

# **U.S. DEFENSE PLANNING**

A Critique

**John M. Collins**

**Elizabeth Ann Severns and  
Thomas P. Glakas**



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and  
**Thomas P. Glakas**  
Research Assistants



**Routledge**

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To  
"BARBWIRE BOB" KINGSTON

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who knows that sound plans improve prospects  
for success in battle.*

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# Foreword

We wrote the Director of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) on July 15, 1981, to express our concerns in regard to the United States defense planning apparatus.

We observed that bolstering budgets will produce fewer defense benefits than desired unless U.S. leaders stand back, survey the strategic forest instead of the tactical trees, stress proven principles, and press for practical change. We concluded that "sound, cohesive strategies all too often fail to shape requirements for U.S. Armed Forces. We will continue to pay more than necessary for capabilities that fail to match ends with means until the shortcoming is corrected."

We felt that sizable increases in defense spending requested in the Fiscal Year 1982 budget, and plans for even greater increases in future years, magnified the need to insure that our initiatives are coordinated toward agreed upon objectives. Therefore, we requested CRS to thoroughly examine the procedures and structures for U.S. strategic policy and planning.

The events since July, 1981, have, if anything, strengthened our conviction. The defense spending plans of the Administration have come under increasing criticism from those who feel there is lack of coherent strategy underlying them.

This is not an indictment of this particular Administration. In fact, it has proposed some constructive changes. The problems we see are built into the structure and institutional attitudes of the system and have existed for years. But their importance is magnified today as the consensus for increased defense effort erodes in the face of tight budgets.


We recognize the necessity to increase defense capabilities, but feel that dollars alone will not solve our problems. Critical examination of the way we approach defense issues is even more important.

The recent call for reform of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a welcome sign that the requirement for critical examination is being more widely recognized. We compliment the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of Staff of the Army for coming forward with their analyses and recommendations for improvement in the JCS system. We particularly want to express our appreciation to Chairman Richard White and the House


Armed Services Subcommittee on Investigations for conducting a very extensive series of hearings on possible changes in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and related aspects of the National Security Act.

But the examination of defense planning must go beyond the Joint Chiefs to include all the participants: the Services, the Department of Defense, the State Department, the National Security Council, the President, and the Congress. This work examines all these elements, provides the first comprehensive review of the strengths and weaknesses of the present structure, and suggests options for improvement.


We want to extend our deep appreciation to John M. Collins, Senior Specialist in National Defense at the Congressional Research Service, and his research assistants who devoted hundreds of hours in producing this report. Its observations and conclusions are incisive and hardhitting. While we as individuals may disagree with some of his specific conclusions and characterizations, we wholeheartedly agree that the present structure is far from optimum and deserves serious discussion. We trust this work will be a constructive addition to the present debate and will assist in putting the major national security questions it addresses in perspective.



NORMAN D. DICKS  
Member of Congress



JACK EDWARDS  
Member of Congress



GARY HART  
U.S. Senator



NEWT GINGRICH  
Member of Congress



BILL CHAPPELL  
Member of Congress

# Acknowledgments


Congressman Norman D. Dicks (D-Washington) started this study when he invited me to a working lunch at the Capitol, where we discussed U.S. defense issues. Four associates, at his invitation, co-signed requests for a complete appraisal of the U.S. planning system. Terry Freese, one of his Legislative Assistants, was my primary point of contact for 12 full months, while the product took shape.

A parade of defense officials, past and present, participated in this community effort. They provided input during the gestation process and reviewed products, with clear understanding that concurrence was never required. Distinguished civilians among them included a former Secretary of Defense, a former Director of Central Intelligence, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs in a former NSC. Two Chairmen of The Joint Chiefs of Staff, a sitting Service Chief, the current CINC of a unified command, and a recent J-5 all made important contributions. So did other senior officers and assistants from the JCS and all four U.S. Military Services, in active and retired status.

Colleagues in the Library of Congress, such as Louis C. Finch, Mark M. Lowenthal, Alva M. Bowen, Jr., Alice Maroni, Robert L. Goldich, and Paul Zinsmeister were special sources of information and inspiration. Frederick H. Pauls, Walter J. Oleszek, and Stanley I. Bach scrubbed my coverage of Congress. Jim Robinson, the CRS reviewer, blocked most of my Irish hyperbole and improved balance in other important ways.

Several first-class professionals converted my scrawl to intelligible type. Mary Jane Berens and Sherry Ann Robinson took turns at the start. Claudette Lytle and Annie Ruth Warren put the package in final form fast enough to make my head swim. Gail Coppage gnawed her nails to the elbow producing complex tables.

As always, I salute my long-suffering wife, Swift, who proofed successive drafts, put paper on my bureau, and bought bulbs for a pen that writes in the dark.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "John M. Collins". The signature is fluid and stylized, with the first letters of the first and last names being capitalized and prominent.

John M. Collins  
Alexandria, Virginia  
July 4, 1982

# Background, Purpose, and Scope

*The cold fact is that the United States can survive . . . without any one of the hotly debated . . . weapon systems. But the United States is in grave danger without a viable national strategy.*

Daniel O. Graham  
"The Decline of U.S. Strategic Thought"  
*Air Force Magazine*, August 1977

Superior defense plans fuse political, economic, military, technological, and sociological power in ways that cover state interests, while conserving resources to the greatest prudent extent. Poor products can increase costs without reducing risks, because forces and funds that support slipshod schemes often fail to furnish security.

This critical appraisal of the U.S. defense planning system seeks to serve a five-fold purpose:

- set assessment standards;
- appraise U.S. planning in principle;
- appraise U.S. planning in practice;
- identify U.S. planning problems; and
- present optional courses of corrective action.

The study shows how domestic and foreign policy inputs from the White House, National Security Council, and State Department affect defense planning. It also considers congressional participation. Detailed discussion, however, dwells on the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and their abilities to produce sound military strategies.<sup>1</sup> Organizational structures, procedures, personnel, and products are essential subjects.

1. For panoramic discussions of defense planning, which expand many points addressed in this paper, see Jordan, Amos A. and William J. Taylor, Jr., *American National Security: Policy and Process*, Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, 604 p.; also *Planning U.S. Security*, ed. by Phillip S. Kronenberg, Washington, D.C., National Defense University, 1981, 214 p.

The study surveys forests instead of trees. Specialists will be surprised at the absence of “alphabet soup.” Particulars concerning DG, JSPD, JSCP, and POM receive less attention than planning patterns.<sup>2</sup> Programming, budgeting, tactics, doctrine, logistics, personnel management, and force development are treated only tangentially, to indicate connections with defense strategy.

The product notes but does not dwell on strengths of the U.S. defense planning system. Instead, as requested, it explores problems with an eye toward pursuing improvements. The ultimate aim is to furnish a point of departure for congressional hearings on a range of related subjects, starting with the National Security Act of 1947, as at present amended.<sup>3</sup>

2. DG is Defense Guidance. JSPD is Joint Strategic Planning Document. JSCP is Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. POM is Program Objectives Memorandum. A spate of such acronyms are part of the Pentagon's Planning-Program-Budgeting System (PPBS).

3. The purpose and scope of this study respond to requests from the five congressional sponsors identified in their foreword.

PART ONE

**Defense Planning:  
Steps and Standards**

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## ONE

# Defense Planning Steps

Defense planning, a dynamic process, takes place in a matrix, much of which is non-military (Figures 1 and 2). Comprehensive and foreign policy planning, which are complementary, proceed simultaneously through five stages in constant flux.

Step 1, which specifies purpose, takes precedence. Step 2 appraises opposition. Step 3 formulates strategy to satisfy objectives in the face of all obstacles. Step 4 allocates resources to cover requirements without intolerable risk. Step 5 reviews alternatives, if available assets are insufficient to support preferred concepts.

### STEP 1: SPECIFY PURPOSES

Defense planners seek to protect and promote assorted interests that form the foundation for national security.

Domestic tranquility and prosperity are inseparable from the interest called common defense, which U.S. founding fathers first delineated in the Declaration of Independence, then incorporated in the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution. Survival, physical security, peace, strategic stability, power, freedom of action, and freedom of the seas are among its many subdivisions.

Tributary interests (strategic and tactical, active and passive, positive and negative, immediate and deferred, regional and worldwide) supplement the intrinsic core. American interests in European political alignment and Persian Gulf petroleum are exemplary.<sup>1</sup>

Some interests are worth spilling blood and spending billions to safeguard. Others merit strong attention, but not a shooting war. Decision-makers who hope to match ends and means in meaningful ways must put them in perspective, with the most important on top.

1. Additional discussion of U.S. security interests is contained in Collins, John M., *U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities, 1960-1980*, Washington, D.C., McGraw-Hill Publications, 1980, p. 17-22, 303, 343, 367.

Figure 1

DEFENSE PLANNING MATRIX

COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING<sup>1</sup>

Identifies national wants/needs	Interests
Shapes supporting national purposes	Basic Goals
Determines relative importance	Priorities
Identifies impediments to accomplishment	Multiform Threats
Allocates national resources	Means
Seeks public consensus	Information

FOREIGN POLICY PLANNING

Outlines roles in the world	International Aims
Identifies present/potential opponents	External Threats
Generates strategic guidelines	International Policies
Promotes partnerships	Commitments
Specifies role of military power	Tasks

---

DEFENSE PLANNING

DETERMINES GOALS	MILITARY AIMS
DETERMINES RELATIVE IMPORTANCE	PRIORITIES
ASSESSES OPPOSING CAPABILITIES/INTENTIONS	MILITARY THREATS
SELECTS COURSES OF ACTION	MILITARY STRATEGY
HOW	CONCEPTS
WHERE	THEATERS
WHEN	TIMING
ASSIGNS RESPONSIBILITIES	MISSIONS
DETERMINES RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS	FEASIBILITY
FORCES	TOOLS
WHAT KIND	TYPES
HOW MANY	LEVELS
LOGISTICS	SUPPORT
BUDGETS	COSTS
IDENTIFIES DEFICIENCIES	RISKS


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ALL PLANNING

Seeks to reconcile mismatched ends and means	Accommodation
--	---------------

1. Comprehensive planning considers national security in complete context, taking foreign and domestic requirements into account concurrently.

Figure 2.  
**DEFENSE PLANNING PROCESS**



## STEP 2: APPRAISE OPPOSITION

The nature, imminence, and intensity of apparent perils determine what (if anything) should and could be done in what order of priority to safeguard U.S. interests from all foes, both foreign and domestic. Proper appraisals start with enemy capabilities (what opponents *could do*, if so inclined). Listing capabilities in isolation, however, can lead to incorrect conclusions. The Soviets, for example, massed enough ballistic missiles to atomize America many years ago, but still refrain for many reasons. Enemy intentions (what opponents are *likely to do* in assorted circumstances) consequently are critical. Complete assessments also consider enemy vulnerabilities and opportunities to exploit them.<sup>2</sup>

## STEP 3: FORMULATE STRATEGY

Experienced defense specialists recognize that the best intelligence estimates are often fallible, and try to fashion strategies that will work if prognostications prove wrong.

Collins' Law says, "If you don't know what you want to do, you can't plan how to do it." Sound politico-military objectives therefore must delineate at the onset what must be done to achieve desired degrees of security. Domestic goals frequently conflict with needs for national defense. Attempts to balance the U.S. federal budget, reduce tax burdens, and curb inflation while pushing important social programs, for example, bump into demands for big military buildups. Priorities once again are imperative.

Concept formulation starts with policy guidelines, keeping national aims in mind. Ten possible choices at opposite poles illustrate a wide range of options:

Isolation	or	Involvement
Defensive posture	or	Offensive posture
Stress diplomacy	or	Stress military power
Stress arms control	or	Slight arms control
Status quo	or	Change
Containment	or	Rollback
Selective containment	or	Universal containment
Partnerships important	or	Partnerships immaterial
Supply supplicants	or	Police the world
Prorate burdens	or	Bear the biggest brunt

2. Essentials of net assessment are summarized in *ibid*, p. 3-14. For relationships between such assessments and strategy formulation, see Kent, Sherman, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1966, 226 p.

Collective security policy simply sets forth a philosophy that loosely links nations with common interests or needs. It can, and usually does, however, lead to formal or informal commitments that pledge partners to take specific actions at particular times and places. Planners must consider multiple implications in each case, since allies may hinder as well as help.

Finally, defense strategists fit operational concepts into the policy/commitment framework in ways they believe would best accomplish objectives picked to protect national interests. That process, which is both an art and a science, employs political, economic, military, social, technological, and psychological power to achieve stated purposes through diplomacy, threats, force, indirect pressures, subterfuge, and other imaginative means in many combinations.<sup>3</sup>

#### STEP 4: ALLOCATE RESOURCES

Conceptual planning ascertains what should be done to satisfy critical security interests. Resource allocators compare resultant requirements with present and projected capabilities, in terms of forces and funds, to confirm or deny feasibility.

The planning process terminates with Step 4 only if aspirations and assets mesh completely. Step 5 follows when they refuse to merge.

#### STEP 5: RECONCILE ENDS WITH MEANS

Reconciliation is essential when unacceptable risks occupy the breach between ends and means. At least six choices, singly or in combination, are available:

- Reduce waste
- Compress or discard objectives
- Reshape strategic concepts
- Revise force requirements
- Increase resources
- Bluff

Planners must be cautious, because reducing risks can be a risky business. Reducing waste is properly top priority, but trimming "fat" can cause serious problems, if careless surgeons cut into "muscle." Telescoping objectives and tinkering with strategies is less likely to stir up political

3. For a concise review of interrelationships among national security interests, objectives, policies, commitments, and concept formulation, see Collins, John M., *Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices*, Annapolis, Md., U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1973, p. 1-7, 14-21.

storms than requests for more resources. Critical interests, however, remain and must be covered. Overoptimizing forces for any set of concepts stifles flexibility. Bluster sometimes holds foes at bay, but habitual bluff is bound to be a loser.

### **PLANNING STEPS RELATED TO REALITY**

The five planning steps summarized above rarely occur in Utopian sequence. Except in times of dire emergency, U.S. leaders tend to downgrade national defense, glossing over or assuming away many potential threats. They try to walk a tightrope between excessive defense expenditures that emasculate political, economic, social, scientific, and ecological programs on one hand, and deficient defense expenditures that endanger national security on the other. Experience shows, however that success is spotty whenever planners skip steps or overstress one at the expense of others.

## TWO

# Defense Planning Standards

Essentials of successful defense planning establish standards against which personnel policies, organizational structures, and procedures can be assessed. Failure to satisfy any of the following preconditions makes effective products an iffy proposition at best, and perhaps an impossible one.

### COMPETENT PLANNERS

No defense planning system is any better than the people who shape and operate it. Professional competence for overseers and staff thus appears first on the list.

Intellectual acuity is the basic prerequisite for beginners at the bottom of the planning ladder, but it is not enough for those at the top. Political appointees, such as our Secretary of Defense, should be able to evaluate proposals that subordinates submit the first day on the job. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should be fully familiar with all four U.S. Military Services. The system suffers while those who fall short improve proficiency, a prolonged process that may take up their entire tenures.

Picking capable people is simply the first step. Qualified performers must remain in place long enough to put complementary policies and programs in motion, then pursue them to completion. Apprentices must receive repetitive tours, interspersed with periodic returns to the "real world." Otherwise, they never develop progressively greater skills.

### TEAM PLAY

Defense planning demands team play. Political expediency and military parochialism do the State a disservice when national security (even survival) is at stake. Professional integrity and moral courage thus are critical characteristics.

Successful planning systems stress two-way communications from top to bottom, laterally, and back, on a continuing basis. Free give-and-take



ensures a full spread of opinion. Feedback keeps all parties informed, from civilian "front offices" to forces in the field. Planning profits from that procedure, because no important players are "cut out of the traffic pattern" even by accident, much less on purpose. Close and continuous contact between planners, programmers, and operators reduces the likelihood of impractical input and poor implementation.

### GOAL-ORIENTED GUIDANCE

No defense specialist can have any real feel for how many forces of what kind are needed or how much money they will cost until he knows what missions must be accomplished against what opposition.

Successful planning therefore features goal-oriented guidance at every level. It starts at the top with authoritative statements of national purpose, predicated on explicit interests and objectives in order of importance, expressed in public or private. An exposition of perceived threats, present and projected, puts those aims in perspective and helps shape final priorities that reflect acceptable degrees of risk. Required predictive powers place a high premium on intelligence collection and processing capabilities, with special concern for analysis.

Prescribed roles for military power and diplomacy are particularly important. So are assumptions, which fill information gaps when facts are missing. Will synthetic fuels, for example, drastically reduce Free World dependence on Persian Gulf petroleum in the foreseeable future? Official positions make a big difference to defense planners at all levels.

### A SPECTRUM OF OPTIONS

Successful defense decisionmakers prescribe planning boundaries, then explore a spectrum of possible approaches to every problem. Accordingly, they strive to open new options and prevent premature closings, without overloading the system. They spurn preemptive foreclosures for partisan reasons, "stacked deck" studies, and slanted intelligence estimates that selectively mass information to support preconceived conclusions.

Strategic pioneers in research establishments should probe defense frontiers in search of new theories and concepts which could solve present problems and open possibilities that do not now exist. Success reaps rewards. Supervisors impose few penalties for failure, because false starts are sure to outnumber breakthroughs.

The need for imaginative means of accomplishing missions increases manyfold when Chiefs of State adopt militarily disadvantageous plans for political, economic, or social purposes. Canny generals and admirals put on

thinking caps at such times and look for feasible concepts, instead of fighting the problem or responding "can do" when they can't.

### A SPECTRUM OF PLANS

"Planning for certitude is the greatest of all military mistakes. . . ." No national leader can always forecast correctly the time, place, scope, tenor, intensity, and course of potential crises or conflicts. Players with only one plan may run fatal risks, because they have no fallback position if rivals figure that plan out.<sup>1</sup>

Successful systems consequently produce a spectrum of long-, mid-, and short-range plans that cover present problems, projected probabilities, and contingencies. There is no other way to avoid injurious surprise. U.S. plans to restore a better U.S./Soviet military balance, for example, could consider China as a friend (high priority: present hopes for a partnership pan out); a foe (low priority contingency: Sino-Soviet reconciliation occurs); and a fencestraddler (high priority contingency: polarized U.S. predictions prove wrong).

Such plans rarely are executed as written. The process, however, pays off like pre-registered artillery. Preparation permits implementing parties to make amendments in an emergency, then hit targets of opportunity with pinpoint accuracy much sooner than otherwise possible.

### REALISTIC RESOURCE ALLOCATION

Plans remain meaningless piles of paper unless requirements and resources match. Sufficient money, manpower, and materiel to implement primary plans and high priority contingencies must accompany concepts. Failure to provide those resources renders important national interests vulnerable and plays loose with the lifeblood of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who are called on to execute military concepts in times of crisis.

### TIMELY OUTPUT

Perfect plans produced too late are no better than none at all. Even long-range plans usually have time-sensitive components and, once complete, must be reviewed periodically to prevent them from being overtaken by events. Successful planners, who understand the importance of punctuality,

1. Wylie, J. C., *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control*, New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1967, p. 83-85. Admiral Wylie was the last Navy member of the Joint Strategic Survey Council with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962-64.

establish schedules, priorities, and procedures that shorten response times and wheel-spinning, then insist that subordinates comply.

### IMPARTIAL INSPECTION BY PROFESSIONALS

Quality control is an important aspect of program development. It is also the final step in defense planning cycles which spawn consistently sound products.

Planners, however, cannot appraise their own output much better than students can grade their own tests or writers review and proof their own works. Built-in bias is one impediment. Bureaucratic momentum and poor perspective are others. Many planners reflexively defend findings that are hard to justify in practical terms. Few find it possible to identify all serious flaws after being immersed for months in a project.

There is no shortage of sniping from special interest groups inside and outside the official establishment. Such criticism is useful, but suffers from partisanship and often from incomplete information.

A demand thus exists for impartial inspection by a "murder board" of objective professionals, who are familiar with the full spread of opinion and qualified to pick plans apart piece by piece before they recommend that sponsors ratify, revise, or revoke. Permanent positions are reserved for the director and a small staff, who provide continuity. Remaining members are assigned temporarily to suit requirements for special expertise, although many may be repeaters.

Unless otherwise instructed, the panel submits findings in low-profile, confidential ways that scorn the limelight and leave decisionmakers freedom to accept or reject advice as they see fit.

**PART TWO**

**U.S. Defense Planning in Principle**

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## THREE

# Idealistic Depiction of U.S. Defense Planning

No nation has a perfect planning system, even in principle. The U.S. setup, however, would satisfy most essentials for success, if it worked well in practice. The idealistic depiction in this section shows how players and procedures hypothetically mesh. Figures 3 and 4 portray key parts of the U.S. apparatus as it presently exists.<sup>1</sup>

### EXECUTIVE BRANCH PARTICIPATION IN PRINCIPLE

Strategists in the Executive Branch plan the application of national power under all circumstances to assure security in peacetime as well as war, despite impediments.

#### Comprehensive Policy


Comprehensive national security policy, promulgated by the President, forms the foundation for defense planning, in conformation with proven procedures. He hand-picks qualified cabinet officials, who participate in that process. The Senate probes and confirms their competence, together with that of appointed senior subordinates, both military and civilian.

The President chairs the National Security Council (NSC), which advises him regarding the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies. Other statutory members include the Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). Additional departments, agencies, and offices take part as required, to ensure various viewpoints. The Treasury Secretary, for example, is frequently present during deliberations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been a regular attendee since

1. This section contains no documentation. Subsequent sections, which address details, include supporting notes.

Figure 3.

# U.S. DEFENSE PLANNING APPARATUS Concept Formulation as Primary Function




NOTES:

1. Service Chiefs are the Joint Chiefs of Staff "wearing a second hat."
2. Service plans/operations deputies are the JCS Ops Depts "wearing a second hat."
3. The U.S. intelligence community provides essential support.
4. Defense Resources Board oversees entire process.
5. Assistant Secretaries of Defense subordinate to the Under Secretary for Policy do not show.
6. This display stresses "players." Dashed lines indicate coordination are limited to a few important relationships.
7. See Annex C for acronyms.

Figure 4.

# U.S. DEFENSE PLANNING APPARATUS

## Resource Allocation as Primary Function



NOTES:

1. Service Chiefs are the Joint Chiefs of Staff "wearing a second hat."
2. Service plans/operations deputies are the JCS Ops Depts "wearing a second hat."
3. The Joint Economic Committee is advisory only. It has no legislative power.
4. Assistant Secretaries of Defense subordinate to the Under Secretary for R & E do not show.
5. This display stresses "players." Dashed lines that indicate coordination are limited to a few important relationships.
6. See Annex C for acronyms.



President Truman's time. So has the Director of Central Intelligence. Professional military opinion and intelligence input thus are always on tap.

The President and his helpers put interests and objectives in order of priority, after assessing political, economic, military, social, psychological, and technological impediments to the accomplishment of competing missions, then codetermine with Congress what resources should go to domestic sectors and which to defense. The Treasury Department, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and Federal Reserve Board offer specialized advice. The Council of Economic Advisers forecasts economic conditions to provide the President further perspectives.

Final approval comes from the American people. National policies that fail to reflect their will rarely last very long. Neither do officials who formulate them. U.S. leaders therefore try to promulgate strategic plans and programs that clearly are compatible with public opinion, or take steps to shape and acquire concurrence.

### **Foreign Policy**

Foreign policy seeks to satisfy all sorts of U.S. interests overseas as one sub-set of national security. The Secretary of State is officially the President's principal adviser on that subject and directs the department primarily responsible for related plans and operations. Other participants, however, are important. Many deliberations therefore take place in the National Security Council, which provides a forum for reconciling foreign policy with military capabilities and financial costs.

Positions approved by the President spell out U.S. roles around the world, contemplate present and projected opponents, promote partnerships whenever that seems propitious, and promulgate policy guidelines that, in part, specify what part military power should play compared with arms control and diplomacy.

### **Defense Policy**

The President, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of all U.S. Armed Forces, is responsible for U.S. defense policy. He delegates most related duties to the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advance professional military advice. Together, they determine what to do, who should do it, and what assets are essential, with particular attention to how, where, when, why, and in what priority, collaborating with, and absorbing input from, peripheral parties. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) supports.

A Defense Resources Board (DRB), whose powers far exceed the scope expressed in its title, presently oversees the entire planning, programming,

and budgeting process, in accord with its charter from the SECDEF. Permanent members, including the Service Secretaries, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and key functionaries on the OSD staff, are expected to forego parochial vantage points in favor of "broader and deeper" views. Service Chiefs and Commanders-in-Chief of unified and specified commands (CINCs), who attend selected sessions, express their special opinions.

### *Concept Formulation*

Military aims, which complement other governmental goals, provide the focus for defense concept formulation. Appraisals of threats, opportunities, and imperative assumptions are part of that process. Force planning follows.

Primary responsibility for steering the Pentagon team in pursuit of those tasks rests with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP). Four Operations Deputies (Ops Deps), one each from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, shape JCS input, speaking for their respective Joint Chiefs.<sup>2</sup> CINCs afford an influential frame of reference. The JCS Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5) provides documentation, working with counterparts from all four Military Services in close collegial collaboration.

That group in principle comes to grips with conceptual questions that span the conflict spectrum. What military missions and courses of action would most effectively cope with impending problems in space? Is there any way to "win" a nuclear war? Can we cover critical commitments overseas without restoring conscription? How could armed forces best complement other components in efforts to frustrate low intensity conflicts, such as transnational terrorism and subversive insurgencies?

The concepts crew considers strategies first in isolation, then in concert, according to the ideal sequence. Assorted "think tanks" assist. There is no nuclear strategy, separate and distinct from conventional schemes. Land, sea, and air warfare all interlock. What happens in Europe influences the Far East. Strategists in OSD and on the Joint Staff consequently plan steps at every stage to ensure that U.S. military objectives, policies, commitments, and capabilities not only are internally consistent, but merge effectively with those of friends and reflect estimated inclinations of foes.

Force planning at this stage is limited to types and levels. How many weapon systems, for example, are needed to underpin U.S. nuclear

2. The Army Chief of Staff, Chief of Naval Operations, Air Force Chief of Staff, and Marine Commandant each has a three-star plans and operations deputy who assists him in his capacity as a Service Chief and acts as his alter ego on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Those Ops Deps thus help determine policies, plans, and programs for their particular Services and participate in JCS counterpart activities.

strategy? Two? Three? Four? More? Should they be improved bombers and ballistic missiles like those that comprise our present triad, or new systems that are functionally different? (Cruise and ballistic missiles in assorted basing modes come to mind.) Must at least one "leg" always be airmobile, another land-launched, and a third afloat to foster flexibility and forestall technological surprise?

### *Resource Allocation*

Concept formulation and resource allocation are indivisible parts of the defense planning process, but the former is the driving force, according to present policy. The latter stands in support.

The Defense Resources Board is especially well suited to participate in this phase, since most of its permanent members specialize in monetary matters, manpower, or materiel.

Several OSD staff sections share working responsibilities. The Under Secretary for Research and Engineering is the fulcrum for matters of force modernization, acquisition management, industrial base responsiveness, interoperability, and international collaboration in related affairs. The Assistant Secretary for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics pilots planning that pertains to personnel, readiness, sustainability, military mobilization, construction, and other support. The DOD Comptroller and Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), assisted by the Office of Management and Budget, furnish fiscal forecasts and affiliated guidance for the forthcoming five-year period.

Military Departments and DOD Agencies, using data thus derived, estimate future capabilities, considering the full range of resource constraints, which include intangibles like time, along with money, manpower, technology, critical materials, and civilian plant capacities.

When that process is complete, Pentagon planners have a "real world" appreciation for relationships between intentions and tools.

### *Reconciling Ends With Means*

The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore seek to ascertain whether significant risks result when resource shortfalls separate proposed concepts from capabilities. That is a highly subjective enterprise. Their collective conclusions do not necessarily coincide with those of civilian superiors, whose political persuasions, personalities, experience, and proclivities for risk-taking may be of a different bent.

When Defense Resource Board members concur that probable risks are unacceptable, they review optional courses of corrective action and recommend that SECDEF approve those they believe would best close gaps.

## CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION IN PRINCIPLE

The Executive Branch promulgates national security policy. Congress indirectly approves or disapproves, in accord with the separation of powers prescribed by our Constitution. Few strategic plans prepared in the Pentagon can be implemented satisfactorily without congressional consent and fiscal support. Oversight and legislation in combination bring great pressures to bear on the size, characteristics, operational concepts, and consequent capabilities of U.S. Armed Services.

### Oversight

Congress does not participate directly in defense concept formulation. It does, however, help shape strategy as part of the oversight process, which scrutinizes every facet while keeping fingers on the public pulse to get a feel for wants and needs of the nation's people.

The President cannot impose important security interests or supporting objectives without consulting Congress, which does not always applaud his choice. Investigative powers of the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees cover international relations. The two Armed Services Committees follow national defense. Government Operations and Government Affairs Committees have wide-ranging responsibilities. Other elements, like select committees on intelligence, are important, but more confined.

### Legislation

Congress does not legislate strategy, but its authorizations and appropriations influence strategy in decisive ways. Article II of the Constitution permits the President to make treaty commitments only "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." The Armed Services Committees annually originate legislation that authorizes about two-thirds of all DOD expenditures, including allowances for weapon procurement. Appropriation Committees, which may reduce but not exceed authorized limits, handle the other third. Semi-stable constants, such as military pay/allowances and operations/maintenance, are within their purview.

Manpower matters, such as allowable levels and sources of supply (volunteer force or conscription), are legislative concerns of Armed Services Committees, although the entire Congress feels emotional and moral links that influence outcomes.

Seen in that context, strategic plans and implementing legislation are