



THE CULTURES AND GLOBALIZATION SERIES 1

# CONFLICTS AND TENSIONS

HELMUT ANHEIER AND YUDHISHTHIR RAJ ISAR



## THE CULTURES AND GLOBALIZATION SERIES ①

THE CULTURES AND GLOBALIZATION SERIES ①

THE CULTURES AND GLOBALIZATION SERIES ①

THE CULTURES AND GLOBALIZATION SERIES ①

THE CULTURES AND GLOBALIZATION SERIES ①

THE CULTURES AND GLOBALIZATION SERIES ①

THE CULTURES AND GLOBALIZATION SERIES ①

THE CULTURES AND GLOBALIZATION SERIES ①

THE CULTURES AND GLOBALIZATION SERIES ①

THE CULTURES AND GLOBALIZATION SERIES ①

THE CULTURES AND GLOBALIZATION SERIES ①

THE CULTURES AND GLOBALIZATION SERIES ①

THE CULTURES AND GLOBALIZATION SERIES ①

THE CULTURES AND GLOBALIZATION SERIES ①

THE CULTURES AND GLOBALIZATION SERIES ①





THE CULTURES AND GLOBALIZATION SERIES ①

# CONFLICTS AND TENSIONS

Edited by  
**HELMUT K. ANHEIER AND YUDHISHTHIR RAJ ISAR**

 **SAGE Publications**  
Los Angeles • London • New Delhi • Singapore



Introduction and Editorial Arrangement © Helmut K. Anheier and  
Yudhishthir Raj Isar 2007, Chapters © Contributors 2007

First published 2007

Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, this publication may be reproduced, stored or transmitted in any form, or by any means, only with the prior permission in writing of the publishers, or in the case of reprographic reproduction, in accordance with the terms of licences issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside those terms should be sent to the publishers.



SAGE Publications Ltd  
1 Oliver's Yard  
55 City Road  
London EC1Y 1SP

SAGE Publications Inc.  
2455 Teller Road  
Thousand Oaks, California 91320

SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd  
B 1/11 Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area  
Mathura Road, Post bag 7  
New Delhi 110 044

SAGE Publications Asia-Pacific Pte Ltd  
33 Pekin Street #02-01  
Far East Square  
Singapore 048763

#### **British Library Cataloguing in Publication data**

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 978 1 4129 3471-8  
ISBN 978 1 4129 3472-5 (pbk)

**Library of Congress Control Number 2006928698**

Typeset by C&M Digital (P) Ltd., Chennai, India  
Printed in Great Britain by The Cromwell Press Ltd, Trowbridge, Wiltshire  
Printed on paper from sustainable resources

# CONTENTS

Foreword, by Ralf Dahrendorf	xi
Acknowledgements	xii
Contributors	xv
List of boxes, figures, illustrations and tables	xxii
<i>Introducing the Cultures and Globalization Series</i>	3
Helmut K. Anheier and Yudhishtir Raj Isar	
<b>CONFLICTS AND TENSIONS</b>	<b>17</b>
Introduction	19
<i>Y. Raj Isar and Helmut K. Anheier</i>	
<b><i>Approaches and Developments</i></b>	<b>29</b>
Introduction	29
<b>1</b> Globalization and Cultural Conflict: An Institutional Approach	31
<i>Beverly Crawford</i>	
<b>2</b> Dimensions of Conflict in Globalization and Cultural Practice: A Critical Perspective	51
<i>Rustom Bharucha</i>	
<b>3</b> Ethnicity and War in a World of Nation-States	66
<i>Brian Min and Andreas Wimmer</i>	
<b>4</b> Resistance to Cultural Globalization—A Comparative Analysis	80
<i>Laura Adams, Miguel Centeno, and Charles Varner</i>	
<b>5</b> Cultural Expression in Globalized Conflict: Cause or Victim?	90
<i>Dragan Klaic</i>	
<b>6</b> Conflict and the Deliberate Destruction of Cultural Heritage	102
<i>Dacia Viejo Rose</i>	
<b><i>Regional Realities</i></b>	<b>119</b>
Introduction	119
<b>7</b> Cultures, Conflict, and Globalization: Africa	121
<i>Francis B. Nyamnjoh</i>	
<b>8</b> Regional Realities in the Arab World	133
<i>Ahmad S. Moussalli</i>	

<b>9</b>	Globalization and Asian Values <i>Janadas Devan</i>	143
<b>10</b>	Globalization and the European Social Model <i>Anthony Giddens</i>	151
<b>11</b>	Latin America: Diversity, Invention and Crisis in Cultural Production <i>Aníbal Ford</i>	162
<b>12</b>	Managing Cultural Conflicts: State Power and Alternative Globalization in China <i>Yunxiang Yan</i>	172
<b>13</b>	Capitalism, Conflict and Churn: How the American Culture War Went Global <i>Ronnie D. Lipschutz</i>	185
	<b><i>Fault Lines: Tensions, Values and Migration</i></b>	<b>199</b>
	Introduction	199
	<i>Tensions</i>	201
<b>14</b>	Tensions between North and South <i>Hugo Achugar</i>	201
<b>15</b>	The West versus the Arab World: Deconstructing the Divide <i>Georges Corm</i>	210
<b>16</b>	Islam: Between Religious-Cultural Practice and Identity Politics <i>Bassam Tibi</i>	221
<b>17</b>	Europe versus America: A Growing Clash within the West? <i>Nathan Gardels</i>	232
	<i>Values</i>	241
<b>18</b>	Value Patterns in Europe and the United States: Is there a Transatlantic Rift? <i>Christian Welzel and Franziska Deutsch</i>	241
<b>19</b>	Why Didn't Religion Disappear? Re-examining the Secularization Thesis <i>Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris</i>	253
	<i>Migration</i>	258
<b>20</b>	Migration, Security and Culture in the USA <i>Leo F. Estrada</i>	258
<b>21</b>	Migration: the Experience of Argentina <i>Alejandro Grimson</i>	264
<b>22</b>	Migration, Conflict and Illegitimacy: A Malaysian Case Study <i>Diana Wong</i>	272

<b><i>Culture as a tool of conflict prevention and resolution</i></b>	<b>281</b>
Introduction	281
<b>23</b> Creating Concord Organizations: Institutional Design for Bridging Antagonistic Cultures <i>Barbara J. Nelson, Kathryn A. Carver and Linda Kaboolian</i>	283
<b>24</b> Performance, Globalization and Conflict Promotion/Resolution: Experiences from Sri Lanka <i>James Thompson</i>	296
<b>25</b> Performing <i>Gacaca</i> in Rwanda: Local Culture for Justice and Reconciliation <i>Ananda Breed</i>	306
<b>26</b> From Violence to Discourse: Conflict and Citizens' Radio Stations in Colombia <i>Clemencia Rodríguez and Amparo Cadavid</i>	313
<b>27</b> The Pedagogy of Drums: Culture Mediating Conflict in the Slums of Brazil <i>Silvia Ramos</i>	328
 <b>INDICATOR SUITES</b>	 <b>333</b>
Idea and Conceptualization <i>Helmut Anheier</i> Design and Production <i>Willem Henri Lucas</i>	
Introducing 'Cultural Indicator' Suites <i>Helmut K. Anheier</i>	335
 <b>THE CONTEXT OF CULTURE</b>	 <b>349</b>
<b>1A Economic Globalization</b>	349
<b>1B Global Civil Society</b>	357
<b>1C Political and Legal Globalization</b>	361
Digest: <i>Globalization</i>	368
Digest: <i>Identity</i>	369
 <b>SOCIAL ASPECTS OF CULTURE</b>	 <b>371</b>
<b>2A Values</b>	371
<i>Identities</i>	372
<i>Economic</i>	374
<i>Social</i>	376
<i>Political</i>	378
<i>Religious</i>	380
<i>Gender</i>	384
<i>Religious Institutions</i>	388
Digest: <i>Attitudes towards Globalization</i>	394
Digest: <i>Values</i>	395
Digest: <i>Religion</i>	396

<b>2B Knowledge</b>	397
<i>Creation</i>	398
<i>Dissemination</i>	403
<i>Storage</i>	406
<i>Innovation and Protection</i>	412
<i>Digest: Knowledge</i>	420
<b>2C Heritage and Practices</b>	421
<i>Heritage, Preservation and Destruction Environment</i>	422
<i>Cultural Participation</i>	427
<i>Sports</i>	432
<i>Digest: Heritage Preservation &amp; Destruction</i>	435
<i>Digest: Environment</i>	436
<i>Digest: Cultural Participation</i>	437
<i>Digest: Sports and Recreation</i>	438
<b>SOCIAL ASPECTS OF CULTURE</b>	439
<b>3A Economy</b>	439
<i>Global Arts Market</i>	440
<i>Cultural Consumption and Expenditures</i>	444
<i>Cultural Industries</i>	447
<i>Trade in Cultural Goods and Services</i>	449
<i>Digest: Culture and the Economy</i>	453
<b>3B Professions</b>	455
<i>Cultural Professions</i>	456
<i>Digest: Cultural Professions</i>	460
<b>3C Corporations and Organizations</b>	461
<i>Transnational Cultural Corporations: Disney</i>	462
<i>Other Major Media Corporations</i>	464
<i>Cultural INGOs and Foundations</i>	469
<i>Digest: Transnational Cultural Corporations</i>	473
<i>Digest: International INGOs and Foundations</i>	474
<b>CULTURAL SITES, EVENTS AND FLOWS</b>	475
<b>4A Global Sites and Events</b>	475
<i>Global Cities: Hong Kong and Mumbai</i>	476
<i>Global Cities: New York</i>	479
<i>Global Cities: Los Angeles</i>	481
<i>Global Cities: London</i>	483
<i>Global Events</i>	485
<i>Symbolic Sites and Significant Cities</i>	486
<i>Digest: Global Cities</i>	487
<i>Digest: Global Events, Symbolic Sites &amp; Significant Cities</i>	488

<b>4B Communications and Media</b>	<b>489</b>
<i>Human Languages</i>	490
<i>Print Media</i>	492
<i>Books</i>	494
<i>Music</i>	496
<i>Telephones</i>	498
<i>The Internet</i>	500
<i>Blogs</i>	503
<i>Movies</i>	504
<i>TV and Radio</i>	508
<i>TV and Online News</i>	510
<i>Digest: Human Language</i>	511
<i>Digest: Print Media</i>	512
<i>Digest: Books</i>	513
<i>Digest: Music and Movies</i>	514
<i>Digest: Telephones, the Internet and Blogs</i>	515
<i>Digest: TV and Radio</i>	516
<i>Digest: TV and Online News</i>	517
 <b>4C Movements and Communities</b>	 <b>519</b>
<i>Migration</i>	520
<i>Refugees and Asylum Seekers</i>	524
<i>Tourism</i>	526
<i>Transnational Communities</i>	530
<i>Transnational Social Movements</i>	532
<i>Transportation: Airports</i>	536
<i>Digest: Travel</i>	540
<i>Digest: Migration, Diasporas &amp; Transnational Communities</i>	541
<i>Digest: Transnational Movements</i>	542
 <b>5 POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND CULTURE</b>	 <b>543</b>
 <b>5A Regulatory Frameworks</b>	 <b>543</b>
<i>International Standards</i>	544
<i>International Regulatory Frameworks</i>	549
<i>Digest: International Standards</i>	552
<i>Digest: Regulatory Frameworks</i>	553
 <b>5B Policy</b>	 <b>555</b>
<i>Cultural Diplomacy and Cultural Observations</i>	556
<i>Digest: Cultural Observatories</i>	558
 <b>5C Current Conflicts and Cooperation</b>	 <b>559</b>
<i>Arms</i>	560
<i>Conflict Resolution and UN Peacekeeping</i>	565
<i>Current Conflicts and Issues/Tension</i>	569
<i>Human Rights</i>	578
<i>Trafficking and Corruption</i>	592

<i>Piracy</i>	596
Digest: <i>Arms</i>	599
Digest: <i>Conflict Resolution &amp; UN Peacekeeping</i>	600
Digest: <i>Current Conflicts, Issues and Tensions</i>	601
Digest: <i>Human Rights</i>	602
Digest: <i>Terrorism</i>	603
Digest: <i>Transnational Crime</i>	604
Source Material	605
Index	627

# FOREWORD

In a sense, globalization began as a cultural phenomenon. The simultaneous availability of information everywhere on the globe was the seed of world-wide developments economically and politically. Strangely perhaps, the economic and political consequences of globalization are not only clearly in evidence but have also been widely studied, whereas few have focused on the cultural consequences of what was originally a cultural phenomenon. *The Cultures and Globalization Series* fills this gap, and for that reason alone it is most welcome.

The financial and general economic consequences of globalization have become a part of our lives, even if they are variegated and in no sense simple. The political consequences of globalization are with us every day, not least through the threat of the world-wide interconnections of terrorism. By contrast, the cultural consequences of globalization are more complex and less visible. Nor are they a set of developments pointing in one direction only. Globalization has now become widely recognized, that is to say the simultaneous extension of relevant cultural spaces and growing significance of more immediate, locally limited sources of cultural identity.

The task of documenting the relations of culture and globalization is thus formidable. It is appropriate that the *Series* editors, Helmut Anheier and Yudhishtir Raj Isar, should have enlisted the support of a large number of authors and advisers to accomplish the task. Professor Anheier himself is no stranger to complexity, as his work on civil society in a variety of countries shows. Professor Isar's background in international cultural policy is equally important to the project's objectives. Thus the project leaders and the authors from diverse parts of the globe guarantee that this *Series* will be about diversity yet usable in many if not all parts of the world.

Such wide utility is strengthened by a methodological feature. The end of ideology has often been stated when in fact ideological politics had a stubborn way of returning. Globalization might be assumed to have consigned ideology finally to the rubbish dumps of history. Yet again we are faced with what has been called, market fundamentalism on the one hand, and with sometimes violent anti-globalization movements on the other. Fortunately there is also the new trend of evidence-based politics, and one may hope that it will prevail. This volume is nothing if not evidence-based. It provides a considerable amount of evidence otherwise unavailable or only accessible in disparate sources. Not the least merit of this *Series* is that it helps find out what is actually happening. There are valuable beginnings of the development of indices of the cultural consequences of globalization. In this way, the volume will contribute to making full use of the opportunities of globalization while not ignoring its threats.

**Ralf Dahrendorf**  
London, 2006



# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

*The Cultures and Globalization Series* has relied on the support, advice and contributions of numerous individuals and organizations. We endeavor to acknowledge all who have participated in the development and production of this project, and are grateful for the support, advice and encouragement received. The final publication remains the responsibility of the editors.

## International Advisory Board

Hugo Achugar (Uruguay)  
Arjun Appadurai (India/USA)  
Benjamin Barber (USA)  
Hilary Beckles (Barbados)  
Tony Bennett (United Kingdom)  
Craig Calhoun (USA)  
Georges Corm (Lebanon)  
Mamadou Diouf (Senegal)  
Yehuda Elkana (Israel/Hungary)  
Yilmaz Esmer (Turkey)  
Sakiko Fukuda-Parr (Japan/USA)  
Mike Featherstone (United Kingdom)  
Anthony Giddens (United Kingdom)  
Salvador Giner (Spain)  
Xavier Greffe (France)  
Stuart Hall (Jamaica/United Kingdom)  
David Held (United Kingdom)  
Vjeran Katunaric (Croatia)  
Nobuku Kawashima (Japan)  
Arun Mahizhnan (Singapore)  
Achille Mbembe (Cameroon/South Africa)  
Candido Mendes (Brazil)  
Catherine Murray (Canada)  
Sven Nilsson (Sweden)  
Walter Santagata (Italy)  
James Allen Smith (USA)  
Prince Hassan bin Talal (Jordan)  
David Throsby (Australia)  
Jean-Pierre Warnier (France)  
Margaret Wyszomirski (USA)  
Yunxiang Yan (China/USA)  
George Yudice (USA)

## Participants in Consultations held in Paris, New Delhi, New York, Washington, and Barcelona

Alice Abreu, Rob Albro, Jeffrey Alexander, Edith Archambault, Alberta Arthurs, Pat Aufderheide, Sushma Bahl, Ann Baker, Alec Balasescu, Jordi Baltà, Manfred

Bardeleben, Elisenda Belda, Françoise Benhamou, Lluís Bonet, Jozsef Borocz, Tom Bradshaw, Craig Calhoun, Esteve Caramés, Judit Carrera, Miguel Centeno, Joni Maya Cherbo, Tyler Cowen, Diana Crane, Diane Dodd, Zahava Doering, Waddick Doyle, Baykal Eyyuboglu, James Fitzpatrick, Nancy Fuller, Aimee Fullman, Leonore Yaffee Garcia, Sandra Gibson, Bill Gilcher, Salvador Giner, Faye Ginsburg, Mercedes Giovinazzo, William Glade, Xavier Greffe, Narayani Gupta, James Herbert, Bill Ivey, Maria Rosario Jackson, Selim Jahan, Om Prakash Jain, Varun Jain, Arnita Jones, Hagai Katz, Jonathan Katz, Stanley Katz, Inge Kaul, Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, Adam Klausner, Annamari Laaksonen, Sophia Labadi, Marc Leland, Hui Lu, Bob Lynch, Peter Mandaville, Connie McNeely, Sara Meneses, Tanni Mukhopadhyay, Francesc Muñoz, Mary Ann Newman, Jorge Osterling, Agnieszka Paczynska, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Jordi Pascual, Peter Rantasa, Serge Regourd, Greg Richards, David Rieff, Aurea Roldan, Dominique Sagot-Duvaouroux, Joan Shigekawa, James Allen Smith, Paul Smith, Kate Stimpson, András Szántó, Nalini Thakur, Stefan Toepler, Heather Townsend, Anne Vena, Shalini Venturelli, Monica Villegas, Ray Wanner, Jean-Pierre Warnier, Janine Wedel, Nancy Weiss, Harrison White, Margaret Wyszomirski, George Yudice.

## Additional support

### Guest boxes

Sreten Ugričić and Jean-Joseph Boillot.

### Research Coordination for Indicator Suites

Tia Morita and Jennifer E. Mosley.

### Design and Production of Indicator Suites

Willem Henri Lucas with assistance from David Whitcraft, Levi Richard Brooks and Daniel Tadiarca.

### Researchers

Michael Kyle Behen, Lauren Buckland, Karina Danek, Juliet Gharibian, Amber Hawkes, Hagai Katz, Aaron Kofner, Ilona Iskandar, Marcus Lam, Margaret Lee, Luis Medina, Leda Nelson, Aiha Nguyen, Ronaldo Nibbe, Alexander Nino-Ruiz, Cheryl Samson, Lily Song, Swati Solanki.

### Artwork

Emilia Birlo

#### *A note from the Artist*

*The images readers will find throughout this volume express an idea I regard as fundamental to the human condition: the human longing for dignity. For this reason, I focused on humans as individuals and not as part of larger groups, let alone masses. I tried to visualize this longing for dignity with images that, increasingly reduced in form and varying in abstraction, are somewhere between ancient cave painting and contemporary urban graffiti. Human dignity is also an ongoing search, and for this reason I tried to make the images express a certain dynamism and optimism.*

### Administrative support

Jocelyn Guihama and Laurie Spivak.

### Financial Support

We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the following institutions:

Aventis Foundation  
Atlantic Philanthropies  
The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation  
Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation  
Compagnia di San Paolo  
The J. Paul Getty Trust  
The Prince Claus Fund for Culture and Development  
Bertelsmann Foundation  
Shell International Limited  
Swedish International Development Agency  
UCLA School of Public Affairs

In particular we would like to acknowledge the support of Rui Esgaio (Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation), Els van der Plas (The Prince Claus Fund), Dario Disegni (Compagnia di San Paolo), Dan Brandström, Mats Rolén and Carl-Johan Kleberg (The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation).

We also wish to recognize the supportive partnership of Forum Cultural Mundial (World Culture Forum), Rio de Janeiro, and its Director-General, Dieter Jaenicke.

## CONTRIBUTORS

**Hugo Achugar** previously taught at Universidad de la República (Uruguay) and Northwestern University, held distinguished visiting appointments at UC Irvine and Dartmouth, and has been the recipient of two Rockefeller Foundation Humanities grants. He is the author of *Ideologías y estructuras narrativas en José Donoso (1950–1970)* (1979), *Poesía y sociedad (Uruguay, 1880–1911)* (1986), *La biblioteca en ruinas: reflexiones culturales desde la periferia* (1994) and *Escritos sobre arte, cultura, y literature* (2003).

**Laura Adams** is an instructor in the sociology department at Princeton University. She has written articles on the globalization of culture in Central Asia and is finishing a book, *The Spectacular State: Culture and National Identity in Uzbekistan*.

**Helmut Anheier** is Professor of Public Policy and Social Welfare at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), and Director of the Center for Civil Society, and the Center for Globalization and Policy Research at UCLA. He is also a Centennial Professor at the Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics (LSE). His work has focused on civil society, the non-profit sector, organizational studies, policy analysis, sociology of culture, and comparative methodology.

**Rustom Bharucha** is an independent writer, director, and cultural critic based in Kolkata, India. He has written a number of books including: *Theatre and the World*, *The Question of Faith*, *In the Name of the Secular*, *The Politics of Cultural Practice*, *Rajasthan: An Oral History*, and *Another Asia*. Combining cultural theory with theatre practice and activism, he conducts workshops with underprivileged communities on the politics of identity and rights, while intervening in debates relating to international cultural policy.

**Emilia Birlo** is a visual artist and fashion designer who divides her time between Germany and the United States. Her art can be viewed at [www.Milli.Birlo.de](http://www.Milli.Birlo.de) and her creations at [www.birlos.de](http://www.birlos.de).

**Jean-Joseph Boillot** is Professeur Agrégé de Sciences Economiques et Sociales and has a PhD in Development Economics from the university of Paris-Nanterre. He spent most of the 1980s in India and China as Associate Researcher with an institute attached to the office of the Prime Minister of France. From 1990 to 2005 he was Economic Advisor to the Ministry of Finance on Eastern Europe, Russia, China and India. He is the author of more than 20 books, including *Europe after Enlargement, Economic challenges for EU and India* (Academic Foundation, New Delhi 2005) and many articles.

**Ananda Breed** is a PhD student of Applied and Social Theatre at the University of Manchester. She has facilitated workshops for the UN Special Session for Children, the UN Third World Water Forum (Osaka, Japan), the City Hall Forum Theatre and Video Initiative (NY), Search for Common Ground (Bukavu, Congo) and the Ministry of Justice (Kigali, Rwanda). Her dissertation will address performance in relation to justice and reconciliation in Rwanda including the Gacaca courts, established theatre

companies, and grassroots reconciliation associations. She recently presented her paper 'Theatre as Social Intervention in Post-Genocide Rwanda' at the International Researching Drama and Theatre Education Conference at Exeter University in April 2005.

**Amparo Cadavid** is professor of Ethics and Communication for Social Change, and a senior research fellow at the Faculty of Communications of the Pontifical Javeriana University, in Bogotá, Colombia, since 2003. She has carried out and published several studies on community and citizen media. She is an expert in the design and application of communication strategies within regional development and peace plans, in zones of high conflict. She has also conducted consultancy and policy advisory work for the REDPRODEPAZ (National Development and Peace Programs Network), the Ministry of Culture and several Development and Peace Programs and citizen media networks in Colombia.

**Kathryn A. Carver**, a health and human rights lawyer with both a law degree and a degree in epidemiology, is the Executive Director of The Concord Project. The Concord Project undertakes research and action programmes to design successful cross-community organizations and leadership training in divided communities with longstanding animosity. She has led the Technical Assistance Program of the Ryan White Care Act while at John Snow, Inc., a public health consulting company. Previously, she was the Director of the Office of Patient Advocacy of the (U.S.) National Marrow Donor Program. She is the author of many articles on conflict mediation, women's political participation, and the rights of Indian children.

**Miguel Angel Centeno** is Professor of Sociology and International Affairs at Princeton University and is Director of the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies. He is currently working on a book project, *Visualizing Globalization*, as well as an online Historical Atlas of Globalization and the International Networks Archive ([www.princeton.edu/~ina](http://www.princeton.edu/~ina)).

**Georges Corm** is Professor at Saint-Joseph University in Beirut and Consultant to several international organizations on issues related to the development of the Arab world and international economic cooperation. His publications and books have focused on international development issues but also on the contemporary history of the Middle East and the relations between the Arab Orient and Europe. He is a member of several scientific councils or trustee boards of non-profit organizations in Europe and the Arab world. His latest book is devoted to a critical examination of the religious revivals in the Moslem and western worlds.

**Beverly Crawford** teaches Political Economy at the University of California, Berkeley and is Associate Director of UC Berkeley's Institute of European Studies. She is the co-editor of *The Myth of Ethnic Conflict: Politics, Economics and Cultural Violence*, (Berkeley: International and Area Studies, 1998), and *The Convergence of Civilizations: Constructing a Mediterranean Region* (University of Toronto Press, 2006.) She recently served as a co-principal investigator on a Ford Foundation project entitled *Promising Practices in Information Technology Training for Disadvantaged Adults* and is currently working on a three-volume series entitled *Globalization Comes Home: The Impact of Globalization on the United States*.

**Franziska Deutsch** is a Research Associate and PhD candidate at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the International University Bremen, Germany.

Together with Chris Welzel and Ronald Inglehart (2005) she published 'Social Capital, Voluntary Associations and Collective Action: Which Aspects of Social Capital Have the Greatest "Civic" Payoff?' in the *Journal of Civil Society*. Her main research interests cover political participation, political culture, and political and social values.

**Janadas Devan** is a Singaporean journalist. He was educated at the University of Singapore and Cornell University. His publications include journal articles on culture and politics, as well as articles in newspapers and magazines in Singapore, the United States, Malaysia and elsewhere.

**Leo F. Estrada** is an Associate Professor of Urban Planning, School of Public Affairs at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). He is a social demographer with a focus on the demographic aspects of ethnic and racial populations, planning for multiple publics and urban revitalization. He has publications on the topic of immigrant adaptation, language access issues and transnational networks.

**Aníbal Ford** is a Distinguished Professor in the Social Sciences Department at the University of Buenos Aires, where he directed the Communication Studies and Masters of Communication and Culture program. He currently leads research into the visual representations of socio-cultural diversity, for the Secretariat of Science and Technology at the University of Buenos Aires. He has published several books about communications, culture, and information. His latest publications include: *La marca de la bestia. Identificación, Desigualdades e infoentretenimiento en la sociedad contemporánea*; *Resto del mundo: Nuevas mediaciones de las agendas críticas internacionales*, and the fictional *Oxidación*.

**Nathan Gardels** is editor of National Policy Quarterly, the journal of social and political thought published by Blackwell, as well as the Global Viewpoint service of the *Los Angeles Times* Syndicate/Tribune Media, which has 35 million readers in 15 languages. His latest book is *The Changing Global Order: World Leaders Reflect* (Blackwell, 1997).

**Lord Anthony Giddens** has taught at the University of Leicester and subsequently at Cambridge, where he was Professor of Sociology. From 1997 to 2003 he was Director of the London School of Economics. He is currently a Life Fellow of King's College, Cambridge. He was made a Life Peer in May 2004. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Science and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and was the BBC Reith Lecturer in 1999. He has had a major impact upon the evolution of New Labour in the UK. He took part in the original Blair–Clinton dialogues from 1997 onwards. He is one of the founders of Polity Press, one of the best known publishers in the social sciences and the humanities.

**Alejandro Grimson** is Director of the *Instituto de Altos Estudios Sociales (Universidad de San Martín)*, Buenos Aires, and researcher of the CONICET. He has published books and articles on migration, border zones, and ethnic and national identities, such as: *Argentina and the Southern Cone. Neoliberalism and National Imagination* (with Gabriel Kessler). He participated in different research projects and international seminars with Princeton University, Texas University, Social Science Research Council, and other institutions.

**Ronald Inglehart** is a professor of political science and program director at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. He helped found the

Euro-Barometer surveys and directs the World Values Surveys. His research deals with changing belief systems and their impact on social and political change. Author of more than 200 publications, his most recent books are (with Pippa Norris) *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World* (Cambridge University Press, 2003) and *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (Cambridge University Press, 2004); and (with Christian Welzel) *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence* (Cambridge University Press, 2005). He also edited *Mass Values and Social Change: Findings from the Values Surveys* (Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2003) and *Human Beliefs and Values: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook based on the 1999-2001 Values Surveys* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 2004).

**Yudhishtir (Raj) Isar**, an anthropologist by training, is Jean Monnet Professor of Cultural Policy Studies at The American University of Paris and also teaches at the *Institut d'Etudes Politiques (Sciences Po)*. He is the President of the European Forum for Arts and Heritage (EFAH), a board member of the Institute of International Visual Arts (*inIVA*) and of the Fitzcarraldo Foundation (Turin), Special Advisor to the World Monuments Fund (New York) and the Sanskriti Foundation (New Delhi). Earlier, at UNESCO, he was Executive Secretary of the World Commission on Culture and Development, director of cultural policies and of the International Fund for the Promotion of Culture.

**Linda Kaboolian**, a sociologist, is a faculty member at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, where she is the Director of the Labor Program and Co-Director of the Executive Program for State and Local Officials. Her areas of specialization are conflict mediation, organizational behaviour, labour policy and educational policy. She is the Co-Principal Investigator of The Concord Project. Her new book, *Win–Win Labor–Management Collaboration in Education* was published in 2006. She is also the co-author of *Working Better Together: A Practical Guide for Union Leaders, Elected Officials and Managers*.

**Dragan Klaic** is a Permanent Fellow of Felix Meritis (Amsterdam). He teaches Arts and Cultural Policy at the University of Leiden and serves as advisor, editor, researcher and trainer. Klaic has worked as a theatre critic and dramaturge, held professorships at the University of Arts Belgrade and University of Amsterdam and guest professorships in the USA, led the *Theater Instituut Nederland*, co-founded the European Theatre Quarterly *Euromaske*, and served as the President of the European Network of Information Centres for the Performing Arts and of the European Forum for the Arts and Heritage. He was the Moderator of the Reflection Group of the European Cultural Foundation and author of its final report *Europe as a Cultural Project* (2005).

**Ronnie D. Lipschutz** is Professor of Politics, Co-Director of the Center for Global, International and Regional Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz. His most recent books are *Globalization, Governmentality and Global Politics: Regulation for the Rest of Us?* (Routledge, 2005) and a text co-authored with Mary Ann Tétreault, *Global Politics as if People Matter* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2005). His areas of research and teaching include international politics, global environmental affairs, US foreign policy, empire and religion, globalization, international regulation, technology and public policy, and film, fiction, and politics.

**Willem Henri Lucas** (designer) studied at the Academy of Visual Arts in Arnhem in the Netherlands and worked as an intern and apprentice for Max Kisman. From 1990 to 2002 he served as a professor and chair of the Utrecht School of the Arts' Graphic Design department. In 1998 he designed holiday postage stamps for the PTT (Dutch



Post and telecom company). In 2003 and 2004 he won a 'Best Book' award and a nomination from the Art Directors' Club in the Netherlands for his catalogue design and posters series for 'de 4e salon' exhibition for Centraal Museum Utrecht. He teaches at UCLA's D/MA and has done freelance jobs for Ogilvy and Mather. He is working for the Museum of Contemporary Art in Los Angeles where he designed *The Painting in Tongues* catalogue, and has just finished designing the book *Everythinghappensatonce* on video-artist Euan Macdonald for Kunstverlag Nuremberg, Germany.

**Brian Min** is a graduate student in political science at the University of California, Los Angeles. He uses formal models and quantitative methods to study the comparative politics of ethnicity and has conducted field research among the Inuit of the Canadian Arctic. He holds a BA from Cornell University and a MPP from Harvard University.

**Ahmad S. Moussalli** is Professor of Political Science at the American University of Beirut. He was visiting Professor at the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University (USA) and University of Copenhagen (Denmark). He is the author of numerous writings, including: *The Islamic Quest for Human Rights, Pluralism, and Democracy*; *Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalist Movements in the Arab World, Iran and Turkey*; *Human Rights, Pluralism and Democracy in Islam*; *Myths and Realities of Islamic Fundamentalism: Theoretical Aspects and Case Studies*; *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb*; *A Theoretical Reading In Islamic Fundamentalism Discourse*.

**Barbara J. Nelson**, a political scientist, is the Dean of the UCLA School of Public Affairs. She was previously the Vice President of Radcliffe College. Her areas of specialization are conflict mediation in civil society, organizational design, and leadership education. She is the Founder of The Concord Project, and the co-author with Linda Kaboolian and Kathryn A. Carver of *The Concord Handbook: How to Build Social Capital Across Communities*. She is the author of six books including *Leadership and Diversity: A Case Book* (UCLA and the Ford Foundation, 2004) and over sixty articles. Active in community leadership, Dean Nelson is on the Board of Trustees of the United Way of Greater Los Angeles and See Jane, a US organization dedicated to better presentation of girls and women in electronic media for children under 12.

**Pippa Norris** is the McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Her research compares elections and public opinion, political communications, and gender politics. She has published almost three dozen books, with a related series of volumes for Cambridge University Press including, with Ronald Inglehart, *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the Globe* (2003), and *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (2004, winner of the Virginia Hodgkinson prize from the Independent Sector). Her most recent research is for a new book on *Driving Democracy: Do power-sharing institutions work?* (for Cambridge University Press).

**Francis B. Nyamnjoh** is Associate Professor and Head of Publications and Dissemination with the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). He has taught sociology, anthropology and communication studies at universities in Cameroon, Botswana and South Africa, and has researched and written extensively on Cameroon and Botswana, where he was awarded the 'Senior Arts Researcher of the Year' prize for 2003. His most recent books include *Negotiating an Anglophone Identity* (Brill, 2003), *Rights and the Politics of Recognition in Africa* (Zed Books, 2004), *Africa's Media, Democracy and the Politics of Belonging* (Zed



Books, 2005), *Insiders and Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in Contemporary Southern Africa* (CODESRIA/ZED Books, 2006).

**Silvia Ramos** is a social scientist and the area coordinator for minorities, social movements and citizenship at the University Candido Mendes Center for Studies on Public Security and Citizenship, in Rio de Janeiro. Since 2004 she coordinates the project Youth and the Police in partnership with the cultural group Afro Reggae. The experience uses music, art and culture as a means of reducing the barriers between the police and youngsters from slum areas. Silvia Ramos has published *Police Stops, Suspects and Discrimination in the City of Rio de Janeiro* (2005) with Leonarda Musumeci.

**Clemencia Rodríguez** is Associate Professor at the University of Oklahoma, in the United States. Dr Rodríguez has conducted research since 1984 on citizens' media in different international contexts including Nicaragua, Colombia, Spain, Chile, and among Latino communities in the United States. Dr Rodríguez' publications on citizens' media include *Fissures in the Mediascape: An International Study of Citizens' Media* (2001), 'Citizens' Media and the Voice of the Angel/Poet' (in *Media International Australia*, 2002), 'Civil Society and Citizens' Media: Peace Architects for the New Millennium' (in *Redeveloping Communication for Social Change: Theory, Practice, Power* (ed.) Karin Wilkins 2002), and 'The Bishop and His Star: Citizens' Communication in Southern Chile' (in N. Couldry and J. Curran (eds.) *Contesting Media Power: Alternative Media in a Networked World*, 177–94. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield).

**James Thompson** is Professor of Applied and Social Theatre at the University of Manchester and a Director of the Centre for Applied Theatre Research. He is currently the co-director of In Place of War – a major research project funded by the UK's Arts and Humanities Research Council. He was Guest Editor of TDR: the journal of performance studies Social Theatre edition (T183) and is author of *Applied Theatre: Bewilderment and Beyond* (Peter Lang, 2003) and *Digging Up Stories: Applied Theatre, Performance and War* (Manchester University Press, 2005). He is a theatre practitioner and has worked in Brazil, Burkina Faso, Rwanda, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the UK and USA. He has research interests in Applied Theatre, community-based theatre and theatre and war.

**Bassam Tibi**, born 1944 in Damascus and educated in Frankfurt, has been, since 1973, Professor of International Relations at the University of Goettingen, Germany and is, since 2004, A.D. White Professor-at-Large at Cornell University. He is author of 26 books in German and 6 monographs in English, including the recent publications: *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder*, (University of California Press, 1998, updated edition 2002), *Islam between Culture and Politics*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, enlarged 2nd edition 2005). Tibi lectured at more than 30 universities in four continents and co-authored dozens of English books between 1980 and 2006.

**Sreten Ugričić** is Director of the National Library of Serbia, Belgrade and is the author of seven books (theory and fiction). During 1992–1997, he was a teaching fellow at the Faculty of Philosophy in Priština (Aesthetics and Ethics) and from 1997–2001 he was programme manager at the Soros Fund (Priština, Belgrade, Budapest). He is a member of the Serbian PEN Club, and sits on The European Library Project Executive

Board. He also serves as a member of the Serbia and Montenegro UNESCO Commission as well as member of the Reflection group of the European Cultural Foundation (ECF Amsterdam).

**Charles Varner** is a graduate student in the department of sociology at Princeton University where he studies processes of stratification and inequality, economic sociology, and urban life. His current work is focused on intergroup contact and threat in multi-ethnic settings.

**Dacia Viejo Rose** is a PhD student at the University of Cambridge, UK. Her research looks into the reconstruction of cultural heritage after civil wars and the effect this has in building memories, meaning and reconciliation. At Cambridge she has set up the Post-Conflict and Post-Crisis Research Group. She has worked at the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs and at UNESCO where she worked on the Cultural Policies for Development programme and the Cities for Peace Project. Dacia collaborates with a number of NGOs working in areas of cultural heritage preservation and conflict mitigation.

**Christian Welzel** is Professor of Political Science and Program Coordinator for the Social Sciences at the International University Bremen, Germany. He is a member of the Executive Committee of the World Values Survey Association. His most recent book is *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence* (with Ronald Inglehart, Cambridge University Press, 2005), and he also published numerous articles in the *European Journal of Political Research*, *Comparative Politics*, *Comparative Sociology*, *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, *International Review of Sociology*, *Journal of Civil Society* and others. His main research interests are on cultural change, social values, civil society, democratization, and modernization theory.

**Andreas Wimmer** is professor of sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles. His research aims to understand the dynamics of nation-state formation, ethnicity making and political conflict from a comparative perspective. He has pursued this theme across several disciplinary fields, focusing on examples from both the developing and the developed world, and pursuing various methodological and analytical strategies: anthropological field research in Mexico and Iraq, network studies in Swiss immigrant neighbourhoods, quantitative cross-national research on wars in the modern world, comparative historical analysis of Swiss, Iraqi, and Mexican nation-state formation, and policy oriented research on the prevention of ethnic conflict.

**Diana Wong** is currently a freelance researcher residing in Malaysia. She has worked as a sociologist in Germany, Singapore and Malaysia. Her research interests are in the areas of development sociology, migration and religion.

**Yunxiang Yan** is a professor of Anthropology and co-director of the Center for Chinese Studies at University of California, Los Angeles. He has published two books on social change in rural China and has also published research articles on consumerism, cultural globalization, and state–society relationship.

# LIST OF BOXES, FIGURES, ILLUSTRATIONS & TABLES

## Boxes

5.1	The memory and reconciliation virtual library: Sarajevo – Belgrade – Frankfurt	100
6.1	The Mosque of Cordoba	104
6.2	The Story of Voskopojë	105
6.3	Protection measures	107
6.4	Looting, illicit trade and conflict	109
6.5	Rebuilding religious symbols in Sarajevo	113
17.1	The French suburbs and the violence of exclusion	238

## Figures

Introduction 1	Framework for the Cultures and Globalization Series	14
1.1	Unemployment rate of EU and non-EU nationals in 2001	36
3.1	Number of ongoing wars around the world, 1816–2001	67
3.2	Civil conflicts by level of intensity	70
3.3	Ethno-nationalist civil wars as a share of all civil wars, 1825–2001	73
3.4	Number of nation-state creations (five-year periods), 1800 to 2000	75
3.5	Nation-state creation and rates of war	77
4.1	Dimensions of cultural conflicts	82
18.1	Global cultural map	244
18.2	Value changes in selected societies	246
18.3	Absolute beliefs, in %	248
18.4	Intolerance towards ‘The Other’, in %	249
19.1	Religiosity by type of society	256
19.2	Percentage who ‘often’ think about the meaning and purpose of life	256
24.1	Map of Sri Lanka	297

## Illustrations

14.1	Our North and South	207
26.1	Re-claiming a park in Puerto Wilches	318
26.2	Mitigating aggression among political candidates	319
26.3	Rescuing José Botello from the ELN	322
26.4	A radio station trying to offset the terror of war	323

**Tables**

Introduction 1	Analytic dimensions of conflict	23
1.1	Stocks of foreign population in selected OECD countries	35
1.2	Violent crimes per 1000 foreigners	46
4.1	Foreign market share (1997)	83
4.2	Canada	83
4.3	Kazakhstan	85
4.4	Malaysia	87
6.1	Tentative typology of the destruction of cultural heritage caused during conflicts	103
13.1	Great Awakenings and their salient features	190
21.1	Percentage in the population of immigrants from neighboring countries and Peru in Argentina (1869–2001)	265
21.2	Argentine and migrant population of Buenos Aires City: 1869 and 1914	270







# INTRODUCING THE CULTURES AND GLOBALIZATION SERIES

Helmut K. Anheier and Yudhishtir Raj Isar

## Why Cultures and Globalization?

The world's cultures are broadly and deeply affected by globalization in ways that are still inadequately documented and understood. These impacts are at once unifying and divisive, liberating and corrosive, homogenizing and diversifying; they have become a truly central contemporary concern. Understandably, the interplay between cultures and globalization crystallizes both positive aspirations and negative anxieties, as it transforms patterns of sameness and difference across the world or modifies the ways in which cultural expression is created, represented, recognized, preserved or renewed (Wieviorka and Ohana 2001). This complex interplay has also contributed to generating new discourses of 'culturalism' that evoke the power of culture in domains as diverse as economic development, the fostering of citizenship and social cohesion, human security and the resolution or prevention of conflict. Yet 'culture and globalization' has become a discursive field that is all too often perceived and thought about – whether in negative or in positive terms – in ways that are simplificatory or illusive.

Clearly, there is a knowledge gap. The *Cultures and Globalization series* is designed to fill this gap, one that – we believe – has already become politically perilous, socially unsustainable and economically constraining. Achieving a better understanding of the relationships between globalization and cultural change is thus of much more than academic interest – it is important for many areas of policy and practice.

That globalization has a profound impact on culture, and that cultures shape globalization, may seem a truism. Yet the two-way interaction involves some of the most vexed and at the same time taken-for-granted questions of our time. It transforms previously stable forms of everyday life and of living together, of identity and belonging; of cultural expression including creative practice and entertainment. Highly diverse and uneven, the

impacts of the globalization process on cultural life present unprecedented challenges to many traditional relationships as well, particularly between individuals on the one hand and 'communities', civil society and the nation on the other. What is more, they continue to transform the institutional roles of markets, governments, the non-profit sector and organized citizens' groups and movements.

Analyzing these relationships between globalization processes on the one hand and cultural patterns and developments on the other is the core objective of *Cultures and Globalization*. We seek to draw attention to changes in the world's cultures, and the policy implications they have, by providing an outlet for cutting-edge research, thinking and debate. Our hope is that this book will become a valued reference for the exploration of contemporary cultural issues from different perspectives – in the social sciences, in the arts and the humanities, as well as in policy-making circles – and that it will contribute to building bridges among them. As Fredric Jameson has pointed out:

*Globalization falls outside the established academic disciplines, as a sign of the emergence of a new kind of social phenomenon ... There is thus something daring and speculative, unprotected, in the approach of scholars and theorists to this unclassifiable topic, which is the intellectual property of no specific field, yet which seems to concern politics in immediate ways, but just as immediately culture and sociology, not to speak of information and the media, or ecology, or consumerism and daily life. Globalization ... is thus the modern or postmodern version of the proverbial elephant, described by its blind observers in so many diverse ways. Yet one can still posit the existence of the elephant in the absence of a single persuasive and dominant theory; nor are blinded questions the most unsatisfactory way to explore this kind of relational and multilevel phenomenon. (Jameson and Miyoshi 1998: xi)*



Globalization affects millions of people across the world, the organizations where they work, and the communities in which they live. People's values and expectations are changing, and their identities and orientations are being transformed in ways that are subtle and fundamental alike, and involve other institutional complexes such as organized religion and civil society more generally, and, of course, politics and the economy. For the first time in human history, communication flows, migration patterns, transnational interpersonal and inter-organizational networks are emerging at such significant scales that they are increasingly achieving global range (Barber 1995; Castells 1996 and 1997; Dicken 2003; Held and McGrew 2000, 2002).

Yet while massive amounts of data exist on the economics of globalization, and have been appropriately interpreted, we face a paucity of information and analysis when it comes to culture. Cultural patterns and changes – including the values, aspirations, meanings, representations and identities they express or suppress, and the ways people appropriate them across the world – remain largely unmeasured and unanalyzed. Moreover, much information is collected but goes unreported and hence does not reach the right audiences in the policy-making arena. There are exceptions, to be sure. For example, European organizations such as ERICarts (with its *Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe*, prepared for the Council of Europe), the European Cultural Foundation (with its newly-launched 'LAB for Culture' consortium), or global organizations such as the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies (IFACCA) are producing useful new data. And a range of individual researchers are renewing frameworks of analysis (e.g., Mercer 2002) or coming up with new findings (e.g., Ilczuk and Isar 2006). The point remains, however, that comparative research in the field of culture is seriously underdeveloped. In particular, there is a lack of empirical analysis of why globalization matters for culture and why culture matters for globalization, whether nationally or, even more importantly, internationally or globally.

One reason for the neglect at the global level is that the conventional understandings of culture are still connected principally to the sovereign nation-state. However, today, this nexus of culture and nation no longer dominates, as the cultural dimension has become constitutive of collective identity

at narrower as well as broader levels. As Paul Gilroy reminds us, the idea of culture 'has been abused by being simplified, instrumentalized, or trivialized, and particularly through being coupled with notions of identity and belonging that are overly fixed or too easily naturalized as exclusively national phenomena' (Gilroy 2004: 6). What is more, cultural processes take place in increasingly 'deterritorialized' transnational, global contexts, many of which are beyond the reach of national policies. Mapping and analyzing this shifting terrain, in all regions of the world, as well as the factors, patterns, processes, and outcomes associated with the 'complex connectivity' (Tomlinson 1999) of globalization, is therefore a main purpose of this Series.

Behind this objective lies the concern, which began to emerge strongly in the 1990s, to provide a more robust evidence base for policy-making in the rapidly changing cultural arena. This concern was crystallized by the World Commission on Culture and Development, whose report entitled *Our Creative Diversity* (World Commission on Culture and Development, 1996), stressed the weakness of the knowledge base as regards to the relationships between culture on the one hand and development on the other. The World Commission's recommendation that UNESCO should prepare a periodic report of worldwide reach in this field was thus the original inspiration for the present endeavor. In the ensuing decade, a number of other influential developments have taken place. UNESCO for its part followed up on the recommendation by preparing and publishing, in 1998 and 2000, two editions of a *World Culture Report* (note the use of the word 'culture' in the singular) devoted respectively to the topics 'Culture, creativity and markets' and 'Cultural diversity, conflict and pluralism'. UNESCO subsequently abandoned this enterprise, creating a vacuum this Series is intended to fill.

It should be noted though, that the UNESCO publication had perforce to keep 'culture' within the nation-state 'container', despite the fact that cultural questions now escape the direct reach of purely national policy-making because the economic and political dimensions, with which they are to varying degrees intertwined, are increasingly organized and played out at the transnational level. UNESCO's reports also had to appear as 'representative' as possible of that intergovernmental

organization's nation-state membership and also respond to the imperatives of international cultural diplomacy and politics. They could not be the work of an entirely 'independent team', as called for by the World Commission. The present project is thus the first attempt by an academic consortium to take up the task in total intellectual freedom; and in a spirit of catholicity as regards conceptual frameworks and approaches, with the aim of giving 'voice' to visions and interpretations of the nexus between cultures and globalization and of sharing fresh data about it drawn from as many different world regions as possible.

It is important to stress also that the main focus of this Series is not 'culture and development', as envisaged by the World Commission of the same name, but the relationships between cultures and globalization that came strongly to the fore in the closing years of the twentieth century. By 1998, when the Stockholm Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development mainstreamed many of the key findings and recommendations of the World Commission, the cultural implications of globalization had moved to center stage, often displacing 'development' as the term of reference. Thus the Stockholm Conference called for an international research agenda on precisely the sorts of questions this project now proposes to tackle. The need has been echoed widely in many other policy circles.

*Cultures and Globalization* thus seeks to rise to a multi-faceted challenge. Prepared by teams of independent researchers and cultural experts, hailing mainly but not exclusively from academia, each edition will focus on a specific set of 'culture and globalization' issues as they are perceived, experienced, analyzed and addressed in different geo-cultural regions of the world. This inaugural volume is devoted to the complex theme of 'conflict' that is related to or driven by the changing dynamic of cultural sameness and difference vis-à-vis globalization. The next one will tackle the latest issues and developments as regards the cultural economy across the world. The third is likely to explore issues of arts practice and creativity in the arts.

Each volume will also include a major data section that presents a novel form of cultural 'indicators' with the help of state-of-the-art information graphics. We are, of course, aware of the largely underdeveloped state of cultural statistics and, a fortiori, cultural indicators, particularly for cross-national, comparative purposes. Therefore, in a

departure from conventional approaches, we will neither seek to list data for indicators by country, nor strive to have a uniform table layout by country; rather we would use 'indicator suites' to present related data and information on specific aspects of the relationships between culture and globalization. A basic premise of this approach, which will be shown in detail in the chapter 'Introducing Cultural Indicator Suites', is that much information on culture and culture-related facets is already 'out there', but that much of this information remains to be systematically assessed, compiled, described, analyzed and presented.

## The issues

As Appadurai (1996), Wolton (2003) and others have observed, we are in a time of intense 'culturalism', as cultural difference is consciously mobilized in a politics of recognition and representation, as a political arm, a bulwark or a refuge for both individuals and groups. The terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington DC on September 11, the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, heated debates about the cultural dimensions of migration in Europe, fundamentalist re-assertions in all major religions that are forms of cultural identification rather than spirituality, are among the many events and forces that have turned these articulations of cultural difference into political fault lines. The 'fateful militancy' (Hartman 1997) which culture has achieved in political terms is now high on the policy agenda.

At the same time, immense political pressure from the West on some regions and countries, while it ignores others, is met by a general disillusionment about the largely unmet promises of globalization in the Global South, where the majority of the population lives on less than \$2 a day (Stiglitz 2003). One striking cultural response to such asymmetries has been the rise of 'cultural diversity' as a leading notion in international cultural politics. This is no longer simply the diversity that is a given of the human condition – and the stuff of anthropology – but a normative meta-narrative, deployed as the standard-bearer of a campaign to exclude cultural goods and services from global free trade rules (Isar 2006). In this guise, the term emerged at the turn of the present century, as an alternative to the limited and somewhat negative connotations of

the *'exception culturelle'* that France, Canada and other nations had been advocating since the end of the Uruguay Round discussions in the mid-1990s. The discursive maneuver of shifting from 'exception' to 'diversity' as the master concept allowed French international diplomacy to tap into a much broader range of cultural commitments and anxieties across the world. Thus, in UNESCO's 2001 Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, Article 8, entitled 'Cultural goods and services: commodities of a unique kind', states:

*In the face of present-day economic and technological change, opening up vast prospects for creation and innovation, particular attention must be paid to the diversity of the supply of creative work, to due recognition of the rights of authors and artists and to the specificity of cultural goods and services which, as vectors of identity, values and meaning, must not be treated as mere commodities or consumer goods. (2001)*

Recognizing this specificity is also the main purpose of the 'Convention on the protection of the diversity of cultural contents and artistic expressions' adopted by UNESCO in October 2005; it is the sense in which many individuals, non-governmental organizations, cultural activists and government officials deploy the term strategically today.

The principle is laudable. The goal is to foster the dynamism of contemporary cultural production rather than play a preservationist role. Yet this is a 'strategic essentialism' built upon unquestioned, un-deconstructed discourses of nationhood. Precisely because its object is cultural diversity among nations rather than within them, it is less about the negotiation of cultural difference than about the representation of 'cultures' as islands unto themselves, fixed and given (Isar 2006). Yet the key challenge of negotiating difference today is to 'give up notions of cultural purity, and search to uncover the ways in which the meanings and symbols of culture are produced through complex processes of translation, negotiation and enunciation' (Stevenson 2003: 61).

### **Cultures and globalization: towards a framework**

There is a rich and growing body of globalization literature (see Castells 1996; Held and McGrew

2002; Lomborg 2004; Murray, 2006). However, this literature has been focused largely on economic globalization and the spread of the international rule of law, including security issues, and typically devotes one chapter, if that, to cultural trade issues. Only secondarily has it dealt with social-cultural aspects in a broader sense, although the *Global Civil Society Yearbook* (Anheier et al. 2001), and UNDP's *Human Development Report* (2004) and other publications, are beginning to address this imbalance. Specific cultural aspects have been even less acknowledged. Barring some notable exceptions (Appadurai 1996, 2001; various works by Mike Featherstone, particularly 1995; Jameson and Miyoshi 1998; Rao and Walton 2004; Sassen 1998; Tomlinson 1999; Warnier 2004; Wolton 2003), both globalization in the cultural sphere and the relationships between globalization and cultural change remain relatively under-explored. Empirical evidence about them is not being gathered regularly and updated for the purpose of ongoing analysis.

As mentioned earlier, the current destinies of culture have been brought into the international policy debate through a number of publications and the political messages they contained. The process was initiated by UNESCO's World Commission on Culture and Development, which introduced a strong policy link between culture and development. It called for a 'commitment to pluralism' as a middle course between universalism and radical cultural relativism. The notion of a 'constructive pluralism' developed subsequently by UNESCO suggests the active and dynamic coexistence of groups, and incorporates the conditions for a public domain that allows creative contact and transformation. Building on the ground laid by the World Commission on Culture and Development, the *2004 Human Development Report*, sub-titled 'Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World', stipulated a close connection between culture, liberty and human development. It suggested that cultural liberty, i.e., the ability to choose one's identity, is important in 'leading a full life'. To some extent the *2004 Human Development Report* was written in the context of concerns about the increasing cultural dominance of the West, in particular the United States, and the exponential growth of identity politics. At the same time, while emphasizing the importance of culture for human development, the Report rejected culture-based theories of development, stressing the plurality of cultural traditions and paths to modernity.

Two aspects of these United Nations publications are worth noting for our purposes. First, they do not test in a systematic manner how different facets or dimensions of globalization relate to cultural development. Cultural fragmentation and modernist homogenization are not just two opposing views of what is happening in the world today but are on the contrary both constitutive of the current reality (Friedman 1996).

Second, these publications, although they stress the importance and the impact of globalization, are rooted in nation-state thinking. The sovereign nation-state remains the default case in grappling with cultural processes and finding solutions to global, transnational problems (Lomborg 2004). Trans-border flows of people and artifacts, which are profoundly cultural, are inadequately addressed. The role of transnational businesses and civil society organizations that span many national and regional boundaries receive scant attention, as does the role of the various international epistemic communities (artists, lawyers, academics, etc.) and committed individuals from different walks of life. This is not to argue, however, that the nation-state is no longer relevant as an organizing framework for cultural belonging and identity, as well as for cultural practice. The point is, rather, that national policy-makers need new tools with which to think the challenges of culture in broader transnational terms.

## Our method and framework

As we seek to shift the frame in the ways suggested above, there could be a danger that this volume emerges as little more than a compilation of chapters on loosely connected topics. To counteract this danger, we suggest a set of organizing principles and offer an initial conceptual framework for breaking down the complex relationships between cultures and globalization, and for analyzing the shifting ground on which cultural change is occurring. This framework will inform our editorial policies for the coming years. We will use it to identify and develop our themes, and to set substantive priorities and foci.

The framework will serve three additional purposes: First, for the development of the statistical part of the book, guiding the selection of indicators and the identification of data needs with a view to

encouraging evidence-based research and policy analysis; second, by allowing for a systematic exploration of core themes and critical issues, it will help build a permanent 'multilogue' across fields, disciplines, countries and regions. Third, a better conceptual and empirical understanding of how globalization and culture relate to each other can be useful to others in developing policy options and their implications.

## Conceptual challenges

To be sure, any attempt at seeking to establish such a framework in the field of cultures and globalization faces many challenges. The initial challenge is that of definition. As a phenomenon, culture is directly or indirectly related to virtually every aspect of the human condition; as a concept, it is even broader and more capacious than 'economy' or 'society.' Kroeber and Kluckhohn's 281 famous definitions of 1952, a classic reference, come to mind immediately; indeed this is not surprising, since within various disciplines – anthropology and sociology in particular – there have been many attempts to stabilize meanings in the interest of a technical vocabulary (Williams 1976). Having entirely escaped academic control in recent decades, however, the notion has become even more protean, especially as cultural difference has come to be consciously mobilized in political ways by individuals and groups.

The word 'culture' is thus the object of a complex terminological tangle. With no single definition generally accepted, differences, overlaps and nuances in meaning complicate rather than facilitate rigor and communication in the field. Various disciplines deal with culture and regard it as their 'terrain', however inclusively or exclusively: anthropology, political science, history, sociology, the law, and, of course, the humanities including cultural studies and art history. These disciplines have become institutionalized as such in the academy, and have come to function as closed intellectual 'silos', as it were, frequently discouraging multidisciplinary approaches and cross-disciplinary dialogue. Within each discipline, we typically find multiple approaches in terms of focus and methodology, such as the split between quantitative and qualitative sociology, or between cultural and social anthropology. For brevity's sake, we will refer to the sum of academic disciplines concerned with culture as the 'cultural disciplines'.



These disciplines present a rich tapestry of approaches, theories and models that sometimes compete, sometimes overlap and conceptually nest one within the other. They frequently span disciplinary boundaries and spill over into other parts of the field. It is neither possible nor necessary to review them further here. This has been done elsewhere. Suffice it to say that these disciplines draw inspiration from many different thinkers, including ancestral figures such as Durkheim (1965), Freud (1961), Gramsci (1971), Marx (1978), Simmel (1983), Weber (1978), or more recent intellectual mentors such as Appadurai (2001), Beck (2000), Bourdieu (1987), (Calhoun, 1994), Castells (1996), Featherstone (1995), Foucault (see Rabinow and Rose 2003), Giddens (1991), Habermas (1987), Hall, (Hall and Du Gay 1996), Hannerz (1992), or Touraine (1997), to mention but a few. Much of the thinking of these scholars is directly relevant to cultures and globalization. Although we cannot offer a systematic review here, we will mention four dominant strands for illustrative purposes, and refer to them more directly over time in the context of specific topics covered in successive volumes in the Series:

- A recurrent theme in the cultural disciplines is the **degree of independence of culture** from the economy, and what form and direction this relationship might take in a globalizing world. This ranges from Marxist notions of economic determinism, to Weberian thinking that attaches greater '*Eigendynamik*' to culture, in particular to the role of ideas, includes Bourdieu's notion of cultural capital as a distinct 'currency' of status-seeking and elite maintenance. This strand of work leads us to address the question of how independent cultural globalization is from other globalization forms and drivers. Does cultural globalization have its own dynamic, relatively independent of economic and political developments?
- Another theme is the **attributed developmental capacity and trajectory of cultures**, and the questions this raises in the context of globalization. This has deep intellectual roots in anthropology and sociology, e.g., the distinction between traditional and modern cultures; Tönnies' (1991) *Gemeinschaft* versus *Gesellschaft* model, or Innis' (1950) distinction between space-binding

cultures and time-binding cultures. Assuming that globalization challenges many cultures, and some in fundamental ways in terms of their very survival, what will be their capacity to respond and adapt, in particular in view of the often assumed hegemonic force of American-style consumer culture?

- The **unity (or multiplicity) and impact of modernity** constitutes another theme worth revisiting when examining the relationship between globalization and cultures. Some have suggested that modernity comes in 'packages': some aspects are extrinsic and allow for separation (e.g., modern medicine and Christianity), while others are intrinsic and make separation impossible (modern medicine and notion of causality). Moreover, some cultural aspects have carry-over effects and spill into other life spheres (culture of work into family life), while other cultural patterns may block such movements. There is also a range of perspectives that speaks of 'multiple modernities' (among them Eisenstadt 2000) or 'alternative modernities' (Gaonkar 2001).
- Related to the theme of modernity is the question of identity formation and maintenance in a globalizing world. Conceptualizations of this theme include Appadurai's concepts of global flows and deterritorialization (1996); García Canclini's understandings of hybridity (1995); Wolton's (2003) notion of 'cultural cohabitation', and what has been called *World Culture Theory* as a reference to the 'compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the global whole' (Robertson 1992: 8).

In addition to these themes, there are globalization theories with important implications for our understanding of culture (see Guillen 2001). For example, researchers such as Meyer et al. (1997) argue that a world-culture of institutions such as citizenship, human rights, science and technology, socioeconomic development, education, religion, and management has emerged that penetrates virtually all human endeavor. This increasingly global social organization of rationalized modernity has its logic and purposes built into almost all nation-states, resulting in a world that shows increasing structural *similarities of form* among countries. At the same time, countries differ in the fit between

these institutions, their needs and capacities, and therefore produce different cultural, social and economic *outcomes*.

However, with some exceptions, many of the models or ideas listed above, and we could add others, are either not fully testable to begin with or have not yet been explored systematically. Generally, theses and theories tend to be interpreted and reinterpreted, with little verification or further development. While it may be an overgeneralization, it is tempting to conclude that the cultural disciplines tend to add new ideas without discarding old ones, and to create conceptual complexity rather than parsimony. As a result, they display considerable theoretical inertia, and a cacophony of definitions, approaches and theories.

### Characteristics

A conceptual framework is neither a theory nor a fully integrated body of knowledge. Rather, it serves as a marker of 'intellectual terrain' by identifying boundaries, major concepts and issues as well as the relations, *de facto* or hypothesized, among them. Several qualities or characteristics are worth keeping in mind:

- *Parsimony*, i.e., the aim to 'achieve most with least'. Any framework or model produces a picture of the reality that is simpler than reality itself;
- *Significance*, i.e., a framework that identifies the truly critical aspects of a phenomenon and its relationships, and focuses attention on aspects that are neither obvious nor trivial;
- *Combinatorial richness*, i.e., the range of hypotheses that can be generated with the framework, the number of interesting issues, features and relations it helps identify and anticipate; this includes *theoretical fruitfulness*, i.e., the extent to which the framework allows us to explore and develop existing and new insights, models, and theories; and *organizing power*, i.e., the ability of the framework to bring in and integrate new aspects, thereby extending the applicability and range; and, finally,
- *Policy relevance*, i.e., the extent to which a framework leads to insights, options, recommendations and models of interest to policy-makers (e.g., some aspects might be 'interesting' and even theoretically relevant, but have low policy salience).

### Prerequisites

The *Series* is unlikely to avoid the problems of definition that are endemic to the cultural disciplines, which are as it were, their conceptual discontents. We do not intend to adopt a single set of omnibus concepts, much less a single lens. We know that the various contributors to this collective endeavor will each work with very different concepts of culture – for the reasons already outlined above. Also, the cultural disciplines, as well as cultural operators, activists and policy-makers, tend to oscillate permanently between variants of the 'ways of life' notions of culture and 'arts and heritage' ones. We nevertheless intend to initiate our work with an agreed understanding of the terms we ourselves shall be using. In other words, we shall offer working definitions for key concepts and also state our methodological approach.

**Culture** in the broad sense we propose to employ refers to the social construction, articulation and reception of meaning. Culture is the lived and creative experience for individuals **and** a body of artifacts, symbols, texts and objects. Culture involves enactment and representation. It embraces art and art discourse, the symbolic world of meanings, the commodified output of the cultural industries as well as the spontaneous or enacted, organized or unorganized cultural expressions of everyday life, including social relations. It is constitutive of both collective and individual identity. Closely related to culture is the concept of **communication**, which refers to the ways in which meanings, artifacts, beliefs, symbols and messages are transmitted through time and space, as well as processed, recorded, stored, and reproduced. Communication requires media of storage and transmission, institutions that make storage and transmission possible, and media of reception.

**Globalization** involves the movement of objects (goods, services, finance and other resources, etc.), meanings (language, symbols, knowledge, identities, etc.) and people across regions and intercontinental space. The notion of **cultural globalization** involves three movements (UNDP 2004): flows of investments and knowledge; flows of cultural goods; and flows of people. Cultures or aspects of cultures are globalized to the extent to which they involve the movement of specified objects, systems of meaning and people across national/regional borders and continents. Yet these

processes, so closely related to the globalization of communication, the media and the cultural industries, are for one thing inaccessible to the majority of the world's population and actually appear to generate countless counter-affirmations at the level of local reception. Indeed, some analysts such as Warnier (2004) reject the notion of 'cultural globalization' altogether: there are globalized cultural industries, to be sure, but no global culture in the sense of the term as we have defined it above.

Cultural products and values are part of a larger process that involves economic globalization, defined as the functional integration of economic production and distribution processes across multiple national borders (Dicken 1999); the emergence of a global civil society, defined as the socio-sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organizations, networks, and individuals located primarily outside the institutional complexes of family, state, and market and operating beyond the confines of national societies, politics, and economies (Anheier et al. 2001; Kaldor et al. 2003); and international law and the emergence of an international legal system, e.g., the International Court of Justice or the European Court of Justice.

In terms of methodology, the proposed framework is neither self-referential in its intent, i.e., not seen as a closed system; nor does it imply any notion of causality among the concepts specified, nor a strict focus on some 'dependent variable'. Nor does it favor any particular approach, theory or policy. Instead, it is descriptive as well as analytical in the context of seeking to inform theory-building and policy-making in the field. While it is not normative in purpose, this does not mean that we will in any way prevent normative viewpoints and ethical stances from finding their way into these pages; rather, we encourage multiple voices to be heard, and wish to see them engaged in evidence-based debate.

### Key understandings

Even though our understanding of the relationships between culture and globalization remains sketchy and uneven, enough has been thought and written on the subject to allow us to extract positions, statements and generic hypotheses that identify, at least initially, key conceptual building blocks and relationships.

#### A. Context

The world's cultures are being shaped by economic, social and political-legal globalization

and vice versa. The strengths and the directions of the reciprocal relationships vary by field, country and region as well as over time. For analytic purposes, we refer to the other globalization processes as context, even though in reality, they are typically concomitant rather than parallel, and occur in different combinations rather than uniformly across time and space.

#### B. Systems and units of analysis

Culture and globalization are complex, multifaceted concepts, and difficult to reduce to one or two dimensions without conceptual and empirical harm. Like globalization, culture involves social, economic and political aspects, and also the artistic-aesthetic realm. We refer to these dimensions as system, not in the strict sense of system theory, but only to emphasize that different aspects of culture can display considerable dynamics of their own, driven by specific logics, incentives and rewards in terms of recognition, prestige and power (Geertz 1983). Thus, to counteract any reductionist tendencies, we can think of culture as a system of artistic endeavor and realm of creativity, as a social system of meaning and values, as an economic system of production, distribution and consumption, and as a political system of positions of power and influence. Each 'lens' is equally valid and likely brings up different questions, leading to different insights and implications.

The relationship between cultures and globalization is not only multifaceted from a systemic perspective; in each case, it also involves different units of analysis such as individuals, organizations, professions, institutional patterns, communities, societies, as well as nation-states. The different units, in turn, may be interrelated and affect each other over time. In making observations, and in reaching conclusions about these relationships, it is important to specify the units of analysis involved. Importantly, however, given the objectives of the *Series*, we generally also put emphasis on units other than nation-states, national cultures or countries. This would involve in particular units like organizations, communities, and actual networks among individuals as well as virtual networks like the Internet.

#### C. Structures and processes

Within the context of globalization and for the different units of analysis, we can address the two

major conceptual blocks we regard as the central substantive concern of the project (i) cultural identities, patterns and structures; and (ii) cultural processes, communication and flows. In what follows, we illustrate each and show what kind of theories and questions will guide the setting of priorities in the future. Our editorial policy is to address such priority issues by using more general approaches in the social sciences, exploring how they relate to available work in the globalization field, and then posing questions that could become the topic of individual chapters.

The complex and increasingly troubled relationship between *identities* and globalization is a case in point. Both individual identity and collective identity are involved here, both the individual subject and the cultural community (Touraine 1997). Two long-standing strands of social science theory shape our understanding of personal or individual identity. One is rooted in developmental psychology and sees identity as the result of 'deep socialization', i.e., early value-forming experiences and learning processes that make up the core personality traits and character dispositions. This psychological understanding is close to what could be called the 'hard-wired' aspect of identity as a sense of self – once formed, it is fairly stable throughout the life course, and relatively resistant to political, cultural and social changes.

The other approach is more sociological in nature and sees it as the outcome of ongoing search processes. Individuals try to forge, negotiate and reconcile their own 'worldviews' and notions of self with that of collectively defined expectations. Given the multiple roles people perform in modern, diverse societies, however, this more 'soft-wired' form of identity is not only evolving, it is also precarious and precious. It refers less to identity as 'self' but more to identity in relation to categories such as nation, religion, place, or belonging (Calhoon 1994).

Are these approaches useful in the context of globalization? What are some of the drivers shaping identity in a globalizing world, and what policy implications can be suggested? What are the social and cultural outlets of identity formation? These questions would form the basis for a chapter on the relationship between globalization and individual identity. By the same token, other chapters could address collective identity, including the cosmopolitan, as well as organizational and professional (or 'social') identities. How are such identities

and the possible conflicts between them acting as forces for social change or stasis? As regards tensions and conflicts, what are the factors of escalation or resolution? The important point is that the critical relationship between cultures, globalization and identity would be examined from different theoretical perspectives and different units of analysis.

The globalization literature suggests a number of approaches that can be useful for examining the relation between globalization and culture looking for patterns and structures across different units of analysis. The work of Castells (1996, 1997) and Held et al. (1999) are cases in point. Castells (1996) argues that networks among organizations and individuals increasingly form meta-networks at the transnational level and create a system of 'decentralized concentration', where a multiplicity of interconnected tasks takes place in different sites. Since the 1970s, enabling technologies such as telecommunication and the Internet brought about the ascendance of a 'network society', whose processes occur in a new type of space – the space of flows. The space of flows, comprising a myriad of links and exchanges, has come to dominate the older space of place (including territorially defined units such as states and neighborhoods), thanks to its flexibility, and its compatibility with the new logic of the network society. The social organization of the network society is constructed by nodes and hubs in this space of flows, where most of the social action occurs. Hence, the manifold spaces of flows are at the core of understanding globalization, and are where we need to explore the role and place of culture. What is the 'culture' of these spaces, and how do they affect cultural changes, and at what level or unit of analysis?

Following Held et al. (1999: 17–27), we suggest that some of the major contours of the more organizational aspects of cultures and globalization can be described by four related characteristics:

- *Extensivity* as a measure of the geographical expansion of activities, i.e., movements of objects (goods, services, resources etc.), meaning (symbols, knowledge) and people across regions and intercontinental space, as indicated by the number of 'nodes' (e.g., organizations, informal networks, artists, and participants) that constitute the overall spread of a 'network' or practice. Extensivity refers to the range of cultural globalization;



- *Intensity* of the overall volume of such movements relative to the national and the local; it refers to the number and types of connections involved among the various 'nodes'. Intensity indicates how densely the elements are connected amongst each other;
- *Velocity* of the overall interactions as a measure of the frequency to which movement connections are made or used among nodes; and
- *Impact* of globalization on cultures. This is the most difficult one to conceptualize and measure, and involves processes such as homogenization, hybridization, contestation, indifference, evolution, decline or, on the positive side, liberation or emancipation, that can be described in terms of the resulting cultural infrastructures, practices and repertoires; the institutionalization of interactions; patterns of stratification, power, inclusion and exclusion.

The modes of interaction are of particular interest, and include:

- *Imposition*, which implies cultural power differences and stratification, hierarchy and unevenness in the establishment and use of institutional infrastructure across societies, regions, etc.; such power needs organizational, institutional infrastructure (media, professionals, knowledge).
- *Diffusion*, whereby elements from one 'culture' find their way into another.
- *Relativization*, whereby cultural elements take shape relative to other elements.
- *Emulation*, as the creation of a common cultural arena in which actors can selectively choose from an increasingly global arsenal.
- *Glocalization*, whereby universal ideas, patterns values are interpreted differently; refers to the way in which homogenization and heterogenization intertwine.
- *Interpenetration*, whereby the universalization of particularism and the particularization of universalism combine.
- *Resistance*, whereby local culturalist claims and identities are asserted in reaction to the perceived imposition of the global.

These interactions involve a communication and media infrastructure of cultural production, transmission and reception, although the extent to which flows and processes are institutionalized varies

across time and space. For different cultural areas and issues, we would ask what kinds of interactions prevail among what units of analysis to produce different kinds of outcomes, and policy implications, in terms of:

- *Thick* cultural globalization (high extensity, high intensity, high velocity, and high impact), with the Internet, mass tourism as cases in point.
- *Diffused* globalization (high extensity, high intensity, high velocity, and low impact), e.g., global art markets.
- *Expansive* globalization (high extensity, low intensity, low velocity, and high impact), e.g., elite cultural networks.
- *Thin* globalization (high extensity, low intensity, low velocity, and low impact), e.g., international cultural organizations.

#### D. Models and policy positions

What are some of the initial positions and policy approaches in sociology, for example, that can be relevant for our purposes, and that can be examined empirically in a range of cultural fields and areas? Specifically, for the positions illustrated below, we would ask: what are the policies and policy implications concerning the relationship between culture and globalization for the movements of objects, meanings and people in terms of identities, patterns and structures, and the processes, communications and flows?

Held et al. (1999) identify the *Hyperglobalizers* who predict a homogenization of the world's cultures along the American model of mass culture and consumerism. They are set apart from the *Skeptics* who lament the loss of 'thick' national cultures and point to the 'thinness' and ersatz quality of globalized culture, whereas the *Transformationalists* shift attention to the intermingling of cultures and the emergence of hybrid global cultural elements and networks.

Berger (1997) suggests that globalization involves four conflicting 'cultures' that themselves are closely allied to specific institutions: the *Davos Culture* is the increasingly globalized corporate culture, lifestyle, career patterns and expectations of the international business community; the *Faculty Club* is the intellectual response to globalization that is largely on reform course, trying to 'tame' and 'humanize' the process; *McWorld* refers to the spread of consumerism and Americanization of

popular culture (Barber 1995); and *religious revival* refers to the efforts of largely protestant and Islamic groups to proselytize and gain greater influence. The value systems around these cultures are on a collision course as they make very different claims on the nature of globalization, leading to rather different policy implications.

Kaldor, Anheier and Glasius (Kaldor et al. 2003) develop a different, though complementary, approach and identify political/value positions on globalization. These positions are held by actors such as NGO leaders as well as political parties, governments, business executives and individuals. They argue that there are very few out and out *supporters* of globalization (i.e., groups or individuals who favor all forms of global connectedness such as trade, money, people, law and politics); at the same time, there are very few total *rejectionists*. Rather, the dominant responses to globalization are mixed. Specifically, 'regressive globalizers' are individuals, groups and governments who favor globalization on their own terms and when it is in their particular interest. Reformers or 'redistributive globalizers' are groups, individuals, governments and multilateral institutions that, like Berger's 'Faculty Club,' favor 'civilizing' or 'humanizing' globalization.

Viewing the various positions from the vantage point of the sociology of culture, Crane (2002) has identified the following four broad models as heuristic markers:

1. *The cultural imperialism model*, which focuses upon the roles of governments and of multinational and trans-national corporations in the dissemination of different forms of global culture. It hypothesizes that this culture is disseminated from rich and powerful countries located at the core of the world cultural system to poorer and less developed countries on the periphery. The theory presupposes a relatively homogeneous mass culture that is accepted passively and uncritically by mass audiences. Cultural imperialism is viewed as purposeful and intentional because it corresponds to the political interests of powerful capitalist societies.
2. *The cultural flows or network model* sees the transmission process as a set of influences that do not necessarily originate in the same place or flow in the same direction. Receivers may also be originators. In this model, cultural

globalization corresponds to a network with no clearly defined centre or periphery (see, for example, Appadurai 1996) but shifting configurations. Globalization as an aggregation of cultural flows or networks is a less coherent and unitary process than cultural imperialism and one in which cultural influences move in many different directions to bring about rather more hybridization than homogenization.


3. *The reception model* argues that audiences vary in the way they respond actively rather than passively to mass-mediated culture, and that different national, ethnic, and racial groups interpret the same materials differently. Hence the different empirical responses to cultural globalization by publics in different countries, a phenomenon one observes readily in many developing countries where 'cultural pride' is strong. This model does not view globally disseminated culture as a threat to national or local identities. Multiculturalism rather than cultural imperialism is the dominant trend.
4. Finally, *a negotiation and competition model*, based on the recognition that globalization has stimulated a range of strategies on the part of nations, global cities, and cultural organizations to cope with, counter, or facilitate the culturally globalizing forces. They include strategies for preserving and protecting cultural forms inherited from the past, strategies for rejuvenating traditional cultures, strategies for resisting cultural imposition, and strategies that aim to process and package – maybe even alter or transform—local and national cultures for global consumption. In this perspective, globalization impels these entities to try to preserve, position, or project their cultures in global space.

It is clear that these positions involve very different policy preferences in all the areas of concern.

### Setting priorities

As suggested at the outset, a clear analytical framework should spell out the organizing principles and substantive foci of *Cultures and Globalization*. Thus, in the context of globalization drivers and processes, we are primarily interested in describing and analyzing different units of analysis, cultural identities, patterns, structures and flows, and the models, theories and policy options they suggest. We would do so through four lenses that each highlight specific aspects of culture: artistic,

**Figure I.1 Framework for the Cultures and Globalization Series**



social, economic, and political. This framework, presented in Figure 1, shows our intellectual terrain in the context of other forms and drivers of globalization, the various systems and units of analysis that can become relevant, and the core descriptive and analytic foci pursued. As elaborated in the chapter 'Introducing Cultural Indicator Suites', Figure 1 also offers both framework and guidance for the 'Profiles of World Cultures', the data section of the *Cultures and Globalization Series*.

We see this framework as an analytic tool for breaking down the relationship between culture and

globalization, and the shifting nexus between culture and society. In terms of setting priorities and for keeping focus as well as editorial coherence, each edition examines, though not exclusively, the relationship between globalization and culture with the help of a particular emphasis. This could be a specific theme or set of related themes, a critical policy approach or some other topic. The thematic foci for the first five include, beginning with this year's theme Conflicts and Tensions; The Cultural Economy; Creativity and Arts Practice; Identities and Values; and Innovation and Regression.

## REFERENCES

- Anheier, H. K., Glasius, M. and Kaldor, M. (2001) *Global Civil Society 2001*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Appadurai, A. (1996) *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- (2001) (ed.) *Globalization*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Barber, B. (1995) *Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World*. New York: Times Books.
- Beck, U. (2000) *What is Globalization?*. Cambridge, UK: Malden, MA: Polity Press.
- Berger, P. L. (1997) 'Four Faces of Global Culture', *The National Interest* (49): 23(7).
- Bourdieu, P. (1987) *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Calhoun, C. (ed.) (1994) *Social theory and the politics of Identity*. Cambridge, MA and Oxford, Blackwell.
- Castells, M. (1996) *The Rise of Network Society*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- (1997) *The Power of Identity*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Crane, D. (2002) 'Cultural globalization from the perspective of the sociology of culture'. Paper presented at the Symposium, Statistics in the Wake of Challenges Posed by Cultural Diversity in a Globalization Context, UNESCO Institute of Statistics, Montreal, October 21–23.
- Dicken, P. (1999) 'Globalization: An Economic-Geographical Perspective', in W. Halal and K. Taylor (eds), *Twenty-First Century Economics*. New York: St Martin's Press.
- (2003) *Global Shift: Reshaping the Global Economic Map in the 21st Century*, 4th edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Durkheim, E. (1965) [1912] *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. Trans. by Joseph Ward Swain. New York: The Free Press.
- Eisenstadt, S.N. (2000) 'Multiple Modernities', *Daedalus*, Vol. 129, No. 1, Winter 2000.
- Featherstone, M. (1995) *Undoing Culture: Globalization, Postmodernism and Identity*. London: Sage.
- Freud, S. (1961) *Civilization and its Discontents*. Trans. and ed. by James Strachey. New York: Norton.
- Friedman, J. (1996) *Cultural Identity and Global Process*. London: Sage Publications.
- Gaonkar, D. (ed.) (2001) *Alternative Modernities*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- García Canclini, N. (1995) *Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Geertz, C. (1983) *Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology*. New York: Basic Books, Inc.
- Giddens, A. (1991) *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Gilroy, P. (2004) *After Empire*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Gramsci, A. (1971) *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. Trans. and ed. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Guillen, M.F. (2001) 'Is Globalization Civilizing, Destructive or Feeble? A Critique of Five Key Debates in the Social Science Literature', *Annual Review of Sociology*, pp. 235–60.
- Habermas, J. (1987) *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Habermas, J. (1994) *Multiculturalism and 'The Politics of Recognition': an essay*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hall, S. and Du Gay, P. (1996) *Questions of Cultural Identity*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

- Hannerz, U. (1992) *Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Organization of Meaning*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hartman, G. (1997) *The Fateful Question of Culture*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Held, D. and McGrew, A. G. (2000) *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate*. Malden, MA: Polity Press.
- (2002) *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture*. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press (revised and updated edition).
- , Goldblatt, D., and Perraton, J. (1999) *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture*. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.
- Ilczuk, D. and Isar, Y.R. (eds) (2006) *Metropolises of Europe: Diversity in Urban Cultural Life*. Warsaw: CIRCLE.
- Innis, H.A. (1950) *Empire and Civilization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Isar, Y. R. (2006) 'Cultural diversity', *Theory, Culture and Society*, Special Issue on *Problematising Global Knowledge*, Vol. 23, Nos. 2–3 March–May 2006.
- Jameson, F. and Miyoshi, M. (1998) *The Cultures of Globalization*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Kaldor, M., Anheier, H. and Glasius, M. (2003) 'Global Civil Society in an Era of Regressive Globalization', in M. Kaldor, Helmut, Anheier and Marlies Glasius (eds), *Global Civil Society 2003*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kroeber, A. L. and Kluckhohn, C. (1952) *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*. Cambridge, MA: The Museum.
- Lomborg, E. (ed.) (2004) *Global Crisis, Global Solutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Marx, K. (1978). *The Marx-Engels Reader*. New York: Norton.
- Mercer, C. (2002). *Towards Cultural Citizenship: Tools for Cultural Policy and Development*. Stockholm: The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation and Digiunds Förlag.
- Meyer, J. W., Boli, J., Thomas, G. M. and Ramirez, F. O. (1997) 'World Society and the Nation-State', *American Journal of Sociology* 103(1): 144–81.
- Murray, W. (2006) *Geographies of Globalization*. London: Routledge.
- Rabinow, P. and Rose, N. (eds) (2003) *The Essential Foucault*. New York: New Press.
- Rao, V. and Walton, M. (2004) *Culture and Public Action*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Robertson, R. (1992) *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*. London: Sage Publications.
- Sassen, S. (1998) *Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money*. New York: The New Press.
- Simmel, G. (1983) *Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
- Stevenson, N. (2003) *Cultural Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Questions*. Maidenhead: Open University Press.
- Stiglitz, J. (2003) *Globalization and Its Discontents*. New York: Norton.
- Tönnies, F. (1991) *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundbegriffe der reinen Soziologie*. Berlin: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Tomlinson, J. (1999) *Globalization and Culture*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Touraine, A. (1997) *Pourrons nous vivre ensemble? Egaux et différents*. Paris: Fayard.
- United Nations Development Program (2004) *Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- UNESCO (1998) *World Culture Report: Culture, Creativity and Markets*. Paris: UNESCO Publishing.
- UNESCO (2000) *World Culture Report: Cultural Diversity, Conflict and Pluralism*. Paris: UNESCO Publishing.
- UNESCO (2001) Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001271/127160m.pdf>
- Warnier, J-P. (2004) *La mondialisation de la culture*. Paris: La Découverte.
- Weber, M. (1978) *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Wieviorka, M. and Ohana, J. (eds) (2001) *La différence culturelle: Une reformulation des débats*. Paris: Balland.
- Williams, R. (1976) *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wolton, D. (2003) *L'autre mondialisation*. Paris: Flammarion.
- World Commission on Culture and Development. (1996) *Our Creative Diversity*. Paris: UNESCO Publishing.







## INTRODUCTION

Yudhishtir Raj Isar and Helmut K. Anheier

Behind the concern for ‘culture’ that is increasingly evoked in contemporary public debate lurks the specter of conflict: the cultural dimensions of conflict on the one hand, and the conflictual dimensions of culture on the other. The duality inherent in this concern is, however, not always overtly stated. Yet, like so many other phenomena that characterize or are generated by globalization, conflict–culture relationships are inadequately analyzed and little understood. Hence they are easily politicized by ideologues of many different types and persuasions. This applies in particular to the question of cultural identities, both individual and collective, and their forms of expression, maintenance, representation, recognition, and renewal.

What exactly do we mean by ‘conflict’? At one level, we mean the tensions between individual and collective values on the one hand and economic and political interests on the other. These are an integral part of the human and social condition; they have always re-asserted themselves in times of accelerated change. Nor are they all inherently negative or harmful, on the contrary. Many observers make the point that the arts, for example, flourish during times of change and tension as tools of critique and dissent. Or take the ‘creative conflicts’ that sociologists from Simmel (1983) to Dahrendorf (1994) have written about, or the ‘creative destruction’ economists such as Schumpeter (1962) and others identified. Globalization has given a new ‘edge’ to such conflicts, however. Harnessing them through adequate institutions and ways of conflict regulation is now the challenge (see, e.g., Berger 1998).

Yet there are also violent conflicts, including conventional inter-state wars, ethnic strife and religious riots. Such conflicts are not only hideously wasteful of social energies and acutely harmful to all their protagonists. They also endanger future generations by creating a legacy of grievances and a ‘culture of memory’ that, as will become clear below, are likely to sow the seeds of future conflicts as well.

Addressing a broad range of conflicts, their cultural content and their relationships to globalization processes – within and among nations as well as

across the world’s geo-cultural regions – is our focus for this maiden issue of the *Series*. We shall use the framework outlined in the Introductory chapter to this volume in order to break down these relationships and the shifting nexus between cultures and societies. In so doing, we shall have to examine two facets of culture-related conflict, in other words: i) the extent to which conflicts generated by globalization in other areas appropriate the cultural dimension and ii) the extent to which the cultural dimension itself may have its own inbuilt conflict dynamics and tensions that might be either amplified or suppressed by globalization processes.

Although conflictuality is constitutive of the human condition, today we live in a particularly conflict-prone global environment, as the contributors to this volume will demonstrate, even though scholars disagree about the assessment and interpretation of different types of conflicts, their intensity and impact. Culturally driven and culturally implicated conflicts have been and are unfolding throughout the world. A myriad of tensions constantly surface with respect to cultural claims and assertions of many different kinds. A new commonplace is to see culture as a ‘security issue’. Yet fact-based and theoretically informed debate about the causes and consequences of such conflicts and tensions in the context of globalization has not become easier, but more difficult. One of the reasons is the increasing tendency to reify and essentialize the concept of culture, to instrumentalize ‘culture’ as a thing, an agency, and to ascribe causality to it, when often culture is only a pawn and the tensions are in fact generated by contests over power and resources.<sup>1</sup>

### **The duality of cultural conflict: path-dependency, worldviews and interests**

What, then, can be done to ‘deconstruct’ this relationship? First, we suggest that even the most complex reality should not deter us from proposing



explanatory models, if only to discard them after having explored their utility. Second, we think that such models, like the framework already proposed for breaking down the relationship between globalization and cultures, should be parsimonious, allow us to focus on essential features and issues, encourage further thinking, and be relevant to policy. This may be easier to advocate than to accomplish, however, and so here we can do little more than sketch what kind of model we have in mind.

Let us make a risky proposition as a starting point, although we are aware that it may well not be fully testable with the limited evidence available: in our opinion, many of today's conflicts, though not all, and rarely in their entirety, are tied to globalization processes.

Why might this be the case? In making this proposition, we have in mind a broad range of conflicts, including overtly ethnic conflicts, conflicts over resources and power, inter-state and civil wars, which are the focus of many of the chapters in this book, but also industrial, work-related conflicts, peasant revolts and student demonstrations, etc. We see globalization not primarily as the single cause of such conflicts but as a process penetrating and changing the 'causal chemistry' and 'fabric' of existing conflicts as well as emerging and re-emerging ones. Finally, in putting forward our proposition, we are invoking a broader historical perspective on globalization similar to that of many contemporary analysts when they point to the expansion of direct foreign investment and world trade since the end of the Cold War as the critical period but not the only one. Thus we see the current globalization spurt, as indeed previous ones in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in the context of a long-term though uneven expansion of world rationalization *and* capitalism. While in operational terms, we fully share contemporary readings of globalization as greater connectedness of flows of finance, knowledge, goods and services, and people across time, nations, regions and inter-continental space, we treat it conceptually as part of an ongoing historical process with *cultural roots* reaching back many centuries.

In other words, rather than a process that may have started in the late twentieth century, we regard today's globalization as the latest phase of historic developments whose major impetus was the rise of capitalism in Europe and North America, but which for centuries have spurred and interacted with

specific dynamics in other parts of the world in terms of economic and political development (e.g., Japan) or underdevelopment (e.g., Sub-Saharan Africa). At some level, the spread of rationality and capitalism has engendered conflict dynamics, i.e., colonialism, imperial wars, and struggles for self-determination and independence. At another level, these conflict dynamics, while often economic and political on the surface, have also been deeply cultural.

By 'cultural conflict' we mean nothing as dramatic as some 'clash of civilizations' or 'epochal fight' of ethnicities or religions. What we have in mind is more subtle and long-term: the cultural dynamics of rationalism and capitalism have long brought diverse cultural worldviews into contact with each other.<sup>2</sup> In many cases, such contact implied domination, but frequently it also involved some form of 'meshing' or partial inter-penetration of worldviews over time, encouraging cultural learning, cross-fertilization, imitation and innovation. Not surprisingly, the ways in which worldviews interact and relate to each other reflect power relations and changing elite interests over time. Some of these worldviews are religious, for example those of Catholicism or Sufism, while others are secular ideologies such as socialism, liberalism or Baathism, while yet others are eclectic mixtures, such as fascism or many forms of nationalism. Some are more coherent than others, and they vary in terms of openness and capacity for adaptation. Critically, these worldviews have been, and are, affected by globalization in varying ways, and vice versa, but they also have their own dynamics. The important point is that such worldviews have existed and evolved for many centuries, sometimes millennia, and typically antedate the more pronounced globalization periods of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Indeed, Christianity, Islam and socialism have been transnational creeds from their very beginning, and are certainly not the products of national societies or cultures.

Thus, when exploring the relationship between globalization and conflict we have to be mindful that some types of conflicts are deeply rooted in history, and that they are not the result of current events, even though the latter may well have contributed new impetuses and triggers. Instead, some conflicts are closely linked to worldviews held by different populations, groups and individuals, and how these worldviews line up with prevailing economic, political, and cultural realities. For example, the

'culture wars' in nineteenth-century Germany were a conflict between a politically and economically weakened Catholic Church and the rising secular power of Prussia. The culture wars of late twentieth-century America, however, take place between a cosmopolitan urban-industrial elite, and a religiously minded lower-middle class in danger of losing the socioeconomic status they worked so hard to attain.

Yet, if globalization involves more frequent movements of objects, meanings and people across transnational space, then it also implies, at the very least, a greater exposure of different collectivities to each other, and hence also greater contact among worldviews. Such contacts may challenge or reinforce long-held cultural assumptions and they may also increase the frequency of 'meshing' and depths of interpenetration, including acceptance and rejection as well as patterns of innovation and diffusion. Whatever the outcome, such contacts may also generate a greater conflict potential.

Yet what specifically could be such greater conflict potential in the historic and current relationship between globalization and culture? Let us step back and remind ourselves of Weber's observations about the relationship between ideas and interests. In his comparative analysis of world religions (Weber 1988), he concluded that material and ideal interests, and not specific ideas, govern human behavior. Yet the worldviews, i.e., the sum of ideas and their assumptions, act as a 'switch' and determine the 'tracks' along which actions are then being pushed by the dynamics of interests, be they political or economic. Thus, interests are path-dependent on patterns suggested, if not largely determined, by worldviews (see Tenbruck 1999; Schluchter 2005).

The parallel argument could be made for conflicts: not specific ideas, but material and ideal interests, govern human actions leading or responding to conflict. The worldviews, again, provide both structure and context to these conflicts and help shape specific conflict dynamics. As a result of globalization processes, the relationship between worldviews and interests has become more complex; and increasingly, through greater interpenetration and more frequent 'meshing', conflicts are nested in each other, either in latent or manifest ways.

An example of such nested conflicts is provided by the current morass in Iraq, with several layers of latent inter-ethnic and inter-religious strife that were

'ignited' to become manifest conflicts after the US-led invasion produced a power vacuum in an inconclusive post-war scenario. In other words, not only are conflicts, like interests, path-dependent on worldviews, they are also path-dependent on each other, as the illusion that World War I was a 'war to end all wars' profoundly and tragically demonstrated. In sum, in an age of globalization, the duality inherent in the relationship between culture and conflict stems from the path-dependent interplay between worldviews and interests.

### Taking a closer look

The preceding paragraphs implied a rather abstract notion of 'conflict'. How to make our understandings more concrete? In the most general terms, conflict is a disagreement through which parties involved perceive a threat to their needs, interests and concerns. In other words, conflict is more than a disagreement; it is that plus a perceived threat. It is also a social configuration in that it establishes a relation among conflicting parties, even if that relationship is very uneven and contested in content and form. Several aspects are worth noting.

It is the perceived threat that matters, not the actual one; and parties act according to their perception of the situation, which points to the importance of worldviews, values and belief systems as 'filters' but also to the role of information and recall (memory) of prior experience in interpreting threats. In other words, as shown above conflicts are culturally and socially embedded.

Power plays a crucial role in any conflict situation; conflict involves a confrontation among conflicting parties, each with some capability (real or imagined, specific or diffuse) to produce some effect in addressing the disagreement about needs, interests and concerns. Power is closely linked to resource availability and legitimacy, as well as to the potential of inflicting violence and the deployment of military means. Conflict is a clash of power, a pushing and pulling, a giving and taking. In this balancing process of powers confronting each other, the capabilities of the involved parties vary and may shift. In other words, conflicts are dynamic and rarely static.

Conflicts are manifest tensions that arise from perceived disagreements, as opposed to latent

conflicts where parties may be largely unaware of the level of threat and power capabilities. Once conflicts are manifest, however, the conditions for communicating, mobilizing and organizing them are critical for the process and outcome. As we will suggest below, the wider availability of information technology, combined with a steep decline in communication costs, facilitates the transformation of latent into manifest conflicts.

While modern societies are conflict-prone they tend to seek ways and means of managing, i.e., institutionalizing, conflicts (panels, hearings, political parties, social movements, judiciary, etc.) rather than seeking settlement through domination alone. Such institutionalized conflicts are seen as creative conflicts that reduce the tensions that could otherwise build up along major societal cleavage structures. Such tensions could threaten the social fabric of societies, while managed conflicts contribute to social stability and 'tamed' social change.

However, over-institutionalization of conflicts can create inertia and stifle social change and innovation, whereas under-institutionalization can lead to a spreading of the conflict into other fields and generate unintended consequences. Moreover, deep-seated core conflicts (labor–capital; value conflicts; ethnic conflicts) have the tendency of amassing complicating factors around them that in the end can make some conflicts intractable.<sup>3</sup> Such basic insights into conflict are useful for our purposes as they allow us to probe deeper into the complex relationship between globalization, culture and conflict.

While Table 1.1 applies to conflicts in general, globalization has the potential of changing the dynamics of conflict as well as the forms conflicts can take. For instance, conflicts spill across national boundaries, and create latent and manifest conflicts among parties that hitherto have not been connected in that way. Outsourcing is an obvious example, as are environmental problems or the influx of Western cultural products ('Hollywood') in Asia or the Middle East.

Global governance problems are important here. Because of globalization, the management of conflicts towards some form of institutionalization is more difficult to achieve today. Because of the limited capacity of the system of international institutions to deal effectively with global, transnational issues such as the environment, crime, epidemics, or economic exploitation, virtually all nation-states find it more challenging to address such problems

with regulatory tools geared to dealing with domestic policy settings.

At the same time, globalization offers greater opportunity structures for movements of many kinds and a greater range of framing options, flowing from worldviews, for bringing grievances about divergent needs, interests and concerns forward (e.g., via global media networks). Moreover, technological developments have reduced the cost of communication, mobilizing and organizing (e.g., the Internet). Entry barriers for entering conflicts are reduced. In sum, latent and manifest conflicts exist in an environment of higher global connectivity at lower costs.

Persistent global governance problems, greater opportunities, reduced barriers and lower costs may well encourage a more frequent transformation of latent conflicts into manifest ones, and, related to this, of oppressed and dormant conflicts into open and active ones. In essence, we would expect globalization to free up existing conflicts as well as generate new ones, which have become salient in two ways:

- First, through identity politics, which generate conflicts largely but increasingly across established political boundaries, and have a tendency to instrumentalize culture for other ends; and
- Second, through what has become known as the 'clash of civilizations' discourse that exercises a certain hegemony upon academics, journalists and politicians as well as in the popular imagination.

Both types of conflicts are variations of the pattern or questions Weber identified: how current economic and political interests are aligned with prevailing worldviews, and the extent to which path-dependencies of interests play themselves out in a world characterized by increased interpenetration.

### Identity politics and mobilization

The first avatar of the 'cultures and conflict' binomial is based on increasing group recourse to culture in connection with politicized and often conflict-saturated discourses of ethnicity and nationalism. A renewed politics of identity, often bloody, emerged forcefully at the end of the Cold War, whose bloc confrontations had masked a multitude of local claims and tensions over scarce resources or over the sharing of newly acquired

**Table I.1 Analytic dimensions of conflict**

Dynamics of conflict phases	Process of latent conflicts becoming manifest	Process of manifest conflicts becoming resolved
	Possibility of conflict (disagreement and perceived level of threat) filtered through worldviews, and assessed relative to opportunity structures, grievance issues, framing processes, and instrumentalization options; politics of memory and path-dependencies	Conditions of communicating, mobilizing and organizing, resources available and resource dependencies
		Power differentials and technical, organizational capacity for collective action; range of complicating factors, conflict forms, channels, and forums; learned conflict behavior
		Conditions for conflict balancing and reaching settlement, conflict outcomes; of alignment of outcome with worldview and current as well as anticipated interests

ones. Once freed, these claims began to push collectivities of many different kinds into the narrow walls of group identity, often the ‘narcissism of small differences’ posited by Freud, feeding a new tide of smaller confrontations between, ethnic, religious and national communities. Religion as a marker of group identity has come particularly to the fore in recent years. In the psychoanalytical perspective (one that is regrettably not represented in this volume), Sudhir Kakar (1996: 192) has observed:

*The involvement of religious rather than other social identities does not dampen but, on the contrary, increases the violence of the conflict. Religion brings to conflict between groups a greater emotional intensity and a deeper motivational thrust than language, region or other markers of ethnic identity.*

The collapse of the USSR and other regimes in Central and Eastern Europe revealed the resilience of apparently widespread nationalist sentiment hitherto hidden under the mantle of Soviet universalism. The cultural vocabularies of this resilience, in Europe and elsewhere, revealed the strength with which the ‘bent twigs’ of suppressed or wounded *Volksgeist* spring upright, to quote the image Isaiah Berlin often used, borrowed from

Schiller. And the story has been repeated elsewhere across the world, as a world system centered on transnational corporate power and globally-ranging financial markets has taken hold, generating strong local reactions in worldviews, sentiments and aspirations. The values of different ways of life have risen to consciousness to become the rallying cry of diverse claims to a space in the planetary culture. Before, culture was just lived. Now it has become a self-conscious collective project (Sahlins 1994).

As populations shift and societies change, people turn to cultural distinctions embodied in their traditions to resist what is perceived as a threat to their integrity and prosperity, even their very survival in terms of transmission of identities and values. This recurrent mobilization around group identity has led to a cultural politics whose stakes include gaining control of (or access to) political and economic power. Where ethnic groups have enjoyed relatively equitable positions, tensions have arisen as soon as one or several of them has begun to feel that their relative position is slipping. Such tensions, often inevitable as economic conditions change, have led to contentions over rights to land, education, the use of language, political representation, freedom of religion, the preservation of ethnic identity, autonomy or self-determination.

The standard 'development' models have paid little attention to cultural values and differences, assuming that functional categories such as class and occupation are more important. We suggest, however, that many conflict-haunted development failures and disasters stem from an inadequate recognition of precisely these cultural complexities. In these situations, culture has been a determining factor in the nature and dynamic of conflict, as different markers such as language, race or religion have been used to distinguish the opposing actors. All too frequently, one specific group has assumed state power, and state building has rendered many other groups devoid of power or influence. Where it is perceived that the government either favors or discriminates against groups identifiable in cultural terms, this encourages the negotiation of benefits on the basis of cultural identity and leads directly to the politicization of culture. The dynamics of this process are such that when any one group starts negotiating on the basis of its cultural identity, others are encouraged to do likewise; and it has often been cumulative (Tambiah 1996).

### **'Civilizations' and conflict**

The idea of a cultural conflict at world level has been generated by Samuel Huntington's thesis that 'the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations' (Huntington 1996). Although the empirical foundation of the thesis is highly contestable, the phrase 'clash of civilizations' has become a contemporary cliché, abundantly thrown around by academics, politicians and journalists who have read neither Huntington nor his many critics. The thesis itself, reductionist and highly abstract, is a significant step backwards when compared to the Weberian understanding presented above. It treats culture with little heed for the internal dynamics and plurality of every so-called 'civilization', or for the fact that the major contest in most cultures concerns the diverging definitions and interpretation of each of them (see in particular Senghaas 2003).

Indeed, this is precisely what is happening with 'Islamic civilization', which has such a central place in Huntington's theory (Kepel 2004). This is particularly ironic post-September 11, when we realize that the thesis is identical with the reasoning of the chief protagonist of that horrific event, Osama Bin Laden himself, and this may well be the case as well of many who have since waged latter-day

'Crusades', if subsequent events in Iraq are any indication. Nonetheless, it appears necessary to present empirical evidence that either supports or rejects the thesis, and to shift the debate away from its highly ideological justification to evidence-based reasoning.

Against the background presented above, we have enlisted a group of experts from a range of social science or other analytical disciplines to explore different facets of the culture, conflict and globalization relationship. We were interested in comparative studies that explore this relationship at the global level, and across a larger number of cases. We were particularly keen to explore regional variations and realities, and also decided to focus on a number of cross-cultural tensions and cultural/political fault lines in today's world. Finally, we decided not to focus only on conflict as such, but also on its prevention, reconciliation and resolution. Although it was clear from the start that the theme of this inaugural volume encompassed culture principally in the 'ways of life' sense, we were also determined to bring culture as the arts and heritage into the equation as well. For the two dimensions of the culture concept are often closely intertwined. We wanted to be able to pinpoint current tensions within the arts and in the practices of commemoration that accompany heritage, to uncover how both are articulated with the broader meanings and, most specifically, how 'cultural capital' of various kinds can be either conflict's pawn or its remedy.

### **Conclusion**

The results of our contributors' efforts are presented in twenty-seven chapters, organized in four sections, each with a separate introduction to help orient the reader. All in all, this is a project based on great expectations shared by those of us (including the co-editors and the authors) who believe deeply in the central importance of the 'cultural'. The theme this volume addresses, as we have unpacked it in these introductory remarks, is one that crystallizes, behind those great expectations, great anxieties and perhaps equally great illusions. The great anxieties arise from the persistent abuse of culture, both as a concept and as a reality. The great illusions are the result of overblown visions, of simplifications that are reductive, and readings that are instrumental. The illusions can be dispelled, the



anxieties allayed (and the expectations justified), however, by the patient and methodical marshalling of evidence in an informed and conceptually sensitive way. It is our hope that this volume will contribute meaningfully to that task.

## Notes

- 1 Academic anthropologists have long been familiar with the pitfalls of reification and essentialization that dog the 'culture' concept. But since culturalist discourse is now pervasive in much broader circles and has invested the public rhetoric of governments, intergovernmental organizations and civil society bodies alike, it seems important to reiterate a number of points for the benefit of a less specialized readership. Despite growing sophistication about the constructed nature of this contemporary culturalism, a number of misleading ideas persist whenever the notions of culture and 'cultural identity' are deployed, viz., that *culture is homogeneous*, which
- 2 Worldviews refers to ways of making sense of the world and accounting for realities so perceived, within prevailing circumstances. We use the term worldview rather than 'civilization' for two reasons. First, worldview, close to Weberian thinking, suggests greater plurality and fluidity than the term civilization. Second, the term civilization has become overly politicized through Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis and the ensuing debate around it.
- 3 These distinctions and ideas owe much to the sociology of conflict, in particular the work of Simmel (1983), Dahrendorf (1994), Coser (1956), and others.

## REFERENCES

- Avruch, K. (1998) *Culture and Conflict Resolution*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Berger, P. (ed.) (1998) *The Limits of Social Cohesion: Conflict and Mediation in Pluralist Societies. A Report of the Bertelsmann Foundation to the Club of Rome*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Coser, L. (1956) *The Function of Social Conflict*. New York: Free Press.
- Dahrendorf, R. (1994) *Der moderne soziale Konflikt: Essay zur Politik der Freiheit*. Munich: DTV.
- Huntington, S. P. (1996) *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Kakar, S. (1996) *The Colors of Violence: Cultural Identities, Religion, and Conflict*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kepel, G. (2004) *Fitna: Guerre au coeur de l'Islam*. Paris: Editions Gallimard.
- Sahlins, M. (1994) 'A Brief cultural history of culture'. Unpublished paper prepared for the World Commission on Culture and Development (UNESCO).
- Schluchter, W. (2005) *Handlung, Ordnungen und Kultur: Studien zu einem Forschungsprogramm im Anschluss an Max Weber*. Tübingen: Mohr.
- Schumpeter, J. (1962) *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. New York: HarperPerennial.
- Senghaas, D. (2003) *The Clash within Civilizations: Coming to Terms with Cultural Conflicts*. New York: Routledge.
- Simmel, G. (1983) *Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
- Tambiah, S.J. (1996) *Leveling crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Tenbruck, F. (1999) *Das Werk Max Webers*. Tübingen: Mohr.
- Weber, M. (1988) *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie I*. Stuttgart: UTB.









## INTRODUCTION

This first section presents cross-cutting approaches that address basic questions about the 'whys and hows' of tensions and conflicts linked to cultural identity and belonging as well as to forms of cultural expression. The six contributors share the conviction that cultural conflicts are not natural but constructed, not necessarily cultural in their origins but often sited at the intersection between political and economic interests and the universes of ideas, values, meanings, memories, representations. On the basis of empirical and interpretive observation or comparative data, they analyze the stances of different actors and institutions – the nation state, political elites, local communities, artists and arts institutions, or intellectuals – as stakeholders.

The 'institutional' approach in political science has long argued that cultural conflicts are induced first and foremost by economic and political inequities. In the opening chapter, Beverly Crawford analyzes a number of current conflicts in this perspective and links them directly to changes brought about by globalization. State institutions attempt to deal with inequities but frequently find that the very processes they try to counteract are rapidly undermining their capacity to do so. Instead, these processes open up opportunities for political actors to become 'cultural entrepreneurs' as it were, by politicizing culture for economic or political gain. According to Crawford, effective institutions are the key factor in enabling societies to combat such pressures. The contribution entitled 'Ethnicity and War in a World of Nation-States' is a longitudinal and cross-cultural analysis by Andreas Wimmer and Brian Min that combines the insights of political science and sociology. The authors demonstrate that the number of interstate wars has decreased, while civil wars have increased. However, they argue that the formation of the modern nation-state is an often-disregarded cause of conflict and has influenced both forms of violent conflict, and in two ways. First, nationalist movements during nation-state formation were often rooted in violence and

contention. Second, the nation-states that were created then sought to include diverse ethnic or cross-national groups, and this meant increased competition within the nation-state for political and institutional power.

What happens when nation-states develop policies and mechanisms to the sorts of cultural pressures brought about by globalization? This is the question Laura Adams, Miguel Centeno and Charles Varner take up in their comparative analysis of resistance to globalization. Some governments actively institutionalize resistance: Canada's regulations against influences from the United States, Kazakhstan's regulation of Russian culture, and Malaysia's attempts to limit the influence of local Chinese and Indian immigrant populations. Resistance to globalization is a complex process that always takes place within a local context where the globalization process is represented by a concrete target of resistance. In these three countries, the state has employed three different frameworks in resisting globalization processes: anti-hegemonic, post-colonial, and diasporic. Policies are generated in response to a specific threat related to cultural globalization and are related to cultural trade, media, language, and religion. Like Crawford, these authors argue that institutions are especially responsible and powerful for both exacerbating and mitigating cultural conflict.

The three social scientific approaches are mirrored by the three chapters written from the perspective of artistic practice and heritage preservation. As an Asian performance scholar, Rustom Bharucha draws on the latent dimensions of conflict in on-the-ground cultural practice of 'subaltern' groups. He takes as a case study India's *Siddi* community, people of African origin or descent, who now live in scattered settlements in different parts of the country, and focuses on what he calls the 'intra-cultural' contexts by which local and regional differences interact with global forces and opportunities. In emphasizing the disjunctions between

global theoretical discourse and grassroots activism in representing subaltern communities, he questions 'the capacity to aspire' dimension of culture posited by Arjun Appadurai, highlighting the limits of global networking and performance in favor of a more nationally grounded cultural praxis.

Dragan Klaic asks whether culture is the cause or the victim in cases of globalized conflict. He too demonstrates how what appears to be cultural conflict, is often politics, economics, or religion advancing masked behind culture, so that passions are enlivened and key stakeholders and audiences engaged. Globalization, he argues, fuels the processes of 'culturization' or 'ethnicization' – and this interpretation will be returned to several times in the volume as a whole. For example, globalization allows worldwide involvement in the memory wars of different locales because of worldwide media streams and global associations. Memory wars evoke values, authorities, and beliefs and in countries without viable, functioning institutions, these rifts can explode into violence. The intensity

of these protests relies more on politics, on deeply ingrained anger and feelings of repression, than on culture per se.

Cultural heritage is 'collective memory' made tangible: Dacia Viejo Rose explores how both are attacked in present-day armed conflict: through the deliberately targeted destruction of monuments, the theft of artifacts, the replacement of important imagery and symbols, and the imposition of politically charged propaganda. She too suggests a typology, but of destruction, according to the kind of action, the type of object destroyed or damaged and the type of conflict. She assesses the ways in which globalized forces such as movements of people and international normative instruments act against or in favor of heritage conservation. Finally, she discusses international reconstruction efforts while also demystifying them: post-conflict societies need to recognize new meanings and symbols and an interpretation of heritage and history that encourage concord over the long term.

# GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURAL CONFLICT: AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

Beverly Crawford

*The links between economic globalization and cultural conflict are found at the level of the state and the level of the society. Global economic forces can weaken state institutions that ensure social peace, and can cause distinct cultural groups in multi-ethnic societies to suffer disproportionate economic hardships and gains. This suffering provides a concrete justification for grievances that can be transformed into a resource for political mobilization by cultural entrepreneurs. If political institutions provide a legitimate arena for those entrepreneurs to compete and if resources are allocated fairly, cultural politics, like other kinds of political competition, can be legitimate and stable. But when demographic and economic changes – often brought on by the forces of globalization – undermine the ‘rules of the game’, and lead to perceptions that the balance of political power is unfair, cultural politics can escalate to cultural conflict and violence.*

### Introduction

What is the impact of globalization on social cohesion and political integration? Does globalization nourish social and political integration and tear down cultural barriers that divide people? Does it signal a ‘vital step toward both a more stable world and better lives for the people in it’ (Rothkopf, 1997)? Or does it hasten social disintegration and exacerbate social conflict? Is there really a link between globalization and ‘cultural’ conflict or harmony? If so, what is it?

Migratory flows, the tidal wave of global information, and the imperatives of economic liberalization and fiscal reform – the markers of globalization – have reshuffled social relations all over the world. As the flood of immigrants to the industrial West has given birth to a nascent heterogeneity in previously homogeneous societies, social pressures and plummeting income levels accompany it. In some countries, a spike in hate crimes against foreigners seems to correspond to the influx of

immigrants. And people have watched in horror as Islamic radicals have committed brutal acts of violence, justified as revenge against cultural oppression or religious deviance.

Although globalization has been called an integrating force, cultural conflict has become the most rampant form of international violence as globalization has accelerated. Of the 36 violent conflicts raging around the world in 2003, the Iraq invasion was the sole international war. The remaining 35 were internal wars within the territory of 28 countries, and all but four of these were communal conflicts, inspired by ethnic, sectarian, or religious grievances (Marshall 2005). Nonetheless, the number of those conflicts has begun to decline, and many have ended. Indeed, in vast areas of the world, conflicts are being resolved peacefully, and people of different cultures live together or side by side without hostility or prolonged violent conflict.

But as some conflicts ended, new conflicts ignited. Despite the end of the wars in ex-Yugoslavia, continued violence plagues Kosovo and Bosnia. Even in the presence of foreign peace-keeping troops, violence in Kosovo took between 4,000 and 12,000 lives between 1999 and 2004. And between 1999 and 2004, Chechnya erupted in a war of secession, causing the deaths of close to 30,000 civilians. Attacks on dark-skinned people, often identified as Chechens or Dagestanis were reported in Moscow and other major Russian cities beginning in 1994, and escalated as the conflict continued (Human Rights Watch (2003)). Between 1989 and 2003, more than 65,000 people, mostly Muslim civilians were killed in Kashmir and the conflict there continues to take over 2,000 lives per year. These examples suggest significant differences in the kinds and levels of conflict and the conditions under which it breaks out. In this essay, I present a conceptual framework for understanding these differences. It relies on the role of economic forces triggered by globalization that drive

both 'cultural' conflict and integration. It looks to the role and strength of political institutions as the key to conflict provocation, exacerbation, and mitigation. It focuses on those institutions that channel economic forces to create cultural winners and losers in the globalization process, and those that channel political participation and treat group 'rights' in ways that mitigate or intensify the violence that members of one culture perpetrate against those who belong to another.

## Argument

Many analysts (Rothkopf 1997; Sadowski 1998; Telo 2001; Kuran, 2001; Dutceac, 2004) critique the idea that economic globalization fuels cultural conflict, arguing that cultural conflicts are found in almost every society, whether it experiences high levels of globalization or not. And in fact, these conflicts are likely to be much less lethal in societies that are receptive to globalization (Bhalla 1994; Whitehead 1995; Geddes 1994).<sup>1</sup> There is evidence to support this view. For example, Malaysia had much in common with Sri Lanka in terms of economy, society, and culture, including ethnic composition and inequalities between ethnic groups (Bruton 1992). Unlike Sri Lanka, however, whose economy stagnated with economic liberalization, Malaysian prosperity expanded the economic pie through its participation in the global economy, providing abundant resources to Chinese and Malay alike. Because the allocative institutions that distribute these resources in ways that are widely perceived as 'fair', rising prosperity denies extremist groups – bent on pitting these two communities against each other – the grievances that could fuel cultural conflict (Athukorala 2001).

The Indian State of Punjab between 1992 and 1998 provides a second example. There, after violence was repressed, the federal government abolished many restrictions, and market-stimulated growth benefited disgruntled Sikh farmers who were previously disadvantaged by discriminatory regulations. But this social harmony may be difficult to sustain, as the costs of participation in the global economy outweigh the benefits. By 2002, because of extreme fluctuations in global agricultural markets, Punjab experienced *both* chronic economic crisis, and the renewed escalation of social unrest.<sup>2</sup> The stories of Punjab and Malaysia suggest that

as long as states 'win' in market competition, and when both advantaged and previously disadvantaged cultural groups benefit, economic transformation resulting from globalization can mute cultural conflicts.

While many analysts suspect that there is a link between economic globalization and the current round of cultural conflict<sup>3</sup> (e.g., Lapidus et. al. 1992; Woodward 1995; Kapstein 1996; Schulman 2000; Bandarage 2000; Alesina et al. 2003; Bizouras, forthcoming), few have investigated causal forces that might explain that relationship.<sup>4</sup> I suggest here that such causes operate at two levels, the level of *the state* and the level of *the society*. Global economic forces can weaken those state institutions that ensure social peace, and can cause distinct cultural groups in multi-ethnic societies to suffer disproportionate economic hardships and gains. I suspect that although the forces of globalization have created a common commercial culture – particularly among elites – they have also deepened cultural divides in many societies where those elites live. Few would disagree that integration in the global economy – even if the result is net aggregate growth – creates winners and losers in the domestic economy. If economic hardship – whether in a growing or declining economy – falls disproportionately on distinct cultural groups, they have a concrete justification for political grievances that can be transformed into a resource for political mobilization. Groups with grievances are ripe for recruitment efforts by those I term '*cultural entrepreneurs*' – *individuals or agencies that politicize culture or protest cultural discrimination for political or economic gain*. These entrepreneurs will be successful if they have resources to distribute in exchange for support. These resources will be available if a 'cultural machine' is in place – either in or out of government – to acquire and distribute those resources and if 'cultural brethren' abroad provide support targeted to extremist political entrepreneurs. States weakened by the forces of globalization have fewer means to cope with social disintegration. And violence may be the only alternative course for groups making non-negotiable resource demands.

## The myth of liberalization

This argument challenges the claim that the rapid and simultaneous construction of liberal economic and democratic political institutions – a process for which 'globalization' is sometimes a

code word – can mitigate cultural conflict. Free markets create wealth for all, the argument runs, erasing the need for violent struggle over resources. And democracy permits political aggregation and representation of all social interests, allowing conflicts of interest to be adjudicated in the political arena and trump identity conflicts that are more difficult to negotiate.

Despite widespread acceptance of these claims, however, I would argue that *perceived economic inequities, particularly those that arise from current policies of economic liberalization and the longer term effects of globalization can undermine liberal political practices and, combined with illiberal politics, can be an explosive trigger for cultural conflict*<sup>5</sup>. Where communal differences had already become politically relevant in the past, today the ethnic or religious card may be the easiest one to play in the effort to mobilize political support in the face of economic decline, in the shift from welfare to market economies, and in the move from centralized to decentralized polities. The policies of economic liberalization require the ‘dismantling’ of state institutions, and weakened states cannot provide equal protection for all who live within their territory.

Liberal democracies can mute cultural conflict with institutions of inclusiveness, universal representation, and electoral systems designed to encourage elite compromise. Indeed, a robust liberal democracy may be one of the strongest defenses against cultural conflict. But ‘democracies’ are not all liberal; many *illiberal* democracies have emerged in the last fifteen years that possess some democratic attributes, such as free elections, freedom of speech, freedom of movement, freedom of association, and freedom of religion. But they pay only lip service to the rule of law, minority and citizen rights, and independent judicial review (Zakaria 1997, 2003; Pigliucci 2004). Illiberal democracies exacerbate cultural conflict. In periods of economic uncertainty and political transition, when states that once provided entitlements are dismantled, when illiberal democracies are so constructed that they fail to protect rights, and when the introduction of markets leads to deep insecurities, the rich symbolic resources of culture offer hope in their promise of collective empowerment to populations who feel powerless.

Illiberal democracies can arise in the absence of economic liberalization and globalization. At the time of independence in Sri Lanka, for example,

there were about 4.6 million Sinhalese and 1.5 million Tamils living there,<sup>6</sup> and Sri Lanka’s ‘democratically’ elected majority Sinhalese government discriminated against the Tamil minority. The Citizenship Act of 1948 deprived Tamils – whose ancestors had lived in the country for more than a century – of citizenship in the independent state of Sri Lanka. In fact, Tamils were only allowed to *apply for* citizenship in 2003. From the 1950s on, the Sinhalese-controlled parliament enacted discriminatory legislation against the Tamil minority, starting with the ‘Sinhala-only Act’, replacing English with Sinhala as the only official language, effectively excluding Tamils from employment in the civil service if they could not speak Sinhala. The 1972 Constitution made Buddhism the state religion, threatening the Tamil practice of their Hindu faith, and Tamils were excluded from institutions of higher education by strict quotas.

I am therefore not suggesting that the forces of globalization and economic liberalization directly ‘cause’ cultural conflict. In Sri Lanka, as we shall see, violence broke out as the country entered the global economy, but, as a result of the creation of an illiberal democracy, tensions churned long before. In places like Malaysia (Lubeck 1998; Bizouras, forthcoming), integration into the global economy has brought growth and a distribution of income that has helped to attenuate cultural conflict. Clearly, the link between economic liberalization, illiberal politics, and cultural conflict is not a linear one. Here, I explore the role of globalization by conceptualizing both its differential impact on cultural groups in multicultural societies and its impact on the state’s ability to support institutions that provide social order. I argue that the institutions of political participation and resource allocation are the crucial factors affecting social integration, and the nature and strength of these key institutions differ among societies.

### Globalization: factor flows and state ‘shrinking’

Two aspects of the globalization process may be significant triggers for cultural conflict: migration, and trade. While the expansion of trade and its requirement for state-shrinking impacts both the developed and underdeveloped world, immigration can ignite conflict in the industrialized West, turning homogeneous nations into heterogeneous societies with vast differences in wealth, values, and cultural



practices. Combined with the state-shrinking imperatives of trade openness, conflict can increase, triggering the intervention of opposing diasporic communities. This mixture can be lethal (see contributions by Estrada, Grimson and Wong below).

For roughly half a century, from the 1930s to the 1980s, immigration rates were historically low, compared to rates from 1850 to 1920. Now the tide has turned. Net immigration rates have more than doubled in the United States and Western Europe since the 1960s. Ironically, this upward surge occurred during a period in which immigration policy in the most developed countries became increasingly restrictive.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, some 500,000 undocumented migrants enter the European Union each year, and over 150 million people are on the move every year – one out of every 50 people worldwide. This migration surge has broken the back of cultural homogeneity, particularly in the industrialized West, where most migrants are headed. Table 1.1 shows the dramatic surge of migration to Europe between 1992 and 2001.

Immigrants rarely arrive in their host countries today without bringing with them ties to family and community in their homeland. These bonds heighten the importance of diaspora communities in the globalization process. With decreasing costs of transportation and communication worldwide, interactions within such communities are increasing in depth. This intensity can be partially captured in the evidence of growth in cross-border remittances worldwide. For example, remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean from Latinos in the United States doubled in the last half of the 1990s (Suro 2003). Official remittances from immigrant labor to 24 countries worldwide have grown almost 4 percent per year between 1980 and 2002, and grew three times faster than the GDP of most developing countries during the same period (Adams 2003). In addition to the increase in migration over the last 50 years, there has been a marked expansion in the flow of goods worldwide. The ratio of worldwide exports to worldwide GDP rose from about 8 percent in 1960 to 20 percent in 2001. The most important contributor to this growth was a dramatic lowering of trade barriers across the globe. Average tariffs in the United States, Germany, and Japan fell by more than half. The membership of the World Trade Organization rose from 18 countries in 1948 to 146 countries in 2003.

And free-trade areas, led by the European Union and NAFTA, have increased from 1 in 1958 to 16 in 2003.

Political power lies behind the growth of world commerce. Trade expanded because trading states replaced policies that protected some producers from global competition with policies that removed that protection, such as tariffs and subsidies and other non-tariff trade barriers. States open their economies to trade by also assuring that their currencies are convertible, and lifting controls on the flow of capital. Governments have also enacted 'reform' policies that they believe will make their products more competitive in the global market place. We can call these economic liberalization measures policies of 'state-shrinking,' because their goal is to remove the state from interference with the market.

### Globalization and economic hardship

Political and economic forces unleashed in the globalization process can drive each other in a vicious circle that often ends in conflict. In particular, these policies of 'state-shrinking' can cause social disruption and radical dislocation of communities. In multicultural societies, the resulting hardships can be disproportionately allocated among various cultural groups, especially where there is a cultural division of labor in which different cultural groups are segmented into distinct economic sectors. Existing political cleavages based on cultural difference are then exacerbated and new ones are created. In the industrialized world, this result is perhaps nowhere more obvious than in countries with large immigrant communities.

In Europe, for example, immigrants from non-European states suffer from much lower wage rates and much higher rates of unemployment than native populations, despite the fact that nearly 88 percent come with a secondary education or higher (Adams 2003). Figure 1.1 shows that in France and Germany, immigrant unemployment is twice the national rate, and in Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands, and Sweden, it is three to four times the national average. These rates suggest persistent exclusion, disadvantage and even discrimination (The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia 2003).

With the exception of the 2005 youth riots in French suburbia, immigrants have rarely engaged in violent protest against these conditions. It is most




**Table 1.1 Stocks of Foreign Population in selected OECD Countries**  
Thousands and percentages

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Austria	623.0	689.6	713.5	723.5	728.2	732.7	737.3	748.2	757.9	764.3
% of total population	7.9	8.6	8.9	9.0	9.0	9.1	9.1	9.2	9.3	9.4
Belgium	909.3	920.6	922.3	909.8	911.9	903.2	892.0	897.1	861.7	846.7
% of total population	9.0	9.1	9.1	9.0	9.0	8.9	8.7	8.8	8.4	8.2
Czech Republic	41.2	77.7	103.7	158.6	198.6	209.8	219.8	228.9	201.0	210.8
% of total population	0.4	0.8	1.0	1.5	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.2	1.9	2.0
Denmark	180.1	189.0	196.7	222.7	237.7	249.6	256.3	259.4	258.6	266.7
% of total population	3.5	3.6	3.8	4.2	4.7	4.7	4.8	4.9	4.8	5.0
Finland	46.3	55.6	62.0	68.6	73.8	80.6	85.1	87.7	91.1	98.6
% of total population	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9
France	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3 263.2	—	—
% of total population	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5.6	—	—
Germany	6 495.8	6 878.1	6 990.5	7 173.9	7 314.0	7 365.8	7 319.5	7 343.6	7 296.8	7 318.6
% of total population	8.0	8.5	8.6	8.8	8.9	9.0	8.9	8.9	8.9	8.9
Greece	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	762.2
% of total population	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7.0
Hungary	—	—	137.9	139.9	142.5	143.8	—	127.0	110.0	116.4
% of total population	—	—	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4	—	1.2	1.1	1.1
Ireland	94.9	89.9	91.1	96.1	118.0	114.4	111.0	117.8	126.5	151.4
% of total population	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	3.2	3.1	3.0	3.2	3.3	3.9
Italy	925.2	987.4	922.7	991.4	1 095.6	1 240.7	1 250.2	1 252.0	1 388.2	1 362.6
% of total population	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.7	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.4	2.4
Japan	1 281.6	1 320.7	1 354.0	1 362.4	1 415.1	1 482.7	1 512.1	1 556.1	1 686.4	1 778.5
% of total population	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.4
Korea	55.8	66.7	84.9	110.0	148.7	176.9	147.9	169.0	210.2	229.6
% of total population	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5
Luxembourg	122.7	127.6	132.5	138.1	142.8	147.7	152.9	159.4	164.7	166.7
% of total population	31.0	31.8	32.6	33.4	34.1	34.9	35.6	36.0	37.3	37.5
Netherlands	757.4	779.8	757.1	725.4	679.9	678.1	662.4	651.5	667.8	690.4
% of total population	5.0	5.1	5.0	4.7	4.4	4.3	4.2	4.1	4.2	4.3
Norway	154.0	162.3	164.0	160.8	157.5	158.0	165.0	178.7	184.3	185.9
% of total population	3.6	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.7	4.0	4.1	4.1
Poland	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	42.8	—	—
% of total population	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.1	—	—
Portugal	123.6	131.6	157.1	168.3	172.9	175.3	177.8	190.9	208.0	223.6
% of total population	1.3	1.3	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.2
Slovak Republic	—	11.0	16.9	21.9	24.1	24.8	27.4	29.5	28.3	29.4
% of total population	—	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Spain	393.1	430.4	461.4	499.8	539.0	609.8	719.6	801.3	895.7	1 109.1
% of total population	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.8	2.0	2.2	2.7
Sweden	499.1	507.5	537.4	531.8	526.6	522.0	499.9	487.2	477.3	476.0
% of total population	5.7	5.8	6.1	5.2	6.0	6.0	5.6	5.5	5.4	5.3
Switzerland	1 213.5	1 260.3	1 300.1	1 330.6	1 337.6	1 340.8	1 347.9	1 368.7	1 384.4	1 419.1
% of total population	17.6	18.1	18.6	18.9	18.9	19.0	19.0	19.2	19.3	19.7
United Kingdom	1 985.0	2 001.0	2 032.0	1 948.0	1 934.0	2 066.0	2 207.0	2 208.0	2 342.0	2 587.0
% of total population	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.6	3.8	3.8	4.0	4.4

Note: Data are from population registers or from registers of foreigners except for France and Greece (Census), Italy, Portugal and Spain (residence permits) Poland (estimates), Ireland and the United Kingdom (Labour Force Survey). The data refer to the population on 31 December of the years indicated unless otherwise stated.

**Figure 1.1** Unemployment rate of EU and non-EU nationals in 2001  
(percent of their active population 16–64)



Source: LFS, Eurostat

often the native population that threatens or engages in violence against foreigners. This is because unemployed immigrants are often legally eligible for welfare and unemployment compensation. When majority native populations also suffer high unemployment rates as the shrinking state removes its social safety net, they often blame those same immigrants. As European economies stagnate, and as governments engage in 'state-shrinking' policies to revive them, we have witnessed throughout Europe a heightened awareness of hate crimes against foreigners and a growing number of those crimes in some countries. Anti-immigrant violence is fueled by political rhetoric that portrays immigrants as an economic burden.

Examples of this rhetoric abound. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance reported in 2004 that immigrants in Austria were

typically portrayed as being responsible for unemployment and increased public expenditure, as well as posing a threat to the preservation of Austrian 'identity' (McClintock 2005). In England, as industry declined in the early 1980s, and as Margaret Thatcher's policies of 'state-shrinking' took hold, many industries preferred cheap immigrant labor to an expensive native workforce. And although immigrant workers bore the brunt of economic recession, as indicated by higher than average unemployment rates, native workers were not protected from rising unemployment by the immigrant buffer (Money 1997). The immigrant communities invariably had higher levels of unemployment than the native workforce and were gradually pushed into the slums of the cities where they had worked. But slum removal projects required that slum occupants be housed in public housing. Thus unemployed immigrant slum dwellers leapfrogged over

natives who had long waited for public housing. It was not long before immigrants were being blamed for taking the jobs and housing away from the white workforce.

In Germany a similar story can be told. Between 1987 and 1991 unemployment increased five-fold, while two million immigrants streamed into the country. One million were ethnic Germans from the East, about 500,000 were East Germans fleeing west, and about 600,000 were asylum seekers. And as in England, foreign workers were more likely to become unemployed and eligible for social services than natives. Extremist neo-Nazi groups targeted asylum seekers as the foreigners who undermined German social stability and committed numerous acts of violence against them.

Countries elsewhere are now experiencing similar pressures too. In recent years, Hindu immigrant labor has flooded into Punjab seeking employment in low wage jobs. Census data for 2004 showed that the Sikh population in Punjab, which had hovered around 60 percent for decades, had begun to drop, as Sikhs migrate abroad and as Hindus enter Punjab in search of jobs (Singh 2004). Tensions began to rise as letters to the editor of local newspapers blamed migrants for causing social, economic, and housing problems (*Chandigarh Tribune*, 22 January 2004.) Both churning up and capitalizing on this discontent, *Dal Khalsa*, a radical Sikh organization, began a drive against migrants from the poorer states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, who have settled in Punjab, saying they are a drain on the state's economy, and warning that 'if allowed to come into Punjab unchecked and unhindered, migrants would hold the key to the state's political power' (Indo-Asian News Service 2004). Publicly calling migrants a 'population bomb', a *Dal Khalsa* march against immigration portrayed banners and placards intended to alarm migrants that they were not welcome in Punjab.

Immigrants are not the only targets of violence when economies stagnate and states reduce entitlements to native populations who have come to depend on them. In Bulgaria, the introduction of markets and the restitution of land created disproportionate unemployment among the Muslims, leading to accusations of 'genocide' of the Turkish population against the Bulgarian majority. In Yugoslavia, Croatia fared better in global economic

competition than the less developed republics and yet was forced to transfer resources to them, fostering deeper and deeper resentments against federal Yugoslavia that took the form of ethnic discrimination and privilege.

In 1977 Sri Lanka initiated a structural adjustment program that included trade liberalization, reduction in public expenditures, de-control of prices and interest rates, promotion of private sector development and foreign investment, and financial sector reforms. But the reforms could not halt a decline in economic growth.<sup>8</sup> Although the reforms transformed Sri Lanka from an agricultural to an industrial and service economy, growth rates were some of the lowest in the Asian developing world. And the Tamil population suffered disproportionately. Gunasinghe (1984) argues that trade liberalization swept away the main agricultural activities in the North, hurting the Tamil farmers. And Biziouras (forthcoming) shows that during the entire liberalization process, the state continued to give preferential treatment to the Sinhalese: the vast majority of export-oriented industrialization projects were targeted for Sinhalese-dominated regions; food subsidies were reduced across the board for Sinhalese and Tamils alike, but savings were then allocated to loss-making enterprises dominated by the Sinhalese. And, despite policies of 'state-shrinking', the state remained the most important source of employment. As noted above, strong patronage networks allocated jobs to Sinhalese, while Tamil employment options – particularly for Tamil youth – were extremely limited (Kelegama 1997; Tiruchelvam 1984). Although Tamil groups began to commit sporadic acts of violence shortly before the state-shrinking began, after the 'reforms' they had entered a civil war with the aim of carving out a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka.

As these examples suggest, economic hardships can lead cultural groups to distrust each other and to no longer trust the state to protect all of its citizens. Hardships can make these groups available for reassignment to new political identities. The losers in economic transformation will attempt to use their political resources and position to resist changes that disadvantage them. It is often under these circumstances that we see the rise of cultural entrepreneurs as the catalysts of conflict.

### The role of 'cultural entrepreneurs': political interpreters of economic hardship as cultural discrimination

Cultural entrepreneurs often emerge in the face of economic hardship to articulate grievances of distinct cultural groups, thus mobilizing support that can place them in positions of political power. These organizations, political parties, or would-be political leaders are entrepreneurial, in that they have discovered that if they politicize cultural identity, they can transform it into a reliable and efficient basis for ethnic group cohesion, and that group can then become an effective political base. Cultural entrepreneurs resemble their economic counterparts in that while the economic entrepreneur seeks to maximize wealth, the cultural entrepreneur seeks to maximize political power by mobilizing support around cultural identity (Laitin 1985; Brass 1976).

Cultural entrepreneurs increase the odds of political conflict because they heighten the role of 'identity politics' in multicultural societies. Identity politics are said to be more prone to conflict than interest-based politics. While *interests* are malleable and multiple, making compromises and logrolling possible, *cultural identity* is fixed and non-negotiable. Identity groups – distinct cultural communities – often lay exclusive claims to resources, and the more power they gain, the more ability they have to deny those resources to other cultural groups. Disputes over resources among 'identity groups' are thus particularly difficult to negotiate, raising the odds of violence.<sup>9</sup>

Examples abound of individuals who become cultural entrepreneurs. In Bulgaria, two stand out: Ahmed Dogan and Kamen Burov. The first led a newly organized Turkish party after Communism's collapse, calling on past grievances to mobilize collective support. It was Dogan who pointed to disproportionate unemployment among Turks, calling it 'genocide.' Burov led the Democratic Labor Party, formed to represent the Bulgarian Muslims, who called themselves Pomaks. As the Pomak mayor of the village of Zhiltusha, he purveyed the notion that Pomaks were entitled to resources on the basis of their distinct cultural identity. In England, in the 1960s, cultural entrepreneur Enoch Powell took advantage of the explosive combination of widespread economic dislocation and the presence of immigrant communities described above and stigmatized

'immigrants as strangers, as objects of justifiable fear and hatred, and as a source of future division in the nation'. He received overwhelming support for his position from the native population. In Punjab, the radical Sikh, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale gathered a following of unemployed Sikh youth, who were denied jobs in industry, the military, and even farming. Claiming that Hindu immigrants were snapping up Sikh jobs, and condoning guerrilla tactics, he fomented violence and urged his followers to fight for a separate state for Sikhs only, where 'the Sikhs could experience the glow of their freedom'.

A cultural entrepreneur does not need to be an individual. In Germany, although individuals participated in the formation of right wing parties that fomented violence against immigrants, the cultural entrepreneurs were the parties themselves. Although Jörg Haider, the leader of Austria's extreme right wing freedom party, has been singled out as an important cultural entrepreneur – linking immigration and unemployment in almost every speech – the right wing parties themselves are currently playing that role. In Punjab, after the death of Bhindranwale, groups like *Babbar Khalsa*, the International Sikh Youth Federation, *Dal Khalsa*, and the Bhindranwale Tiger Force continued to link economic deprivation and cultural discrimination – and continued to engage in guerrilla tactics. Even after the violence was quelled in 1992, new cultural entrepreneurs began to spring up. A previously unknown group, for example, the *Saheed Khalsa Force*, claimed credit for marketplace bombings in New Delhi in 1997.

In Sri Lanka, in both the Sinhalese and Tamil populations, rival political parties as cultural entrepreneurs competed for political power, using different mobilization tactics and appealing to different sectors of the population. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) known as the 'Tamil Tigers', became (and continue to be) the most powerful cultural entrepreneurs among the Tamils, and have been willing to turn to violence in pursuit of their aims. They have built an organization by actively seeking out socially and economically marginalized groups, lower castes, young rural peasants, coastal fishermen, and all those without land. In particular, the Tigers have been able to recruit the young, who had been denied both education and employment and were ripe for political mobilization.

### Legacies of ascriptive resource allocation

People will flock to cultural entrepreneurs and join their cause in those places where legacies of discriminatory resource allocation are still entrenched. In many regions where cultural conflict is most intense, resources have been traditionally allocated according to ethnic or religious criteria, and an ethnic division of labor persists. In Abkhazia, populated by Abkhazis and Georgians before the onset of civil war, Abkhaz farmers received more subsidies and experienced less central control than Georgian farmers; likewise, ethnic 'machines' provided a disproportionate share of jobs in the government bureaucracy for Abkhazis. Yugoslavia, under Tito, was governed by the institutions of 'ethnofederalism'. Five culturally defined groups – Serbs, Slovenes, Croats, Macedonians, and Montenegrins were territorially organized in constituent republics in which, as the titular nationality, they held the status of 'constitutive nation'. The 1971 census recognized Muslims as a separate nation, and Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognized under the national principle as a republic, consisting of three constitutive peoples: Serbs, Croats, and Muslims.<sup>10</sup> Investment funds from the central government were provided to distinct ethnic republics by the central state according to political and ascriptive criteria rather than economic 'rationality'. Ascriptive allocation fostered both bitterness among some groups, and perceptions of intrinsic 'rights' to further resources from the center among others. This system churned up mutual resentments and suspicions of other republics; this solidified the political relevance of ethnic identity, weakened loyalty to the central government, and reinforced the dominant logic of identity politics at the federal level.

The disintegration of federal control over resources created opportunities for regional officials – nascent cultural entrepreneurs – in ethnic republics to seize assets and gain political support. After 1973, the four-fold increase in oil prices fused with a decline in the economic growth rate to trigger expanded borrowing on international markets. Although there was a sense of well-being on the surface because consumption was financed by debt, overall economic growth ground to a halt by 1982. As the economy worsened, regional fragmentation increased; conflicts among the republics over the

distribution of rapidly declining economic resources contributed to economic decline. The regionally based allocation of resources increased local power and the political strength of local ethnically motivated political entrepreneurs at the expense of the central state. Cultural entrepreneurs such as Slobodan Milosevic, Franjo Tudjman, and a host of local Serb and Croat politicians found that they could use funds distributed from the center to the republics to build a political power base at the local (republic) level. They used these funds as patronage to mobilize and gain the political loyalty of their culturally defined populations and then exploited ethnic differences and whipped up ethnic hatred.

As noted above, Sri Lanka allocated resources based on cultural criteria, using the Sinhala-only act to remove Tamils, who were more proficient in English, from employment in the state bureaucracy and the army. The act also mandated that children be educated in their birth language, effectively preventing Tamils from learning the official language and further reducing employment opportunities. Tamils also lost educational opportunities because of discriminatory policies, when the parliament replaced the merit system in higher education with preferential treatment for Sinhalese students.<sup>11</sup> The Tamils became increasingly radicalized by these exclusionary policies and their effects, and in 1976 declared independence for 'Tamil Eelam', the name they adopted for what they claimed as the traditional Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese majority, with their preponderance of economic resources and military might, moved to quell the Tamil Tigers, leading to the civil war of 1983.<sup>12</sup>

Under conditions of resource scarcity and institutional uncertainty and weakness, in societies where an entrenched tradition of cultural privilege and discrimination prevailed earlier, politicians are tempted to privilege – or promise to privilege – the members of one ethnic or religious community over others. In Yugoslavia, for example, the weaker the central government became, the more allocative authority fell into the hands of regional party elites. The deepening economic crisis and the collapse of the social welfare system made their role and their patronage networks increasingly important because their aid became indispensable in keeping both enterprises and individuals afloat; they made significant allocative decisions in the economy, as well as political



and administrative appointments based on ethnic and cultural bonds created in their local communities. In Sri Lanka, Biziouras (forthcoming) shows that, 'economic decline from 1970–1977 increased the demands of the Sinhalese community on the state for employment and assistance at the expense of the Tamil minority.'

### **Contributions by the diaspora cultural community and other external sources of support to cultural entrepreneurs**

The odds of violent ethnic conflict increase when diasporic communities funnel resources to cultural entrepreneurs in order to fight an opposing cultural group believed to be a cause of hardship and suffering. The Tamils fared surprisingly well in the civil war, despite a ban on the possession of weapons and the overwhelming power of the Sinhalese army, because of an infusion of resources from the diaspora Tamil community. Because diaspora groups abroad often see their 'brethren' under an oppressive yoke in their own land from which they must be liberated, they channel these resources to those extreme groups who argue for secession or a form of 'ethnic cleansing'. Ethnic Kosovars living abroad sent funds directly to the KLA; before the wars of Yugoslav succession, Croats abroad sent support to the HDZ, Tudjman's extremist party.

Support from the diaspora is particularly important when distinct cultural communities in their homeland are excluded from other resources. Local Abkhaz officials, for example, were cut off from their patronage networks in Moscow with the Soviet collapse. Bereft of internal resources, they looked outward to potential alliances, and received enough military support from Russia and Trans-Caucasus alliances to defeat the Georgians. In Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers, with financial help from Tamils overseas, evolved into a formidable military force, with technologically sophisticated arms, including weaponry such as rocket-propelled grenade launchers and night-vision glasses. By 2002, the Tamil Tigers had created a fighting force of 10,000 men who used guerrilla tactics that included everything from suicide bombings to surface-to-air missiles acquired through Tamil networks abroad.<sup>13</sup> Similarly, in Punjab, radical groups needed money from abroad to sustain their activities. Many Sikhs living in Britain, Canada, and the United States had been campaigning for an independent nation of Khalistan

for many years. When Bhindranwale began to campaign in Punjab for a separate state, he was bolstered by foreign funds from the Diaspora Sikh community.<sup>14</sup> He used funds from these groups to purchase arms for a military buildup in the area surrounding the Golden Temple in Amritsar, the traditional seat of spiritual and temporal authority of the Sikhs, and scene of some of the worst violence in the conflict.

The community offering support does not necessarily have to be of the same ethnic or religious group. Support can come from those who sympathize with the cultural 'cause' or simply from those groups who perceive a common enemy. Abkhazi separatists called on former KGB members, elements of the Soviet army, and the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of Caucasia for material support in their war of secession. These groups came to the aid of the separatists because they each had a separate grievance against Georgia or had previous ties to the separatists. Other external support can be 'grabbed' by well-positioned extremist groups, even if that support is not necessarily targeted to bolster their position. Western human rights organizations and aid agencies unwittingly abetted the agendas of ethnic and religious entrepreneurs in post-communist regions and helped to swell the ranks of their supporters. They have done this by providing or promising to provide material or symbolic support to targeted cultural groups and excluding other groups.

The strength of cultural entrepreneurs – often armed with external support – will grow as central authority weakens. Established authority can be weakened by the globalized forces of 'state-shrinking' because liberalization policies tend to reduce government resources that can be distributed in return for support. It is to the issue of state strength in the face of the imperatives of globalization that I now turn.

### **Globalization and state strength**

All stable countries are characterized by political and social arrangements that have some form of historical legitimacy. Sometimes these arrangements or 'social contracts' are written in constitutions; sometimes they are found instead in a country's political and social institutions. In either case, such social contracts structure the terms of citizenship and inclusion in a country's political

community, the rules of political participation, the political relationship between the central state and its various regions, and the distribution of material resources within a country. When political institutions make ascription – that is, cultural distinctions – a criterion for membership, participation, and resource allocation, ‘identity politics’ is played out in the political arena. When the institutions of central authority are strong, and perceived as legitimate, and when resource allocation is considered ‘fair’, political conflicts are less likely to become violent. Indeed, perceptions of fair resource allocation are a key pillar of institutional legitimacy. Strong and legitimate institutions provide broadly accepted channels of political competition within which political actors operate in ‘normal’ times. They allow central authorities to make credible commitments to distribute benefits and structure bargaining among various groups in ways that will be perceived as mutually advantageous. Institutional legitimacy enhances institutional capacity, reducing the threat of cultural conflict by increasing the benefits of peaceful dispute resolution and reducing the benefits of violence. Although these institutions may privilege some groups over others, they can counter the threat of backlash with offers of side payments and compensation to those who see themselves as harmed by the preferential practices.

It would be wrong to assert that perfect social harmony is the result. These institutions often foster resentment because of these practices of privilege and compensation. But where they are considered essentially legitimate, their behavioral rules are echoed in other organizations and in the society at large. The opposite is true when state institutions are considered unfair, illegitimate and oppressive. Often, privilege is granted to one group, and others are excluded from the privileged resource allocation. Resentment is likely to build but will be repressed as long as the state is strong enough to exert coercive power to maintain social order. For example, in the 1970s, both Punjabi Sikhs and Georgian peasants in Abkhazia were excluded from privileged resource allocation. Thus both sought to secede from the governing state that they perceived as oppressive. As long as that state remained strong enough to repress dissent and as long as these two groups continued to be deprived of resources for mobilization, their grievances festered, but they did not resort to violence until the institutions of the central state weakened.

There are many reasons why a central state would weaken: corruption, inefficiency, and over-extension come readily to mind. In addition, however, upholding these social contracts becomes more difficult when globalization weakens the state through its imperatives for ‘state-shrinking’. This is exemplified in the case of Bulgaria after Communism’s collapse. There, the former Communist regime provided the Turkish minority with economic security: ethnic Turks were concentrated in the tobacco industry; the state purchased tobacco, ensuring full lifetime employment. With the fall of Communism, however, the inefficient and uncompetitive tobacco industry was privatized, and its failure in global markets left the majority of Turks unemployed and destitute. Turkish political entrepreneurs in Bulgaria began to label unemployment ethnic ‘genocide’ in their effort to mobilize the Turkish population against the liberalizing policies of the new regime. Similarly, as noted above, the worsening of the Sri Lankan national economy in 1970–1977 only increased the demands of the Sinhalese community on the state for employment and assistance, often at the expense of the Tamil minority.

In short, policies of state-shrinking that reduce the state’s role in the economy and reduce its sovereignty over political membership – and exacerbate social cleavages along cultural lines – are important causes of broken social contracts and failed coercive policies. National economic growth and decline and the level of external debt affect the level of resources that the state can allocate, and short-term policies of economic liberalization yield up the state’s distributive powers to the market. Indeed, when states make the decision to allow the market to pick economic winners and losers, they often break the social contract that once permitted them to soften some of the disadvantages suffered by particular cultural groups.

### **Coping with cultural conflict: the role of institutions**

A perception of unjust political and economic resource distribution among distinct cultural groups lies at the heart of many of today’s cultural conflicts. Therefore, political leaders in multicultural societies must take care to maintain strong, legitimate institutions in the face of globalization’s state-shrinking imperatives. Institutions should be fashioned so



that economic hardships and benefits are allocated in ways that integrate rather than fragment the political community. Federal systems in multi-ethnic states must create a strong center if they are to survive. They must be strong enough to protect and maintain the rule of law and civil and political rights of groups as well as individuals. And governments must be committed to those rights. An independent judiciary not captured by political forces is essential. Institutions of the presidency and parliament must be constructed so that stalemates do not repeatedly occur and in which negative majorities – able to veto decisions but unable to take positive action – do not dominate. A system of political competition that fosters compromise will buffer against perceptions of further unfair resource distribution as state budgets shrink.

Even globalization in the form of market rationality can actually be a coping mechanism that can mitigate cultural conflict: markets can reduce the influence of unjust patronage networks, including ethnic and sectarian ones. Coping with globalization in multi-ethnic societies must mean more than reducing fiscal deficits, privatization, currency stabilization, and creating economic efficiencies; coping with globalization must also mean refashioning institutions that both depoliticize and respect cultural identity. Below I tell two stories that highlight the role of institutions in coping with those effects of globalization that heighten cultural conflict.

### **Coping with globalization and mitigating cultural conflict I: Bulgaria**

Bulgaria is strikingly similar to Yugoslavia in terms of historical legacies, social composition, and economic structure: yet Yugoslavia erupted in communal conflict with the fall of Communism, and Bulgaria did not. Below I sketch out a brief explanation for Bulgaria's relative social harmony, which suggests that political institutions played a significant role in channeling Bulgarian cultural conflict into non-violent political competition.

#### **Pre-1989: impact of institutions on social integration in the face of international pressures**

The roots of Communism's collapse can, in part, be traced to the forces of globalization and the position of

communist countries in the international economy. Communist countries found themselves on the sidelines in the race for economic prosperity as their technical expertise in commercial industry began to lag far behind the industrial capitalist nations. Throughout the Cold War, technology gaps between them and the West widened and multiplied (Crawford 1993).

While both Bulgaria and Yugoslavia pursued autarky and central planning that brought economic hardship to all social groups, they were marked by differences in the structures of their political institutions. Despite the tight grip of the Communist party on both countries, Bulgaria was a centralized state while post-war Yugoslavia was constructed as a federal system. These different structures made a crucial difference in filtering the forces of globalization when they began to change economic and political calculations within each country.

In contrast to Yugoslavia, Bulgaria was a unitary state, with political power concentrated in the center (Curtis 1992). The Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) program specified an orthodox hierarchical party structure of democratic centralism, each level responsible to the level above. The lowest-level party organizations were based in workplaces: all other levels were determined by territorial divisions, which were weaker than the workplace organizations (Bell 1986). Allocative institutions privileged party members and functionaries rather than particular ascriptive groups.

This centralization was reflected in the forced inclusion of Muslim minorities into the state. From the outset, the Communist regime sought to overcome the 'backwardness' of the Turkish population through policies of forced inclusion, for example, the destruction of autonomous local organizations and decrees of mass public de-veilings of Turkish women – not unlike the recent French ban on the *hijab* (or head scarf) – in public schools.

In 1984–85, the Bulgarian regime tightened the screws of 'inclusion'. It declared that Bulgarian Turks were not really Turkish, but rather they were Bulgarians who had been forcibly Islamicized and Turkified under Ottoman rule. It forced all Turks to change their names from Turkish to Slavo-Christian ones, and prohibited most religious rites, closing down mosques, and destroying public signs of an existing Turkish culture (Neuburger 1997: 6; Curtis 1992: 82).

The Bulgarian Muslims, or 'Pomaks', suffered much less repression. Because, historically, there