THE EUROPA DIRECTORY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 2021

23RD EDITION

ROUTLEDGE

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FOREWORD

THE EUROPA DIRECTORY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, now in its 23rd edition, is a unique reference source. It offers a detailed and extensive guide to international organizations and their role in world affairs, an understanding of which is critical to the debate of how to address the far-reaching challenges facing the global community in the 21st century.

Part One of this publication, providing background information, includes a unique chronology charting the evolution of the international system and contemporary intergovernmental collaboration. Introductory essays, written by experts in their fields, provide further context to the workings and structure of international organizations, environmental challenges, the governance of migration, and transboundary water management. Newly commissioned for this edition is an essay which offers an historical context to multilateral co-operation with regard to global health.

Part Two covers, in depth, the United Nations—the world's largest intergovernmental body. All of its major offices, programmes, specialized agencies and related organizations are given separate entries detailing their structure, objectives and recent activities. Similar information is provided, in Part Three, for other major international and regional organizations. While these bodies do not operate in isolation, and there is increasing collaboration between them, the structured approach of these principal sections is intended to provide the reader with a clear and consistent overview of each organization. Briefer details of other organizations appear in Part Four, where, for ease of reference, they are listed according to subject. There is an index to all listed organizations and key groupings at the back of the volume.

Several articles incorporate the text of an organization's founding treaty or other significant document that shaped its future structure and objectives. Other important international treaties are positioned so as to be of most interest or use to the reader; usually this is where an organization has been actively involved in its formulation, even if not bearing any legal responsibility for its implementation or supervision. Separately documented are lists of key resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly and Security Council, which aim to place the activities and development of these bodies, in particular the UN's peacekeeping and peace-building role, within a broader context.

The book concludes, in Part Five, with a Who's Who section, providing biographical information on the principal officers and other key personalities in the international community.

All the information in this publication has been extensively researched and verified. The editors are most grateful to those organizations and individuals that have provided information for this edition, and to the contributors for their articles and advice.

June 2021

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CONTENTS

Abbreviations *Page* ix
International Telephone Codes xiii

PART ONE

Background Information

Multilateral Co-operation and Global Governance: The Evolution of International Organizations
ZORZETA BAKAKI 3
Global Environmental Governance
KATE O'NEILL 7
The Structure of Migration Governance
SARAH P. LOCKHART and JEANNETTE MONEY 13
Multilateral Governance and Global Action on Health
PRESLAVA STOEVA 19
Transboundary Water Management: Conflict and Co-operation
JOANNE YAO 24
The Development of International Organizations: A Chronology 29
International Observances 37

PART TWO

The United Nations

United Nations 43
Members 43
Diplomatic Representation 44
Permanent Missions 44
Observers 50
Information Centres/Services 51
Conferences 52
System-wide Coherence 53
Inter-Agency Bodies and Programmes 53
Finance 54
Publications 54
Secretariat 55
Other Special High Level Appointments of the Secretary-General 57
General Assembly 57
Resolutions 59
Security Council 65
International Tribunals 71
Resolutions 72
Trusteeship Council 116
Economic and Social Council—ECOSOC 117
International Court of Justice 118

United Nations Fundamental Treaties
Charter of the United Nations 121
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 130

United Nations Regional Commissions
Economic Commission for Europe—UNECE 132
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific—ESCAP 136
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean—ECLAC 142
Economic Commission for Africa—ECA 145
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia—ESCWA 149

Other United Nations Bodies
Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs—OCHA 153
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights—OHCHR 155
United Nations Children's Fund—UNICEF 160
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development—UNCTAD 172
United Nations Development Coordination Office *Page* 176
United Nations Development Programme—UNDP 179
Funds, Programmes and Policy Centres 183
United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women—UN Women 185
United Nations Environment Programme—UNEP 188
Associated Bodies 195
The Rio Conventions 196
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees—UNHCR 215
United Nations Human Settlements Programme—UN-Habitat 234
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs—UNODA 237
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime—UNODC 240
United Nations Peacekeeping 244
Chronology of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Observer Missions 261
United Nations Political Missions and Peacebuilding 266
Special Appointments of the UN Secretary-General Concerned with His Good Offices and with Peacebuilding 282
United Nations Population Fund—UNFPA 283
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East—UNRWA 286
United Nations Training and Research Institutes 289
World Food Programme—WFP 292

Specialized Agencies and Related Organizations within the UN System
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations—FAO 297
International Atomic Energy Agency—IAEA 305
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development—IBRD—World Bank 314
International Development Association—IDA 321
International Finance Corporation—IFC 323
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency—MIGA 325
International Civil Aviation Organization—ICAO 326
International Fund for Agricultural Development—IFAD 330
International Labour Organization—ILO 333
International Maritime Organization—IMO 338
International Monetary Fund—IMF 342
International Organization for Migration—IOM 350
International Telecommunication Union—ITU 355
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization—UNESCO 359
United Nations Industrial Development Organization—UNIDO 365
Universal Postal Union—UPU 368
World Health Organization—WHO 370
World Intellectual Property Organization—WIPO 384
World Meteorological Organization—WMO 388
World Tourism Organization—UNWTO 393
World Trade Organization—WTO 397

PART THREE

Major Non-UN Organizations

African Development Bank—AfDB 407
African Union—AU 413
Andean Community of Nations—CAN 428
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development—AFESD 433
Arab Monetary Fund 434
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation—APEC 436
Asian Development Bank—ADB 444
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank—AIIB 449
Association of Southeast Asian Nations—ASEAN 451
Bank for International Settlements—BIS 468
Caribbean Community—CARICOM 471
Central American Integration System—SICA 478
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa—COMESA 484
The Commonwealth 488
Commonwealth of Independent States—CIS 499

Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf—GCC *Page* 505
Council of the Baltic Sea States—CBSS 510
Council of Europe 512
Economic Community of West African States—ECOWAS 534
Economic Cooperation Organization—ECO 543
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development—EBRD 545
European Space Agency—ESA 549
European Union—EU 552
Franc Zone 606
Inter-American Development Bank—IDB 608
Intergovernmental Authority on Development—IGAD 611
International Chamber of Commerce—ICC 616
International Criminal Court—ICC 619
Hybrid International Criminal Courts 623
International Olympic Committee—IOC 626
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 629
International Committee of the Red Cross—ICRC 629
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 631
International Seabed Authority—ISA 640
International Trade Union Confederation—ITUC 642
Inter-Parliamentary Union—IPU 645
Islamic Development Bank—IsDB 649
Latin American Integration Association—LAIA 652
League of Arab States 654
North Atlantic Treaty Organization—NATO 664
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development—OECD 677
International Energy Agency—IEA 684
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency—NEA 686
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe—OSCE 688
Organization of American States—OAS 703
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries—OAPEC 716
Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation—BSEC 718
Organization of Islamic Cooperation—OIC 721
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries—OPEC 729
OPEC Fund for International Development 733
Pacific Community 735
Pacific Islands Forum 739
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation—SAARC 744
Southern African Development Community—SADC 748
Southern Common Market—MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL 755
World Council of Churches—WCC *Page* 759
World Federation of Trade Unions—WFTU 761

PART FOUR

Other International Organizations

Listed by subject

Agriculture, Food, Forestry and Fisheries 765
Arts and Culture 770
Commodities 773
Economic and Sustainable Development Co-operation 776
Economics and Finance 786
Education 791
Environment and Energy 796
Governance and Security 801
Industrial and Professional Relations 812
Law 814
Medicine and Health 817
Posts and Telecommunications 826
Press, Radio and Television 827
Religion 829
Science 832
Social Sciences 840
Social Welfare and Human Rights 843
Sport and Recreations 848
Technology 852
Tourism 856
Trade and Industry 858
Transport 864
Youth and Students 867

PART FIVE

Who's Who in International Organizations

Who's Who 873

Index of organizations 899

ABBREVIATIONS

Abog.	Abogado (Lawyer)
Acad.	Academician; Academy
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific (countries)
ADB	Asian Development Bank
Adm.	Admiral
admin.	administration
AEC	African Economic Community; African Economic Conference
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFESD	Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development
AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Area
AH	anno Hegirae
a.i.	ad interim
AIA	ASEAN Investment Area
AIDS	acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
Al.	Aleja (Alley, Avenue)
ALADI	Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración
Alt.	Alternate
amalg.	amalgamated
Apdo	Apartado (Post Box)
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
approx.	approximately
Apt	Apartment
APT	ASEAN Plus Three
ARV	advanced retroviral
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
asscn	association
assoc.	associate
asst	assistant
AU	African Union
AUDA-NEPAD	African Union Development Agency
Aug.	August
auth.	authorized
av., Ave	Avenija, Avenue
Avda	Avenida (Avenue)
Avv.	Avvocato (Lawyer)
Bd	Board
Bd, Bld, Blv., Blvd	Boulevard
b/d	barrels per day
BINUB	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
BINUCA	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic
BINUH	United Nations Integrated Mission in Haiti
BIS	Bank for International Settlements
Bldg	Building
Bn	battallion
BNUB	United Nations Office in Burundi
BP	Boîte postale (Post Box)
br.(s)	branch(es)
Brig.	Brigadier
BSE	bovine spongiform encephalopathy
bte	boîte (box)
BSEC	(Organization of the) Black Sea Economic Cooperation
bul.	bulvar (boulevard)
c.	circa; cuadra(s) (block(s)); child, children
CACM	Central American Common Market
Cad.	Caddesi (Street)
CAFTA-DR	Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement
CAN	Comunidad Andina de Naciones
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy; Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal Process
cap.	capital
Capt.	Captain
CAR	Central African Republic
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CBSS	Council of Baltic Sea States
Cdre	Commodore
CEMAC	Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale
Cen.	Central
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CET	common external tariff
CFA	Communauté Financiére Africaine; Co-opération Financiére en Afrique centrale
CFE	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CFP	Common Fisheries Policy; Communauté française du Pacifique; Comptoirs français du Pacifique
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CGAP	Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
Chair.	Chairman/person/woman
Cia	Companhia
Cía	Compañía
Cie	Compagnie
c.i.f.	cost, insurance and freight
C-in-C	Commander-in-Chief
circ.	circulation
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
cm	centimetre(s)
CMAG	Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the Harare Declaration
cnr	corner
c/o	care of
Co	Company; County
CoI	Commission of Inquiry
Col	Colonel
Coll.	College
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
Comm.	Commission; Commendatore
Commdr	Commander
Commdt	Commandant
Commr	Commissioner
Confed.	Confederation
confs	conferences
Cont.	Contador (Accountant)
COO	Chief Operating Officer
COP	Conference of (the) Parties
Corpn	Corporation
COVAX	COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access
COVID	Coronavirus disease
CP	Case Postale; Caixa Postal; Casella Postale (Post Box)
Cres.	Crescent
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CTBT	Comprehensive (Nuclear) Test Ban Treaty
Cttee	Committee
cu	cubic
cwt	hundredweight
d.	daughter(s)
DC	District of Columbia; Distrito Central
DDC	UNDP Drylands Development Centre
Dec.	December
Del.	Delegación; Delegate
Dem.	Democratic; Democrat
Dep.	Deputy
dep.	deposits
Dept	Department
devt	development
DF	Distrito Federal
Diag.	Diagonal
Dir	Director
Div.	Division(al)
DN	Distrito Nacional
Doc.	Docent
DOMREP	Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic
DOTS	direct observation treatment; short-course
Dott.	Dottore
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Dr	Doctor
Dr.	Drive
Dra	Doctora
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
Drs	Doctorandus
dwt	dead weight tons
E	East; Eastern
EAC	East African Community

EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Community
ECA	(United Nations) Economic Commission for Africa
ECLAC	(United Nations) Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
Econ.	Economic; Economics; Economist
ECOSOC	(United Nations) Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECU	European Currency Unit
ed.	edited; editor; educated
EDI	Economic Development Institute
Edif.	Edificio (Building)
edn	edition
EEA	European Economic Area
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
e.g.	exempli gratia (for example)
EIB	European Investment Bank
EMS	European Monetary System
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
Eng.	Engineer; Engineering
ERM	exchange rate mechanism
ESA	European Space Agency
Esc.	Escuela; Escudos; Escritorio
ESCAP	(United Nations) Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
ESCWA	(United Nations) Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESM	European Stability Mechanism
esq.	esquina (corner)
est.	established; estimate; estimated
etc.	et cetera
EU	European Union
EVD	Ebola Virus Disease
excl.	excluding
exec.	executive
Ext.	Extension
f.	founded
fax	facsimile
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FATF	Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
FDI	foreign direct investment
Feb.	February
Fed.	Federation; Federal
feds	federations
FM	frequency modulation
FIFA	Fédération internationale de football association
fmrly	formerly
f.o.b.	free on board
Fr	Father
Fr.	Franc
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
ft	foot (feet)
FTA	free trade agreement/area
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
FYRM	former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia
g	gram(s)
GAFTA	Greater Arab Free Trade Area
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	gross domestic product
Gdns	Gardens
GEF	Global Environment Facility
Gen.	General
GIEWS	Global Information and Early Warning System
GM	genetically modified
GMT	Greenwich Mean Time
GNP	gross national product
Gov.	Governor
Govt	Government
GPML	Global Programme Against Money Laundering
grt	gross registered tons
GSM	Global System for Mobile Communications
GWh	gigawatt hours
ha	hectares
HE	His/Her Eminence; His/Her Excellency
HEWS	Humanitarian Early Warning System
HIPC	heavily indebted poor country
HIV	human immunodeficiency virus
HLTF	High Level Task Force
HPAI	highly pathogenic avian influenza
hl	hectolitre(s)
HM	His/Her Majesty
Hon.	Honorary; Honourable
HQ	Headquarters
HRH	His/Her Royal Highness
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICC	International Chamber of Commerce; International Criminal Court
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICSID	International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
ICT	information and communication technology
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IDA	International Development Association
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDP	internally displaced person
i.e.	id est (that is to say)
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFI	international financial institution
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IML	International Migration Law
ILO	International Labour Organization/Office
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IML	International Migration Law
IMO	International Maritime Organization
in (ins)	inch (inches)
Inc, Incorp., Incd	Incorporated
incl.	including
Ind.	Independent
Ing.	Engineer
INSAG	International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group
Insp.	Inspector
Inst.	Institute
Int.	International
IOC	International Olympic Committee
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IP	Intellectual Property
IPM	Integrated Pest Management
IPU	Inter-Parliamentary Union
IRMCT	International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals
irreg.	irregular
Is	Islands
IsDB	Islamic Development Bank
ISIC	International Standard Industrial Classification
IT	information technology
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
ITUC	International Trade Union Confederation
IUU	illegal, unreported and unregulated
Jan.	January
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
Jnr	Junior
Jr	Jonkheer (Netherlands); Junior
Jt	Joint
kg	kilogram(s)
kHz	kilohertz
km	kilometre(s)
kv.	kvartal (apartment block); kvartira (apartment)
kW	kilowatt(s)
kWh	kilowatt hours
LAC	Latin America and Caribbean
LAIA	Latin American Integration Association
lb	pound(s)
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
Lic.	Licenciado
Licda	Licenciada
Lt, Lieut	Lieutenant
Ltd	Limited

m	metre(s)
m.	married; million
MAFTA	Mediterranean Arab Free Trade Area
Maj.	Major
Man.	Manager; managing
MDG(s)	Millennium Development Goal(s)
MDRI	multilateral debt relief initiative
mem.	member
MENUB	United Nations Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MERCOSUL	Mercado Comun do Sul (Southern Common Market)
MERCOSUR	Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market)
MFN	most favoured nation
mfrs	manufacturers
Mgr	Monseigneur; Monsignor
MHz	megahertz
MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
Mil.	Military
Min.	Minister; Ministry
MINUCI	United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
MINUGUA	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
MINUJUSTH	United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti
MINURCA	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MIPONUH	United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
Mlle	Mademoiselle
mm	millimetre(s)
Mme	Madame
MONUA	United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Member of Parliament
MSS	Manuscripts
MW	megawatt(s); medium wave
MWh	megawatt hour(s)

N	North; Northern
n.a.	not available
nab.	naberezhnaya (embankment, quai)
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
nám.	námestí (square)
Nat.	National
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NFI	non-food item
NGO	non-governmental organization
no	número (number)
no.	number
Nov.	November
NPT	(Nuclear) Non-Proliferation Treaty
NPV	net present value
nr	near
nrt	net registered tons
NTF	Nigeria Trust Fund
NY	New York
NZ	New Zealand

OACPS	Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States
OAPEC	Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Oct.	October
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECS	Organisation of East Caribbean States
Of.	Oficina (Office)
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
ONUCA	United Nations Observer Group in Central America
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
opp.	opposite
ORB	OPEC Reference Basket
Org.	Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

p.	page
p.a.	per annum
PA	Palestinian Authority
PACER	Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations
PAPP	Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People
Parl.	Parliament(ary)
pas.	passazh (passage)
per.	pereulok (lane, alley)
Perm. Rep.	Permanent Representative
PF	Postfach (Post Box)
PIC	Prior Informed Consent
PICTs	Pacific Island countries and territories
PICTA	Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement
PK	Post Box (Turkish)
PKO	peacekeeping operation
pl.	platz; place; ploshchad (square)
PLC	Public Limited Company
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PMB	Private Mail Bag
PNA	Palestinian National Authority
POB	Post Office Box
pr.	prospekt (avenue)
Pres.	President
PRGF	Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper(s)
Prin.	Principal
Prof.	Professor
Prov.	Province; Provincial; Provinciale (Dutch)
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
Pte	Private
Pty	Proprietary
p.u.	paid up
publ.	publication; published
Publr	Publisher
Pvt.	Private

QIP	Quick Impact Project
q.v.	quod vide (to which refer)

RC	Resident Coordinator
Rd	Road
REC	regional economic community
reg., regd	register; registered
Rep.	Republic; Republican; Representative
Repub.	Republic
res	reserve(s)
retd	retired
Rev.	Reverend
Rm	Room
Rt	Right

S	South; Southern; San
s.	son(s)
SA	Société Anonyme, Sociedad Anónima (Limited Company)
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAFTA	South Asian Free Trade Area
SAR	Special Administrative Region
SARS	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SDG(s)	Sustainable Development Goal(s)
SDR(s)	Special Drawing Right(s)
Sec.	Secretary
Secr.	Secretariat
Sen.	Senior; Senator
Sept.	September
SICA	Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
SIS	Small(er) Island States
SITC	Standard International Trade Classification
SJ	Society of Jesus
SMEs	small and medium-sized enterprises
Soc.	Society
Sok.	Sokak (Street)
SPARTECA	South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement
Sq.	Square

sq	square (in measurements)
Sr	Senior; Señor
Sra	Señora
SRSG	Special Representative of the (UN) Secretary-General
St	Saint; Street
Sta	Santa
Ste	Sainte
STI(s)	sexually transmitted infections(s)
Str., str.	Strasse, strada, stradă, strasse (street)
subs.	subscriptions; subscribed
Supt	Superintendent
tech., techn.	technical
tel.	telephone
Treas.	Treasurer
TV	television
u.	utca (street)
u/a	unit of account
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UDEAC	Union Douanière et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale
UEE	Unidade Económica Estatal
UEMOA	Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine
UK	United Kingdom
ul.	ulitsa (street)
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
UNAMIC	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNASOG	United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group
UNASUR	Union of South American Nations
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNCRO	United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDOCO	United Nations Development Coordination Office
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEA	United Nations Environment Assembly
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNGOMAP	United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIIMOG	United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
UNIOGBIS	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNIPOM	United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission
UNIPSIL	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNITAMS	United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan
Univ.	University
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMHA	United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIN	United Nations Mission in Nepal
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in East Timor
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNMOP	United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka
UNMOT	United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNMOVIC	United Nations Monitoring,Verification and Inspection Commission
UNOAU	United Nations Office to the African Union
UNOCA	United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOGBIS	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau
UNOGIL	United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNOSSC	United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation
UNOWAS	United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel
UNPA	United Nations Protected Area
UNPEI	UNDP-UNEP Poverty-Environment Initiative
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNRCCA	United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSCO	Office of the United Nations Special Co-ordinator for the Middle East Peace Process
UNSCOL	Office of the United Nations Special Co-ordinator for Lebanon
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
UNSDG	United Nations Sustainable Development Group
UNSF	United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (New Irian)
UNSMIH	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
UNSMIS	United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Group
UNTMIH	United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UNV	United Nations Volunteers
UNWTO	World Tourism Organization
UNYOM	United Nations Yemen Observation Mission
UPU	Universal Postal Union
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USMCA	United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VAT	value-added tax
Ven.	Venerable
viz.	videlicet (namely)
Vn	Veien (Street)
vol.(s)	volume(s)
vul.	vulitsa, vulytsa (street)
W	West; Western
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development
WTO	World Trade Organization
yr	year

INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE CODES

To make international calls to telephone and fax numbers listed in *The Europa Directory of International Organizations*, dial the international access code of the country from which you are calling, followed by the appropriate country code for the organization you wish to call (listed below), followed by the area code (if applicable) and telephone or fax number listed in the entry.

	Country code
Abkhazia	7
Afghanistan	93
Åland Islands	358
Albania	355
Algeria	213
American Samoa	1 684
Andorra	376
Angola	244
Anguilla	1 264
Antigua and Barbuda	1 268
Argentina	54
Armenia	374
Aruba	297
Ascension Island	247
Australia	61
Austria	43
Azerbaijan*	994
Bahamas	1 242
Bahrain	973
Bangladesh	880
Barbados	1 246
Belarus	375
Belgium	32
Belize	501
Benin	229
Bermuda	1 441
Bhutan	975
Bolivia	591
Bonaire	599
Bosnia and Herzegovina	387
Botswana	267
Brazil	55
British Indian Ocean Territory (Diego Garcia)	246
British Virgin Islands	1 284
Brunei Darussalam	673
Bulgaria	359
Burkina Faso	226
Burundi	257
Cabo Verde	238
Cambodia	855
Cameroon	237
Canada	1
Cayman Islands	1 345
Central African Republic	236
Ceuta	34
Chad	235
Chile	56
China, People's Republic	86
Christmas Island	61
Cocos (Keeling) Islands	61
Colombia	57
Comoros	269
Congo, Democratic Republic	243
Congo, Republic	242
Cook Islands	682
Costa Rica	506
Côte d'Ivoire	225
Croatia	385
Cuba	53
Curaçao	599
Cyprus	357
Czech Republic (Czechia)	420
Denmark	45
Djibouti	253
Dominica	1 767
Dominican Republic	1 809
Ecuador	593
Egypt	20
El Salvador	503
Equatorial Guinea	240
Eritrea	291
Estonia	372
Eswatini	268
Ethiopia	251
Falkland Islands	500
Faroe Islands	298
Fiji	679
Finland	358
France	33
French Guiana	594
French Polynesia	689
Gabon	241
Gambia	220
Georgia†	995
Germany	49
Ghana	233
Gibraltar	350
Greece	30
Greenland	299
Grenada	1 473
Guadeloupe	590
Guam	1 671
Guatemala	502
Guernsey	44
Guinea	224
Guinea-Bissau	245
Guyana	592
Haiti	509
Honduras	504
Hong Kong	852
Hungary	36
Iceland	354
India	91
Indonesia	62
Iran	98
Iraq	964
Ireland	353
Isle of Man	44
Israel	972
Italy	39
Jamaica	1 876
Japan	81
Jersey	44
Jordan	962
Kazakhstan	7
Kenya	254
Kiribati	686
Korea, Democratic People's Republic (North Korea)	850
Korea, Republic (South Korea)	82
Kosovo	383‡
Kuwait	965
Kyrgyzstan	996
Lao People's Democratic Republic	856
Latvia	371
Lebanon	961
Lesotho	266
Liberia	231
Libya	218

	Country code
Liechtenstein	423
Lithuania	370
Luxembourg	352
Macao	853
Madagascar	261
Malawi	265
Malaysia	60
Maldives	960
Mali	223
Malta	356
Marshall Islands	692
Martinique	596
Mauritania	222
Mauritius	230
Mayotte	262
Melilla	34
Mexico	52
Micronesia, Federated States	691
Moldova	373
Monaco	377
Mongolia	976
Montenegro	382
Montserrat	1 664
Morocco	212
Mozambique	258
Myanmar	95
Nagornyi Karabakh (Artsakh)	374
Namibia	264
Nauru	674
Nepal	977
Netherlands	31
New Caledonia	687
New Zealand	64
Nicaragua	505
Niger	227
Nigeria	234
Niue	683
Norfolk Island	672
North Macedonia	389
Northern Mariana Islands	1 670
Norway	47
Oman	968
Pakistan	92
Palau	680
Palestinian Territories	970 or 972
Panama	507
Papua New Guinea	675
Paraguay	595
Peru	51
Philippines	63
Pitcairn Islands	872
Poland	48
Portugal	351
Puerto Rico	1 787
Qatar	974
Réunion	262
Romania	40
Russian Federation	7
Rwanda	250
Saba	599
Saint-Barthélemy	590
Saint Helena	290
Saint Kitts and Nevis	1 869
Saint Lucia	1 758
Saint-Martin	590
Saint Pierre and Miquelon	508
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1 784
Samoa	685
San Marino	378
São Tomé and Príncipe	239
Saudi Arabia	966
Senegal	221
Serbia	381
Seychelles	248
Sierra Leone	232
Singapore	65
Sint Eustatius	1 721
Sint Maarten	1 721
Slovakia	421
Slovenia	386
Solomon Islands	677
Somalia	252
South Africa	27
South Ossetia	7
South Sudan	211
Spain	34
Sri Lanka	94
Sudan	249
Suriname	597
Svalbard	47
Sweden	46
Switzerland	41
Syrian Arab Republic	963
Taiwan	886
Tajikistan	992
Tanzania	255
Thailand	66
Timor-Leste	670
Togo	228
Tokelau	690
Tonga	676
Transnistria	373
Trinidad and Tobago	1 868
Tristan da Cunha	290
Tunisia	216
Turkey	90
'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'	90 392
Turkmenistan	993
Turks and Caicos Islands	1 649
Tuvalu	688
Uganda	256
Ukraine†	380
United Arab Emirates	971
United Kingdom	44
United States of America	1
United States Virgin Islands	1 340
Uruguay	598
Uzbekistan	998
Vanuatu	678
Vatican City	39
Venezuela	58
Viet Nam	84
Wallis and Futuna Islands	681
Yemen	967
Zambia	260
Zimbabwe	263

* Telephone numbers for Nagornyi Karabakh (Artsakh) use the country code for Armenia (374).

† Telephone numbers for Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the two territories on the Crimean peninsula use the country code for the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan (7).

‡ Mobile telephone numbers for Kosovo use either the country code for Monaco (377) or the country code for Slovenia (386).

Note: Telephone and fax numbers using the Inmarsat ocean region code 870 are listed in full. No country or area code is required, but it is necessary to precede the number with the international access code of the country from which the call is made.

PART ONE

Background Information

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MULTILATERAL CO-OPERATION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

ZORZETA BAKAKI*

The international system in the 21st century has been described as a multilateral scheme represented by actors who look to maximize their own gains. These actors, states and organizations usually work together seeking also to maximize public goods. Succeeding in public goods policy is probably the largest challenge that global co-operation faces nowadays. To this end, there has been a lot of discussion on how states act within the international system given their potentially 'anarchic' behaviour.

States are known as rational and unitary, self-interested, self-help systems whose core principle is how to thrive independently from others. Their main interest is their own sovereignty, focusing on their own individual motivations. This, however, can only occur under specific circumstances where a state is indeed self-sufficient and independent, and thus not reliant on other countries. Actors then prioritize their own maximum gain without considering any compromise. Therefore, under such circumstances, co-operation as a simple act of working together is difficult to achieve. Co-operation is inherently all about compromises. Although this is a firmly rationalist approach, well discussed by Thomas Hobbes and other philosophers, many elements of such thinking continue to be present in the more liberal world that we live in today. States are still self-centred, yet they are unable to survive without co-operation. In the 21st century we certainly cannot imagine a world without co-operative behaviour where actors willingly work together for a common benefit. How is this co-operative behaviour managed and potentially successful today? Can international regimes overcome anarchical attitudes or performances by states without underestimating their interests?

International organizations (IOs) often have to deal with dilemmas that lead to inferior outcomes in the absence of an entity above the actors. In essence, international regimes play the role of a central government that manages all states. Their role is to distribute power and co-ordinate the game. This can prove not to be an easy task, considering the amount of actors that are involved in the international system. Matters such as the provision of public goods, free-riding and the costs of monitoring and enforcement are among the most severe problems international regimes have to face. Despite such issues co-operation is not impossible, as actors may consider that they will be able to gain more by co-operating than by working on their own. In this regard, the role of IOs is particularly complex and challenging.

In order to pursue successful international co-operation IOs aim to enlarge the shadow of the future, ensuring that member states see a long-term benefit to be gained by co-operating. Part of their role is to make co-operation easier, more approachable, and accessible to all states by reducing transaction costs. Furthermore, states would have to deal with a lot of uncertainty without an IO representing their interests in the international system. Therefore, IOs seek to decrease uncertainty via different mechanisms. They promote transparency by allowing for and encouraging provision of information, or information flow. At the same time, to make co-operation productive and effective, IOs are responsible for generating credible commitments for their members. Committing decreases uncertainty and binds members' towards the IO and other co-members. IOs not only aim to develop and implement co-operation but also to monitor states' co-operative behaviour. Likewise, IOs may also be able to enforce an agreement if members do not comply with it.

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The role and impact of IOs in the international system has been changing throughout the decades, primarily based on the member states' adapting needs. For example, environmental concerns have only been part of IOs' mandates in the most recent decades. Global environmental challenges generated the need for global decision making on environmental policy. Although this was not a priority in the immediate post-Second World War era, IOs nowadays put particular effort into considering how environmental concerns affect the interests of member states. Even IOs whose policy priority or mandate is not the environment do take measurements on how to address environmental concerns. For example, the World Trade Organization has no particular agreement or mandate focused on the environment; WTO agreements, however, endorse governments' right to protect the environment.

This essay addresses IOs' primary roles in the international system to examine, and discuss further, how they have evolved through these roles and expanded their legitimacy and activity to encompass all aspects of the international system. The first section offers an overview of how international law shapes IOs and their design. The second section outlines one of the biggest debates on the role of IOs: delegation and how it embeds power. The third section moves to another aspect of delegation and its impact on democratic politics. The fourth section continues with challenges generated in the relationship between states and IOs via agency problems, whilst the fifth section focuses on compliance. The last section considers how contemporary challenges have impacted on the institutional design of IOs and what this means for global governance.

HOW DOES INTERNATIONAL LAW SHAPE IOs?

An IO consists of more than two member states, and is usually established by a treaty. There should be a clear mandate indicating the scope of the organization. An IO follows a particular set of rules but also allows for norms that can be as important as rules. Derived from its scope each IO sets policy goals that are in accordance with its founding purpose and areas of expertise. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in 1949 by the North Atlantic Treaty with 12 founding member states. NATO's mandate concerns mutual defence in response to an attack by any external party. Accordingly, NATO's policy focuses on defence and armed forces. The North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO's governing body, is responsible for setting the rules and demonstrating the norms of the organization. Most IOs were established in the aftermath of the Second World War, and there has been an—almost—continuous increase in the number of IOs since then.

Different types of IOs deal with different aspects of world politics. The major distinct classification is between global IOs and regional IOs. Global IOs such as the United Nations (UN) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) address world-wide concerns and feature a wider spectrum of member states. Regional IOs such as the African Union (AU) on the other hand, have a more defined geographical scope.

Generally, the design of IOs is about legalization. In essence, legalization is a system of institutionalized rules, norms and regulations that characterize organizations along the following 'three plus one' dimensions: obligation, precision, delegation, and flexibility.

Obligation refers to an IO's degree of bondage and commitment. Rules are not necessarily binding in a legal sense, i.e. they may not be subject to scrutiny under the general rules procedures

and discourse of international law. This means that rules can actually have a more relaxed form allowing for alternative ways of commitment. The majority of IOs rest on principles, norms and goals that are non-binding and, therefore, do not create any compulsory actions for their members. In contrast, high obligation commitments enable members to assert legal claims (*pacta sunt servanda*) as well as empowering them to engage in legal discourse, invoke binding procedures, and resort to legal remedies.

Precision captures an unambiguous definition of states' required actions in certain circumstances. IOs do not usually adopt precise rules because those narrow the scope for broad reasonable interpretation. When IOs are precise with their rules and governance clarity is introduced into their structure then the level of uncertainty is significantly reduced. The mechanism of precision generates a non-contradictory framework of rules that can be carried out by all member states coherently. A high level of precision is therefore likely to lower the propensity of rule violations.

Delegation relies on granting authority of implementation, interpretation, rule application, and dispute resolution to one or more third parties. To this end, states lose some degree of sovereign decision making as other bodies, like enforcement organizations or secretariats, take over some of this power. The alternative of long and costly bargaining between states could be an obstacle to good relations and to further co-operation. When delegation is applied, there are clauses that allow for parties to accept or reject an outcome without legal justification or to interpret agreements in a self-serving and biased manner.

The 'plus one' mechanism refers to *flexibility*. This creates procedural opportunities for transcending initial constraints and in essence can be applied to all three aforementioned dimensions. In practice, flexibility mechanisms might include escape clauses or opting-out possibilities. If these are incorporated into a regime, states can circumvent exogenous shocks and other difficulties that would make compliance less desirable. In other words, flexibility mechanisms directly address countries' reservations relating to sovereignty, power-sharing and enforcement.

These dimensions are basic elements of IOs' design and they translate into soft and hard law. Soft law essentially weakens the strength of the previously introduced dimensions of legalization. The purpose of this is to lower contracting costs for members, make the IO approachable, and ease the membership commitments. Under soft law it is easier to bargain and negotiate as the rules do not dictate decision making. Here actors can react flexibly to circumstances and potentially act on a case-by-case basis. Most resolutions and declarations of the UN General Assembly are non-binding, and thus soft law is applied. Importantly soft law applications have little impact on states' concerns about sovereignty as IOs do not have the legitimacy to enforce decisions.

On the other hand, hard law is binding, meaning that the commitments are not recommendations or suggestions but firm guidance. This helps to keep actors in line and prevent deviation from the collective policy goals. Hard law requires strict contracts that strengthen the credibility of commitments for member states. The application of hard law by IOs usually depends on the subject and level of commitment required to see a positive outcome. For example, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer is a hard law treaty that features obligation, monitoring, and enforcement and dispute settlement.

When applying the various possibilities of legalization one important aspect to consider is the nature of the domestic actors involved, and what their role is here. Applying hard law at the international level means it might be more difficult to approve and then ratify such policy at the domestic level. The costs of signing a hard agreement then may outweigh the benefits. This constrains leaders as it reduces flexibility. However, all uncertainties can never be predicted in the first place. Often the reaction at the domestic level simply depends on the type of policy and its particularities.

MORE DELEGATION IS NEEDED

The international system faces challenges that require global, inclusive and multi-party collaboration. Hence, effective co-operation is valuable. Co-operation beyond hegemonic power is possible if it is mutually beneficial for all due to the interdependencies of the actors. Co-operation can take various forms and setups. It can exist via a framework of bilateral agreements between actors, or via an IO. The role of IOs in this case is to pursue states' interests more efficiently. To put it differently, IOs seek ways to save costs for their members. These are the costs occurred from negotiations and bargaining, compliance and enforcement deals. Therefore, IOs solve potential bargaining problems that may occur without an institutional framework.

IOs may lower transaction costs via various channels. First, they offer a negotiation forum that gives the opportunity for discussion and the exchange of ideas, with clearly defined aims and procedures. This therefore excludes the need for costly pre-negotiations. Second, the fact that a third-party functions as a mediator increases the chances of negotiation success and compliance. The expectation is that the mediator aims to satisfy the interests of all parties. At the same time, an IO is responsible for monitoring and fact-finding, which decreases uncertainty for the negotiating parties and increases trust in others' actions. For this IOs have in place institutional monitoring and enforcement procedures. For example, the mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to ensure that there is no incentive to build nuclear weapons. Expanding the membership of the IAEA reduces the fear that others will break the agreement. Moreover, IOs often employ the issue linkage strategy—i.e. a simultaneous discussion of two or more issues that could be settled in tandem. In fact the need for extensive co-operation in many policy areas encourages IOs to multi task when it comes to negotiating settlements. To this end, IOs increase interdependencies, and as a result save further transaction costs. However, issues of structure, number of states and the distribution of power are common obstacles to achieving effective co-operation.

The relationship between a member state and an IO relies on the principal agent theory where the principal is the member state and the agent is the IO. Hence, the latter acts on behalf of the former. This relationship is limited in time and according to the scope of the IO, and it can be revoked by the principal, who grants the authority in the first place.

The relationship between the principal and the agent relies on the division of labour and gains from specialization. This means that the principal calls out to an IO when the task at stake is frequent, repetitive and most importantly requires specific expertise. When there is a need for such tasks an IO is responsible first and foremost for managing policy externalities. This is achieved via co-ordination and collaboration among the member states in reaching the policy goals. The IO then evaluates alternatives on more technical or social welfare grounds, and this is where the expertise of the IO is the most needed. Second, the agent facilitates collective action decision making by setting the agenda and presenting the options. Often the IO acts as a leading authority by providing decision making procedures. By assuming such responsibility an IO is also responsible for resolving potential disputes. This can be managed via different means, such as mediation, arbitration or adjudication. Essentially, an IO, after evaluating the issue at stake, can decide the outcome and enforce it. For instance, the WTO has in place a dispute settlement system that is the central pillar of the organization, and has helped to sustain the global economy. Effective co-operation is largely affected by reliable actors, reputation and credibility. That is, the IO sets the policy commitments and secures the non-violation of the terms. Enforcement mechanisms are in place that can move the policy in the right direction for achieving the set goals. Considering the global challenges and the level of delegation given to IOs it is not surprising that IOs create policy bias. This means that they are able to direct and even influence governments on what policy they should be adopting and implementing. Policy winners actively bias policies in their favour through delegation. Along the same lines, IOs promote lock-in actions for ensuring future co-operation on the policy winners' preferences.

HOW DO DEMOCRATIC POLITICS IMPACT ON CO-OPERATION?

The role and responsibilities of IOs are better implemented under democratic regimes. The reason being that domestic politics are decisive for the international arena. IOs' policy efforts need to be

ratified at the domestic level before they can be implemented. Therefore, in promoting effective co-operation a functional two-level system is in place. However, this may vary across different regimes due to decision making procedures at the domestic level. In general, domestic and international level politics are highly intertwined meaning that a two-level game defines such relationships. On the one hand, the international level (i.e. level I) is the one where governments seek to satisfy domestic pressures, minimize adverse consequences of foreign policies, and maximize their own utility. On the other hand, the domestic level (i.e. level II) is where domestic groups exert pressure on governments to adopt favourable policies. The second level is important for internal bargaining and ratification processes. At the same time, this is the most perplexing aspect of the two level-game; how to obtain a win set despite the constraints that may exist at level II. These constraints can be tackled via domestic preferences and coalitions, political institutions and their role in governance, but also by the strategies of negotiators. Moreover, IOs can influence domestic politics through two-level games while countries can pressure and influence other countries through IOs. After all, the two-level game promotes interdependencies that is the ultimate mechanism of co-operation.

What is important to consider here is how the domestic audience is involved in this relationship. This is primarily relevant in democratic regimes where the audience plays a major role. Each decision taken at the domestic level should ultimately respect the public's wishes, the electoral audience. Public opinion ought to play a crucial role in whether policies' achieve ratification, as governments place a high value on retaining public support.

The discussion of democratic politics in relation to IOs relies on a bigger picture and prominent research theme: democracies can promote IO co-operation. The basic argument is that democracies have a common structural background and a common political culture that shapes their identities, norms, behaviour, and, above all, interests. In turn this gives these kinds of regimes more inclusivity, a higher level of transparency and it promotes a common understanding that induces shared norms. In addition, it increases the likelihood that those regimes know about each other's internal evaluations, their intentions, the intensity of their preferences, and their willingness to adhere to an agreement, even in adverse future circumstances. This is possible because democracies operate under a norm of bounded competition that favours the use of compromise and non-violence. The inclusivity and transparency of democratic systems allows enhanced communication flows between these sorts of regimes. This matters in promoting co-operation because democracies have more information about each other and thus will ultimately face less uncertainty and have more mutual trust, as well as higher reliability towards each other. This facilitates the resolution of collective action problems that is often seen as a crucial issue in the contemporary world politics. Ultimately, the shared norms and common transparent institutional features make it more likely that democracies will delegate power to IOs.

The interest of democracies to audience costs is driven by a leader's primary goal of retaining office. As a consequence, their aim to stay in power depends on the electorate, and democratic leaders have to satisfy them. When it comes to foreign policy, instead of unilateral policies, delegation to IOs signals to the audience that the costs of foreign policy are indeed shared. Hence, they should be lower than in the former case. This also increases legitimacy. Therefore, democracies seek co-operation within IOs. Additionally, democratic countries may have an extra incentive to avoid foreign policy failure as this would have detrimental reputational costs.

That said, the impact of other regimes can still be crucial in decision making on issues of global impact, for example climate change. Furthermore, the relationship between democracy and IOs can be reversed and thus raises the question of whether IOs promote democracy. Actually, democratization has become a foreign policy goal for many—particularly—regional IOs and democratic states. IOs can exert pressure in democratizing states through their legitimacy. Even the least democratic member states of IOs tend to adopt better democratic norms. Besides, democracies perform better when it comes to trade, peace or making alliances. Overall, IOs can induce acceptance of democratic norms by elites that leads to hand-tying and socialization within the organization. Against this background, democratizing states can approach IOs for facilitating the democratizing process. Once more, this process induces IO co-operation.

CHALLENGES TO STATE CONTROL THROUGH AGENCY PROBLEMS

This way of understanding the international system implies that delegation is necessary for successful co-operation among its actors. Hence, the emphasis is heavily on the view that delegation is good, and therefore IOs, their role, scope and policy purposes mean well for member states. There are, however, normative and positivist reasons not to delegate power to IOs. Often delegation, if not carefully assigned, can backfire in domestic politics. Among other mechanisms, the process of delegation relies on the foundations of principal-agent theory. In other words, this refers to delegation of power to an IO that in turn is able to make laws and regulations that may be binding for state actors. Take for instance the processes of European Union (EU) law making. The EU's legal act is based on regulations and directives which are legally-binding and are applicable to all member states. Binding politics often are desirable as they increase state commitments, reliability and, thus, enhance effective co-operation. However, in turn, those agents (IOs) can influence their principals (member states) and policy outcomes via various means. First, the agents may apply impartial mediation at the expense of equal treatment to all member states. Second, they can influence principals with technocratic guidance and policy expertise. Finally, they can impact the domestic level and their related actors. All this can occur under the spectrum of the symbolic legitimation of the IO body. A very powerful example is the EU Commission. It dominates regulations and norm procedures for the common market (not the treaties as such, though). It also has the prerogative to initiate policy proposals.

Such bodies develop a dynamic on their own that can be out of the control of member states and especially of democratic control. This leads to democratic deficit. The same phenomenon does apply to other IOs such as the UN, NATO or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The practices of these bodies have important implications for accountability, responsibility and their overall legitimacy against member states. Potentially the practice in reality (positivist) outweighs what they should be doing (normative).

Members of IOs are in need of the agents' expertise—but increasing agent autonomy may lead to undesirable outcomes. In essence, granting autonomy once may not be the last time. This shows the dynamics of spillover processes that could potentially get out of states' control. These are functional processes that, as new forms of power delegation occur, make an effective control of the apparatus rather difficult: for example, the establishment of a single European common market then followed by a common market without borders. The agent may develop new preferences at the expense of pursuing the principal's interest. The structure of the delegation itself opens up possibilities for the agent actually to behave against the principal's principles. Naturally, principals can adopt a series of administrative and oversight procedures for addressing these issues. Administrative options include the evaluation of *ex-ante* definitions of scope, activities, and procedures of the agent. These definitions may be restrictive and can be altered. Nonetheless, the trade off in amending them is a loss of efficiency. Also, these options are costly and do not necessarily guarantee effectiveness. Although there is no optimal strategy against agency problems, member states choose delegation when they are not able to achieve desirable policy targets on their own. This should be the ultimate rationale when considering how much power to delegate.

TO COMPLY OR NOT?

With delegation comes compliance. Member states have to agree on behaviour that is favourable to the solution of a problem and then pursue the policies they have agreed to. On the other hand, if states do not follow the rules and regulations of IOs, this leads to non-compliance. In general, states have an incentive to comply with IO rules, not only because this is why they joined the IO in the first place, but also because compliance will prime effective policy outcomes. States also comply due to reputational concerns; they tend to prefer to be known as good team players who

do not violate the rules. Failing to comply with IOs' efforts may lead to being named and shamed that significantly impacts on a state's reputation, in particular when this involves a human rights commitment. There is, however, an alternative way of thinking about reputational concerns; states might choose to join only specifically those treaties that they can comply with in the first place. Although this is not necessarily bad, in the long-term it may impact on the quality of target policies. Put differently, if countries design treaties in such a way that they can comply easily with them, these treaties might be very shallow.

Again, member states' general incentive is to comply with IOs' policies for their own benefit as well. Compliance is in any case a crucial requirement for solving a problem of international interest and a necessary condition for IO effectiveness. Thus, given compliance induces effective solutions. However, this is only one part of the story. IO rules may only reflect the lowest common denominator. In this scenario, precise IO compliance may not necessarily alter the status quo when the IO rules do not make an actual difference. This implies that some deviation from compliance is possible. The level of states' compliance to an IO's rules depends generally on willingness and opportunity. For example, lack of clarity in the rules and regulations may discourage states from compliance. At the same time, states may not be able to comply due to lack of state capacity in fulfilling specific regulations. Time inconsistency here may also be a problem. Different member states may be ready to fulfil regulations at different times. When the problem is a capacity issue the enforcement strategy differs and the aim of the IO is to enhance state capacity through capacity-building mechanisms. If it is about willingness, the IO will be trying to change states' short-term interests by highlighting the long-term preferences and displaying the long-term benefits. The IO is responsible for providing incentives for enforcement, such as state capacity building, and giving therefore the opportunity to find ways to comply, which largely depends on its institutional design. Take for example the case of the IMF, which has received multiple criticisms relating to its lending strategies in Africa. The debate is whether the IMF chooses to enforce the wrong policies or whether the IMF does not enforce policies at all. The agent may not be well controlled, or else the principals may not wish for enforcement, meaning that the IMF in effect does not have enough independence to act on behalf of the principals. It turns out that whether the conditions for lending are implemented or not does not have an impact on programme suspension. However, indicators showing how important a country is to the major donor countries (principals of the Fund) can explain programme suspension. As a result, it is not the lack of control but too much interference by major industrial countries that makes IMF lending ineffective. A policy suggestion here is that the IMF requires more independence for the implementation of successful competitive policy.

THE FUTURE OF IOs

The scope per se of IOs in the international system has not changed much since their wide establishment after 1945. The general scope of IOs has been to promote co-operation among states. Nevertheless, the means of implementing global co-operation has experienced challenges that basically rely on the aforementioned aspects. Hence, these challenges have changed the ways that IOs function in promoting co-operation. The primary factors that drive IOs' functioning are states' interests, needs and preferences. Based on these, the IOs adopt rules, norms and regulations. There is a paradoxical increase in self-power that can only be achieved via global co-operation. States need to co-operate more and more in order to achieve demanding targets from competitive policy in all aspects, economy, trade, welfare and social policy, technology, etc.

IOs' promotion of co-operation has now been moving beyond simple policy scopes. Their impact on global co-operation focuses more than ever before on unintended consequences that in essence are not so indirect anymore. This occurs via socialization disseminated by IOs, referring to the process of incorporating a new member into the norms and rules of a given community. More generally, it is a process by which members learn to adopt the norms, values, attitudes, and behaviours accepted and practised by an ongoing system. This is ultimately the environment that member states work in within an IO. They learn from and emulate each other, aiming to gain first for their own interest and second for the global public good. This effectively translates into policy effectiveness as actors thus gain experience and expertise.

What we have been experiencing is that IOs reflect, rather than directly affect, world politics, and hence state interests. Hence, IOs are (institutionally) weak and unlikely directly to influence peace processes, for instance. Rather, IOs form networks comprising direct and indirect links between states that facilitate social capital and communication. IOs effectively generate ties between countries that move beyond the simple term of co-operation. To this end, social capital embodies mutual obligations, relations of trust, norms, common expectations, authority relations, and organizations that facilitate collective action. Social capital creates obligations and expectations that help enforce compliance and communication among states, which makes co-ordination easier and also decreases uncertainty. However, not all ties are created equal. On the one hand, the states could share a set of direct links. On the other hand, countries that have no or only weak direct connections with each other do not act in isolation. We therefore see the generation of indirect links as well. These are ties that connect two states via one or more third parties and allow for communication. In this case, indirect links are more crucial for a network (and states' position therein) and actually can replace direct links between states.

From a policy perspective, the role of IOs and the unintended consequences of their scope can only enhance their influence in the international system. They are powerful institutions that both foster policy agreements and also generate, shape, and even alter states' preferences. The extent of this power is still, however, assumed by the state itself, the principal.

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE

KATE O'NEILL*

THE RISE IN AWARENESS OF AND ACTION AROUND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

In the past few years climate change has risen to pre-eminence on the global political agenda. The subject of scientific debate, it is now an issue that shapes the interactions of the most powerful countries in the international system. In 2019 the failure of these countries to step up to face what many see as a climate crisis generated extensive protest around the world. It is the most prominent, and most serious, example of the global and transboundary environmental issues that have emerged since the late 1960s. However, even this most pressing of problems faded against the background of anti-inequality protests around the world in late 2019, and, of course, the COVID-19 pandemic that struck in early 2020. One global climate meeting had to be moved from Chile to Spain. Another—scheduled for late 2020—was postponed.

Environmental degradation, through resource depletion and emission of pollutants into the air, ground and water, is hardly a new phenomenon. It has accompanied economic growth since the early days of the Industrial Revolution. Water pollution, urban sanitation crises and land degradation through over-use actually predate industrialization. However, until the late 1960s, public awareness of environmental problems was most keen at the local level, where their effects were most visible. Smoke stacks, dead rivers, and waste dumps became focal points for early environmental activism in urban and industrial areas. Preservation of wilderness or countryside essentially focused on the land itself, not necessarily on broader causes, connections or ecosystems.

By 1970 a different perspective had pervaded environmental activism and policymaking: that environmental problems were not restricted to local or even national impacts. They crossed borders, even affecting the global commons, i.e. the atmosphere and the oceans, in ways unimagined years earlier. It had become abundantly clear that the unparalleled economic growth the world had experienced in the previous 25 years carried with it a huge ecological cost. Forests in Germany and Norway were being destroyed by acid rain which resulted from sulphur dioxide emissions in the United Kingdom that were blown across by prevailing winds. Ocean fish stocks were starting rapidly to be depleted. Distinct and important (so-called 'charismatic') species, for example whales or pandas, were high on the list of those threatened with extinction, and the Amazon Rainforest became a symbol of the threats facing many whole ecosystems worldwide as a result of resource depletion to fulfil growing demand for timber products and agricultural goods, primarily from industrialized nations. In 1960 the world's population reached 3,000m., and was heading towards 4,000m. by the end of that decade. Scientists, too, were starting to identify and draw causal linkages with human behaviour around two problems that threatened the earth's atmosphere and climate. The first was stratospheric ozone layer depletion as a result of the production and use of a very widely applied chemical, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), and second was the very real potential for the alteration of the world's entire climate through the accumulation of greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, in the atmosphere, the phenomenon we now call climate change, or global warming.

Even with this mounting evidence that environmental problems could be global in nature, it took concerted effort to persuade nation states to start working together to address these issues in a systematic way, utilizing international law and international institutions. Scientists and environmental activists worked hard to raise concern among the public and policy elites, with a good degree of success. Events such as the first 'Earth Day' in 1970 and the wide dissemination of the first pictures of the earth from space, depicting a fragile green and blue sphere hanging alone in the dark vacuum, helped to heighten public concern, and to create symbols that could stand in the absence of visible impacts. Economists and ecologists started to publish works that were critical of untrammelled economic and population growth, painting dire future scenarios in the absence of action: concepts such as 'limits to growth' or 'small is beautiful', and the slogan 'act local, think global', were all products of this period. At the same time that a global environmental movement was starting to emerge, scientific communities, which had been working across national and disciplinary boundaries for some time, began to take their findings about climate change, ozone layer and biodiversity depletion and other global problems to a wider audience.

The decisive step towards concerted international political action to combat global environmental problems was taken by the United Nations (UN). In 1972 the UN convened the first global 'earth summit', the UN Conference on Humans and the Environment (UNCHE), in Stockholm, Sweden. UNCHE brought together representatives from over 100 countries to discuss how to address the newly recognized global scope of environmental problems. The resulting agreements accomplished several goals. First, delegates agreed that the most effective way forward would be through multilateral diplomacy: the negotiation of binding legal agreements among nation states on an issue by issue basis. This decision essentially ratified existing practices, as by then a number of international environmental agreements were already in existence—the 1946 International Whaling Convention, for example, although cases exist as far back as the 19th century. In order to reinforce this somewhat piecemeal system, the Stockholm Declaration codified 26 principles of international environmental law, including the rights of states to use their own resources but also their obligations not to harm the environments of other states. The Declaration placed strong emphasis on the importance of science in informing global environmental policymaking and laid out a number of priorities for the international community. UNCHE delegates agreed to establish a new UN Environment Programme (UNEP), whose job it would be to co-ordinate global environmental governance through identifying important problems, convening and enabling international negotiations, and monitoring the resulting agreements (see below).

Since Stockholm, there have been three more global earth summits: the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), convened in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992, the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), held in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2002, and the 'Rio+20' UN Conference on Sustainable Development, convened on the theme of a 'Green Economy', in June 2012, again in Rio. The 1992 Rio Summit marked the high point of international environmental diplomacy, with the opening for signature of two major conventions, on biological diversity and climate change. WSSD was a far more subdued event (at least in terms of output), reflecting disillusionment with multilateral diplomacy as the primary global environmental governance tool. Likewise, the Rio+20 meeting failed to produce substantive results, although none were really expected. States agreed on a declaration of principles and on institutional restructuring, including strengthening UNEP. Subsequently, the UN has adopted an ambitious series of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), to be reached by 2030. The titles of these conferences demonstrate how the language of sustainable development has been incorporated into global environmental governance, reflecting a dominant understanding that environmental and development goals can not only be made compatible, but that they should also be reconciled to achieve effective results. It is true, however, that the global summits have been sidelined by the contentious politics characterizing climate governance, which has become the focal point for global environmental governance. While climate

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governance remains unresolved there have, however, been moderate successes in addressing other, less high-profile issue areas, including negotiating a 2013 treaty controlling the production and use of mercury. There has also been a successful initiative to restrict global trade in plastic wastes.

EXISTING STRUCTURES OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE

The 1972 Stockholm conference set the stage for the ensuing four decades of global environmental governance. The most important actors on this stage are, of course, nation states and their representatives, all with different and often conflicting interests about what, and how much, to do about specific environmental problems. The most important divide among states has been between the industrialized countries (the 'North') and the poorer 'South', largely around issues of responsibility for global environmental problems, and thus how adjustment costs should be distributed. International environmental politics (unlike some other global policy arenas) has, however, been remarkably open to participation by other sorts of actors. Environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been very active at this level, attending negotiations, lobbying for particular solutions, and helping to monitor resulting commitments. The scientific community, too, has played a central role in demonstrating cause and effect, generating new knowledge, and working towards consensus, in order to ameliorate two of the biggest obstacles to effective environmental policies: uncertainty and complexity. The most well known international scientific body at this level is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), though other advisory groups, both ad hoc and permanent, advise other negotiating processes. One of these is the International Panel for Biodiversity and Ecosystems Services, established in 2012 to manage scientific knowledge for the Convention on Biological Diversity. The private sector was somewhat slower to get involved directly at the level of international negotiations, preferring instead to work through government representatives. Now, however, business coalitions represent their members' interests at many sets of negotiations, from climate change to hazardous waste trading. In some cases, they can obstruct effective measures, but in others they have been key partners in forging solutions.

Of the international organizations active in this policy arena, UNEP plays the leading role as an 'anchor' institution for global environmental governance (Ivanova 2007). It is based in Nairobi, Kenya, but has offices around the world. It also houses convention secretariats. Although relatively small and under-funded given its mandate, UNEP has remained the most important international institution in the area of global environmental governance, helping to usher in dozens of environmental agreements and measures since its founding. In December 2012, following discussions at Rio+20, the UN General Assembly announced that UNEP would be upgraded, expanding its organizational structure from a 58-member governing council to an assembly with universal membership, and strengthening its funding.

The World Bank is probably the second most important international organization in this area. It has had to work hard to correct its negative environmental record in funding large-scale development projects, such as dams, in the absence of social and environmental assessments. The World Bank co-ordinates funding for the Global Environment Facility (GEF), established in 1991 as a partnership between UNEP, the Bank and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), to fund projects in developing countries with specific global environmental benefits. It also plays a lead role in the development and implementation of new climate funds, such as the Green Climate Fund. A UN Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD), established in 1992 at the Rio Summit, oversaw progress towards world goals on sustainable development until, following Rio+20, it was disbanded and replaced by a high-level political forum on sustainable development. Finally, in recent years the World Trade Organization (WTO) has come to have its own place on this stage, in part to address potential conflicts between global trade rules and environmental regulations (both national and international), and in part to examine how trade liberalization might be harnessed to achieve the SDGs. This shift is not without opposition, as many civil society representatives have pointed out that economic liberalization has been a major driver of environmental problems, from resource extraction to waste generation.

The past 50 years have witnessed the introduction of dozens of major multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Taking into account the protocols and amendments associated with major treaties and framework conventions, as well as environmental components of other international agreements (notably around trade), this number runs well into the hundreds. Table 1 lists some of the major MEAs and, where applicable, their major associated legal protocols and amendments.

Table 1: Major Multilateral Environmental Agreements

Agreement and major associated legal instruments	Date adopted/ entry into force	Number of parties (at mid-2021)
International Whaling Convention	1946/1946	88
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)	1973/1975	183
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)	1973/1983	160
UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS)	1982/1994	168
Agreement for the Implementation of UNCLOS related to the Conservation and Management of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks	1995/2001	91
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer	1985/1988	198
Montreal Protocol	1987/1989	198
Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol	2016/2019	121
Basel Convention on the Control and Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal	1989/1992	188
Basel Ban Amendment (Decision III/1, COP 3)	1995/2019	100
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)	1992/1994	197
Kyoto Protocol	1997/2005	192
Paris Agreement	2015/2016	191
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)	1992/1993	196
Cartagena Biosafety Protocol	2000/2004	173
Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing	2010/2014	131
UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)	1994/1996	197
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs)	2001/2004	184
Minamata Convention on Mercury	2013/2017	131

Source: Adapted from O'Neill 2017, Table 4.1.

Table 1 illustrates some important points about the process of global environmental diplomacy. First, negotiations proceed in stages. In many cases, states initially negotiate a framework convention which outlines the parameters of a problem and an agenda for action without imposing strict obligations on signatory states. At subsequent Conferences of the Parties (COPs), states negotiate amendments and protocols that do require action, in the form of emissions limits, for example. The rationale for this approach is that to ensure as much participation as possible it is best to work gradually: if states commit themselves to a framework convention, they are more likely to take the next steps towards stricter measures. Second, as the table shows, for many agreements, there is a lengthy gap between the date they are open for signature and their entry into force in international law. This has to do with ratification requirements: a certain number of parties to the treaty need to enact the treaty into domestic law for it to enter into force. In some cases requirements are simple (e.g. 50% of parties). In others it is more complex: the

1997 Kyoto Protocol on climate change required 55% of parties to ratify, which had to include 'Annex 1' (developed) countries responsible for at least 55% of global emissions. Given that some of the leading opponents of the Protocol, such as the USA and Australia, fell into this category, it is not surprising that eight years elapsed between signature and entry into force. Third, Table 1 demonstrates how broad the membership of many conventions is, in some cases, approaching a near universal set of nation states. For most MEAs, membership has grown over the years, particularly as new states, or states newly re-engaging in global affairs, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, sign on.

The table does not, however, show the organizational complexity of these MEAs. Typically, framework conventions establish a Convention Secretariat, which is responsible for day-to-day management of the convention's activities and subsequent negotiations. Many also include permanent advisory bodies, often on scientific and technical affairs. Although much environmental funding is channelled through the GEF, some conventions have been established with their own funding mechanisms.

One of the biggest success stories of international environmental diplomacy has been the effort to end the production of chemicals, notably CFCs, which threaten the stratospheric ozone layer. The 1985 Vienna Convention laid the groundwork for the 1987 Montreal Protocol which enacted a phased-in ban of CFC production worldwide. The reasons for this success have a lot to do with the nature of the issue area with relative certainty about the causes and impacts of ozone layer depletion, and a concentrated chemicals industry willing to manufacture safer substitutes. By contrast, negotiations over climate change have been far more contentious. Climate change is an inherently complex problem. Combating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions requires action across industrial sectors, and would particularly affect fossil fuel producers, i.e. oil, gas and coal companies. It also requires significant behavioural change by individual consumers.

At the same time, climate change is an issue long plagued by a lack of scientific consensus over the causes, impacts and timeframe, a lack of consensus that fuelled opposition to strong global action. Only in 2007 did the IPCC report 'with 90% confidence' that climate change, resulting from human activity in the 20th century, would have a likely devastating impact on vulnerable communities, and a real worldwide impact in the coming century. Further complicating international negotiations was a lack of consensus over which countries should bear the burden of adjustment costs. The USA, for example, objected to the fact that under the Kyoto Protocol only developed ('Annex 1') countries had to meet emissions targets. The architects of the Kyoto Protocol were extremely creative in designing measures that would bring reluctant Annex 1 nations on board, for example the opportunity for those countries to meet targets by funding emissions reductions projects in developing countries, but the resulting agreement pleased no one in the environmental community. In 2001 the USA took the unusual step of withdrawing from the protocol. With the Kyoto Protocol commitments scheduled to expire on 31 December 2012, negotiations to create a successor agreement, too, were hampered by conflicting national interests. Between 2007–13 seven successive COPs inched towards new obligations, even as the negotiations teetered on the edge of complete failure. In December 2011, at COP 17, held in Durban, South Africa, parties finally agreed to seek a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol to be negotiated by 2015 and in force by 2020. Durban also marked the formal emergence of the so-called BASIC countries, i.e. Brazil, South Africa, India and the People's Republic of China, as a negotiating group. Regardless of whether this alliance continues, these countries are starting to wield real power in climate governance. At COP 18, held in Doha, Qatar in November–December 2012, 35 Annex 1 countries agreed to extend the commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol to 2020. Discussions continued in Warsaw at COP 19 in November 2013 in the wake of the fifth IPCC Assessment Report, which further highlighted the gravity of climate change. The perceived failure of the UN process around climate change has in turn led to a search for governance alternatives, which will be considered in the final section of this essay.

In December 2015 states negotiating the UNFCCC in Paris, France, reached a breakthrough moment. After so many years of negotiating deadlock, the Paris Agreement ushered in a new era of global climate governance—albeit one that still may not be up to the challenge. The Agreement is unique in that it started with self-determined goals—'Nationally Determined Contributions'—for greenhouse gas mitigation and climate adaptation that each state, regardless of economic status, submitted in advance of the meeting. These NDCs form the basis of the accord, which also established procedures by which states would strengthen commitments over time and ensure transparency. Notably, too, countries committed to keeping global temperature rise to a maximum of 1.5 degrees Celsius, lower than the 2 degrees committed to at COP 15, held in Copenhagen, Denmark, in December 2009. Paris was hailed as a huge success by negotiators and observers, which, politically, it most certainly was, and a watershed moment in the history of global environmental governance. Concerns remain, however, about the issues states did not fully agree upon, including 'loss and damage', a move to compensate those irrevocably affected by climate change, including climate refugees. Also, and as scientific evidence about the pace and extent of climate change continues to mount, Paris opened the door to more radical solutions, such as climate geoengineering on a large scale that could have significant negative side effects if implemented.

Beyond the atmosphere, MEAs are clustered around other issue areas, including conservation and biodiversity loss, oceans, and chemicals and hazardous waste production. In the conservation arena, some of the earlier, more specific, agreements are considered the most successful. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES, 1973), for example, commands a good deal of international support and action to combat trade in endangered species, despite recent conflicts about adding or removing particular species to trade-restricted lists. The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), a framework agreement designed to address biodiversity loss at species and ecosystem levels worldwide, has been more contentious. Conservation biologists criticise its generality and lack of specific targets. Less developed nations, during negotiations, objected to language that would restrict their ability to exploit their own natural resources, resulting in a convention that emphasized state sovereignty and responsible national management over the protection of biodiversity as the 'common heritage of humanity'. Its first protocol, the Cartagena Protocol (2000), deals not with specific targets, but with international trade in genetically modified organisms, politically important given moves in the trade regime to liberalize such trade, but a development some consider tangential, at best, to the primary challenges of biodiversity conservation. Its second protocol, adopted at the so-called Nagoya Biodiversity Summit, held in October 2010, addresses access and benefit sharing around biodiversity resources. The summit meeting also led to countries setting specific biodiversity goals.

The failure of negotiators at the 1992 Rio Summit to overcome divergent national interests and enact a framework convention to protect the world's forests left an important gap in the framework of global environmental governance. However, as an example of how issues are being increasingly linked in global politics, the issue of forest protection has emerged in discussions of climate funding, given the value of forests for carbon storage. This idea underlies the REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) programme, a collaborative initiative launched in 2008 by the UN, which provides funding to developing countries to maintain and rehabilitate their forests while at the same time sequestering carbon and thereby mitigating greenhouse gas emissions.

The production of hazardous chemicals and wastes poses another set of challenges for global governance. Early negotiations focused on the trade in hazardous wastes from industrialized nations to less developed countries, a practice considered particularly appropriate for global action and which led to the 1989 Basel Convention. Later conventions, notably the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), address the production of and trade in particularly dangerous chemicals. In 2009 UNEP's Governing Council agreed to initiate intergovernmental negotiations towards a new global mercury treaty, one of the first new treaty processes in many years. In October 2013 140 countries adopted the Minamata Convention on Mercury, to control the production, use of, and trade in mercury and products containing mercury,

with the USA being the first country to become a formal party. It entered into force in August 2017. The Basel Convention has faced criticism, first for failing to enact, and subsequently for failing to implement, a ban on waste trading. However, in 2019, negotiators took a stand in the battle against plastic waste by adding scrap plastics to an 'amber' list of wastes subject to import and export controls. This 'Norway Amendment' was greeted with enthusiasm by activists and others who saw the potential for reducing inflows of plastics into the world's oceans, although, in fact, it addresses only a tiny fraction of overall plastic waste produced globally each year. One debate in global chemicals regulation had been bringing these disparate agreements under a common global framework, in order to regulate the entire chemicals life-cycle from production to transportation and trade to final disposal. In April 2013, parties to the three major chemicals treaties—Basel, Rotterdam, and the Stockholm Convention on Prior Informed Consent (a POPs treaty)—held an unprecedented joint COP that focused on their synergies. These discussions mirror more general debates about the possibility of centralizing and strengthening the very fragmented architecture of international environmental law and diplomacy. The 'BRS' conventions have subsequently met in joint COPs every other year and share a secretariat.

CHALLENGES

In many ways the existing framework of global environmental governance has led to some significant political accomplishments. International co-operation has been broader and more durable than international relations theory would predict. It has led to the establishment of important international organizations, and the participation of others in environmental affairs, as well as encouraging NGO and private sector engagement at the international level. International environmental negotiators have pioneered ways to incorporate scientific insights into diplomatic processes and the use of market mechanisms in global governance. However, it is clear that the system has faults, and political progress has failed to outstrip rates of global environmental degradation. James Gustave Speth, founder of the World Resources Institute, in 2004 labelled this system a 'failed experiment'.

Successful global environmental governance has always faced significant political obstacles. Collective action problems have long plagued efforts towards international co-operation among nation states. As has been demonstrated, the system established at Stockholm contained measures specifically designed to overcome such problems and encourage national participation and commitments, including a practice of negotiating agreements in successively stronger stages, a process that can also allow parties to incorporate new information or correct earlier mistakes. On the other hand, the focus on universal membership has the potential to lead to 'lowest common denominator' outcomes that satisfy those parties least interested in changing the status quo but do little to address the actual problem. In addition, the process of negotiating in this iterated fashion can lead to years between when the time processes are set in motion, and when final agreements enter into force.

Another challenge to international legal approaches is that UNEP and associated agencies have very few enforcement powers, or have the ability to sanction member states who violate an agreement. Results of existing arrangements are often monitored primarily through national reporting, and there are few penalties imposed on states if they fail to meet obligations. On the other hand, agreements do often contain transparency, or so-called 'sunshine', mechanisms, and secretariats publish national performance data online. Interested actors, often NGOs, are able to use this data to 'name and shame' violators. It is also debatable whether sanction mechanisms in environmental agreements would be politically acceptable to signatory states. Even where they exist in more powerful governance arenas, such as global trade, they are divisive.

With multiple separate treaty negotiation processes under way, or ongoing indefinitely, negotiators and observers have in recent years developed a distinct sense of fatigue. At any given time there are multiple meetings taking place all over the world, to which countries have to send representatives. For many poorer countries, finding the people to attend and the resources to send them to ensure adequate representation, is a real challenge. Further, functional and institutional overlap and conflict across policy domains have created challenges and opportunities that should be addressed by international policy actors. To address this problem, various plans have been put forward to rationalize or centralize global environmental governance at this level, as discussed in the following section.

A second, related, set of challenges to global environmental diplomacy concerns how to reconcile diverse and often conflicting national interests. Powerful states will frequently use their leverage to alter agreements in their favour, for better or worse. In the case of climate change, the USA has been one of the lead 'laggard' states, though counterbalanced to some extent by the European Union (EU). In CBD negotiations, less developed nations, whose territory contains most of the world's biodiversity hotspots, had the upper hand. Again, certain characteristics of MEAs and other negotiating processes are designed to overcome some of these problems: the incorporation of scientific evidence, for example, as a way of galvanizing serious action, or utilizing particularly skillful negotiation leaders. Smaller states, such as the Scandinavian countries, have been able to use moral suasion as a way of exhorting other nations to take stronger measures than they otherwise would have done: negotiations over transboundary air pollution in the late 1970s are a case in point. The North–South split has been a major challenge for negotiations to overcome. Countries of the global South, the Group of 77 (G77) nations, have insisted that industrialized countries of the North bear the bulk of the responsibility for addressing global environmental degradation, and that any obligations they have should not prevent their ability to develop and meet the needs of their populations. In addition, many G77 countries lack the capacity, financial or otherwise, to meet treaty obligations. As a result, several environmental negotiations have incorporated the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibility', which allows for differential obligations to be placed on those countries, from the absence of fixed emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol, to an additional 10 years to implement the CFC ban under the Montreal Protocol. The relevance of the G77 grouping, especially in climate change, is, however, coming increasingly under question by the countries themselves as well as non-G77 states.

To foster capacity in developing countries, many treaties also contain provisions for monetary aid and technology transfer. Much of this activity is overseen by the GEF, which, since its founding, has funded some 3,900 projects in 165 developing and transitional countries that help to meet global environmental goals concerning climate change, biodiversity, POPs, desertification, ozone depletion and international waters. Such aid is of course a drop in the ocean compared with annual (or even daily) global expenditures on military actions, but with major lending institutions such as the World Bank and regional development banks turning their attention to sustainable development goals and to managing climate change mitigation and adaptation, environmental concerns are now at the forefront of development financing. Indeed, the global climate finance architecture (including programmes that enable the sequestration of carbon, such as REDD+) has become far larger and more complex in recent years, with dozens of multilateral and bilateral funding mechanisms established between countries, lenders and aid agencies.

Third, a governance system focused primarily on resolving political collective action problems between nation states can omit or downplay other important global drivers of environmental change. In this case, many have argued that environmental problems should instead be framed as a result of global economic forces, most notably the processes of neoliberal globalization in recent decades associated most closely with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WTO. Trade liberalization, privatization not only of industry but of what had been public goods such as fresh water, and structural adjustment programmes aimed at minimizing the role of the state and maximizing resource extraction in developing countries have all taken a serious environmental toll. To that end, global environmental governance needs to take economic globalization into account. This argument has, to some extent, been taken on board by international institutions. The WTO and UNEP have committed to a shared agenda around sustainable development, and steps have been taken to minimize the potential for conflict between global trade and environmental rules. A key development is the way that many multinational corporations are starting

to design transboundary environmental governance measures, either on their own or in partnership with NGOs. Whether these actions constitute real and effective change, or whether they amount to 'rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic', remains to be seen, and many civil society organizations remain sceptical, especially as economic inequalities continue to widen worldwide and push environmental issues to the backburner for many countries.

Finally, global environmental governance institutions face the critical challenge of continued, and accelerating, rates of environmental change, most notably with respect to extreme weather events, sea level rise and other phenomena associated with climate change. Each year it appears some new milestone is passed, such as population reaching nearly 8,000m. (2020) or concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere surpassing 410 parts per million (2020), a level not seen in millions of years. At the same time, the international community has struggled with how to incorporate scientific uncertainty and complexity into institutional arrangements, in particular over the standard of certainty needed to take decisive action. While the EU and its allies favour the use of the precautionary principle in international agreements, which allows for action in advance of full certainty, the USA and like-minded countries strongly opposed this standard, arguing for waiting for greater certainty before taking costly and possibly misguided action. These debates over the use of science and expertise are quite fundamental to the practice of global environmental policy, but, as scientists have learned to their cost in the continued popularity of climate 'denial', cannot easily be resolved through factual arguments alone.

POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

One thing is certain in the contested field of global environmental governance: it continues to evolve as new challenges emerge, and as new actors and new ideas filter into existing processes. In just the past few years, national interests have raised their heads in climate governance. In the run-up to the Paris Agreement, China emerged as a leader in global climate politics. Conversely, in June 2017, US President Donald Trump announced the withdrawal of the USA from the Paris Agreement. While this withdrawal under international law took two years to effectuate (and given that under President Trump the USA was unlikely to work towards its goals in any case), its importance was symbolic of the deteriorating relations between the USA and the EU, China and India. However, the response to the US Administration's announcement appeared to lead to a doubling down of commitments to Paris as the EU, China and other leading governments condemned the US decision. At the same time, throughout the USA, many state governments, companies (including huge multinationals), universities and NGOs publicly announced their ongoing commitment to the goals of the agreement—underscoring the growing influence of non-conventional actors in international politics. Among the first actions of the new US Administration of President Biden in January 2021 was to rejoin the Paris Agreement and endeavour to reclaim leadership of the climate debate, appointing a new special envoy to further negotiations prior to the delayed COP 26, to be held later in that year. More generally, by shaping the overall debate around the global environment and sustainable development and connecting in with global poverty and human rights (among others), the 2015 UN Sustainable Development Goals are recognized as important steps in building a shared normative framework to guide international action.

These developments also highlight the growing fragmentation of global environmental governance whereby issue areas are characterized by a patchwork of governance institutions, state-led, non-state and hybrid (Biermann et al 2009). These include non-binding governmental arrangements such as the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate Change, privately run carbon markets, NGOs working to change consumer behaviour, and global networks of local and municipal governments committed to reducing GHG emissions. The implications of the Paris Agreement for the form and function of global environmental governance have yet to be fully assessed. However, it has introduced a model of bottom-up target setting that could have implications for other, highly complex issue areas, even beyond the global environment. Some issue areas where no intergovernmental agreement exists, such as forest degradation, are almost wholly dominated by non-state actors and forest certification schemes, such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). Other issue areas, such as chemicals and biodiversity, remain anchored in intergovernmental arrangements, although with more outreach to private sector and civil society actors, and a greater emphasis on market mechanisms rather than direct regulation.

These changes, plus the realization that more urgent and effective action is required to combat global environmental change, suggest two possible (and not necessarily mutually exclusive) directions in global environmental governance. The first is centralization and rationalization of existing and future MEAs. Such centralization could occur in a number of ways. One option is more formal issue-area clustering, already being considered for chemicals-related agreements, perhaps through the negotiation of umbrella conventions. In 2019 UN officials, national representatives, NGO leaders and leaders started to discuss how global plastics governance—cradle to grave—could be managed in order to combat plastic pollution in the world's oceans. While some advocated a new treaty, others suggested incorporating plastics into existing agreements, such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea or the Basel Convention. Another approach could be functional: the creation, for example, of a global scientific agency that could supply expert advice across issue areas. At a higher level, some have advocated the creation of a World Environment Organization with a legal and enforcement capacity that could match that of the WTO, although political will for a new international bureaucracy is low.

Second, global environmental governance functions could be devolved to a variety of regional, non-state or hybrid governance initiatives, many of which already exist. Regional organizations, such as the EU, the Association for Southeast Asian Nations and others, are formulating and implementing regional environmental agreements. Non-state governance initiatives are developed and conducted by actors outside government institutions. Hybrid initiatives have some state and/or international organization involvement. The most high profile form of non-state governance at the global level involves NGOs and private sector actors, working in partnership to develop, enforce and monitor environmental standards within a particular sector. Such certification schemes exist in areas as diverse and important as forestry (notably the FSC), fisheries, agriculture and the electronics sector. Other non-state or hybrid governance forms include harnessing or creating markets, such as emissions trading systems that have been part of the global climate regime since the early 2000s. These sorts of initiatives can be more nimble and efficient than international agreements, and less vulnerable to dilution to satisfy national interests. They are also one way that local communities' interests can be incorporated into global governance mechanisms. They do, however, suffer some shortcomings. They are voluntary, thus failing to capture some of the worst corporate offenders. They are disparate, and sometimes confusing. Finally, they do not automatically have the legitimacy or authority associated with governmental institutions.

Where, therefore, these two different trends, of potential centralization and the encouragement of diverse non-state and hybrid initiatives, can be compatible is that a re-engineered UN-led system could supply norms, principles and expertise that could support both state-led and non-state global environmental governance. The early decades of the 21st century are proving to be a time of experimentation and tentative moves forward in combating environmental change amid ongoing clashes of national interests and global crises. International organizations and institutions continue to have a strong role in steering this process, efforts that will be critical in determining whether or not the international community can effectively, and rapidly, combat the severity and complexity of global environmental problems such as climate change.

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THE STRUCTURE OF MIGRATION GOVERNANCE

Sarah P. Lockhart and Jeannette Money*

On 19 September 2016, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. The Declaration recognized that the world is witnessing an 'unprecedented level of human mobility', and that 'people move in search of new economic opportunities and horizons. . .to escape armed conflict, poverty, food insecurity, persecution, terrorism, or human rights violations. . . [and] in response to the adverse effects of climate change or other environmental factors'. Perhaps most significantly, the Declaration recognized that 'many move for a combination of these reasons'. The Declaration launched a process of thematic sessions, regional consultations, and stakeholder consultations culminating in a December 2018 intergovernmental conference, in Marrakesh, Morocco, where a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) was adopted by 164 states. On 19 December 2018, the UN General Assembly endorsed the GCM by a vote of 152 to 5 (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Poland, and the USA voted against the Compact).

Just two days earlier, on 17 December 2018, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) presented the Global Compact for Refugees for consideration by the UN General Assembly, which adopted it by a vote of 164 to 1 (the USA being the sole opponent). The Compact includes a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and implementation plan to ease pressures on refugee-hosting countries, enhance refugee self-reliance, expand access to third-country solutions, and support conditions in countries of origin to facilitate refugee return.

The two Global Compacts were the UN's response to recent migration crises that have challenged states' abilities to manage borders, generated severe humanitarian crises, and blurred the distinction between refugee, migrant, and internally displaced person (IDP). These include the European 'migration crisis' that peaked in 2015 and 2016, when 2.5m. people applied for asylum in the European Union (EU), and nearly 9,000 people lost their lives trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea. Of those who reached the EU and claimed asylum, a large minority did not meet the qualifications for refugee status, despite having fled states like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo that are mired in conflict-related poverty and instability (those fleeing Syria, where conflict was more acute, generally fared differently). This crisis followed on the US migration crisis that began in 2014 with a surge in unaccompanied minors and women fleeing violence and poverty in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to make the dangerous journey through Mexico to the USA. But the Compacts are also prospective, anticipating a world in which mass dislocations occur due to the environmental and economic consequences of climate change.

These crises, however, have not only motivated global action; they have also driven receiving states to pursue bilateral agreements with both sending and transit states to control the flow of migrants, and have mobilized nationalist movements against migration more broadly. These movements reject global governance and multilateral agreements as solutions to migration challenges, instead calling for stronger border enforcement, stricter asylum policies, and an increase in deportations. In the United Kingdom, this nationalist mobilization contributed to the successful referendum in 2016 to withdraw from the EU and its freedom of movement provisions. In Germany, which received over a million asylum seekers between 2015 and 2017, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party became the first far-right party to enter the Bundestag since World War II. Campaigning on an anti-immigrant platform, the AfD received 13.3% of the vote in the September 2017 parliamentary elections, making it the third largest party in parliament. Other European states have also seen a resurgence in the popularity of anti-immigrant, far-right parties, with varying degrees of electoral success, both at the national level and within the EU; in the most recent European Parliament elections in May 2019, far-right parties increased their total seat share from 20% to 25%. In the USA, nationalist sentiment helped propel Donald Trump to the presidency in 2016, with his campaign pledge to 'build a wall' along the Mexican border; it is no wonder then that the USA rejected both of the Global Compacts.

The pursuit of global migration governance is thus persistently haunted by a tension between the failure of unilateral state action adequately to address the challenges of international migration and the desire by states and their domestic publics to maintain sovereign control over who can enter the state and become a member of the society and polity. This essay first explains why the issue area of migration remains resistant to international co-operation and global governance. Next, it provides an overview of the two main international bodies with a focus on migration: UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). It traces their institutional development and the effect that these institutions have on the activities of these organizations. Additionally, these sections address the Global Forum on Migration and Development as well as the development of the Palermo Protocols, the two protocols to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC) dealing with migrant trafficking and smuggling. These sections conclude with a summary of bilateral and regional co-operation on migration issues including bilateral readmission agreements (BRAs), bilateral labour agreements (BLAs), and regional freedom of movement. The next section addresses the weaknesses of global migration governance through an examination of the early efforts of the International Labour Organization (ILO) to address migrant rights and the more recent International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (ICMRW). The essay concludes with a discussion of future challenges.

THE LIMITS OF CO-OPERATION ON MIGRATION

Migration is characterized by a surprisingly minimal degree of institutionalized co-operation, particularly at the global level. While other areas of the international economy, like trade, have become heavily institutionalized at the international level, migration policy remains largely the unilateral prerogative of states. The major exception in international law relates to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; signatories to this convention promise to not *refoule* (turn away) individuals seeking protection from persecution. Our discussion of the institutional history of migration governance is therefore divided between 'forced' migration and 'voluntary' migration regimes.

Although international co-operation on voluntary migration is limited, there are several conditions under which it may arise. First, the status quo in international law favours migrant receiving states. Whereas historically states were free to control the export and import of goods and services, customary international law recognized both the right of individuals to leave a country and the right of return to one's country of origin. However, there is no corresponding right to enter another state; this has given receiving states both the right and responsibility of immigration control. Receiving states, not surprisingly, do not want to relinquish this control through multilateral co-operation.

Second, the level and type of co-operation are also affected by the pattern of migratory flows. In the post-World War II era, migration patterns have been predominantly unique and

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unidirectional. They are unique in that no two countries share the same migration profile; they send and receive different numbers of migrants to/from a different collection of states. They are unidirectional in that migrants have generally moved from poorer, less-developed states to wealthier, more stable states. These two features combined indicate that states can broadly be classified as either migrant sending or migrant receiving states, and that sending states are less powerful in the traditional measures of state power associated with wealth and development. This is significant because sending and receiving states have conflicting interests in terms of the optimal number and type of migrants crossing borders as well as the rights and responsibilities that these migrants should have. These conditions reinforce unilateral action by powerful receiving states, so it is unsurprising that the opportunities for co-operation might be scarce. In a few instances, migrant flows are more reciprocal, such that net migration is close to zero. In these cases, states may have a shared interest in freedom of movement to maximize labour market efficiency. Empirical examples are rare; the most well-known example is the EU and the prior institutional iterations. Thus, patterns of flows suggest that unidirectional flows limit co-operation whereas reciprocal flows facilitate co-operation.

Third, although the international legal status quo privileges receiving states, there are occasional exogenous shocks that change the costs of the status quo. When the costs of unilateral action become high, receiving states may pursue co-operation with sending states through quid pro quo bargaining processes in which they offer incentives to sending states in order to secure co-operation. Because each state's migration profile is different, which affects the costs and benefits of quid pro quo negotiations, co-operation is likely to be bilateral or regional. Recent migrant crises provide examples of such situations.

Finally, sending states may also initiate co-operation to further their own interests, using international forums in which majoritarian institutions give them institutional power due to their numerical majority in the state system. This type of co-operation is likely to lead to informal co-operative structures, weak international institutions, or poorly ratified international agreements.

These instances of international co-operation are presented below and include a number of different issues associated with international migration:

(1) Refugee acceptance, management, resettlement, and return;

(2) Immigration control and readmission;

(3) Trafficking and smuggling;

(4) Labour mobility;

(5) Freedom of movement;

(6) Migrant rights.

A distinction between co-operation on the first set of issues, related to refugees, and co-operation on the remaining migration issues is important. Since the enactment of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1951 and the establishment of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to uphold the legal protections enshrined in the Convention, co-operation on refugees has been governed by an entirely different legal framework than co-operation on other types of migration. The legal definition of refugee is enshrined in the Convention: it is given as an individual fleeing persecution 'for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion'. But both the Convention and the establishment of UNHCR emerged in response to unusually extreme conditions: mass displacement in Europe after World War II followed by the establishment of the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe. These unusual conditions led states to commit themselves to obligations that would endure long after these initial challenges were resolved. It has also made them hesitant to expand the definition of refugee to include those fleeing both man-made and natural disasters, such as civil conflict or climate change due to global warming.

THE FORCED MIGRATION REGIME

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees

While the concept of a refugee is as old as civilization itself, the idea that the international community might have some responsibility to protect refugees dates to the League of Nations. During the 1920s, the League appointed a High Commissioner for Refugees to assist particular groups of refugees, including Russian, Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldean, and Turkish refugees. During World War II, the US-led but internationally supported Relief and Rehabilitation Administration spearheaded the effort to assist displaced Europeans. After it was absorbed by the UN in 1945, it was then shut down and replaced by the International Refugee Organization (IRO) in order to continue its work in resettling European refugees. The IRO was scheduled to complete its work by 1950; when it became clear that this was not possible, the UN General Assembly decided to replace it with UNHCR. UNHCR's initial mandate was also short-term and regional; it was tasked with finishing up the job of European refugee repatriation and resettlement by 1954, although this was later extended. Some member states were uncomfortable about creating a permanent body.

At the same time, however, UN member states signed and ratified the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The Convention outlined the responsibilities of states to those defined as refugees, the most significant of which is the principle of *non-refoulement*, meaning that host states cannot force refugees to return to their country of origin if they confront individualized persecution. They must also provide assistance to refugees, access to the courts, identity papers, the possibility of assimilation or naturalization, and co-operation with UNHCR, among other obligations. While initially applicable only to pre-1951 European displaced persons, this limit was soon tested by the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, when 200,000 Hungarians fled to Austria. UNHCR's mandate was expanded and it led both relief and resettlement efforts. By the 1960s, the gravest refugee problems were in Africa as a result of decolonization. UNHCR worked to address these new crises on an ad hoc basis until the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees removed both the temporal and geographic restrictions to the original treaty. The Convention with its Protocol remains the only universal binding refugee protection instrument. However, there are regional agreements that build on it as well. The 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention on the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, for example, expanded the definition of a refugee from someone facing persecution to someone displaced by conflict and violence more broadly.

The conditions surrounding the 1951 Convention and establishment of UNHCR were very different from what they are today. At that time, the vast majority of refugees came from powerful European states that dominated new international institutions. By enshrining refugee rights in international law, they protected their own interests and their own people. Furthermore, the Convention prioritized the individual and political freedoms enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, elevating these above the social rights prioritized by the communist states and further cementing liberal ideology in the international community and serving the interests of powerful Western democracies.

The expansion of the refugee regime to the rest of the world continues to serve powerful states' interests, ensuring that neighbouring states to conflict zones in the developing world shoulder the majority of the burden in hosting refugees. This also explains why powerful states rejected the Declaration on Territorial Asylum, which was introduced around the time of the 1967 Protocol. The Declaration would have required not just *non-refoulement* but also admittance, and not just territorial asylum but also diplomatic asylum (meaning asylum-seekers would have been able simply to present themselves at an embassy in any country to claim asylum). The current system works fairly well for the most powerful states; even in 2016, as the European migration crisis peaked, only one European country made the top-ten list of refugee hosting states (Germany, at number eight). Rather, Turkey, Pakistan, and Lebanon topped the list. Poorer, developing states may wish to shift this burden, but they lack the power to change the existing international regime in a significant way, nearly 70 years after the Convention was signed and ratified.

UNHCR is governed by the UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The UN Secretary-General nominates a High Commissioner for Refugees that the General Assembly then elects to lead UNHCR every five years. Additionally, a four-person Executive Committee (Ex-Com) of

country representatives meets once a year to review and approve the budget proposed by the High Commissioner. It also reviews and approves the programmatic work of the Ex-Com's Standing Committee, which meets regularly throughout the year. By 2021 UNHCR employed some 17,000 people in 138 countries, addressing the needs of more than 20m. refugees who fall under its mandate. Its remit has subsequently been expanded to include responsibility for IDPs and stateless persons. Its budget for 2021 was US $8,616m., with 87% of the funds coming from the voluntary contributions of individual states and the EU; the remaining 13% comes from the private sector and other intergovernmental organizations.

THE VOLUNTARY MIGRATION REGIME

International Organization for Migration

IOM also has its roots in the aftermath of World War II. Briefly known as the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe when it was created in 1951, its name was changed just a year later to the more parsimonious Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, both reflecting its regional origins and scope. It wasn't until 1980 that its global reach was acknowledged with the name change to the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration. It became known as IOM in 1989. While UNHCR was given an explicit UN mandate to identify, protect, and manage people who legally qualified for refugee status, IOM was created outside the UN system and focused on the logistical task of managing migration and the physical movement of people.

The USA and the UK spearheaded the creation of IOM for it to be, in part, a counterbalance to the power of UNHCR. The USA, in fact, never signed up to the 1951 Refugee Convention (it did accede to the Protocol in 1968), and remained wary of Soviet influence within the UN. IOM thus gave the USA a way to address migration challenges along with like-minded states through an intergovernmental organization outside the reach of the UN. Membership was originally open only to non-communist states with an 'interest in the free movement of persons'. The 16 original members were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, and the USA. Like UNHCR, it was initially designed to dissolve after three years, at which point states hoped the post-World War II dislocations would finally be resolved. Also like UNHCR, it found new justifications for its continued existence after that term expired. But, unlike UNHCR, it has never received a universal mandate and remained outside the UN system, by design, until 2016.

From the beginning, IOM recognized the connection between migration and economic development, and the links between refugees and economic migrants; it viewed both groups as 'surplus populations' and viewed migration as a vehicle for matching surplus labour with labour-scarce countries, providing a safety valve for sending states and an economic resource for receiving states. Unencumbered by the legal definitions of a refugee that UNHCR was mandated to uphold, IOM could focus on the logistics of migration and its economic consequences.

IOM has two main governing bodies: the Council and the Administration. The Council is IOM's highest authority and comprises all of the member states; each member state gets one vote on the Council. The Administration is the body that actively runs the organization, headed by the Director-General and Deputy Director-General, each of whom are elected independently by the Council to serve five-year terms. The Executive Committee, which last included 33 representatives from member states serving two-year terms, was abolished in 2013 when amendments to the IOM constitution that had been adopted in 1998 entered into effect. Today, the most important committee below the Council is the Standing Committee on Programmes and Finance, which is open to the entire membership and has met twice a year since its establishment in 2013 to review policy, programmatic, administrative, and budgetary issues.

IOM has a highly decentralized, project-based structure. Some 97% of its budget (US $1,712m. in 2019) comes directly from voluntary contributions to fund specific projects; the remaining 3% comes from member state contributions to fund general administration. By mid-2021 the organization had 174 member states and offices in more than 150 countries, with over 400 field locations. The number of active projects increased from 686 in 1998 to 2,277 by 2019. IOM now employs more than 12,000 people, mostly in the field.

IOM touts this client-based or 'projectization' structure as being highly responsive to member state needs and highly efficient, with low overheads. This funding structure, however, means that IOM has very little freedom to cultivate an independent voice that can criticize state governments, unlike UNHCR. IOM essentially only undertakes projects for which it will receive funding; it is highly incentivized to cater to state interests, particularly the interests of wealthy Western states. It is disincentivized to articulate and pursue its own vision of a just international migration regime, which might conflict with powerful member state interests.

In 2016, UN member states unanimously adopted a resolution to make IOM a related organization of the UN. By becoming part of the UN system, IOM may face pressure to prioritize migrant rights over the interests of its state sponsors, but its mandate has not officially been changed. The main consequence, at least for now, is that IOM has a formal 'seat at the table', although it has long worked informally with the UN. This is important because it has long maintained a small headquarters, so its voice in Geneva has been less influential even as its robust presence in the field increasingly shapes what happens on the ground. The main focus remains on the logistical expertise and nimbleness that IOM brings to the table.

Inter-state Consultative Mechanisms

IOM continues to expand its activities and facilitate inter-state co-operation, in particular through support for the development of Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs). The first RCP was the Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum, and Refugees (IGC), established in 1985. During the 1990s, IOM sponsored 15 new RCPs, based on the IGC model. RCPs emerged in part because of growing calls within the UN for a world conference on migration (a call that has only recently been heeded with work on the Global Compacts for Migration and Refugees). Receiving states, which are outnumbered by sending states in the UN General Assembly, did not want the UN to take the lead on this issue. Thus, they looked outside the UN to IOM, as they did in the 1950s.

RCPs are international forums that allow state officials, both at the political leadership level and at the bureaucratic level, to meet their counterparts in other states and discuss migration challenges. In some processes, non-governmental organizations are also invited to participate. RCPs are designed to be informal, voluntary, and (in some cases) confidential, so that state representatives can freely discuss migration challenges without obligating themselves to anything. Thus, the agendas tend to be wide-ranging, encompassing a variety of migration-related concerns: border control, human trafficking, migrant rights, economic development, deportations and readmission, etc. At their most useful, RCPs can facilitate information sharing, the exportation of best practices, and policy co-ordination (which emphasizes the logistical issues on which IOM has long focused). Some proponents suggest that RCPs might provide the foundation for more formal, binding agreements to address migration challenges. Those most sceptical of the processes criticize them for advancing the interests of powerful receiving states at the expense of sending states; indeed, the RCP proposals that more closely align with receiving state interests, such as border control or readmission, are usually the only ones actually implemented. Between the proponents and the sceptics, there are observers who argue that RCPs are mere 'talking shops', which do not lead to much of anything.

Generically, the term RCP is used to refer to any informal migration dialogue. But, as these dialogues have proliferated, IOM has developed new terms to differentiate between different types. In 2010, IOM coined a new term for RCPs that included member states from more than one region, Inter-Regional Forums on Migration (IRFs). IOM hosts global RCP meetings to bring together representatives of the RCPs, and it also hosts global processes, such as the International Dialogue on Migration.

REGIONAL CONSULTATIVE PROCESSES

African Union Horn of Africa Initiative on Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling
Almatı Process on Refugee Protection and International Migration
Arab Regional Consultative Process
Caribbean Migration Consultations
Central American Commission of Migration Directors
Co-ordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative against Trafficking (COMMIT Process)
IGAD-RCP on Migration
International Technical Meeting on Human Mobility of Venezuelan Citizens in the Region (Quito Process)
Migration Dialogue for COMESA Member States (MIDCOM, formerly COMESA-RCP)
Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA)
Migration Dialogue for West Africa (MIDWA)
Pacific Immigration Development Community
Prague Process
Regional Conference on Migration (Puebla Process)
Regional Consultative Process on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin in Asia (Colombo Process)
Regional Ministerial Forum on Migration for East and Horn of Africa
South American Conference on Migration
Dormant RCPs:
Asia-Pacific Consultations on Refugees, Displaced Persons and Migrants (APC)
CIS Conference
Cluster Process
Eastern Partnership Panel on Migration and Asylum (former Söderköping Process)
Manila Process
Migration Dialogue for Central African States (MIDCAS)

INTER-REGIONAL FORUMS ON MIGRATION

5+5 Dialogue on Migration in the Western Mediterranean
Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime
Budapest Process
EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (Khartoum Process)
Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development (Rabat Process)
Ibero-American Network of Migration Authorities
Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees (IGC)
Ministerial Consultation on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin and Destination in Asia (Abu Dhabi Dialogue)
Pan-African Forum on Migration
Dormant IRFs:
Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment (MME)
African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States-EU Dialogue on Migration
ASEM Conference of the Directors-General of Immigration and Management of Migratory Flows
Asia-EU Dialogue on Labour Migration
EU-CELAC Structured and Comprehensive Bi-regional Dialogue on Migration
Ibero-American Forum on Migration and Development
Mediterranean Transit Migration
Tripoli Process (Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration and Development)

Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD)

The GFMD is a UN initiative that follows the model set by IOM's RCPs. The Forum emerged from the UN High Level Dialogue on Migration (HLD) in 2006 and now meets annually to 'address, in a transparent manner, the multidimensional aspects, opportunities and challenges related to international migration and its inter-linkages with development, to bring together government expertise from all regions, to enhance dialogue and co-operation and partnership and to foster practical and action-oriented outcomes at the national, regional and global levels'. It is open to all UN member states and to select observer organizations; each year, a different government hosts the Forum. The GFMD is supported by a Troika (the past, current, and future chairs), a steering group (consisting of representatives from 30 governments), a consultative body comprised of all UN members and observers (called the Friends of the Forum), and a small administrative unit. The Forum's link with the UN is maintained through the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on International Migration and Development and the inter-agency Global Migration Group. The UN recognized the GFMD as an important platform to contribute to preparations for the Global Compact on Migration in the GCM's Modalities Resolution. A second UN HLD was held in 2013 to discuss the post-2015 development framework and resulted in an eight-point migration and development agenda.

The Palermo Protocols to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, are two of the three protocols to the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC), adopted in November 2000. These agreements, known as the Palermo Protocols (so-called as the high-level conference to open the Convention for signature was convened in Palermo, Italy) represent the rare instance in which a large number of states (including both sending and receiving states) signed a binding multilateral treaty relating to migration. While international treaties relating to trafficking pre-date World War I (specifically 'white slavery'), this new Convention developed in response to an increase in trafficking and smuggling in the late 1980s and 1990s, which was due in part to the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. Transnational criminal networks became increasingly involved in trafficking and smuggling, making unilateral action less effective. Additionally, existing agreements did not define trafficking and smuggling broadly enough, nor did they facilitate the type of co-ordination needed effectively to combat the problem.

The contextual venue in which the trafficking and smuggling problem could be most effectively addressed was not immediately clear at the beginning. Earlier international agreements addressing trafficking included six human rights treaties, nine migration treaties, four labour instruments, one gender specific treaty, four child specific instruments, five treaties on slavery, and three treaties on development. Advocates for trafficking victims and smuggled migrants pursued human rights and migrant rights arguments, but they didn't gain traction with a broad cross-section of states until they approached it from a criminal justice perspective. All states share an interest in combating criminality, which became the central focus of the trafficking and smuggling debate, along with a commitment to protect victims. Because of these protocols, the locus of UN co-operation on human trafficking and smuggling is the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, which is charged with implementing the CTOC.

Bilateral Readmission Agreements (BRAs)

Under customary international law, sending states are expected to accept the return of their own citizens when they are deported or denied entry by receiving states. However, migrants themselves can thwart this process by destroying their own identity documents and/or travelling through third countries in order to avoid removal to their home state. A small number of states, concentrated in Europe, have sought to address this problem through bilateral readmission agreements with sending and transit states. These agreements seek to both streamline the removal process through co-ordinated policies and obligate states to accept not only the return of their own citizens but also of migrants who transited through the state. The first wave of readmission agreements were signed in the 1950s and 1960s between European states. These early agreements were often paired with Bilateral Labour Agreements and freedom of movement provisions that also facilitated migration. A much larger second wave of agreements began in the 1990s as European states lost their ability fully to secure their own borders after the introduction of intra-European freedom of movement in the

Schengen Agreement. Paradoxically, readmission agreements with states outside of Western Europe allowed European states to reclaim some sovereignty over migration control by giving them a greater ability to deport unwanted migrants to the country from which they arrived.

Readmission agreements require quid pro quo negotiations, as sending or transit states have interests that conflict with those of receiving states; receiving states must offer incentives to entice sending and transit states to sign these agreements. As (1) not all states send an equal number of migrants; (2) each receiving state has a unique migration profile; and (3) reaching agreement can be costly, receiving states prefer to make bilateral agreements. By 2002, European states had concluded 464 readmission agreements. Nevertheless, the EU did gain the competency to conclude EU-wide readmission agreements in 1999; in the years since, it has only concluded 17 (it has had more success in inserting readmission clauses in broader agreements; since 2002, it has included over 100 such clauses, although they are not self-executing and require additional negotiation to achieve implementation). The trend towards readmission agreements appears to have slowed as sending states realized how costly these agreements can be and began to demand more in return for signing them.

Bilateral Labour Agreements (BLAs)

International co-operation on migration facilitation primarily occurs through BLAs. BLAs can take a variety of forms, from informal Memorandums of Understanding to formal Memorandums of Agreement, and can cover many types of employment: seasonal work, project-based employment, guest worker programmes, trainee and apprenticeship programmes, cross-border employment, working holidaymaker programmes, and occasionally permanent employment. Because there is no international reporting requirement for BLAs, there is no definitive accounting of these. But, reports from the International Labour Organization (in 2015) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, in 2003) suggest that the number remains quite small. The ILO estimated that there were 358 BLAs on low-skilled migration, and the OECD counted 280 agreements with OECD member states.

In the post-World War II period, there have been three 'waves' of BLA enactment. In all three waves, receiving states have pursued agreements when there have been labour shortages that a unilateral relaxation of immigration policies could not adequately address. The first wave occurred in Europe immediately after World War II; the last agreement of that period was signed in 1968. During that time period, European countries signed a small number of agreements with specific states in order to fill severe labour market shortages. But, the degree to which states did this varied; France, for example, signed 12 agreements, while the UK only signed one. This was because the UK was more able effectively to fill its labour needs through private recruitment in the Commonwealth and its colonies, while France initially found it more efficient for the state to intervene and match foreign labour with employment in France. Once migration networks became established, the need for BLAs dissipated.

Second wave agreements followed a similar logic to the first wave, in the response to the rapid economic growth of the oil-rich Gulf States in the 1970s and the so-called tiger economies of Southeast Asia in the 1980s, which created unmet labour needs. The third wave of agreements, pursued by Western democracies in the contemporary period, follows a slightly different logic. First, they tend explicitly to focus on filling unmet high-skilled labour needs. Second, they serve as an incentive that receiving states can offer sending states in exchange for more co-operation in controlling unwanted low-skilled migration. In short, the BLA has become a tool that receiving states can use better to control the nature of immigration flows.

Freedom of Movement

Freedom of movement, in which most barriers to travel, live, and work in another country are removed, is very rare in the international system. Where it does exist, there are still restrictions on accessing social welfare services, at least for some period of time. While many regional economic agreements mention freedom of movement and aspire to the integration of labour markets in order to capture the efficiency gains that such openness would provide, very few have actually implemented these clauses. Those that have share some unique characteristics. First, they include states that share a similar standard of living; a similar degree of social welfare provision; and some sort of linguistic, historical, and/or cultural affinity. Second, they include states that have a long history of reciprocal migration; no state can definitively be classified as a sending or receiving state in relation to other states party to the agreement. Lastly, the move to codify freedom of movement is usually initiated by a state currently experiencing unmet labour market needs.

Europe is the locus of freedom of movement, starting with the Nordic Common Labour Market, the Benelux Agreement, and the precursors to the EU (the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community). Today, European freedom of movement is governed by the EU, the European Free Trade Association's European Economic Area, and bilateral agreements with Switzerland. Outside of Europe, freedom of movement provisions have been implemented through the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement in New Zealand and Australia, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States.

MIGRANT RIGHTS AND CHALLENGES TO INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

The International Labour Organization

International attention to migrant rights dates back to the early 20th century in response to the industrial revolution. Labour organizers viewed migrant rights as intrinsically linked to worker rights, since the rights of native workers could be undermined by migrant labour if immigrants were not afforded the same rights as citizens. Thus, both the preamble to the 1919 Versailles Treaty, which established the ILO, and the Charter of Workers' Rights (Article 427 of the Treaty) make reference to protecting and improving the conditions of workers employed outside their countries of origin. Since then, there have been nine ILO conventions that address migration at least peripherally, although all but three do so by requiring reciprocity of national treatment for migrant workers by countries party to the treaty; they do not apply universally.

The ILO conventions directly addressing migrant worker rights emerged either when receiving states faced severe labour shortages or when the balance of power within the ILO began to favour sending states. The introduction of ILO Convention No. 66 in 1939 is an example of the former condition; this convention primarily addressed labour recruitment practices and coincided with labour shortages in Latin American receiving states and emigration controls in European states that were preparing for war. The Convention failed to receive any ratifications. Ten years later, in a very different global context, Convention No. 97 in 1949 incorporated and expanded upon the migrant protections of the failed Convention No. 66. This time, European states concerned with their own dislocated 'surplus populations', found common cause with states in Latin America that were transitioning into being sending states; this coalition formed a majority with the ILO. Even so, the Convention was poorly ratified; only 16 states signed on. The balance of power within the ILO continued to shift in favour of sending states as former colonies became independent and joined international organizations. These states sought additional protections for their citizens emigrating to the more developed economies and proposed ILO Convention No. 143 in 1975. Once again, the treaty was poorly ratified; only 23 countries (all sending states) signed on.

The UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and their Families (ICRMW)

The locus of co-operation on migrant rights shifted to the UN General Assembly following the failure of ILO Convention No. 143. This was primarily driven by sending states in the developing world that were unhappy about the focus on interdiction and illegal employment in the convention, but it was also supported by receiving states that wanted the ILO to maintain its focus on workers, not migrants. Developing states viewed the UN General Assembly as the preferred venue because (1) UN conventions can be ratified with reservations, whereas ILO conventions cannot, increasing the likelihood of ratification; (2) the UN General Assembly was not limited by the pre-existing ILO conventions;

(3) the UN General Assembly automatically gave developing states a large majority; and (4) the ILO had a tripartite representation structure that allocated seats within a state's delegation to independent trade unions, which many developing states did not like.

Negotiations on migrant rights within the UN General Assembly culminated in 1990 with the adoption of the ICRMW, but the Convention did not reach the threshold of 20 ratifications to go into effect until 2003. As of 2021, 56 states had ratified the treaty, but no major receiving state had signed on. Thus, the treaty remains quite weak.

The record of international migrant rights agreements, both within the ILO and the UN General Assembly, indicates that states are reluctant to commit to protecting migrant rights through binding international agreements. However, many of the same receiving states that refuse to sign these treaties have unilaterally implemented migrant rights protections through domestic legislation and practices, particularly in places that already have a strong domestic commitment to human and civil rights. Since states can address migrant rights unilaterally, this suggests that advocacy for migrant rights should focus on domestic policymaking.

FUTURE CHALLENGES

There are many challenges to international migration governance, but three deserve special attention as the global community attempts to implement the Global Compact for Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees, which are both non-binding. Our expectation is that international co-operation (particularly formal multilateral agreements) will remain limited as states seek to confront these challenges.

First, migration governance would be vastly improved by a system that could better facilitate burden sharing. International stability is improved when states that can accommodate surplus labour and refugees accept them. This is especially true in the case of refugees, who often come in large waves, and this was part of the impetus for the Refugee Convention and the establishment of UNHCR. But, the burden of hosting refugees has fallen primarily on developing states in recent decades, with wealthier states only accepting a small fraction for resettlement. This issue only regained global attention when refugees began to spill into the core Western democracies in recent years. A reassessment of each state's obligations to maintaining the refugee regime and shouldering the costs of future mass migrations due to climate change is in order. The prospects for multilaterally and comprehensively addressing this challenge remain bleak, particularly because the political costs of accepting refugees have risen as support for right-wing nationalist parties has surged.

Second, migration governance should recognize the link between refugee and voluntary or economic migration. The legal obligations that states have towards refugees make a distinction between the types of migration important, and it is unlikely that states will agree to assuming greater legal obligations to economic migrants as well. It is also unlikely that states would agree to expand the legal definition of a refugee to be more all-encompassing. However, recent migration crises demonstrate that, in practice, individual motivations for migration are multi-faceted. Additionally, waves of refugee migration may correspond with an increase in migration by those who will not meet the legal definition of a refugee. Thus, migration governance might take a more holistic approach that considers the relationship between forced and voluntary migration. Any action on this will most likely take place at the state level, not through formal international agreement, to ensure the continued legal distinction between refugees and economic migrants. But, there might be some opportunity for greater international co-ordination on the logistics of managing both types of migration.

Third, any system of international migration governance must recognize the centrality of state sovereignty. Barring a radical re-imagination of the state-based international system, sovereignty over who is permitted to enter and join the polity is going to remain a core function, and defining feature, of the state. Migration governance is unlikely to rely on binding, multilateral agreements but instead rely on quid pro quo negotiation, regional regimes, and bilateral agreements. The implementation of migrant rights protections in particular may draw on internationally recognized best practices and core human rights treaties, but most of the action will likely occur at the domestic level. This should not be viewed as a failure of international migration governance but should rather be seen as the appropriate response to the nature of migration challenges. The goal should be to support state policies that protect human rights, distribute the costs and benefits of migration broadly, and operate efficiently.

MULTILATERAL GOVERNANCE AND GLOBAL ACTION FOR HEALTH

PRESLAVA STOEVA*

Governance efforts to prevent and address the spread of communicable diseases across borders date back centuries. Historic accounts of organized public health measures to contain the spread of infectious diseases along routes of international trade and travel date back to the 13th century city-states of modern Italy, which used a system of quarantine measures to attempt to contain the spread of the plague. This system was later adopted by other European cities and countries and by ports in North America to control yellow fever. A network of port surveillance was established in the 17th century, which had consuls representing European and Middle Eastern states. The transborder character of the threats posed by infectious diseases demonstrated that measures by individual cities and countries were insufficient to protect from health-related threats and thus collective efforts were needed for surveillance and measures to be effective. This gave rise to regional and later international multilateral co-operation efforts, crystalizing in the establishment of intergovernmental organizations and international legal instruments for health. Understanding governance efforts to address disease-related threats in historic perspective can give us a better understanding of how and why multilateral international governance for health has evolved the way it has, but also may guide us to explore the historic roots of some of its inadequacies, which is a necessary first step in considering how these can be addressed. The COVID-19 pandemic has most recently exposed many weaknesses of the system of transnational governance and global action for health, demonstrating the urgent need to reflect on historic path dependencies in considering how to change what does not work.

Action to address threats to health has not been limited to governments. Non-state actors have played varied and considerable roles in this realm. The spectrum of non-state actors involved in delivering action for health is vast—ranging from philanthropic foundations funding public health programmes and education, to volunteer involvement in routine and emergency healthcare campaigns, to the work of humanitarian organizations in conflict and natural disasters, to non-governmental advocacy and consultative work at intergovernmental organizations. While non-state actors are not directly involved in public health decision- and policymaking and therefore in transnational governance, they are involved indirectly, as their actions shape the context within which governments and intergovernmental organizations make decisions. While the influence of non-state actors in public health policymaking is indirect, it is very significant. Extensive scrutiny is needed, it will be argued, to evaluate their impact not only on public policy, but also on those affected by their work. The involvement of non-state actors in health has a long history and is a very specific feature of global health governance.

A brief discussion of terminology is needed to set the context for this essay. The field of global health is studied by a number of different disciplines and terminology is often used inconsistently. The term 'global' is trendy and much utilized in the 21st century, while the terms 'international' and 'multilateral' may appear as if they have lost some of their appeal and edge. International (and multilateral) politics and governance relates to the concerted efforts of states (inter-national) in the global arena. And since states are the main political decision-making actors, often engaging in collective decision-making through intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and its agencies, the terms international and multilateral are still relevant, denoting a field of public policymaking among sovereign states. The term global can be used to describe the same arena, but this time including non-state actors (including private for-profit or not-for-profit organizations). Non-state actors do not possess public authority, but they can still have significant influence on public policymaking, participate in the implementation of policy decisions, and impact human lives through their activities. Notably, non-state actors represent private interests and values, even when their actions are humanitarian and altruistic. Since the activities of non-state actors are not underpinned by public authority and these actors have no public policymaking capacity, their transborder work in health will be described as 'global action' and not considered under the umbrella term of international (or multilateral) health governance. The widely used term 'global health governance' is therefore misleading as it obscures the distinction between public authority and private action. The term 'global' will be used here to describe the work and influence of state and non-state actors involved in activities that transcend national borders, but not in relation to governance, which remains broadly a domain of states and intergovernmental organizations. The global level, thus, includes both international co-operation among public bodies, between these and private action by non-state actors, as well as co-ordinated initiatives between public and private bodies, such as public-private partnerships.

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed a range of areas of health policy and decision-making that are not working—including health inequities within and between states, weak health systems, insufficient pandemic preparedness on a global scale, as well as the continued inability of states to work together in a co-operative and co-ordinated manner to address transborder challenges and threats. The pandemic was also a reminder of how prominently health is intertwined with so many aspects of social and economic life, and how significantly it is impacted but also shaped by political decisions. The full spectrum of lessons to be learnt from this pandemic will take time to identify and evaluate, but there are obvious weaknesses that can be considered even now. A starting point for critical reflection on these weaknesses is the recognition of historic patterns of activity and continuity, which are in some instances a direct cause of human suffering and ill-health. Contemporary inequities can be traced back to colonial politics and, despite the dismantling of political structures of colonialism through the recognition of independence and autonomy of former colonies in the mid-20th century, coloniality continues to shape contemporary political relations in general and global public health, in particular. Power inequalities have shaped the architecture of multilateral governance for health and beyond. They have shaped agenda- and priority-setting, intergovernmental institutions, decision-making rules within these and so on, to benefit those with more power to the exclusion of others. Understanding historic processes and practice, seeing how these have carried on and shaped contemporary governance and decision-making are key components in addressing the contemporary dysfunctions of transnational governance and global action for health.

This essay will proceed in four parts. The first of these discusses the emergence of cross-border co-operation for health, focusing on three prominent patterns of activity—the emergence of colonial medicine, of regional inter-state co-operation, and of the involvement of philanthropic foundations in health work. These patterns of activity have played a significant role in forming the foundations of contemporary global public health practice. The second part of this essay will briefly outline key characteristics of international governance of and for health, as illustrated by state co-operation within intergovernmental organizations. The third part will briefly discuss global action for health or the work of non-state actors in global public health. The final part will reflect on the weaknesses in the global system of governance and action for health, exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, and

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on what recommendations for change can be made, based on the discussion in this essay.

THE EMERGENCE OF CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION FOR HEALTH

Politics has a significant influence on health. This is nowhere more obvious than in historic patterns of cross-border action and co-operation for health. The emergence of tropical and colonial medicine constitute early forms of transborder health programmes and interventions, defined by unequal power relations and dynamics of exclusion, extraction and oppression. The emergence of inter-state co-operation was a form of collective organization to stem and contain the spread of infectious disease across borders and through international trade and travel. Such co-operative approaches were fostered by necessity and they continue to be relevant. Inter-state co-operation, however, is deeply political, which affects the outcomes for health too. The involvement of philanthropic foundations in public health is an idiosyncratic feature of health politics. The political influence that they wield without the responsibility, accountability and transparency normally attached to public authority, raises questions about the appropriateness of their involvement and the need for regulation of their activities.

Tropical and Colonial Medicine

Tropical and colonial medicine are examples of the distortions of public health policy, priorities and the delivery of health care by political interests and significant power inequalities between colonial powers and colonial territories. There are many patterns of continuity, which historians have identified, which have seeped into contemporary health programmes, giving rise to calls for the need to decolonize global health.

European journeys of geographic discovery from the 15th and 16th centuries meant that travellers became exposed to novel diseases and were also able to transmit known infectious diseases to local populations. The transfer of infectious diseases from Eurasia (the 'Old World') to the Americas (the 'New World')—such as measles, smallpox, influenza and others—had devastating consequences for the indigenous populations of North and South America. The public health needs of European soldiers, merchants, sailors as they became exposed to unfamiliar infectious diseases necessitated the emergence of a new branch of public health—namely, tropical medicine. Tropical medicine is often associated with colonial medicine, which emerged in response to the public health needs of colonizers. A defining feature of tropical medicine is its one-sided focus on the need of soldiers, traders and travellers, preferencing these over the health needs of local populations.

Colonial medicine was concerned in the first instance with the health of colonial settlers, traders and military personnel who were affected by diseases prevalent in parts of the world that they had invaded. Public health measures often treated problems that were of more concern to the colonizers than the local population—such was the case with campaigns to eliminate yellow fever in United States-ruled Philippines, Panama and Cuba, or to treat cholera, sleeping sickness, malaria in Africa and South Asia. Colonial interests also prioritized the health of workers essential to the colonial economy and extraction. This determined the concentration of health services around urban areas and sites of economic production. Many of the health programmes and campaigns were intrusive and unilaterally imposed by colonial officials, sometimes by the use of force. Such actions were premised on assumptions that the local population was unable to take responsibility for their health, and were dependent on their colonizers. This approach entirely ignored local knowledge, traditional medicinal practices and undermined existing public health infrastructures.

The power inequalities in interactions between colonial powers and their subjects are self-evident. Colonial health campaigns were defined by a narrow, disease specific focus, dealing mostly with communicable diseases, creating temporary systems to administer health initiatives, and effectively eroding local capacity to address problems deemed significant to local people. The similarities between these campaigns and modern-day health interventions in some low- and middle-income countries are uncanny and unsettling. The pathologies of these are deeply rooted in colonial attitudes and practice and not justified by science and evidence. Addressing these is a necessary step towards decolonizing global health and creating an inclusive and supportive system of health protection and promotion that works for the global majority, not just for a privileged minority.

Colonial conquest intensified trade and further affected the spread of infectious diseases through trade routes. Unsuccessful efforts to contain outbreaks of devastating infectious diseases within states, the impact that disrupted trade and travel were having on individuals and communities, demonstrated the need for inter-state co-operation.

Regional Inter-state Co-operation for Health

The structures, organizations and processes that we see in contemporary international governance for health have emerged through historic state practice and organization. Regional inter-state governance is illustrative of the commitment of states to working together and seeking common solutions to common problems. Regional co-operation did not start in Europe and is not exclusive to Europe—two aspects of inter-state co-operation for health that are often obscured through uncritical Eurocentric analysis. Many accounts of the history of international co-operation begin with the International Sanitary Conferences held in Europe between 1851 and 1938. There is a longer and more diverse history of regional co-operation for health beyond Europe with sanitary and health councils established in Egypt (Maritime et Quarantinaire d'Egypte, based in Alexandria (1831), modern day Turkey (Conseil Supérieur de Santé de Constantinople, 1839), Morocco (Conseil Sanitaire de Tanger, 1840), what is now Iran (the Conseil Sanitaire de Teheran set up by the Shah of Persia, 1867). With diplomatic representation from foreign states, these organizations had trans-regional reach. These councils did not hold regular meetings, but their focus of work was on containing and limiting the spread of infectious diseases through trade. The work of these councils is a representation of early health-focused multilateral diplomacy and concerted efforts to protect populations from infectious diseases imported through trade, but also to sustain vital trade and travel—issues and dilemmas that continue to occupy space on the contemporary international health governance agenda when it comes to containing infectious disease epidemics in different parts of the world.

The International Sanitary Conferences held in Europe also had trans-regional diplomatic representation. They were more frequent and led to the creation of four International Sanitary Conventions between 1892 and 1903. They were later consolidated into the International Sanitary Regulations (1951), which in turn formed the foundations for the International Health Regulations (1969 and revised in 2005). The early conventions were created to respond to the urgent needs of states for the creation of a system of rights and obligations for states to report public health events. The scope of the early conventions and sanitary regulations was very narrow—initially focusing on cholera, plague and yellow fever. The scope was then expanded further to include smallpox, typhus and relapsing fever in the International Sanitary Regulations (1951). The revised International Health Regulations (2005) do not limit the scope of diseases that they pertain to. These developments highlight a historic pattern of emergence of a set of international legal norms to use common measure to protect public health by placing obligations on states to take necessary actions to contain and report outbreaks without unnecessarily obstructing commerce and passenger traffic.

The International Sanitary Conferences led to the establishment of the Office International d'Hygiène Publique (OIHP) in Paris, in 1907. Five years prior, in 1902, the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau (PASB) had been set up in Washington, DC. These are two examples of the establishment of permanent international regional health organizations. Both organizations facilitated the operation of the International Sanitary Conventions and became prominent features of inter-state governance for health. PASB was set up primarily to seek local solutions to health-related concerns specific to the Americas. It was a comparatively small organization, which helped establish important regional co-operative practices, including the collection of data across borders, and the exchange and sharing of information. PASB promoted a focus on social medicine and the social determinants of health, but it was dominated by the interests and

influence of the USA, which inevitably affected patterns of regional co-operation.

Stand-alone regional health organizations no longer exist but have been subsumed into broader structures of multilateral governance—such as the EU, African Union and ASEAN—which continue to support states in addressing local and regional health priorities. The historic practice of regional inter-state co-operation, co-ordinated decision-making informed by scientific knowledge and sustained diplomatic efforts to address issues of common concern formed the foundation for the establishment of the first international health organization under the League of Nations in 1924 and later the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1948, as will be discussed in the following section.

Philanthropic Foundations and Transborder Public Health Work

The architecture of the global governance for the elimination of threats to health has a unique feature in comparison with other fields of global governance and that is the involvement of private foundations in the funding, research and delivery of healthcare initiatives and programmes. This involvement is as prominent today—illustrated by the high-profile work of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation—as it was in the early 20th century, as evidenced by the work of the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations. These bodies have committed vast resources to health programmes and initiatives. The historic involvement of philanthropic foundations in public health education, research, initiatives and interventions is often overlooked. Their major influence on global public health policy and governance, on local health programmes and priorities and on the health programmes that get funded, remains only partially acknowledged.

The work of the Rockefeller Foundation since its establishment in 1913 has included the establishment of the Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm Disease, and later the International Health Board, which worked with governments across the world not only to address a broad spectrum of health issues, but also to support efforts to modernize health institutions, as well as to fund schools of public health across almost all continents. Through its work, the Foundation has been able to promote its vision and ideas for the institutionalization of public health and for public health education, as well to direct the provision of finance and resources to particular health issues, aligned with its interests. According to historians, the Foundation avoided costly, complex or time-consuming disease campaigns, the results of which might have been difficult to measure in technical terms. It sought to establish the biomedical approach to health as standard, in opposition to efforts to advocate for social-determinants of health-oriented approach to health policymaking. The Foundation is also credited with the invention of the model of public-private partnerships, which is now a defining, but not uncontroversial, feature of global health governance. Such observations provide a glimpse into the subversive power of private capital over the provision of healthcare and health services, as well as its profound influence on what has come to be considered good and appropriate practice, to the exclusion of alternative frameworks.

Private foundations have also contributed financially to supporting intergovernmental organizations. The Rockefeller Foundation funded the League of Nations Health Organisation (LNHO), which was the predecessor to the WHO. In 2020, the Gates Foundation was poised to become the largest donor to the WHO after the USA temporarily withdrew from the organization. The Foundation's contributions already account for nearly one-half of WHO's funding from non-governmental entities. With such significant contributions to the funding of intergovernmental organizations, but also with enormous resources dedicated to funding education, research and health programmes, private foundations whether purposefully or not, have profound influence in global public health. They shape global, regional and local health agendas, determine funding priorities, influence governments who are in receipt of their funds and have capacity to influence the global health landscape and health policy agenda. While the contributions of private foundations are much lauded and needed, questions arise as to the implications and consequences of such sizeable influence of private power and interests in a domain traditionally reserved for public governance. As noted previously, public authority has expectations of accountability and transparency attached to it, while the same cannot be said for private actors.

INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF AND FOR HEALTH

International co-operative efforts towards governance of health and management of disease have become institutionalized over time. From ad hoc meetings aimed at facilitating regional co-operation in the 19th century, through the establishment of the PASB in Washington, DC and the OIHP in Paris in the early years of the 20th century, and later the LNHO, we can discern not only patterns of inter-state diplomatic co-operation and collective decision-making, but also a drive towards developing a global focus of international governance and the establishment of permanent specialized institutions. In addition to the activities of organizations whose mandate is focused on health, over time it has become apparent that decisions made in other spheres of international politics have implications for health, meaning that a more holistic approach is needed to gain an understanding of how international governance influences and impacts health.

International Co-operation through WHO

The experiences of regional inter-state co-operation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries laid the foundation of international co-operation. In the inter-war period, the League of Nations embodied hopes by governments that they could work together to avoid another Great War and promote world peace. A permanent international health organization was established by the League of Nations at the request of its Council. The work of the LNHO was fairly limited in scope, which was due in part to its small budget and small staff. It functioned alongside the PASB and OIHP, searching for ways to consolidate a global agenda on health. It worked with experts, the majority of whom were European and North American, illustrating the dominance of European and US interests over global health, intertwined undoubtedly with their political and colonial dominance. The LNHO is nevertheless considered to have made significant progress in crafting a global agenda for health and in advocating for the health needs of all people, which was in fact quite progressive in its historic context.

The successor of LNHO—the World Health Organization—was established as one of the UN specialized agencies in 1948. It is one of the largest specialized agencies in terms of budget and membership. In comparison with LNHO, WHO brings together more delegates (representing 194 states), is better funded and comprises established and influential decision-making structures. WHO's mandate is also much broader covering a broad spectrum of public health activities, including immunization campaigns, disaster preparedness and response, working towards combating communicable and non-communicable diseases, the improvement of maternal and child health, and so on. WHO occupies a central decision-making space in international governance of health. There have been challenges to its leadership over the years—including by attitudes of states, withdrawal of support for the organization (most recently by the 45th President of the United States, Donald Trump), as well as through its displacement by the World Bank as a major influence on health policy in some parts of the world, which rely on its funding. With six regional offices and 150 country offices, WHO's reach is extensive. It is fair to say that in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic people and governments have been looking to WHO for leadership in times of crisis. The organization remains a focal point for global health decision- and policymaking, but its activities are also shaped and constrained by the interests and commitment of its member states.

Impact of Governance in Other Areas on Health

The work of international organizations in other spheres of politics impact health, and analysts have argued in favour of considering these as part of broader analysis of the global governance of health. Some examples include the conditionality attached to IMF lending. The Fund's structural adjustment programmes have had a significant impact on the ability of governments to provide basic and primary healthcare services, as well as to the funds available to governments for spending to meet social needs. International trade rules governed by the World Trade Organization, including intellectual property rights

protection and the liberalization of trade in commodities and services have had an impact on the availability and accessibility of medicines across the world, as well as on the proliferation of private healthcare services, some of which have syphoned human resources away from local health systems. Discussions about the ability of governments to procure COVID-19 vaccines, as well as issues with production and stockpiling of these, are an illustration of how trade rules have a direct impact on health and healthcare provision.

Human rights and humanitarian law principles shape expectations around the responsibility of governments to look after their citizens, and regarding the provision of basic health services not only to citizens, but also to refugees and migrants. Humanitarian law principles stipulate rules about the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure (including healthcare workers and hospital infrastructure) during conflicts. Violations of these principles amount to war crimes, but also have significant impacts on the health of affected populations. Agreements on the protection of the environment from pollution and degradation as well as agreements for the prevention of climate change also have a direct impact on health, on the supply of food and on livelihoods. Analysts are advocating for greater awareness of the interconnectedness and embeddedness of health within broader areas of inter-state governance and the clearer definition of health issues and priorities, so these can be factored more effectively into decision making across different sectors.

GLOBAL ACTION FOR HEALTH

With the intensification of transborder connectivity through improvements in technology, trade liberalization and faster travel, which some refer to as globalization, and in the context of the proliferation of non-state actors involved in cross-border initiatives in health, there has been a notable transition from the narrowly framed 'international health' defined by a focus on communicable disease outbreaks of a transborder character, to 'global health' or a broader concern with the health needs of people across the world. The scope and meaning of these two terms is contested, as is the level of overlap and novelty implied in the process of distinguishing them.

Analysis of policy decisions and health-related initiatives and programmes demonstrates a clear lack of a 'global' focus. In the realm of inter-state governance, policymaking is still very much focused on state interests and threats to the stability and security of states. By presuming state responsibility for health, the health needs of people effectively take a back seat in international governance. While global initiatives led by the UN and its agencies are co-opting states in pursuing globally set and agreed objectives to improve the health and wellbeing of their citizens—such as the Sustainable Development Goals, or the Framework Convention for Tobacco Control. The beneficial outcomes of such global initiatives and agreements cannot be guaranteed at individual level, as the extent to which the health needs of people would be met depends on individual state priorities and actions. In practice, in other words, global health remains more of a value than an actual framework for the guaranteed protection and promotion of individual health.

There is a very broad spectrum of non-state actors involved in health-related work—philanthropic foundations, humanitarian organizations—both global, like the International Committee of the Red Cross or Médicins Sans Frontières, as well as national, local, even grassroots organizations, other civil society organizations, advocacy groups, but also corporate actors (private and for-profit), as well as public-private partnerships. The landscape of non-state actors working in health is complex and intensely populated. It is important to remember that most of these actors do not participate directly in the policymaking process. Some civil society organizations have consultative status in intergovernmental organizations, many corporate actors are able to lobby policymakers, advocacy groups are able to bring information to the attention of policymakers, but none of them make policy. Non-state actors, however, are still involved in global action for health, which in turn affects individuals on the receiving end of programmes, initiatives and funding.

In short, the defining characteristics of what has broadly been termed global health governance are slightly different from the implied meaning of the term. Governance in the narrow sense of policy- and decision-making is still delivered through state-centric action. States make decisions either individually or collectively, and often at a global forum like the World Health Assembly. They are then responsible for implementing these decisions nationally, which is work that some states subcontract to non-state actors such as civil society, voluntary or humanitarian organizations. Various non-state organizations (most often private, not-for-profit, but increasingly philanthropic foundations, as well as public-private partnerships) work transnationally, on issues related to health and their work is best described as 'global action for health'. Such global action may be aligned with priorities set by states, and therefore carrying the mandate of public policymaking, but they may also be in pursuit of other priorities, e.g. of significance or interest to funders. It is the sum of inter-state governance and global action that forms the field of activity, which affects individual and population health across the world.

COVID-19 AND THE FUTURE OF INTER-STATE GOVERNANCE AND GLOBAL ACTION FOR HEALTH

The COVID-19 pandemic has brought discussions of the challenges facing inter-state health governance and global action for health into sharper focus and given these a sense of urgency. Many of these challenges are experienced more broadly in other areas of global governance as well, meaning that change in one field can lead the way to more profound changes of how politics is done, for whom, and when. Some of the very characteristics of health governance and action are indicative of the issues that hinder effective collaborative solutions. Five key recommendations emerge from critical reflections on historic developments of global action and governance for health:

1. Persistent problems of collective state action need to be addressed through deep commitment to co-operation and co-ordination across the international system, including a renewed commitment by states to work closely with inter-governmental organizations and adhere to international legal principles and obligations;
2. Outdated patterns of policymaking, shaped by profound power inequalities and colonial logics, need to be dismantled with a view to moving away from state-centred action on narrow state interests, reaffirming appreciation of the intrinsic value of all human life and commitment to reflect on privilege and power, and seeking ways to address power imbalances;
3. Close attention needs to be paid to the ways in which private actors are involved in funding and delivering health programmes, shaping public health research and thus influencing the global health agenda. This can be achieved through requirements for transparency and accountability, as well as openness to scrutiny and critical evaluation of their activities;
4. A long-term view of developing resilient and sustainable health systems is needed, in addition to the focus on responding to immediate challenges and crises;
5. A recognition of the interconnectedness of health with all other spheres of human and planetary life ought to be at the heart of future health policy. This could be delivered through a renewed commitment to social medicine, recognizing the social and economic determinants of health and considering health in all policies and planetary health.

Problems of collective action are endemic in the international and global system. The pull of individual interests (be it of persons, communities or states) is often much too tempting and strong. Acting in self-interest comes naturally. A commitment to be part of a global community and sacrifice some self-interest for a greater good, however, brings a whole host of benefits. The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated how the lack of collective action can slow down progress towards containing an infectious disease. Individual action by states has been insufficient to stop the spread of new variants and the emergence of new waves of infection, which spread quickly from one part of the world to the rest. Globally agreed collective action is likely to be more effective, but for that to work, states need to share resources and support.

Structurally, the field of health governance, much like other fields of inter-state governance, is defined by significant power inequalities between the actors involved. The roots of these inequalities are in part at least traceable to colonial relations of

the 19th century. These created an environment conducive to structural violence, to creating relationships of exploitation, discrimination and marginalization of the global majority, to attitudes of 'pathologization' of regions deemed 'underdeveloped' and 'saviourism' in the Global North. These have enabled and justified exploitation and dispossession. The need to decolonize health politics is particularly evident amidst a poorly co-ordinated and disjointed global response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which has failed to recognize the successes achieved not only in resource-affluent countries, but around the world. Reforming the structures of transnational health governance will take significant effort and commitment to facing uncomfortable truths, dismantling or reforming organizations enabling oppression, acknowledging historic injustices and working towards addressing these. This requires a collective, purposeful and dedicated effort across the whole of humanity.

There is persistent fragmentation in global health—in terms of both policymaking and action. The proliferation of private actors working in a field traditionally a focus of public governance raises questions about the organization and co-ordination of efforts and activities, about legitimacy, leadership, responsibility, accountability, transparency. As noted earlier, while WHO is nominally the leading organization in global health governance, it is funded by contributions by states, but also by non-state actors, including to a significant degree by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. The largest funders of health programmes are the World Bank and the IMF, throwing the question of who is leading or indeed co-ordinating health governance wide open. A global system of accountability and responsibility for donors and anyone involved in global action for health will go some way towards opening up an otherwise opaque sphere of influence over public health policymaking. Developing a nuanced understanding of everyday practice is of great significance, as it would provide a conceptual basis for critical reflection, the identification of problems and the search for root cases, as well as a clearer direction for recommendations about institutional and policy reforms, co-ordination and transparency.

Working towards the development of resilient and sustainable health systems, which can promote universal health coverage and through that support poverty alleviation, economic growth, individual and collective security, must become an overarching aim for the international community (including both states and non-state actors). Narrowly focused, disease-specific, vertical funding campaigns, grounded solely in biomedical logics, do not work. They act as a temporary pain killer—addressing a symptom, rather than the root cause of health problems. Such campaigns have become the norm, due to the preferences of donors. This approach needs to be denaturalized and questioned, because it has become evident that over a period of time such campaigns serve to weaken health systems, to take away critical resources and to redirect these in areas that might be of interest to funders, but not of primary significance to local populations. The ethics of global action for health need to be scrutinized and aligned more effectively with long-term goals. The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed these weaknesses, and where health systems have demonstrated resilience and adaptability the health outcomes have been better for the population. This is a value that policymakers must not let out of their sight.

Global health issues have complex, broad and diverse causes. Different health issues affect different groups, in different countries, leading to diverse priorities in state-driven health policy and programmes. Taking concerted action across states, therefore, can be challenging if there is little agreement on common priorities. International health and more recently global health have tended to focus priority attention on a narrow range of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases, often perceived as a threat to the Global North, emanating from the Global South. These attitudes are very similar to the logic underpinning colonial and tropical medicine and ignore broader and shared challenges—such as the emergent pandemic of non-communicable diseases, the effects on health of environmental degradation and pollution, weak health systems, as well as the far-reaching effects of social, economic and political determinants of health. The COVID-19 pandemic has tragically demonstrated the interconnectedness between these health issues through its impact on weak or under-resourced health systems stretched to the limit and unable to cope with high volumes of patients needing complex medical care; and through disproportionately affecting individuals with non-communicable diseases, ethnic minorities and marginalized and economically disadvantaged communities, many of whom are already affected by precarity, environmental degradation, pollution, food insecurity, economic insecurity, and limited access to medical services. The pandemic has further emphasized the need to address, sustainably, long-term social, economic and political determinants of health and not just seek biomedical and technical solutions in response to an acute health crisis.

TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT: CONFLICT AND CO-OPERATION

JOANNE YAO*

Water is essential to human life. Humans need water for consumption, sanitation, and food preparation; the United Nations (UN) recommends that each person have access to 50 litres of water per day to avoid dehydration, malnutrition, and diseases. Furthermore, human societies depend on water for agriculture, infrastructure, and for industrial processes from manufacturing to petroleum extraction—as well as for a source of inspiration, a focus of worship, and a setting for quiet contemplation. While political actors have tried to claim water for themselves, water, whether flowing above ground or in underground aquifers, does not recognize international borders. Indeed, water itself can be powerful agent—in the creation of dramatic canyons, verdant valleys, and as the source of all life. Its unique molecular properties mean that water expands and floats when it freezes. This property has allowed cycles of freezing and melting water in cracks along rock surfaces to turn boulders into soil. It allows frozen ice floating on lakes to insulate the water beneath, permitting complex life to flourish even during ice ages. Despite water's unparalleled power, we increasingly see our shared freshwater sources as fragile and vulnerable to the increasing greed of private companies and the needs of human communities. Co-operation and conflict over the world's shared water has captured international attention as freshwater resources have become scarcer. As demonstrated by examples ranging from extreme water shortages in California's Central Valley and South Africa's Cape Town to the fractious politics surrounding the construction of megadams from the Three Gorges Dam along the Yangtze River to the Grand Renaissance Dam along the Nile River, water has become an increasingly important concern for local and international politics. This essay negotiates between the polarized discourses surrounding water, peace and water conflict by exploring transboundary water management as a complex set of international interactions where co-operation and conflict coexist. It will first outline the case for water conflict and water peace. In doing so, it will argue that, rather than an either-or dichotomy, co-operation and conflict exist as two sides of the same coin embedded in multi-layered institutional frameworks. Then this essay will examine the first international organizations established to manage contested transboundary water and stress that historical moments of co-operation should not be seen as linear and unidirectional progress from conflict to co-operation. Indeed, each moment of successful transboundary co-operation also showcases deeply conflictual interactions. The final section highlights recent developments in transboundary water management with an emphasis on the complexity of water issues and the interconnectedness of water with many of today's salient global challenges.

THE FEAR OF WATER CONFLICT

The argument behind the water wars hypothesis is simple and compelling: it is human nature to compete over scarce resources, and the scarcer and more essential a resource is to human wellbeing, the more intense the conflict. Indeed, the term 'rivals' comes from the Latin *rivalis* or 'one who uses the same stream as another'. This logic finds its most famous expression in Thomas Hobbes' anarchic world of scarcity and conflict. In the 21st century, the increasing demand for freshwater resources fuels this Hobbesian logic and threatens to make water both a cause of and a tool or target for armed conflict. Fears of neo-Malthusian population pressures, accelerating environmental decline, climate change, and unequal distribution of water between international and local actors all contribute to the political framing of water as a security issue and likely flashpoint for intrastate and interstate conflict. The violence and destruction that resource scarcity might instigate was demonstrated by Sudan's Darfur conflict, where environmental degradation and water shortage were driving factors. Similarly, disagreement between upstream and downstream states over the use of the Nile River in irrigation and hydroelectric dams demonstrates how shared water, particularly in arid places, can fuel conflict. In addition, water infrastructure has also been the target of warfare, with a long historical legacy stretching back to accounts of Vlad the Impaler poisoning wells against the Ottoman Turks in the 15th century. International humanitarian law codified in the 1977 First and Second Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Convention expressly prohibits attacks against water infrastructure, but the threat continues. In 2006 Israel's bombing of a power plant in Gaza adversely affected water and sewage facilities. In the more recent conflict against Islamic State, actors on all sides sought to control dams and other water infrastructure as strategic chokepoints. Furthermore, cyberattacks can be used to damage water infrastructure from afar. In 2017 a team from the George Institute of Technology successfully used ransomware to stage a simulated takeover of a water treatment plant and increase the level of chlorine. The deadly potential of water as an instrument of violence fuels fears of water conflict. Statements from world leaders bolster fears of impending water wars. In 1979, the then President of Egypt, Anwar Sadat, said that 'the only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water'; similarly, then Egyptian minister of foreign affairs Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated in 1988 that 'the next war in our region will be over the waters of the Nile, not politics'. In 2013 in response to news of Ethiopia's construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam, the then Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi warned that 'if our share of Nile water decreases, our blood will be the alternative'. Echoing Egypt, Israeli leaders have also framed water as a matter of national security, with former premier Levi Eshkol describing water as 'a question of life for Israel'. At the international level, former World Bank President Ismail Serageldin predicted in 1995 that 'wars of the next century will be over water', and in 2000 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan observed that 'fierce competition for fresh water may well become a source of conflict and war in the future'. While all these statements paint a bleak picture of water conflict, the reality of water co-operation encourages a brighter outlook.

WATER, PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

For many analysts, the geographic determinism of the water wars narrative is not only misleading but dangerous, and leaders who pander to this discourse are instrumentally using bellicose rhetoric to shore up domestic security and trade policies. If we look beyond the rhetoric, humankind's deep dependence on water—and our extreme vulnerability in the absence of water—pushes us toward co-operation and highlights a point of commonality between even long-time geopolitical rivals. According to Aaron Wolf, who developed and co-ordinates a vast dataset on transboundary freshwater disputes at Oregon State University's Institute for Water and Watersheds, the last war fought explicitly over water occurred 4,500 years ago between the Mesopotamian city states of Lagash and Umma. Historical evidence of co-operation between societies over water has been consistently found since the first known legal codes: the Sumerian Code of Ur-Nammu and the Babylonian Hammurabi Code. Legal principles governing the shared use of water have ancient roots. The term for Islamic religious law, *Shari'a*, originates from a phrase that literally means 'the way to water'. Talmudic, Christian, and Islamic traditions all uphold the 'Right to Thirst' and ancient Roman law allowed non-citizens as well as citizens to

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use public water for drinking and domestic purposes. Recent empirical examples abound that support the water peace argument. In Central Asia, fears that the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s might send the newly minted Central Asian states into water conflict proved unwarranted. Arid Central Asia boasts few sources of freshwater, and during the Soviet era authorities even concocted plans to divert water from Siberia and the Volga River to irrigate the region's water intensive crops, such as cotton. The Aral Basin includes two major rivers—the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya—that flow through the territories of five states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are downstream states and use water mostly for irrigating cotton during dry summer months. Upstream on the Syr Darya, Kyrgyzstan's hydroelectric power station releases water during the cold winter months to generate electricity for heating. Regional tensions arose over the optimal timing of the release of the water: whether this should be during the winter months to supply electricity, or during the summer to irrigate the cotton fields. However, the European Union (EU) successfully mediated the dispute, and a barter agreement was reached, whereby Kyrgyzstan would guarantee the downstream states a steady supply of water over the summer. In exchange, the other upstream states would supply Kyrgyzstan with energy during the winter months. The agreement is not perfect, and the two institutions that govern the Aral Basin—the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) and the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS)—face constant suspicions from stakeholders over the fairness of water deals. Global actors with interests in the region, including China, the EU, and the World Bank, also complicate co-operation. Furthermore, the region's hydraulic complexity, with its series of dams, reservoirs and irrigation channels, makes technical management difficult. The sharp decrease in water quantity and quality of the Aral Basin, the disappearance of four-fifths of the fish species from the Aral Sea, and the unknown future effects of climate change, all make co-operation over water a moving target. However, despite these challenges, all parties realize that co-operative measure are preferable to conflict. In a further example, transboundary co-operation on the Tigris and Euphrates between Turkey and Syria in the 1980s and 1990s demonstrates that power asymmetries between riparian states does not necessarily prevent co-operation. Turkey's hegemonic and upstream position along the Tigris-Euphrates River system should have translated into the absence of co-operation as Turkey holds all the geopolitical cards in its ability to cut off water flows to downstream countries Syria and Iraq. In the 1990s Turkey attempted to use the Euphrates as a foreign policy tool, threatening to restrict water flow if Syria did not withdraw support from Kurdish separatists. Syria, however, linked the Kurdish issue with water rights, and in 1987 concluded the Protocol on Matters Pertaining to Economic Cooperation between the two countries, guaranteeing for Syria a minimum flow of 500 cubic metres per second, or 16,000m. cubic metres of water per year. In exchange, Syria made concessions to limit the transfer of arms and narcotics across the two countries' common border. Hence, by linking the water issue to other pressing interests, Syria was able to compel Turkey—the greater power—to co-operate. Tough cases like the Jordan River demonstrate how functional concern over water can help forge co-operation between unlikely actors. In 1979 Israeli water experts covertly crossed the Jordan River to discuss water resources with their Jordanian counterparts. The positive outcomes of the meeting were not isolated to water issues—process linkage allowed parties to move from water talks to peace negotiations. These dialogues built confidence between Israel and Jordan and established mutually agreed rules to govern future co-operation. In many ways the peace treaty that was concluded between Israel and Jordan in 1994 traced back to these first co-operative efforts between water experts. Again, this is not a linear story of unmitigated success from conflict to co-operation. Contentious issues such as dam construction, removal of sand bars, and access to springs and groundwater continued to divide the parties. Furthermore, Jordan and Israel are downriver states, while Syria and Lebanon hold upstream positions, and instability in upstream states has grave consequences for downstream water co-operation. However, despite these challenges, the two sides recognize their mutual dependence on the Jordan River and its branches. Transboundary water co-operation not only has a long history, but also casts a long shadow into the future, as parties appreciate the permanency of shared water and the mutual engagement that must repeatedly take place if both sides are to survive and thrive. As these examples highlight, water co-operation balances on a complex set of interlinked political and socioeconomic issues and serious potential for conflict is built into every co-operative framework. Moments of international co-operation are never unqualified successes. Here, co-operation and conflict should not be seen as an either-or truths of global water politics, but rather as different sides of the same coin that coexist as actors renegotiate and refine interactions over the same shared water resources. The limited historical instances of full-blown water conflict should not lull us into a false sense that shared humanity or rational technocratic solutions have triumphed over fears over resource scarcity. Similarly, the international organizations that have been developed over time to institutionalize co-operation also accommodate political conflict. To illustrate this, the following section will chart the development of transboundary water co-operation in the context of the international laws and organizations that govern modern international relations.

THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The notion that transboundary rivers should be treated as public, international highways was adapted from Roman imperial law, which designated a river as *res publicae jure gentium*, i.e. 'a thing common to all'. The right to freely navigate, fish, and use the banks for loading and unloading belonged to all Roman citizens. This Roman legacy could be found in European medieval legal traditions, such as the 13th century German *Sachsenspiegel* (a compendium of customary law), as well as in Islamic water law, with legal norms transmitted through the legal codes of the Ottoman Empire. In the 16th and 17th centuries those who drew on the laws of nature, such as Hugo Grotius and Emer de Vattel, also argued that international rivers traversing multiple states should belong to all. Relying on reason rather than legal precedent, these proponents of natural law argued that no single nation should be excluded from the use of inexhaustible assets such as flowing water. These legal principles, however, were not institutionalized in European and international law until the 1815 Congress of Vienna, with the creation of the Rhine Commission.

The 1815 Rhine Commission

Despite legal traditions, prior to the 19th century passage along Europe's transboundary waterways, including the Rhine and the Danube Rivers, was choked by local authorities that jealously guarded their feudal right to extract tolls from river traffic. In the 12th century, roughly 60 toll points dotted the Rhine. In the 13th century English chronicler Thomas Wykes described the situation as *furiosa Teutonicorum insania*—Teutonic insanity. By the eve of the French Revolution more than 30 tolls harried boats travelling the 78 km between Bingen and Koblenz. Local history along the Danube even tells of a local medieval lord who attached a large metal chain across the river to regulate traffic and enforce tolls. Furthermore, collected tolls entered the local lord's private coffers rather than contributing towards the maintenance of towpaths and other infrastructure needs. Excessive tolls and other feudal practices deterred merchants from using the river for transport and hindered the economic potential of Europe's transboundary rivers. As the French revolutionary army swept east, the French sought to dismantle the aristocratic privileges of feudal Europe and to liberalize international rivers such as the Rhine and the Scheldt. In 1792 the French Republic invaded the Netherlands and issued a decree opening up the Scheldt and the Meuse Rivers to freedom of navigation, and freedom of navigation was extended to the Rhine with the 1795 Treaty of the Hague. However, the German Rhine states resisted French encroachment on their ancient rights. It was only when Napoleon imposed the Octroi Convention on the Holy Roman Empire in 1804 that the principle of freedom of navigation along the Rhine translated into practice. The Octroi Convention finally abolished feudal monopolies and excessive tolls, standardized regulations along the river, and created a new organization—the Magistrate of the Rhine, composed of French and German representatives—to enforce regulations and supervise engineering projects. Despite its innovative design, the Octroi Convention was very short-lived

and expired with the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806. Following Napoleon's defeat the European powers gathered at the 1815 Congress of Vienna to rebalance power and to re-establish a stable European order. To decide whether to adopt French reforms along international rivers or to return to antebellum arrangements, the Congress established the International Rivers Committee. The Committee included representatives from the four major powers—France, Great Britain, Austria and Prussia—along with smaller riparian German states. The Committee worked to balance sensible liberal reforms with the protection of sovereign rights and a preference for a restoration of traditional European order. Article CIX of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna reflected the Committee's decision cautiously to preserve some reforms, and declared that 'the navigation of the rivers... from the point where each of them becomes navigable, to its mouth, shall be entirely free, and shall not, in respect to commerce, be prohibited to anyone'. The Final Act also ended feudal privileges and unnecessary tolls, and established the Rhine Commission, the first international organization. However, the 1815 Rhine Commission should not be seen as a marker of uncontested progress from irrational conflict to rational co-operation. Co-operation had always characterized politics along the Rhine. In the mid-13th century dozens of cities co-operated to form the League of Rhenish Cities, as a means of establishing order and maintaining safe passage along the river. In the 18th century a group of Rhine cities joined forces to sue Cologne and Mainz in the Holy Roman Empire's courts over unfair privileges. These examples demonstrate that, alongside the fractious politics that colour historical narratives of Rhine politics before 1815, there was political space for engaging in collective action and co-operation. Similarly, while it seems that the Congress of Vienna's International Rivers Committee represented liberal progress, the Committee's debates were highly contested and its outcomes demonstrated a conservative bent that backtracked from French innovations. Following its founding in 1815 the Rhine Commission was stymied by years of political impasse as the Dutch stood by their right to levy tolls at the mouth of the Rhine. In response, Cologne and Mainz refused to give up their rights and monopolies along the river. It was not until Belgian independence in 1831 that the Dutch position softened, leading to the Convention of Mainz and to greater consolidation of freedom of navigation. Hence, as this historical illustration shows, even when co-operative frameworks are successfully established conflict continues to shape politics within institutional frameworks.

The 1856 Danube Commission and Beyond

In the decades leading up to the 1856 Crimean War, freedom of navigation along the Danube River became an arena of political contestation by Russia and the European powers, particularly Great Britain. Eighteenth century treaties between Austria, the Ottoman Empire and Russia agreed that subjects of all three empires would freely navigate the river. However, natural barriers at the Danube's mouth hindered navigation. The Danube has an unusual hydrological character—the river slows down as it reaches its mouth, and the sand and silt carried from upstream accumulate in its delta to obstruct shipping. The Ottoman Empire made an effort to clear the delta's shipping channels, but with the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople control was ceded to Russia and it became Russian responsibility to maintain the delta. Russia's perceived failure sparked a flurry of diplomatic protest, and the Danube Delta was portrayed as an uncivilized and lawless space that stood in the way of commercial progress. At the conclusion of the Crimean War the victorious powers stipulated freedom of navigation along the Danube as one of four major concessions that must be addressed in the peace treaty. At the ensuing conference the delegates, rather than applying the Congress of Vienna principles, went further and established the European Commission of the Danube as the first truly international body, with French and British representatives exercising joint control over a geographic area a continent away. By contrast, the Rhine Commission only included riparian states. During the post-Crimean peace settlement Russia had ceded territorial control over the Danube Delta to new political entities. A driving concern behind the institutional innovation was the perceived inability of the newly established Danubian Principalities (Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia), under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire, to impose effective control over the delta and to guarantee freedom of navigation. Indeed, maintaining freedom of navigation required not only that local authorities refrain from hampering navigation, but for the active establishment of common regulations, the authority to enforce such regulations, and the engineering competence to improve navigation. The 1856 European Commission of the Danube gained these competencies and more, eventually having its own flag, courts, ability to secure loans, and employees that took an oath to the Commission. This institutional innovation was later celebrated by early 20th century liberal thinkers as an early achievement in international governance and as a model for subsequent international co-operation. Again, it is important to highlight that the European Commission of the Danube was established in the context of both conflict and co-operation. During the Crimean peace conferences the heated contestation between Austria, a riparian state advocating for control over the river to remain with riparian powers, and Great Britain, a non-riparian power favouring an international approach, shaped the co-operative outcome which limited the Commission's authority to the delta. In addition, the European Commission of the Danube was at first established to be a temporary body, to further limit its authority. Furthermore, the co-operative outcome itself could be seen in a less favourable light. Rather than as a triumph of rational international co-operation, the Commission could be understood as the forced application of British and French hegemony upon less powerful states. Nevertheless, these 19th century river commissions on the Rhine and Danube have remained a model for international co-operation over transboundary water into the 20th and 21st centuries. Their legacies can be traced in subsequent commissions such as the International Joint Commission established between the USA and Canada in 1909, the Okavango River Basin Water Commission established in 1994, the Mekong River Commission established in 1995, and the Nile Basin Initiative established in 1998. Freedom of navigation on all international rivers was codified in international law by the 1921 Barcelona Convention and Statute on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern, as part of the League of Nations treaty system. This agreement guaranteed the same freedoms for riparian and non-riparian states, and included all navigable rivers and lakes of international concern. However, the limited number of states (22) that adopted the Convention shows that the norm remains a contentious facet of international co-operation over transboundary water.

Unintended Consequences and New Frameworks

In the 20th century new concerns beyond navigation came to influence international co-operation over transboundary water. These concerns increasingly included the joint management of rivers to guard against flooding, industrial pollution, excessive agricultural use, and loss of habitat for wildlife and fish stock. Ironically, the success of interstate co-operation over navigation had accelerated many of these environmental problems. For example, river engineers in the 18th and 19th centuries removed bends and oxbows and dredged riverbeds in an effort to create a straight and consistent highway for river traffic. But in doing so the unintended consequences included destroying wildlife habitats and increasing the risk of floods. To take advantage of the straightened water highways, industries moved to riverbanks, and both industrial traffic as well as tourism along the rivers increased, all contributing to pollution. The Emscher River, a tributary of the Rhine, became so polluted that a member of the German Reichstag in 1920 described it as 'der Höllenfluss' (river of hell). In the 1950s and 1960s fish kills regularly blighted the Rhine, prompting some to dub it the 'river of horrors'. Following increasing concerns over the environmental degradation of international rivers, actors agreed to new frameworks aimed at addressing these challenges. In 1950 the Rhine states established the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine to monitor the environmental health of the river. The Commission adopted several resolutions to protect the river against pollution. Similarly, the Danube River Protection Convention was signed in 1994 to protect surface and groundwater within the Danube River Basin, and the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR) was founded to ensure adherence to the convention. In 1997, in order to codify these norms at the international level, the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of

International Watercourses, also known as the UN Watercourses Convention (Resolution 51/229). Article 5 of the Convention upholds the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization of watercourses, and Article 7 obliges states to 'take all appropriate measure to prevent causing significant harm' to other states. The Convention also addresses pollution control and prevention, and the protection of ecosystems. The Convention entered into force in August 2014 (following its 35th ratification in May). While it represents a crucial aspect of international law governing co-operation over transboundary waters, the agreement remains open to contestation as key states have not signed it. Furthermore, beyond interstate frameworks that outlined joint management of transboundary water, water as a human right became an international principle. In 2002 the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted General Comment 15, which states that 'the human right to water is indispensable for leading a life in human dignity'. In 2010 the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 64/292 recognizing the human right to water and sanitation. Despite the adoption of these principles, access to safe freshwater for consumption and sanitation remains a global challenge, with 2,100m. people lacking safe drinking water in their homes, according to a 2017 World Health Organization and UNICEF report.

TRANSBOUNDARY WATER CO-OPERATION INTO THE FUTURE

The extensive networks of multilateral agreements and frameworks governing transboundary water can be seen as a successful example of international co-operation, but the multiplicity of political, ecological, and socioeconomic factors shaping conflict and co-operation over shared water complicates the picture. This final section will address continuing challenges surrounding co-operation over water from the local to the international level, and draws attention to the importance of power, discursive framing, and interconnectedness in understanding the complexity of global water challenges.

Continuing Challenges

One challenge is the role that power continues to play within co-operative frameworks. The discourse on international co-operation often assumes that peaceful co-operative outcomes between states is the only desirable goal. However, this framing of the issue gives preference to powerful states over smaller states and local actors. Co-operative agreements between states of uneven power may have adverse effects on equitable distribution and sustainable development within smaller states, and for local actors. For example, the 1995 Agreement on the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin was celebrated as a triumph of interstate co-operation that aimed to develop that under-utilized river for the benefit of all its state owners. But in effect the agreement has been criticized for benefiting China over the smaller South-East Asian states of Thailand, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Cambodia, Myanmar and Viet Nam. Furthermore, the framework has been critiqued for favouring large-scale infrastructure and irrigation projects, such as the Pak Mun Dam, while ignoring local ecological and hydrological dimensions of the river that have a direct impact for fishermen and villagers. Thus, even within the framework of transboundary co-operation, power and injustice remain important dynamics that cannot be ignored in assessing water politics. In addition, framing water as a human right that ought to be freely accessible to all can have problematic consequences and lead to the tragedy of the commons, as actors use more and more of a dwindling resource with little incentive for more sustainable practices. India's rapid groundwater depletion is a stark illustration. Unlike the desert states of the Middle East or Central Asia, India is not a water scarce country, but between 2007 and 2017 excessive groundwater extraction led to a decline in water levels of more than 60%. This dramatic change is a result of government policy since the 1970s and 1980s that frames free access to water as a right, providing little incentive for the population to limit groundwater use. Indeed, the incentives are directly the opposite, as the availability of free electricity and water has resulted in the installation of millions of electric water pumps to boost agricultural production across the country. With lowering groundwater, farmers are installing more powerful pumps that reach deeper into the ground and consume more energy and water. India is not an isolated case: similar dynamics are at play from the western USA to Southern Europe to Australia. Moreover, groundwater does not stop at international borders, and overuse in one country has transboundary and regional consequences. For example, an estimated 70% of Southern Africa's population depends on groundwater sources for everything from human consumption to agriculture to industrial processes. Overuse in one country and one sector immediately impacts others. Regional organizations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are active in highlighting such challenges through regional strategic action plans. The SADC developed the SADC Water Information Sharing Hub (SWISH). Addressing the tragedy of the water commons by privatizing water resources, however, also presents political and ethical dilemmas. The 1992 Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, adopted by the International Conference on Water and the Environment, puts forth the principle that water should be treated as an economic good and that 'past failure to recognize the economic value of water has led to wasteful and environmentally damaging use of the resource'. If misuse of water arises from treating the resource as free and plentiful, then placing a price on water would allow market solutions to take effect and drive conservation. However, attempting to privatize once publicly funded water infrastructure has met with political resistance that contests the neoliberal logic of privatization schemes. How can we morally justify private corporations 'owning' a natural good such as water? One prominent example of such opposition occurred in Cochabamba, Bolivia, in 2000 when local protesters challenged the privatization of the city's water supply by a consortium led by US engineering company Bechtel. The Cochabamba Water Revolts forced the Government and Bechtel to back down. Resistance to water privatization spans from the developed world to the developing world. Yet, water privatization schemes continue not only in the provision of municipal drinking water, but in bottling water and even in the privatization of freshwater sources such as glaciers and icebergs. Furthermore, groundwater depletion highlights the water-food-energy nexus and the interconnectedness and embeddedness of water in the global economy. Water is not only essential for human consumption and sanitation, but also is vital to agricultural production, energy production, and to a variety of industrial processes as a universal solvent and coolant. The production of fossil fuels, biofuels, and shale gas are all highly water intensive. The reverse is equally true, as the harvesting of freshwater from deep underground aquifers, piping water across distances, and the desalination of saltwater are highly energy intensive. Food production consumes huge amounts of freshwater, roughly 70% of freshwater used by humans worldwide, according to the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization, and the demand for food will increase over the next decades, driven by population growth, economic development, and urbanization. British Professor Tony Allan's concept of virtual water captures the degree to which water is embedded in everyday traded goods (i.e. the amount of water necessary to produce a product), from 140 litres of water to produce a cup of coffee, to 200 litres for a glass of milk, to 4,500 litres in a piece of steak. Any successful framework to address transboundary water challenges must confront the nexus between water, energy, and food, and balance the complex interdependencies between multiple sectors.

Potential Solutions

Technological solutions have the potential to provide cheaper, cleaner, and more plentiful water, and could represent a way forward to addressing global water challenges. The promise of technology ranges from micro-level solutions—for example, LifeStraw that filters personal drinking water or SkyWater that captures atmospheric humidity, to large-scale construction projects such as Jordan's ambitious Red Sea to Dead Sea Conveyance pipeline. Expected to cost an estimated US $10m. and to require 180 km of pipeline, the proposed Red–Dead Conduit would pump seawater uphill from the Gulf of Aqaba, desalinate the seawater to provide freshwater to Amman, and then use the brine to replenish the quickly disappearing Dead Sea. However, even if successful, such grandiose technological projects are unlikely to bring peace to the region overnight, and the complexity of water issues make the consequences of technology difficult to anticipate. For example, desalination plants are attractive for transforming plentiful seawater into freshwater,

but are expensive and require enormous energy. Pipes would be necessary to transport the freshwater to inland locations and energy would be needed to move the water uphill. Furthermore, the brine produced by desalination is twice as salty as seawater and requires proper disposal. Towing icebergs or extracting freshwater from Antarctica can also seem like an attractive short-term fix, but the process is expensive, energy-intensive, and may have long-term negative effects for climate change and ecosystems. Hence, one technology solution may precipitate unintended challenges in connected sectors and in increasingly interconnected regions. Moreover, the introduction of technology needs to be suitable for the local context. For example, in the 2000s, PlayPumps International designed merry-go-rounds that harness the energy of children playing to pump water into holding tanks for local communities in Africa. The innovative idea elicited interest and funding from a range of famous donors, from George and Laura Bush to Jay-Z. However, the PlayPumps were entirely impractical. Concerns arose immediately regarding whether child labour was an appropriate source of energy to pump water, and over whether children would wish to play for hours a day in the heat in order to supply adequate amounts of water. Not only were the PlayPumps expensive to install and the parts difficult for local communities to replace, but often the local context meant that the key challenge was the lack of accessible groundwater of sufficient quality, which more advanced pumping technology could not solve. While technological fixes might seem an attractive investment for solving global water challenges, technology should not be considered a magic bullet. Careful consideration must ensure that technological solutions are suitable, given the local socioeconomic and environmental context, and that they are paired with policy and management changes that address underlying structural issues. Discussion of the international community's efforts to resolve transboundary water issues often revolve around global elite actors and the quest for one-size-fits-all approaches, rather than indigenous or local communities and small-scale solutions. However, engaging local stakeholders to formulate context-specific solutions may achieve powerful results with more community buy-in and ownership. Indigenous techniques such as rainwater or fog harvesting are low tech, but can be an important part of the solution. Furthermore, the anthropocentric focus of water co-operation gives little weight to the wellbeing of water ecosystems, beyond their direct impact on human communities. In 2017 the Whanganui River in New Zealand and the Ganges and Yamuna rivers in India were recognized as 'legal persons' in order to battle corporate pollutors and to preserve indigenous relationships with their rivers. As illustrated throughout this essay, international frameworks for transboundary water co-operation represent the beginning rather than the end of a sustainable solution. While current co-operative frameworks form a baseline upon which actors could come together and avoid imminent water wars, they include problematic underlying assumptions and are limited in tackling the overall threat of environmental degradation. In focusing on the equitable division of the resource pie, international frameworks often miss larger questions about the sustainability of ever more demands on the pie, and about the consequences of pie division for marginalized groups within and beyond the state. The dire consequences of co-operative overuse are seen in the shrinking Aral Sea, and in saltwater intrusion into the Nile and Indus river deltas due to water extraction upriver. While the sheer complexity of water as a transboundary issue is daunting, the potential consequences of continued mismanagement are more so. Sobering archeological evidence from a number of ancient cities, such as Angkor Wat in Cambodia, Mashkan-shapir in Mesopotamia, and Mayan centres in Central America, stress that water-related environmental collapse contributed to civilizational decline. Creative, adaptable, and sustainable water solutions are needed so that we might avoid replaying these ancient tragedies.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A CHRONOLOGY

1863

17 Feb. First meeting of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as the International Committee for the Relief of Wounded Soldiers.

1864

22 Aug. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Soldiers Wounded in Armies in the Field signed.

1865

17 May International Telegraph Convention signed in Paris, establishing the International Telegraph Union; present name—International Telecommunication Union—adopted in 1934 (became a specialized agency of the UN on 15 Oct. 1947).

1874

9 Oct. General Postal Union established (name changed to Universal Postal Union in 1878; became a specialized agency of the UN on 1 July 1948).

1889

31 Oct. Inter-Parliamentary Union established (initially as the Inter-Parliamentary Conference for International Arbitration).

1890

14 April International Union of American Republics founded, at first International American Conference, held in Washington, DC, USA.

1894

23 June International Olympic Committee established.

1899

18 May–29 July International Peace Conference held in The Hague (Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes signed).

1906

6 July Geneva Convention signed, extending the provisions of the first Convention to naval warfare.

1907

18 Oct. Convention respecting laws and customs of war on land (Hague Rules) signed at second Hague Peace Conference.

1914

Aug. Outbreak of World War I.

1918

18 Jan. US President Wilson outlined the objectives of a peace settlement, which included provisions for the establishment of an association of nations to strengthen international relations and help maintain peace.

11 Nov. Armistice declared, ending World War I.

1919

5 May League of Red Cross Societies established (became League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in 1983; present name—International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies—adopted in 1991).

28 June Versailles Peace Treaty signed, incorporating the Covenant establishing a League of Nations.

International Labour Organization established by the Treaty of Versailles, to assume the functions of the International Labour Office (became a specialized agency of the UN on 14 Dec. 1946).

1920

10 Jan. Covenant establishing the League of Nations entered into force.

13 Dec. Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice adopted (operational until 31 Dec. 1945).

1921

19 June International Federation of Christian Trade Unions established (renamed World Confederation of Labour Oct. 1968 and merged with other organizations to form the International Trade Union Confederation in Nov. 2006).

20 Aug. First High Commissioner for Refugees appointed.

21 Nov.–6 Feb. 1922 Washington Conference, during which treaties were concluded relating to China's territorial integrity, the use of chemical weapons and limitations on naval armaments.

1925

4–5 May First International Congress of Official Tourism Traffic Associations convened in The Hague (renamed the International Union of Official Travel Organisations in 1947).

18 Dec. International Bureau of Education established (became an intergovernmental org. on 25 July 1929; incorporated into UNESCO in 1961).

1926

26 Sept. Slavery Convention signed by representatives of 36 nations, in Geneva.

1928

26 Sept. General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes adopted by the General Assembly of the League of Nations.

1929

27 July Geneva Convention relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War signed.

1930

13 March–12 April (Second) Conference on Codification of International Law held in The Hague.

17 May Bank for International Settlements established.

1939

1 Sept. German invasion of Poland, marking the start of World War II.

1941

14 Aug. Atlantic Charter signed by US President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, proposing a set of principles for international collaboration in maintaining peace and security.

1942

1 Jan. Declaration by United Nations signed by representatives of 26 nations (pledged to continue fighting together against the Axis powers).

1943

18 May–3 June UN Conference on Food and Agriculture held in Hot Springs, Virginia, USA.

9 Nov. Agreement on establishment of an interim UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to extend emergency assistance to liberated countries.

1944

1–22 July UN Monetary and Financial Conference held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, USA: representatives of 45 countries formulated proposals relating to post-war international payment problems, and endorsed establishment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).

21 Sept.–7 Oct. Dumbarton Oaks Conference Washington, DC, USA: China, United Kingdom, USA and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) agreed on aims, structure and functioning of a world organization.

1945

22 March Pact of League of Arab States signed (entered into force 10 May 1945).

8 May Unconditional surrender of Germany, ending war in Europe.

26 June UN Charter signed by representatives of 50 nations.

6 Aug. First use of atomic bomb during warfare, on Hiroshima, Japan.

2 Sept. Unconditional surrender of Japan.

3 Oct. World Federation of Trade Unions established.

16 Oct. Food and Agriculture Organization established (incorporating the International Institute of Agriculture, an intergovernmental body established 7 June 1905).

24 Oct. UN Charter entered into force, formally establishing the UN.

16 Nov. Constitution adopted establishing a UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (entered into force 4 Nov. 1946).

20 Nov. International Military Tribunal initiated trial proceedings in Nürnberg, Germany, against principal military officers in the former Nazi regime (continued functioning until 1 Oct. 1946).

27 Dec. Articles of Agreement establishing the IMF and IBRD adopted.

1946

10 Jan. First meeting of the UN General Assembly, held in London, UK.

13 Jan. UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) formally constituted.

17 Jan. First meeting of the UN Security Council.

24 Jan. UN Atomic Energy Commission established (suspended 22 June 1948 after differences between the USA and the USSR).

1 Feb. First Secretary-General of the UN, Trygve Lie, took office.

6 Feb. International Court of Justice inaugurated.

25 June IBRD commenced operations.

11 Dec. UN International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) established (mandate extended in 1950; name and mandate amended in 1953 to become UN Children's Fund, retaining the same acronym).

15 Dec. International Refugees Organization (IRO) established (assumed responsibility from the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration).

1947

1 March IMF commenced operations.

28 March UN Economic Commission for Europe established by ECOSOC as the first regional commission of the UN (commenced operations in May 1947; became a permanent organ of the UN in 1951).

UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) established (commenced operations in June 1948; name changed to UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific—ESCAP in Aug. 1974).

4 April International Civil Aviation Organization established, following ratification of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation (signed 7 Dec. 1944).

11 Oct. Convention on establishment of World Meteorological Organization signed, assuming functions of the International Meteorological Organization (f. 1873) (convention entered into force 23 March 1950; became a specialized agency of the UN on 20 Dec. 1951).

30 Oct. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade signed (entered into force on 1 Jan. 1948, establishing multilateral rules for trade).

1948

25 Feb. UN Economic Commission for Latin America established (redesignated Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean—ECLAC—in July 1984).

6 March Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization established at the conclusion of a UN Maritime Conference.

17 March Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence (The Brussels Treaty) signed by France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the UK.

24 March Charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO) signed at the end of the International Conference on Trade and Employment, held in Havana, Cuba. (The establishment of the ITO was subsequently postponed indefinitely.)

7 April Constitution establishing World Health Organization (WHO) entered into force (signed July 1946).

16 April Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) established, in connection with the post-war Marshall Plan for economic reconstruction.

2 May Organization of American States established, as a successor to the International Union of American Republics.

29 May UN Security Council resolved to deploy first group of UN military observers in order to supervise a halt in the hostilities between Palestinian Arabs and the newly-proclaimed state of Israel. (The UN Truce Supervision Organization was deployed in June.)

25 June European and US commands began collaboration to deliver by air humanitarian provisions to Berlin, Germany, which had been isolated by a Soviet blockade (the so-called 'Berlin Airlift'; continued to 30 Sept. 1949).

22 Aug. World Council of Churches established.

1 Dec. UN Relief for Palestinian Refugees established.

9 Dec. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted by the UN General Assembly.

10 Dec. Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly.

1949

25 Jan. Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon) established to support economic development of the USSR and countries of Eastern Europe.

4 April North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington, DC, USA, institutionalizing the Atlantic Alliance and providing a legal basis for the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

5 May Statute establishing Council of Europe signed (entered into force 3 Aug. 1949).

12 Aug. Convention on the Protection of Civilian Populations in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), together with revisions of previous Geneva Conventions, adopted at the conclusion of a Diplomatic Conference (initiated 21 April 1949).

8 Dec. UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) established to succeed earlier programme (began operations in May 1950).

1950

7 July UN Security Council authorized the establishment of a unified multinational force to restore peace in Korea, under the command of the USA.

4 Nov. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights) adopted by the Council of Europe; entered into force on 3 Nov. 1953.

1951

1 Jan. Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees began operations, assuming the functions of the IRO.

18 April Treaty of Paris signed, establishing a European Coal and Steel Community.

28 July Convention relating to the Status of Refugees adopted.

5 Dec. Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for Movement and Migrants from Europe established (mandate extended and name changed to become Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration in Nov. 1952, later Intergovernmental Committee for Migration; constitution changing name to International Organization for Migration—IOM entered into force in Nov. 1989).

1952

13 Feb. Nordic Council inaugurated.

1954

23 Oct. Treaty of Brussels modified, providing for establishment of a Western European Union (commenced operations May 1955, now defunct).

1955

14 May Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (the Warsaw Pact) signed by the USSR and six Eastern European countries.

1956

24 July International Finance Corporation (IFC) established as an affiliate of the IBRD.

1957

25 March Treaty of Rome establishing a European Economic Community and a European Atomic Energy Community signed (entered into force 1 Jan. 1958).

29 July Statute establishing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) entered into force (approved 23 Oct. 1956).

1958

17 March Convention establishing Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization entered into force (became a specialized agency of the UN on 13 Jan. 1959; present name, International Maritime Organization, adopted in May 1982).

1959

8 April Agreement to establish an Inter-American Development Bank adopted (entered into force 30 Dec. 1959).

20 Nov. Declaration on the Rights of the Child adopted by UN General Assembly.

1 Dec. Antarctic Treaty signed by 12 countries, banning weapons testing on the continent and guaranteeing its use solely for peaceful purposes (entered into force 23 June 1961).

1960

18 Feb. Montevideo Treaty signed, constituting Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA).

3 May Convention establishing European Free Trade Association entered into force (signed in Jan. 1960).

10–14 Sept. Conference held in Baghdad, Iraq, established Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

24 Sept. International Development Association established.

1 Oct. Inter-American Development Bank commenced operations.

14 Dec. Convention on the establishment of an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, to supersede the OEEC, signed.

15 Dec. General Treaty of Central American Economic Integration signed (ratified Sept. 1963, creating Central American Common Market).

1961

24 Nov. World Food Programme established (commenced operations 1 Jan. 1963).

1962

23 March Treaty of Nordic Co-operation (Helsinki Treaty) signed.

1963

25 May Charter establishing Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted.

4 Aug. Agreement establishing African Development Bank signed (entered into force 10 Sept. 1964; Bank commenced operations on 1 July 1966).

1964

30 Dec. UN Conference on Trade and Development established as a permanent organ of the General Assembly.

1965

23 June First Secretary-General of the Commonwealth appointed (following decision in 1964 by Commonwealth heads of government to establish a permanent secretariat).

22 Nov. UN General Assembly approved the establishment of a UN Development Programme, by merger of the UN Special Fund and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (created in 1949), effective from 1 Jan. 1966.

21 Dec. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination adopted (entered into force 4 Jan. 1969).

1966

14 Oct. International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes established.

24 Nov. Asian Development Bank established (commenced operations 19 Dec. 1966).

16 Dec. International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights adopted by UN General Assembly.

1967

1 Jan. UN Industrial Development Organization established, on the basis of a resolution of the General Assembly adopted on 17 Nov. 1966 (became a specialized agency of the UN on 1 Jan. 1986).

14 Feb. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Tlatelolco Treaty) signed (entered into force on 22 April 1968, establishing the first nuclear-free zone in a populated region).

14 July Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) adopted; entered into force on 26 April 1970. (WIPO became a specialized agency of the UN in Dec. 1974.)

8 Aug. Declaration establishing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed in Bangkok, Thailand.

1968

9 Jan. Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries established.

1 May Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) established (on basis of agreement signed between Antigua, Barbados and Guyana on 15 Dec. 1965).

12 June Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) adopted by UN General Assembly (entered into force 1970).

1969

26 May Agreement signed by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru to establish a common market (Andean Pact).

10 Sept. OAU Convention on Refugees signed.

22 Nov. American Convention on Human Rights adopted.

1970

27 Sept. An Extraordinary General Assembly of the International Union of Official Travel Organisations adopted the Statutes of the World Tourism Organization (entered into force on 2 Jan. 1975).

1971

25 May Organization of the Islamic Conference (renamed in 2011 Organization of Islamic Cooperation) formally inaugurated.

5 Aug. First South Pacific Forum held, in Wellington, New Zealand.

25 Oct. People's Republic of China assumed a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, following recognition by the General Assembly of it being a permanent member of the UN (in place of the Republic of China, which had held the seat in the Security Council since 1949).

1972

10 April Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention) opened for signature (entered into force 26 March 1975).

15 Dec. UN Environment Programme established.

18 Dec. UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA, established as the Trust Fund for Population Activities in 1967) designated a fund of the UN General Assembly; name changed to UN Population Fund in 1987, retaining the same acronym.

1973

17 April South Pacific Trade Bureau established to service South Pacific Forum meetings (changed name to South Pacific Forum Secretariat in 1988, and to Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat in 2000—when the annual South Pacific Forum was renamed Pacific Islands Forum).

4 July Treaty of Chaguaramas signed, establishing a Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) to supersede CARIFTA.

9 Aug. UN Economic Commission for Western Asia established (commenced operations 1 Jan. 1974; renamed Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia—ESCWA—in 1985).

1974

12 Aug. Agreement establishing Islamic Development Bank signed.

17 Dec. World Food Council established.

1975

28 Feb. First Lomé Convention signed between EC and 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries (replacing Yaoundé Conventions 1965/70 and Arusha Convention 1968).

28 May Treaty establishing Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) signed in Lagos, Nigeria.

31 May European Space Agency established (succeeding European Launcher Development Organization and the European Space Research Organization, established in 1962).

3 July–2 Aug. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, held in Helsinki, Finland. Concluded the Helsinki Final Act on East-West Relations, signed by representatives of 35 nations.

1976

1 Jan. OPEC Fund for International Development began operations.

1977

2 Feb. Agreement establishing Arab Monetary Fund entered into force.

8 June Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions adopted, relating to the protection of victims of international and non-international conflicts.

30 Nov. Agreement establishing International Fund for Agricultural Development entered into force.

1978

Oct. UN Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) established (renamed UN Human Settlements Programme in Jan. 2002).

1980

1 April Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) established (succeeded by Southern African Development Community in 1992).

8 May Eradication of smallpox declared by the 33rd World Health Assembly.

13 Aug. Latin American Integration Association established (succeeding LAFTA).

1981

25 May — Cooperation Council for Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) inaugurated.
27 June — African Charter on Human and People's Rights signed (entered into force 21 Oct. 1986).
22 Dec. — Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA) established.

1982

22 May — IMCO transformed into International Maritime Organization.
10 Dec. — UN Convention on the Law of the Sea signed in Montego Bay, Jamaica.

1984

10 Dec. — Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment adopted by UN General Assembly.

1985

6 Aug. — South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty) signed in Cook Islands (entered into force 11 Dec. 1986).

1988

12 April — Convention establishing Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency entered into force.

1989

7 Nov. — Inaugural meeting of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), in Canberra, Australia.
20 Nov. — Convention on the Rights of the Child adopted by the UN General Assembly.

1990

Aug. — First multinational forces of the Economic Community of West African States dispatched, to Liberia.

1991

26 March — Treaty of Asunción signed establishing the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR).
15 April — European Bank for Reconstruction and Development inaugurated.
1 July — Warsaw Pact countries agreed to end political functions of the Pact (its military institutions having already been abandoned).
30 Sept. — Council for Mutual Economic Assistance formally dissolved.
8 Dec. — Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) established by the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine; other republics joined on 21 Dec. giving formal recognition that the USSR had ceased to exist.
24 Dec. — Russia assumed the USSR's permanent seat in the Security Council and in all other UN organs.

1992

3 July — UNHCR initiated an emergency airlift to provide humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (became the longest humanitarian airlift in history by the time it ended on 9 Jan. 1996).
17 Aug. — Members of SADCC signed a treaty establishing a successor organization, the South African Development Community (treaty entered into effect 5 Oct. 1993).

1993

13 Jan. — Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction signed (entered into force 29 April 1997).
25 May — UN Security Council adopted statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
1 Nov. — Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) entered into force.
20 Dec. — Position of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights established by the UN General Assembly.

1994

1 Jan. — North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force.
12 May — Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community entered into force.
1 Nov. — UN Trusteeship Council suspended.
8 Nov. — International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) established.
16 Nov. — UN Convention on the Law of the Sea entered into force, providing for the establishment of the International Seabed Authority.
6 Dec. — CSCE transformed into Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
8 Dec. — Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) established, succeeding the PTA.

1995

1 Jan. — World Trade Organization formally established, succeeding GATT.
MERCOSUR became fully operational.
11 May — States party to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty agreed to extend its provisions indefinitely.
15 Dec. — South-East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone treaty signed (entered into force 27 March 1997).

1996

1 Jan. — Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) became operational.
10 March — Protocol to the Cartagena Agreement signed in Trujillo, Peru, establishing the Community of Andean Nations.
21 March — Charter of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development—IGAD adopted; IGAD superseded the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development, established in 1986.
11 April — African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) signed in Cairo, Egypt.
24 Sept. — Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty signed.

1997

27 May — Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security signed between Russia and NATO (provided for the establishment of a Permanent Joint Council).

1998

17 July — Statute for an International Criminal Court adopted, in Rome, Italy.
2 Sept. — First judgment by an international court for the crime of genocide passed by the ICTR.

1999

1 Jan. — Single currency ('euro') adopted by 11 EU states.
1 March — Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Land Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention) entered into force.
12 March — Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland admitted as full members of NATO.
24 March — NATO initiated its first military offensive against a sovereign state (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).

10 June — UN Security Council authorized the deployment of an international security presence in Kosovo and Metohija and the establishment of an international civilian presence. For the first time other organizations (the OSCE and EU) were mandated to co-ordinate aspects of a mission under the UN's overall jurisdiction.

17 Dec. — UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) established in Iraq.

2000

23 June — Cotonou Agreement concluded between the EU and 78 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, replacing the fourth Lomé Convention.

7 July — Treaty re-establishing the East African Community (EAC, signed by the heads of state of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda on 30 Nov. 1999) entered into force.

14 Aug. — Special Court for Sierra Leone established by Resolution 1315 of the UN Security Council.

6–8 Sept. — Summit of UN heads of state or government adopted a series of Millennium Development Goals, incorporating targets that were pursued during 2000–15.

1 Nov. — Federal Republic of Yugoslavia assumed the seat in the UN General Assembly previously occupied by the former Yugoslavia.

2001

26 May — Constitutive Act of the African Union (signed 11 July 2000 in Lomé, Togo, by OAU heads of state and government) entered into force.

22 July — The Group of Eight (G8) industrialized nations endorsed the creation of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria.

12 Sept. — Following major terrorist attacks against targets in the USA, NATO's North Atlantic Council invoked for the first time Article 5 of the organization's founding treaty, concerning collective self-defence.

23 Oct. — New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) launched by 15 OAU heads of state.

9–14 Nov. — Fourth WTO ministerial conference, convened in Doha, Qatar: Doha Declaration adopted, incorporating new negotiating agenda and work programme; China and Taiwan admitted as WTO members.

10 Dec. — Centennial Nobel Peace Prize awarded, in two equal portions, to the UN and to its then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan.

2002

1 Jan. — 'Euro' banknotes and coins entered into circulation in the then 12 eurozone countries of the EU.
UN System Staff College became operational.

1 July — Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted on 17 July 1998) entered into force.

10 July — African Union (AU) formally inaugurated, succeeding the OAU.

10 Sept. — Switzerland admitted to the UN.

27 Sept. — Timor-Leste (East Timor) admitted to the UN.

2003

1 Jan. — Customs union of the GCC entered into force.

1 April — Cotonou Agreement entered into force.

23 Dec. — World Tourism Organization became a specialized agency of the UN.

2004

29 March — Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia admitted as full members of NATO.

1 May — Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia admitted to the EU.

28 May — US-Central America Free Trade Agreement on the establishment of a Central American Free Trade Area (CAFTA) signed by the USA and CACM member countries (signed in Aug. by the Dominican Republic, thereby establishing CAFTA-DR).

2005

1 Jan. — Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) came into effect.
EAC customs union launched.

16 Feb. — The Kyoto Protocol of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change entered into force.

2006

1 Jan. — Single market component of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) became operational.
South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) came into effect.

19 June — UN Human Rights Council inaugurated, replacing the former UN Human Rights Commission.

23 June — UN Peacebuilding Commission inaugurated.

28 June — Montenegro admitted to the UN, following its declaration of independence on 3 June; Serbia retained the UN seat hitherto occupied by Serbia and Montenegro.

1 Nov. — International Trade Union Confederation established by merger of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the World Confederation of Labour and eight national trade union confederations.

19 Dec. — South-Eastern European countries and territories signed the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA).

2007

1 Jan. — Ban Ki-Moon succeeded Kofi Annan as UN Secretary-General.
Bulgaria and Romania admitted to the EU.

31 July — AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) established.

2008

1 Jan. — Gulf Cooperation Council Common Market inaugurated.
Cyprus and Malta admitted to the eurozone.

24 May — South American heads of state signed a constitutive treaty to establish a Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).

17 Aug. — SADC Free Trade Area entered into effect.

15 Nov. — Group of 20 (G20) major developed and emerging economies met for the first time at the level of heads of state and government, in Washington, DC, USA.

15 Dec. — A new Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, signed 20 Nov. 2007) entered into effect.

2009

1 Jan. — Slovakia admitted to the eurozone.

1 March — Special Tribunal for Lebanon became operational.

1 April — Albania and Croatia admitted as full members of NATO.

16 June — Inaugural BRIC summit convened, comprising the heads of state of Brazil, Russia, India and China (renamed BRICS from April 2011 when South Africa joined the grouping).

22–23 Oct. — AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa adopted at a Special Summit on Refugees, Returnees and IDPs in Africa.

1 Dec. Treaty of Lisbon Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community entered into force.

2010

1 Aug. Convention on Cluster Munitions (adopted on 30 May 2008) entered into force.

23 Dec. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance entered into force.

2011

1 Jan. Estonia admitted to the eurozone.
UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) became operational.

14 July South Sudan admitted as the 193rd member of the UN.

2–3 Dec. Inaugural summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.

2012

2 Feb. Eurasian Economic Commission, with participation by Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan, became operational.

26 April First guilty verdict imposed by a world court against a former head of state (Special Court for Sierra Leone *v.* Charles Taylor, the former President of Liberia).

6 June An agreement establishing the Pacific Alliance signed by the Presidents of Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.

20–22 June UN Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) convened, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

1 July Residual workload of the ICTR assumed by the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals.

22 Aug. Russia acceded to membership of the WTO.

30 Nov. Palestine granted non-member observer state status at the UN.

2013

1 Jan. Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (the 'fiscal compact') entered into force in the eurozone.

1 July Croatia admitted as the 28th member state of the EU.

24 Sept. Inaugural meeting held of the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, replacing the Commission on Sustainable Development.

16 Oct. A Joint Mission of the UN and Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons formally established to monitor the elimination of the chemical weapons programme in Syria.

7 Dec. Bali Package—aimed at advancing progress in the Doha Development Round of multilateral trade liberalization negotiations—adopted by the Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference.

2014

1 Jan. Latvia admitted as the 18th member of the eurozone.

24 March Russia suspended from participation in the G8, which thereafter met in the Group of Seven (G7) format for co-operation.

23–27 June Inaugural meeting of the UN Environmental Assembly convened.

15 July Agreement signed by the BRICS member states, meeting in Fortaleza, Brazil, on the establishment of a New Development Bank.

19 Sept. First UN emergency health mission—the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response—deployed, in West Africa.

24 Dec. Arms Trade Treaty entered into force.

31 Dec. International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) formally disbanded (first authorized by UN Security Council on 20 Dec. 2001; command assumed by NATO on 11 Aug. 2003).

2015

1 Jan. The Eurasian Economic Union, initially comprising Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, entered into effect. (Kyrgyzstan became a full member in May.)

14–18 March Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction held in Sendai City, Japan, adopted the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015–30).

10 June Agreement signed establishing the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area.

13–16 July Third International Conference on Financing for Development convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

25–27 Sept. UN Summit to Adopt the Post-2015 Development Agenda, convened in New York, endorsed the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including 17 Sustainable Development Goals.

12 Dec. Paris Agreement to combat and counter the effects of climate change adopted by the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.

31 Dec. ICTR was disbanded.

2016

19 Jan. China-based multilateral Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank inaugurated.

4 Feb. Agreement on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) signed.

23–24 May First World Humanitarian Summit convened in İstanbul, Turkey.

30 May Former President of Chad, Hissène Habré, convicted of crimes against humanity by an ad hoc Extraordinary African Chambers.

23 June The UK voted in a popular referendum to leave the EU.

19 Sept. IOM incorporated into the UN System as a 'related organization' during a high-level summit on large movements of refugees and migrants.

4 Nov. Paris Agreement entered into force.

2017

1 Jan. António Manuel de Oliveira Guterres succeeded Ban Ki-Moon as UN Secretary-General.

23 Jan. USA withdrew from the TTP.

22 Feb. WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement entered into force.

2 June Montenegro admitted to NATO as its 29th member state.

9 June India and Pakistan became full members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

8 Aug. Grupo de Lima (Lima Group) established by ministers responsible for foreign affairs of 12 states from the Americas.

12 Oct. USA and Israel announced their intention to withdraw from UNESCO (to take effect on 31 Dec. 2018).

31 Dec. ICTY was disbanded.

2018

8 March Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), replacing the TPP, signed by the 11 remaining participants.

21 March African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) adopted by the 10th extraordinary summit of AU heads of state and government.

25 May EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) became legally binding and fully applicable in all EU member states.

10 Dec. Intergovernmental Conference on International Migration, held in Marrakesh, Morocco, adopted

a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (the Compact was formally endorsed by the UN General Assembly on 19 Dec.).

30 Dec. The CPTPP entered into force in Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand and Singapore (and in Viet Nam on 14 Jan. 2019).

2019

22 March Prosur (intended to replace UNASUR) established by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay and Peru.

10 May A global framework on monitoring, tracking and managing plastic waste was adopted by 187 governments, in the context of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal.

30 May The AfCFTA entered into force.

16–18 Dec. Inaugural Global Refugee Forum held.

2020

31 Jan. The UK's withdrawal from the EU took effect.

1 Feb. The Maldives rejoined the Commonwealth as its 54th member.

11 March WHO designated the ongoing COVID-19 health emergency as a pandemic.

27 March North Macedonia admitted as the 30th member of NATO.

5 April Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) established as successor to the ACP Group of States, upon the entry into force of a revised Georgetown Agreement.

1 July The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) entered into effect, replacing NAFTA.

5 Nov. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership was signed, in a virtual ceremony, by the 10 ASEAN member states, as well as by Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea.

13 Dec. Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations Plus (PACER Plus)—signed in Nuku'alofa, Tonga, on 6 Sept. 2017—entered into force.

2021

1 Jan. AfCFTA implementation commenced.

20 Jan. US President Joe Biden, on his first day in office, signed an Executive Order that provided for the USA to rejoin the Paris Agreement on climate change (on 19 Feb., the USA having, under its previous Administration, completed a process of withdrawal from the accord on 4 Nov. 2020).

22 Jan. Entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, adopted by 122 UN member states in July 2017.

5 April Negotiations formally concluded on a new EU-OACPS Partnership Agreement, to succeed the Cotonou Agreement (scheduled to expire on 30 Nov. 2021).

INTERNATIONAL OBSERVANCES

(Mainly sponsored by the UN and its specialized agencies; other sponsoring organizations are indicated in parentheses)

Days and Weeks

January

4	World Braille Day (World Blind Union).
16	ECOWAS Human Rights Day.
23	World Leprosy Day.
24	International Day of Education.
27	International Day of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims of the Holocaust.
28	Data Privacy Day.
30	World Neglected Tropical Diseases Day.

February

2	World Wetlands Day.
4	International Day of Human Fraternity.
	World Cancer Day.
	OAS Electoral Observation Day.
6	International Day of Zero Tolerance to Female Genital Mutilation (UNICEF, UNFPA and the Inter-African Committee on Traditional Practices).
(1st week)	World Interfaith Harmony Week.
8	Baltic Sea Science Day (CBSS).
10	World Pulses Day.
11	International Day of Women and Girls in Science.
	Safer Internet Day (European Commission and ITU).
12	International Day against the Use of Child Soldiers.
13	World Radio Day.
20	World Day of Social Justice.
21	International Mother Language Day.
25	SADC Healthy Lifestyles Day.
28	Data Protection Day (Council of Europe).
	Rare Disease Day.

March

1	Zero Discrimination Day.
3	Africa Environment Day (AU).
	International Ear Care Day.
	World Wildlife Day.
4	World Engineering Day for Sustainable Development.
	World Obesity Day.
8	International Women's Day.
(2nd Mon.)	Commonwealth Day (Commonwealth Secretariat).
10	International Day of Women Judges.
14	International Day of Mathematics.
15	World Consumer Rights Day (Consumers International).
20	International Day of Happiness.
	UN French Language Day.
21	International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.
	World Down Syndrome Day.
	International Day of Nowruz.
	World Poetry Day.
	World Forestry Day.
21–27	Week of Solidarity with the Peoples Struggling against Racism and Racial Discrimination.
22	World Day for Water.
23	World Meteorological Day.
24	International Day for the Right to the Truth concerning Gross Human Rights Violations and for the Dignity of Victims.
	World Tuberculosis Day.
25	Arab Day for Standardization.
	Earth Hour (WWF International).
	International Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Slavery and the Transatlantic Slave Trade.
	International Day of Solidarity with Detained and Missing Staff Members.
26	UN Social Work Day.
27	World Theatre Day (International Theatre Institute and UNESCO).

April

2	International Children's Book Day (International Board on Books for Young People).
	World Autism Awareness Day.
4	International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action.
6	International Day of Sport for Development and Peace.
7	International Day of Reflection on the Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda (AU, UN).
	World Health Day.
8	International Day of Roma.
12	International Day of Human Space Flight.
	International Day for Street Children.
14	Pan-American Day (OAS).
	World Chagas Day.
15	World Art Day.
20	UN Chinese Language Day.
21	World Creativity and Innovation Day.
22	International Mother Earth Day.
23	UN English Language Day.
	UN Spanish Language Day.
	World Book and Copyright Day.
24	International Day of Multilateralism and Diplomacy for Peace.
24–30	World Immunization Week.
25	Africa Malaria Control Day.
	World Malaria Day.
26	Girls in ICT Day.
	International Day of Remembrance for Victims of Radiation (CIS).
	International Chernobyl Disaster Remembrance Day.
	World Intellectual Property Day.
27	Arab Day for Financial Inclusion.
28	International Workers' Memorial Day.
	World Day for Safety and Health at Work.
30	International Jazz Day.

May

2	World Tuna Day.
2–4	Asia-Pacific Economic Statistics Week.
3	World Press Freedom Day.
5	Europe Day (Council of Europe).
	Hand Hygiene Day.
	International Day of the Midwife.
6	World Asthma Day.
6–12	UN Global Road Safety Week.
7–14	Global Week of Action Against Gun Violence (International Action Network on Small Arms).
8	World Red Cross Red Crescent Day (ICRC).
8–9	Time of Remembrance and Reconciliation for Those Who Lost Their Lives During the Second World War.
(2nd Sat.)	World Migratory Bird Day (observed twice a year, in May and Oct.).
10	International Day of Argania.
12	World Trade Fair Day.
15	International Day of Families.
16	International Day of Light.
	International Day of Living Together in Peace.
17	International Day against Homophobia, Transphobia and Biphobia.
	World Telecommunication and Information Society Day.
18	International Museum Day (ICOM).
20	World Bee Day.

21	International Tea Day (FAO).
	World Day for Cultural Diversity for Dialogue and Development.
22	International Day for Biological Diversity.
23	International Day to End Obstetric Fistula.
25	Africa Day (AU).
	International Missing Children's Day.
25–31	Week of Solidarity with the Peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories.
26 (in 2021; full moon, day varies)	Day of Vesak.
27	Multiple Sclerosis Day.
29	International Day of UN Peacekeepers.
31	World No Tobacco Day.

June

1	Global Day of Parents.
3	World Bicycle Day.
4	International Day of Innocent Children Victims of Aggression.
5	International Day for the Fight Against Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing.
	World Environment Day.
6	UN Russian Language Day.
7	UN Volunteers Family Day.
	World Food Safety Day.
8	World Anti-Counterfeiting Day.
	World Oceans Day.
9	Coral Triangle Day.
12	World Day against Child Labour.
13	International Albinism Awareness Day.
14	World Blood Donor Day.
15	ASEAN Dengue Day.
	World Elder Abuse Awareness Day.
16	Day of the African Child (AU).
	International Day of Family Remittances.
18	Sustainable Gastronomy Day.
17	World Day to Combat Desertification and Drought.
19	International Day for the Elimination of Sexual Violence in Conflict.
	Sickle-cell Anaemia Awareness Day.
	World Albatross Day.
20	Africa Refugee Day (AU).
	World Refugee Day.
21	International Day of the Celebration of the Solstice.
	International Day of Yoga.
23	International Widows' Day.
	UN Public Service Day.
	Olympic Day (International Olympic Committee).
25	BSEC Day.
	Day of the Seafarer.
	World Vitiligo Day.
26	International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking.
	UN International Day in Support of Victims of Torture.
27	International Day for Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises.
29	International Day of the Tropics.
30	International Asteroid Day.

July

(1st Sat.)	International Day of Cooperatives.
11	World Population Day.
15	World Youth Skills Day.
17	International Criminal Justice Day (International Criminal Court).
18	Nelson Mandela International Day.
20	World Chess Day.
25	African Day of Seas and Oceans (AU).
	World Drowning Prevention Day.
26	International Day for the Conservation of the Mangrove Ecosystem.
28	World Hepatitis Day.
30	International Day of Friendship.
	World Day against Trafficking in Persons.

August

1–7	World Breastfeeding Week.
2	Roma and Sinti Genocide Remembrance Day (Council of Europe).
9	International Day of the World's Indigenous Peoples.
10	Africa Day of Decentralization and Local Development (AU).
12	International Youth Day.
17	SADC Day (Southern African Development Community).
19	World Humanitarian Day.
21	International Day of Remembrance of, and Tribute to, the Victims of Terrorism.
(3rd week)	APEC Food Security Week.
23	International Day for the Remembrance of the Slave Trade and its Abolition.
29	International Day against Nuclear Tests.
30	International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearance.

September

5	International Day of Charity.
7	International Day of Clean Air for Blue Skies.
8	International Literacy Day.
9	African Union Day.
	International Day to Protect Education from Attacks.
10	World Suicide Prevention Day.
12	UN Day for South-South Cooperation.
15	International Day of Democracy.
16	International Day for the Preservation of the Ozone Layer ('International Ozone Day').
17	World Patient Safety Day.
18	International Equal Pay Day.
21	International Day of Peace.
23	International Day of Sign Languages.
25	Pan-African Women's Day.
26	European Day of Languages (Council of Europe).
	International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.
27	World Tourism Day.
28	International Day for Universal Access to Information.
	World Rabies Day.
29	International Day of Awareness of Food Loss and Waste (FAO, UNEP).
	World Heart Day (World Heart Federation, WHO).
30	International Translation Day.
	World Maritime Day.

October

(1st week)	Africa Engineering Week.
1	International Day of Older Persons.
	International Music Day (International Music Council).
2	International Day of Non-Violence.
3	International Action Day (WFTU).
4–10	World Space Week.
5	Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia Day.
	World Teachers' Day.
7	International Walk to School Day.
	World Day for Decent Work (International Confederation of Trade Unions).
(1st Mon.)	World Habitat Day.
(2nd Wed.)	International Day for Natural Disaster Reduction.
(2nd Sat.)	World Migratory Bird Day.
(2nd week)	European Week Against Pain (EU).
9	World Post Day.
9–12	ESCAP Disaster Resilience Week.
10	World Day against the Death Penalty.
	World Mental Health Day.
	World Standards Day (International Organization for Standardization).
11	Global Day Against Pain (International Association for the Study of Pain, WHO).
	International Day of the Girl Child.

13	International Day for Disaster Reduction.
	World Sight Day.
15	Caribbean Statistics Day (CARICOM).
	Global Handwashing Day (Global Public-Private Partnership for Handwashing with Soap).
	World Rural Women's Day.
(3rd week)	European Local Democracy Week (Council of Europe).
	European Week for Safety and Health at Work (EU).
16	World Food Day.
17	International Day for the Eradication of Poverty.
20	World Statistics Day.
21	African Human Rights Day (AU).
	World Values Day.
21–27	International Lead Poisoning Prevention Week.
22	European Day for Organ Donation & Transplantation (Council of Europe).
24	United Nations Day.
	World Development Information Day.
	World Polio Day.
24–30	Disarmament Week.
24–31	Global Media and Information Literacy Week.
27	World Day for Audiovisual Heritage.
29	Cybersecurity Awareness Day (APEC).
30	Africa Day for Food and Nutrition Security (AU).
31	World Cities Day.
	International Black Sea Day (BSEC).

November

(1st week)	Youth Work Week (Commonwealth).
1	African Youth Day (AU).
2	International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists.
3	International Day for Biosphere Reserves.
5	Smog Day.
	World Tsunami Awareness Day.
6	International Day for Preventing the Exploitation of the Environment in War and Armed Conflict.
(2nd week)	CARICOM Energy Week.
	International Week of Science and Peace.
10	World Science Day for Peace and Development.
11	Climate Finance Day.
13–19	World Antibiotic Awareness Week (WHO).
14	World Diabetes Day (International Diabetes Federation and WHO).
16	International Day for Tolerance.
	World Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease Day.
17	World Prematurity Day.
18	African Road Safety Day (AU, ECA, WHO).
	African Statistics Day.
	European Day on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (Council of Europe).
18–24	World Antibiotic Awareness Week.
19	World Toilet Day.
(3rd Thurs.)	World Philosophy Day.
(3rd Sun.)	World Day of Remembrance for Road Traffic Victims.
20	Africa Industrialization Day (AU).
	Universal Children's Day.
21	World Television Day.
22	World Humanitarian Day.
25	International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women.
26	World Olive Tree Day.
28	ECO Day (Economic Cooperation Organization).
29	International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People.
30	Day of Remembrance for all Victims of Chemical Warfare.

December

1	Antarctica Day.
	World Aids Day.
2	International Day for the Abolition of Slavery.
3	International Day of Persons with Disabilities.
	European Day of Disabled People (EU).
4	International Day of Banks.
5	International Volunteer Day for Economic and Social Development.
	World Soil Day.
7	International Civil Aviation Day.
8	SAARC Day (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation).
9	International Anti-corruption Day.
	International Day of Commemoration and Dignity of the Victims of the Crime of Genocide.
10	Human Rights Day.
11	World Asthma Day (Global Initiative for Asthma).
	International Mountain Day.
12	International Day of Neutrality.
	Universal Health Coverage Day.
(2nd Sun.)	International Children's Day of Broadcasting.
18	International Migrants' Day.
	UN Arabic Language Day.
19	International Human Solidarity Day.
27	International Day of Epidemic Preparedness.

Years

2021	AU Year of the Arts, Culture and Heritage.
	International Year for the Elimination of Child Labour.
	International Year of Creative Economy for Sustainable Development.
	International Year of Fruits and Vegetables.
	International Year of Peace and Trust.
	Year of Architecture and Urban Planning in the Commonwealth of Independent States.
2022	International Year of Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture.
2023	International Year of Millets.
2024	International Year of Camelids.

Decades

2013–22	Asian and Pacific Decade of Persons with Disabilities.
2014–24	UN Decade of Sustainable Energy for All.
	Madiba Nelson Mandela Decade of Reconciliation in Africa (AU).
2015–24	International Decade for People of African Descent.
2015–25	Decade of African Seas and Oceans (AU).
2016–25	Third Industrial Development Decade for Africa.
	UN Decade of Action on Nutrition.
2018–27	Third UN Decade for the Eradication of Poverty.
2018–28	International Decade for Action on Water for Sustainable Development.
2019–28	UN Decade of Family Farming.
2020–30	AU Decade of Women's Financial and Economic Inclusion.
2021–30	Decade of Action To Deliver the SDGs.
	Fourth International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism.
	International Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development.
	UN Decade of Healthy Aging.
	UN Decade on Ecosystem Restoration.
2022–32	International Decade of Indigenous Languages.

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PART TWO

The United Nations

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UNITED NATIONS

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Telephone: (212) 963-1234; **fax:** (212) 963-4879; **internet:** www.un.org.

The United Nations (UN) was founded in 1945 to maintain international peace and security and to develop international co-operation in addressing economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems.

The 'United Nations' was a name devised by President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the USA. It was first used in the Declaration by United Nations of 1 January 1942, when representatives of 26 nations pledged their governments to continue fighting together against the Axis powers.

The UN Charter was drawn up by the representatives of 50 countries at the UN Conference on International Organization, which met in San Francisco, USA, from 25 April to 26 June 1945. The representatives deliberated on the basis of proposals put forward by representatives of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the United Kingdom and the USA at Dumbarton Oaks in August–October 1944. The Charter was signed on 26 June 1945. Poland, not represented at the Conference, signed it at a later date but nevertheless became one of the original 51 members.

The UN officially came into existence on 24 October 1945, when the Charter had been ratified by China, France, the USSR, the UK and the USA, and by a majority of other signatories. United Nations Day is celebrated annually on 24 October.

The UN's chief administrative officer is the Secretary-General, elected for a five-year term by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. He acts in that capacity at all meetings of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council, and performs such other functions as are entrusted to him by those organs. He is required to submit an annual report to the General Assembly and may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which, in his opinion, may threaten international peace.

Secretary-General: António Manuel de Oliveira Guterres (Portugal) (2017–26).

Membership

MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
(with assessments for percentage contributions to the UN budget in 2021, and year of admission)

Afghanistan	0.007	1946
Albania	0.008	1955
Algeria	0.138	1962
Andorra	0.005	1993
Angola	0.010	1976
Antigua and Barbuda	0.002	1981
Argentina	0.915	1945
Armenia	0.007	1992
Australia	2.210	1945
Austria	0.677	1955
Azerbaijan	0.049	1992
Bahamas	0.018	1973
Bahrain	0.050	1971
Bangladesh	0.010	1974
Barbados	0.007	1966
Belarus[1]	0.049	1945
Belgium	0.821	1945
Belize	0.001	1981
Benin	0.003	1960
Bhutan	0.001	1971
Bolivia	0.016	1945
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.012	1992
Botswana	0.014	1966
Brazil	2.948	1945
Brunei Darussalam	0.025	1984
Bulgaria	0.046	1955
Burkina Faso	0.003	1960
Burundi	0.001	1962
Cabo Verde	0.001	1975
Cambodia	0.006	1955
Cameroon	0.013	1960
Canada	2.734	1945
Central African Republic	0.001	1960
Chad	0.004	1960
Chile	0.407	1945
China, People's Republic	12.005	1945
Colombia	0.288	1945
Comoros	0.001	1975
Congo, Democratic Republic	0.010	1960
Congo, Republic	0.006	1960
Costa Rica	0.062	1945
Côte d'Ivoire	0.013	1960
Croatia	0.077	1992
Cuba	0.080	1945
Cyprus	0.036	1960
Czech Republic[2]	0.311	1993
Denmark	0.554	1945
Djibouti	0.001	1977
Dominica	0.001	1978
Dominican Republic	0.053	1945
Ecuador	0.080	1945
Egypt	0.186	1945
El Salvador	0.012	1945
Equatorial Guinea	0.016	1968
Eritrea	0.001	1993
Estonia	0.039	1991
Eswatini[3]	0.002	1968
Ethiopia	0.010	1945
Fiji	0.003	1970
Finland	0.421	1955
France	4.427	1945
Gabon	0.015	1960
The Gambia	0.001	1965
Georgia	0.008	1992
Germany	6.090	1973
Ghana	0.015	1957
Greece	0.366	1945
Grenada	0.001	1974
Guatemala	0.036	1945
Guinea	0.003	1958
Guinea-Bissau	0.001	1974
Guyana	0.002	1966
Haiti	0.003	1945
Honduras	0.009	1945
Hungary	0.206	1955
Iceland	0.028	1946
India	0.834	1945
Indonesia	0.543	1950
Iran	0.398	1945
Iraq	0.129	1945
Ireland	0.371	1955
Israel	0.490	1949
Italy	3.307	1955
Jamaica	0.008	1962
Japan	8.564	1956
Jordan	0.021	1955
Kazakhstan	0.178	1992
Kenya	0.024	1963
Kiribati	0.001	1999
Korea, Democratic People's Republic	0.006	1991
Korea, Republic	2.267	1991
Kuwait	0.252	1963
Kyrgyzstan	0.002	1992
Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.005	1955
Latvia	0.047	1991
Lebanon	0.047	1945
Lesotho	0.001	1966
Liberia	0.001	1945
Libya	0.030	1955

Liechtenstein	0.009	1990
Lithuania	0.071	1991
Luxembourg	0.067	1945
Madagascar	0.004	1960
Malawi	0.002	1964
Malaysia	0.341	1957
Maldives	0.004	1965
Mali	0.004	1960
Malta	0.017	1964
Marshall Islands	0.001	1991
Mauritania	0.002	1961
Mauritius	0.011	1968
Mexico	1.292	1945
Micronesia, Federated States	0.001	1991
Moldova	0.003	1992
Monaco	0.011	1993
Mongolia	0.005	1961
Montenegro[4]	0.004	2006
Morocco	0.055	1956
Mozambique	0.004	1975
Myanmar	0.010	1948
Namibia	0.009	1990
Nauru	0.001	1999
Nepal	0.007	1955
Netherlands	1.356	1945
New Zealand	0.291	1945
Nicaragua	0.005	1945
Niger	0.002	1960
Nigeria	0.250	1960
North Macedonia[5]	0.007	1993
Norway	0.754	1945
Oman	0.115	1971
Pakistan	0.115	1947
Palau	0.001	1994
Panama	0.045	1945
Papua New Guinea	0.010	1975
Paraguay	0.016	1945
Peru	0.152	1945
Philippines	0.205	1945
Poland	0.802	1945
Portugal	0.350	1955
Qatar	0.282	1971
Romania	0.198	1955
Russian Federation[6]	2.405	1945
Rwanda	0.003	1962
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0.001	1983
Saint Lucia	0.001	1979
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0.001	1980
Samoa	0.001	1976
San Marino	0.002	1992
São Tomé and Príncipe	0.001	1975
Saudi Arabia	1.172	1945
Senegal	0.007	1960
Serbia[4]	0.028	2000
Seychelles	0.002	1976
Sierra Leone	0.001	1961
Singapore	0.485	1965
Slovakia[2]	0.153	1993
Slovenia	0.076	1992
Solomon Islands	0.001	1978
Somalia	0.001	1960
South Africa	0.272	1945
South Sudan[7]	0.006	2011
Spain	2.146	1955
Sri Lanka	0.044	1955
Sudan	0.010	1956
Suriname	0.005	1975
Sweden	0.906	1946
Switzerland	1.151	2002
Syrian Arab Republic	0.011	1945
Tajikistan	0.004	1992
Tanzania	0.010	1961
Thailand	0.307	1946
Timor-Leste	0.002	2002
Togo	0.002	1960
Tonga	0.001	1999
Trinidad and Tobago	0.040	1962
Tunisia	0.025	1956
Turkey	1.371	1945
Turkmenistan	0.033	1992
Tuvalu	0.001	2000
Uganda	0.008	1962
Ukraine[1]	0.057	1945
United Arab Emirates	0.616	1971
United Kingdom	4.567	1945
USA	22.000	1945
Uruguay	0.087	1945
Uzbekistan	0.032	1992
Vanuatu	0.001	1981
Venezuela	0.728	1945
Viet Nam	0.077	1977
Yemen[8]	0.010	1947/67
Zambia	0.009	1964
Zimbabwe	0.005	1980

Total Membership: 193

[1] Until December 1991 both Belarus and Ukraine were integral parts of the USSR and not independent countries, but had separate UN membership.

[2] Czechoslovakia, which had been a member of the UN since 1945, ceased to exist as a single state on 31 December 1992. In January 1993, as Czechoslovakia's legal successors, the Czech Republic and Slovakia were granted UN membership, and seats on subsidiary bodies that had previously been held by Czechoslovakia were divided between the two successor states.

[3] Eswatini was known as Swaziland until April 2018.

[4] Montenegro was admitted as a member of the UN on 28 June 2006, following its declaration of independence on 3 June; Serbia retained the seat formerly held by Serbia and Montenegro.

[5] In February 2019, following parliamentary approval in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia (FYRM, admitted to the UN in 1993) and Greece of a UN-mediated bilateral agreement reached in June 2018 to resolve a longstanding naming dispute, the FYRM was renamed as the Republic of North Macedonia.

[6] The Russian Federation assumed the USSR's seat in the General Assembly and its permanent seat on the Security Council in December 1991, following the USSR's dissolution.

[7] South Sudan was admitted to the UN on 14 July 2011, having achieved independence on 9 July.

[8] The Yemen Arab Republic (admitted to the UN as Yemen in 1947) and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (admitted as Southern Yemen in 1967) merged to form the Republic of Yemen in May 1990.

SOVEREIGN STATES NOT IN THE UNITED NATIONS

(June 2021)

Palestine Taiwan (Republic of China) Vatican City (Holy See)

Note: Palestine and Vatican City have non-member observer state status at the UN, granted in 2012 and 1964, respectively.

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(June 2021)

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Senegal: Parcelle N°20, route du King Fahd, Almadies, Dakar; tel. 33-869-99-11; fax 33-820-30-46; e-mail unic.dakar@unic.org; internet dakar.sites.unicnetwork.org; also covers Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania.

South Africa: Metro Park Bldg, 351 Francis Baard St, POB 12677, Pretoria 0126; tel. (12) 354-8507; fax (12) 354-8501; e-mail unic.pretoria@unic.org; internet unicpretoria.org.za.

Sri Lanka: POB 1505, 202–204 Bauddhaloka Mawatha, Colombo 7; tel. (11) 2580691; fax (11) 2581116; e-mail unic.colombo@unic.org; internet lk.one.un.org.

Sudan: POB 1992, UN Compound, House No. 7, Blk 5, Gamma'a Ave, Khartoum; tel. (187) 121404; fax (183) 773772; e-mail unic.sd@undp.org; internet sudan.un.org; also covers Somalia.

Switzerland: Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10; tel. 229171234; fax 229170030; e-mail press_geneva@un.org; internet www.ungeneva.org.

Tanzania: POB 9224, 182 Mzinga Way, Oysterbay, Dar es Salaam; tel. (22) 2199200; e-mail unic.daressalaam@unic.org; internet tanzania.un.org.

Togo: 468 angle rue Atimé et ave de la Libération, BP 911, Lomé; tel. 221-23-06; fax 221-11-65; e-mail unic.lome@unic.org; internet togo.un.org; also covers Benin.

Trinidad and Tobago: Bretton Hall, 2nd Floor, 16 Victoria Ave, Port of Spain; tel. 623-4813; fax 623-4332; e-mail unic.portofspain@unic.org; internet caribbeanun.org; also covers Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, the Netherlands Antilles, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname.

Tunisia: BP 863, Immeuble le Prestige Business Center, rue du Lac Windermere, Tour A, Les Berges du Lac 1053, Tunis; tel. (36) 011-680; fax (71) 900-668; e-mail unic.tunis@unic.org; internet unictunis.org.tn.

Turkey: Yildiz Kule, Turan Güneş Bul. 106, 06550 Cankaya, Ankara; tel. (312) 4541052; fax (312) 4961499; e-mail unic.ankara@unic.org; internet turkey.un.org.

Ukraine: 01021 Kyiv, Klovsky uzviz, 1; tel. (44) 253-93-63; e-mail un.ua@one.un.org; internet ukraine.un.org.

USA: 1775 K St, NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20006; tel. (202) 331-8670; fax (202) 331-9191; e-mail unicdc@unic.org; internet www.unicwash.org.

Uzbekistan: 100015 Tashkent, 4 T. Shevchenko St; tel. (71) 120-34-50; fax (71) 120-34-85; e-mail uno.tashkent@unic.org; internet www.un.uz.

Western Europe: Residence Palace, Bloc C2, Level 7, 155 rue de la Loi/Wetstraat, 1040 Brussels, Belgium; tel. (2) 788-84-84; fax (2) 788-84-85; e-mail info@unric.org; internet www.unric.org; serves Andorra, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom; also provides liaison with the institutions of the European Union.

Yemen: POB 237; Hadda Post Office Area, Sana'a; tel. (1) 410568; fax (1) 412251; e-mail unic.yemen@unic.org; internet yemen.un.org.

Zambia: POB 32905, Revenue House, Ground Floor, Kalambo Rd, Lusaka; tel. (21) 1228487; fax (21) 1222958; e-mail unic.lusaka@unic.org; internet lusaka.sites.unicnetwork.org.

Zimbabwe: POB 4408, Sanders House, 2nd Floor, First St/Jason Moyo Ave, Harare; tel. (4) 777060; fax (4) 750476; e-mail unic.harare@unic.org; internet zimbabwe.un.org.

Conferences

Global conferences are convened regularly by the UN. Special sessions of the General Assembly assess progress achieved in the implementation of conference action plans. Numerous conferences and other meetings originally planned for 2020 were cancelled or rescheduled owing to the COVID-19 emergency; others were convened in a videoconference format. Major global conferences that had originally been scheduled for 2020 included: the Second UN Ocean Conference: to be hosted jointly by Portugal and Kenya, in Lisbon, Portugal—it was envisaged that this would take place in 2022—and the Beijing+25 World Conference on Women: opening statements were made and a draft political declaration was adopted on 9 March 2020, following which the session was suspended until further notice. A UN Food Systems Summit was to be convened in late 2021. The following events were also scheduled for 2021:

Fifth Global Meeting of the Indigenous Peoples' Forum at IFAD (Feb.: online);

UN General Assembly Special Session Against Corruption (June: New York, USA);

World Cities Summit 2021 (June: online, hosted by Singapore);

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 10th Review Conference (Aug.: New York);

UN General Assembly Special Session on the Transformation of Pandemic Preparedness and Response;

UN High-level Dialogue on Energy (Sept.: New York);

UN Biodiversity Conference, 15th Conference of the Parties (COP) (Oct.: Kunming, People's Republic of China);

UN World Data Forum (Oct.: Bern, Switzerland);

UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 26th COP (Nov.: Glasgow, Scotland, UK);

Nutrition for Growth Summit (Dec.: Tokyo, Japan).

System-wide Coherence

The Senior Management Group, a committee of senior UN personnel established in 1997, acts as the Secretary-General's cabinet and as the central policy-planning body of the UN. The 31-member UN System Chief Executives Board for Co-ordination (CEB) convenes at least twice a year under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General to co-ordinate UN system-wide policies, activities and management issues. The UN Sustainable Development Group (UNSDG, known until 2018 as the UN Development Group)—which unites the heads of some 34 UN agencies—was brought into the CEB structure from April 2008. It serves as a high-level forum for joint policy formation and oversees the implementation of development activities. Inter-agency mechanisms, including UN-Energy, UN-Nutrition, UN-Oceans, UN-Water, the Working Group on Climate Change, and the UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries, facilitate UN system-wide inter-agency co-operation and coherence. In August 2017 an independent panel that had been tasked by the UN Secretary-General in April with enhancing the effectiveness of UN-Habitat proposed the establishment of a new inter-agency co-ordinating mechanism, 'UN Urban', that would complement the work of UN-Habitat. Project management services are provided throughout the UN system of entities and organizations, as well as to certain bilateral donors, international financial institutions and governments, by the UN Office for Project Services. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), comprising the executive heads of 18 UN agencies (the 'IASC Principals'), co-ordinates and administers the international response to complex and major humanitarian disasters, and the development of relevant policies (see OCHA). A UN Environment Management Group convenes the entire UN System to advance system-wide coherence and effectiveness on environmental issues. An inter-agency UN Privacy Policy Group has developed a series of Principles on Personal Data Protection and Privacy.

INTER-AGENCY BODIES AND PROGRAMMES

UN-Nutrition: internet www.unnutrition.org; f. 2021, through the merger of the previous UN Network for the Scaling up Nutrition Movement and UN System Standing Committee on Nutrition, to co-ordinate and collaborate on advancing nutrition and eliminating hunger, undernutrition and obesity; aims to identify strategic issues related to nutrition; align policy coherence and advocacy for nutrition; act as a platform for innovation and knowledge management; and to help translate global guidance into country-level actions; serves as the UN network for the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement; Steering Cttee comprises FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO; Chair. Dr NAOKO YAMAMOTO (Japan).

UN-Energy: UN Energy Secretariat, c/o UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Two United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017, USA; internet www.un-energy.org; f. 2002; established following the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, as a mechanism to promote coherence among UN agencies in energy matters, and to develop increased collective engagement between UN agencies and key external stakeholders; supports the implementation of UN SDG 7 (Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all); the UN Dept of Economic and Social Affairs provides secretariat services to UN-Energy.

UN-Oceans: c/o Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, Rm DC2-0450, Two United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017, USA; tel. (212) 963-3962; e-mail doalos@un.org; internet www.unoceans.org; f. 2003 as an inter-agency mechanism aimed at enhancing the co-ordination and effectiveness of relevant UN bodies and the International Seabed Authority, in conformity with relevant competences, mandates and priorities and with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); UN-Oceans' activities are mandated by General Assembly Resolution 68/70 (2013) and by successive short-term work programmes; establishes ad hoc assignments to facilitate co-ordination with respect to specific issues; has developed an 'Inventory of mandates and priorities' with a view to identifying and developing further areas of collaboration; it was envisaged that a High-Level UN Conference to Support the Implementation of SDG 14 (Second UN Ocean Conference) (originally scheduled for mid-2020) would be convened in Lisbon, Portugal, during 2022.

UN-Water: UN-Water Secretariat, Rm 2250, c/o UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Two United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017, USA; fax (212) 963-4340; e-mail unwater@un.org; internet www.unwater.org; f. 2003 to foster greater co-operation and information sharing among UN agencies and other partners on water-related issues, with a focus on all aspects of freshwater and sanitation, including surface and groundwater resources, the interface between freshwater and seawater, and water-related disasters; appoints task forces, including on transboundary waters, and climate change and water; in Jan. 2016 the UN Secretary-General appointed a UN High-level Panel on Water to mobilize support for SDG 6: Ensure access to water and sanitation for all; UN-Water issues the biennial *UN-Water Global Analysis and Assessment of Sanitation and Drinking-Water* addressing global water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) provision, and the annual *World Water Development Report*; the 2020 edition of the latter report, published in March, focused on mitigation of and adaptation and improved resilience to the impacts of climate change; specific agencies host activities and programmes on behalf of UN-Water, which is not itself an implementing body; Exec. Head GILBERT F. HOUNGBO (Togo) (Pres. of IFAD).

United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD): UN-REDD Inter-agency Secretariat, International Environment House, 11–13 chemin des Anémones, 1219 Châtelaine, Geneva, Switzerland; tel. 229178946; e-mail un-redd@un-redd.org; internet www.un-redd.org; f. 2008 to support developing countries in preparing and implementing national REDD+ strategies, involving—within the framework of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change—investment in low-carbon routes to sustainable devt, reversal of deforestation and the promotion of conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks; provides assistance to 65 developing partner countries in Africa, Asia, the Pacific, and Latin America; extends support to national programme activities aimed at developing and implementing REDD+ strategies in 16 of the partner countries, having (by Feb. 2021) approved funding totalling more than US $330m. in this respect, channelled through a Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF); by early 2021 UN-REDD had supported 40 countries in developing national forestry management systems; governed by a Policy Board comprising representatives from UNEP, UNDP and FAO and from partner countries, donors to the MPTF, civil society, and indigenous peoples.

United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR): 9–11 rue de Varembé, 1202, Geneva, Switzerland; tel. 229178907; fax 227339531; e-mail isdr@un.org; internet www.unisdr.org; operates as the secretariat of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), adopted by UN mem. states in 1999 as a strategic framework to achieve substantive reduction in disaster losses, and build resilient communities and

nations as the foundation for sustainable devt activities; UNDRR promotes information sharing to reduce disaster risk, and serves as the focal point providing guidance for the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction—covering 2015–30, and adopted by the Third World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, held in March 2015, in Sendai City, Japan, under the auspices of the Office—which pursues measurable outcomes in reducing natural disaster-related fatalities and injuries, and social and economic impacts; in 2018 the ISDR adopted a Sendai Framework Monitor, which aimed to track progress in implementing the Sendai Framework in the context of 38 globally agreed indicators; organizes the (normally) biennial sessions of the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (6th session: May 2019, in Geneva); implements a 'Making Cities Resilient' campaign in response to increasing urbanization; supervises the compilation of the biennial *Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction*; has 5 regional offices, in Bangkok (covering Asia), Nairobi (for Africa), Brussels (Europe), Cairo (the Arab states), and Panama (the Americas and Caribbean); there are liaison offices, at the UN Headquarters in New York, USA, and in Bonn, Germany; and field presences in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Kobe, Japan; Suva, Fiji; Incheon, Rep. of Korea; and Almatı, Kazakhstan; Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction MAMI MIZUTORI (Japan).

United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS): Marmorvej 51, POB 2695, 2100 Copenhagen, Denmark; tel. 45-33-75-00; internet www.unops.org; f. 1973 as a branch of UNDP; from 1 Jan. 1995, in accordance with a decision of the UN General Assembly, UNOPS became a distinct and self-financing (but non-profit-making) entity within the UN development system; supports the implementation of projects by UN agencies and other partners through the extension of specialized technical advice and the provision of management support services—in areas such as procurement, project management, financial management, human resources, and infrastructure and logistics; at Feb. 2021 UNOPS was supporting 1,197 country and multi-country projects in the focal areas of conflict resolution, peace and security; government and civil society; emergency relief and recovery; health; livelihoods; education; transport and construction; renewable energy; and water and sanitation; Exec. Dir GRETE FAREMO (Norway).

United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Co-ordination (CEB): CEB Secretariat (Geneva), Rm C551, UN Geneva Office, Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland; tel. 2291071234; fax 229170123; CEB Secretariat (New York), United Nations, New York, NY 10017, USA; tel. (212) 963-1234; fax (212) 963-4879; internet www.unsceb.org; f. 1946 as the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination, present name adopted in 2001; meets at least twice a year under the chairmanship of the UN Secretary-General to co-ordinate UN system-wide policies, management issues and activities; supported by the High-Level Committee on Programmes (HLCP—with a policy focus), the High-Level Committee on Management (HLCM—which addresses co-ordination of activities), and the UNSDG; collects financial, procurement and human resources statistics from member organizations; thematic areas of interest in 2021 included attracting and retaining a highly skilled international civil service; fostering the safety, security and well-being of UN staff; peace and conflict prevention; risk management and resilience building; ensuring the quality, accessibility and reliability of disaggregated data; and working with multi-stakeholder and multi-sectoral partnerships to mobilize expertise, technologies and financial resources in support of the SDGs; mems: heads of 31 UN system orgs: the UN as represented by the UN Sec.-Gen. (who chairs the Board), 15 specialized agencies (autonomous orgs working with the UN and each other, co-ordinated by ECOSOC at intergovernmental level, and through the CEB at the inter-secretariat level), 12 UN funds and programmes, and 3 related orgs (IAEA, the WTO, and UNOPS); Dir SIMONA PETROVA.

United Nations Working Group on Climate Change: f. 2007; co-ordinates system-wide coherent action on climate change and participation in UN climate conferences; initiatives established under the Group's auspices include: UN-REDD; the Global Framework for Climate Services (co-ordinated by WMO); and Climate Smart Agriculture (FAO).

Finance

UN member states pay mandatory assessed contributions towards the regular budget, towards peacekeeping operations, to international tribunals, and to the Capital Master Plan (which manages renovation works at UN headquarters in New York, USA). Ability to pay assessed contributions to the regular budget is determined by a 10-year average of national gross domestic product figures, adjusted to take into account high levels of foreign debt or very low per caput income (the minimum assessment is 0.001% of the budget). From 2001 the upper level of contributions to the UN's regular budget was capped at 22.0%. In accordance with a new scale of assessments calculation that was adopted in December 2018, the three largest contributors to the regular budget in 2021 were the USA (22.0%), the People's Republic of China (12.0%), and Japan (8.6%). The Holy See and Palestine (non-member states that participate in UN activities) also pay annual contributions, with assessments in 2021 of 0.001% and 0.008%, respectively.

In December 2016 the General Assembly endorsed a proposal to transform, on a trial basis from 2020, the UN planning and budget cycle from a biennial to an annual time period. A final decision on the viability of the new yearly budget was to be made by the 77th session of the Assembly, which was to commence in September 2022. The regular programme budget for 2021, totalling US $3,208m., was approved by the UN General Assembly in December 2020. A longstanding pattern of budget deficits has become critical in recent years. By 7 June 2021 105 countries had paid their full 2021 assessments.

In 1997 a US business executive, Ted Turner, announced a donation of US $1,000m. to finance UN humanitarian and environmental causes until 2014 (later extended to 2024). Paid in instalments from 1997, the donation was administered through Turner's 'UN Foundation'. The Foundation, which is also sustained by resources from other donors (with total resources since its inception having exceeded $2,000m. by 2021), supports the UN through advocacy, grant-making, and the implementation of public-private partnerships. In December 1997 a UN Development Account was established to finance capacity development projects, and in July 2005 a UN Democracy Fund was created to support democratic institutions, participation in the democratic process, and human rights. A UN Office for Partnerships was established in 2006 to co-ordinate the UN Fund for International Partnerships and the UN Democracy Fund.

PROGRAMME BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS
(US $'000)

	2021
Overall policymaking, direction and co-ordination	419,788.6
Political affairs	865,253.8
International justice and law	88,433.3
International co-operation for development	262,008.5
Regional co-operation for development	324,843.6
Human rights and humanitarian affairs	224,785.8
Global communications	99,066.1
Common support services	305,063.5
Internal oversight	20,789.8
Jointly financed activities and special expenses	86,979.3
Capital expenditures	84,308.8
Safety and security	130,206.9
Development Account	15,199.4
Staff Assessment	281,352.7
Total	3,208 080.1

United Nations Publications

Demographic Yearbook.

Index to Proceedings (of the General Assembly; the Security Council; the Economic and Social Council; the Trusteeship Council).

Monthly Bulletin of Statistics.
Population and Vital Statistics Report (annually).
Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization (annually).
Statement of Treaties and International Agreements (monthly).
Statistical Yearbook.
UN Chronicle (online magazine).
World Economic and Social Survey (annually).
World Economic Situation and Prospects (annually).
World Statistics Pocketbook.

Other UN publications are listed in the chapters dealing with the agencies concerned.

Secretariat

The Secretary-General is the chief administrative officer of the UN. In December 2007 the post of Deputy Secretary-General was created to assist in the management of Secretariat operations, and represent the Secretary-General as required. The chief administrative staff of the UN Regional Commissions and of all the subsidiary organs of the UN are also members of the Secretariat staff and are listed in the appropriate chapters. The Secretariat staff also includes high-level envoys and special appointments. At 31 December 2019 the Secretariat had 36,574 staff members. Its working languages are English and French.

The Secretary-General chairs the Senior Management Group, a committee of senior UN personnel that acts as a cabinet and as the central policy-planning body of the UN.

In September 2015 a UN Summit to Adopt the Post-2015 Development Agenda, held at UN headquarters, endorsed the so-called 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which had been agreed in August by UN member states, and incorporated 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), reinforced by some 169 specific targets and indicators (see UNDP for further details), to be pursued over the period 2016–30. In January 2016 the UN Secretary-General appointed several political leaders and prominent figures from international agencies, business, and the sports and the arts worlds, to promote the SDGs as 'eminent advocates'.

In June 2017 the General Assembly approved the establishment of a UN Office of Counter-Terrorism, to function under the direction of an Under-Secretary-General. In August, as a means of advancing diplomatic efforts in pursuit of peace, the Secretary-General inaugurated an 18-member High-Level Advisory Board on Mediation, comprising former and current global leaders, senior officials and experts.

In June 2017 the Secretary-General issued a report that detailed a series of proposals aimed at realigning the UN development system to maximize the delivery of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In December he released a second report, which included a system-wide strategic document to underpin collective action for implementing the Agenda, as well as proposed improvements to the UN country team and Resident Coordinator system. In May 2018 a resolution on repositioning the UN development system was endorsed by a further resolution of the General Assembly. The reform process was overseen by a transition team, under the leadership of the Deputy Secretary-General.

Extensive reforms of the UN's peace and security architecture were also formulated in 2018, to enhance efficiencies and co-ordination across all elements of the peace continuum. New Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and of Peace Operations that were established on 1 January 2019 incorporated realigned responsibilities of the previous architecture. A single regional structure, headed by three Assistant Secretaries-General reporting to both new departments, aimed to enhance integrated political and operational activities. Management reforms, approved by the General Assembly in July 2018, included the establishment of new Departments of Operational Support and of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance.

On 23 March 2020 the Secretary-General issued a Global Ceasefire Call to support efforts in conflict zones to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. At the end of March he initiated a COVID-19 Response and Recovery Fund with a focus on low- and middle-income countries. In April the Secretary-General stated that the unprecedented impacts of the mounting global health, economic and social crisis could only be successfully confronted collectively through a massive co-ordinated global response. He issued a call to action: (i) to suppress transmission of the disease, under the guidance of the World Health Organization (he stressed that countries acting autonomously would be unable to achieve this); (ii) to confront the onwards devastating economic and social impacts of the crisis; and (iii) to recover better—i.e. to make more inclusive, sustainable, resilient economies and societies with powerful public health systems, social protections, public services and also gender equality. In late 2020, terming the continuing COVID-19 situation as simultaneously a human tragedy and a generational opportunity, the Secretary-General reiterated a call for a collective new deal involving a rebalancing of global governance and financial and trade systems, to be guided by standards of sustainability. In February 2021 he listed 10 priorities for that year: Respond to COVID-19; Start an inclusive and sustainable economic recovery; Make peace with nature; Tackle poverty and inequality; Reverse the assault on human rights; Gender equality, the greatest human rights challenge; Heal geopolitical rifts; Reverse the erosion of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime; Seize the opportunities of digital technologies while protecting against their growing dangers; and Launch a reset for the 21st century. In March the Secretary-General established a High-Level Task Force on Preventing Famine.

Secretary-General: António Manuel de Oliveira Guterres (Portugal) (1 January 2017–31 December 2026).

Deputy Secretary-General: Amina Mohammed (Nigeria).

OFFICES AND DEPARTMENTS OF THE SECRETARIAT

Executive Office of the Secretary-General

Under-Secretary-General, Chef de Cabinet: Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti (Brazil).

Spokesperson for the Secretary-General: Stéphane Dujarric de la Rivière (France).

Assistant Secretary-General for Strategic Co-ordination: Volker Türk (Austria).

Senior Adviser on Policy: Ana Maria Menéndez (Spain).

Special Adviser on Climate Action: Selwin Hart (Barbados).

Office of Internal Oversight Services

Under-Secretary-General: Fatoumata Ndiaye (Senegal).

Assistant Secretary-General: David Muchoki Kanja (Kenya).

Office of Legal Affairs

Under-Secretary-General, The Legal Counsel: Miguel de Serpa Soares (Portugal).

Assistant Secretary-General, Legal Affairs: Stephen Mathias (USA).

Includes a Codification Division; General Legal Division; Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea; an International Trade Law Division; and the UN Treaty Section.

Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs

Under-Secretary-General: Rosemary DiCarlo (USA).

Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support: Oscar Fernández-Taranco (Argentina).

Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs: TAYÉ-BROOK ZERIHOUN (Ethiopia).

Assistant Secretary-General for Africa: MARTHA AMA AKYAA POBEE (Ghana).

Assistant Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia and the Americas: MIROSLAV JENČA (Slovakia).

Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific: MOHAMED KHALED KHIARI (Tunisia).

Includes the Peacebuilding Support Office, the Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, divisions on Electoral Assistance, Policy and Mediation, Security Council Affairs, the Americas, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Middle East and West Asia, Palestinian Rights, as well as two divisions focused on Africa, and a Decolonization Unit.

Office for Disarmament Affairs

Under-Secretary-General, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs: IZUMI NAKAMITSU (Japan).

Department of Peace Operations

Under-Secretary-General: JEAN-PIERRE LACROIX (France).

Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions: ALEXANDER ZOUEV (Russia).

Military Adviser for Peacekeeping Operations: Lt-Gen. BIRAME DIOP (Senegal).

Police Adviser: LUIS CARRILHO (Portugal).

Department of Operational Support

Under-Secretary-General: ATUL KHARE (India).

Assistant Secretary-General for Support Operations: LISA M. BUTTENHEIM (USA).

Assistant Secretary-General for Supply Chain Management: CHRISTIAN SAUNDERS (UK).

Chief Information Technology Officer, Assistant Secretary-General: BERNARDO MARIANO, Jr (Mozambique).

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator: MARK LOWCOCK (UK) (outgoing), MARTIN GRIFFITHS (UK) (designate).

Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator a.i.: RAMESH RAJASINGHAM (Sri Lanka).

Office of Counter-Terrorism

Under-Secretary-General: VLADIMIR VORONKOV (Russia).

Deputy Under-Secretary-General: RAFFI GREGORIAN (USA).

Director: Dr JEHANGIR KHAN (Pakistan).

Department of Economic and Social Affairs

Under-Secretary-General: LIU ZHENMIN (People's Republic of China).

Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Development and Chief Economist: ELLIOT HARRIS (Trinidad and Tobago).

Assistant Secretary-General for Policy Co-ordination and Inter-Agency Affairs: MARIA-FRANCESCA SPATOLISANO (Italy).

Includes a Financing for Sustainable Development Office, Office for Intergovernmental Support and Co-ordination for Sustainable Development, the Secretariat of the UN Forum on Forests, and divisions on Inclusive Social Development, Statistics, the UN Sustainable Development Goals, Population, Economic Analysis and Policy, Public Institutions and Digital Government, and Capacity Development. Issues the annual *World Economic Situation and Prospects* (the 2021 edition, published in January, addressed the COVID-19 pandemic crisis).

Department of General Assembly and Conference Management

Under-Secretary-General (and Coordinator for Multilingualism): MOVSES ABELIAN (Armenia).

Assistant Secretary-General for General Assembly Affairs and Conference Management: CHERITH NORMAN CHALET (USA).

Includes a Protocol and Liaison Service, and divisions of Central Planning and Coordination, Documentation, General Assembly and ECOSOC Affairs, and Meetings and Publishing.

Department of Global Communications

Under-Secretary-General: MELISSA RUTH FLEMING (USA).

Department of Safety and Security

Under-Secretary-General: GILLES MICHAUD (Canada).

Assistant Secretary-General: NÓIRÍN O'SULLIVAN (Ireland).

Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance

Under-Secretary-General: CATHERINE POLLARD (Guyana).

Controller, Assistant Secretary-General for Programme Planning, Finance and Budget: CHANDRAMOULI RAMANATHAN (India).

Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resources Management: MARTHA HELENA LOPEZ (Colombia).

Assistant Secretary-General for Information and Communication Technology: PATRICK CAREY (acting).

Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States

Under-Secretary-General and High Representative: COURTENAY RATTRAY (Jamaica).

Office of the Special Adviser on Africa

Special Adviser on Africa: CHRISTINA LOPES DA SILVA MONTEIRO DUARTE (Cabo Verde).

Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect

Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide: ALICE WAIRIMU NDERITU (Kenya).

Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect: KAREN SMITH (South Africa).

Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict

Under-Secretary-General and Special Representative: VIRGINIA GAMBA DE POTGIETER (Argentina).

Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict

Under-Secretary-General and Special Representative: PRAMILA PATTEN (Mauritius).

Office of the Global Compact

Executive Director of the Global Compact: SANDA OJIAMBO (Kenya).

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland; tel. 229179000; fax 229179010; internet www.unhchr.ch.

High Commissioner: MICHELLE BACHELET JERIA (Chile).

Deputy High Commissioner: NADA AL-NASHIF (Jordan).

Assistant Secretary-General: ILZE BRANDS KEHRIS (Latvia).

Office on Drugs and Crime

Under-Secretary-General: GHADA FATHI WALY (Egypt).

UN Development Coordination Office

Assistant Secretary-General: ROBERT PIPER (Australia).

UN Office for Project Services

Executive Director: GRETE FAREMO (Norway).

UN Ombudsperson and Mediation Services

Assistant Secretary-General, UN Ombudsman: SHIREEN L. DODSON (USA).

Geneva Office

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland; tel. 2291071234; fax 229170123; internet www.unog.ch.

Director-General: TATIANA VALOVAYA (Russia).

Nairobi Office

POB 67578, Nairobi, Kenya; tel. (20) 7621234; internet www.unon.org.

Director-General: ZAINAB HAWA BANGURA (Sierra Leone).

Vienna Office

Vienna International Centre, POB 500, 1400 Vienna, Austria; tel. (1) 26060; fax (1) 263-3389; internet www.unvienna.org.

Director-General: GHADA FATHI WALY (Egypt).

OTHER SPECIAL HIGH LEVEL APPOINTMENTS OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL

Special Advisers

Special Adviser on Climate Change: ROBERT ORR (USA).

Special Adviser on Human Security: YUKIO TAKASU (Japan).

Special Adviser on Reforms: JENS WANDEL (Denmark).

Special Adviser on System-wide Implementation of Chief Executive Board Decisions: JAN BEAGLE (New Zealand).

Special Envoys

Envoy on Youth: JAYATHMA WICKRAMANAYAKE (Sri Lanka).

Special Envoy for Climate Action: MARK CARNEY (Canada).

Special Envoy for Climate Ambition and Solutions: MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG (USA).

Special Envoy for 2021 Food Systems Summit: AGNES KALIBATA (Rwanda).

Special Envoy for Global Education: GORDON BROWN (UK).

Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa: SPECIOSA WANDIRA-KASIBWE (Uganda).

Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in Asia and in the Pacific: PRASADA RAO JONNALAGADDA (India).

Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in the Caribbean Region: Dr EDWARD GREENE (Guyana).

Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: Dr MICHEL KAZATCHKINE (France).

Special Envoy for Road Safety: JEAN TODT (France).

Special Envoy for the Ocean: PETER THOMSON (Fiji).

Special Envoy for Youth Refugees and Sport: JACQUES ROGGE (Belgium).

Special Envoy on Disability and Accessibility: MARÍA SOLEDAD CISTERNAS REYES (Chile).

Special Envoy on Disaster Risk Reduction and Water: HAN SEUNG-SOO (Republic of Korea).

Special Envoy on Financing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: MAHMOUD MOHIELDIN (Egypt).

Special Envoy on Innovative Finance and Sustainable Investments: HIRO MIZUNO (Japan).

Special Envoy on South-South Co-operation: JORGE CHEDIEK (Argentina).

Special Envoy on Tuberculosis: ERIC GOOSBY (USA).

Special Envoy on Technology: FABRIZIO HOCHSCHILD DRUMMOND (Chile).

Special Envoy on Youth Employment: WERNER FAYMANN (Austria).

Special Representatives

Joint Special Representative for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela: EDUARDO STEIN (Guatemala).

Special Representative for International Migration: LOUISE ARBOUR (Canada).

Special Representative for the Implementation of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction: MAMI MIZUTORI (Japan).

Special Representative for Sustainable Energy for All: DAMILOLA OGUNBIYI (Nigeria).

Special Representative for the United Nations International School: JOAN W. MCDONALD (UK).

Other Special High Level Appointments

High Representative for the Alliance of Civilizations: MIGUEL ÁNGEL MORATINOS CUYAUBÉ (Spain).

Humanitarian Envoy: AHMET AL-MERAIKHI (Qatar).

Special Co-ordinator for Development in Sahel: ABDOULAYE MAR DIEYE (Sahel).

Special Co-ordinator on Improving the UN Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: JANE HOLL LUTE (USA).

Victims' Rights Advocate: JANE CONNORS (Australia).

Further Special Representatives and other high-level appointees of the UN Secretary-General are detailed under Peacekeeping, and Political Missions and Peacebuilding. The Secretary-General also appoints distinguished public figures as Messengers of Peace, as a means of focusing global attention on the UN's activities.

General Assembly

The General Assembly, established under the UN Charter as the main deliberative organ of the UN, first met on 10 January 1946. It is the only UN organ composed of representatives of all the member states. Each delegation consists of not more than five representatives and five alternates, with as many advisers as may be required. It has specific responsibility for electing the Secretary-General and members of other UN councils and organs, and for approving the UN budget and the assessments for financial contributions by member states. It may also make recommendations (but not binding decisions) on questions of international security and co-operation.

The President of the forthcoming session of the General Assembly is elected in June. The regular session of the General Assembly commences each year in mid-September. An ensuing two-week-long period of high-level events includes the Assembly's annual (normally) week-long General Debate, during which the head of each delegation makes a formal statement of their government's views on major world issues. Since 1997 the Secretary-General has presented his report on the work of the UN at the start of the General Debate. The Assembly then begins examination of the principal items on its agenda: it acts directly on some agenda items, but most business is handled by the six Main Committees, which study and debate each item and present draft resolutions to the Assembly. After a review of the report of each Main Committee, the Assembly formally approves or rejects the Committee's recommendations. On designated 'important questions', such as recommendations on international peace and security, the admission of new members to the UN, or budgetary questions, a two-thirds' majority is needed for adoption of a resolution. Other questions may be decided by a simple majority. In the Assembly, each member has one vote. In May 2021, owing to non-payment of arrears to the UN, the Central African Republic and Iran were advised they would not be entitled to vote in the Assembly's 76th session.

Voting in the Assembly is sometimes replaced by an effort to find consensus among member states, in order to strengthen support for the Assembly's decisions: the President consults delegations in private to find out whether they are willing to agree to adoption of a resolution without a vote; if they are, the President can declare that a resolution has been so adopted.

Special sessions of the Assembly may be held to discuss issues which require particular attention, and 'emergency special sessions' may also be convened to discuss situations on which the UN Security Council has been unable to reach a decision.

The Assembly's 10th emergency special session, concerning Illegal Israeli Actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, commenced in April 1997 and subsequently has been reconvened intermittently.

In December 2003 the Assembly adopted a landmark resolution that outlined a number of reforms aimed at enhancing the Assembly's operations. The resolution provided for a regular meeting of the Presidents of the Assembly, Security Council and ECOSOC, with a view to strengthening co-operation and complementarity in the respective work programmes of the three bodies. In March 2005 the Secretary-General presented to the General Assembly a report entitled *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*. The report focused on three main pillars, defined as 'Freedom from Want', urging developing countries to improve governance and combat corruption, and industrialized nations to increase funds for development assistance and debt relief and to provide immediate free market access to all exports from least developed countries; 'Freedom from Fear', urging states to agree a new consensus on security matters and adopting a definition of an act of terrorism as one 'intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act'; and 'Freedom to Live in Dignity', urging the international community to support the principle of 'responsibility to protect'.

In December 2005 the General Assembly authorized the establishment of an intergovernmental advisory Peacebuilding Commission. The Assembly and Security Council also authorized at that time the creation of a Peacebuilding Fund. In March 2006 the Assembly authorized the establishment of a Human Rights Council to replace the Commission on Human Rights. Both the Peacebuilding Commission and Human Rights Council were inaugurated in June. In September the Assembly adopted the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and plan of action.

In October 2008, in view of the international financial crisis, the President of the General Assembly announced that a body would be established to review the global financial system, including the role of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The first plenary meeting of the resulting Commission of Experts of the President of the UN General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System was held in January 2009, and, in September, the Commission issued a report addressing the origins of, and outlining recommendations for the future global response to, the ongoing crisis; the latter included proposals to establish a new global reserve system, a new global credit facility to complement the IMF, a new global co-ordination council, and an International Debt Restructuring Court. In June the General Assembly convened a UN Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and its Impact on Development.

In September 2009 the General Assembly adopted, by consensus, its first resolution on the 'Responsibility to Protect', promoting efforts to protect the world's population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity.

In September 2015 heads of state and of government convened in New York for a UN Summit to Adopt the Post-2015 Development Agenda. The meeting endorsed a series of new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs—superseding a previous set of Millennium Development Goals that had been pursued during 2000–15), which formed the basis of a 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Also in September 2015, the General Assembly adopted a resolution that permitted the flags of non-member observer states to be raised at UN premises. Consequently, in that month the flag of Palestine was raised at UN headquarters for the first time.

In February 2016 the Assembly held a formal debate that welcomed the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism that had been introduced earlier in the year by the UN Secretary-General. In September the Assembly issued the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, endorsing the development of a new Global Contract for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. After extensive negotiations, the Global Contract was adopted by an Intergovernmental Conference on International Migration that was held in December 2018, in Morocco.

The Assembly adopted a resolution in December 2016 which recommended that the Assembly's Sixth Committee establish a working group tasked with finalizing the process of drafting a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism; this was to unify the existing system of counter-terrorism instruments, to define terrorism definitively, to criminalize every form of international terrorism, and to deny funds, means and safe havens to all perpetrators and supporters of terrorism.

In September 2019 a UN General Assembly Special Summit was convened on the 2030 Agenda and the SAMOA Pathway (Small Island Developing States Accelerated Modalities of Action) Mid-Term Review. A High-level General Assembly Meeting on Universal Health Coverage, also held in September, adopted a related political declaration.

On 27 March 2020 the General Assembly adopted a decision that provided for (exceptionally) a 'Procedure for taking decisions of the General Assembly during the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic', in accordance with which the Assembly President was authorized to circulate (following consultation with the General Committee) draft decisions to all member states, using a 72-hour silence procedure mechanism. If after the end of the 3-day period the silence remained unbroken, a decision was to be considered as adopted. On 2 April the Assembly adopted Resolution 74/240 on Global Solidarity to Fight the Coronavirus Disease, which emphasized the central role of the UN in catalyzing and co-ordinating the global response to the crisis, and called on member states to combat COVID-19 collectively through the exchange of information, scientific knowledge and best practices, and through the application of relevant World Health Organization (WHO) recommendations.

High-level events convened in late September–October 2020 at the start of the General Assembly's 75th session—in addition to the annual General Debate—included meetings to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the UN and the 25th anniversary of the Fourth World Conference on Women ('Beijing+25'), and a Biodiversity Summit. All gatherings were convened in a virtual format. A Special Session of the General Assembly in response to the COVID-19 pandemic was held in early December. The Assembly's 32nd Special Session, addressing Challenges and Measures to Prevent and Combat Corruption and Strengthen International Co-operation, was held in early June 2021. A Special Session focused on the transformation of pandemic preparedness and response was to take place in September.

President of 75th Session (from Sept. 2020): VOLKAN BOZKIR (Turkey).

President-elect of 76th Session (from Sept. 2021): ABDULLAH SHAHID (Maldives).

MAIN COMMITTEES

There are six Main Committees, on which all members have a right to be represented. Each Committee includes an elected Chairperson and two Vice-Chairs.

First Committee: Disarmament and International Security.

Second Committee: Economic and Financial.

Third Committee: Social, Humanitarian and Cultural.

Fourth Committee: Special Political and Decolonization.

Fifth Committee: Administrative and Budgetary.

Sixth Committee: Legal.

ASSEMBLIES AND COUNCILS

Council of the UN University: f. 1973.

Human Rights Council: f. 2006; see under the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights for further details; 47 mems.

UN-Habitat Assembly: f. 2019; all UN mem. states.

UN Environment Assembly: f. 2014; all UN mem. states.

EXECUTIVE BOARDS

Executive Board of the UN Children's Fund: f. 1993; composed of 36 mems.

Executive Board of the UN Development Programme, UN Population Fund and UN Office for Project Services: f. 1993; composed of 36 mems.

Executive Board of the World Food Programme: f. 1995; composed of 36 mems.

COMMISSIONS

Advisory Commission on the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA): f. 1948; mems: 29 mems and 4 observers.

Disarmament Commission: f. 1978 (replacing body f. 1952); 61 mems.

International Civil Service Commission: f. 1972; 15 mems appointed for four-year terms.

International Law Commission: f. 1947; 34 mems elected for a five-year term; drafted the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which entered into effect in Jan. 1980 and provides a comprehensive framework of rules and guidelines to govern the drafting, interpretation and implementation of treaties concluded between states.

UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL): f. 1966; in June 2018 approved the final draft of the Singapore Convention on Mediation, which was adopted in Dec. by the General Assembly; 36 mems.

UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine: f. 1948; 3 mems.

UN Peacebuilding Commission: f. 2006 as an intergovernmental advisory body, subsidiary simultaneously to both the General Assembly and the Security Council; mandated to focus sustained international attention on reconstruction, institution building and sustainable development in countries emerging from conflict; to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict recovery; to promote an integrated, strategic and coherent approach to peacebuilding—noting the close linkages between security, development and human rights; to share advice on peacebuilding needs and priorities, as relevant, within the UN system; and to serve as a platform for all stakeholders; the Commission receives strategic advice and policy guidance from the Peacebuilding Support Office (f. 2005); it organizes thematic events related to peacebuilding, and engages in relevant policy discussions; peacebuilding projects in countries on the Commission's agenda are financed through a UN Peacebuilding Fund (established in 2009); in Oct. 2019 a new SALIENT (Saving Lives Entity) fund was established within the UN Peacebuilding Fund, with a focus on linking illicit small arms control to development; the Commission maintains a Working Group on Lessons Learned; 31 mem. states, of which seven are elected by the UN General Assembly, seven by the Security Council and seven by ECOSOC, plus the top five contributors of assessed contributions to UN activities, and top five contributors of personnel to peace missions (in 2021–22: Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan and Rwanda); the chairmanship rotates on an annual basis (2021: Egypt).

OTHER COMMITTEES

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: f. 1959; 61 mems; has a Legal Sub-Committee and a Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee; in Dec. 2013 endorsed the establishment of an International Asteroid Warning Network and Space Mission Planning Advisory Group, to guide the global response to near-earth object threats.

Executive Committee of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): f. 1959; 102 mems.

General Committee: f. 1946; composed of 28 mems, including the Assembly President, the 21 Vice-Presidents of the Assembly and the Chairs of the six Main Committees.

High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation: f. 1978; principal UN policymaking body on South-South co-operation.

Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34): f. 1965; 34 appointed mems.

Special Committee on the Charter of the UN and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization: f. 1975; composed of all UN mems.

Special Committee on the Implementation of the Declaration on Decolonization: f. 1961; 24 mems.

Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: f. 1961.

Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories: f. 1968.

UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation: f. 1955; 21 mems.

There are also standing Committees for: Conferences; Information; Investments; Programme and Co-ordination; Relations with the Host Country; Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments; the UN Population Award; and the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. The General Assembly has established several thematic Ad Hoc Committees, including: Administration of Justice at the UN; Announcement of Voluntary Contributions to the Programme of UNHCR; Announcement of Voluntary Contributions to UNRWA; Criminal Accountability of UN Officials and Experts on Mission; and the Indian Ocean. Advisory Committees cover: Administrative and Budgetary Questions; Independent Audit; and the UN Programme of Assistance in the Teaching, Study, Dissemination and Wider Appreciation of International Law.

WORKING GROUPS

The General Assembly has a standing Working Group on Finance of UNRWA. There are also ad hoc Working Groups on the Regular Process for Global Reporting and Assessment of the State of the Marine Environment, including Socioeconomic Aspects; and on Revitalization of the General Assembly. Open-ended General Assembly Working Groups address Follow-up to the Major UN Conferences and Summits in the Economic and Social Fields; Marine Biological Diversity Beyond Areas of National Jurisdiction; Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council; and consideration of the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament.

OTHER SUBSIDIARY BODIES

There are also an Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters; Board of Auditors; Joint Inspection Unit; Panel of External Auditors of the UN, the Specialized Agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency; Trade and Development Board; UN Appeals Tribunal; UN Dispute Tribunal; UN Joint Staff Pension Board; and the UN Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS (IGN) ON SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

The IGN process was initiated, under the auspices of the General Assembly, in February 2009, with a view to altering the structure of the UN Security Council (q.v.) to render it more representative of the contemporary international situation. In June 2019 the General Assembly endorsed the continuation of the IGN, and authorized an open-ended working group on Security Council reform.

General Assembly Resolutions

(Adoption of Agreements, Conventions, Declarations, Protocols and other instruments)

Note: Until 1976 resolutions of the General Assembly were numbered consecutively, with the session of the Assembly indicated in parentheses. Since that date (i.e. from the 31st regular session of the Assembly) a new numbering sequence has been established at the beginning of each session. Thus each resolution is numbered according to the session in which it was adopted, followed by its chronological position within that session. Resolutions adopted in special or emergency session are identified with an 'S' or 'ES', respectively.

Resolution 22 (I): Adopted 13 Feb. 1946. General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the UN.

Resolution 54 (I): Adopted 19 Nov. 1946. Transfer to the UN of power exercised by the League of Nations under the International Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Narcotic Drugs, including a Protocol amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Narcotic Drugs.

Resolution 84 (I): Adopted 11 Dec. 1946. Agreement between the UN and the Carnegie Foundation concerning the use of the premises of the Peace Palace at The Hague by the ICJ.

Resolution 169 (II): Adopted 31 Oct. 1947. Agreement between the UN and the USA regarding the headquarters of the UN.

Resolution 179 (II): Adopted 21 Nov. 1947. Co-ordination of the privileges and immunities of the UN and of the specialized agencies of the UN, including the General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the UN.

Resolution 211 (III): Adopted 8 Oct. 1948. International provisions for the control of certain drugs including a protocol bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of the Convention of 13 July 1931 for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the Protocol contained in Resolution 54 (I).

Resolution 217 (III): Adopted 10 Dec. 1948. International Bill of Human Rights, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Resolution 260 (III): Adopted 9 Dec. 1948. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Resolution 317 (IV): Adopted 2 Dec. 1949. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of others.

Resolution 428 (V): Adopted 14 Dec. 1950. Statute of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

Resolution 630 (VII): Adopted 16 Dec. 1952. Convention on the International Right of Correction.

Resolution 640 (VII): Adopted 20 Dec. 1952. Convention on the Political Rights of Women.

Resolution 1040 (XI): Adopted 29 Jan. 1957. Convention on the Nationality of Married Women.

Resolution 1386 (XIV): Adopted 20 Nov. 1959. Declaration of the Rights of the Child.

Resolution 1514 (XV): Adopted 14 Dec. 1960. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

Resolution 1541 (XV): Adopted 15 Dec. 1960. Principles which should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73e of the Charter, in respect of such territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of independence.

Resolution 1653 (XVI): Adopted 24 Nov. 1961. Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Weapons.

Resolution 1763 (XVII): Adopted 7 Nov. 1962. Draft Convention and draft Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriages and Registration of Marriages.

Resolution 1904 (XVIII): Adopted 20 Nov. 1963. Declaration on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination.

Resolution 1962 (XVIII): Adopted 13 Dec. 1963. Declaration of Legal Principles governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space.

Resolution 2018 (XX): Adopted 1 Nov. 1965. Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages.

Resolution 2037 (XX): Adopted 7 Dec. 1965. Declaration on the Promotion among Youth of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual Respect and Understanding between Peoples.

Resolution 2106 (XX): Adopted 21 Dec. 1965. International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination.

Resolution 2131 (XX): Adopted 21 Dec. 1965. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty.

Resolution 2200 (XXI): Adopted 16 Dec. 1966. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Resolution 2222 (XXI): Adopted 19 Dec. 1966. Treaty on Principles governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies.

Resolution 2263 (XXII): Adopted 7 Nov. 1967. Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.

Resolution 2312 (XXII): Adopted 14 Dec. 1967. Declaration on Territorial Asylum.

Resolution 2345 (XXII): Adopted 19 Dec. 1967. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects launched into Outer Space.

Resolution 2373 (XXII): Adopted 12 June 1968. Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Resolution 2391 (XXIII): Adopted 26 Nov. 1968. Convention on the Non-applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.

Resolution 2530 (XXIV): Adopted 8 Dec. 1969. Convention on Special Missions and Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes.

Resolution 2542 (XXIV): Adopted 11 Dec. 1969. Declaration on Social Progress and Development.

Resolution 2625 (XXV): Adopted 24 Oct. 1970. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the UN.

Resolution 2626 (XXV): Adopted 24 Oct. 1970. International Development Strategy for the Second UN Development Decade.

Resolution 2627 (XXV): Adopted 24 Oct. 1970. Declaration on the Occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the UN.

Resolution 2660 (XXV): Adopted 7 Dec. 1970. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof.

Resolution 2734 (XXV): Adopted 16 Dec. 1970. Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security.

Resolution 2749 (XXV): Adopted 17 Dec. 1970. Declaration of Principles governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.

Resolution 2777 (XXVI): Adopted 29 Nov. 1971. Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects.

Resolution 2826 (XXVI): Adopted 16 Dec. 1971. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.

Resolution 2832 (XXVI): Adopted 16 Dec. 1971. Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

Resolution 2856 (XXVI): Adopted 20 Dec. 1971. Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons.

Resolution 2902 (XXVI): Adopted 22 December 1971. Supplementary Agreement between the UN and the Carnegie Foundation concerning the use of the premises of the Peace Palace at The Hague by the ICJ.

Resolution 3068 (XXVIII): Adopted 30 Nov. 1973. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.

Resolution 3074 (XXVIII): Adopted 3 Dec. 1973. Principles of international co-operation in the detection, arrest, extradition and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Resolution 3166 (XXVIII): Adopted 14 Dec. 1973. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents.

Resolution 3201 (S-VI): Adopted 1 May 1974. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order.

Resolution 3235 (XXIX): Adopted 12 Nov. 1974. Convention on the Registration of Objects launched into Outer Space.

Resolution 3281 (XXIX): Adopted 12 Dec. 1974. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.

Resolution 3314 (XXIX): Adopted 14 Dec. 1974. Definition of Aggression.

Resolution 3318 (XXIX): Adopted 14 Dec. 1974. Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict.

Resolution 3346 (XXIX): Adopted 17 Dec. 1974. Agreement between the UN and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).

Resolution 3384 (XXX): Adopted 10 Nov. 1975. Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress in the Interests of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind.

Resolution 3447 (XXX): Adopted 9 Dec. 1975. Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons.

Resolution 3452 (XXX): Adopted 9 Dec. 1975. Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from being subjected to Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

Resolution 31/72: Adopted 10 Dec. 1976. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

Resolution 32/105: Adopted 14 Dec. 1977. International Declaration against Apartheid in Sports.

Resolution 32/107: Adopted 15 Dec. 1977. Agreement between the UN and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).

Resolution 32/155: Adopted 19 Dec. 1977. Declaration on the Deepening and Consolidation of International *Détente.*

Resolution 32/156: Adopted 19 Dec. 1977. Agreement on Co-operation and Relationships between the UN and the World Tourism Organization.

Resolution S-9/2: Adopted 3 May 1978. Declaration on Namibia.

Resolution 33/73: Adopted 15 Dec. 1978. Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace.

Resolution 33/162: Adopted 20 Dec. 1978. Charter of Rights for Migrant Workers in Southern Africa.

Resolution 34/68: Adopted 5 Dec. 1979. Agreement governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies.

Resolution 34/88: Adopted 11 Dec. 1979. Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament.

Resolution 34/93: Adopted 12 Dec. 1979. Declaration on South Africa.

Resolution 34/146: Adopted 17 Dec. 1979. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages.

Resolution 34/169: Adopted 17 Dec. 1979. Code of Conduct for law-enforcement officials.

Resolution 34/180: Adopted 18 Dec. 1979. Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women.

Resolution 35/46: Adopted 3 Dec. 1980. Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade.

Resolution 35/55: Adopted 5 Dec. 1980. International Agreement for the Establishment of the University for Peace and Charter of the University of Peace.

Resolution 35/56: Adopted 5 Dec. 1980. International Development Strategy for the Third UN Development Decade.

Resolution 36/55: Adopted 25 Nov. 1981. Declaration on the Elimination of all forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination based on Religion or Belief.

Resolution 36/100: Adopted 9 Dec. 1981. Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe.

Resolution 36/103: Adopted 9 Dec. 1981. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States.

Resolution 37/7: Adopted 28 Oct. 1982. World Charter for Nature.

Resolution 37/10: Adopted 15 Nov. 1982. Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes.

Resolution 37/63: Adopted 3 Dec. 1982. Declaration on the Participation of Women in Promoting International Peace and Co-operation.

Resolution 37/92: Adopted 10 Dec. 1982. Principles governing the use by states of artificial earth satellites for international direct television broadcasting.

Resolution 37/194: Adopted 18 Dec. 1982. Principles of medical ethics relevant to the role of health personnel, particularly physicians, in the protection of prisoners and detainees against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Resolution 39/11: Adopted 12 Nov. 1984. Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace.

Resolution 39/29: Adopted 3 Dec. 1984. Declaration on the Critical Economic Situation in Africa.

Resolution 39/46: Adopted 10 Dec. 1984. Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

Resolution 39/142: Adopted 14 Dec. 1984. Declaration on the Control of Drugs-trafficking and Drug Abuse.

Resolution 40/33: Adopted 29 Nov. 1985. UN standard minimum rules for the administration of juvenile justice (The Beijing Rules).

Resolution 40/34: Adopted 29 Nov. 1985. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power.

Resolution 40/64: Adopted 10 Dec. 1985. International Convention against Apartheid in Sports.

Resolution 40/144: Adopted 13 Dec. 1985. Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals of the Country in which they live.

Resolution 40/180: Adopted 17 Dec. 1985. Agreement between the UN and the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).

Resolution 41/65: Adopted 3 Dec. 1986. Principles relating to remote sensing of the earth from outer space.

Resolution 41/85: Adopted 3 Dec. 1986. Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, with special reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally.

Resolution 41/128: Adopted 4 Dec. 1986. Declaration on the Right to Development.

Resolution 42/22: Adopted 18 Nov. 1987. Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations.

Resolution 42/186: Adopted 11 Dec. 1987. Environmental perspective to 2000 and beyond.

Resolution 43/51: Adopted 5 Dec. 1988. Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations which may threaten International Peace and Security and on the Role of the UN in this Field.

Resolution 43/165: Adopted 9 Dec. 1988. UN Convention on International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes.

Resolution 43/173: Adopted 9 Dec. 1988. Body of principles for the protection of all persons under any form of detention or imprisonment.

Resolution 44/25: Adopted 20 Nov. 1989. Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Resolution 44/34: Adopted 4 Dec. 1989. International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries.

Resolution S-16/1: Adopted 14 Dec. 1989. Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa.

Resolution 44/114: Adopted 15 Dec. 1989. Principles that should govern further actions of states in the field of the 'freezing' and reduction of military budgets.

Resolution 44/128: Adopted 15 Dec. 1989. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Second Optional Protocol aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty.

Resolution S-18/3: Adopted 1 May 1990. Declaration on International Economic Co-operation, in particular the Revitalization of Economic Growth and Development of the Developing Countries.

Resolution 45/62: Adopted 4 Dec. 1990. Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade.

Resolution 45/95: Adopted 14 Dec. 1990. Guidelines for the regulation of computerized data files.

Resolution 45/110: Adopted 14 Dec. 1990. UN standard minimum rules for non-custodial measures (The Tokyo Rules).

Resolution 45/111: Adopted 14 Dec. 1990. Basic principles for the treatment of prisoners.

Resolution 45/112: Adopted 14 Dec. 1990. UN guidelines for the prevention of juvenile delinquency.

Resolution 45/113: Adopted 14 Dec. 1990. UN rules for the protection of juveniles deprived of their liberty.

Resolution 45/116: Adopted 14 Dec. 1990. Model Treaty on Extradition.

Resolution 45/117: Adopted 14 Dec. 1990. Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and Optional Protocol concerning the Proceeds of Crime.

Resolution 45/118: Adopted 14 Dec. 1990. Model Treaty on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters.

Resolution 45/119: Adopted 14 Dec. 1990. Model Treaty on the Transfer of Supervision of Offenders Conditionally Sentenced or Conditionally Released.

Resolution 45/158: Adopted 18 Dec. 1990. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.

Resolution 45/199: Adopted 21 Dec. 1990. International Development Strategy for the Fourth UN Development Decade.

Resolution 46/59: Adopted 9 Dec. 1991. Declaration on Fact-finding by the UN in the Field of the Maintenance of International Peace and Security.

Resolution 46/91: Adopted 16 Dec. 1991. UN principles for older persons.

Resolution 46/119: Adopted 17 Dec. 1991. Principles for the protection of persons with mental illness and for the improvement of mental health care.

Resolution 46/151: Adopted 18 Dec. 1991. UN new agenda for the development of Africa in the 1990s.

Resolution 46/152: Adopted 18 Dec. 1991. Statement of Principles and Programme of Action of the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme.

Resolution 47/5: Adopted 16 Oct. 1992. Proclamation on Ageing.

Resolution 47/68: Adopted 14 Dec. 1992. Principles relevant to the use of nuclear power sources in outer space.

Resolution 47/133: Adopted 18 Dec. 1992. Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

Resolution 47/135: Adopted 18 Dec. 1992. Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.

Resolution 48/96: Adopted 20 Dec. 1993. Standard rules on the equalization of opportunities for persons with disabilities.

Resolution 48/104: Adopted 20 Dec. 1993. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women.

Resolution 48/134: Adopted 20 Dec. 1993. Principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (Paris Principles).

Resolution 48/263: Adopted 28 July 1994. Agreement relating to the implementation of part XI of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Resolution 49/57: Adopted 9 Dec. 1994. Declaration on the Enhancement of Co-operation between the UN and Regional Arrangements or Agencies in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security.

Resolution 49/59: Adopted 9 Dec. 1994. Convention on the Safety of UN and associated Personnel.

Resolution 49/60: Adopted 9 Dec. 1994. Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism.

Resolution 50/5: Adopted 18 Oct. 1995. Declaration in Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the end of the Second World War.

Resolution 50/6: Adopted 24 Oct. 1995. Declaration on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the UN.

Resolution 50/48: Adopted 11 Dec. 1995. UN Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit.

Resolution 50/50: Adopted 11 Dec. 1995. UN model rules for the conciliation of disputes between states.

Resolution 51/59: Adopted 12 Dec. 1996. International Code of Conduct for public officials.

Resolution 51/60: Adopted 12 Dec. 1996. UN Declaration on Crime and Public Security.

Resolution 51/122: Adopted 13 Dec. 1996. Declaration on International Co-operation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of all States, taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries.

Resolution 51/162: Adopted 16 Dec. 1996. Model law on electronic commerce.

Resolution 51/191: Adopted 16 Dec. 1996. UN Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions.

Resolution 51/210: Adopted 17 Dec. 1996. Declaration to supplement the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism of 1994.

Resolution 51/229: Adopted 21 May 1997. Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses.

Resolution 51/240: Adopted 20 June 1997. Agenda for Development.

Resolution 52/27: Adopted 26 Nov. 1997. Agreement concerning the Relationship between the UN and the International Seabed Authority.

Resolution 52/86: Adopted 12 Dec. 1997. Model strategies and practical measures on the elimination of violence against women in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice.

Resolution 52/158: Adopted 15 Dec. 1997. Model law on cross-border insolvency.

Resolution 52/164: Adopted 15 Dec. 1997. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.

Resolution S-20/3: Adopted 10 June 1998. Declaration on the Guiding Principles of Drug Demand Reduction.

Resolution 52/251: Adopted 8 Sept. 1998. Agreement on Co-operation and the Relationship between the UN and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.

Resolution 53/2: Adopted 6 Oct. 1998. Declaration on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping.

Resolution 53/101: Adopted 8 Dec. 1998. Principles and guidelines for international negotiations.

Resolution 53/144: Adopted 9 Dec. 1998. Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

Resolution 54/4: Adopted 6 Oct. 1999. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Resolution 34/180).

Resolution 54/109: Adopted 9 Dec. 1999. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

Resolution 54/263: Adopted 16 May 2000. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child concerning the involvement of children in armed conflict, and Optional Protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography.

Resolution S-22/2: Adopted 12 June 2000. Declaration on state of progress of and initiatives for the future implementation of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States.

Resolution 54/280: Adopted 30 June 2000. Agreement to regulate the relationship between the UN and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization.

Resolution 55/2: Adopted 8 Sept. 2000. UN Millennium Declaration.

Resolution 55/25: Adopted 15 Nov. 2000. UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; two additional Protocols.

Resolution 55/59: Adopted 4 Dec. 2000. Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century.

Resolution 55/153: Adopted 12 Dec. 2000. Articles on nationality of natural persons in relation to the succession of states.

Resolution 55/255: Adopted 31 May 2001. Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Resolution S-25/2: Adopted 9 June 2001. Declaration on Cities and other Human Settlements in the New Millennium.

Resolution S-26/2: Adopted 27 June 2001. Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS.

Resolution 55/278: Adopted 12 July 2001. Statute of the UN System Staff College in Turin, Italy.

Resolution 55/283: Adopted 7 Sept. 2001. Agreement concerning the relationship between the UN and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Resolution 56/6: Adopted 9 Nov. 2001. Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations.

Resolution 57/2: Adopted 16 Sept. 2002. UN Declaration on the New Partnership for Africa's Development.

Resolution 57/18: Adopted 19 Nov. 2002. Model Law of the UN Nations Commisson on International Trade Law on International Commercial Conciliation.

Resolution 57/199: Adopted 18 Dec. 2002. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Optional Protocol.

Resolution 58/4: Adopted 31 Oct. 2003. UN Convention against Corruption.

Resolution 58/232: Adopted 23 Dec. 2003. Agreement between the UN and the World Tourism Organization.

Resolution 59/38: Adopted 2 Dec. 2004. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property.

Resolution 59/280: Adopted 8 March 2005. UN Declaration on Human Cloning.

Resolution 59/290: Adopted 13 April 2005. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

Resolution 60/21: Adopted 23 Nov. 2005. UN Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts.

Resolution 60/42: Adopted 8 Dec. 2005. Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel: Optional Protocol.

Resolution 60/147: Adopted 16 Dec. 2005. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.

Resolution 60/262: Adopted 2 June 2006. Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS.

Resolution 61/1: Adopted 19 Sept. 2006. Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the 61st session of the General Assembly on the mid-term comprehensive global review of the implementation of the Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2001–10.

Resolution 61/106: Adopted 13 Dec. 2006. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

Resolution 61/177: Adopted 20 Dec. 2006. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

Resolution 61/295: Adopted 13 Sept. 2007. UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

Resolution 62/88: Adopted 13 Dec. 2007. Declaration of the Commemorative High-level Plenary Meeting devoted to the follow-up to the outcome of the Special Session on Children.

Resolution 63/1: Adopted 22 Sept. 2008. Political Declaration on Africa's Development Needs.

Resolution 63/2: Adopted 3 Oct. 2008. Declaration of the High-level Meeting on the mid-term review of the Almatı Programme of Action.

Resolution 63/177: Adopted 10 Dec. 2008. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

Resolution 63/122: Adopted 11 Dec. 2008. UN Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea.

Resolution 63/303: Adopted 9 July 2009. Outcome of the Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and its Impact on Development.

Resolution 64/292: Adopted 28 July 2010. Recognized access to water and sanitation as a human right.

Resolution 64/257: Adopted 9 April 2010. Observation of 65th Anniversary of the End of the Second World War.

Resolution 64/293: Adopted 30 July 2010. UN Global Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons.

Resolution 65/230: Adopted 21 Dec. 2010. Salvador Declaration on Comprehensive Strategies for Global Challenges: Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Systems and Their Development in a Changing World.

Resolution 65/276: Adopted 10 May 2011. Participation of the European Union in the work of the UN.

Resolution 65/277: Adopted 10 June 2011. Political Declaration on HIV and AIDS: Intensifying Our Efforts to Eliminate HIV and AIDS.

Resolution 66/2: Adopted 19 Sept. 2011. Political Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Prevention and Control of Non-communicable Diseases.

Resolution 66/3: Adopted 22 Sept. 2011. Political Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action 'United against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance'.

Resolution 66/136: Adopted 9 Dec. 2011. Declaration on the 50th Anniversary of Human Space Flight and the 50th Anniversary of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

Resolution 66/137: Adopted 19 Dec. 2011. UN Declaration on Human Rights Education and Training.

Resolution 66/138: Adopted 19 Dec. 2011. 66th Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a Communications Procedure.

Resolution 66/288: Adopted 27 July 2012. The Future We Want (outcome document of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development).

Resolution 66/290: Adopted 10 Sept. 2012. Follow-up to paragraph 143 on human security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome.

Resolution 67/1: Adopted 24 Sept. 2012. Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels.

Resolution 67/L-58: Adopted 2 April 2013. Arms Trade Treaty.

Resolution 67/259: Adopted 26 April 2013. Declaration on the peaceful resolution of conflicts in Africa.

Resolution 68/4: Adopted 3 Oct. 2013. Declaration of the High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development.

Resolution 68/163: Adopted 18 Dec. 2013. On the safety of journalists and the issue of impunity.

Resolution 68/167: Adopted 18 Dec. 2013. Principles relating to the right to privacy in the digital age.

Resolution 68/196: Adopted 18 Dec. 2013. Lima Declaration on Alternative Development.

Resolution 68/262: Adopted 24 March 2014. On the territorial integrity of Ukraine; called on states, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any change in the status of Crimea or the Black Sea port city of Sevastopol, and called on states to desist and refrain from actions aimed at disrupting Ukraine's national unity.

Resolution 69/2: Adopted 22 Sept. 2014. Outcome document of the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples (a High-level plenary meeting of the General Assembly).

Resolution 69/15: Adopted 14 Nov. 2014. The Small Island Developing States Accelerated Modalities of Action (SAMOA) Pathway.

Resolution 69/116: Adopted 10 Dec. 2014. UN Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration.

Resolution 69/137: Adopted 12 Dec. 2014. Vienna Programme of Action for Landlocked Developing Countries for the Decade 2014–24.

Resolution 69/216: Adopted 19 December 2014. Towards the sustainable development of the Caribbean Sea for present and future generations. Recognized the Sea as an area of unique biodiversity with a highly fragile ecosystem, the conservation of which required co-operation from development partners.

Resolution 69/L-71: Adopted 21 May 2015. On saving the cultural heritage of Iraq; condemned and demanded an immediate stop to the destruction and looting of the cultural heritage of Iraq carried out by Islamic State; affirmed that intentional attacks on sites dedicated to education, science, art, religion, or charitable purposes, and on historic monuments, may amount to war crimes.

Resolution 69/277: Adopted 5 May 2015. Political declaration on strengthening co-operation between the UN and regional and subregional organizations.

Resolution 69/283: Adopted 3 June 2015. Sendai Declaration for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–30.

Resolution 69/313: Adopted 17 July 2015. Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development (Addis Ababa Action Agenda).

Resolution 69/320: Adopted 10 Sept. 2015. Agreed that the flags of non-member observer states maintaining permanent observer missions at UN Headquarters should be raised at UN Headquarters and other UN offices alongside the flags of member states.

Resolution 70/1: Adopted 25 Sept. 2015. Transforming Our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (the outcome document of the UN Summit to Adopt the Post-2015 Development Agenda).

Resolution 70/3: Adopted 23 Oct. 2015. Declaration on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the UN.

Resolution 70/57: Adopted 7 Dec. 2015. Universal Declaration on the Achievement of a Nuclear Weapon-Free World.

Resolution 70/125: Adopted 16 Dec. 2015. Outcome document of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the overall review of the implementation of the outcomes of the World Summit on the Information Society.

Resolution 70/174: Adopted 17 Dec. 2015. The Doha Declaration on Integrating Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice.

Resolution 70/175: Adopted 17 Dec. 2015. UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules).

Resolution 70/186: Adopted 22 Dec. 2015. UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection (2015 revision).

Resolution 70/254: Adopted 12 Feb. 2016. Welcomed the UN Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism; recognized that violent extremism should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group.

Resolution S-30/1: Adopted 19 April 2016. Joint Commitment to Effectively Addressing and Countering the World Drug Problem.

Resolution A/70/L.52: Adopted 8 June 2016. Political Declaration on HIV and AIDS: On the Fast-Track to Accelerate the Fight Against HIV and to End the AIDS Epidemic by 2030.

Resolution 71/1: Adopted 19 Sept. 2016. New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants.

Resolution 71/1: Adopted 21 Sept. 2016. Political Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Antimicrobial Resistance.

Resolution 71/151: Adopted 13 Dec. 2016. Recommended that the Assembly's Sixth Committee establish a working group tasked with finalizing the process of drafting a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.

Resolution 71/189: Adopted 19 Dec. 2016. Declaration on the Right to Peace.

Resolution 71/L.66: Adopted 15 June 2017. Endorsed the establishment of a UN Office of Counter-Terrorism.

Resolution 72/1: Adopted 27 Sept. 2017. Political Declaration on the implementation of the UN Global Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons.

Resolution ES-10.L.22: Adopted 21 Dec. 2017. Status of Jerusalem. Declared actions to designate Jerusalem as Israel's capital as null and void.

Resolution 72/L.49: Adopted 26 April 2018. Follow-up to the UN Secretary-General's report (issued in Jan. 2018) titled *Peacebuilding and sustaining peace*.

Resolution 72/277: 10 May 2018. Towards a Global Pact for the Environment.

Resolution 72/279: Adopted 31 May 2018. Repositioning of the UN development system in the context of the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review of operational activities for development of the UN system.

Resolution ES-10/20: Adopted 13 June 2018. Protection of the Palestinian civilian population.

Resolution 73/2: Adopted 3 Oct. 2018. Political Declaration of the Third High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable Diseases.

Resolution 73/3: Adopted 10 Oct. 2018. Political Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the fight against tuberculosis.

Resolution 73/151: Adopted 17 Dec. 2018. Global Compact on Refugees.

Resolution 73/165: Adopted 17 Dec. 2018. UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas.

Resolution 73/195: Adopted 19 Dec. 2018. Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.

Resolution 73/198: Adopted 20 Dec. 2018. UN Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (the 'Singapore Convention on Mediation').

Resolution 73/239: Adopted 20 Dec. 2018. Decided to dissolve the UN-Habitat Governing Council as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly and to replace it with the UN-Habitat Assembly.

Resolution 73/291: Adopted 15 April 2019. Buenos Aires Outcome Document on the Second High-level UN Conference on South-South Cooperation

Resolution 73/295: Adopted 22 May 2019. Endorsed the (Feb. 2019) Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on the legal consequences of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, and called on the United Kingdom to withdraw its 'colonial administration' from the Chagos islands by 22 November 2019 (this deadline was ignored by the UK Government).

Resolution 74/2: Adopted 10 Oct. 2019. Political Declaration of the High-level Meeting on Universal Health Coverage.

Resolution 74/270: Adopted 2 April 2020. Global Solidarity to Fight the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19). Noted the unprecedented consequences of the pandemic, including severe disruption to societies, economies, commerce, global travel, and devastating impacts on human livelihoods. Recognized that the poorest and most vulnerable were hardest hit economically by the pandemic crisis, and that it would reverse hard-won development gains. Recognized the central role of the UN in catalyzing and co-ordinating the global response to the crisis. Encouraged all countries to combat COVID-19 collectively through the exchange of information, scientific knowledge and best practices, and the application of relevant WHO recommendations.

Resolution 74/273: Adopted 20 April 2020. Called on UN member states to investigate, arrest, prosecute or extradite all remaining fugitives from justice accused of genocide.

Resolution 74/274: Adopted 20 April 2020. International Co-operation to Ensure Global Access to Medicines, Vaccines and Medical Equipment to Face COVID-19.

Resolution 74/306: Adopted 11 Sept. 2020. Comprehensive and co-ordinated response to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic.

Resolution 74/307: Adopted 11 Sept. 2020. United response against global health threats: combating COVID–19.

Resolution 75/17: Adopted 1 Dec. 2020. Called for international co-operation to resolve challenges posed by the COVID-19 crisis to seafarers and to global supply chains.

Resolution 75/27: Adopted 7 Dec. 2020. Called for the first International Day of Epidemic Preparedness to be observed on 27 Dec.

Resolution 75/176: Adopted 16 Dec. 2020. Further considerations on the right to privacy in the digital age, including relating to advancements in the development of artificial intelligence.

Resolution 75/203: Adopted 21 Dec. 2020. International Trade and Development: stressed the urgent need to combat all forms of trade protectionism, and to reverse all trade-distorting measures that are inconsistent with World Trade Organization rules; also—in the context of the COVID-19 crisis—reaffirmed the critical importance of safeguarding global supply chains.

Resolution 75/205: Adopted 21 Dec. 2020. External Debt Sustainability and Development: emphasized the importance of extending assistance (such as the suspension of debt service payments) to developing states, in the context of the COVID-19 crisis.

Resolution 75/225: Adopted 21 Dec. 2020. Towards a New International Economic Order: urged member states and international institutions to increase financial liquidity, and called for expanded access to concessional finance, to address the COVID-19 crisis.

Resolution 75/273: Adopted 28 April 2021. Global Drowning Prevention.

Security Council

The Security Council was established as a principal organ under the UN Charter, tasked with promoting international peace and security in all parts of the world; its first meeting was held on 17 January 1946.

MEMBERS

Permanent members: People's Republic of China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, USA, known as the P-5. The remaining 10 members—the Elected 10, or E-10—are normally elected (five each year) by the General Assembly for two-year periods (five countries from Africa and Asia, two from Latin America, one from Eastern Europe, and two from Western Europe and others).

Non-permanent members in 2021–23: 1 January 2021–31 December 2022: India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway; 1 January 2022–31 December 2023: Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana, United Arab Emirates.

Rotation of the Presidency in 2021: Tunisia (January); United Kingdom (February); USA (March); Viet Nam (April); People's Republic of China (May); Estonia (June); France (July); India (August); Ireland (September); Kenya (October); Mexico (November); Niger (December).

Organization

The Council is organized to be able to function continuously. Its Presidency is held monthly in turn by the member states in English alphabetical order. Each member of the Council has one vote. On procedural matters decisions are made by the affirmative vote of any nine members. For decisions on other matters the required nine votes must include the votes of the five permanent members. This is the rule of 'great power unanimity' popularly known as the veto privilege. In practice, an abstention by one of the permanent members is not regarded as a veto. Any member, whether permanent or non-permanent, must abstain from voting in any decision concerning the pacific settlement of a dispute to which it is a party. Any member of the UN that is party to a dispute under consideration by the Council may participate in the Council's discussions without a vote.

From March 2020, in view of the unprecedented requirements for physical distancing resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, the Council modified its normal procedures to enable remote virtual meetings and processes. An exceptional 'written procedure' format was introduced for voting on draft resolutions. These measures were described as 'temporary, extraordinary and provisional'. In total the Council adopted 57 resolutions and issued 13 presidential statements during 2020.

Activities

The Security Council has the right to investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to friction between two or more countries; such disputes or situations may be brought to the Council's attention either by one of its members, by any member state, by the General Assembly, by the Secretary-General or even, under certain conditions, by a state which is not a member of the UN.

The Council has the right to recommend ways and means of peaceful settlement and, in certain circumstances, the actual terms of settlement. In the event of a threat to or breach of international peace or an act of aggression, the Council has powers to take 'enforcement' measures in order to restore international peace and security. These include severance of communications and of economic and diplomatic relations and, if required, military action.

As the UN organ primarily responsible for maintaining peace and security, the Security Council is empowered to deploy UN forces in the event that a dispute leads to conflict. It may also authorize the use of military force by a coalition of member states or a regional organization. The Council then monitors closely all peacekeeping and political missions and the situations in countries where missions are being undertaken, and authorizes extensions of their mandates accordingly.

Situations addressed by a peacekeeping, peacebuilding or political mission are covered in those respective sections.

COVID-19 GLOBAL EMERGENCY

From early 2020 the unfolding COVID-19 crisis was a major focus of the Security Council's agenda. In May a resolution negotiated by France and Tunisia demanding an immediate temporary ceasefire in major conflicts, as a measure to support efforts to contain the COVID-19 pandemic, stalled, reportedly as a result of a dispute between the USA and China relating to referencing the World Health Organization (WHO). A revised text, Resolution 2532, was adopted unanimously on 1 July.

In September 2020, in an address to a (videoconferenced) UN Security Council meeting on post-COVID-19 global governance, the UN Secretary-General emphasized that the ongoing spread of the virus and high number of related fatalities represented, hitherto, essentially a failure of international co-operation, global preparedness and solidarity. Noting that the First and Second World Wars had emerged from an unstable background of fragmentation and polarization, he emphasized the critical nature of 'networked multilateralism', and the need for an effective new paradigm to address cross-border challenges, such as the climate crisis, inequality and cybercrime. Addressing the Council in late January 2021, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs stressed the risks that the continuing pandemic were posing to peace and security. She noted that the impacts of the pandemic were amplifying the challenge of preventing new outbreaks of violent unrest, and were aggravating the dynamics underlying existing armed conflicts. She also stated that emerging new strains of the virus were likely to cause severe new waves of infection into 2021, at a time when social safety networks and public health systems were already dangerously overstretched.

SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL MILITARY ACTION

The Security Council may—as provided for under Chapter VII of the UN Charter—take enforcement measures as a means of

targeting regimes and entities that are deemed to threaten international peace and security, in situations where diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving a resolution to the situation have failed. The offending entities are expected to comply with a set of objectives issued by the Security Council aimed at restoring order. Such enforcement measures encompass mandatory economic and trade and/or other sanctions (such as financial or diplomatic restrictions, arms embargoes and bans on travel), and also, in certain cases, international military action. Sanctions committees are established to oversee the implementation of economic or political enforcement measures imposed by the Security Council; each committee is chaired by a non-permanent member of the Council. In 2021 10 expert panels were supporting the work of 11 of the then 14 sanctions committees. The sanctions that took effect against the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan and al-Qa'ida in January 2001 were the first to entail mandatory monitoring of the humanitarian impact of sanctions on the local population, in particular the most vulnerable groups. In December 2006 an informal working group recommended that resolutions enforcing sanctions should clearly specify intended goals and targets, include incentives to reward partial compliance, and focus in particular on the finances and movements of leaders (so-called smart sanctions). Humanitarian exceptions may now be embodied in Security Council resolutions. The Consolidated Sanctions List comprises all individuals and entities on which the Council has imposed sanctions measures, under all punitive regimes. A Focal Point for De-listing, established in December 2006, by Resolution 1730, receives and processes requests from individuals and entities wishing to be removed from sanctions lists, with the exception of the ISIL (Da'esh) and al-Qa'ida Sanctions List. At 24 May 2021 a total of 112 de-listing requests had been received by the Focal Point; of these, 101 had been fully processed, resulting in the de-listing of 17 individuals and also of 17 entities. Since 2005 INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notices have been issued for individuals and entities that are subjected to UN sanctions regimes. These alert national law enforcement authorities to freezes imposed on funds and assets; travel restrictions; and arms embargoes. There is, however, no requirement to seize assets or to prosecute named individuals or entities. In February 2021 511 Special Notices were active for individuals, and 108 for entities. In December 2017 the Security Council adopted Resolution 2399, which encourages biometric data to be attached to Special Notices for individuals. The following Sanctions Committees were operational in 2021:

Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali;

Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), al-Qa'ida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities;

Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan;

Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 2140 (2014) concerning Yemen;

Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic;

Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau;

Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1988 (2011) concerning the Taliban in Afghanistan;

Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1970 (2011) concerning the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1718 (2006) concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;

Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1636 (2005) concerning events in Lebanon;

Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005) concerning Sudan;

Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the DRC;

Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1518 (2003) concerning Iraq.

Office of the Ombudsperson of the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da'esh) and al-Qa'ida Sanctions Committee: Rm TB-08041 D, UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017, USA; f. Dec. 2009; reviews requests from individuals, groups, undertakings or entities seeking to be removed from the Islamic State and al-Qa'ida Sanctions List; by June 2021 some 86 cases had passed fully through the Ombudsperson process, resulting in the de-listing of 59 individuals and 28 entities; Ombudsperson DANIEL KIPFER FASCIATI (Switzerland).

COUNTERING TERRORISM

On 12 September 2001 the Security Council expressed its unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist attacks against targets in the USA, which had occurred on the previous day. It stated its readiness to combat terrorism and reiterated the right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the UN Charter. At the end of September the Council adopted Resolution 1373, establishing a Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) to monitor a range of measures to combat international terrorism, including greater international co-operation and information exchange and suppressing the financing of terrorist groups. In January 2003 the Council, meeting at ministerial level, adopted a resolution urging intensified efforts to combat terrorism and full co-operation with the CTC. The CTC has made efforts to strengthen and co-ordinate contacts with international, regional and subregional organizations. In March 2004 the Council adopted a resolution to strengthen the Committee by classifying it as a special subsidiary body of the Council, headed by a Bureau and assisted by an Executive Directorate (the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate—CTED). In April, under the binding Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Council adopted Resolution 1540, which considered the threat posed by the possible acquisition and use by non-state actors, including terrorists, of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and demanded that all states establish controls to prevent the proliferation of such weapons. The resolution authorized the establishment of the '1540 Committee', including a nine-member Group of Experts, to monitor its implementation. UN member states are obliged to submit so-called matrix reports to the Committee outlining measures taken to prevent the proliferation of WMD. In April 2011 the Council extended the mandate of the 1540 Committee until 25 April 2021, and in the latter month it authorized a further extension of the Committee's mandate, until 28 February 2022. In 2005 the UN Secretary-General established a Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), and in 2011 a UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) was inaugurated. In accordance with a resolution of the UN General Assembly that was adopted in June 2017, the CTITF and UNCCT were transferred to a newly-established UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT). The new Office was mandated to strengthen implementation of the UN's Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, enhance the provision to member states of counter-terrorism capacity-building support, and to ensure that counter-terrorism activities and the prevention of violent extremism were prioritized across the UN system. In 2018 a new UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact Committee superseded the CTITF. The Committee presides over eight inter-agency working groups, and implements the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, an initiative that was adopted in February 2018 by the UN Secretary-General, UN entities, INTERPOL, and the World Customs Organization. UNOCT acts as secretariat to the Committee. By February 2021 43 UN and other entities had signed the Compact. Focal areas of the UNCCT during 2021 included behavioural insights (an International Hub on Behavioural Insights to Counter Terrorism had been established under UNOCT auspices in December 2020); border security and management; chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism; civil society engagement; countering the financing of terrorism and terrorist travel; cybersecurity; engaging parliamentarians; foreign terrorist fighters; gender equality; preventing violent extremism; sports and security; South-South co-operation; victims of terrorism; vulnerable targets; and youth engagement.

Countering Islamic State: In August 2014 the Council adopted Resolution 2170, which expressed 'gravest concern' that areas of Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic were under the

control of Islamic State (which it identified as an al-Qa'ida splinter grouping) and of the then al-Qa'ida-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra (the al-Nusra Front). The Council condemned the violent extremist ideologies of these groupings, their role in fomenting sectarian tensions, the devastating humanitarian impact of their activities, and their continued gross, systematic and widespread abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law. The Council demanded that Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra, and related groupings and individuals should cease all violence and disband, and urged all UN member states to adopt measures aimed at suppressing the flow of foreign terrorist combatants to Iraq and Syria. The Council placed several individuals affiliated with these terrorist groups on its al-Qa'ida Sanctions List, and imposed punitive measures against any entity that plans for, finances, recruits or supplies weapons to them, including through the internet and via social media. Security Council resolutions 2178 (2014) and 2396 (2017) require states to prevent their citizens from travelling to join terrorist groups, and also that they repatriate and prosecute them.

In February 2015 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2199, emphasizing that Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra and other terrorist groupings in Iraq and Syria should not be permitted to access the international financial system, receive donations or benefit from direct or indirect trade in petroleum and refined oil products, (looted) antiquities, or hostages. (Jabhat al-Nusra was restyled in July 2016—at which time it reportedly severed its links to al-Qa'ida—as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, and merged with other militant groups in January 2017 to form Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham.) In March 2015 the grouping Jama'atu Ahlus Sunnah lid Da'awati wal Jihad, 'Boko Haram', pledged allegiance to Islamic State, formally becoming Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP). (However, a splinter faction subsequently re-identified as Boko Haram.) In December 2015 the Security Council Committee decided that the al-Qa'ida Sanctions Committee would henceforth be known as the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da'esh) and al-Qa'ida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities Sanctions Committee, and urged member states to participate actively in maintaining and updating the relevant Sanctions List. The Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution in December 2015 aimed at disrupting revenues channelled to Islamic State from ransom payments, sales of oil and antiquities, and other criminal activities. From January 2016 the UN Secretary-General issued regular reports to the Security Council on Islamic State. A pattern of brutal murders of hostages by Islamic State was strongly condemned by the Council. In September 2017 the Security Council authorized the establishment of a team of international and Iraqi experts tasked with supporting the Iraqi authorities in holding Islamic State accountable for all war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide that it had perpetrated in Iraqi territory. In December the Iraqi authorities declared victory over Islamic State. The Secretary-General's eighth report on Islamic State, released in February 2019, observed that in Iraq it had transformed into a covert network. In the following month the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces recaptured Islamic State's final territorial stronghold, the Syrian town of Baghouz Fawqani, thereby broadly defeating Islamic State's five-year illegal caliphate. The Secretary-General subsequently reported, however, that since ceding territorial control in Syria, Islamic State had reconstituted itself as a clandestine network (as in Iraq, post-2017). The death of the Islamic State leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was announced by the US authorities in October 2019.

The Secretary-General's 10th report on Islamic State, issued in February 2020 stated that the grouping was continuing to attack infrastructure, officials and formal checkpoints in Iraq, while the Iraqi authorities had initiated an operation aimed at expelling remaining Islamic State fighters. Meanwhile, Islamic State activity had reportedly recently increased in Syria's Dayr al-Zawr and Hasakah Governorates. The report noted that in the Sahel, Somalia and Yemen al-Qa'ida-affiliated groupings prevailed, that Islamic State in Afghanistan was of great concern, that ISWAP remained a very active presence in the Lake Chad Basin during the second half of 2019 (and that it had reinforced its links to Islamic State in the Greater Sahara), and that Islamic State Central Africa Province represented an evolving threat. In August 2020 the 11th report of the Secretary-General noted a recent surge in Islamic State activity in both Iraq and Syria, and among some of its regional affiliates, against the background of the COVID-19 crisis. His 12th report, released in February 2021, stated that the socioeconomic disruption caused by the pandemic might embolden groups allied to Islamic State in conflict zones, and that a parallel recent surge in online Islamic State propaganda risked inspiring spontaneous attacks. He emphasized the strategic imperative, for maintaining peace and security, of resolving the situation of foreign terrorist fighters and family members who were still in Iraq and Syria. Some 10,000 Islamic State combatants were reported still to be active in the two countries (mainly based in Iraq), while principal camps in northeastern Syria were holding around 65,000 Islamic State fighters, wives, children, and affiliates, potentially fomenting a resurgent radicalization threat. Islamic State was reported to be funding its continuing clandestine insurgency in both countries by methods that included extorting money from local people and channelling remittances from abroad. Turning to West Africa, the report noted that during 2020 a significant attrition of Islamic State's forces had been observed in the Sahel, although its command and control structure there had not been diminished. Numerous attacks against both military and civilian targets had persisted in the Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad Basin areas. Continuing activity by Islamic State affiliates was reported in Somalia, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

By 31 December 2020 the ISIL (Da'esh) and al-Qa'ida-affiliated Sanctions List comprised 262 individuals and 89 entities.

Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC): internet www.un.org/sc/ctc; f. 2001, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) and, in March 2004, in accordance with Resolution 1535 (2004), elevated to a special subsidiary body; comprises a Plenary (composed of the Council member states) and a Bureau; assisted by an Executive Directorate (CTED, which became operational in Dec. 2005); since Sept. 2005 the CTC has also been mandated to monitor implementation of Resolution 1624 (2005), concerning incitement to commit acts of terrorism; supports the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, adopted by UN mem. states in Sept. 2006; issued the Madrid Guiding Principles in 2015, aimed at supporting mem. states in stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters; adopted in April 2016 a database of contacts for third-party terrorist asset freezing requests; supports the implementation of the 2018 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact; Exec. Dir Counter-Terrorism Exec. Directorate MICHÈLE CONINSX (Belgium).

SELECTED SITUATIONS ON THE COUNCIL'S FORMAL AGENDA

In early 2021 consideration of the military takeover in Myanmar (at the beginning of February), peace consolidation in West Africa, the situations in, *inter alia*, Colombia, Central African Republic, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Libya, Syria and Yemen, and the ongoing COVID-19 crisis figured prominently on the Council's formal agenda.

Iraq: In January 2014 the Council adopted a presidential statement deploring ongoing fighting between al-Qa'ida-affiliated militants and pro-government forces in Iraq's al-Anbar province, which by then had prompted more than 300,000 people to leave their homes. In mid-June the Council deplored in the strongest terms the continuing violent uprising by Islamist insurgents that had escalated in that month in the northern city of Mosul, and was resulting in significant fatalities and causing massive population displacement. The Council urged the Iraq authorities and other partners to work with the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief to affected areas. The Council also condemned the kidnapping by Islamist insurgents of Mosul-based Turkish diplomats. In June the so-called Islamic State grouping unilaterally declared a caliphate in parts of Iraq and Syria, imposing upon civilians adherence to its severe interpretation of Islamic *Shari'a* law. In late July the Council issued a statement that condemned, in the strongest terms, the persecution by the Islamist militants of Christians and other minority groups in northern Iraq. Soon afterwards two senior UN special rapporteurs on human rights

(appointed by the UN Human Rights Council) accused the insurgents of perpetrating gross violations of human rights, possibly including war crimes and crimes against humanity, and warned that religious and ethnic minorities in Iraq were suffering 'devastating and irreversible' effects of the conflict. In October UN rapporteurs found that some 5,000 members of the Yazidi community had been massacred by Islamic State in northern Iraq in August, and that between 5,000 and 7,000 Yazidi women had been captured by the grouping. In September a US-led international coalition initiated operations against Islamic State in Iraq, as well as in Syria. Briefing the UN Security Council in July 2015 on conditions in Iraq, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) reported that one-third of the country remained under Islamic State control, and emphasized UNAMI's valuable role, including in providing support with regard to the high number of internally displaced persons (IDPs). In August Security Council members condemned the use of sexual violence as a tactic of warfare in the conflict in Iraq and Syria, with a particular focus on sexual enslavement and forced marriage.

In February 2016 the SRSG for Iraq, reporting to the Council, noted that in late 2015 US-backed Iraqi and Kurdish *peshmerga* forces had undertaken successful offensives in Baiji, Sinjar and Ramadi to reclaim land from Islamic State. He emphasized the importance of stabilizing liberated areas and facilitating the safe return of IDPs, including through de-mining activities. In July 2016, addressing the Security Council, the SRSG, noting recent strategic victories against Islamic State in Fallujah and Qayyarah, recommended that political planning should be undertaken for Iraq in the post-Islamic State era. An operation to liberate Mosul—undertaken by the Iraqi security forces, the *peshmerga*, local combatants, and popular mobilization forces (established in June 2014 as a predominantly Shi'a parallel Iraqi paramilitary force), with the support of the international coalition against Islamic State—commenced in mid-October 2016; a second phase of the operation was initiated in late December. In July 2017 the Iraqi authorities declared that Mosul had been liberated. In the following month the UN Security Council requested the UN Secretary-General to establish a mechanism—subsequently named the UN Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/ISIL (UNITAD)—which was tasked with collecting evidence of acts committed by Islamic State over the period 2014–17 that might amount to crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide. The Iraqi Prime Minister declared final victory over Islamic State on 9 December. The Security Council repeatedly condemned in the strongest terms Islamic State terrorist atrocities perpetrated in Iraq, resulting in many thousands of civilian casualties, and deplored Islamic State's destruction, and looting for monetary gain, of cultural heritage in Iraq.

In December 2019 the Security Council issued a statement in which it stated grave concern at the recent killing, maiming and arrests of unarmed protesters in Iraq. The Council also expressed concern over extrajudicial killings and kidnappings in that country. The Council issued a statement in September 2020 welcoming the formation of a new Government of Iraq under the premiership of Mustafa al-Kadhimi, and also welcoming a pledge by the Iraqi authorities to introduce reforms, and to address the COVID-19 crisis. In January 2021 the Council condemned in the strongest terms an Islamic State terrorist attack on Baghdad that had resulted in 32 fatalities and had caused injuries to at least 110 people.

In May 2021 the Head of UNITAD announced the completion of initial investigations into Islamic State attacks that had been perpetrated against the Yazidi community in Sinjar (northern Iraq), and into the mass killing of unarmed military cadets and personnel at the Tikrit Air Academy in June 2014, and reported that 'clear and convincing evidence' had been established that genocide had been perpetrated against the Yazidis.

A compensation fund established by the Council in May 1991 to assist victims of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait had disbursed around US $47,800m. to more than 1.5m. claimants by the end of 2014, at which time the Iraq Government's payments into the fund were temporarily suspended, owing to the budgetary challenges presented by the ongoing extreme insecurity in the country.

In February 2019 the Council adopted a presidential statement that welcomed ongoing co-operation between Iraq and Kuwait concerning the issue of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and the return of missing Kuwaiti property, including national archives.

Israel and Palestine: The Council provides a forum for discussion of the situation in the Middle East and supports a comprehensive and just settlement to the situation. In March 2002 the Council adopted Resolution 1397, which envisaged two separate states of Israel and Palestine existing within secure and recognized borders. In November 2003 the Council endorsed the adoption, in April, by the so-called Quartet comprising (as 'Principals') envoys from the UN, the EU, Russia and the USA of a 'performance-based roadmap to a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict'.

In July 2014, following an escalation of tensions, the Israel Defense Forces initiated an intensive land, air and sea military operation against Gaza. The Security Council held an emergency meeting, which called for an immediate permanent ceasefire in Gaza, and for respect for international humanitarian law. In late August, as a result of Egyptian-mediated talks, Israel and Hamas concluded an agreement on a long-term truce in Gaza, and the Israeli authorities agreed to ease the Israeli blockade of the territory to permit access for humanitarian assistance and building materials. In mid-September the UN Special Co-ordinator for the Middle East Peace Process briefed the Security Council that his Office had negotiated a triangular agreement between the UN and the Palestinian and Israeli authorities on finalizing a mechanism that would enable the comprehensive rehabilitation of shelters and the commencement of large-scale reconstruction activities in Gaza. A report assessing the status of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that was released in July 2015 by the Quartet called on the Israeli authorities to halt the construction and expansion of settlements, and to cease designating territory as being exclusively for Israelis and denying development permits to Palestinians. The Palestinian authorities were urged not to incite violence and to condemn clearly all acts of terrorism. In December the Security Council adopted Resolution 2334, which reaffirmed that under international law there was no validity to the establishment by Israel of settlements in Palestinian territory occupied since 1967. In February 2017 the newly inaugurated US Administration announced that the USA's support for a peaceful resolution to the Israel-Palestine conflict would no longer be restricted to pursuing only a two-state solution. In mid-December, at the behest of eight of its 15 members, the Council convened an emergency meeting to address a controversial recent decision of the US Administration to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, Italy and Sweden and the UK issued a joint statement that denounced the US decision, noting that this was not in line with resolutions of the Council and was not conducive to securing peace in the region. An emergency meeting of the Security Council convened in March 2018 to address a recent escalation of violence in Gaza, near the border with Israel, urged restraint on both sides. In mid-May the UN Secretary-General expressed profound concern and urged maximum restraint by the Israeli security forces and by Hamas in view of a sharp escalation of violence in Gaza, arising from Palestinian demonstrations against the repositioning in that month of the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, and the ongoing 'Great March of Return' wave of protests. On 1 June a draft Security Council resolution (proposed by Kuwait) that condemned recent Israeli military conduct at the Gaza border was vetoed by the USA, on the grounds that it did not hold Hamas to accountability. In late March 2019 an emergency meeting of the Council was convened following a unilateral proclamation by the US President recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. The majority of Council members upheld their existing position that the land was illegally occupied by Israel and expressed regret at the US decision.

Addressing the Council at an open briefing in early February 2020, the leader of the Palestinian (National) Council, Mahmoud Abbas, strongly rejected a recent controversial US proposal aimed at resolving the Palestine–Israel conflict (by, *inter alia*, making Jerusalem the 'undivided' capital of Israel, legalizing illegally built Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and enabling the annexation of parts of the West Bank)—describing it as a US-Israeli initiative that annulled Palestinians' rights. He asked that it should not be taken forward

as an international reference. At that event the UN Secretary-General reiterated the full support of the UN for a two-state solution. At an open debate convened by the Council in October the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process stated concern over a decision by Israel to endorse the construction of almost 5,000 housing units in the West Bank. He also requested the Palestinian (National) Authority to resume co-operation with Israel (suspended since May) on security and financial matters, as a means of enhancing efforts to overcome the COVID-19 crisis; co-operation was resumed shortly afterwards.

In mid-May 2021 the Council convened a series of emergency meetings to address an intensive escalation of Hamas–Israeli conflict, which, by the time an Egypt-mediated ceasefire entered into effect on 21 May, had resulted in a reported 242 Palestinian fatalities (of whom 65 were children), and 12 Israeli deaths (including two children) (see UNRWA). The USA reportedly repeatedly blocked efforts by Council members to issue a collective statement that would have condemned the force of Israel's military response and called for a ceasefire. On 22 May the Council issued its first statement on the crisis, in which it urged full adherence to the ceasefire.

Libya: In March 2014 the Security Council adopted a resolution that imposed punitive measures on vessels (designated by the Sanctions Committee on Libya) that were illegally transporting crude petroleum from Libya. In August the Council adopted Resolution 2174, which demanded an immediate ceasefire in Libya and the initiation of inclusive political dialogue on achieving a negotiated settlement to the worsening national crisis. The Council strongly condemned the murder in February 2015, in Libya, of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians by a grouping claiming affiliation to Islamic State. It reiterated its strong condemnation of the persecution of communities and individuals on the grounds of religion or belief. During April the Council issued condemnations of the murder by Islamist militants of more than 30 Coptic Christians, and of terrorist attacks perpetrated against the diplomatic missions of Morocco and the Republic of Korea in Tripoli. In October the Council welcomed the conclusion by participants in the UN-facilitated Libyan Political Dialogue of a political agreement on establishing a Government of National Accord (GNA), and urged all parties to sign the document. The so-called Libyan Political Agreement was formally adopted at a gathering convened in mid-December, in Skhirat, Morocco. Reporting at the end of August 2018 on efforts to halt people trafficking and smuggling across the Mediterranean, the Secretary-General noted that increased interceptions of illegal shipments of people had led to an increase in the number of migrants lingering in detention in Libya. In February 2020 the Council adopted a resolution (with Russia abstaining) that endorsed the outcome of a conference on Libya, held in Berlin, Germany, in mid-January, with participation by the UN Secretary-General, the heads of state or of government of Germany, France, Russia, Turkey and the UK, and also by the opposing sides in the Libyan conflict—at which the foreign leaders pledged not to interfere in Libya's civil war, and adopted a roadmap for future UN-sponsored negotiations aimed at achieving a ceasefire between the opposing militaries of the Tripoli-based official Government of National Unity and the East Libya-based Libyan National Army, led by Gen. Khalifa Haftar. The Council also recognized the significant role of the African Union (AU) and League of Arab States in resolving the conflict, but emphasized deep concern at terrorist groups' and mercenaries' activities in Libya. Reports emerged in May that significant numbers of Russian mercenaries were assisting Gen. Haftar's military campaign. From early June Haftar's forces retreated from Tripoli, and GNA forces regained full control of the city. On 20 July the Egyptian legislature authorized the deployment of troops to support Haftar; it was envisaged that this development risked significantly escalating the conflict. On 21 August, however, both sides announced a ceasefire. In October a UN facilitated full, nationwide, permanent and comprehensive ceasefire accord was adopted. This also required all foreign troops and mercenaries to leave Libya before the end of January 2021. On 26 October 2020 the inaugural virtual session was convened of an inclusive Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), aimed at achieving consensus on governance arrangements that were to lead to national elections. In February 2021 the Council issued a statement welcoming an agreement achieved in January by the LPDF (following a two-month deadlock) for a process under which an interim consensual unified executive—comprising a Prime Minister and representatives of the eastern and western regions—would be nominated to manage Libya pending presidential and parliamentary elections that were scheduled to take place in December.

Syria: In February 2012 the Secretaries-General of the UN and of the Arab League appointed Kofi Annan—formerly the UN Secretary-General—as their Joint Special Envoy on the Syrian Crisis. A six-point peace plan proposed in March by Annan was accepted, towards the end of that month, by the Syrian Government. In April the Security Council unanimously authorized the establishment of the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), comprising some 300 unarmed observers to monitor a ceasefire by all parties to the Syrian violence. The Security Council, while united behind the six-point plan, remained divided in its approach to the situation, with China and Russia refusing to countenance any external actions aimed at influencing regime change in Syria. At the end of June the Secretaries-General of the UN and the Arab League, as well as the ministers responsible for foreign affairs of China, France, Russia, the UK, the USA, Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, gathered in Geneva, Switzerland, as the 'Action Group for Syria', under Annan's chairmanship. The Group issued the Geneva Communiqué, detailing several future key steps towards resolving the crisis in Syria, starting with the establishment of a transitional governing body. In mid-July, by which time the violence in Syria had further intensified, and the situation was deemed to be a civil war, China and Russia voted against a draft Council resolution that would have imposed sanctions on the Syrian regime. On 2 August, in view of the failure of the parties to the Syrian conflict to adhere to the six-point peace plan, and of the divisions within the Security Council over Syria, Annan announced that he would step down as Joint Special Envoy at the end of that month. The UN Secretary-General expressed regret concerning the divisions that were weakening the collective authority of the Council. The Security Council decided in mid-August not to extend the mandate of UNSMIS, and the mission was terminated. In December a Joint Special Representative of the UN and the Arab League (appointed in September) initiated trilateral discussions with the USA and Russia in an attempt to advance possible solutions for an end to the hostilities.

In August 2013 the alleged use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syrian rebel-held areas prompted widespread international condemnation. None the less, the Security Council P-5 remained deeply divided over the situation. President Obama of the USA had previously, in August 2012, stated that the use in the conflict of chemical or biological weaponry by the Syrian Government would represent the transgression of a 'red line' that might provoke US military intervention, while following the August 2013 atrocity the French and UK Governments indicated that the level of severity of the ongoing humanitarian crisis might necessitate international military action against the Syrian regime even without a UN mandate. The Chinese and Russian authorities, however, urged restraint, with Russia maintaining that any military intervention against Syria without a mandate from the Security Council would represent a grave violation of international law.

In September 2013 a weapons inspection team (comprising experts from the WHO and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons—OPCW) issued a report which found 'clear and convincing evidence' of the use of surface-to-surface rockets containing sarin gas in Ghouta, in August, and that chemical weapons had been used on a relatively large scale generally during the Syrian conflict, including against children. On 27 September intensive diplomatic efforts culminated in the Security Council adopting, unanimously, Resolution 2118, which aimed to eliminate Syria's chemical weapons and initiate a Syrian-led peace process to end the conflict. The resolution authorized the immediate implementation of a weapons monitoring and destruction plan, formulated by the OPCW, and the imposition of punitive measures if any party attempts to use, develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, retain, or transfer chemical weapons. In mid-October the Security Council authorized the deployment of a joint UN-OPCW mission tasked with

implementing Resolution 2118, including supervising the destruction by the Syrian authorities of Syria's chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities. It was announced in June 2014 that the joint UN-OPCW mission had completed the removal of declared chemical weapons material from Syria. In August the material was destroyed, and the mission was terminated at the end of September.

In August 2015 the Security Council established a Joint UN-OPCW Investigative Mechanism, tasked with identifying 'individuals, entities, groups, or governments involved in the use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical' in Syria, with a view to holding such actors accountable. In late October 2017 Russia (as well as the then non-permanent Council member state Bolivia) vetoed—and China and Kazakhstan abstained from voting on—a proposed resolution that was to have extended the mandate of the Mechanism for a further year. The seventh report of the Mechanism, which was issued shortly afterwards, apportioned blame to the Syrian regime for the sarin gas attack that had been perpetrated against Khan Sheikhoun in April. In mid-November Russia again vetoed the renewal of the Mechanism's mandate.

In mid-April 2018—reacting to air strikes conducted without a Security Council mandate by the USA, France and the UK to target chemical weapons manufacturing facilities and capabilities in Syria—the UN Secretary-General emphasized UN member states' obligation to act in matters of peace and security in accordance with the UN Charter, and urged the Council to unite over demanding accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. In December the Security Council approved a resolution renewing longstanding authorization for cross-border and cross-line humanitarian access to Syria. In March 2019 the OPCW transmitted to the Council a final report on an alleged chemical weapons attack on civilians in Douma, Eastern Syria, perpetrated in April 2018; in this it found reasonable grounds to believe that a toxic chemical (containing reactive chlorine) had indeed been used as a weapon. In October 2019 the Security Council President issued a statement welcoming the forthcoming establishment, under UN auspices, of an inclusive Syrian-led committee tasked with drafting a new Constitution for Syria. In January 2020 the Security Council again renewed authorization for cross-border and cross-line humanitarian access to Syria; two of the hitherto four humanitarian border crossings were, however, terminated. In accordance with a subsequent resolution approved in July a further humanitarian border crossing was closed. In June only the use of one crossing (Bab al-Hawa, at the Syria–Turkey border) was renewed, until July 2021. In May 2021 the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs reported to the Security Council that Syria had not been able to account fully to the OPCW for the presence of a recently detected chemical agent.

Afghanistan: The Security Council addresses the situation in Afghanistan at regular intervals. In June 2012 the Council held a debate on Afghanistan at which the SRSG and Head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA, established in March 2002) urged full international support for the transition ('Inteqal') to Afghan responsibility and ownership of its own governance, security and development efforts. In October 2013 the Council extended for the last time, until 31 December 2014, the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (which had been authorized by the Council in 2001). In March 2015 the Security Council welcomed the initiation of Afghanistan's Decade of Transformation (2015–24). In December 2018 the Security Council issued a presidential statement that welcomed the outcome of the Geneva Conference on Afghanistan that had been convened jointly by the Afghanistan Government and the UN in late November, with the aim of renewing partnership and co-operation between Afghanistan and the international community. In March 2020 the Council unanimously adopted a resolution which endorsed a recent joint US-Afghan declaration on peace, and an accord focused on achieving peace that had been concluded between the US Administration and Afghanistan's Taliban movement.

Ukraine: In February 2014 the Council convened an emergency session to discuss the political unrest in Ukraine and escalation of tensions following the movement of Russian troops into the autonomous region of Crimea. Further 'urgent' meetings of the Council were convened in early March. The UN Secretary-General expressed deep concern at a referendum held in mid-March (in which more than 95% of voters supported Crimean secession), and encouraged all parties to pursue a negotiated solution guided by the principles of the UN Charter, including respecting the unity and sovereignty of Ukraine; shortly afterwards he visited both Russia and Ukraine. In mid-April an emergency session of the Council was held, at Russia's request, to address the escalation in eastern Ukraine of unrest between the national security forces and armed supporters of union with Russia. In mid-July, in response to the apparently deliberate shooting down of a Malaysia Airlines passenger flight over Donetsk Oblast, eastern Ukraine, that resulted in 298 fatalities, the Council unanimously adopted a resolution strongly condemning the atrocity, calling for an international investigation into the situation, and demanding that armed groups permit full access by international investigators to the crash site. In February 2015 an emergency meeting of the Council on the situation in Ukraine adopted a resolution endorsing the recently concluded 'Minsk II' package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements (that had been adopted in September 2014 by the parties to the conflict). In June 2018 the Council adopted a presidential statement (the first formal Council opinion on the situation in Ukraine since February 2015) that expressed grave concern on persistent ceasefire violations in eastern Ukraine, and urged all parties to the conflict there to recommit to the Minsk Agreements. At an 'Arria formula' (informal) virtual meeting of the Security Council that was hosted by Russia in May 2020, several local figures defended the quality of the human rights situation in Crimea. Many representatives of member states, however, reiterated condemnation of the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia.

Myanmar: In early February 2021, in response to the overthrow of the Myanma Government by a military junta, the Security Council issued a statement that stressed the need for dialogue and for continued support for the democratic transition process that had been initiated five years previously in that country, and urged the release of all detainees.

Sub-Saharan Africa: In January 2012 the Council endorsed a Strategic Concept for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which had been established by the AU in January 2007, with a mandate to contribute to the political stabilization of Somalia, and was, from January 2009, provided with logistics assistance by the UN Support Office for AMISOM. In February 2012 the Council voted unanimously further to strengthen the mission, to comprise 17,700 troops, and to expand its areas of operation. The resolution also banned trade in charcoal with Somalia, having identified that commodity as a significant source of revenue for militants. The Council decided that the arms embargo on Somalia (first imposed in 1992) would not apply to equipment (excepting heavy weaponry) to be used for the development of the national security forces. In November 2013 the Council requested the AU to increase AMISOM's military strength to a maximum of 22,126 uniformed personnel, with a view to improving its efficacy against the ongoing insurgency of al-Shabaab militants.

In May 2013 the Council authorized the establishment of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), to provide strategic policy advice on peacebuilding and state building; to assist the Government with capacity building and with the co-ordination of international support; and to monitor and help to prevent human rights abuses. The Council has condemned a series of terrorist attacks by al-Shabaab, including the targeted assassination of Somali parliamentarians. In August 2020 the Council authorized an extension of UNSOM's mandate until 31 August 2021.

In November 2018 the Council lifted arms embargoes, asset freezes, travel bans and targeted sanctions against Eritrea that had been imposed by various Resolutions from 2009.

In late November 2020 the Council met informally to discuss the ongoing conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray region where, earlier in the month, federal Ethiopian troops had launched a major offensive to suppress Tigrayan nationalists (who, in September, in defiance of the central federal Ethiopian Government, had held a prohibited regional election). In February 2021 the Council convened a debate to address the dire humanitarian situation and impact on civilians of warfare in Tigray;

participants emphasized the need for greater ease of humanitarian access.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

In recent years the Council has made statements, adopted resolutions and held open debates on a number of other ongoing themes, including the protection of civilians, in particular children, from the effects of armed conflict; curbing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons; the role of the UN in supporting justice and the rule of law; security sector reform; non-proliferation of WMD; the relationship between the Council and regional organizations; the role of the Council in addressing humanitarian crises; and the role of the UN in post-conflict national reconciliation.

A Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), established in January 2009 to facilitate discussion and the co-ordination of actions among states and organizations engaged in suppressing piracy off the coast of Somalia, reports periodically on its progress to the Security Council. A Virtual Legal Forum (also known as the Piracy Legal Forum, and accessible at www.piracylegalforum.org), comprising a group of legal experts from CGPCS member states, was established in 2014 to analyse piracy related legal issues and provide related legal guidance.

In April 2015 the Council released a statement deploring recent shipwrecks in the Mediterranean that had resulted in the deaths of numerous migrants who had been attempting to reach Europe. Expressing concern at the implications for regional stability posed by the smuggling of migrants, the Council called for the full implementation of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime's Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air. In October the Council authorized member states to intercept any vessel in Libyan coastal waters (including dinghies, rafts and inflatable boats) that was suspected of smuggling or trafficking migrants.

OTHER SPECIAL SUBSIDIARY BODIES

The Security Council has established **Standing Committees** covering the admission of new members, rules of procedure, holding meetings away from headquarters, and on the creation of a category of associate membership. **Ad hoc Committees**, comprising all Council members and meeting in closed session, are established as needed.

1540 Committee: internet www.un.org/en/sc/1540; f. 2004, pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004) on preventing the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, with a focus on deterring their acquisition by non-state actors; it is supported by a Group of Experts; Chair. Juan Ramón de la Fuente Ramírez (Mexico).

The UN **Peacebuilding Commission**, which was inaugurated in June 2006, its establishment having been authorized by the Security Council and General Assembly in December 2005, is a subsidiary advisory body of both the Council and Assembly.

The Council also establishes **Working Groups** to assist its activities. In 2021 the following were active:

Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa;

Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions;

Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict established pursuant to Resolution 1612 (2005);

Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations;

Working Group established pursuant to Resolution 1566 (2004): mandated to consider practical measures to be imposed upon individuals, groups or entities involved in or associated with terrorist activities, other than those designated by the Islamic State (Da'esh) and al-Qa'ida Sanctions Committee; and the possibility of establishing an international fund to compensate victims of terrorist acts and their families.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS (IGN) ON SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

The allocation of the Security Council's five permanent seats reflects the global balance of power as it was in the aftermath of the Second World War. It is envisaged that—by establishing a more equitable representation of regions and also between advanced and developing economies, and by generally expanding participation—reforms to the composition of the Council would better reflect modern geopolitical priorities and realities, and would thereby enhance the authority and perceived legitimacy of the Council's decisions. However, the various specific visions that have emerged have not proved easily reconcilable. The IGN were initiated in February 2009, under the auspices of the UN General Assembly, and in September 2015 the General Assembly adopted (unanimously)—with a view to clarifying the process and underpinning further discussions—an initial framework document covering the various visions for reform. Subsequently, however, the process (which was being chaired during 2021 by Poland and Qatar) failed to advance significantly. In January 2021 the G4 countries (see below for a selection of the principal informal negotiating groups) stated dissatisfaction with the progress of the negotiations and doubts over the viability of their future, while strongly emphasizing the need for the ongoing process not to deviate from one agreed single text and to be consistently governed by rules of procedure that had been established by the General Assembly.

African Group: The African Union has contended that six new permanent Security Council seats, with veto privilege, should be established—including two occupied by African states; and that the number of non-permanent seats should be increased from 10 to 15.

Arab Group: The Arab Group has proposed that a permanent seat should be allocated to one of its 22 members, and has appealed for a minimum of two non-permanent seats for Arab states.

Group of Four (G4): The countries in the G4 negotiating group—Brazil, India, Japan and Germany—have each requested the status of permanent members of the Council, as well as advocating for the creation of permanent seats for two African member states, an expansion of the number of non-permanent seats, and a suspension 'for a period of time' of veto privilege.

L69: The so-called L69 grouping advocates for greater representation on the Security Council for developing states, including small island developing states (which have proposed collective non-permanent formal representation on the Council).

Uniting for Consensus: Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Italy, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and Turkey have collectively advocated for maintaining the status quo with regard to the existing five permanent seats, but for doubling to 20 of the number non-permanent seats, with the following proposed regional distribution: Africa (representation for six states); Asia-Pacific (five); Latin America and the Caribbean (four); Western Europe and Others (three; the 'others' covering: Oceania, North America and Western Asia); Eastern Europe (two).

An Accountability, Coherence, Transparency (ACT) group advocates for reformed working methods within the Council, and for more efficient co-ordination between the Security Council and other UN organs and to reform working methods.

International Tribunals

INTERNATIONAL RESIDUAL MECHANISM FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS—IRMCT

The Mechanism was established by Security Council Resolution 1966 (December 2010) to undertake some essential functions of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia (also referred to as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia—ICTY) and of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) pending and after their closure. The IRMCT comprises a branch that is based in Arusha, Tanzania (which commenced operations on 1 July 2012), and a branch based in The Hague, Netherlands (operational from 1 July 2013).

The Mechanism is mandated to conduct any appeals against Tribunal judgments filed following its entry into operation.

The ICTY was established in May 1993 by Security Council Resolution 827, and was inaugurated in The Hague, Netherlands, in November. The first trial proceedings commenced in May 1996. Having completed its scheduled work, the ICTY closed formally on 31 December 2017. The Tribunal finalized proceedings against 161 indictees, including Bosnian Serb political and military leaders and the President of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević (who died in the custody of the Court in March 2006). Of those who appeared before it, 19 were acquitted, 90 received a final guilty sentence, and 13 were referred to national jurisdictions. The ICTY assisted with the establishment of the War Crimes Chamber within the Bosnia and Herzegovina state court, which became operational in March 2005, and also helped Croatia to strengthen its national judicial capacity to enable war crimes to be prosecuted within that country.

In March 2019 the Appeals Chamber of the IRMCT ruled against an appeal by Radovan Karadžić (sentenced in March 2016 to charges including the murder of 7,000 Muslim men and boys at Srebreniča in 1995); his sentence was extended from 40 years to lifelong imprisonment. In June 2021 an appeal by Ratko Mladić (found guilty in November 2017 of genocide and crimes against humanity) was dismissed. At that time two men convicted by the ICTY were being retried before the Mechanism (the closing arguments in that case were heard in April 2021).

The ICTR, established in November 1994 by Security Council Resolution 955 to prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of humanitarian law that had been committed during that year in Rwanda, as well as by Rwandans in neighbouring states, was terminated on 31 December 2015. During the course of its operations the ICTR indicted 95 individuals (with two indictments subsequently withdrawn), and—although eight indictees evaded capture—proceedings against 85 of the accused reached conclusion (including five cases that were transferred to other jurisdictions: two to France and three to Rwanda). Some 14 accused were acquitted by the Tribunal. With regard to the outstanding ICTR indictments, in view of the termination of the Tribunal, the Mechanism assumed responsibility for three of the cases, while the unresolved cases of a further five fugitives were transferred to Rwandan jurisdiction. In mid-May 2020 the French authorities arrested Félicien Kabuga, who had been indicted by the ICTR in 1997 on charges relating to genocide and crimes against humanity, including providing financial backing to the perpetrators of the Rwandan atrocities. Shortly afterwards the IRMCT confirmed that the mortal remains of a second fugitive from justice, Augustin Bizimana, a senior minister in Rwanda's interim government during the 1994 genocide, had been identified, having been discovered at a grave site at Pointe Noire, Republic of the Congo. Kabuga was transferred into the custody of the Mechanism in late October 2020, and appeared for the first time there in November. A pre-trial work plan for the Kabuga case was announced in mid-2021. Six indictees remained at liberty at that time; five were to be transferred to Rwandan jurisdiction, while one, Protais Mpiranya, who had been a senior commander of the Presidential Guard of the Rwandan Armed Forces during the genocide, was to be tried by the Mechanism. Intelligence activities to help track and identify the fugitives were being undertaken by a specialist IRMCT team.

President of the Mechanism: CARMEL AGIUS (Malta).

Prosecutor of the Mechanism: SERGE BRAMMERTZ (Belgium).

Registrar of the Mechanism: ABUBACARR MARIE TAMBADOU (The Gambia).

Security Council Resolutions

Resolution 1: Adopted 25 Jan. 1946. Agreed to convene the Military Staff Committee established by the UN to provide advice and assistance to the Security Council and comprising the Chiefs of Staff of permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives.

Resolution 8: Adopted 29 Aug. 1946. Endorsed the admission of Afghanistan, Iceland and Sweden to the UN.

Resolution 13: Adopted 12 Dec. 1946. Endorsed the admission of Thailand to the UN.

Resolution 16: Adopted 10 Jan. 1947. Constituted a Free Territory of Trieste (in Italy).

Resolution 21: Adopted 2 April 1947. Designated the Pacific Islands, formerly held under a Japanese mandate, as a strategic area and placed them under the International Trusteeship System, with the USA as administering authority.

Resolution 27: Adopted 1 Aug. 1947. Requested that Indonesia and the Netherlands observe an immediate ceasefire and resolve their conflict peacefully.

Resolution 29: Adopted 12 Aug. 1947. Endorsed the admission of Pakistan and Yemen to the UN.

Resolution 30: Adopted 25 Aug. 1947. Recognized measures taken by the Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands to comply with Resolution 27, a statement by the Netherlands of its intention to request career consuls in Batavia (Jakarta) to report on the situation in Indonesia and to organize a sovereign, democratic United States of Indonesia, and a request by Indonesia for the deployment of a Commission of Observers.

Resolution 35: Adopted 3 Oct. 1947. Requested that the UN Secretary-General deploy a three-member Committee of Good Offices to facilitate a settlement between Indonesia and the Netherlands.

Resolution 38: Adopted 17 Jan. 1948. Requested the Governments of India and Pakistan to implement measures to improve the situation in the disputed Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Resolution 39: Adopted 20 Jan. 1948. Established a three-member investigatory and mediatory Commission for India and Pakistan, with one member to be selected by the Government of India and one by the Government of Pakistan, for deployment to the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Resolution 41: Adopted 28 Feb. 1948. Welcomed the Truce Agreement signed by the Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands.

Resolution 43: Adopted 1 April 1948. Requested the Arab and Jewish communities to halt the violent disorder in Palestine. Requested the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee to make available a representative to facilitate a truce.

Resolution 45: Adopted 10 April 1948. Endorsed the admission of Burma (Myanmar) to the UN.

Resolution 46: Adopted 17 April 1948. Requested all parties involved in the situation in Palestine and the governments of member states to facilitate a truce by means of the cessation of military activity, co-operation with the UK in its role as the administering authority, and the avoidance of actions likely to obstruct or damage Holy Places in Palestine.

Resolution 47: Adopted 21 April 1948. Increased membership of the Commission for India and Pakistan to five, and requested its immediate deployment. Made recommendations for the restoration of peace to the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir, and requested that the Indian Government establish a Plebiscite Administration to hold a popular vote on the accession of the state to India or Pakistan. Authorized the Commission to establish a military observer group in Jammu and Kashmir.

Resolution 48: Adopted 23 April 1948. Established a Security Council Truce Commission for Palestine, to monitor the implementation of Resolution 46.

Resolution 49: Adopted 22 May 1948. Demanded that a ceasefire be observed in Palestine. Requested all parties to facilitate the work of a UN Mediator appointed by the General Assembly.

Resolution 50: Adopted 29 May 1948. Requested all those involved in the situation in Palestine to observe a ceasefire for a four-week period. Urged governments to refrain from sending troops or weapons to the area. Stated that any violation of the ceasefire could lead to action under the provisions of the Charter of the UN. Agreed to dispatch a number of military observers to Palestine to assist the UN Mediator and the Security Council Truce Commission.

Resolution 54: Adopted 15 July 1948. Determined that the situation in Palestine constituted a threat to peace under Article 39 of the UN Charter. Requested all those involved to co-operate

with the UN Mediator in Palestine and to observe an immediate ceasefire. Requested the UN Mediator in Palestine to monitor the truce and investigate alleged breaches of the ceasefire.

Resolution 56: Adopted 19 Aug. 1948. Declared the authorities involved in the situation in Palestine to be responsible for preventing all violations of the truce and obliged them to convict any person acting in breach of it.

Resolution 57: Adopted 18 Sept. 1948. Expressed shock at the assassination of the UN Mediator in Palestine.

Resolution 61: Adopted 4 Nov. 1948. Requested governments involved in the situation in Palestine to withdraw any forces which had advanced beyond demarcation lines fixed by the Acting Mediator in Palestine, and to establish demilitarized, neutral zones to ensure the full observance of the ceasefire. Appointed a five-member Committee to advise the Acting Mediator.

Resolution 62: Adopted 16 Nov. 1948. Imposed an armistice in Palestine, with the establishment of permanent demarcation lines.

Resolution 63: Adopted 24 Dec. 1948. Expressed concern at the resumption of hostilities in Indonesia, and requested the Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands to observe an immediate ceasefire. Demanded the release of the President of Indonesia and other political detainees.

Resolution 66: Adopted 29 Dec. 1948. Ordered the observation of an immediate ceasefire in Palestine and the implementation of Resolution 61, following an outbreak of hostilities on 22 Dec.

Resolution 67: Adopted 28 Jan. 1949. Demanded the cessation of military operations by Indonesia and the Netherlands and the release of all political prisoners. Recommended the establishment of an interim federal government by 15 March, the holding of elections to select representatives to an Indonesian constituent assembly by 1 Oct. and the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia by 1 July 1950. Decided that the Committee of Good Offices was to become the UN Commission for Indonesia, to be assisted by the Consular Committee.

Resolution 69: Adopted 4 March 1949. Endorsed the admission of Israel to the UN.

Resolution 73: Adopted 11 Aug. 1949. Requested all those involved in the conflict in Palestine to support the work of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine and observe an unconditional ceasefire. Concluded that the Armistice Agreements reached superseded Resolutions 50 and 54. Relieved the Acting Mediator in Palestine from further duties and confirmed that the implementation of each agreement was to be monitored by a Mixed Armistice Commission, the chairman of which was to be the Chief of Staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Palestine, or his representative.

Resolution 80: Adopted 14 March 1950. Commended the Governments of India and Pakistan for effecting a cessation of hostilities, establishing a ceasefire line and agreeing upon the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator for the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. Requested the two sides to undertake a demilitarization programme and to appoint a UN Representative to assume the duties of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan.

Resolution 82: Adopted 25 June 1950. Condemned the invasion of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and demanded an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of troops from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). Requested the UN Commission on Korea to monitor the situation.

Resolution 83: Adopted 27 June 1950. Appealed for assistance to enable South Korea to repel North Korean forces, and to restore peace and stability to the region.

Resolution 84: Adopted 7 July 1950. Welcomed the prompt military and other assistance provided to South Korea by member states. Recommended that the military forces provided form a unified command under the USA.

Resolution 85: Adopted 31 July 1950. Requested the unified force (officially entitled the UN Command) to determine the humanitarian needs of the population of North Korea.

Resolution 86: Adopted 26 Sept. 1950. Endorsed the admission of Indonesia to the UN.

Resolution 89: Adopted 17 Nov. 1950. Reminded all parties to the situation in Palestine to resolve disputes according to the procedures established by the Armistice Agreements, which envisaged permanent peace for Palestine.

Resolution 91: Adopted 30 March 1951. Instructed the UN Representative for India and Pakistan to effect the demilitarization of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir, on the basis of resolutions made by the UN Commission for India and Pakistan in Aug. 1948 and Jan. 1949.

Resolution 92: Adopted 8 May 1951. Expressed concern at the resumption of violence in the demilitarized zone established by the Israel–Syria Armistice Agreement of 20 July 1949, and demanded that an immediate ceasefire be observed.

Resolution 93: Adopted 18 May 1951. Instructed the Governments of Israel and Syria strictly to observe their Armistice Agreement and to inform the Mixed Armistice Commission of any grievances.

Resolution 95: Adopted 1 Sept. 1951. Requested the Egyptian Government to remove restrictions imposed on the movement of commercial ships through the Suez Canal to Israeli and other ports in contravention of the Egypt–Israel Armistice Agreement.

Resolution 96: Adopted 10 Nov. 1951. Welcomed an agreement by India and Pakistan to determine the accession of Jammu and Kashmir by means of a plebiscite and urged both parties to resolve the issues remaining.

Resolution 101: Adopted 24 Nov. 1953. Condemned retaliatory action taken by Israel against Jordan as constituting a violation of the ceasefire provisions of Resolution 54 and of the Israeli–Jordan Armistice Agreement.

Resolution 106: Adopted 29 March 1955. Condemned an attack by Israel against Egypt on 6 March as constituting a threat to the Egypt–Israel Armistice Agreement.

Resolution 108: Adopted 8 Sept. 1955. Expressed concern at the cessation of negotiations between Egypt and Israel, and deplored the resumption of violence along the armistice demarcation line established between the two countries in Feb. 1949.

Resolution 109: Adopted 14 Dec. 1955. Endorsed the admission of Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Romania and Spain to the UN.

Resolution 111: Adopted 19 Jan. 1956. Condemned an attack by Israel against Syria in Dec. as constituting a violation of the ceasefire provisions of Resolution 54 and the Israel-Syria Armistice Agreement.

Resolution 112: Adopted 6 Feb. 1956. Endorsed the admission of Sudan to the UN.

Resolution 113: Adopted 4 April 1956. Concluded that the situation in the Middle East constituted a threat to peace in the region and requested the UN Secretary-General to arrange for the implementation of measures to reduce tension, including the withdrawal of forces from armistice demarcation lines, freedom of movement for UN observers and arrangements for the detection of violation of the Armistice Agreements.

Resolution 115: Adopted 20 July 1956. Endorsed the admission of Morocco to the UN.

Resolution 116: Adopted 26 July 1956. Endorsed the admission of Tunisia to the UN.

Resolution 118: Adopted 13 Oct. 1956. Agreed that a settlement of the dispute concerning the Suez Canal should ensure free movement through the Canal, be unrelated to political issues, and respect the sovereignty of Egypt, with tolls and charges to be decided between Egypt and the users of the Canal.

Resolution 121: Adopted 12 Dec. 1956. Endorsed the admission of Japan to the UN.

Resolution 123: Adopted 21 Feb. 1957. Requested the President of the Security Council to examine with the Governments of India and Pakistan proposals for resolving the dispute over the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Resolution 124: Adopted 7 March 1957. Endorsed the admission of Ghana to the UN.

Resolution 125: Adopted 5 Sept. 1957. Endorsed the admission of Malaya (now Malaysia) to the UN.

Resolution 127: Adopted 22 Jan. 1958. Instructed the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine to regulate civilian activity between the demarcation lines of Israel and Jordan and to perform a survey of property ownership in the zone, in order to ensure that one party's property was not used by another without permission.

Resolution 128: Adopted 11 June 1958. Agreed to deploy a UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) to ensure that no illegal penetration of weapons or military personnel from the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) was taking place.

Resolution 131: Adopted 9 Dec. 1958. Endorsed the admission of Guinea to the UN.

Resolution 133: Adopted 26 Jan. 1960. Endorsed the admission of Cameroon to the UN.

Resolution 134: Adopted 1 April 1960. Condemned the violent repression of demonstrators against racial discrimination in South Africa, and requested that South Africa abandon its policy of apartheid and seek to promote racial equality.

Resolution 135: Adopted 27 May 1960. Requested the Governments of France, the UK, the USA and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to resume negotiations for a peaceful solution to existing problems, including nuclear disarmament and the cessation of nuclear weapons tests.

Resolution 136: Adopted 31 May 1960. Endorsed the admission of Togo to the UN.

Resolution 139: Adopted 28 June 1960. Endorsed the admission of Mali to the UN.

Resolution 140: Adopted 29 June 1960. Endorsed the admission of Malagasy (now Madagascar) to the UN.

Resolution 141: Adopted 5 July 1960. Endorsed the admission of Somalia to the UN.

Resolution 142: Adopted 7 July 1960. Endorsed the admission of the Republic of the Congo (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo—DRC, previously Zaire) to the UN.

Resolution 143: Adopted 14 July 1960. Demanded that the Belgian Government withdraw its troops from the newly independent territory of the DRC and authorized the UN Secretary-General to dispatch UN troops to the region to maintain order.

Resolution 146: Adopted 9 Aug. 1960. Demanded that the Belgian Government withdraw its troops from the province of Katanga in the (Democratic) Republic of the Congo and allow the UN force to gain access to it.

Resolution 147: Adopted 23 Aug. 1960. Endorsed the admission of Dahomey (now Benin) to the UN.

Resolution 148: Adopted 23 Aug. 1960. Endorsed the admission of Niger to the UN.

Resolution 149: Adopted 23 Aug. 1960. Endorsed the admission of Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) to the UN.

Resolution 150: Adopted 23 Aug. 1960. Endorsed the admission of Côte d'Ivoire to the UN.

Resolution 151: Adopted 23 Aug. 1960. Endorsed the admission of Chad to the UN.

Resolution 152: Adopted 23 Aug. 1960. Endorsed the admission of the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) to the UN.

Resolution 153: Adopted 23 Aug. 1960. Endorsed the admission of Gabon to the UN.

Resolution 154: Adopted 23 Aug. 1960. Endorsed the admission of the Central African Republic to the UN.

Resolution 155: Adopted 24 Aug. 1960. Endorsed the admission of Cyprus to the UN.

Resolution 158: Adopted 28 Sept. 1960. Endorsed the admission of Senegal to the UN.

Resolution 159: Adopted 28 Sept. 1960. Endorsed the admission of Mali to the UN.

Resolution 160: Adopted 7 Oct. 1960. Endorsed the admission of Nigeria to the UN.

Resolution 161: Adopted 21 Feb. 1961. Following the deaths of former Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and two of his ex-ministers in the leaders of the (Democratic) Republic of the Congo, urged that measures be implemented to prevent the re-occurrence of civil war, that all troops, other than those under UN command, be withdrawn, and that an investigation into the alleged killings be undertaken. Urged that Parliament be convened and that the Congolese forces be brought under control to prevent any further deterioration of the situation in the (Democratic) Republic of the Congo.

Resolution 163: Adopted 9 June 1961. Deplored the violent repression by Portuguese forces of a nationalist rebellion in Angola. Requested a Sub-committee on the Situation in Angola to implement its mandate promptly.

Resolution 165: Adopted 26 Sept. 1961. Endorsed the admission of Sierra Leone to the UN.

Resolution 166: Adopted 25 Oct. 1961. Endorsed the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic (Mongolia) to the UN.

Resolution 167: Adopted 25 Oct. 1961. Endorsed the admission of Mauritania to the UN.

Resolution 168: Adopted 3 Nov. 1961. Endorsed the appointment of U Thant as acting Secretary-General of the UN (following the death, in an aircraft accident, of Dag Hammarskjöld).

Resolution 169: Adopted 24 Nov. 1961. Condemned the Belgian Government's support for the secession of the Katanga region in the (Democratic) Republic of the Congo, and all armed attacks against UN forces, and demanded their immediate cessation.

Resolution 170: Adopted 14 Dec. 1961. Endorsed the admission of Tanganyika (now part of Tanzania) to the UN.

Resolution 171: Adopted 9 April 1962. Condemned an outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Syria in March. Requested that both parties co-operate with the Chief of Staff and abide by the new ceasefire agreement and the provisions of the Israel–Syria Armistice Agreement.

Resolution 172: Adopted 26 July 1962. Endorsed the admission of Rwanda to the UN.

Resolution 173: Adopted 26 July 1962. Endorsed the admission of Burundi to the UN.

Resolution 174: Adopted 12 Sept. 1962. Endorsed the admission of Jamaica to the UN.

Resolution 175: Adopted 12 Sept. 1962. Endorsed the admission of Trinidad and Tobago to the UN.

Resolution 176: Adopted 4 Oct. 1962. Endorsed the admission of Algeria to the UN.

Resolution 177: Adopted 15 Oct. 1962. Endorsed the admission of Uganda to the UN.

Resolution 179: Adopted 11 June 1963. Authorized the establishment of the UN Yemen Observation Mission.

Resolution 180: Adopted 31 July 1963. Declared Portugal's policy of claiming the territories administered by it to be 'inalienable' overseas possessions was in contravention of the Charter of the UN. Demanded that Portugal recognize the right of the people under its administration to self-determination and independence, and that it cease all acts of repression, evacuate its forces from the territories concerned, introduce an unconditional political amnesty, commence negotiations with the aim of transferring power to elected political institutions and, ultimately, grant independence to its overseas possessions. Requested all member states to refrain from providing the Portuguese Government with assistance that might enable it to continue to repress territories under its administration.

Resolution 181: Adopted 7 Aug. 1963. Declared South Africa's racial policy to be in contravention of the Charter of the UN and reiterated a request that it abandon the apartheid regime. Established an arms embargo against South Africa.

Resolution 182: Adopted 4 Dec. 1963. Condemned South Africa's refusal to comply with previous resolutions and requested the Government to abolish discriminatory and repressive measures and release all political prisoners.

Resolution 184: Adopted 16 Dec. 1963. Endorsed the admission of Zanzibar (now part of Tanzania) to the UN.

Resolution 185: Adopted 16 Dec. 1963. Endorsed the admission of Kenya to the UN.

Resolution 186: Adopted 4 March 1964. Established a UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and appointed a UN Mediator to promote a peaceful settlement to the dispute between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

Resolution 189: Adopted 4 June 1964. Condemned armed incursions into Cambodia by units of the Vietnamese army. Deployed three observers to Cambodia and Viet Nam to consider measures to prevent further hostilities.

Resolution 191: Adopted 18 June 1964. Reiterated its condemnation of apartheid and appealed to the South African Government to release opponents of the apartheid regime and abolish all charges brought against them.

Resolution 193: Adopted 9 Aug. 1964. Appealed for an immediate ceasefire to be observed in Cyprus, and requested the Government of Turkey to halt its use of military force.

Resolution 195: Adopted 9 Oct. 1964. Endorsed the admission of Malawi to the UN.

Resolution 196: Adopted 30 Oct. 1964. Endorsed the admission of Malta to the UN.

Resolution 197: Adopted 30 Oct. 1964. Endorsed the admission of Zambia to the UN.

Resolution 200: Adopted 15 March 1965. Endorsed the admission of Gambia to the UN.

Resolution 202: Adopted 6 May 1965. Expressed concern at the situation in Southern Rhodesia, following elections at which the white-supremacist party, the Rhodesian Front (RF), which sought full independence from the UK and the retention of a minority-rule constitution, won all seats.

Resolution 203: Adopted 14 May 1965. Authorized a mission of the representative of the UN Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) to report on the conflict in that country.

Resolution 211: Adopted 20 Sept. 1965. Demanded that India and Pakistan observe a ceasefire agreement over the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. Requested the UN Secretary-General to dispatch an Observation Mission to supervise the ceasefire and the withdrawal of military forces.

Resolution 212: Adopted 20 Sept. 1965. Endorsed the admission of the Maldives to the UN.

Resolution 213: Adopted 20 Sept. 1965. Endorsed the admission of Singapore to the UN.

Resolution 215: Adopted 5 Nov. 1965. Requested the Governments of India and Pakistan to instruct their armed forces to halt military activity and violations of the ceasefire agreement in Jammu and Kashmir and to meet a representative of the UN Secretary-General to establish a plan for the withdrawal of troops.

Resolution 216: Adopted 12 Nov. 1965. Condemned the unilateral declaration of independence made by the white minority party, the Rhodesian Front (RF), in Southern Rhodesia, and requested member states to refrain from recognizing the new regime.

Resolution 217: Adopted 20 Nov. 1965. Declared the declaration of independence in Rhodesia to be legally invalid. Requested the UK to resolve the situation in Rhodesia and to allow the population to determine its own future, in compliance with General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV). Urged member states to avoid establishing economic links with Rhodesia.

Resolution 223: Adopted 21 June 1966. Endorsed the admission of Guyana to the UN.

Resolution 224: Adopted 14 Oct. 1966. Endorsed the admission of Botswana to the UN.

Resolution 225: Adopted 14 Oct. 1966. Endorsed the admission of Lesotho to the UN.

Resolution 229: Adopted 2 Dec. 1966. Endorsed the appointment of U Thant as Secretary-General of the UN.

Resolution 230: Adopted 7 Dec. 1966. Endorsed the admission of Barbados to the UN.

Resolution 232: Adopted 16 Dec. 1966. Determined that the rebellion in Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security and imposed mandatory economic sanctions against that country.

Resolution 233: Adopted 6 June 1967. Requested a ceasefire to be observed by Israeli forces and Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Syria (following the initiation by Israel of what came to be known as the 'Six-Day War').

Resolution 237: Adopted 14 June 1967. Demanded the Government of Israel to treat humanely prisoners of war, to ensure the security and welfare of the inhabitants of areas affected by the recent military operations and to facilitate the return of those displaced by the hostilities.

Resolution 239: Adopted 10 July 1967. Condemned all member states permitting or tolerating the recruitment of mercenaries and the provision of facilities to them. In particular, requested governments to ensure that their territories were not used for the recruitment, training and transit of mercenaries seeking to overthrow the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Resolution 242: Adopted 22 Nov. 1967. Refined principles for peace in the Middle East by means of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Occupied Territories and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all countries in the region. Established that the problem of refugees had to be resolved and requested a Special Representative to be deployed to the Middle East to promote a peaceful settlement.

Resolution 243: Adopted 12 Dec. 1967. Endorsed the admission of Southern Yemen to the UN.

Resolution 248: Adopted 24 March 1968. Condemned military action taken against Jordan by Israeli forces, and reaffirmed Resolution 237.

Resolution 249: Adopted 18 April 1968. Endorsed the admission of Mauritius to the UN.

Resolution 252: Adopted 21 May 1968. Condemned Israel's refusal to comply with UN resolutions and declared invalid all legislative and administrative measures taken by Israel in Jerusalem, including the expropriation of land and property. Urgently requested Israel to rescind those measures and to refrain from taking further action of that kind.

Resolution 253: Adopted 29 May 1968. Condemned acts of political oppression undertaken by the Rhodesian regime and demanded the UK, as administering authority, to end the rebellion. Strengthened economic sanctions against Rhodesia and prohibited member states from permitting those connected with the regime to enter their territories. Established a Committee to monitor the implementation of sanctions.

Resolution 255: Adopted 19 June 1968. Welcomed the intention of a number of member states with nuclear weapons to assist non-nuclear-weapon states party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (adopted by General Assembly Resolution 2373 (XXII)) should they be subjected to a threat of aggression by a nuclear state.

Resolution 257: Adopted 11 Sept. 1968. Endorsed the admission of Swaziland to the UN.

Resolution 260: Adopted 6 Nov. 1968. Endorsed the admission of Equatorial Guinea to the UN.

Resolution 262: Adopted 31 Dec. 1968. Condemned Israel for a raid on Beirut airport in Lebanon, which destroyed 13 Lebanese aircraft.

Resolution 264: Adopted 20 March 1969. Recognized that the General Assembly had terminated South Africa's mandate over Namibia and assumed responsibility for the territory until it gained independence. Declared South Africa's continued presence in Namibia to be illegal and demanded its withdrawal.

Resolution 267: Adopted 3 July 1969. Deplored Israel's refusal to comply with UN resolutions. Requested Israel to rescind all measures purporting to alter the status of Jerusalem.

Resolution 277: Adopted 18 March 1970. Condemned Rhodesia for declaring itself a republic. Reiterated the UK's responsibility for Rhodesia and demanded that member states sever all relations with Rhodesia and terminate transport services to and from that country.

Resolution 282: Adopted 23 July 1970. Reasserted its opposition to the apartheid regime of South Africa. Strengthened the arms embargo imposed against South Africa and condemned all violations of it.

Resolution 283: Adopted 29 July 1970. Requested member states formally to withdraw recognition of South Africa's authority over Namibia and to end all commercial and industrial investments in Namibia. Requested the General Assembly to establish a UN fund for Namibia.

Resolution 286: Adopted 9 Sept. 1970. Demanded the immediate release of all hijacked passengers and crews and requested that member states take all possible legal measures to prevent terrorist interference with international civil air travel.

Resolution 287: Adopted 10 Oct. 1970. Endorsed the admission of Fiji to the UN.

Resolution 292: Adopted 10 Feb. 1971. Endorsed the admission of Bhutan to the UN.

Resolution 294: Adopted 15 July 1971. Condemned acts of hostility perpetrated by the army of Portuguese Guinea (now Guinea-Bissau) against Senegal from 1967. Approved the establishment of a special mission to monitor the situation along the border between the two countries.

Resolution 296: Adopted 18 Aug. 1971. Endorsed the admission of Bahrain to the UN.

Resolution 297: Adopted 15 Sept. 1971. Endorsed the admission of Qatar to the UN.

Resolution 298: Adopted 25 Sept. 1971. Confirmed all administrative and legislative actions by Israel which altered the status of Jerusalem to be invalid.

Resolution 299: Adopted 30 Sept. 1971. Endorsed the admission of Oman to the UN.

Resolution 301: Adopted 20 Oct. 1971. Condemned actions taken by the Government of South Africa to destroy the unity and territorial integrity of Namibia, including the establishment of 'Bantustans'. Supported the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which ruled that South Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal and that it should withdraw immediately. Requested all states to refrain from observing treaties or from entering into diplomatic relations with South Africa.

Resolution 304: Adopted 8 Dec. 1971. Endorsed the admission of the United Arab Emirates to the UN.

Resolution 306: Adopted 21 Dec. 1971. Endorsed the appointment of Kurt Waldheim as Secretary-General of the UN.

Resolution 307: Adopted 21 Dec. 1971. Demanded the strict observation of the ceasefire agreement for the disputed Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, while troops were withdrawn. Appealed for international humanitarian aid.

Resolution 310: Adopted 4 Feb. 1972. Condemned South Africa's refusal to comply with Security Council resolutions and its repression of labourers in Namibia. Reaffirmed the illegality of South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia. Requested all member states with business interests in Namibia to ensure that they complied with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Resolution 312: Adopted 4 Feb. 1972. Requested Portugal to recognize the right of its territories to self-determination and independence, in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV). Demanded that Portugal end its colonial wars and its repression of Angola, Portuguese Guinea (now Guinea-Bissau) and Mozambique.

Resolution 313: Adopted 28 Feb. 1972. Demanded that Israel withdraw from Lebanese territory.

Resolution 320: Adopted 29 Sept. 1972. Expressed concern that a number of member states were ignoring the sanctions imposed against Rhodesia by Resolution 253, and urged the USA in particular to comply with its provisions.

Resolution 321: Adopted 23 Oct. 1972. Condemned a border attack on Senegal by the Portuguese army, and warned that the Security Council would consider taking further action if Portugal refused to comply with its resolutions.

Resolution 323: Adopted 6 Dec. 1972. Noted that the majority of Namibian people consulted voiced their support for national independence through the withdrawal of the South African administration and the abolition of its 'homelands' policy.

Resolution 326: Adopted 2 Feb. 1973. Condemned the acts of hostility perpetrated against Zambia by Rhodesia, in collaboration with the regime of South Africa, and condemned Rhodesia's acts of internal political repression. Demanded that the UK, as administrator of Rhodesia, implement measures to prevent further such actions. Agreed to deploy a special mission to assess the situation in the region.

Resolution 328: Adopted 10 March 1973. Endorsed the conclusions of the special mission established by Resolution 326. Affirmed that the Zimbabwean people should be permitted to exercise their right to self-determination in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) and reiterated demands for the withdrawal of South African troops from Rhodesia.

Resolution 333: Adopted 22 May 1973. Strengthened sanctions imposed against Rhodesia.

Resolution 335: Adopted 22 June 1973. Endorsed the admission of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany to the UN.

Resolution 336: Adopted 18 July 1973. Endorsed the admission of the Bahamas to the UN.

Resolution 338: Adopted 22 Oct. 1973. Demanded a ceasefire agreement between Israel and the Arab states. Reaffirmed the principles of Resolution 242.

Resolution 340: Adopted 25 Oct. 1973. Approved the establishment of a second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II) in the Middle East to assist in efforts for the establishment of peace.

Resolution 341: Adopted 27 Oct. 1973. Approved UNEF's mandate in the Middle East.

Resolution 347: Adopted 24 April 1974. Condemned the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and asked Israel to refrain from further acts of violence and to release all abducted Lebanese civilians.

Resolution 350: Adopted 31 May 1974. Welcomed the Agreement on Disengagement negotiated between Israeli and Syrian forces in the context of Resolution 338, and established a UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).

Resolution 351: Adopted 10 June 1974. Endorsed the admission of Bangladesh to the UN.

Resolution 352: Adopted 21 June 1974. Endorsed the admission of Grenada to the UN.

Resolution 353: Adopted 20 July 1974. Requested all states to recognize the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. Demanded an immediate ceasefire and the cessation of foreign military intervention in that country, and requested that Greece, Turkey and the UK commence negotiations for the restoration of peace and constitutional government to Cyprus. Requested that all parties co-operate fully with the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.

Resolution 356: Adopted 12 Aug. 1974. Endorsed the admission of Guinea-Bissau to the UN.

Resolution 360: Adopted 16 Aug. 1974. Expressed regret at the unilateral military action taken against Cyprus by Turkey, urged compliance with the provisions of previous resolutions, and requested the resumption of negotiations, as described in Resolution 353.

Resolution 361: Adopted 30 Aug. 1974. Commended the negotiations between the two community leaders in Cyprus. Expressed concern for persons displaced as a result of the situation and requested the provision of emergency humanitarian assistance to Cyprus.

Resolution 366: Adopted 17 Dec. 1974. Demanded that South Africa comply with the ruling of the International Court of Justice that confirmed its presence in Namibia to be illegal, that it withdraw its administration and transfer power to the Namibian people, and that it release all Namibian political prisoners, abolish the application of all racially and politically discriminatory practices, and allow the return of exiled Namibians to their country.

Resolution 367: Adopted 12 March 1975. Expressed concern at the unilateral declaration of a 'Federated Turkish State' in Cyprus; requested that the UN Secretary-General undertake efforts to resume negotiations.

Resolution 372: Adopted 18 Aug. 1975. Endorsed the admission of Cape Verde (since Oct. 2013: Cabo Verde) to the UN.

Resolution 373: Adopted 18 Aug. 1975. Endorsed the admission of São Tomé and Príncipe to the UN.

Resolution 374: Adopted 18 Aug. 1975. Endorsed the admission of Mozambique to the UN.

Resolution 375: Adopted 18 Aug. 1975. Endorsed the admission of Papua New Guinea to the UN.

Resolution 376: Adopted 17 Oct. 1975. Endorsed the admission of the Comoros to the UN.

Resolution 377: Adopted 22 Oct. 1975. Requested that the UN Secretary-General enter into consultations with the parties involved with the situation in Spanish (Western) Sahara.

Resolution 379: Adopted 2 Nov. 1975. Advised all parties concerned with the situation in Spanish (Western) Sahara to avoid action that could increase tension in the area and requested the UN Secretary-General to intensify consultations with the parties involved.

Resolution 380: Adopted 6 Nov. 1975. Expressed disapproval of the Moroccan 'Green March' on Spanish (Western) Sahara, and demanded that Morocco withdraw all participants from the territory. Urged all parties involved to co-operate fully with the UN Secretary-General.

Resolution 382: Adopted 1 Dec. 1975. Endorsed the admission of Suriname to the UN.

Resolution 384: Adopted 22 Dec. 1975. Demanded that the territorial integrity and right to self-determination of East Timor be respected, and that the Government of Indonesia withdraw its troops from the territory. Requested that the UN Secretary-General deploy a Special Representative to East Timor.

Resolution 385: Adopted 30 Jan. 1976. Condemned South Africa's failure to comply with earlier resolutions and the country's illegal use of Namibia as a military base. Demanded that South Africa end its policy of 'Bantustans' and 'homelands'. Condemned South Africa's evasion of UN demands for free elections in Namibia and demanded that it make a formal declaration accepting provisions for elections to be held.

Resolution 386: Adopted 17 March 1976. Praised Mozambique's decision to impose economic sanctions on Rhodesia, condemned the aggression by the illegal regime in Rhodesia against Mozambique, and appealed to member states and UN bodies to assist Mozambique in its economic situation.

Resolution 387: Adopted 31 March 1976. Condemned aggression against Angola by South African forces. Demanded that South Africa respect Angola's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and compensate Angola for losses incurred by its invasion.

Resolution 388: Adopted 6 April 1976. Resolved that member states should make sure not to insure any products in Rhodesia, or exported from or intended for importation to Rhodesia, in contravention of Resolution 253. Compelled member states to ensure that no trade marks or franchise agreements were entered into with Rhodesian enterprises.

Resolution 392: Adopted 19 June 1976. Condemned the South African regime for the violent repression of demonstrators against racial discrimination, including school children, on 16 June, and expressed its sympathy to the victims of this violence. Reaffirmed that the doctrine of apartheid constituted a crime against humanity, and requested the Government to end violence against African people and eliminate racial discrimination.

Resolution 393: Adopted 30 July 1976. Condemned South Africa for an attack on Zambia on 11 July and demanded that it respect Zambia's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and air space. Reiterated the demand that South Africa end its use of Namibia as a military base. Commended Zambia for its support of Namibia and declared that the liberation of Namibia and Rhodesia and the elimination of apartheid in South Africa were necessary for peace in the region.

Resolution 394: Adopted 16 Aug. 1976. Endorsed the admission of the Seychelles to the UN.

Resolution 395: Adopted 25 Aug. 1976. Requested that Greece and Turkey seek to reduce tensions and resume direct negotiations concerning the dispute over the extent of each country's jurisdiction of the Aegean Sea.

Resolution 397: Adopted 22 Nov. 1976. Endorsed the admission of Angola to the UN.

Resolution 399: Adopted 1 Dec. 1976. Endorsed the admission of (Western) Samoa to the UN.

Resolution 402: Adopted 22 Dec. 1976. Commended Lesotho for its refusal to recognize South Africa's proclamation of an 'independent' Transkei 'Bantustan'. Demanded the immediate reopening of border posts with Lesotho by the Transkeian authorities and condemned all actions intended to compel Lesotho to recognize the Transkei. Appealed to member states and UN bodies to provide assistance to Lesotho.

Resolution 403: Adopted 14 Jan. 1977. Condemned all provocation, harassment and political repression by the illegal regime in Rhodesia against Botswana, and demanded the immediate cessation of all hostilities. Deplored all acts of collaboration and collusion sustaining the illegal regime in Rhodesia. Agreed to dispatch a Mission to Botswana to establish the assistance required and to arrange for the provision of financial assistance.

Resolution 404: Adopted 8 Feb. 1977. Affirmed that the territorial integrity and political independence of Benin must be respected. Agreed to deploy a three-member Special Mission to Benin to investigate the invasion of the capital on 16 Jan.

Resolution 405: Adopted 14 April 1977. Acknowledged the work of the Special Mission to Benin. Condemned the act of aggression perpetrated against Benin on 16 Jan. and agreed to gather more information on the mercenaries. Reaffirmed Resolution 239.

Resolution 406: Adopted 25 May 1977. Expressed support for the Government of Botswana and endorsed the recommendations of the Mission to Botswana.

Resolution 407: Adopted 25 May 1977. Expressed appreciation to the UN Secretary-General for his arrangement of a Mission to Lesotho to establish the assistance required, and endorsed the recommendations of that Mission.

Resolution 409: Adopted 27 May 1977. Agreed that Member States should forbid the use or transfer of funds by the illegal regime in Rhodesia.

Resolution 411: Adopted 30 June 1977. Reiterated Resolution 386 and condemned the continued aggression carried out by Rhodesia against Mozambique. Condemned South Africa for its support of Rhodesia, reaffirmed that its regime constituted a source of instability in the region and requested that member states cease the provision of support to the regime. Reaffirmed the right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence. Appealed to member states to provide assistance to Mozambique to allow it to increase its defence capabilities.

Resolution 412: Adopted 7 July 1977. Endorsed the admission of Djibouti to the UN.

Resolution 413: Adopted 20 July 1977. Endorsed the admission of Viet Nam to the UN.

Resolution 414: Adopted 15 Sept. 1977. Expressed concern at developments in the new Famagusta area of Cyprus and requested that the two communities in Cyprus resume negotiations under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General.

Resolution 415: Adopted 29 Sept. 1977. Requested the appointment of a representative to undertake discussions with the British Resident Commissioner, and other parties, concerning military and other arrangements required to enable a transition to majority rule in Rhodesia.

Resolution 417: Adopted 31 Oct. 1977. Condemned the South African authorities for the violent repression of black people and opponents of racial discrimination. Demanded that the Government release those imprisoned under arbitrary security laws, remove bans on organizations and media opposed to apartheid and abolish the policies of apartheid and 'Bantustans' and the 'Bantu' education system.

Resolution 418: Adopted 4 Nov. 1977. Imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.

Resolution 419: Adopted 24 Nov. 1977. Reaffirmed Resolution 405 and requested that member states gather information concerning the mercenaries involved in the attack on Benin of 16 Jan. and appealed for the provision of assistance to that country. Acknowledged the Government of Benin's wish to bring the mercenaries to justice.

Resolution 421: Adopted 9 Dec. 1977. Established a Security Council Committee to monitor and strengthen the implementation of the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.

Resolution 423: Adopted 14 March 1978. Condemned the attempts of the minority regime in Rhodesia to maintain power and declared unacceptable any internal agreement concluded under that regime. Declared that the replacement of the police and military forces and the holding of free and fair elections under the auspices of the UN were required to restore legality to the country.

Resolution 424: Adopted 17 March 1978. Condemned the invasion of Zambia on 6 March by Rhodesian troops. Demanded that the UK act promptly to end the illegal regime in Rhodesia.

Resolution 425: Adopted 19 March 1978. Demanded that Israel respect Lebanese territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence and withdraw its troops following an invasion of southern Lebanon. Established a UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to assist in the restoration of peace.

Resolution 427: Adopted 3 May 1978. Criticized attacks carried out against UN troops in Lebanon.

Resolution 428: Adopted 6 May 1978. Condemned the invasion of Angola on 4 May by South African troops and their use of Namibia as a military base. Demanded that South Africa respect Angola's integrity, sovereignty and independence and withdrawal unconditionally from both Angola and Namibia.

Resolution 431: Adopted 27 July 1978. Requested the appointment by the UN Secretary-General of a Special Representative for Namibia, to facilitate its independence.

Resolution 432: Adopted 27 July 1978. Voiced support for the reintegration of Walvis Bay by Namibia, in order to ensure the territory's integrity and unity.

Resolution 433: Adopted 17 Aug. 1978. Endorsed the admission of the Solomon Islands to the UN.

Resolution 435: Adopted 28 Sept. 1978. Endorsed proposals for the evacuation of South African forces from Namibia and for the election of a constituent assembly in Namibia under UN supervision. Established a UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG).

Resolution 436: Adopted 6 Oct. 1978. Requested all those involved in the conflict in Lebanon to implement an immediate ceasefire and to permit the International Committee of the Red Cross to gain access to the area of conflict.

Resolution 437: Adopted 10 Oct. 1978. Expressed regret at the decision by the US Government to permit members of the Rhodesian regime, including its leader, Ian Smith, to enter the USA in contravention of Resolution 253, and requested that the USA observe the provisions of Security Council resolutions.

Resolution 439: Adopted 13 Nov. 1978. Condemned South Africa for holding unilateral elections in Namibia and declared the results to be invalid.

Resolution 442: Adopted 6 Dec. 1978. Endorsed the admission of Dominica to the UN.

Resolution 445: Adopted 8 March 1979. Condemned Rhodesian regime for invasions of Angola, Mozambique and Zambia and requested that member states provide assistance to those three countries in order to increase their defence capabilities. Requested that the Government take action to prevent illegal executions in Rhodesia. Criticized the elections scheduled to be held in the territory in April and declared them invalid.

Resolution 446: Adopted 22 March 1979. Declared invalid the settlements established by Israel in Palestine and other Arab territories from 1967, and deplored Israel's contravention of Security Council resolutions. Established a three-member Commission to examine the situation in the Occupied Territories.

Resolution 447: Adopted 28 March 1979. Condemned the sustained invasions of Angola by South African troops and their continued use of Namibia as a military base. Demanded that South Africa respect Angola's integrity, sovereignty and independence and abandon its armed invasions. Requested that member states provide assistance to Angola to strengthen its defence capabilities.

Resolution 448: Adopted 30 April 1979. Condemned elections held in Rhodesia and declared the results to be invalid.

Resolution 452: Adopted 14 June 1979. Accepted the recommendations of the Commission established by Resolution 446 and requested that Israel halt the establishment of settlements in those territories, including Jerusalem.

Resolution 453: Adopted 12 Sept. 1979. Endorsed the admission of Saint Lucia to the UN.

Resolution 455: Adopted 23 Nov. 1979. Condemned Rhodesia's continued invasions of Zambia and condemned South Africa for its collaboration. Requested compensation for Zambia, and assistance from member states.

Resolution 457: Adopted 4 Dec. 1979. Demanded that the Government of Iran release hostages held in the US embassy in Tehran and requested that the Governments of Iran and the USA peacefully resolve their differences.

Resolution 460: Adopted 21 Dec. 1979. Agreed to remove sanctions implemented against Rhodesia by previous resolutions and to dissolve the Committee established by Resolution 253. Requested all parties to respect the provisions of agreements reached and requested the UK to ensure that troops remained in Rhodesia, other than those agreed upon by the Lancaster House Conference.

Resolution 463: Adopted 2 Feb. 1980. Requested that the UK effect the immediate withdrawal of all South African forces from Rhodesia, and condemned the South African regime for its interference. Demanded that the UK Government ensure full participation in the forthcoming elections by Zimbabweans, through the return of exiles and refugees, the release of political prisoners, compliance with the provisions of the Lancaster House Agreement, equal treatment of all parties and the termination of inappropriate emergency measures.

Resolution 464: Adopted 19 Feb. 1980. Endorsed the admission of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to the UN.

Resolution 465: Adopted 1 March 1980. Deplored Israel's refusal to co-operate with the Security Council Commission, its formal rejection of Resolutions 446 and 452 and its refusal to allow the Mayor of Hebron to appear before the Security Council. Declared invalid the settlements established by Israel in Palestine and other Arab territories from 1967, and deplored Israel's continuing settlement policy.

Resolution 466: Adopted 11 April 1980. Condemned South Africa's intensified invasions of Zambia and demanded that it evacuate its troops.

Resolution 467: Adopted 24 April 1980. Condemned Israel's contravention of resolutions concerning its invasion of Lebanon and all acts of hostility in Lebanon and towards UNIFIL, including an attack on UNIFIL headquarters. Requested that a meeting of the Israel–Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC) be convened in the hope of reaffirming the General Armistice Agreement.

Resolution 468: Adopted 8 May 1980. Demanded that Israel allow the return of illegally expelled Palestinian leaders, the Mayors of Hebron and Halhoul and the Judge of Hebron.

Resolution 473: Adopted 13 June 1980. Condemned the South African regime for the continued violent repression of black people and opponents of apartheid. Expressed support for the victims of racial discrimination. Demanded that the Government release those imprisoned for their opposition to apartheid, including Nelson Mandela, remove bans on political parties, organizations and the media opposed to apartheid, halt all political trials, abolish the policy of apartheid and introduce equal opportunities for all South Africans.

Resolution 476: Adopted 30 June 1980. Reaffirmed the need for Israel to end its continued occupation of Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and reiterated that all changes made to Jerusalem were invalid. Deplored Israel's contravention of UN resolutions and requested that, henceforth, it comply with them.

Resolution 477: Adopted 30 July 1980. Endorsed the admission of Zimbabwe to the UN.

Resolution 478: Adopted 20 Aug. 1980. Announced its refusal to recognize a 'basic law' by Israel, which made East Jerusalem part of an undivided Jerusalem, and requested that member states withdraw all diplomatic missions established in Jerusalem.