THE POLITICAL DILEMMAS OF MILITARY REGIMES

Edited by
Christopher Clapham and George Philip

Volume 2

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CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM AND
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THE POLITICAL DILEMMAS OF MILITARY REGIMES

Chapter One

THE POLITICAL DILEMMAS OF MILITARY REGIMES

Christopher Clapham and George Philip

THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY REGIME SUCCESSION

The basic problem about military regimes is one not
of how they can gain power, but of what they can do
with it. A military coup, like an election victory,
installs a new government and helps to define a
pattern of opposition and support which will
constrict its political options. But as time goes
by, the way in which a government gained power takes
second place to the problem of how it is to keep it,
and it is at this point that the most distinctive
dilemmas of military regimes become apparent.
Firstly, they must reconcile continuing control over
the military with a measure of acceptance from civil
society. Military regimes need not be popular, but
they do need to command obedience on the basis of
more than simple coercion; even though legitimacy
(i.e. de jure acceptance from civil society) is not
always necessary, a degree of political (and not
just military) organisation certainly is. Secondly,
they must devise some institutional structure,
whether formally of a military or a non-military
kind, through which this political settlement can be
maintained. This book is about how they seek to
resolve these dilemmas.

If these basic dilemmas are common to all
military regimes, there are nonetheless important
differences, stemming both from the kind of military
involved and from the kind of civil society which it
is governing. Military organisations derive from an
enormous range of cultural and historical
circumstances, and vary widely in internal
structure, political outlook, and social
composition. The regimes which they form may have
very different relationships with their 'parent'
militaries, stay in power for longer or shorter

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periods of time, and display sharply contrasting
degrees of internal stability. Most disruptively of
all, from the viewpoint of comparative political
analysis, they swiftly become enmeshed in the
ordinary business of government (economic
management, international relations, the immediate
need to cope with specific local crises and
circumstances) and in the process come to look
increasingly like national governments concerned
with the problems of their own particular states,
decreasingly like any general category of ´military
regime´. It is therefore not too surprising that
militaries exhibit for instance no distinctive
uniformities in economic policy, save for a tendency
to spend more on the army itself, or that there is
quite a high level of variance in their
international alliance pattern and ideological
stance.(1) Soldiers are not inherently either
conservative or radical. Military leaders may be
old conformists from the top of the hierarchy, or
young firebrands from the bottom. They may come
from privileged or from disadvantaged sections of
indigenous society, or even from outside the society
which they govern altogether. They may be
anti-Communist or anti-American, or simply forced
into dependence on one external backer or another by
the immediate demands of their own international or
domestic political difficulties.

But these differences help to provide varying
answers to what are fundamentally the same questions
about the relationship between the military
organisation and the world of politics. These
questions often resolve themselves into a specific
dilemma between alternative patterns of
institutionalisation and demilitarisation.
Institutionalisation involves the maintenance of the
military leadership in power, coupled with attempts
to entrench its position and broaden its support by
seeking alliances with civilian political groups
which are then subordinated to it. Demilitarisation
conversely involves the withdrawal of the military
from direct control of government, whether
voluntarily in favour of some designated civilian
successor, or involuntarily under varying degrees of
pressure or compulsion. While these are in
principle choices open to all military regimes, the
constraints within which such choices have to be
made, the success which they achieve, and especially
the patterns of succession of one form of regime by
another, make possible a comparative political
analysis which goes beyond the simple codification

of the attitudes of the regimes themselves.

The reason why these problems are constant, common to all militaries, is because no military regime, even in the simplest political system, is able to maintain an uncomplicated unity of military and political command, either by itself or in conjunction with the civil bureaucracy, in anything but the short term: a matter of some two or three years at most. This is not primarily the result of the military's supposed lack of 'legitimacy', a problem very easily exaggerated in weakly institutionalised political systems where there are few if any generally shared assumptions about the proper means of acquiring and exercising political power: and these are, after all, the political systems in which military intervention is in any event most likely to occur. It is much more the result of the straightforward problems of political management. The very short term does not usually create much difficulty. Often the army or some group within it takes over as the result of a crisis which may well lead to its intervention being greeted with relief. Even when it isn't, there is rarely any other source of organised force (apart from divisions within the armed forces themselves) which is immediately capable of resisting it. The problems arise during the subsequent period, during which the regime has to devise policies to cope with whatever crisis prompted its intervention, together with the further issues raised by the intervention itself, or thrown up in the ordinary course of events. Such policies inevitably arouse opposition and define support: a natural process no different for military rulers than for any other form of government. In the case of military governments, however, this process is almost certain to raise the question of the status of the regime itself, both within the military and in the wider political society, and to confront the regime wih the need to formulate some kind of longer term political or constitutional programme.

In formulating such a programme, the military quickly comes up against the limitations imposed by its own values and structures; at the same time, the political analyst comes up against the corresponding problem of whether there <u>are</u> structures and values, common to all militaries, which can be used to provide a general rationale for the behaviour of military regimes. We would start by expressing a firm preference for structural over attitudinal considerations. Without committing

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ourselves to any general opinion on the relative
importance of cultural as against institutional
variables, there are two specific reasons for
emphasising the structural element in this case.
First, in the military more than in almost any other
form of social organisation, deliberate attempts are
made to inculcate values appropriate to the
structures already established; values may
therefore be seen as following from structures,
rather than vice versa. These notably include the
authoritarian attitudes derived from military
hierarchy, the associated 'military virtues' of
discipline, efficiency and esprit de corps, the core
value of nationalism, and the shared attitudes which
arise in particular military institutions from the
physical proximity of its members and their
isolation from the rest of society. Secondly,
however, what is important is the extent to which
these military values are inculcated, rather than
any substantial variance in the values themselves.
Even military structures cannot be relied upon to
entrench military attitudes, and competing values
may intrude from the social group identities and
cultural characteristics of the society. If
soldiers cannot be relied upon to hold the values
commonly attributed to them, then such values
readily turn into stereotypes which may be
misleading as guides to actual behaviour.(2)
     The structural characteristics of the military
do however have some value in defining the political
options which it is able to accept. The most
important of these is its status as part of the
permanent state bureaucracy, which provides it with
a set of political and economic interests from which
it is extremely difficult for any military regime to
escape. The military maintains the state, and the
state maintains the military. A military coup is,
prima facie, the capture of control over the state
by its own employees: that is why it is so easy. A
military regime will from this viewpoint have
interests in common with the civilian bureaucracy,
and be inherently opposed to any measure which would
threaten the state's control over the resources
which it needs to maintain itself. A secondary
though still important structural feature is the
command hierarchy itself, which defines a mode of
operation of an extremely constricting kind. It
allows some scope for political discussion and
compromise within the military leadership, usually
confined to a peer group of officers of roughly
similar rank, and some opportunity for co-opting

other groups and interests to support the regime;
but it allows little capacity for handling political
organisation beyond a very limited level.
   Despite the enormous variations between
military regimes, therefore, they do face a common
political problem: that of combining their need to
preserve the interests derived from their position
in the state apparatus, with the inherent
limitations in their capacity for political
organisation. This problem is equally evident in
the experience of such widely differing regimes·as
those of Chile and Ethiopia, and is also common to
former guerilla liberation armies, such as those of
Algeria or Guine-Bissau, once these come to inherit
state power. This lands them in dilemmas which are
likewise characteristic and recurring, even though
the precise forms which these take, and the
practical options which are open, will vary from
case to case.

TERMS AND VARIABLES

In order to start working out some of the
characteristic patterns of political settlement by
military regimes, it is necessary to define three
sets of variables. The first set consists of those
key civil-military variables which provide the most
important influences on the structure and nature of
military regimes. The second set consists of
military regime types, while the third consists of
different forms of political outcome. Even though we
do not subscribe to any rigidly causal view of
comparative political explanation, we regard the key
variables as providing powerful constraints which
help to account for the type of regime, and
subsequently to produce discernible patterns of
regime succession, while allowing some measure of
autonomous political choice.

The Key Civil-Military Variables

The main constituents of the set of key variables
will be familiar to any student of civil-military
relations, derived as they are from the structure of
the military, the structure of civil society, and
the nexus between the two. Moving from the most
specific and military-related variables, to the more
general and civil society-related ones, these are:

The unity of the military command structure. The most basic distinction here is between armies that behave like armies (that is to say, according to an official stereotype of discipline, hierarchy and established procedures) and ones that do not. This may broadly be associated with a geographical continuum stretching from the 'professionalised' militaries of South America and Europe (including Turkey) at one end, through those of the Middle East, Central America and South-East Asia, to institutionally weak African militaries at the other. This should not be taken to imply any geographical causation, and takes no account of wide variations within each zone, such as those produced in Portugal by the effects of conscription and colonial war. Low unity is indicated by the prevalence of coups and coup attempts by junior officers and other ranks, and by intra-military killings, as in Nigeria (1966), Ethiopia (1974-78), and Bangladesh (1980); it may also, paradoxically, be a feature of highly personalist long-term dictatorships, such as that of Somoza in Nicaragua. High unity is conversely indicated by the absence of these phenomena even in military regimes subjected to high political stress, such as Chile since 1973 and Turkey since 1980. The ability of military regimes to change leaders without bloodshed under high political stress, as in Argentina (1982), is evidence of high unity rather than low, and helps to indicate the way in which unity constrains the leaders of military regimes, as well as the lower ranks.

Differentiation of the military from civil society. This criterion concerns the permeability of the boundary between the military and civilian politics, and is particularly important in cases where the military seeks to play the role of arbiter between contesting civilian political groups, or to withdraw intact from government in favour of a civilian regime. It does not correspond nearly as closely as the 'unity' criterion to any general level of 'development', but may be influenced both by the structure and experience of the military, and by general social factors. Professional armies will tend to be more differentiated than conscript ones, and deliberate measures may be taken to increase differentiation through the introduction of military schools and higher education colleges, and the inculcation of a distinctly military ideology. While foreign training missions may thus increase

differentiation, as in South America in the early twentieth century, extensive external dependence is likely to reduce it, especially (as in Iran or Ethiopia) by raising doubts both in the army and outside about its relationship to the core value of nationalism; analoguous problems may be one legacy of military defeat, as in the Egyptian army after 1948 or the Portuguese in the 1970s. Ethnic and regional divisions provide an obvious threat to differentiation, especially once immersion in pclitics leads soldiers to be regarded as spokesmen for their own local interests. Class divisions on the other hand are much less of a threat, and it is possible as in South America for military regimes to defend established class interests without becoming permeated by their civilian suppporters. Indeed, in a more general way, differentiation may only be possible in a country large and developed enough to sustain a substantial professional middle class.

Level of perceived threat from civil society. This is an explicitly subjective variable, but nonetheless a very important one in determining the military's relationship with civilian political groups. At its most intense, a sense of threat may provoke measures of extreme repression, while threat at a lower level influences both the military's capacity to withdraw from office and its need to select and influence a successor regime. Threat is a reflection of two elements. The first is the military's awareness of values or interests which it regards as central to its own position; these may be associated with nationalism (especially when the army represents a core governing group opposed by centrifugal forces), with class interests, or with the internal unity and differentiation of the military itself. The second is its estimate of the strength of autonomous political organisations whose goals clash with these interests. In a rough and ready way, then, threat expresses the military's felt need for political involvement, and indicates the way in which, and level at which, involvement will take place.

Level of autonomous political organisation. Autonomous political organisations are ones which are capable of maintaining themselves over time without direct access to the coercive and distributive powers of the state, and if need be in opposition to them. The level of autonomy reflects both the scope of such organisations, in terms of

the range and number of the people whom they
incorporate, and their intensity, in terms of
organisational effectiveness and membership
commitment. This variable derives entirely from
civil society, but tends to vary in line with
´development´ criteria in the same way as military
unity, while differentiation and threat, being
derived from the relationship between civil and
military, do not. Autonomous political organisation
nonetheless strongly influences the possibility of
combining civil and military elements within a
single regime, as most clearly instanced by the
difference between Argentina, where autonomous
political organisations inhibit the formation of
civil-military coalitions, and Brazil, where the
comparative weakness of such organisations
facilitates them.

These variables naturally shift over time in
any given case, and are inter-related with one
another. Most obviously, unity affects
differentation, and autonomy affects threat. Since
we are not in any event concerned to develop a
causal or mechanistic model of military regime
succession, this does not worry us. Our concern,
rather, is to develop criteria which will be helpful
in organising and appraising alternative patterns of
relationship between military regimes and their
civilian allies, rivals or successors.

Types of Military Regime

Our second group of variables then consist of
military regime types, being on the whole derived,
with some modification, from Huntington´s well-known
categories.(3) It is not necessary to specify types
of regime for every possible combination of our four
initial variables, partly because these are
interrelated as already noted, partly because some
combinations do not commonly occur, or where they do
occur (e.g. high unity, differentiation and
autonomy, low threat) do not give rise to military
regimes. The types which we feel it useful to
distinguish are the following:

Veto Regimes. These correspond closely to
Huntington´s category, and are characterised by high
unity, fairly high differentiation (though allowing
for association between the military and privileged
or centralist political groups), high threat, and

medium or high autonomy. This is, of course, a
recipe for military regimes of the most
systematically repressive kind, as in Chile and
Argentina, since it pits the military directly
against strongly organised civilian political
structures. Where, as in Turkey perhaps, the
military is more differentiated (in the sense of not
being inherently committed to either right-wing or
left-wing political parties), and the perceived
threat against which the military decided to
intervene is one to civil society rather than to the
military as such, the degree of repression is
unlikely to be so intense, and the regime comes
closer to the moderator type.

Moderator Regimes. These most closely correspond to
Huntington´s ´guardian´ type, and are characterised
by fairly high (though variable) unity and
differentiation, combined with fairly low threat and
moderate autonomy. Classically, this is the case of
the professional military which feels itself obliged
to ´step in, to sort out the mess´ created by
factious politicians, and after a period of
´corrective government´ to hand over to a cleaned up
civilian political system. Moderator regimes may be
found in societies at varying levels of social and
economic development, and be drawn both from the
small ex-colonial armies of West Africa considered
in Adekanye´s chapter, and from the much larger and
more institutionalised armies of Brazil (1945-64),
Argentina (1955-66) and Turkey. It may well be an
unstable regime type, because unity and
differentiation are threatened by the military´s
political role.

Factional Regimes. These are distinguished from the
moderator type by low unity, and in consequence
often by low differentiation also. This type of
regime is the almost inevitable result of the
personal coup by a disgruntled officer, such as
Acheampong´s intervention in Ghana in 1972, or
Amin´s in Uganda the previous year, still more so of
an NCO´s coup such as that of Batista in Cuba. It
may equally follow from the decline of unity and
differentiation in an initially moderator regime.
The military, and equally in the latter case groups
within it, become participants in the political
process in alliance with one or another set of
civilian political actors or factions, with which
they may be linked on grounds of ethnicity,
ideology, or simply mutual tactical convenience.

This is potentially a highly unstable pattern, and
such regimes, when they fall, may fall very hard
indeed; most of the extreme examples of
fragmentation, such as Uganda and Bangladesh, fairly
clearly belong to it, while in appropriate
conditions, as in Cuba or Nicaragua, it may give
rise to a revolutionary situation. It is
nonetheless possible for a sufficiently skilful
leader with an adequate political base, such as
Mobutu in Zaire or even Somoza in Nicaragua, to
construct a personalist regime which may be
surprisingly long-lasting.

Breakthrough Regimes. This, one of the most useful
of Huntington´s categories, is nonetheless difficult
to classify in terms of our initial variables. It
is the classic type of radical reforming military
regime, and normally requires low differentiation
and (since it usually results from a junior
officers´ coup) low unity. Thailand (1930), Egypt
(1952), Libya (1969) and Ethiopia (1974) are among
the clearest examples, all of them resulting from
coups against monarchies. Breakthrough coups may
also be fomented, as in Sudan (1969), Ethiopia and
Portugal (1974) by the radicalising effects on the
lower ranks of the military of prolonged involvement
in unsuccessful counter-insurgency operations.
There are few if any recent Latin American examples,
perhaps the closest being Peru (1968-75), where the
increased popular mobilisation promoted by a radical
military regime led to growing threats to military
unity, and in turn to the abandonment of the
venture; the military was in a sense too
differentiated to embark on a strategy of this kind.
The most distinctive feature of a breakthrough
regime is the peculiar form of threat which prompts
intervention. Rather than seeking, as with the veto
regime, to defend an existing social order with
which its own interests are identified, the military
seeks to attack a social order which presents a
threat to the radical nationalism of a modernising
army. While repression by the veto regime is
defensive, and mobilisation by civilian groups is
discouraged, that by the breakthrough regime is
offensive, and selective mobilisation at least is
positively encouraged. This leads in turn to a
decline in differentiation as other groups come to
share the values of the military.

While these regime types are, we believe,
useful, and will be used to structure our discussion

of political outcomes, they do not imply any rigid set of categories. Actual regimes are mixtures derived from specific conditions, not mere examplars of ideal types. They are affected not only by circumstances peculiar to particular countries, but also by more general variables which, because of their uneven impact, cannot easily be fitted into an outline like this one. One striking example is the role of external influence. We reject that stereotype which sees military regimes as neo-colonialist impositions, tied to some metropolitan power either by military dependence (for training and arms supply) or by economic interest. Too many regimes (Burma, Ethiopia, Ghana after 1981) not only fail to fit this stereotype, but run dramatically counter to it. At the same time, it would be foolish and biased to exclude the degree of external influence which frequently affects not only the military itself, but (in often heavily penetrated societies) other social groups and indeed the whole structure of state, society and economy as well. One of the advantages of a case study format is that it permits such variables to be admitted as and when they are needed.

Military Regime Outcomes

Our final set of variables consists of outcomes. At its crudest, the dilemma facing military regimes is whether to go or to stay: whether to demilitarise, by establishing and transferring power to some civilian political structure, or to institutionalise the regime by entrenching it at the centre of a civil-military structure of a more or less authoritarian kind. Even the choice between going and staying is not as stark as this suggests, however, since demilitarisation will almost inevitably be accompanied by some attempt by the military to guarantee its vital interests by placing restrictions on its successors, while institutionalisation will require some association of civilian groups with the regime. Equally, there are important variations within each main type. The following are the main possibilities:

Handback. This is the classic process of demilitarisation in which characteristically the military leadership supervises the drafting of a new constitution (usually devised in an often vain attempt to overcome what it sees as the deficiencies

of the previous civilian regime), and holds
elections in which familiar politicians, their
parties sometimes slightly realigned or disguised
under new names, compete for office. An alternative
form appears when the military precipitately
abandons power in the face of threats to its own
unity and differentiation, or of overwhelming
pressure from an external patron or domestic
political forces. There is no more difficult
military operation to manage than a retreat, and the
retreat from power may be anything from a tactical
withdrawal to a rout. The term handback emphasises
the continuity with previous periods of civilian
rule, and indicates the main problem to which the
chapters by Adekanye and Karakartal draw attention:
that the new civilian regime will embody many of the
deficiencies of the old, and may well lead to
further military intervention, and very possibly to
a cycle of successive interventions and
demilitarisations.

Civilian Renewal. Though ostensibly similar to the
handback option, this is distinguished by the new
civilian regime's capacity to break away from
previous political structures and attitudes. Almost
invariably, it requires a very long period of
military rule, or else a particularly sharp and very
likely violent jolt to the pattern of both civilian
and military politics. Otherwise entrenched
political structures, the resilience of which is
very easily underestimated by military regimes which
place their faith in constitutional engineering,
will be likely to reassert themselves. One way in
which this jolt may be produced is by a failure of
military rule so dramatic as to cure both civilian
politicians of calling for intervention, and
officers of wishing to intervene; Greece after 1974
and possibly Argentina in the wake of revelations
about the 'dirty war' following the 1983 return to
civilian rule may perhaps provide examples. Spain
and Portugal are cases of civilian renewal after
long periods of authoritarian rule. The capacity of
renewal to lead to stable liberal democratic systems
should not however be taken for granted. Such
systems rest on general conditions for the
maintenance of democratic government which go beyond
the process of demilitarisation.

Authoritarian Clientelism. The institutionalisation
of a military regime depends on its capacity to
acquire civilian allies who are willing to accept

subordination to military leadership in exchange for
some   share in running the state and especially some
share in the benefits which it provides.   The nature
of such a relationship is inherently   clientelistic:
it   is   an essentially transactional arrangement, in
which   the   military   patron   offers   some   of   the
resources   derived   from its control over the state,
notably physical protection   and   economic   payoffs,
and   in   return   receives political support from the
civilian   client.   The   essential   element   in   the
transaction   is   the   military's capacity to attract
subordinates who are on the   one   hand   sufficiently
influential   to make their support worth having, and
on the other insufficiently strong   and   independent
to   threaten   the   military   itself.   This   in turn
requires a fairly low level of autonomous   political
organisation,   or   alternatively   serious   divisions
among subordinated civilian groups which   facilitate
a   strategy of 'divide and rule'.   There are however
different forms of clientelism, which depend on   the
unity   of   the   military   command   structure and its
differentiation from civil society, as   well   as   on
the   character   of   the   civilian   clients   thus
recruited.   By authoritarian clientelism we have   in
mind a united military which, despite possibly close
links   with   the   civilian   bureaucracy,   is   well
differentiated from   (and   consequently   impermeable
to)   civilian   political groups.   This type is close
to   O'Donnell's   conception   of   bureaucratic
authoritarianism,   and is consequently most familiar
from southern Europe and the southern cone of   South
America.(4)

Factional   Clientelism.   This closely corresponds to
the factional regime   type   already   noted,   and   is
distinguished   from authoritarian clientelism by the
military's   lack   of   unity,   and   usually   of
differentiation.   It   may be queried to what degree
this is a form of institutionalisation   at   all,   or
indeed   to   what   degree   it   is   a form of military
regime.   It is essentially a personalist regime   led
by   an   individual who, having gained power by means
of a military   coup,   has   then   used   his   personal
skills   to   establish himself through alliances with
groups both military and civilian, and very possibly
also the backing of external allies.   It   does   not
differ substantially from personalist regimes led by
civilian   party   politicians, and often includes the
establishment of a party which serves as   a   conduit
for patronage.   Like equivalent civilian regimes, it
may   be longer or shorter lived.   It is certainly an

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option which is open to military leaders, however, and a popular one with many of them.

The Military Party State. This is rather a distinctive option, and involves the attempt to mobilise both the military and civilians within a single party state. It is especially associated with breakthrough regimes, and is distinguished both from handback and from the clientelist options by its conscious attempts to expand participation while destroying any previous structures through which participation has been organised. It is in this sense most closely akin to civilian renewal, but is distinguished from it both by the choice of authoritarian rather than liberal political forms, and by the continued involvement in government of a military leadership committed to programmatic goals. It may also be accompanied by a strong sense of threat. In a way, it may be seen as an attempt to create the kind of merger between army and party which results from guerilla revolutionary wars or wars of national liberation in such states as China, Cuba or Mozambique. If it succeeds, it may result, as in Mexico, in a uniquely stable and effective form of regime. As our case study of Ethiopia shows, however, it may involve considerable strains in the relationships between military, civilians, and external sources of influence.

Impasse. The preceding discussion may have given the impression that at the end of every military regime there is some more or less stable pattern of civil-military accommodation. That is far from being the case. Military regimes usually, though not always, set themselves some kind of political strategy which is intended, implicitly or explicitly, to lead to one of the outcomes noted above. Often, they do not achieve it. In particular, there may come a point at which the regime has clearly boxed itself into a corner, in which it can neither create new political institutions itself, nor do deals with existing political groupings, either by buying their support or by handing over to them. The length of time for which such a regime can struggle on will then depend very largely on the degree to which the rest of the military shares the predicament which has overtaken its leaders. Where the regime faces a threat which also confronts the military institution and civilian elite groups as a whole, the result may well be foreign intervention, invited by the beleaguered

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authorities; something of this kind has happened recently in El Salvador. Where the threat is less drastic, the commonest fate for the impasse regime is for it to be overthrown by a group within the armed forces which instantly sets about trying to reopen the political options which its predecessor has closed. This was the fate of the Acheampong government in Ghana after the failure of its ´union government´ scheme in 1978, or of the Galtieri government in Argentina after the failure of the Malvinas adventure in 1982. The alternative may be the midnight flit: a quick and undignified abandonment of power which leaves it to an incoming government to pick up the pieces, and which leaves the military in no condition to take over political responsibilities for several years to come.

PATTERNS OF REGIME SUCCESSION

The discussion so far has suggested that, despite the varieties of national experience and inevitable blurring of conceptual categories, there are only a limited number of regime types and of outcomes to which they may lead. From these, several characteristic patterns of regime succession can be derived. The most convenient point from which to trace these patterns is from the different regime types, which may be related both back to the key civil-military variables and forward to the possible outcomes. We will take each major regime type in turn, linking the pattern of outcomes to the much more detailed case studies examined in the later chapters.

Veto Regimes
The distinguishing feature of veto regimes is that they seize power at moments of high threat, either to the military itself or to some broader interests associated with it, and resort to highly repressive measures, usually of a counter-revolutionary kind, in order to remove this threat by dramatically reducing the level of political participation. This initial period of repression or state terror, sufficiently instanced by Chile, Argentina and Indonesia, is likely to be of fairly short duration. The most important reason for this is that, over the medium and longer term, the use of terror is likely to have corrosive effects on the unity of the military command structure. The initial coup may