Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union

Edited by Kjell A. Eliassen

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Contents

Preface

The aim of this volume is to try to explain why integration in the second pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union, is proving to be such a difficult task. The point of departure for the book is a question: why do we often find that the nation-state's self-interest in this field is much more important than the possibility of developing a regional solution? The question of why this is so difficult has been investigated along three main avenues. The first part of the book examines how the reluctant growth of EU integration in the CFSP field has developed since the mid 1980s. The second part identifies national security policies and interests that often obstruct the development of a common policy in four important European countries: France, Germany, Britain and Spain. The final part discusses the future problems that will need to be addressed successfully if the EU's CFSP is to have any credibility within the fields of EU expansion and armament.

This book is published as part of a research project for the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence on EU foreign, security and defence policy and possible consequences for Norway. The project has produced several reports, articles and books. I am grateful for the financial support given to the project and for the interest shown by the Ministry in the publications resulting from our research efforts.

This volume is the result of a collective effort within the Centre for European and Asian Studies at the Norwegian School of Management (BI). I would like to express my thanks first and foremost to researcher Pinar Tank. Without her insistent and very energetic interest and help during the final completion of the manuscript, my task would have been nearly impossible to fulfil. I would also like to thank my assistants and staff at the Centre and in particular PhD student Marit Sjøvaag, research assistant Karin Skyllingstad and office manager Grethe Haug.

Kjell A. Eliassen

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1 Introduction: The New European Foreign and Security Policy Agenda

Kjell A. Eliassen

CFSP is less a policy in the sense of a specific course of action, than a process.

European Commissioner Hans Van den Broeck (van Ham, 1997: 309)

In an interdependent world, policies cannot flourish in vacuums. It is impossible to have an effective economic policy without simultaneously also possessing a coherent foreign policy and a credible security policy. This is an indisputable reality for all those who work with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). What is considerably more difficult to identify are the means through which this is to be accomplished. We do not make any claims to providing the answers in this book. However, it is through asking some of the important questions that answers may be found and this is what we have sought to do in this book. We have attempted to explain why integration in the second pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, is proving to be a much more arduous task than economic integration in the first pillar.

Thus, the first part of the book examines the reluctant growth of integration, the second part identifies national security policies and interests that often obstruct the development of a common policy, and the final part discusses the future problems that will need to be addressed successfully if the EU's CFSP is to have any credibility. Briefly, then, the book is organized into separate parts based on policy, actors and issues.

Our second intention has been to illustrate the developmental process behind CFSP which is indicative of the time and the effort involved to arrive at the present state of affairs. It is perhaps knowledge of this process that provides some optimism for the future of integration in the second pillar. Commenting on its present state, Roy Ginsberg notes that 'A messy state of affairs is at least an accurate description for it avoids extremes of optimism and pessimism that serve no useful purpose' (1997: 31). The importance of the project for the future of the EU cannot be ignored for, to paraphrase a common expression, one may claim that the EU 'is only as strong as its weakest link' which, at present, is to be found in the second pillar.

What then is foreign and security policy? Foreign policy can be defined as the part of a state's policy that determines its relations with other states and with the international community. This concept covers diplomacy, alliances, military policy, trade policy etc. The broadness of the concept

reflects the complex nature of politics and the multitude of connections between different policy areas. Deutsch stated that 'the foreign policy of every country deals with the preservation of its independence and security, and second with the pursuit and protection of its economic interests' (1978: 101). This makes foreign policy a multi-faceted animal.

Security policy is an even broader term. The most basic definition of security is to lower the risks. Traditionally security policy was policy answering external military threats, but as the number and intensity of links in international society have increased, security policy is extended to cover contingencies for other types of threats. Examples of such are terrorism, social unrest, domestically and abroad, and activities undermining the legitimacy of the regime.

It is quite clear that the 1989 events in Eastern Europe created an important change in European countries' security policy. Economic and material welfare inequalities, high unemployment rates, and internal conflicts were all factors contributing to the high mobility of people from the East to the West. The difficult assimilation in Western European societies resulted in increasing social unrest in EC member countries.

The political difficulties do not have to occur within one's own territory for them to have repercussions. International terrorists also attack civil targets in all parts of the world, with the 'excuse' of bringing global attention to their problem. Moral considerations play a role in deciding when states engage in other countries' internal conflicts, as for example aid to refugees and civilians in wars, and support (economical, military and moral) to certain regimes. Furthermore, the decolonization in the 1940s and 1950s influences the current situation. Former colonies, poor and badly equipped to compete in the international arena, claim rights to help from the former colonial powers.

All this has contributed to the development of a 'new' security concept. Traditionally security meant military strength, but there is a clear development indicating that security includes more areas as threat emerges from different sources. 'Nowadays ... increasing significance attaches to a new aspect centring around internal civil strife, protection of minorities, human rights violations, ecological disaster risks, irresponsible use of new technologies etc.' (Westendorp Report, 1995: 31). The new security concept gains in relevance as the complexity of our modern society grows.

As this book attempts in part to describe the story behind the process of CFSP, we begin in the introduction by rendering a brief overview of its historical development.

History of development of idea of European Political Cooperation

Understanding European Political Cooperation as a process necessitates an overview of its history. European Political Cooperation began following the

end of the Korean War in the 1950s, based on the Jean Monnet idea that Europe should strengthen its military potential against an increasing Soviet threat through defence cooperation. The European Defence Community (EDC) came into being in 1952 through the cooperation of the six member states of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC: Benelux, West Germany, Italy, France). It became increasingly clear that an inevitable consequence of this effort at defence cooperation would result equally in foreign policy cooperation. Italy, led by federalist Altiero Spinelli, set out to convince the other member states that federal European institutions were necessary to command a European army. The outcome of this was the European Political Community in 1953 with a constitution corresponding to the EDC Treaty.

However efforts at integration were to be short-lived, for while the EDC Treaty was signed by all the member states involved in its creation, it came to a halt in the French Parliament in 1954. This was due primarily to opposition to the supranational nature of the Treaty. Secondly, and no less important, the moves towards European Political Cooperation were taking place at a time when the Second World War was still deeply imprinted on the collective European memory. The thought of placing French troops under foreign command or the rearming of Germany faced too much opposition in the French Parliament. However, the French did indicate a willingness to cooperate at an intergovernmental level in foreign and security policy within the Community through the Fouchet Plan. This sought to coordinate the Community's foreign and defence policies outside the Community and was under discussion until the French veto of British entry.

When the EC came into being, foreign and security policies were left outside Community competency. These areas were left to national sovereignty, while the Community had the power to deal with so-called 'external relations', including economic and commercial terms for relations with third countries. Despite the clear connection between economic behaviour and foreign policy, there was no institutional framework in the EC whose competencies included analysing such effects. Nor was there any central organ to make sure that member countries' diverse bilateral agreements and actions towards third countries were consistent with each other, or at least not in conflict with joint Community action. The consequences were evident: it proved difficult to preserve the image of one coherent and unified EC actor while member states made bilateral agreements with various third countries (Regelsberger, 1988).

The European Political Cooperation (EPC) concept dates back to 1970 and the Luxembourg Report, which was made by the foreign ministers in the six member countries on request from the Hague summit in 1969. This report 'set down guiding principles and convictions which revealed both cautiousness and ambivalence over the venture into foreign policy cooperation'. On the one hand, it referred to a 'Europe composed of States which while preserving their national characteristics, are united in their essential interests'. On the other hand, references were made to a 'united Europe'

founded upon 'liberty and the rights of men', and 'democratic states having freely elected parliaments'. Thus 'united Europe' was defined as 'the fundamental aim' to be achieved as soon as possible through 'the political will of its people and the decisions of their Governments' (Lodge, 1989: 228).

The goals outlined in this report were rather modest, formulated as 'greater mutual understanding of international affairs through the exchange of information and regular consultation, of greater solidarity through harmonisation of views, conformity of attitudes, and joint action when it appears feasible and desirable' (Vanhoonacker, 1992: 28). The instruments to be used were purely intergovernmental cooperation.

At the time there were signs that deepening of EC relations was desirable. Several countries had applied for membership and there was a need to tighten the existing community before these new members were admitted. The aims of the foreign policy were twofold: first, to ensure an increased mutual understanding on international problems through exchange of information and consultations; and secondly, to strengthen the member states' solidarity by harmonization of views and, when feasible, actions.

In spite of declarations and decisions to prove increasing political unity, the member countries never, during the 1970s, managed to – or wanted to – incorporate EPC into the EC. The document on European identity adopted in 1973, which stated that the Nine were to try to promote, by acting as a single entity, harmonious and constructive relations with third countries, was as close as they got to joining the two. The same document pronounces the goal of establishing a European Union within the decade (Lodge, 1989: 229).

The oil crisis of 1973 was, to some extent, a turning point for European Political Cooperation as the EC became involved in political dialogue to resolve the economic crisis, once again indicating the futility of separating economic issues from the political. This led to a gradual strengthening of the EPC so that by 1980 it was able to develop political positions, for example issuing the Venice Declaration recognizing the right of the Palestinians to a homeland. Further steps towards linking security and foreign policy were made with the signing of the Single European Act in 1986, revising the Treaty of Rome and drawing the European Parliament closer to EPC. In addition to promoting closer economic integration it also encouraged, through the provision of a legal framework, the development of political cooperation.

However, the real momentum to European security and foreign policy coordination came with the ending of the Cold War. The period of uncertainty following cast doubts on the United States' willingness to remain engaged in Europe by questioning the future of NATO. Without a dominant Soviet threat, it became increasingly difficult for American policy makers to justify spending defence dollars protecting wealthy Europeans. European nations realized that they had to take greater responsibility for their own security in an increasingly unpredictable international environment. The changes brought on by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany exacerbated fears of regional conflict as hitherto

repressed animosities surfaced. These fears realized themselves in the terrible reality of the Yugoslav civil war. The international system was in flux and the focus of change was in Europe. The further integration of the EU and its development of common policies in foreign affairs and security were regarded as necessary to providing a framework of stability in which to meet these new challenges. Across the Atlantic, the Americans were pressing for greater support from Europe in military operations and the willingness of Europeans to commit themselves, if not as equal partners, as active partners nonetheless. This was highlighted by American involvement in conflicts beyond European boundaries in the Gulf and in Somalia which led to discussions in Europe as to the degree of European commitment to out-of-area operations.

Perhaps the most important result of the end of the Cold War with respect to the development of CFSP was the change in security thinking. Whereas previously, the all-encompassing Soviet threat and the realist school of thinking in American foreign policy had dominated discussions on security, this began to change in response to the changing international system. A more multilateral approach to security policy began to emerge and aspects of 'soft security' were increasingly debated.

In 1990, at a Franco–German initiative, a letter was sent to the EU Presidency asserting the need to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy. The request was further reinforced under the Italian Presidency later in the same year. Finally, the Gulf War of 1990 had been imperative in exposing the weaknesses of the lack of an integrated European approach to foreign and security policy.

Thus, the question of CFSP was placed on the agenda of the Conference on Political Union at the 1991 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on European Monetary Union and European Political Cooperation in Rome in December 1990. At this time, the European Council forwarded a proposition aimed at creating an institutional structure for EPC to be incorporated into the EC. Despite the differences among the member states as to the issues discussed, the development of CFSP was considered of central importance. The role of the WEU and the decision-making process were particularly divisive. It was during this conference that the first suggestion of a pillar structure was made, with three different pillars, each under the direction of a different institution and each with particular decision-making processes. However, the prevailing divisions between Atlanticists and Europeanists and between intergovernmentalists and federalists, and the pressing political problems of the day, resulted in the postponement of CFSP until the Maastricht summit in 1991.

The Conference on Political Union confirmed the tripartite pillar structure and stated, through Article J. 4.1, that the CFSP 'shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence'. Additionally, through Article J. 4.2, it created a formal link between the WEU and CFSP by stating that 'The Union requests the Western European

Union (WEU) which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions which have defence implications.' Both through stipulating the necessity of a common defence to ensure the security of the Union, and by identifying the vehicle responsible, the Maastricht Treaty became the end point of the formal, legal process institutionalizing European security and foreign policy integration.

While the legal framework for CFSP is now in place, its practical application has often been seen to be lacking. This has partly been attributed to the ambiguity of the language and the role assigned to it. There is no doubt that much of this ambiguity is a result of the need to reach a compromise at its creation that could prove acceptable to all the member states. Partly, however, it is due to the lack of consensus on the future role of Europe (van Ham, 1997: 307). Issues that remain unresolved are those of an institutional nature that weaken its ability to implement common policies. Let us then briefly show how these different issues are dealt with in the book.

The history, actors and challenges of the CFSP

As illustrated briefly above, the development of the institutional framework for European foreign policy and security cooperation was a long and onerous process. There is little reason to imagine that its practical implementation will transpire more rapidly. We hope through this book to describe the development of the process, its key players and the challenges it is likely to face in the coming years. As such, the book has been divided into three parts, each focusing on a particular aspect of CFSP.

The first part, consisting of chapters 2–5, discusses the development of CFSP through to the termination of the 1996–7 IGC with the publication of the Amsterdam Treaty. The first chapter in this part, 'The CFSP and the Nation-State' by Pinar Tank, attempts to place CFSP in the framework of the ever changing international environment. It is intended to explain the changes undergone by the nation-state following the end of the Cold War period by examining the growth not only of the EU as a supranational institution but also through the competing allegiances to the nation-state. Following this contribution is one by Marit Sjøvaag, explaining the history of European Political Cooperation leading to the development of CFSP. It focuses particularly on the period from 1985 to 1991, reviewing the increasing integration between the EC countries. This is followed by Arnhild and David Spence's contribution examining the difficulties experienced by European member states in their efforts to implement CFSP, noting both the challenges and the limited successes. The final chapter in this part leads us from Maastricht through to the end of the 1996–7 IGC, reflecting on the progress that was made and the ever present gap between intentions and outcomes.

The second part of the book is intended to focus on the security policies of some of the key member states involved in the development of the CFSP.

It informs on national security strategies, then reflects on the changes necessitated by member states' commitment to CFSP. It should be no surprise to the reader that the section begins with the two countries that have been regarded as spearheading the efforts at developing the CFSP. Thus, the first chapter on 'France and the European Project' by Yves Boyer starts by explaining the effects that France's difficult domestic situation has had on its support for the European project, particularly emphasizing the pressures created domestically by France's determination to forge ahead with European integration. This is followed by Reimund Seidelmann's contribution on 'The Security Policy of a United Germany', where the reasons behind Germany's support for the integration project are discussed as well as the past and future benefits they have derived through closer security ties with Europe. Closing the section are two chapters on 'British Security Policy' by Michael Clarke and 'Spanish Security Policy and the Mediterranean Question' by Esther Barbé. The first of these explains British reticence towards European cooperation in the security field owing to the benefits it derived from the status quo in European security. Esther Barbé's chapter follows the history of Spain's reluctant entry into the European security architecture through NATO up to its present role in furthering the CFSP and addressing the difficulties particular to the Mediterranean region.

In the final part of the book, we have chosen to focus on the challenges that are likely to have a major impact on CFSP in the coming years. Adequate and satisfactory responses to these issues are necessary if the second pillar is to increase its efficacy and, by extension, its legitimacy. Chapter 10 in this part, 'Security Issues Emanating from the Mediterranean Basin' by Pinar Tank, discusses the potential for instability in the countries of the Mediterranean Rim. While much of the focus has thus far been on stability to the East, stability in the South is not to be regarded as only a problem of the Southern EU states as the credibility of the EU has much to gain by being able to successfully formulate policies to increase stability in its own backyard. Looking to the East, one of the much debated issues of the new European security architecture is its expansion to include Central and Eastern European countries. The chapter titled 'Security Implications of EU Expansion to the North and East' by Esben Oust Heiberg attempts to shed some light on the effects this will have for CFSP. This is followed by a chapter addressing the issue of defence cooperation between European member states by Pierre de Vestel titled 'The Future of Armament Cooperation in NATO and the WEU'. He reflects on the present political changes in Europe that will affect the establishment of an independent European system for arms procurement and the problems it has encountered owing to the lack of momentum in European defence integration. In addition, he points out the difficulty of developing a separate European defence identity with regard to its effects on the transatlantic relationship. Finally, Kjell A. Eliassen makes concluding comments regarding 'European Foreign and Security Policy in the Future'.

In the process of selecting chapters and gathering information for this

book, we have been increasingly aware of discussions that have necessarily been limited owing to the constraints of time and space. Questions of democracy, legitimacy and identity which compound the difficulties of achieving CFSP are discussed only briefly in Chapter 2, although they are at the root of the most difficult problems concerning the EU's CFSP. We have also limited our discussion of the procedural or institutional difficulties except as they relate to individual chapters as there is already a considerable specialized literature on this topic. Finally, with respect to the approach we have taken in this book, we hope to be able to present, through the following contributions, a balanced view as each chapter has reflected the conceptual framework of the author. As we have an international list of contributors, we hope that this has also served to highlight some of the different perceptions of the CFSP and its future role.

I EUROPEAN UNION FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

2 The CFSP and the Nation-State

G. *Pinar Tank*

The end of the 1996–7 Intergovernmental Conference on the European Union did not result in the envisaged revisions to the second pillar – the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It was hoped that the Amsterdam summit would conclude with a commitment to strengthen the political foundations of the European integration process. However, the focus of the summit was very much on the first pillar, reinforcing the greater importance attributed to monetary union as the engine in the integration process. There is a historical precedent in the failure of the French Parliament to ratify the EDC Treaty in 1954, indicating that future integration was more likely to be successful in the economic domain and met with resistance in the areas of foreign policy and security. This chapter attempts to examine why there is a much greater resistance to integration in the second pillar(not to mention the third). In doing so, it will by focusing first on the nation-state in general, addressing its composition and the role of sovereignty as an integral element. There is little doubt that increasing interdependence has affected the role of the nation-state, in some cases diminishing it and in others strengthening it through strategic alliances. The phenomenon of interdependence and its effects are therefore significant to any discussion of the nation-state. This leads quite naturally to a discussion of whether the European integration process is taking on a federalist structure as desired by pro-European advocates or whether it remains at the level of intergovernmental cooperation. In order to do this, it is necessary to analyse the potential cleavages resulting from national differences among the nation-states. Finally, it must be noted that the ambiguous, and from time to time difficult, relation between the nation-state and CFSP is the backdrop against which most of the discussions concerning its future development take place.

Composition of the nation-state

The Common Foreign and Security Policy provides challenges to the nation-state structure which can be better understood by first understanding the

elements that compose the nation-state. Among the objective elements forming the nation-state are included a common territory and its defence. The question of territory, however, can also provide a divisive element if groups feel greater allegiance to a particular region over and above that which is defined by the borders of the nation-state. Several examples of this abound, from the democratic secessionist movement of Quebec to the more militant variety of the Basque separatists. Another necessary element in the composition of the nation-state is that of common language, though it need not necessarily be a factor as in the case of Belgium, or of Switzerland with its three languages. Further, there are the elements of culture and religion which can equally result in either integration or disunity. Finally, a nation-state has common economic goals and must be capable of redistributing welfare by intervening on behalf of the national interest.

All of the aforementioned factors serve to objectively define the nation-state, but it is the abstract elements that ensure its survival. Primary among these is the belief in the sovereignty of the nation-state. The concept of sovereignty is first mentioned in the writing of the French political thinker Jean Bodin, who in 1576 defined it as 'the state's supreme authority over its citizens and subjects' (Stoessinger, 1973). Thomas Hobbes, also believing in the predominance of the state over the individual, claimed that the power of the state must be unconstrained in its actions both within and beyond the boundaries of the state. Historically, sovereignty was a concept that was used to justify the monarchical consolidation of state power (state sovereignty).[1] While the above definition of the state's power internally over its citizens is still valid today, it has also has been modified in tandem with the acceptance of democracy to include an element of consent so that, within the nation-state, sovereignty is considered to be a right given to the state by its citizens. Externally, sovereignty has meant the pursuit of the national interest and it has been distinctively more resistant to change. The process of yielding sovereignty to other states has not had as much success externally as the process of yielding sovereignty to the consent of the governed has had internally – a reality depicted by the CFSP process.

While, on the one hand, a loss of sovereignty for the nation-state has been the stated argument behind some member states' unwillingness to integrate further in foreign policy and security matters, on the other, the demise of sovereignty in the modern world has also been used to explain the necessity for further integration. According to Michael Newman's (1996) analysis, 'sovereignty' has been used emotively throughout the EU debate to justify the aims of both the Eurosceptic and the integrationist camps, obscuring its definition to meet their intended aims. The contradiction between these two views on sovereignty clearly indicates the difficulty inherent in using such a complex and diffuse term to justify the arguments either for or against integration. Sovereignty has historically been linked to the sanction of power, whether given by the people, as in the case of popular sovereignty, or vested in the state beyond any higher authority as in the case of legal sovereignty. Thus, there has evolved over time a connection

between power and sovereignty that is at the root of the supranational debate surrounding the EU. However, sovereignty can be more clearly and simply defined as an attribute of statehood with the result, as Newman indicates, that it is then not used as a doctrine to legitimate arguments for or against European Union.

The second defining element in a nation-state is the equally diffuse concept of nationalism. Nationalism is, contrary to popular belief, a modern, developed concept rather than a permanent element in political life. Its development in Europe dates to the end of the eighteenth century with the growth of cultural nationalism through the reformation of European languages and the exaltation of national myths. This served to lay the foundations for movements of national statehood. Briefly, nationalism can be described as the collective consciousness forming the cornerstone of national identity as created through common past myths and future hopes. It is a sense of allegiance to, and identification with, a particular group. It is described by Charles Kupchan (1995) as 'an ideology that calls for the merging of the sentimental nation with the functional state. The state is purely administrative; it provides goods and services to its citizens. The nation is purely emotive; it provides a sense of belonging and community to its members.' As noted above, the modern nation-state in the nineteenth century and through the twentieth has been an evolutionary concept and the elements that compose it have not always been inherent to its definition. The spread of mass education along with the imposition of a standard language (Horsman and Marshall, 1994) have been fundamental to commanding the allegiance of citizens within a defined border. In practice, the nation-state was regarded as the model best suited to organizing international relations in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Finally, contained in the nation's history is its 'personality' with failures and successes determining its future development. Important to bear in mind is that the collective identity is composed of individual perceptions projected onto the nation. So 'man may seek compensation for the lack of a personal future in the reflected glory of a nation's collective future' (Stoessinger, 1973). This has had a particular impact in international relations after the end of the Cold War era.

Within the European Union and particularly with regard to the CFSP, nationalism has been interlinked with sovereignty in providing both resistance to political union and protection from the dangers of excessive nationalism through integration. As with sovereignty, it has been manipulated to justify the arguments of the European Union debate, alternately conveyed as essential to the survival of the nation-state or as detrimental to the survival of the nation-state in the international system. On the other hand, the integrative function of nationalism is often disregarded although interestingly enough, according to Charles Kupchan, one of the reasons that the European Union has managed to advance to its present level of political and economic integration is the strong sense of national identity in the member states. States with highly developed national identities (a strong

sense of legitimacy and sovereignty) are more capable of devolving their sovereignty to supranational institutions than those that are struggling with their identity and autonomy (Kupchan, 1995). There is, thus, the potential for European Union policy makers to capitalize on this aspect of nationalism rather than regarding it as a danger to integration *per se.*

Finally, the success of the nation-state and its capacity to persevere depend in the long run on its legitimacy. The concept of legitimacy is closely tied to state sovereignty, relying on a justification for state authority over society. For this to occur, it must provide for the welfare of its citizens and satisfy their demands. In responding to the needs of its citizens, the state must not contradict the prevailing values in liberal democracies such as those of democracy and government by popular consent. Legitimacy is thus defined as 'the expectation of freedom from intolerable value conflict, and is, therefore, the expectation of the compatibility or consonance of values' (Deutsch, 1978: 56). The legitimacy of the European Union in general and the CFSP in particular is often linked to questions of democracy and sovereignty. Additionally, Weiler points out that legitimacy depends on the existence of a *demos*, or in other words, a polity 'for which and by whom the democratic structure and process is to take place' (1997: 250). For while legal legitimacy exists where national parliaments have yielded some of their sovereign powers to the EU, social legitimacy is still lacking. Its evolution depends partly on the subjective perceptions of its members that they belong to a distinct group of people with a clear identity and partly on the accessibility of decision making within the polity (Wallace and Smith, 1995).

Sovereignty, nationalism and legitimacy are all factors that construct a feeling of national identity which interprets the past, accepts the present, and plans for the future. As indicated above, none of these concepts are organic. They have all evolved over time. This leads to the conclusion that time and political will could lead to the construction of a European identity which could provide the basis of solidarity in foreign and security policy. A union of European member states based solely on pragmatic reasons, for example of economic gain, will be a 'frail process susceptible to reversal' as it is not 'reinforced with deep ideological or philosophical commitment' (Haas, 1967).

The nation-state and the growth of interdependence

The centrality of the nation-state was particularly affirmed after the end of the Second World War with the rise of the theory of realism in international relations which remained dominant throughout the Cold War period. This theory depended on states as the major actors in international relations and defined power in terms of military security, securing the national interest, as the goal of all states operating in an anarchic international environment.

However, whether this remains to be the case as we approach the twenty-first century is debatable. Several changes have made it such that the

state-centric approach is becoming increasingly unsuited to the evolving world order. Doubts as to the descriptive adequacy of realism were already gaining ground in the 1970s with the evolution of pluralist theory. Pluralism began challenging the realist approach by claiming that states were not necessarily the most important actors in international relations and that they were not always driven to action by the need to guarantee national security, challenging the supremacy of 'high politics', the competition between states to attain greater power, over that of 'low politics', the securing of economic and social welfare for citizens. Finally, it questioned the realist belief that competition, endemic violence and insecurity describe the international world order, citing the rise of institutions and procedures that indicated growing collaboration, interdependence and cooperation between national governments in their efforts to improve the material well-being of their citizens (Hanrieder, 1978). In a pluralist view, security issues, based on sheer military power, were of secondary importance to economic issues. The traditional barrier between international and domestic policy was becoming less defined, so resulting, in Hanrieder's words, in a 'domestication' of international politics. The ability of national governments to protect the material interests of citizens, in turn, served to maintain their legitimacy.

With the end of the Cold War period came both greater integration among the states of Western Europe, evident in the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, and elsewhere greater fragmentation of nation-states freed from the oppression of superpower hegemony. Both these processes served to weaken the traditional role of the nation-state. The increased globalization and integration of nation-states have been most evident in the spheres of finance, production and commerce (Horsman and Marshall, 1994). Traditional manufacturing is declining in the developed world and being replaced by the service sector and knowledge-based industries making their way into the international market. Additionally, it is the *Fortune* 500 companies that are increasingly responsible for a substantial amount of global production. The technological revolution has also had the effect of making borders irrelevant as data transmissions allow interactions among financial markets at opposite corners of the globe. Financial markets have also robbed the nation-state of some of its economic sovereignty with their influence on the making of monetary policy. An example of this was the August 1993 reaction to France's decision to espouse a policy of economic liberalism through a strong currency linked to the European monetary system, which was subsequently sabotaged by foreign exchange markets. Economic liberalism as interpreted by twentieth century capitalism has encouraged the growth of private ownership, reduced trade barriers, and replaced the state with the market as a distributor of economic goods (Horsman and Marshall, 1994). The growth of interdependence corresponds to the federalist vision of Europe that claims that a state-centred international system is an anachronism owing to the pressures both internal, for example through separatist movements, and external through the necessity of economic

interdependence. In this perspective, the European Union presents a new supranational entity that needs stronger democratic institutions in order for it to develop into a federation. Nonetheless, the federalist vision is still counterbalanced by the realist view, which claims that states will remain the only real actors at the international level and that the development of a supranational European Union replacing the position of the member state is an illusion.

Although it cannot be claimed that the nation-state is an insignificant actor on the international stage, it is undoubtedly facing challenges both internally and externally that undermine its position. This makes it particularly sensitive to yielding power to the European Union in the second pillar. Indicative of this are the cleavages to be found within the European Union between the competing member states' national interests. Esther Barbé (1997a) notes three categories of cleavages that divide the member states of the EU with regard to the CFSP. The first group consists of the states' perspective on the European construction (either federalist or intergovernmentalist), and the second on whether their sympathies lie in the Atlanticist or Europeanist camp. The final cleavage is to be found in their world view, and divides in reality into several smaller categories including their size (small/large), their location (Baltic/Mediterranean) and their historic interests or loyalties. In addition to the internal cleavages, there are the external factors found at the international systemic level.

The first two sets of cleavages affect the depth of European security cooperation, determining to what extent an independent European defence identity is to be endorsed. Thus, there is the divide between the Atlanticists who maintain that intergovernmental cooperation within already established security organizations such as NATO is the best option available, and the Europeanists who see the eventual development of a unified European approach in security and foreign affairs, independent of American involvement. The final cleavage among the member states that creates divisions in their approach to CFSP is formed by their world view or their relationships to countries beyond the Community framework. As an example, some CFSP efforts have been undermined through historical ties to other nations that have impeded agreement on common policies. Britain's close relationship with the United States and France's historical animosity towards a US dominated foreign policy, illustrated by its absence from NATO until 1997, have resulted in their opposing outlooks when discussing the development of CFSP. The colonial past of countries such as France has had a particular impact on their desire to focus more energy on developments in the southern Mediterranean. Likewise, Spain's links with Latin America and Portugal's past involvement in both Africa and Asia result in their unique perspectives in foreign policy *vis-à-vis* these regions (ibid.). Another equally salient national consideration has been that of geographic proximity, resulting in differing views as to the policies to be followed in the formation of foreign and security policy within the EU. An indication of this has been Germany's desire to focus on projects to develop Eastern Europe

competing with the Mediterranean countries' wish to encourage the development of a satisfactory policy for the southern Mediterranean. Both these policy initiatives are based on the perception of challenges that will directly affect these regions. Another consideration is that of size, with small countries such as Luxembourg consolidating their strength through alliances with larger countries. Conversely, larger countries such as the UK which already possess a significant international position and defence capability are not as willing to become party to a Community framework in foreign and security policy.

In addition to the internal differences among member states, there are also the external factors that have influenced the momentum of the CFSP process. Prior to its inclusion as Title III in the Single European Act of 1987, European Political Cooperation remained separate from the European Community treaties. This initial stage between 1970 and 1987 has been further divided by EU scholars into three plateaux (Barbé, 1997a; Regelsberger, 1988) which are described briefly here. First, from 1970 to 1974, member states established working procedures while facing the pressures of détente between the USA and USSR and the oil crisis. Secondly, from 1974 to 1979, once the working procedures became more familiar, increased confidence in cooperation in security and foreign policy among the European states was evident, for example, through their unified opposition to the United States' position in the Middle East and the Camp David process (Barbé, 1997a: 132). However, the positive momentum ended in the final period from 1979 to 1987 when the member states increased from the original nine to twelve and negative developments surfaced on the international scene such as the end of détente and the overtly antagonistic feelings between East and West, evident in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and President Reagan's 'evil empire' references to the Soviet Union. All these factors contributed equally to straining the relations among the European member states and stagnation in the European security integration process, forcing it to yield first and foremost to American policy in NATO.

By 1987, however, the Community was strengthened with Spain's and Portugal's accession and a gradual easing of East–West tensions. Therefore, the Single Act was signed in 1987 amidst an atmosphere of greater optimism both within the Community and in the international political climate generally. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 removing the previous bipolar structure of international relations brought about the opportunity, if not the necessity, for further integration in the CFSP. It simultaneously accentuated differences among the nation-states, discussed above, that had been restrained under the previous bipolar confrontation. A turning point came with the Gulf War in 1990 which was imperative in exposing the weaknesses of the lack of an integrated European approach to foreign and security policy. However, the external event that had the greatest impact on European security and foreign policy integration was the reunification of Germany in 1990. As an immediate consequence of this, European member