



POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY

VOLUME 19

**DIANE E. DAVIS
CHRISTINA PROENZA-COLES**

Editors

POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY

POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY

Series Editor: Diane E. Davis

Volume 1: 1980

Volume 2: 1981

Volume 3: 1982

Volume 4: 1984

Volume 5: 1985

Volume 6: 1987

Volume 7: 1989

Volume 8: 1994

Volume 9: 1995

Volume 10: 1996

Volume 11: 1997

Volume 12: 1998

Volume 13: 1999

Volume 14: 2000

Volume 15: 2002

Volume 16: 2004

Volume 17: 2005

Volume 18: 2006

John Lawson, Ottawa
Raisa Valli, Helsinki

POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY VOLUME 19

POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY

EDITED BY

DIANE E. DAVIS

*Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, MA, USA*

CHRISTINA PROENZA-COLES

*Department of History and Philosophy
Virginia State University
Petersburg, VA, USA*



JAI

United Kingdom – North America – Japan
India – Malaysia – China

JAI Press is an imprint of Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley BD16 1WA, UK

First edition 2008

Copyright © 2008 Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Reprints and permission service

Contact: booksandseries@emeraldinsight.com

No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without either the prior written permission of the publisher or a licence permitting restricted copying issued in the UK by The Copyright Licensing Agency and in the USA by The Copyright Clearance Center. No responsibility is accepted for the accuracy of information contained in the text, illustrations or advertisements. The opinions expressed in these chapters are not necessarily those of the Editor or the publisher.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: 978-0-76231-418-8

ISSN: 0198-8719 (Series)



Awarded in recognition of
Emerald's production
department's adherence to
quality systems and processes
when preparing scholarly
journals for print



CONTENTS

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS	<i>ix</i>
EDITORIAL BOARD	<i>xi</i>
EDITORIAL STATEMENT	<i>xiii</i>
LIST OF REVIEWERS	<i>xv</i>
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION <i>Diane E. Davis</i>	<i>xvii</i>

PART I: STATES AND CITIZENSHIP

WAR, STATE COLLAPSE, REDISTRIBUTION: RUSSIAN AND GERMAN REVOLUTIONS REVISITED <i>Pavel Osinsky</i>	<i>3</i>
“NO BOURGEOIS MASS PARTY, NO DEMOCRACY”: THE MISSING LINK IN BARRINGTON MOORE’S AMERICAN CIVIL WAR <i>Cedric de Leon</i>	<i>39</i>
T. H. MARSHALL MEETS PIERRE BOURDIEU: CITIZENS AND PAUPERS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. WELFARE STATE <i>Chad Alan Goldberg</i>	<i>83</i>

PART II: CITIES, CITIZENS, AND POWER

- INTERTWINING NATIONAL AND URBAN POLICIES:
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES AND
MUNICIPAL TACTICS IN GREATER BUENOS AIRES
Nora Libertun de Duren 119

- A TALE OF TWO WALLED CITIES:
NEO-LIBERALIZATION AND ENCLOSURE IN
JOHANNESBURG AND JERUSALEM
Andy Clarno 159

- THE INTERNET AND THE CITY:
BLOGGING AND GENTRIFICATION ON
NEW YORK'S LOWER EAST SIDE
Lara Belkind 207

PART III: SCHOLARLY CONTROVERSY: THE FAMILIAL STATE

- A MEMO ON THE FAMILIAL STATES OF THE
NETHERLANDS, FRANCE AND ENGLAND, 1500–1800
Julia Adams 237

- PATRIMONIAL STATES IN EARLY MODERN
EUROPE AND IN THE CONTEMPORARY ERA:
SIMILARITIES?
Mounira M. Charrad 243

- PATRIMONIAL RISE AND DECLINE. THE STRANGE
CASE OF THE FAMILIAL STATE
Ivan Ermakoff 253

- ELABORATING THE MICROFOUNDATIONS OF
THE FAMILIAL STATE: UNITING EVOLUTIONARY
BIOLOGY AND HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY
Edgar Kiser 273

FAMILIAL STATE AND THE DYNAMICS OF
HOUSEHOLD MASTERY

Pavla Miller

283

POLITICS, PATRIARCHY AND FRONTIERS OF
HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

Julia Adams

289

This page intentionally left blank

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

<i>Julia Adams</i>	Department of Sociology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
<i>Lara Belkind</i>	Department of Urban Planning and Design, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
<i>Mounira M. Charrad</i>	Department of Sociology, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA
<i>Andy Clarno</i>	Department of Sociology, University of Illinois, Chicago, IL
<i>Ivan Ermakoff</i>	Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, USA
<i>Chad Alan Goldberg</i>	Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, USA
<i>Edgar Kiser</i>	Department of Sociology, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA
<i>Cedric de Leon</i>	Providence College, Department of Sociology, River Avenue, Providence, RI, USA
<i>Nora Libertun de Duren</i>	Graduate School of Architecture, Planning, and Preservation, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA
<i>Pavla Miller</i>	School of Global Studies, Social Science and Planning, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia
<i>Pavel Osinsky</i>	Department of Sociology, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC, USA

This page intentionally left blank

EDITORIAL BOARD

Ronald Aminzade
University of Minnesota

Eduardo Bonilla-Silva
Texas A&M University

Michael Burawoy
University of California-Berkeley

John Coatsworth
Columbia University

Susan Eckstein
Boston University

Peter Evans
University of California-Berkeley

Nora Hamilton
University of Southern California

Evelyne Huber
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill

Eiko Ikegami
New School University Graduate Faculty

Howard Kimeldorf
University of Michigan-Ann Arbor

Florencia Mallon
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Jill Quadagno
Florida State University

Ian Roxborough
State University of New York-Stony Brook

Michael Schwartz
State University of New York-Stony Brook

George Steinmetz
University of Michigan

John D. Stephens
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill

Charles Tilly[†]
Columbia University

Maurice Zeitlin
University of California-Los Angeles

Sharon Zukin
City University of New York

This page intentionally left blank

EDITORIAL STATEMENT

Political Power and Social Theory is a peer-reviewed annual journal committed to advancing the interdisciplinary understanding of the linkages between political power, class relations and historical development. The journal welcomes both empirical and theoretical work and is willing to consider papers of substantial length.

Publication decisions are made by the editor in consultation with members of the editorial board and anonymous reviewers. Potential contributors should submit manuscripts in electronic format to ppst@mit.edu. Alternatively, authors may direct manuscripts to the mailing address below; please include four additional copies to the managing editor when submitting by post. Potential contributors are asked to remove any references to the author in the body of the text in order to preserve anonymity during review.

Diane E. Davis, Editor
Professor of Political Sociology
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
77 Massachusetts Avenue #9-521
Cambridge, MA 02139

Christina Proenza-Coles, Managing Editor
Assistant Professor of Atlantic History
Department of History and Philosophy
P.O. Box 9070
Virginia State University
Petersburg, VA 23806

ppst@mit.edu
<http://web.mit.edu/dusp/ppst/>

This page intentionally left blank

LIST OF REVIEWERS

Edwin Amenta
Richard Bensel
Scott Bollens
Neil Brenner
Paolo Carpignano
Miguel Centeno
Robert Cook
Frank Dobbin
Jonathan Eastwood
Nina Eliasoph
Leila Farsakh
Chad Goldberg
Jack Hammond
Ann Hironaka
Menachem Klein

Roberto Korzeniewicz
Greta Krippner
Jan Lin
Martin Murray
Laurie Naranch
Anya Paretskaya
Dylan Riley
Magali Sarfatti-Larson
William Sites
Gregory Squires
Joel Stillerman
Susan Stockdale
John Tirman
Robert Zussman

This page intentionally left blank

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

This year's volume of *Political Power and Social Theory* marks the end of my tenure as Editor. I thank the editorial board and all our dedicated readers for making this journal a leading venue for high quality scholarship in comparative and historical social science. I look forward to seeing the series continue under new leadership. The upcoming articles explore a variety of questions relating to states, citizenship and power, common themes examined with divergent analytical entry points and through deep knowledge of country cases as diverse as Russia, Germany, the United States, Israel, South Africa, Argentina and key nations in early modern Europe. Whether examined with a focus on revolutions and political parties, or cities and their physical and social transformation, or through development of the concept of the "familial state," which marries a preoccupation with lineage and micro-cultures to that of national-state institutions, these articles expand our theoretical and methodological imagination of how citizens become included or excluded in local and national structures of power.

Part I focuses directly on the theme of states and citizenship, albeit as focused primarily on earlier historical periods in both the US and Europe. The first contribution in this section, Pavel Osinsky's "War, State Collapse, Redistribution: Russian Revolution Revisited" raises questions about warmaking, statemaking and revolution. Inspired in part by the work of Charles Tilly, the author rejects actor-centered efforts to explain social revolutions and offers a sociologically structuralist account of the Russian Revolution. To do so, he compares the situations of early 20th century Russia and Germany and attempts to isolate a single structural factor that explains why communist revolution succeeded in the former and, despite agitation, did not in the latter. The author's main argument builds around the strategies and alliance-building actions of the state. Osinsky suggests that it was the German provisional government's capacity to negotiate a peace agreement and achieve internal political consolidation that prevented radicals from coming to power. In Russia, in contrast, the provisional government failed to exit the war and resolve problems of internal consolidation, bringing worsening socio-economic conditions that created structural opportunities for takeover of the state authority by a radical redistributive coalition.

In “No Bourgeois Mass Party, No Liberal Capitalist Democracy: The Missing Link In Barrington Moore’s American Civil War” Cedric de Leon advances our understanding of democratization in general and the American Civil War in particular by demonstrating that mass inter-class parties have, in certain historical contexts, played a critical role in the forging of bourgeois capitalist democracy in the modern world. De Leon argues that the origins and outcome of the American Civil War cannot be understood without recognizing the changing logic of party politics, specifically that the Republican Party forged an antislavery alliance between capitalists and workers, therefore breaking the bonds of the anti-capitalist alliance that had held the Democratic Party together.

Chad Goldberg’s article, “Pierre Bourdieu Meets T. H. Marshall: Citizens and Paupers in the Development of the U.S. Welfare State,” takes us from mass movements to citizenship practices and welfare rights. His exploration of the Works Progress Administration challenges T. H. Marshall’s idea of a trajectory of citizenship cumulatively incorporating social rights and examines the development of U.S. welfare provisions as a more complex process of citizenship losses, not simply gains. Goldberg argues that the failure of the Workers Alliance and public officials to fully mobilize the identity of “independent, able-bodied worker” as they were stymied by institutional constraints, political interests and racial politics, preserved the dependent status of “pauper.”

While Part I centers on citizenship, as understood in terms of politics of inclusion and exclusion (with revolution the result of struggles for a politics of inclusion), and democracy, or the politics of governing structures/political regimes, in Part II questions are raised about how democracy and/or particular regimes “write themselves” in urban space, or the urban built environment. Nora Libertun de Duren’s “Intertwining National and Urban Policies: National Development Policies and Municipal Strategies in Greater Buenos Aires” examines how national development policies, and their changes in the context of globalization and democratization, affect the “suburbs” of Buenos Aires. She is particularly interested in the ways these two large processes interface with the decentralization of political and economic functions to local municipalities, how this in turn produces new patterns of social and income inequality in the urban periphery, and whether these new patterns of inequality within peripheral locales will change the social and political character of municipal politics.

In “The Empire’s New Walls: Revanchism and Enclosure in Johannesburg and Jerusalem,” Andy Clarno successfully uses the two case studies to argue that enclosure (in the spatial, territorial and functional senses) is a

fundamental process of restructuring of power relations at multiple geographical levels – from the local to the global. While neo-liberalism is helping to sustain and create new forms of separation and exclusion in post-apartheid South Africa, it is pushing an emerging form of separation and enclosure in Israel/Palestine.

The third paper in this section looks at virtual as well as physical space. In her article, Lara Belkind addresses what has become and will increasingly become a critical set of social, spatial, and political issues pertaining to the impact of the internet on urban space and the uneven development of metropolitan areas generally in “The Internet and the City: Blogging and Gentrification on New York’s Lower East Side.” While her specific focus on the role of weblogging in facilitating gentrification in the Lower East Side is timely, Belkind’s discussion raises larger issues and questions about the relationships between information, culture and economic development, local knowledge and global markets, “digital democracy” and the growing class divide as they relate to urban change.

While Part I links states to war and welfare and Part II links states to cities, Part III links states to families. We are very pleased to have Julia Adams as the featured scholar of our Scholarly Controversy section. In her essay, “Paternity and Hegemony in Early Modern Europe,” Adams asks why the Dutch Golden Age came to an end. She explores the role played by family patriarchs – who were at the time both state-builders and merchant capitalists – in Holland, France and England in a tri-cornered race for domestic political power and imperial expansion. Adams raises important issues about the familial state, issues ably taken up by this year’s eminent commentators: Mounira Maya Charrad, Ivan Ermakoff, Edgar Kiser and Pavla Miller. Each tackles, extends and challenges Adams’ arguments from very different vantage points.

Finally, let me close with a few personal remarks. I have worked with Christina Proenza on this journal for the last seven years, and have relished her great contributions to the production and development of each annual volume. Despite being separated by great distance (ah, the wonders of the internet!), we have managed to stay “virtually” in touch. She has carried much of the burden for this journal, and deserves considerable credit. As we turn over the reigns of the volume to a new editor, Christina no doubt will cycle out of her role as Managing Editor. I wish her well, and hope to see one of her own first-rate pieces of comparative-historical research in one of the next few volumes.

Finally and on a much sadder note, one of this journal’s longstanding editorial board members, Charles Tilly, passed away as this volume went to

press. Chuck was the premier comparative-historical sociologist of our times, a man of global renown who influenced countless scholars, young and old. He gave tireless service to this journal, never rejecting a request to review a manuscript. He was a good friend to many, and will be greatly missed. This issue is dedicated to him.

Diane E. Davis
Cambridge, MA
John Lawson, Ottawa
Raisa Valli, Helsinki

PART I:
STATES AND CITIZENSHIP

This page intentionally left blank

WAR, STATE COLLAPSE, REDISTRIBUTION: RUSSIAN AND GERMAN REVOLUTIONS REVISITED

Pavel Osinsky

ABSTRACT

This chapter examines why the political collapse of Russia and Germany in the end of the First World War resulted in massive expropriation of private property in Russia and consolidation of private property in Germany. This historical divergence is explained by the different measure of coercive capacities of the provisional governments and, consequently, their different ability to withstand the assault of the radical Left during the periods of turbulent political transitions. The measure of coercive capacities was determined primarily by support of the army, which, in turn, was contingent upon the provisional governments' decisions to negotiate peace and exit the war.

INTRODUCTION

Most historical accounts of the Russian Revolution prioritize the role of an ideologically driven transformative agency (e.g., the revolutionary labor

movement, the radical intelligentsia, the Bolshevik party, Lenin and so forth). In a similar fashion, these accounts view state socialism, the outcome of the revolution, as a radical experiment in social engineering: Lenin and the Communist Party were determined to build socialism in Russia and in doing so followed the general guidelines of the Marxian design of the new society (see Fitzpatrick, 2001; Malia, 1995, 2000; Pipes, 1996, 1997, 2003; Scott, 1998; Wade, 2000).

Historical sociologists, on the other hand, examine the Russian Revolution through the lenses of macrosociological theories of social change. These theories focus at various structural determinants of the revolution: absence of commercial revolution in agriculture and survival of collectivist peasant institutions (Moore, 1966); a bureaucratic absolutist state subjected to extreme military pressures from abroad and persistence of strong peasant communities (Skocpol, 1979); autocratic capitalism and a revolutionary labor movement (McDaniel, 1988). These conceptions suggest that there existed specific institutional conditions that made a social revolution in Russia possible. These conditions were formed in the course of decades, if not centuries, of Russia's historical development.

While the contribution of both historical and sociological studies to our understanding of the Russian Revolution is enormous, these accounts cannot address few interesting questions. First, both revolutions in Russia (of 1905 and of 1917) took place in the end of unsuccessful wars that critically undermined the autocracy, the Russo-Japanese War and the First World War, respectively. Despite the recurrent economic hardship, famine, peasant revolts, political repression, labor unrest and various combinations of these and other social ills, the revolutions did not erupt before 1905 or in between 1905 and 1917. No matter how widespread peasant rebellions and labor uprisings were, these movements had not been able to challenge the autocracy until the Tsar's authority was decisively undermined by the empire's disastrous performance in war. May we neglect centrality of war in constructing narratives of the revolution? Second, in the wake of the First World War, not only Russia but several European states also experienced revolutionary crises. In the end of 1918, revolutionary socialists were close to victory in Germany. In spring 1919, the short-lived Soviet Republics were declared in Bavaria and Hungary. In 1919–1920, Italy went through a major revolutionary upheaval. In other words, Russia was the first but not the only country that experienced a revolutionary crisis in the end of the war. It would be logical to suggest that these revolutions originated more in the common disastrous experience of the First World War rather than in peculiar structural conditions inside individual countries.

This chapter develops a new approach to explaining the Russian Revolution. Because it searches for an explanation of the revolution in the specific features of mass-mobilization warfare, it may be named a war-centered approach. It starts with a general premise that the First World War created a situation of a strategic stalemate which turned the conflict into a protracted war of attrition, in which nations that were denied access to international markets were likely to experience economic collapse and political breakdown. Among the major European nations, the states that maintained access to the world economy (e.g., Britain and France) were able to preserve social stability and avoided revolutionary crises during the war. The states excluded from the world economy and forced to rely on their own resources (e.g., Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany) suffered deep economic and political crises. These semi-absolutist states collapsed while the new provisional governments came to power (Osinsky, 2007).

Although this argument seemed to be fairly consistent in interpreting the causes of breakdown of three empires, it did not explain the subsequent events. In most of Central Europe (e.g., Germany or Austria) the processes of political transition brought to power moderate social-democratic regimes that launched major economic and political reforms but left fundamental features of these societies intact. In Russia, where the Bolsheviks came to power, the revolutionary change resulted in a dramatic break with the past. Abolition of private property and establishment of collective ownership of the means of production signaled the beginning of an unprecedented economic and political transformation.

Why was a communist revolution successful in Russia and not in other countries? Consider the closest comparable case, Germany. Both imperial states, Russia and Germany, experienced deep economic and political crises at the final stage of the First World War. In both countries the imperial dynasties collapsed, provisional governments came to power and radical social movements launched frontal attack on existing authorities. As a consequence, in Russia the Bolsheviks overthrew the provisional government and abolished private property of the means of production. In Germany, on the other hand, despite the vigorous challenge of the radical Left, the provisional government was able to stay in power and preserve economic institutions of capitalism. How can one explain such divergence of the revolutionary outcomes in these countries?

The key difference, I would argue, was the extent to which state authorities in these two countries were able to make reasonable policy choices and, as a consequence, maintain their coercive capacities after the breakdown of the old regimes. Specifically, if a provisional government was

able to negotiate a peace agreement and achieve internal political consolidation, like it happened in Germany, it prevented radicals from coming to power. If a provisional government failed to exit the war and resolve problems of internal consolidation, like it happened in Russia, the worsening socio-economic conditions created structural opportunities for takeover of the state authority by the radicals.

Thus, in contrast to most existing accounts of the revolution, this study places a primary emphasis on policy choices of a power incumbent (i.e., the provisional government) than mobilization strategies and political capacity of a revolutionary contender (i.e., the Bolsheviks).¹ The “inexorable histories” of the Bolshevik Revolution notwithstanding, there was little that prefigured October in February. The crucial factor explaining success of the Bolshevik takeover was prolongation of war and, as a result, the turning of the masses of war-weary soldiers to the side of the radicals. The Bolsheviks *coup d’etat* could have been prevented had the new authorities been able to both stop war and resolve domestic problems.

REVOLUTION OR STATE BREAKDOWN? A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Although my emphasis on external structural determinants of internal political change resembles the argument of a state-centered theory of revolutions (see Goldstone, 2001, 2003; Goodwin, 1997, 2001; Skocpol, 1979, 1994), it originates in a different school of thought (see Collins, 1978, 1986, 1999; Mann, 1986, 1993; Tilly, 1975, 1985, 1990). Why does this difference matter? According to a state-centered theory of revolutions, a military-fiscal breakdown of the state, often caused by war and other exogenous factors, represents a necessary precondition and an important element of a revolution. For state-centered scholars, a revolution is thus a master narrative and a state breakdown is a sub-plot, an overture to the revolution.

I suggest reversing the relationship between these concepts and viewing state breakdown, rather than a revolution, as a focal point of analysis. Drawing from Weber, I define state breakdown as a situation in which the central state authority does not uphold the claim to the monopoly of legitimate use of violence on the territory of its jurisdiction. In such situation, state authorities and other agents of power compete in their claims to a right to exercise violence. Because a political authority is challenged by contender(s), uncertainty about who will rule in future is a distinct feature of state breakdown, as contrasted to a normal political development (see Stinchcombe, 1999).

Not every episode of a state breakdown turns into a revolution. Conceptually, four potential outcomes of state breakdown may be identified: a restoration (after a period of uncertainty an old regime is restored with some insignificant modifications), a reform (an existing state authority, challenged by contenders, initiates a major institutional change), a replacement (a new authority comes to power but does not transform basic institutions) and, finally, a revolution (a new authority comes to power and initiates a major structural change).² Political survival of a power incumbent in such situations hinges upon support of coercion-wielding institutions (army, police, secret police, etc.). State's coercive capacity in this context refers to its ability to control and effectively deploy these forces, the army first of all. By enlisting support of a military institution and effectively using troops, the government can suppress political contenders and consolidate its authority.

Of course, selecting state breakdown rather than a revolution as a primary object of study is more a matter of preference dictated by the purposes of research than an intention to replace one research agenda by the other. In fact, recent state-centered studies of revolutions of the twentieth century, particularly a Goodwin's research (2001), demonstrate inseparability of states and revolutions. According to Goodwin (2001, pp. 24–58), no states, no revolutions; states “construct” the revolutionary movements that challenge and sometimes overthrow them. Some states (patrimonial, exclusionary, infrastructurally weak) are more likely to be overthrown by revolutionary movements than other.

While such convergence of two streams of research can only be welcomed, modern historical development renders studies of state breakdown increasingly informative on their own terms. In the world, in which the power of states becomes greater than the power of societies while international systems display strong interdependence among states, studies of international relations become indispensable for understanding the dynamics of domestic politics. Given the fact that many political crises are caused by exogenous forces (“revolutions from abroad”), the concept of state breakdown allows building a much-needed bridge between studies of international relations (including wars) and domestic political processes.

A STATE UNDER SIEGE

After discussing the theoretical background of the argument, we can now apply it to the final stage of the First World War (1917–1918). The macrocosm of the First World War strikingly resembled conditions of siege warfare

(Strachan, 2000). Economically, the Central Powers (i.e., Germany and Austria-Hungary) have found themselves in a situation of isolation similar to the conditions of fortresses besieged by enemy troops. The economic organization in these countries came to resemble methods historically employed in beleaguered cities where military authorities requisitioned all resources for the needs of combat. To some extent it was also true for Russia, despite the fact that this country fought on the side of the Allies. The disintegration of the European economy and the competing naval blockades severely constrained access of these states to resources from the outside world.

Like commanders in besieged cities, the state authorities in Germany and Austria-Hungary had to introduce far-reaching administrative measures of “war socialism,” which involved centralized allocation of economic assets, including provision. These institutional mechanisms, as we know, did not prevent their collapse but allowed these nations to maintain social stability for almost four years in war.

What happened in besieged cities if commanders failed to ensure equality of sacrifice while the gap between wealthy citizens and starving poor reached critical proportions? In such situations class struggle between the poor and the better-off reached its utmost intensity. Sometimes the poor turned their weapons against the better-off, seizing and equally distributing the property of the wealthy among the population. In other words, they made a revolution. This is exactly what happened in Russia in 1917.

SOCIALIZATION AS REDISTRIBUTION

An economic system, which began taking shape in Russia in 1917 and later was copied (with some modifications) in several countries in Europe and Asia, is known as state socialism. State socialism refers to a type of a command economy in which the state possesses all or most economic assets of a nation. Transition to state socialism thus involves transfer of property rights over productive assets to the state or a state-directed socialization (nationalization) of major economic assets.

Theoretically, such socialization may be conceptualized as a specific case of coercive redistributive action, by which one actor forcibly acquires properties of other actors. Coercive redistributive action differs from all other forms of collective action insofar as economic assets represent the primary object of contention and expropriation is carried out against the will of the owner. Such coercive expropriation may take various forms: a robbery by a mob, a requisition by the army or nationalization by the state.

Under normal course of events, a large-scale coercive redistributive action is unlikely. Individual economic assets constitute private property. If anyone attempts to seize someone's property or interfere with exercise of property rights, the owner would appeal for the intervention of the authority and, if the latter is sufficiently effective, the perpetrator would be arrested and punished. Thus, the state's protection of property rights prevents coercive redistributive action.

What happens if state authority disintegrates? If repressive capacity of a state authority is critically undermined, a spontaneous process of coercive expropriation may be initiated. If there is no authority, laws and orders may no longer be enforced. Individual rights and freedoms (including property rights) may no longer be respected. The poor would begin seizing economic assets of the well-to-do classes: food, consumer goods, housing, land and other means of production. The greater the incapacitation of state authority, the greater the scope and intensity of coercive redistributive action.

Surely, such scenario applies to a relatively narrow range of conditions characterized by a catastrophic scarcity of primary living necessities and extreme relative deprivation of poor classes, particularly if large segments of poor classes are concentrated in major cities and have access to firearms. In all other contexts, breakdown of authority may induce other forms of economically oriented collective action or may not affect economic relations at all.

WHAT ABOUT IDEOLOGY?

From the viewpoint of conventional historical accounts such argument may seem incomplete. What is the role of ideology in this account? Can we evade studying ideology as a critical ferment of revolutionary change?

It is certainly true that revolutionary rhetoric almost always accompanies popular redistribution. The key issue, however, is whether origins of radical claims are endogenous or exogenous in relation to mass collective action. Social theory offers strong arguments in favor of an endogenous interpretation of popular radicalism. According to Scott (1985, 1990), for example, poverty and inequality always express themselves in various (proto-) ideological constructions of lower classes, which usually display intense opposition to the existing social order. In fact, "hidden transcripts" of subordinate discourses often include utopian scenarios of social reversal ("the world-upside-down") in which poor people win while rich individuals

suffer. Usually, however, such subversive tropes are suppressed by the dominant class, which upholds the official definition of the social order.

A breakdown of the old regime puts an end to the monopoly of the dominant class over ideological production. Democratic liberties declared by a new regime foster rapid democratization of public discourse. Mass newspapers and brochures of all possible orientations proliferate. Since most of the press caters to the needs of mass public, “hidden transcripts” of subordinate classes become popular, if not dominant, themes of public discourse.

In the multitude of voices of the revolutionary democracy, radical demands of coercive expropriation may not necessarily predominate. Initially, themes of law, order and property may still be popular. As war continues, economic crisis deepens and social polarization increases, radical antibourgeois rhetoric – captured, elaborated and amplified by socialist propaganda – gains broader acceptance among working classes (see Figes & Kolonitskii, 1999; Kolonitskii, 1994).

LOGIC OF THE ARGUMENT

In the rest of the chapter I will focus at two episodes of state breakdown in the end of the First World War: Russia (February to October 1917) and Germany (November 1918 to July 1919). Although in both countries the semi-absolutist states collapsed and the transitional governments came to power, the outcomes of the political transitions differed. In Russia the collapse of the autocracy triggered widespread expropriation, which was finally institutionalized in the state-directed nationalization by the Bolshevik government. In Germany a new government was able to channel radical demands to the framework of legal-constitutional deliberations and suppress the socialization movement. The central thesis of the chapter is that these divergent trajectories can be explained by different coercive capacities of the provisional governments: lower in Russia and higher in Germany. This divergence came about because the German provisional government negotiated the armistice and thus secured support of the army; the Russian provisional government, on the other hand, failed to do that.

In the next (second) section of the chapter I will compare intensity of coercive redistributive action in Russia and Germany in three areas: industrial facilities, provision and land. In the third section I will explain the difference in coercive expropriation by different degrees of state incapacitation in these two countries. In final section I will highlight the role of the armed forces as a key factor in state incapacitation or state consolidation.

COERCIVE REDISTRIBUTIVE ACTION: RUSSIA AND GERMANY

(1)

Economic institutions in Russia were integrated in the edifice of the autocratic state. To a larger extent than elsewhere these institutions were created, supported and reproduced by the autocracy (see McDaniel, 1988). As the monarchy and the administrative apparatus of the old regime came to pieces, a major change in economic relations began to unfold. Poor population, both in cities and countryside, began challenging the exiting distribution of wealth and, in some cases, seizing property of better-off classes.

The *first* object of coercive redistribution was property of industrial and commercial enterprises. The initial step in this direction was removal of the most hated managers and foremen. In the first days of the revolution, workers often placed an unpopular manager in a wheelbarrow and rolled him with cheers through the factory gates in the nearby river or pond. Sometimes worse things happened; at the Putilov works, the director and his aide were killed by workers and their bodies were flung in the Obvodnoi canal (Smith, 1983, 2004).

Establishing workers' committees in the factories was another step in taking control over enterprises. These practices began at state-owned enterprises and spread to private companies in Petrograd and other cities. Most of the factory committees functioned in metalworking and armaments industries and supported the war effort. These committees focused primarily in the daily operations of their workshops, had no specific political affiliations and rarely discussed political matters. The Bolsheviks played a minor, if any, role in the workers' committees (see Keep, 1976; Mandel, 1983; Smith, 1983).

Although outright seizures of enterprises were rare, as the economic crisis deepened, the scope of the workers control expanded. Some committees began gaining control over hiring and firing workers and showing keen interest in their companies' sales and finances. As many enterprises ran out of raw materials and fuel, the committees took upon themselves the task of supplying factories with these materials. To obtain fuel, they sent their "pushers" to the coal- and oil-producing regions of the South or requisitioned fuel in the neighboring establishments. In some factories in Petrograd, laborers ventured to run factories themselves.