

The Taiwan Issue in Sino-American Strategic Relations

Martin L. Lasater



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The Taiwan Issue in Sino-American Strategic Relations

Martin L. Lasater

The first two years of the Reagan administration saw a close correlation between improved unofficial relations between Washington and Taipei and a deterioration of strategic cooperation between Washington and Beijing. These developments led many U.S. officials and scholars to conclude that U.S. security interests may require periodic concessions over Taiwan to ensure China's cooperation in countering the Soviet threat.

Rejecting this view, Mr. Lasater argues that Washington's and Beijing's bilateral relations with Moscow and not the Taiwan issue are the key international determinants of Sino-American strategic cooperation. Examining the parameters of that cooperation and the role of Taiwan in Sino-American relations, Mr. Lasater suggests that Beijing is deliberately using U.S. security concerns to seek concessions on Taiwan and other issues. He advises a policy that stands firm in negotiations with the Chinese and that resists the temptation to make politically expedient concessions--a more balanced course of action whereby improved relations with Beijing are sought concurrently with the maintenance of friendly, unofficial ties with Taipei.

Martin L. Lasater is president of Martin L. Lasater and Associates, a consulting firm specializing in foreign policy and security affairs.

**For Celeste, Zara, Keyne, Kieran,
Chryseis, and Kendrik**

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Martin L. Lasater

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*Martin L. Lasater
Washington, D.C.
August 30, 1984*



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Part I

Sino-American Strategic Relations

1

Introduction

The initial decision on the part of the United States to normalize Sino-American relations was based upon perceptions of the Soviet Union as a mutual threat to both countries. The two chief American architects of improved relations with the PRC, President Richard Nixon and his national security affairs advisor Henry Kissinger, have both referred to this strategic imperative as the motive behind their efforts to establish a cooperative relationship with China during 1969-1972. President Nixon wrote in the New York Times on October 11, 1982:

The key factor that brought us together ten years ago was our common concern with the Soviet threat, and our recognition that we had a better chance of containing that threat if we replaced hostility with cooperation between Peking and Washington. This overriding strategic concern dominated our dialogue, and our relationship, during the first decade.¹

Henry Kissinger, in a guest editorial appearing in the January 30, 1983, issue of the Washington Post, described the strategic perspective of the Nixon Administration in this way:

What brought the two nations together was not sentiment but awareness of a common threat....There were powerful incentives for a rapprochement with China: to balance the Soviet Union, either to restrain it or to induce it to negotiate seriously; to isolate

¹ Richard M. Nixon, "America and China: The Next Ten Years," New York Times, October 11, 1982, p. A19.

Hanoi to give it an incentive to end the Vietnam War; to maintain American self-assurance amid our messy withdrawal from Indochina by demonstrating our continuing capacity for major positive initiatives.²

Kissinger was even more explicit in his memoirs regarding the strategic origins of Sino-American relations. In White House Years he wrote: "It had been the Soviet Union whose menace had brought China and us together; our cooperation reflected a geopolitical reality produced by concern at the growth of Soviet military power."³

The Carter Administration carried the Nixon initiative to a logical conclusion by extending diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China on January 1, 1979. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security advisor, outlined the strategic perceptions held by the Democratic administration:

It is essential that we treat the Chinese as a serious global and strategic partner.

Nor need we pretend that the American-Chinese connection isn't heavily influenced by the Soviet threat. Alliances are usually the product of a third-party threat. We should not be shy in saying to the world and to the Chinese that there is a mutual American-Chinese interest in stemming Soviet hegemonism....We have an interest in a strong and secure China.⁴

During the early normalization period, Deng Xiaoping openly advocated close strategic relations between the United States, Japan, Western Europe, and China to counter Soviet expansionism. In a February 1979 interview with Time magazine, Deng stressed the need to unite against the Soviet Union, saying:

² Henry A. Kissinger, "Mr. Shultz Goes to China," Washington Post, January 30, 1983, p. C8.

³ Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years, (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), p. 1053.

⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "If the Russians and the Chinese Make Up," Washington Post, November 22, 1982, p. A15.

After setting up this relationship between China, Japan and the U.S., we must further develop the relationship in a deepening way. If we really want to be able to place curbs on the polar bear, the only realistic thing for us is to unite. If we only depend on the strength of the U.S., it is not enough. If we only depend on the strength of Europe, it is not enough. We are an insignificant, poor country, but if we unite, well, it will then carry weight."

The visit of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the PRC in January 1980 laid the initial foundation for a defense relationship between the United States and China. As envisioned by American planners, the relationship was to be composed of three elements: (1) "a strategic dialogue between senior defense leaders to promote understanding of each other's policies and interests so that parallel actions could be taken when interests were seen to coincide"; (2) "reciprocal visits between...defense establishments in various mutually agreed functional areas, such as military education and training, logistics, and military medicine...to identify areas where limited cooperation might be mutually beneficial"; and (3) "the willingness of the United States to cooperate with China in selected areas of defense technological development."

The Reagan Administration continued to place high value on the strategic aspects of Sino-American relations. The Administration described the PRC as "a friendly, non-allied country with which we share important strategic interests, including a common perception of threatening Soviet ambitions worldwide."

A fundamental question, therefore, is what are the interests of the United States and how does strategic cooperation with the PRC further those interests?

* "An Interview with Teng Hsiao-ping: Calling for Stronger U.S.-China Ties and a United Front Against Moscow," Time, February 5, 1979, p. 34.

6 Prepared statement of James A. Kelly, "Defense Relations with the People's Republic of China," given before U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, June 5, 1984, p. 1, ms.

7 Prepared statement of Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., given before U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, East-West Relations: Focus on the Pacific, 97th Cong., 2d sess., June 10, 1982, p. 9.

According to the FY 1984 Posture Statement of the Secretary of Defense, the fundamental vital interests of the United States and the foreign policy needed to protect them are:

--To preserve our freedom, our political identity, and the institutions that are their foundation--the Constitution and the rule of law.

--To protect the territory of the United States, its citizens, and its vital interests abroad from armed attack.

--To foster an international order supportive of the interests of the United States through alliances and cooperative relationships with friendly nations; and by encouraging democratic institutions, economic development, and self-determination throughout the world.

--To protect access to foreign markets and overseas resources in order to maintain the strength of the United States' industrial, agricultural, and technological base and the nation's economic well-being.*

The Posture Statement defines the Soviet Union as the major, and only serious, threat to these interests: "The Soviet Union poses, and for the foreseeable future will continue to pose, the most formidable military threat to the United States and its interests. Threats to our interests may arise from other sources or circumstances, but only the Soviet Union has the military power directly to inflict mortal damage to the United States."

To counter the Soviet threat to U.S. vital interests, the Reagan Administration established the following as the highest priority national security objectives of the United States:

* U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1984 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 15.

* Ibid.

--To deter military attack by the USSR and its allies against the United States, its allies, and other friendly countries; and to deter, or to counter, use of Soviet military power to coerce or intimidate our friends and allies.

--In the event of an attack, to deny the enemy his objectives and bring a rapid end to the conflict on terms favorable to our interests; and to maintain the political and territorial integrity of the United States and its allies.

--To promote meaningful and verifiable mutual reductions in nuclear and conventional forces through negotiations with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, respectively; and to discourage further proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world.

--To inhibit further expansion of Soviet control and military presence, and to induce the Soviet Union to withdraw from those countries, such as Afghanistan, where it has imposed and maintains its presence and control by force of arms.

--To foster a reduction in the Soviet Union's overall capability to sustain a military buildup by preventing, in concert with our allies, the flow of military significant technologies and material to the Soviet Union, and by refraining from actions that serve to subsidize the Soviet economy.¹⁰

China's role in overall U.S. strategy becomes apparent in the discussion of regional objectives in the Posture Statement. Regarding U.S. security objectives in East Asia and the Pacific, the Statement says:

The importance to the United States of the security of East Asia and the Pacific is demonstrated by the bilateral treaties with Japan, Korea, and the Philippines; the Manila Pact, which adds Thailand to our treaty partners; and our treaty with Australia and New Zealand--the ANZUS Treaty. It is further enhanced by the deployment of land and air

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 16.

forces in Korea and Japan, and the forward deployment of the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific. Our foremost regional objectives, in conjunction with our regional friends and allies, are:

--To maintain the security of our essential sea lanes and of the United States' interests in the region; to maintain the capability to fulfill our treaty commitments to the Pacific and East Asia; to prevent the Soviet Union, North Korea, and Vietnam from interfering in the affairs of others; to build toward a durable strategic relationship with the People's Republic of China; and to support the stability and independence of friendly countries.¹¹

"To build toward a durable strategic relationship with the People's Republic of China" is, therefore, an objective of U.S. national security policy defined as being in the vital interests of the United States. President Ronald Reagan affirmed the strategic value of China to the United States in his official statement accompanying the August 17, 1982 Joint Communiqué between Washington and Beijing. The President said:

Building a strong and lasting friendship with China has been an important foreign policy goal of four consecutive American administrations. Such a relationship is vital to our long-term national security interests and contributes to stability in East Asia. It is in the national interest of the United States that this important strategic relationship be advanced.

In June 1982 testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Under Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle discussed U.S. security interests and strategic objectives in terms of China:

Although not an ally, the People's Republic of China seems to share our view of the dangers from Moscow's expansionist drive into Asia. Indeed, the growing convergence of Chinese and American strategic interests has been the primary reason for the steady

¹¹ Ibid., p. 17. (emphasis added)

improvement in our bilateral relations over the past decade. Increasingly, we have found that where our common interests are threatened, it is useful to take parallel actions.

The People's Republic of China appears to have decided that containment of Soviet expansionism and the maintenance of a global balance of power depends for the foreseeable future on the viability of U.S. military power and America's alliances throughout the world. As a result, the Chinese actively support our security partnership with Japan; they are enthusiastic supporters of NATO; they support a continued U.S. military presence in the Philippines and the Western Pacific. Like us and our allies, China firmly opposes the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Soviet-backed Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea.¹²

Following Secretary of State George Shultz's visit to the PRC in February 1983, Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs, told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: "Developing a strong, stable, and enduring U.S.-China relationship is an important element of President Reagan's foreign policy." He then went on to list some of the principal benefits the relationship had for the United States:

We no longer have to plan and spend to confront a Chinese threat; our parallel interests in containing the Soviet Union have been repeatedly reaffirmed and we are in fundamental agreement that the Soviets remain the principal threat to peace in the world; we have common interests in containing not only Vietnamese aggression in Southeast Asia and encouraging a peaceful settlement of the Kampuchean problem based on Khmer self-determination, but also in resisting Soviet aggression in Afghanistan; we are able to maintain a useful dialogue with China on a wide range of important international problems of common concern; China has developed

¹² Prepared statement of Fred Ikle, "Soviet Challenge in the Pacific and U.S. and Allied Responses," given before U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, June 10, 1982, p. 11, ms.

constructive regional policies and cooperative relations with our Asian allies; China has developed increasingly strong ties to the western-oriented international economic system; trade and investment opportunities for American business have grown tremendously; despite problems, East Asia has emerged as one of the more stable and prosperous regions of the world, with China playing an increasingly responsible regional role.¹³

In mid-1983 the Reagan Administration decided to broaden the base of Sino-American relations. As noted by Wolfowitz in testimony before Congress in June 1984: "The particular goal of this Administration has been to put U.S.-China relations on a more stable and increasingly comprehensive basis--one that avoids the extreme of hostility and suspicion without succumbing to the opposite extreme of euphoria and sentimentality."¹⁴

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William Brown elaborated on this comprehensive approach to U.S. China policy:

Our still developing relationship with China is an event of momentous importance to both countries and to the stability of East Asia. We are, of course, aware of certain perspectives we share with the Chinese concerning Soviet activities in the region. We also recognize that a certain degree of cooperation in security matters could be natural and mutually beneficial as the relationship with China evolves. But the U.S. will neither press this possibility nor make it the centerpiece of our bilateral contacts with Beijing simply because we wish that relationship to rest on a far broader, firmer foundation than a common reaction to Soviet policy. Instead we will work for a balanced development of economic, political and people-to-people contacts with China and

¹³ Prepared statement of Paul Wolfowitz, "Sino-American Relations Eleven Years After the Shanghai Communique," given before U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, February 28, 1983, pp. 1, 3, ms.

¹⁴ Prepared statement of Paul Wolfowitz, given before U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, June 5, 1984, p. 1, ms.

encourage China's greater participation in the regional and international arrangements which we support. We are convinced that only such a far-sighted approach will sustain U.S.-Chinese ties over the long term. And such an approach should also provide an even better basis for security cooperation if that should seem desirable to both sides in the future.¹⁵

The Reagan Administration has attempted to use its broad approach to Sino-American relations not only to enhance the value of strategic cooperation to the Chinese, but also to help moderate PRC domestic and foreign policies. As summarized by James Kelly, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, on June 5, 1984:

The United States' aim is to build an enduring, friendly but not allied relationship with China that recognizes both our common interests and our differences and which will enable us to take complimentary actions with the Chinese when our common interests are challenged. A strong, secure, successfully modernizing China can be a force for peace and stability. China's stake in having a stable and secure international environment for its modernization efforts make it unlikely to become a threat. Over the past several years, China has moderated its foreign policies and demonstrated a real desire to improve state-to-state relations with its Asian neighbors. One of our aims in strengthening the defense component of our relations with China is to reinforce these positive trends in Beijing's foreign policies.¹⁶

At the close of writing in July 1984, Sino-American strategic relations had begun to improve after more than two years of limited cooperation. These were years characterized by continuous controversy over the Taiwan issue and by gradual improvement in Sino-Soviet

¹⁵ Prepared statement of William A. Brown, "The Soviet Role in Asia," given before U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on Europe and the Middle East, The Soviet Role in Asia, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983), pp. 536-537.

¹⁶ James A. Kelly, "Defense Relations with the People's Republic of China," p. 8, ms.

relations. In mid-1984, the Taiwan issue remained unresolved, but the Sino-Soviet normalization process had slowed because of bitter disagreement over Vietnam.

The remaining chapters of Part One examine the close relationship between the Soviet threat and Sino-American strategic cooperation. Among the factors examined will be the national power of the PRC, the nature of the Sino-Soviet split and the probability of its continuation, and the military and political parameters of the U.S.-PRC strategic relationship. The objective of the analysis is to determine the extent to which Sino-American strategic cooperation is possible and of benefit to the United States.

2

The National Power of the PRC

China's national power may be considered in terms of its geography, military capabilities, economic strength, and various sociopsychological factors. Equally important is how China's leaders will likely use the nation's resources. Each of these elements will be introduced briefly in this chapter in terms of U.S. security interests. References to the various elements of PRC national power will appear throughout the remainder of the text.

2.1 GEOGRAPHY

From the point of view of American security interests--that is, the extent to which the PRC diverts the Soviet threat away from the United States and the free world as a whole--the geographic elements of China's national power are paramount. The PRC is the third largest nation in the world, having about 3.7 million square miles and roughly one-quarter of the world's population. The PRC has the world's longest land boundary, roughly 13,000 miles, of which some 4,500 miles lay adjacent to the Soviet Union. The sheer mass of China, both physically and demographically, effectively restricts Soviet expansion into Asia. From the geographic perspective, it matters little to the United States who controls China, as long as that government is sufficiently strong to maintain social cohesion and sufficiently nationalistic to resist USSR encroachment on China's territory. China forms a natural barrier to Soviet domination of Asia, and the preservation of that barrier is strategically important to the United States.

2.2 MILITARY CAPABILITIES

As important as geography and population are to a nation's power, its government must command sufficient military forces to defend national interests. In the case of the PRC, analysts have noted the paradoxical nature of China's military capabilities. Although the nation possesses four million men in uniform, their ability to defend China against a determined Soviet attack is questionable. As Harlan Jencks summarized: "The gross numbers are staggering. The People's Liberation Army constitutes the world's largest land army, the second largest navy, and the third largest air force. Yet there is considerable doubt as to how effectively this huge force can defend China."¹⁷ John J. Sloan of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency described China's military capabilities in this way:

Discussion of China's current and future military capabilities is filled with paradoxes. On the one hand, its overall military capabilities can be viewed as impressive. This is particularly true when the nation's level of economic development and the problems associated with adequately providing for the livelihood of about one billion people are considered. China is the only developing nation possessing a strategic missile system capable of reaching both superpowers. It possesses the world's largest standing army, an army equipped with large numbers of standard weapons, albeit not sufficiently modern. China's air force is the third largest in the world, and its navy includes more submarines and aircraft than any other, save the United States and the USSR. These large numbers of forces and unsophisticated weapons have often been creatively adapted and deployed to maximize other assets available, such as geography, a large population, and political communication skills. Chinese military defense capabilities are better than at any point in modern history.

On the other hand, China's armed forces possess many serious weaknesses which belie the strengths suggested by force numbers

¹⁷ Harlan W. Jencks, "Defending China in 1982," Current History, 81, 476 (September 1982), p. 250.

alone. Many of these weaknesses have become convincingly apparent or have been openly acknowledged only in relatively recent times.^{1*}

Most analysts agree that the most serious weaknesses within the PLA in its ground, air, and naval branches are: lack of mobility and mechanization, poor logistics systems for sustained offensive operations, marginal command and control for combined arms or joint service operations, obsolescent weaponry, limited power projection capability, obsolescent aircraft and avionics, poor pilot training, inadequate communications, limited capability of its defense industry, obsolescent ships and onboard equipment, and limited amphibious lift capability.

Although it is in the U.S. interest that China be strong enough to protect its borders and to prevent Soviet encroachment, it is not in the U.S. interest that the PRC become a threat either to the United States or to friendly governments in the region. This leads to one of the most difficult problems facing U.S. policymakers: to what extent should the United States help build up the PLA? At the heart of U.S. strategic cooperation with China is the assumption that, through military and economic assistance, Washington will be better able to leverage future PRC policy along lines in keeping with U.S. interests. This is a dangerous assumption; but one which American leaders risk, given the growing military strength of the Soviet Union and the hostility evident in U.S.-USSR relations.

2.3 ECONOMY

China has enormous potential economic power; but, like its military, the PRC economy has great weaknesses to overcome. China's gross national product (GNP) in 1983 was \$264.5 billion, but its per capita income averaged only \$258. Total trade was \$43.66 billion, of which \$22.33 billion were exports and \$21.33 billion were imports. Reserves at the close of 1983 totalled \$19.3 billion, of which \$14.5 billion were foreign exchange reserves. China's agricultural output exceeded \$270 billion yuan (\$1.98 yuan = US\$1) and industrial output totalled \$614.7 billion yuan. State revenues in 1983

^{1*} U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, and Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Implications of U.S.-China Military Cooperation: A Workshop (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1981), p. 31.

were \$124.9 billion yuan and expenditures totalled \$129.2 billion yuan.¹⁹

China's current leadership has set socialist economic modernization as the essential national goal of this decade and the remainder of the century. Deng Xiaoping in his opening speech to the important Twelfth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on September 1, 1982, said:

The 1980s will be an important decade in the historical development of our Party and state. To step up socialist modernization, to strive for China's reunification and particularly for the return of Taiwan to the motherland, and to oppose hegemonism and safeguard world peace--these are the three major tasks of our people in the 1980s. Economic construction is at the core of these tasks, as it is the basis for the solution of China's external and domestic problems.²⁰

Echoing the senior statesman's remarks, Hu Yaobang in his report to the CPC Congress said:

The general task of the Communist Party of China in this new historical period is to unite the people of all our nationalities in working hard and self-reliantly to achieve, step by step, the modernization of our industry, agriculture, national defense, and science and technology and to make China a culturally advanced and highly democratic socialist country....

Of the various tasks for bringing about an all-round new situation, the most important one is to push forward the socialist modernization of China's economy.²¹

¹⁹ Data on China's economy in 1983 may be found in Zhang Zhongji, "China's Economy: Achievements in 1983," Beijing Review, 27, 8 (February 20, 1984), pp. 14-17; "Report on the State Financial Situation," ibid., 27, 22 (May 28, 1984), p. 21; and "China Data," China Business Review, 11, 1 (January-February 1984), pp. 52-53.

²⁰ The text of Deng's speech can be found in The Twelfth National Congress of the CPC (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1982), pp. 1-6.

Donald Zagoria addressed the problem of socialist modernization in an important Foreign Affairs article.²¹ Zagoria pointed out that the present leadership is in the midst of dismantling the China created by Mao Zedong. This process is essential because of the loss of popular confidence in the Chinese Communist Party caused by the Cultural Revolution and other policy failures. Zagoria noted several important features of the "quiet revolution" now underway in the PRC: the decollectivization of agriculture through the "household responsibility" system; the shift from heavy to light industry; the placing of emphasis upon labor productivity and efficiency instead of ideological "purity"; the decentralization of economic decision-making; the expansion of private enterprise; the creation of special economic zones; and the increased emphasis on science and technology and the resulting improved status of Chinese intellectuals. Each of these initiatives are resisted by many individuals in the party, bureaucracy, and military who, for personal or ideological reasons, find fault with the reformists' program. Moreover, the current leadership is itself undecided about the ultimate propriety of many of its reforms. As Zagoria observed, "China's economic system is just beginning to experiment with market forces." He warned:

The true tests lie ahead. Will the Chinese move further in the direction of trying to create a market socialist society of the Hungarian or Yugoslav variety, or will they tightly restrict the market forces they are beginning to unleash? There is still no coherent strategy for combining Plan and market and the problems of running a mixed system are bound to be enormous. Indeed, the present situation is unstable....At some point a decision will have to be made whether to go forward or backward.²²

Industrialization is one of the keys to China's modernization. According to Joyce Kallgren, China's major industrial goals are (1) to increase the growth of light industry and slow the growth of heavy industry; (2) to break the bottleneck caused by limited energy

²¹ Ibid., pp. 18-19.

²² Donald S. Zagoria, "China's Quiet Revolution," Foreign Affairs, 62, 4 (Spring 1984), pp. 879-904.

²³ Ibid., p. 895.

resources; (3) to facilitate foreign investment, especially the transfer of science and technology; (4) to increase factory productivity; and (5) to establish a fiscal system which will give the central government appropriate revenues and yet retain local initiative and self-reliance.²⁴

Problems abound. Western businessmen have been particularly concerned about the uncertainties surrounding investments in China. The February 1983 cancellation of the Daqing ethylene glycol plant is an example of setbacks which can occur without warning. The cancellation of the plant, scheduled to be built at a cost of \$26 million with Japanese assistance, caught Tokyo by surprise because the project had been viewed as the first of a series of new construction projects. Previous Japanese and Western expectations of investment opportunities were dashed in 1979, when ongoing negotiations valued at \$40 billion were suddenly cut off in the wake of China's economic retrenchment.²⁵

U.S. security interests are served by a China sufficiently strong economically to prevent a return to the social chaos which plagued the mainland in earlier decades. But care needs to be exercised here as well. It would not be in the U.S. interest for the PRC to develop into a superpower rival like the Soviet Union, or even for China to emerge as a economic competitor on the scale of Japan.

²⁴ Joyce Kallgren, "China in 1983: The Turmoil of Modernization," Asian Survey, 24, 1 (January 1984), pp. 71-72.

²⁵ Kyodo, February 16, 1983, in U.S. Government, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Asia & Pacific, February 16, 1983, p. C1. (Hereafter FBIS-Asia & Pacific). Also see U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, East-West Trade: The Prospects to 1985, 97th Cong., 2d sess., August 18, 1982, p. 56.