it in his deduction of the *sensus communis* in paragraph 21 of the third *Critique* (I shall come back to this). But this sentimental aspect of knowledge is kept rather clandestine. The transcendental *sensus* of ethical practice, on the contrary, has had considerable success, as we know, via the analysis of *Achtung*, of respect, in the second *Critique*. The fact remains that if we judge in ethics as we do in knowledge, the faculty of judging, the ‘go-between’ must be in action here as well as in aesthetics. But it is hidden, and stays so. The intermediary erases itself, slides away; the faculty of judging leaves the office of synthesis to its elder sisters.

Bringing together is the mission of the concept and/or of the reproductive imagination (the schema) in knowledge as such, and the mission of reason in moral practice. The preliminary work of feeling is operating more openly in the latter case, in the name of respect (and in the name of its counterpart, humiliation of the empirical individual’s presumption and self-love). But it is kept at the level of ‘motive’, of *Triebfeder*, of the spring which projects an impure act of will, strung up in pathological motivations, towards the pure moral law. In this way, the faculty of judgement in its most humble form, feeling (here, pleasure and pain, for the feeling of obligation is mixed), is brought down, as in the case of the imaginative schema, to the rank of a mere sketch of a synthesis; is reduced by critical analysis to the role of mere precursor and sign of the veritable a priori ethical synthesis, of the true condition for morality which is

not obligation but law, the free synthesis of 'thine' action and of universal liberty, free, thanks to the free play of the 'as if', of the *so dafs* between the prescription to 'act' and the universal principle of legislation valid for a community of reasonable and practical beings (also called 'persons').

So the *sensus* and the *commune* are necessarily separated in the case of knowledge and in the case of ethics. The cognitive community or the community of people of learning is, as Habermas would say, 'discursive'; or as K.O. Apel would put it, 'one of argument'. It is mediated by the agreement, required pragmatically, about the rules for establishing a true judgement. And the ethical community, if there is one, can only indeed be an ideal of practical reason, a suprasensible society formed from beings with free will; but even so, it too is mediated by the recognition of the suprasensible character of freedom, by the Idea (which is an Idea of reason, and not a concept of understanding) of a moral law which contains tautologically, so to say, the principle of this community in its determinateness. In any case, it isn't feeling, nor respect which makes up an ethical community, nor even which requires it. Obligation only requires community because the law, whose feeling obligation is, contains this community in its definition.

I mean that there is no moral *sensus communis*, but only a reason which is common in its practical ethical use. Or again, the seat of the common, when it is a question of being just, isn't in the feeling (even if the latter can forewarn us), but in an 'unfathomable' concept not found in experience: the Idea of freedom. Ethical community can't be immediate, it must be mediate, mediated by an Idea of reason. So that it is subject a priori (but that must be argued for, proved) to a progression which is the progression of susceptibility (*Empfänglichkeit*) to the Ideas of reason. This is the question of culture, of the culture of the will, that is of reason in its practical use. In the end, there is only a possibility of progress and progression if there is a concept, if the *ambitus* (the register) of what is conceived (through the understanding and through reason) becomes wider, and richer. Now it is constitutive of the concept that it develops in its scope (its quantity) or its tenor (its quality): it is impelled by maximization, says Kant. Haunted by the infinite. It is polarized by the principle of something suprasensible, whether cosmological or ethical. This is also why the feeling which can serve as a *signum* of the progress of humanity towards the best is not the immediate pleasure of the beautiful, and can't be (even if

the beautiful is a passable *analogon* for the good), but is the feeling of the sublime, which far from being immediate and simple is divided in itself and needs the representation of the Idea of freedom, and so the development of pure practical reason. History too has the infinite in it only through the concept.

But what might an aesthetical suprasensible be? The *sensus communis*, if we take *sensus* in the sense of feeling, cannot and must not be mediated by a concept. There, in aesthetics, the pure faculty of judgement, the capacity of bringing together the manifold without having the rule (concept) nor the law (Idea) of that bringing together—this is the definition of reflexivity—must operate without any additions, within the modesty of an immediate synthesis, the form, which makes the subjective synthesis, the feeling, immediately. In other words, reason in the broad sense, the theoretical faculty of *intellectio*, the practical faculty of *acta*, has no interest in it.

We have never finished with the true and the just, but the beautiful does not develop itself. The feeling which it is does not belong to process.

The paragraph in the first *Critique*, the Dialect of Cosmological Ideas, which points out three interests of reason, theoretical, practical and popular, needs analysing in detail. These interests can be contradictory. What is meant by popular? What we call political, at least in part: in the part of it concerning the ‘public’ or *Öffentlichkeit*. But aesthetics which is certainly concerned in this latter, isn’t dependent on it, not at all, through its principle. For through its principle, on principle, aesthetics is not susceptible to any interest. Reason, be it popular, practical or theoretical, can find no advantage in it. Of course this is because the aesthetic feeling isn’t mediated, whether by concepts or Ideas, and because it doesn’t obey the impulse which drives the concept to extend the register of its domain of application. Because this feeling isn’t in the service of any concept, isn’t even subject to that kind of conceivable time that is the schema. In the pleasure of the beautiful, feeling is enough, absolutely enough. It announces nothing further. Is of no use to anything. A *go-between* in the process of coming and going, transmitting no message. *Being* the message. A pure movement which compares, which afterwards we put under house arrest in a seat called *sensus*. But this house arrest is itself only analogical. One that we project on an object when we call it beautiful. But the object is merely an occasion. It is still impossible

to snap shut in a name the capacity for reflection by and for itself, and the objectivity of beauty is still impossible to establish.

As for the *common* of this 'sense', the 'community' or communicability which qualifies it, that is certainly not to be observed in experience. It is certainly not what we call a 'public'. Not the society of art-lovers in museums, galleries, concerts, theatres, or who today look at reproductions of works (and, I may add, of landscapes) in their homes. The *sensus* must be protected from anthropologization. It is a capacity of mind. And yet..., only if the mind itself isn't taken aback, interrupted by pure aesthetic pleasure. Only if the anima or the animation procured by the beautiful doesn't put the mind in a state of suspense. Only if, to sum up, only if the mind isn't limited to the office and the exercise of intrigues.

So a secret *common*, that is, put aside, separated, secessioned, and as the expression goes in Latin *se-curus*, put out of reach of *cura*, of care, a common with no cares. *Sorgenfrei*, as Heidegger would not have written in 1927. Kant calls anima, soul, this mind free of care. We know how Kant comes to detect this common in the analysis of taste. If pleasure is aesthetical, it is disinterested and without concept, but it also has to be universal in its quantity, unlike a particular preference, and it has to be necessary in its modality, unlike the pleasure which can be procured by an object in general (this pleasure is only possible, and the modality of its synthesis with the object will only be problematical), it has to be necessary also in opposition to the pleasure procured by an agreeable object (where the modality of the judgement made is assertoric: *de facto*, that pleases me).

If it were not to fulfil these conditions of necessity and universality, the first relative to the enunciation, the second to what is enunciated, a judgement of taste, the aesthetical feeling could never be isolated as such. And there would be no art because there would be no pure pleasure, independent of empirical or transcendental interests.

We are satisfied by an object which we find agreeable. But we don't require that this satisfaction be shared by everyone, nor posited as inescapable.

This said, neither the necessity of judging like this, nor the universality of the attribution of the predicate 'beautiful' to *this* rose, can be deduced. Kant says, about universality, that the singular judgement of taste is *enjoined* (*ansinnen*) on everyone; and about necessity, that it is not given apodictically, as the conclusion of a