

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT IN ENGLAND

Lewis Rockow

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CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT IN ENGLAND

BY
LEWIS ROCKOW

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PREFACE

THIS book is a brief analysis of the historical relation of contemporary writers to their immediate predecessors. It attempts further a comprehensive summary of certain selected writers, and a fairly full criticism of their ideas. In the last chapter a bare attempt is also made at a synthesis. My purpose is essentially critical, and limited to the illustration of the special British environment. I have aimed at making each chapter as complete as possible, even at the price of some repetition. The bibliography at the end of the volume includes mainly those books that are either mentioned or discussed in the text. Additional works are frequently referred to in the notes.

I hope I have succeeded in inserting in the notes all reference to the writers who have been of help to me. To the lectures and published writings of Professor Graham Wallas, Professor L. T. Hobhouse, H. J. Laski, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, and H. G. Wells I owe more than a brief reference would indicate. To them I am indebted for a good deal of the mental clarification which my study has given me; even though I dissent from some of their views. I therefore take this opportunity to express to them my obligation. I am also indebted to Mr. Jeffery E. Jeffery for assisting me in preparing the manuscript for the press.

LONDON,
March, 1925.

L. R.

I have intentionally refrained from making any changes in this new impression of my book. It represents a certain stage in my mental development, and I therefore prefer that it should remain as originally published.

WASHINGTON,
June, 1930.

L. R.



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CONTENTS

I. THE INHERITANCE	9
II. THE PSYCHOLOGISTS : McDougall and Wallas	21
III. THE IDEALISTS : Jones and Watson.	56
IV. THE INDIVIDUALISTS : Cecil and Mallock	79
V. THE COLLECTIVISTS : The Webbs and MacDonald	100
VI. THE PLURALISTS : I. Laski and Russell	130
VII. THE PLURALISTS : II. Cole	150
VIII. THE COMMUNISTS : William Paul and E. and C. Paul	167
IX. THE THEORY OF COMPROMISE : Hobhouse and Bryce	199
X. INTERNATIONALISM : Norman Angell	230
XI. THE GOVERNANCE OF A UTOPIA	244
XII. THE STATE IN LITERATURE : I. THE DRAMA	258
XIII. THE STATE IN LITERATURE : II. THE NOVEL.	276
XIV. THE FUTURE	290
NOTES	295
BIBLIOGRAPHY	319
INDEX	325



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CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT IN ENGLAND

CHAPTER I

THE INHERITANCE

THAT the eighteenth-century compromise between a governing aristocracy and a "swinish multitude," to be goaded and protected, and Jefferson's dictum that that government is best which governs least¹ could no more be retained are largely the result of the mechanical inventions. They made England mainly industrial instead of agricultural. Their effect was to produce a middle class, conscious of its powers and future possibilities, and a lower class, with which in time the rulers had to reckon. If modern history is a series of dissolutions, the Great Industry is the chief dissolver. The industrial classes of the towns rivalled the landowners, and the rising proletarian class-consciousness put an end to former harmony. That a constitutional change came late is perhaps due to the frightened state of ruling opinion, which identified change with ruin. The doctrines of Ricardo² and Malthus,³ which emphasized less the happiness of the population than the greatest possible volume of production, seemed to justify acquiescence. While reformers like Wilberforce were urging for the emancipation of the negro, they offered to the English poor salvation in the hereafter in recompense for the suffering of the present life; a solution which in no way threatened ancient wrongs. Meanwhile, as Bishop

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT

Horsley declared, "the mass of the people had nothing to do with the laws but to obey them."⁴

Yet England did develop towards democracy. It is a commonplace to say that nineteenth-century British history constitutes a nice compromise between tradition and experiment. The problem was to retain as much as possible of the loaves and fishes of a largely discredited past and still justify the pretension of the popular origin of political power, the fruits of the major efforts of Rousseau⁵ and Bentham.⁶ That this change was accomplished gradually and peacefully is the wonted boast of British historians. The arms which indignant blacksmiths prepared for the popular revolution in 1832 may have been turned into ploughs. England became a democracy by the typical English process of counting heads instead of breaking them. If the ancient constitution were perfect, the nineteenth century showed that there are degrees of perfection.

Perhaps, as Dicey points out, between democracy and collectivism there is no relation of cause and effect.⁷ Yet surely the extension of the function of the state marks another characteristic of our period. The nineteenth century began with Benthamism and ended with Fabianism. It began with a struggle against class privilege for the sake of individual freedom and ended with a struggle against individual claims for the sake of a common life. But, as T. H. Green remarks, the principle in both cases is identical—it is "the power on the part of the citizens as a body to make the most and best of themselves."⁸ If we follow Professor Hobhouse, the New Liberalism is merely the old in new dress.⁹ It is this feature of the gradually expanding state that demonstrates the interrelation between political fact and theory during the last century.

The half century before 1832 was one of immense ferment. It witnessed new illustrations of the eternal struggle between the defenders of stability and the

THE INHERITANCE

advocates of change. Montesquieu¹⁰ and De Lolme¹¹ considered the English Constitution as the best guarantee of liberty, and Blackstone¹² set out to write its apotheosis. Burke magistrally defended it as the product of a slow and painful progression.¹³ A generation later Wellington failed to see any flaw in its perfect symmetry.¹⁴ But the number of dissentients was legion. Already in 1776 Bentham, in his *Fragment on Government*, had hurled the force of his pitiless logic against the shallow optimism of Blackstone. At the same time, the Americans gave the Constitution a shock from which recovery was slow.¹⁵ Paine retorted to Burke that there is no sanctity in perpetuating wrongs.¹⁶ Priestley and Price pointed a finger of scorn at the unrepresentative Parliament.¹⁷ Godwin went a step further and dared to question the basis of authority and private property.¹⁸ During the wars social heresies were temporarily banned, but immediately after the trade union movement showed the latent energies of the working classes. Hodgskin,¹⁹ Gray, and Thompson²⁰ urged what now passes for scientific socialism: that the workers are by right entitled to the full product of their toil. Cobbett's unphilosophic appeal went straight to the unphilosophic masses. His *Register* showed the capacity for good and evil of uncritical journalism. It was Robert Owen, however, who proved that there is no antithesis between industrial greatness and the solid interests of humanity. He understood that, while man creates the environment, the environment also creates the man. His universal sympathy more than made up for his lack of profundity. His recognition of the value of co-operative enterprise is a seminal discovery. The movement for collective help for the children and the infirm can claim him as one of its foster-parents.²¹ Thus, while the solid portion of society acclaimed the defenders of stability, the future was with the dissenters.

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT

It is Bentham, however, who typifies the transformations of the first half of the century.²² The head and centre of a group of astute politicians and acute thinkers, he, more than any one else, personifies his age. His principles were utility and *laissez-faire*. The first meant that institutions were to be judged by the criterion of results. The second implied that, when existing abuses were removed, the government should assume the function of a mere policeman. A whole plan of reform was to replace ancient wrongs. Separating himself from the classic political metaphysics, he made reform palatable to the matter-of-fact British mind. The Reform Act of 1832, the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835, the Repeal of the Corn Laws of 1846, the Judicial Reforms, all can claim him as their common father. He is the founder of the older liberalism.

From the vantage ground of a later generation it is easy to criticize Benthamism. It is now obvious that to apply the Greatest Happiness Principle is as complicated a task as to apply the metaphysics of the school of Rousseau; that Bentham, in the phrase of Professor Hobhouse, thought of individuals more as atoms than as cells in an organism; and that his view of human nature hardly bears scientific scrutiny, as Professor Wallas,²³ following Bagehot,²⁴ has shown us. After the principle of *laissez-faire* had accomplished its historic mission of divorcing the essential from the existing, the principle of utility was subsequently given a wider synthesis.

However, the undisturbed reign of the second principle of Benthamism was brief. In fact, the very decades, 1830-50, during which it held its most distinctive sway saw also the definite beginning of the reaction. The year of the Poor Law was preceded by that of the first effective Factory Act. The year of the Repeal of the Corn Laws, the greatest triumph of Benthamism, was succeeded by the year of the Ten Hours Act,

THE INHERITANCE

which was sternly opposed by all the Benthamites. Thus in the middle of the century, while the main current was undeniably Benthamite, still, as Dicey has shown, there was a counter-current of collectivism.²⁵ Shrewd observers could then perhaps have pointed out that the stagnant Palmerstonian era would be followed by a greater awakening of the social conscience.

From the imperfect focus of the present it is easier to understand the causes of that reaction than to apportion the relative importance to each single cause. It is indeed difficult now to distinguish the streams from the ponds among the many tributaries that led to reaction. The most that we can now say is that there were a number of facts and theories that brought about the change. Some of these are of universal import, while others are purely British.

The facts were, perhaps, the chief single influence. They proved that universal benevolence was no logical consequence of Benthamite universal but enlightened selfishness. Reports by lay and expert investigators showed that individual self-assertion was not synonymous with social values. Moreover, the failure of the working-class movement on two fronts—the economic, under Owen's inspiration, and the political, under Chartism—severed the working classes from revolutionary radicalism. If improvement of conditions was ever to come, it would have to come under middle-class leadership in the typical English conservative fashion.²⁶ The "condition of England" question had to be placed before the chastened powers of Whitehall. It was Shaftesbury and his followers who first aroused the nation "to the wants and rights of the poor; to the powers and duties of the rich." To them the problem was simple. There were women and children who suffered, and the only way to aid was through Parliamentary action.²⁷ What they lacked in philosophy they more than made up in ordinary humanity.

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT

Another influence was the extension of the franchise. Once the ice was broken in 1832, there was no logical stopping point. As Bright said, "If a class has failed, let us try the nation."²⁸ Sovereignty was reinterpreted several times in the nineteenth century to include more and more of the unenfranchised. By 1918 the base of authority could fairly be said to be popular. While the reform of 1832 was undeniably in the interest of individualism, because it served the interest of the middle class, the subsequent reforms were also undeniably in behalf of collectivism. For ages the state had been used to serve the special interest of a class. The masses now newly enfranchised were inclined to follow the example. As the base of political authority was widened, new demands had to be satisfied.

Again, the influence of the church was apparent.²⁹ At the beginning of the century the bulk of the Established Church was solid for the *status quo*, while the Nonconformists supported reform. In the middle of the century a new spirit was evident. By its drastic legislation of 1836-40 Parliament removed the obvious causes of abuse, and thus ensured a change. The Oxford Movement despised the principle of utility; its direct effect was conservative, and confined only to the elect. The High Church movement, which succeeded it, was Anglican, popular, and liberal. The church was now less concerned with its vested privileges than with its social function in a world of change. Maurice and Kingsley emphasized the fact that Christianity was meaningless unless definitely applied. The humanitarian spirit which was characteristic of the Victorian Age found an ally in this revived churchmanship. It meant that human sympathy was not bounded by the limits of class. Collective action seemed to give this spirit effectiveness.

The same spirit is also seen in the teaching and influence of Carlyle and Ruskin. Both dedicated their

THE INHERITANCE

faculties to the fight for sweetness and light. Both were Platonists pleading for apportioned services and regulated duties. To both *laissez-faire* was anathema. As early as 1839 Carlyle declared, "A chief social principle (*laissez-faire*) which this present writer, for one, will by no manner of means believe in, but pronounce at all fit times to be false, heretical, and damnable, if ever aught was."³⁰ To Ruskin "Government and co-operation are the laws of life; anarchy and competition the laws of death."³¹ Disciplined order and regulated life were the base of true society. Only the guidance of the elect could reshape it. All social activity must cater for the creative effort of art. Both Ruskin and Carlyle demonstrate the reaction of sensitive minds to the ugliness of life about them.³² It is easy to pick flaws in the social systems of artists; nevertheless, their teaching helped to undermine the distrust of the state and the abstractions of the economists.

Further, certain movements of a more or less universal nature have had their effect.³³ The rise of the new Economics under List showed the inadequacy of *laissez-faire*. The new biology under Darwin, while it emphasized competition in the struggle for survival, stressed nevertheless the importance of environment and the feasibility of assisted selection. Historical jurisprudence under Savigny, Maine, and Maitland questioned the application of rigid principles to social life. Comtian Positivism, with its religion of service, stressed the unity of the human race, and Sociology, with its concentration on the tangled web of human relationship, revealed a complex social structure. All these factors, though not arising at the same time nor at the same place and though exercising varied influences, contributed to the changed outlook.

But the rise of socialism was the most pregnant international force. The year 1848 marks its entry into the realm of politics. *The Communist Manifesto*

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT

has all the one-sidedness of a party platform. Yet its declaration that the accepted economics is merely the hypothesis of a class could not fail to bear fruit.³⁴ The rise of Christian Socialism in England, though short-lived, shows the new leaven.³⁵ *Das Kapital* is less significant as a constructive thesis than as an angry indictment of the existing *régime*.³⁶ The files of the British Museum furnished Marx with ammunition for his onslaught. Socialism had little definite influence in England before Hyndman and Morris: none the less, it could no longer be denied that problems beg solution and that discontent is violent. Bismarck's strategy of fighting socialism with socialism was not confined to Germany. In its emphasis on a social vision socialism was another factor indicating the decay of individualism.

More than any one else, John Stuart Mill³⁷ typifies this transition. He was like a Samson groping blindly among the pillars of the past: yet he dimly recognized the blurred outlines of the future. It is true that he was the last of the Utilitarians, but it is also true that he was the first of the great liberal socialists. By tradition and descent a Utilitarian, he imbibed, nevertheless, at the close of his life, the sympathies and beliefs of a wider social experience. If the principle of Utility is nominally retained, it becomes in him, however, a vehicle of self-sacrifice which he declares is "the highest virtue than can be found in man." If liberty is justified as essential to the development of personality, it is none the less necessary to the life of a vigorous society. While his political economy is still based on the accepted individualism, he yet looks forward to see an extension of co-operative effort. In fact, he turns almost a complete somersault when declaring his hope of viewing in the future a system of distribution made "by concert on an acknowledged principle of justice." If the spiritual justification of representative demo-

THE INHERITANCE

cracy receives its philosophic finish, it is not, however, an unqualified endorsement. Rule of the democracy is not necessarily coincident with the highest efficiency; nor is the wish of the majority always consistent with the general welfare. Assistance of experts and proportional representation are essential. Thus the new and the old are perhaps inconsistently moulded together. However, if the world were ready for a fuller interpretation than even a modified Benthamism could offer, it was because men like John Stuart Mill interpreted the age.

The decade that saw the death of Mill also witnessed the formation of the New Liberalism. This decade followed the reform of 1867 and began with the astonishing legislation of Gladstone. It ended with the philosophic defence of the liberal state by T. H. Green, followed by Jevons' empirical test of state functions.³⁸ A host of legislation dealing with popular education, land reforms, sanitation, testify to the expanding state.³⁹ The conditions of the slums, the sweated industries, the children and aged were studied and the responsibility of the state was affirmed. The municipalities, too, were being aroused to their vigorous future. The legalization of trade unions and the rise of joint-stock companies were other evidence of the economic helplessness of the individual. Sir William Harcourt's remark that "we are all Socialists now" was more true than Chamberlain's similar statement later in regard to imperialism. By the end of the century the question was not whether the state should act, but to what degree its interference should extend.

It is T. H. Green who gives this movement its finished expression.⁴⁰ There is essential unity, he affirms, between the individual and the state. If individuals find their expression in the state, it is they who form the state into an entity. The full development of the individual can come only through his membership

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT

of the state, but the state must, for the sake of its own growth, grant to the individual full freedom for his self-realization. There are no individual rights in the sense of the Utilitarians. Rights are given and enjoyed because they are essential to an ideal life in the state. Though the essence of morality is self-compulsion, the state may remove the external obstacles to the moral life. With these removed, the individual can then find his true worth. Thus education, the liquor traffic, landed property are proper spheres of state action. Green thus applied Platonism to his English environment, with its solicitude for freedom and fear of magnifying the state. So far are we removed, at the end of the century, from Benthamite individualism that the cohesive force of the state is perhaps overstated by Bradley and Bosanquet, two of Green's chief disciples.⁴¹

It would be erroneous to give the impression that the movement of theory was symmetrical. There were dissenters in every camp. Of these Spencer was the chief, and perhaps therefore the most vulnerable.⁴² Barker has shown that Spencer's contribution to the theory of politics is not of great value. His views are, indeed "an incongruous mixture of Natural Rights and physiological metaphor."⁴³ Even from the imperfect view of the present we appreciate that, to justify with much violence to his basic views a discredited individualism, when T. H. Green was expounding the worth of positive liberty, when socialism was obtaining votaries all over the world, and when life was becoming more interdependent, does not bespeak solidity. Perhaps the future may take Spencer's unique position as an additional sign of his genius. But for the present his laurels must rest in other fields than those of politics.

In spite of Spencer, the beginning of the twentieth century saw no slackening in the general movement.⁴⁴ Just as the Parliament Act of 1911 indicates the

THE INHERITANCE

advance of a determined democracy, so does the Budget Act of 1909 demonstrate the attempt of the contemporary state to relate private income to social function. The belief is that if the state is to undertake further experiments in collective life, the burden should fall on those incomes that are due less to individual effort than to social factors. Nor is the intention of taxing those who have, and giving it in the form of larger opportunities to those who have not any longer disguised. Medical attention for the sick and the school children, pensions for the aged, state-aided insurance for the workers, arbitration in industrial disputes, state regulated wages in certain industries, state aid for the unemployed, are sufficient evidence of the expanding activities of the contemporary state. Behind these acts there is apparent a belief in the collective responsibility of all for each. The war not only accelerated this tendency, but also made the masses less patient with gross economic inequalities. A century ago the Benthamite idea was to confine the state to the removal of abuses; the contemporary practice is that the state should positively undertake to construct the basis of the good life for all its members.

Just as the individualistic state found its best expression in Bentham, the state in transition in Mill, the expanding state in T. H. Green, so does the state at the beginning of this century find its clearest expounders in the group of publicists who are referred to as Fabians. The Fabian doctrine is essentially that of liberal socialism.⁴⁵ It discards the idea of revolution, of the class struggle, and the labour theory of value of Marx. It concentrates its attention on the democratization of the state and the socialization of all value, whether in land or in capital, which is created socially. It aims at improving the condition of the masses by expanding collective action through the medium of an expert civil service and yet at

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT

escaping the danger of a bureaucracy by an economic federalism in which the municipalities will be utilized. It thus follows the traditions of John Stuart Mill and T. H. Green, and, like the Benthamite group of a century ago, it influences opinion by penetration. With the more salient views of some of the leading Fabians, as well as other tendencies in contemporary political thought in England, it is our task to deal with some detail.

CHAPTER II

THE PSYCHOLOGISTS : McDOUGALL AND WALLAS

WHILE the systematic application of psychology to politics is comparatively recent, yet all theories of the state have always implied a theory of human nature. Discussion on what particular political structure will be most suited to man's needs necessarily involves the related question of what man's nature is. Thus Plato's¹ state is modelled on man's nature ; in the state as well as in the individual reason should predominate over the passions. For Aristotle,² the state is essential because man's nature is social. Two thousand years later, Hobbes³ based his theory of absolutism on a psychology which recognized in man a self-seeking and unruly animal held in check mainly by fear. In fact, all the principles of monarchy or aristocracy rest on the assumption that Nature, being niggardly, has made the capacity to govern the monopoly of the chosen few. The "swinish multitude" is stupid and dumbly acquiesces. The task of the defenders of democracy was to vindicate human nature. Hobbes' first principles were assailed ; man was viewed in a more edifying light. In the case of Locke⁴ and Rousseau⁵ this defence took the form of a belief in the existence of a pre-political age, "when wild in the woods the noble savage ran." To the more ardent spirits, such as Godwin,⁶ the perfectibility of human nature seemed to be infinite. That "you cannot fool all the people all the time" is the common sense psychology of democracy. Surely all writers made at least a pretence to plumb man's ways and his nature.

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT

In the case of Bentham,⁷ however, as in that of no other writer perhaps, a theory of politics was the essential corollary to a theory of human nature. It was as obvious as it was simple. To Bentham, man was a deliberate, hedonistic egoist. Man's actions were governed by hedonic selfish reasons. Happiness was excess of pleasure over pain. Pleasure was subject to quantitative analysis. From these principles it followed that a government which permitted the calculated, selfish pleasure-seeking of each citizen would produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number, which should in fact be the ethical aim of government. Thus, fortunately, both utility and duty coincided. Since man was rational, he would subject political questions to the acid test of his rationality. He would favour only those proposals which his efficacious reason told him would further his own greatest pleasure. Later on J. S. Mill⁸ undermined the whole Benthamite edifice by introducing a qualitative standard of pleasure and making room for self-sacrifice. In our own day Bentham's theory of human nature is brought forward only to be exposed. Man is now conceived to be neither wholly rational, nor entirely self-regarding, nor merely a seeker after pleasure.

A generation after Bentham, Bagehot attempted a more Napoleonic task. His *Physics and Politics* (1873) borders upon a philosophy of history. It is a discussion, as Barker states, of the relation of "psychics" to politics.⁹ The book is a "fine imaginative recapture of pre-history,"¹⁰ written with the typical perspicacity of Bagehot. His brilliant restoration of primitive life, if more true historically, is as picturesque as that of Rousseau.

Bagehot's highway of human progress leads from the "cake of custom" to deliberative law. We enter human history through the side door of unconscious imitation, and make our exit through the front door of

PSYCHOLOGISTS : McDOUGALL AND WALLAS

reasoned discussion. We are in the morning of civilization, when morality is "a still small voice" and government an unknown luxury. For the subjugation of men there was then necessary not a teacher, but a drill-sergeant. What was needed was not to train man in liberty, but to acquaint him with the rod. Primitive man could be held in check only by crude methods. The groups that were best united survived, transmitting by heredity their favourable characteristics to later generations.

From a psychological standpoint, what kept men together in those days was the cohesive force of unconscious imitation. "The truth is," Bagehot states, "that the propensity of man to imitate what is before him is one of the strongest parts of human nature."¹¹ "We must not think," he declares further, "that this imitation is voluntary, or even conscious. On the contrary, it has its seat mainly in very obscure parts of the mind, whose notions, so far from having been consciously produced, are hardly felt to exist; so far from being conceived beforehand, are not even felt at the time."¹² Masses of mankind thus passively imitated a predominant type. The "icy chains of custom," made possible because man was an unconscious ape, guaranteed a stable future even before man was able rationally to comprehend his past.

Only later, within recorded history and after man had for ages served his apprenticeship under authority, was it possible for the more progressive peoples to taste the first-fruits of liberty. Imitation was then succeeded by discussion. "To this question," Bagehot states with the utmost assurance, "history gives a very clear and remarkable answer. It is that the change from the age of status to the age of choice was first made in states where the government was to a great and a growing extent a government by discussion, and where the subjects of that discussion

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT

were in some degree abstract, or, as we should say, matters of principle.”¹³ Discussion by testing institutions with the ordeal of reason lifted the dead hand of the past. Argument replaced agreeable sanctified habits by painful variability. Time was ripe for the suspended judgment, and the pioneer of untrodden ways could then obtain a hearing. Ancient Greece and modern England are examples of the triumph of discussion. In the government of men the early irrational tradition gave place to deliberative law. Thus primitive iron uniformity was as essential to create nations, as the later enlightenment was necessary to change them.

In our own day, two writers, Professor McDougall and Professor Wallas, have enriched politics by definite psychological *aperçus*. Professor McDougall's *Introduction to Social Psychology* (1908) is a discussion of the basic tendencies of the human mind which underlie the life of societies. It can, perhaps, be best summarized by the statement that it offers an antithesis to the Benthamite psychology. To Professor McDougall, man is not wholly rational; that is, man's actions are not wholly nor mainly governed by a reasoned calculation as to consequences. In fact, we can only understand them by tracing them back to certain innate tendencies or instincts. “But mankind is only a little bit reasonable, and to a great extent unintelligently moved in quite unreasonable ways.”¹⁴ Human nature possesses a certain number of instincts which form the “prime movers” of man's activities. Thus flight, repulsion, curiosity, pugnacity, self-abasement, self-assertion, and the parental instinct are the seven principal instincts. Each instinct has cognitive, affective, and conative aspects. In each of these principal instincts the affective aspect takes form in the specific “primary emotions” of fear, disgust, wonder, anger, subjection, elation, and tenderness respectively. In addition to these seven most

PSYCHOLOGISTS : McDOUGALL AND WALLAS

important instincts there are also some minor instincts, which "play but a minor part in the genesis of emotions," but possess impulses that are significant in social life. The chief of these consist of the instinct of reproduction, the gregarious instinct, the instinct of acquisition, and the instinct of construction. Imitation, to which Bagehot attributed the stability of early societies, is not an instinct, but forms, with suggestion and sympathy, the three aspects of the general process of mental interaction. Unlike an instinct, each is a general and non-specific tendency, and is influential in moulding the individual by means of his social surroundings. Without the instincts action would be impossible, since the most calculated deliberations are merely means to ends which are determined by instincts. Only by understanding the deeply rooted tendencies of man's nature which man has inherited from a remote past, can we understand the forces that actuate human conduct in societies. Without these tendencies the human organism "would lie inert and motionless like a wonderful clockwork whose mainspring has been removed or a steam-engine whose fires had been drawn."¹⁵ Thus the irrational in man is not supplementary or subordinate to his reason, but, indeed, the more potent and compelling force that determines his behaviour.

Further, Professor McDougall denies the Benthamite contention that all human action can be interpreted on the basis of self-interest. The human constitution, he holds, embodies certain tendencies whose chief characteristic is their disinterestedness. Of these the most potent is mother-love. It is the root of all forms of benevolence and altruism. Nor can mother-love and the various forms of generous impulses which spring from it be interpreted as disguised selfishness. They are primary elements rooted in human nature, and no human being is devoid of them. The Benthamite doctrine libels human nature.

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT

Not only the family, but social life in general, show the manifold applications of the sentiment of love. It is the operative cause in the abolition of slavery, in the attempt to minimize the horrors of war, and in the recent extension of the idea of collective responsibility for the aged and helpless.

Again, the monistic interpretation of Bentham, which attributed all human action to the single desire for pleasure and the avoidance of pain, is, according to Professor McDougall, unfounded. Man's nature is pluralistic, and not monistic. Man's actions are governed not by any unitary desire, but by the manifold and complex tendencies of his nature. Thus, when a woman endangers her life to rescue her child, her act is not determined by hedonistic calculations, but is merely the response to her parental instinct. When men seek the society of their fellows, they act in response to the gregarious instinct, and not to the desire for pleasure. Pleasure and pain are, in themselves, not springs of action; they merely modify the duration of a particular action. Pleasure prolongs it; pain terminates it. Happiness is different from pleasure; nor is it a sum of pleasures. Happiness arises from the harmonious integration of all the sentiments that form the human personality. Pleasure is fleeting and momentary; happiness is stable and permanent. Moral actions do not result from utilitarian calculation, but are psychologically the product of the individual's ideal of self-respect as a member of society.

This somewhat inadequate exposition of Professor McDougall's psychological theory will assist us to understand his social doctrine. We have seen that the Benthamite psychology was the foundation of political individualism; an anti-Benthamite psychology ought, then, to offer a social theory which stresses the group rather than the individual. In this we are not disappointed. His *Group Mind* (1920)

PSYCHOLOGISTS : McDOUGALL AND WALLAS

is, shall we say, a reincarnation of Plato's *Republic* from the standpoint of the "newer" psychology. The view presented in Professor McDougall's *Social Psychology* is now applied to the life of groups. The two volumes form, then, a single study. We are here primarily concerned with its theory of the group mind and then its application to the most significant and complex group—the modern nation-state.

A highly organized social aggregate is, to Professor McDougall, an organic whole. It is a separate entity with a distinct individuality. "Since, then, the social aggregate has a collective mental life, which is not merely the sum of the mental lives of its units, it may be contended that a society not only enjoys a collective mental life but also has a collective mind or, as some prefer to say, a collective soul."¹⁶ When a group has existed for a considerable time and has in the course of its existence acquired a definite organization it can justly be held to possess a self. Since the relation between the individuals in a group is mental, the group itself can be described only in terms of mind. If we define mind "as an organized system of mental or purposive forces,"¹⁷ a well-developed group possesses such a mind. Such a group becomes a mental system of its own, with the individual minds as units. It thinks and acts as a substantial unit. It exists and develops by laws of its own. It is more developed, more real than the sum of individuals; the individual's action in the group differs from his action when isolated from the group. "The structure and organization of the spirit of the community is in every respect as purely mental or psychical as the structure and organization of the individual mind."¹⁸

Professor McDougall now applies his theory of the group mind to various types of groups, of which the human aggregate of the nation-state, especially in the highest developed form, is the most noteworthy

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT

example. "A nation," he declares, "we must say, is a people or population enjoying some degree of political independence and possessed of a national mind and character, and therefore capable of national deliberation and national volition."¹⁹ Its essence is psychic, its mental organization alone gives it effective group life. Like the mind of the individual, the national mind possesses not only an intellectual side, but also conative and affective aspects. This national mind has a definable character, and since the national character is the work of the dead and the living it is different from the character of any individual or from all individual characters taken together. Such a national mind can arise only when there exists homogeneity among the citizens of the nation. This common feeling results from the following factors, which are significant only because they tend to create the national mind: (1) a common race, (2) freedom of communication among members, (3) eminent leaders, (4) a well defined common purpose, shown chiefly during periods of national stress, (5) long continuity of existence, (6) organization of national mind, (7) national self-consciousness, and (8) emulation with other nations. The last three need greater detail.

In the more developed nations, as in the mental organization of the more developed individuals, the organization of the national mind will become more plastic, more deliberative, more purposive, less mechanical, and hence more prepared to meet emergencies. As the nation's activities become less indiscriminating and more integrated, its specialized parts may become less efficient. The executive organization in the form of government departments is guided by the deliberative organization where ideas play a part. The established institutions of a nation are its instincts; its customs are its habits; its deliberative organization is the centre of its ideas.

PSYCHOLOGISTS : McDOUGALL AND WALLAS

Just as the individual impulses become more integrated and harmonized as the idea of the self becomes more conscious to the individual person, so does the national mind become more integrated as the nation achieves self-consciousness. Such national integration denoting self-consciousness must be the result of natural evolution. For if national institutions are imposed, the executive organization may be efficient, but its deliberative organization will lag behind. A nation like Germany before the war is really weak, because it lacks capacity to adjust itself to novel situations and all-round development. Such a nation possesses the one-sidedness of an army.

Just as the will of an individual implies the recognition by that individual of an ideal of self, so does the will of a nation denote the existence of national self-consciousness. Without this recognition of self both individual and national action are merely impulsive. The unity of a well-developed nation, like the personality of a well-developed individual, is a higher form of unity than mere organic unity, because organic unity is true even of low forms of life. The unity of the national personality, like the unity of an individual, can be interpreted only in psychic terms. It is the "idea of the nation" that binds the individuals within the nation. The "idea of the nation," however, must not be interpreted merely as an idea, but, like the idea of the individual self, it is really a sentiment and includes also conative and affective aspects.

Again, just as the self of the individual is developed by communication with other individuals, so is the self of the nation developed by communication with other nations. All forms of international emulation powerfully enforce national self-consciousness. Communication with other nations tends to initiate a spirit of self-criticism favourable to progress. The rise in recent years of national self-consciousness among

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT

peoples, in which we find the key to many recent events, is due mainly to greater ease of intercourse between nations. Loyalty to the nation, more than any other form of group loyalty, lifts men above their personal egoism because the nation alone, perhaps with the exception of the church, can appeal from a long heroic past to a long and contingently noble future. This loyalty, however, is not incompatible with membership in a larger international organization, for the idea of human unity and responsibility of each nation is a dominant current idea.

An act of national volition properly so called is an act undertaken by all for the good of the whole after due collective deliberation in the recognized channels of deliberation. The good of all is different from the good of the whole nation, because the whole is more than the sum of its parts, and because the nation has long continuity of existence, including a long past and a long future. In fact, a majority of a particular nation, as in the case of Belgium, may prefer extinction for the good of the nation as a whole. While the general idea of the good of the whole nation must be in the minds of all, the choice of definite means must lie with the majority in the national deliberative organization established for that purpose. The submission of the minority to these decisions is free as long as it accepts the existing organization. The more developed nation becomes a "contractual organism," each citizen freely co-operating for the good of the whole, and each conscious of the idea of the whole. It is one in which the individuality of the citizen gives best expression to national unity.

In France, and especially in England and the United States, an approach is being made to the reconciliation of individuality and collectivity. In these nations the executive organization is subordinated to the deliberative. The deliberative organization is composed of the formal organization of the

PSYCHOLOGISTS : McDOUGALL AND WALLAS

national parliament and the informal one of public opinion. Both of these allow the persons who are most imbued with the "idea of the nation" to exert their influence. Of the formal organization the English House of Commons is the best example. Its membership is composed of those who display the greater consciousness of the national self; out of this select body a small number is chosen of still more select persons to guide its deliberation. This fact, together with the existence of two parties, the rise of the Cabinet, the impartiality of the Speaker, and other traditions, prevents haste and assures that each proposal is given due attention. Underlying the whole machinery is the tradition that Parliament must voice the national will. The informal organization of public opinion also secures the prestige of the best minds. Public opinion tends to approach the opinion of the best minds because "the moral sentiments are essentially altruistic, while the immoral and non-moral sentiments are in the main self-regarding."²⁰ Thus even the selfish leader can accomplish his aim only by appealing to the altruistic motives of the public, while the great moral leaders find in the elevation of popular ideals a congenial sphere of activity. Through the formal and informal organizations of deliberation the best minds, the minds most conscious of the national will, mould popular ideals. The ideal organization is one which permits the best minds to exercise their greatest influence. Thus defined, public opinion is not the mere sum of individual opinions, but the expression of the moral judgment of the national mind as defined in each particular issue by the moral leaders of the age.

Professor McDougall's doctrines may be subjected to a many-sided analysis. Most psychologists will agree that the field of psychological theory is unfortunately as encumbered with arid and highly speculative discussions as the field of politics.²¹ One is inclined