ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

NEW PERSPECTIVES

Edited by Andy King
and Michael Penman

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THE BOYDELL PRESS

Contents

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Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

Anonimalle, 1307–34	*The Anonimalle Chronicle, 1307–34*, ed. W. R. Childs and J. Taylor, Yorkshire Archaeological Society Record Series (1991).
Anonimalle, 1333–81	*The Anonimalle Chronicle, 1333–81*, ed. V. H. Galbraith (Manchester, 1927).
'Annales Paulini'	'Annales Paulini', *Chronicles of the Reigns of Edward I and Edward II*, ed. W. Stubbs, Rolls Series lxxvi (2 vols, 1882–83), vol. i.
APS	*The Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland*, ed. T. Thomson and C. Innes (12 vols, Edinburgh, 1814–75).
ASR	*Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1174–1328*, ed. E. L. G. Stones (2nd edn, Oxford, 1970).
Avesbury	'Robertus de Avesbury de gestis mirabilibus regis Edwardi Tertii', *Chronica A. Murimuth et R. de Avesbury*, ed. E. M. Thompson, Rolls Series xciii (London, 1889).
Barrow, *Bruce*	G. W. S. Barrow, *Robert the Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland* (4th edn, Edinburgh, 2005).
BL	British Library (London).
Boardman, *Stewart Kings*	S. Boardman, *The Early Stewart Kings: Robert II and Robert III, 1371–1406* (East Linton, 1996).
Bower	*Bower's Scotichronicon*, ed. D. E. R. Watt *et al.* (9 vols, Aberdeen and Edinburgh, 1987–98).
Brown, 'War, Allegiance and Community'	M. Brown, 'War, Allegiance and Community in the Anglo-Scottish Marches: Teviotdale in the Fourteenth Century', *NH* xli (2004).
Brown, *Douglases*	M. Brown, *The Black Douglases. War and Lordship in Late Medieval Scotland, 1300–1455* (East Linton, 1998).
Bruce, McDiarmid and Stevenson	*Barbour's Bruce*, ed. M. P. McDiarmid and J. A. C. Stevenson, Scottish Text Society (3 vols, 1980–85).
Bruce, Duncan	*The Bruce*, ed. A. A. M. Duncan (Edinburgh, 1997).
Brut	*The Brut or Chronicles of England*, ed. F. Brie, Early English Text Society (2 vols, 1906–08).

Campbell, 'England, Scotland'	J. Campbell, 'England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War in the Fourteenth Century', in *Europe in the Late Middle Ages*, ed. J. R. Hale et *al.* (London, 1965).
CCR	*Calendar of Close Rolls* (HMSO, 1892–1907).
CDS	*Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland*, ed. J. Bain (4 vols, Edinburgh, 1881–88); vol. v: *Supplementary*, ed. G. G. Simpson and J. B. Galbraith (Edinburgh, 1988).
CFR	*Calendar of Fine Rolls* (HMSO, 1911–62).
CPL	*Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers Relating to Great Britain and Ireland: Papal Letters, 1198–1513*, ed. W. H. Bliss et *al.* (19 vols, HMSO, 1893–).
CPR	*Calendar of Patent Rolls* (HMSO, 1891–1916).
CCW	*Calendar of Chancery Warrants, 1244–1326* (HMSO, 1927).
CIPM	*Calendar of Inquisitions Post Mortem* (HMSO, 1904–68).
EHR	*English Historical Review.*
ER	*The Exchequer Rolls of Scotland*, ed. J. Stuart et *al.* (23 vols, Edinburgh, 1878–1908).
Flores	*Flores historiarum*, ed. H. R. Luard, Rolls Series xcv (3 vols, 1890).
Foedera	*Foedera, conventiones, litterae et cuiuscunque generis acta publica*, ed. T. Rymer (20 vols, London, 1704–35).
Foedera (RC)	*Fœdera, conventiones, litteræ, et cujuscunque generis publica*, ed. T. Rymer (4 vols in 7 parts, Record Commission edn, 1816–69).
Fordun	*Johannis de Fordun. Chronica gentis Scotorum*, ed. W. F. Skene (2 vols, Edinburgh, 1871–72).
Goodman and Tuck, *Border Societies*	*War and Border Societies in the Middle Ages*, ed. A. Goodman and A. Tuck (London, 1992).
Great Cause	*Edward I and the Throne of Scotland, 1290–1296: An Edition of the Record Sources for the Great Cause*, ed. E. L. G. Stones and G. G. Simpson (2 vols, Oxford, 1978).
Guisborough	*The Chronicle of Walter of Guisborough*, ed. H. Rothwell, Camden Society, 3rd ser., lxxxix (1957).
Hemingburgh	*Chronicon domini Walteri de Hemingburgh*, ed. H. C. Hamilton, English Historical Society Publications (2 vols, 1849).
Haines, *Edward II*	R. M. Haines, *King Edward II. His Life, His Reign and its Aftermath, 1284–1330* (Montreal, 2003).
IR	*Innes Review*
JBS	*Journal of British Studies.*
JMH	*Journal of Medieval History.*
Keen, *Laws*	M. H. Keen, *The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages* (London, 1965).

Knighton	*Knighton's Chronicle, 1337–96*, ed. G. H. Martin (Oxford, 1995).
Lanercost, Maxwell	*The Chronicle of Lanercost, 1272–1346*, tr. H. Maxwell (Glasgow, 1913).
Lanercost, Stevenson	*Chronicon de Lanercost*, ed. J. Stevenson, Bannatyne Club lxv (Edinburgh, 1839).
Lettres communes	*Jean XXII, 1316–34: Lettres Communes analysées d'apres les registres dit d'Avignon et du Vatican*, ed. G. Mollat e*t al.* (Bibliothèque des Ecoles Françaises d'Athenes et de Rome, Paris, 1904–).
Liber Dryburgh	*Liber S. Marie de Calchou. Registrum cartarum Abbacie Tironensis de Kelso, 1113–1567*, ed. C. Innes, Bannatyne Club (2 vols, 1846).
Liber Kelso	*Liber S. Marie de Calchou. Registrum cartarum Abbacie Tironensis de Kelso, 1113–1567*, ed. C. Innes, Bannatyne Club (2 vols, 1846).
Liber Melrose	*Liber S. Marie de Melros. Munimenta vetustiora Monasterii Cisterciensis de Melros*, ed. C. Innes, Bannatyne Club (2 vols, 1837).
Macdonald, *Bloodshed*	A. J. Macdonald, *Border Bloodshed. Scotland, England and France at War, 1369–1403* (East Linton, 2000).
McNamee, *Wars*	Colm McNamee, *The Wars of the Bruces. Scotland, England and Ireland, 1306–28* (East Linton, 1997).
Melsa	*Chronica monasterii de Melsa*, ed. E. A. Bond, Rolls Series xliii (3 vols, 1866–68).
NA	National Archives (Kew).
NAS	National Archives of Scotland (Edinburgh).
NLS	National Library of Scotland (Edinburgh).
Nicholson, *Edward III*	R. Nicholson, *Edward III and the Scots. The Formative Years of a Military Career, 1327–35* (Oxford, 1965).
NH	*Northern History.*
Palgrave, *Docs*	*Documents and Records Illustrating the History of Scotland, Preserved in the Treasury*, ed. F. Palgrave (Record Commission, 1837).
Parl. Writs	*Parliamentary Writs*, ed. F. Palgrave (2 vols in 4 parts, London, 1827–34).
Penman, *David II*	M. A. Penman, *The Bruce Dynasty in Scotland: David II, 1329–71* (East Linton, 2004).
Penman, 'Soules Conspiracy'	Michael Penman, 'A Fell Coniuracioun Agayn Robert the Douchty King: The Soules Conspiracy of 1318–20', *IR* l (1999).
Pluscarden	*Liber Pluscardensis*, ed. F. J. H. Skene (2 vols, Edinburgh, 1877).
PROME	*Parliament Rolls of Medieval England*, ed. C. Given-Wilson et al. (Leicester, 2005).

Rot. Scot.	*Rotuli Scotiæ in turri Londinensi et in domo capitulari Westmonasteriensi asservati*, ed. D. Macpherson (2 vols, Record Commission, 1814–19).
RRS, Robert I	*Regesta Regum Scottorum V: The Acts of Robert I, 1306–29*, ed. A. A. M. Duncan (Edinburgh, 1988).
RRS, David II	*Regesta Regum Scottorum VI: The Acts of David II, 1329–71*, ed. B. Webster (Edinburgh, 1982).
RMS	*Registrum magni sigilli regum Scotorum*, ed. J. M. Thomson and J. B. Paul (11 vols, Edinburgh, 1882–1914).
Ross, 'Strathbogie Earls'	A. Ross, 'Men for All Seasons? The Strathbogie Earls of Atholl and the Wars of Independence, *c.*1290–*c.*1335', part i, *Northern Scotland* xx (2000); part ii, *Northern Scotland* xxi (2001).
Scalacronica, King	*Sir Thomas Gray's Scalacronica, 1272–1363*, ed. A. King, Surtees Society ccix (2005).
Scalacronica, Maxwell	*Scalacronica. The Reigns of Edward I, Edward II and Edward III*, tr. H. Maxwell (Glasgow, 1907).
Scalacronica, Stevenson	*Scalacronica, by Sir Thomas Gray of Heton, Knight*, ed. J. Stevenson, Maitland Club (Edinburgh, 1836).
SHR	*Scottish Historical Review.*
Stevenson, *Docs*	*Documents Illustrative of the History of Scotland, 1286–1306*, ed. J. Stevenson (2 vols, London, 1870).
TDGNHAS	*Transactions of the Dumfriesshire and Galloway Natural History and Antiquarian Society.*
TRHS	*Transactions of the Royal Historical Society.*
Tuck, 'Tax Haven'	A. Tuck, 'A Medieval Tax Haven: Berwick upon Tweed and the English Crown, 1333–1461', in *Progress and Problems in Medieval England. Essays in Honour of Edward Miller*, ed. R. Britnell and J. Hatcher (Cambridge, 1996).
Vita Edwardi	*Vita Edwardi Secundi*, ed. N. Denholm-Young (London, 1957).
VMHS	*Vetera monumenta Hibernorum et Scotorum*, ed. A. Theiner (Rome, 1864).
Westminster	*The Westminster Chronicle, 1381–1394*, ed. L. C. Hector and B. F. Harvey (Oxford, 1982).
Wyntoun, Laing	*The Orygynale Cronykil of Scotland*, ed. D. Laing (3 vols, Edinburgh, 1872–79).
Wyntoun, Amours	*The Original Chronicle of Andrew of Wyntoun*, ed. F. J. Amours, Scottish Text Society (6 vols, 1903–14).
Young, *Comyns*	A. Young, *Robert the Bruce's Rivals: The Comyns, 1212–1314* (East Linton, 1997)

Introduction:
Anglo-Scottish Relations in the Fourteenth Century – An Overview of Recent Research

Andy King and Michael A. Penman

A RECENT VOLUME of conference proceedings on north-east England in the later middle ages makes reference to March 1296, the month in which an English army crossed into Scotland and sacked Berwick-upon-Tweed, as marking the beginning of a 'Three Hundred Years War' between those two realms.[1] Of course, like all such generalisations, it is somewhat wide of the mark – as historians of the reign of James VI of Scotland (1567–1603), when the dynamics of dynastic succession ensured that Anglo-Scottish relations were generally peaceful, might reasonably object. Others might cry caution in the face of any impression of an inevitable or uninterrupted road from the battle of Dunbar (1296) to Pinkie (1547), via Bannockburn (1314), Otterburn (1388) or Flodden (1513). However, recent scholarship has done much to confirm that the perception of a long, continuous and unrelieved conflict must have seemed very real, not just for successive English and Scottish kings and their magnates, but more especially for the people of the Anglo-Scottish borders; between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, the lives of successive generations of borderers – peasants, priests, monks, burgesses or lords – were fundamentally affected by full-scale, if intermittent, war, and persistent cross-border raiding.

Indeed, the Wars of Independence (or the Wars of the Scottish Succession), fought between 1296 and 1328, and 1332 and 1356 (when they became entangled with the opening exchanges of the Anglo-French wars), were undeniably formative of a tradition, an identity and a landscape of border defences, as well as a pedigree of written histories of hostility between England and Scotland.

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[1] R. Lomas, 'St Cuthbert and the Border, *c.*1080–*c.*1300', in *North-East England in the Later Middle Ages*, ed. C. D. Liddy and R. H. Britnell (Woodbridge, 2005), 13; see also A. J. Pollard, 'Introduction', in ibid., 2.

In sum, these wars of the first half of the fourteenth century were to prove a historical source of bitter enmity which later generations continued to act on and invoke in subsequent clashes.

Within the last decade scholars have further illuminated the unprecedented intensity of Anglo-Scottish warfare after 1296, most especially during Robert Bruce's systematic raiding of northern England and Ireland between 1310 and 1322 and in 1327; and during Edward III's early military career in Scotland from 1333 to 1337; and again in Edward's particularly destructive *chevauchée* into Lothian in 1356, remembered as the 'Burnt Candlemas'. The historical study of the impact of these raids upon northern England in particular is greatly aided by the intrusive and bureaucratic nature of fourteenth-century English government which ensured the production and survival of voluminous contemporary records (indeed, these very characteristics help to explain why attempts to impose English government upon Scotland met with such resistance at the time).[2] But the routinely destructive business of raiding was punctuated by major battles, at Dunbar 1296, Stirling Bridge 1297, Falkirk 1298, Loudon Hill 1307, Bannockburn 1314, Dundalk 1318, Dupplin Moor 1332, Halidon Hill 1333 and Neville's Cross 1346;[3] and this war of arms was underwritten by an ongoing war of words both through diplomacy – in Edinburgh, London, Paris and Rome/Avignon – and in official 'national' and popular

[2] E.g. McNamee, *Wars*; idem, 'William Wallace's Invasion of Northern England in 1297', *NH* xxvi (1990); idem, 'Buying Off Robert Bruce: An Account of Monies Paid to the Scots by Cumberland Communities in 1313–14', *Transactions of the Cumberland and Westmorland Antiquarian and Archaeological Society* xcii (1992); C. J. Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp. English Strategy under Edward III, 1327–60* (Woodbridge, 2000); H. Schwyzer, 'Northern Bishops and the Anglo-Scottish War in the Reign of Edward II', in *Thirteenth-Century England VII*, ed. M. Prestwich *et al.* (Woodbridge, 1999); A. King, 'Bandits, Robbers and *Schavaldours*: War and Disorder in Northumberland in the Reign of Edward II', in *Thirteenth-Century England IX*, ed. M. Prestwich *et al.* (Woodbridge, 2003); R. Lomas, 'The Impact of Border Warfare: The Scots and South Tweedside, *c.*1290–*c.*1520', *SHR* lxxv (1996); C. J. Brooke, *Safe Sanctuaries: Security and Defence in Anglo-Scottish Border Churches, 1290–1690* (Edinburgh, 2000). See also M. Haskell, 'Breaking the Stalemate: The Scottish Campaign of Edward I, 1303–4', in *Thirteenth-Century England VII*, ed. Prestwich; F. Watson, 'Settling the Stalemate: Edward I's Peace in Scotland', in *Thirteenth-Century England VI*, ed. M. Prestwich *et al.* (Woodbridge, 1997), 127–43; eadem, *Under the Hammer: Edward I and Scotland, 1286–1307* (East Linton, 1998); M. Strickland, 'A Law of Arms or a Law of Treason? Conduct in War in Edward I's Campaigns in Scotland, 1296–1307', in *Violence in Medieval Society*, ed. R. W. Kaeuper (Woodbridge, 2000). And see David Simpkin, ch. 2, and Iain MacInnes, ch. 3, below.
[3] Neville's Cross in particular has been the subject of considerable study, partly due to the 650th anniversary of the battle. See D. Rollason and M. Prestwich (ed.), *The Battle of Neville's Cross, 1346* (Stamford, 1998); C. J. Rogers, 'The Scottish Invasion of 1346', *NH* xxxiv (1998); M. A. Penman, 'The Scots at the Battle of Neville's Cross, 17 October 1346', *SHR* lxxx (2001). For recent work on Bannockburn, see ch. 2, 1n., below.

historiographies, through chronicle, verse and ballad.[4] As such, the tone was seemingly inevitably set for future generations of both English and Scots born and grown only to war: their mutual hostility would find expression at both local and national levels, and amongst all social and political estates.

Recent studies have also turned to examine a sustained and arguably intensifying pattern of Anglo-Scottish rivalry, and often open conflict, in military, economic, ecclesiastical and cultural terms in the second half of the fourteenth century. Between the flashpoints in Anglo-Scottish relations – the invasions and counter-invasions of the 1380s; Henry IV's invasion of Scotland in 1400 (when he renewed England's claims to overlordship); the battle of Humbleton Hill in 1402; and the English capture of the Stewart Prince James in 1406, who soon became the captive James I – there remained an underlying current of tension, or cold war. It would be reasonable to state, though, that after 1356–57 (years which witnessed the English victory at Poitiers in France, and Edward III's release of David II of Scotland, captured at Neville's Cross in 1346) it was the Scots who were more committed as a realm to sustained aggression towards a perceived 'auld enemy' in England. The researches of Alexander Grant, Stephen Boardman, Michael Brown and Alastair Macdonald have elucidated the influence of the more 'hawkish' magnates over the Stewart court of Scotland from 1371 to 1406 (and to 1424), identifying a bellicose Anglophobia as characteristic of Scottish border lords in particular, a militant patriotism which emerged as a distinctive badge of identity and power in late medieval Scotland.[5] Key members of the late-fourteenth-century Scottish establishment were even prepared to sideline the authority of their king in their pursuit of officially sanctioned war against England. At the same time, these magnates had developed an almost reflexive acceptance of the need for a military treaty with the French against England, the 'Auld Alliance', renewed in 1371, 1383

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[4] R. J. Goldstein, *The Matter of Scotland. Historical Narrative in Medieval Scotland* (Nebraska, 1993); T. Summerfield, 'The Testimony of Writing: Pierre de Langtoft and the Appeals to History, 1291–1306', in *The Scots and Medieval Arthurian Legend*, ed. R. Purdie and N. Royan (Cambridge, 2005); T. Beaumont James, 'John of Eltham, History and Story: Abusive International Discourse in Late Medieval England, France and Scotland', in *Fourteenth-Century England II*, ed. C. Given-Wilson (Woodbridge, 2002); A. J. Macdonald, 'John Hardyng, Northumbrian Identity and the Scots', in *North-East England*, ed. Liddy and Britnell; C. Given-Wilson, *Chronicles: The Writing of History in Medieval England* (London, 2004), 65–9, 74–6, 85–6. Diplomacy at the papal Curia is addressed by Sarah Layfield, ch. 9 below.

[5] Boardman, *Stewart Kings*; Brown, *Douglases*; Macdonald, *Bloodshed*; A. J. Macdonald, 'Profit, Politics and Personality: War and the Later Medieval Scottish Nobility', in *Freedom and Authority, Scotland c.1050–c.1650. Historical and Historiographical Essays Presented to Grant G. Simpson*, ed. T. Brotherstone and D. Ditchburn (East Linton, 2000); A. Grant, 'Fourteenth-Century Scotland', in *The New Cambridge Medieval History, VI: c.1300–c.1415*, ed. M. Jones (Cambridge, 2001), 353.

and 1391.[6] These political trends were fuelled by a Scottish desire to reclaim English-occupied territory in Annandale and Teviotdale, most notably the economic and administrative foci of Roxburgh and Berwick. The same trends were reflected by a burgeoning Scottish national literature which celebrated the chivalry and achievements against England of Scottish aristocratic kindreds alongside those of the heroes of the Wars of Independence, exemplified in such works as John Barbour's vernacular *The Bruce* (1371x1375) and John of Fordun's Latin compilation, the *Chronicle of the Scottish Nation* (*c*.1383).[7] The Scots would later export this belligerence to France, fighting the English forces of Henry V (who had no real interest in Scotland) on land and sea between the battles of Agincourt (1415) and Verneuil (1424).[8]

For their part, the English did take a less aggressive stance towards Scotland following the Treaty of Berwick of 1357, having given up any real intent of imposing regime change upon their neighbour.[9] David II's ransomed release from captivity and his recognition as king of Scots by Edward III left the Plantagenet monarchy free to focus on dealings with the captive Jean II of France, either in war or uncertain truce.[10] In this period, warfare was employed by the English to subdue the Scots rather than to conquer them, while the issue of English overlordship over Scotland was raised mainly as a negotiating ploy to secure Scottish neutrality (or passivity, at the least) – Henry IV's rehearsal of this claim in 1400 was rather more concerned with legitimating and popularising his own recent seizure of power in England than with reasserting wider English 'rights'. Nonetheless, the latter confrontation suggests that a hawkish attitude to Anglo-Scottish affairs was not confined to north of the border. In

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[6] N. A. T. Macdougall, *An Antidote to the English. The Auld Alliance, 1295–1560* (East Linton, 2001), ch. 2; E. Bonner, 'Scotland's Auld Alliance with France, 1295–1560', *History* lxxxiv (1999).

[7] C. Edington, 'Paragons and Patriots: National Identity and the Chivalric Ideal in Late-Medieval Scotland', in *Image and Identity: The Making and Re-making of Scotland through the Ages*, ed. D. Broun et al. (Edinburgh, 1998); S. Cameron, 'Keeping the Customer Satisfied: Barbour's *Bruce* and a Phantom Division at Bannockburn', in *The Polar Twins*, ed. E. J. Cowan (Edinburgh, 2002); S. Boardman, 'Late Medieval Scotland and the Matter of Britain', in *Scottish History: The Power of the Past*, ed. E. J. Cowan and R. J. Finlay (Edinburgh, 2002). For Fordun's compilation, see D. Broun, 'A New Look at *Gesta Annalia* Attributed to John of Fordun', in *Church, Chronicle and Learning in Medieval and Early Renaissance Scotland*, ed. B. E. Crawford (Edinburgh, 1999).

[8] M. K. Jones, 'The Battle of Verneuil (17 August 1424): Towards a History of Courage', *War in History* ix (2002); D. Ditchburn, 'Piracy and War at Sea in Late Medieval Scotland', in *Scotland and the Sea*, ed. T. C. Smout (1992).

[9] This disengagement would seem to come earlier than the fifteenth-century withdrawal stressed in G. L. Harriss, *Shaping the Nation. England, 1360–1461* (Oxford, 2005), 528–39.

[10] C. J. Rogers, 'The Anglo-French Peace Negotiations of 1354–60 Reconsidered', in *The Age of Edward III*, ed. J. S. Bothwell (York, 2001).

the English Marches, at least – a militarised society where regional politics and lordship, and the concomitant expectations of kingship, had been moulded by the impact of the Scottish wars – an aggressively robust attitude to relations with the Scots remained a political imperative. And this was reflected by a continuing antagonism to Scotland in other parts of the country (although antipathy to the French had surely become a stronger current of English 'patriotism' across the realm as a whole). Just as the Stewart kings invoked Robert I as their standard of rule and war against England, so Henry IV could take Edward III as his model, a king who had in his turn sought to emulate Edward I, 'Hammer of the Scots'. Moreover, just as the baronial houses of Douglas and Dunbar and their baronial followings vied to determine Scottish policy not only in the militarised zone of the Borders but at a national or Crown level, so too did ambitious northern English families such as the Percys and Nevilles rival each other to influence and lead Plantagenet policy towards Scotland. And the English Marcher gentry profited greatly from border tension, as the consequent need to provide for the defence of the Marches brought them a steady flow of Crown patronage and office, which more than compensated for such losses as they incurred from Scottish raiding.[11]

The growing animosity between these counterpart lineages is perhaps best exemplified by the Otterburn campaign of 1388. This Scottish victory, bitterly remembered in England until it was overturned at Humbleton Hill in 1402, garnered a wealth of vituperative and propagandist comment in both Scottish and English chronicles, highlighting a rivalry between royal, magnatial and gentry kindreds which also found expression in heraldry and architecture.[12] In addition, in the later fourteenth century, Anglo-Scottish animosity was given

[11] M. Arvanigian, 'Henry IV, the Northern Nobility and the Consolidation of the Regime', in *Henry IV: The Establishment of the Regime, 1399–1406*, ed. G. Dodd and D. Biggs (York, 2003); A. Tuck, 'The Percies and the Community of Northumberland in the Later Fourteenth Century', in Goodman and Tuck, *Border Societies*; Boardman, *Stewart Kings*, chs 4–5; C. R. Young, *The Making of the Neville Family in England, 1166–1400* (Woodbridge, 1996); A. King, 'Scaling the Ladder: The Rise and Rise of the Grays of Heaton, c.1296–c.1415', in *North-East England*, ed. Liddy and Britnell, 72–3 and *passim*. Note, however, that recent work has suggested that the Percies' grip on the Marches was rather less all-encompassing than has often been assumed; Tuck, 'The Percies and the Community of Northumberland'; A. King, '"They Have the Hertes of the People by North": Northumberland, the Percies and Henry IV, 1399–1408', in *Henry IV*, ed. Dodd and Biggs.

[12] See the papers by Goodman, Grant and Reed in Goodman and Tuck, *Border Societies*; S. Hussey, 'Nationalism and Language in England, c.1300–1500', in *Nations, Nationalism and Patriotism in the European Past*, ed. C. Bjørn *et al.* (Copenhagen, 1994); M. Brown, '"Rejoice to Hear of Douglas": The House of Douglas and the Presentation of Magnate Power in Late Medieval Scotland', *SHR* lxxvi (1997). For heraldic rivalry see papers by Shenton and Ailes in *Heraldry, Pageantry and Social Display in Medieval England*, ed. P. Coss and M. Keen (Woodbridge, 2002) and *Bower*, viii, 17–19.

an added edge by growing economic rivalries. Both Crowns and their key burghs vied for trade in border produce and goods (especially wool) at a time of Scottish specie depreciation and Europe-wide economic downturn.[13] Finally, with the international rupture and ecclesiastical division of the Great Schism from 1378 (with England backing Urban VIII and his successors at Rome, while Scotland and France favoured their rivals at Avignon), English and Scottish military leaders could claim spiritual dispensation for waging war on enemies now regarded as heretical schismatics.[14]

Such a broad outline and historiographical survey would thus seem to confirm the fourteenth century as the beginning of a much longer Anglo-Scottish conflict. Nevertheless, even for the century in which this great animosity crystallised, this assumption can and should be questioned. Just as scholars of the fifteenth century have re-emphasised the diplomacy of Edward IV, Richard III and James III (resulting in major truces in 1474 and 1485), and Henry VII and James IV (with a treaty in 1502), thus creating peace and – in Henry VII's case – marriage out of hostility and war, so might scholars of the fourteenth century reassess levels of Anglo-Scottish tension. After all, a state of officially declared and sustained war was only in effect for roughly 55 years out of the 110-year period, from 1296 to 1406, for all that a barely contained hostility underlay many of the intervening truces. As one recent reviewer has remarked of the later middle ages, 'in fact, for much of the period, there was little open warfare. Fighting was regular from 1296 till the truce of 1323, intermittent, though at times serious, from then till 1388; and at most occasional from then on till the Treaty of Edinburgh in 1560, after which there was no formal war.'[15] Indeed, this might be further qualified, for the period 1357–77 also saw no official Anglo-Scottish war. With half of this period thus at least officially given over to truce or peace, however uneasy, we should surely take more historical notice of evidence for peaceful Anglo-Scottish accommodation and exchange revived or persisting within and beyond these periods. Admittedly, the contemporary sources of peacetime interaction – particularly from the Scottish perspective – are often sorely wanting. However, enough has survived to facilitate further recent scholarship in this direction.

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[13] Tuck, 'Tax Haven'; J. Donnelly, 'An Open Port: The Berwick Export Trade, 1311–1373', *SHR* lxxviii (1999). See also H. Summerson, 'Responses to War: Carlisle and the West March in the Later Fourteenth Century', in Goodman and Tuck, *Border Societies*.

[14] *Bower*, vii, 406; A. Goodman, 'Religion and Warfare in the Anglo-Scottish Marches', in *Medieval Frontier Societies*, ed. R. Bartlett and A. Mackay (Oxford, 1989), 256–7; A. D. M. Barrell, *The Papacy, Scotland and Northern England, 1342–1378* (Cambridge, 1995). The impact of the Schism on border abbeys is discussed in Richard Oram, ch. 8 below.

[15] B. Webster, 'Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1296–1389: Some Recent Essays', *SHR* lxxiv (1995), 99.

A number of studies have emphasised the complexity of changing local and national loyalties against an uncertain backdrop of rapidly changing events in this period, a theme which is pursued by a number of papers in the present volume. Such conflicts of loyalty were perhaps nowhere felt more acutely than on the border Marches, where noble families' and rural and urban communities' people, lands and goods were most directly affected by war and the shifting balance of power, as the work of Andy King, Michael Brown and others has already shown.[16] However, issues of geography, pragmatic politics and the territorial patterns of pre-1296 – when many noble houses, ecclesiastical institutions and the Scottish Crown had held lands in both the English and Scottish realms – could also influence the difficult choices of allegiance facing the wider community in the fourteenth century.[17] Robert I's *coup* of 1306, and the consequent adherence of the Comyns and their allies to the English allegiance, is increasingly now viewed in terms of a civil war between rival Scottish factions, rather than the more black-and-white nationalistic view which characterised Bruce's party as 'patriotic', and the Comyns as 'unpatriotic', or worse, as traitors – a view originally peddled quite deliberately by Scottish chroniclers in the latter part of the fourteenth century, with an eye to contemporary Scottish politics. Similarly, Edward Balliol is no longer considered 'an ignominious figure, as the catspaw of Edward III' (and not merely because value-judgements are no longer fashionable in modern historiography).[18] As the work of Alasdair Ross and Sonja Cameron has shown, even as committed a figure as Robert I could toy with the idea of a return to cross-border landholding as the basis of renewed Anglo-Scottish peace: the abandonment and collapse of this option provoked the invasion of the Disinherited in 1332 but equally could be said to have motivated in turn the defence of Robert I's settlement by pro-Bruce Scots.[19] At the end of the century, George, tenth earl of Dunbar, was

[16] A. King, 'Englishmen, Scots and Marchers: National and Local Identities in Thomas Gray's *Scalacronica*', *NH* xxxvi (2000); Brown, 'War, Allegiance and Community'; C. J. Neville, 'Local Sentiment and the "National Enemy" in Northern England in the Later Middle Ages', *JBS* xxxv (1996). Border loyalties are discussed further by Michael Brown, ch. 6, and Andy King, ch. 7, below.

[17] In addition to those items already footnoted, see Ross, 'Men for All Seasons?'; C. J. Neville, 'The Political Allegiance of the Earls of Strathearn during the War of Independence', *SHR* lxv (1986).

[18] A. Young, 'The Comyns and Anglo-Scottish Relations (1286–1314)', in *Thirteenth-Century England VII*, ed. Michael Prestwich *et al.* (Woodbridge, 1999); M. Brown, *The Wars of Scotland, 1214–1371* (Edinburgh, 2004), ch. 11; R. D. Oram, 'Bruce, Balliol and the Lordship of Galloway: South-West Scotland and the Wars of Independence', *TDGNHAS*, 3rd ser., lxvii (1992). For the Comyn family more generally, see Young, *Comyns*. The splendid denunciation of Balliol is from R. C. Reid, 'Edward de Balliol', *TDGNHAS*, 3rd ser., xxxv (1956–57), 38.

[19] S. Cameron and A. Ross, 'The Treaty of Edinburgh and the Disinherited (1328–32)', *History* lxxxiv (1999).

evidently an enthusiastic participant in raids against the English. Nevertheless, he still chose to return to his family's erstwhile English allegiance and swear loyalty to Henry IV, supporting his invasion of Scotland in 1400 – albeit in the wake of a violent falling out with Robert III.[20] In much the same vein, the equally belligerent Hotspur could turn to his captive, Archibald, fourth earl of Douglas, for military support against the English Crown in 1403, while his father would flee to Scotland in 1405. According to the contemporary Scottish chronicler Andrew Wyntoun, Douglas explained away his behaviour as being a course of action that would lead to the deaths of Englishmen, with the clear implication that this was a laudable and desirable end in itself. However, this justification was offered up in a context in which both Douglas and Dunbar were seeking to recover their positions in Scotland in *c*.1408–09.[21] Clearly, the patriotism and lordly identity born of the fourteenth century was by no means inflexibly set in stone, a reality Michael Brown explores further in his paper in this volume.

Part of the seemingly flexible loyalties of these magnates surely stemmed from their involvement in the great volume of everyday interchange that occurred between the realms. Often obscured by the extant sources, this was born out of both practical necessity and desire, reviving and persisting in spite of the intermittent outbreaks of war. As the research of Michael Penman has shown, David II's second adult reign, between 1357 and 1371, saw him seeking to negotiate closer political, dynastic and socio-economic relations with England.[22] These goals were pursued not only for David's own high political ends but also out of a genuine sense of the common heritage and interests of the two realms, despite the conflict of the first half of the century. In particular, a common culture was provided by the shared values of chivalry, which encouraged an impartial admiration of prowess, irrespective of nationality, and provided a practical code for the conduct of war and the ransoming of prisoners; this was a nexus of ideals and lifestyle given expression throughout this period in such works as Sir Thomas Gray's *Scalacronica*, Jean Froissart's *Chroniques* and poems such as *Méliador*, and even the sole extant work of John Barbour.[23]

[20] A. J. Macdonald, 'Kings of the Wild Frontier? The Earls of Dunbar or March, *c*.1070–1435', in *The Exercise of Power in Medieval Scotland*, *c.1200–1500* ed. S. Boardman and A. Ross (Dublin, 2003), 151–8.

[21] Wyntoun, Laing, iii, 90–1; Brown, *Douglases*, 105–7; King, 'They Have the Hertes of the People by the North', 151–2.

[22] Penman, *David II*, chs 5–10.

[23] M. Penman, 'Christian Days and Knights: The Religious Devotions and Court of David II of Scotland, 1329–71', *Historical Research* lxxv (2002); A. King, 'A Helm with a Crest of Gold: The Order of Chivalry in Thomas Gray's *Scalacronica*', in *Fourteenth-Century England I*, ed. N. Saul (Woodbridge, 2000); idem, '"According to the Custom used in French and Scottish Wars": Prisoners and Casualties on the Scottish Marches in the Fourteenth Century', *JMH* xxviii (2002).

However, practical inducements and long-established (pre-1296) connections underpinned this elite interaction. Just as the later Anglo-Scottish unions of the Crowns (1603) and Parliaments (1707) were motivated by strong economic concerns, so Edward III's and David II's plans for alliance attempted to build on the interdependence of existing Anglo-Scottish trading links. A number of scholars have recently drawn attention to the heavy traffic of Scottish merchants entering England after 1357 (recorded by the bureaucratically minded English Crown in the *Rotuli Scotiae*, the Scottish Rolls), taking advantage of a general passport granted by Edward III at the probable request of David II.[24] This suggests a potentially increasing Anglo-Scottish trade beyond the 'porous' cross-border markets of the Marches, focused on Carlisle, Roxburgh, Berwick, Newcastle, Durham and smaller market towns in between, providing further outlets for the exchange of Scottish raw materials for English and European finished goods. This common market of trade necessarily gave major English and Scottish landowners (lay and ecclesiastical) a continuing stake in such exchange.[25] At the same time, an associated traffic in pilgrims, academics, students, diplomats, mercenaries, crusaders and tournament contenders – admittedly, predominantly Scots entering or passing through England – suggests Anglophile tendencies among sections of the Scottish populace, to match the elite minority motivated by the politics of David II's court, and, as Anthony Goodman's paper in this volume shows, the court of Richard II. Religion, above all, had the power to transcend borders and animosities, the Papal Schism notwithstanding; the worship of both universal and regional saints' cults and relics proved especially resistant to erosion by conflict, representing a potentially mutual exchange (with English pilgrimage, say, to St Andrews or Whithorn or Our Lady's at Whitekirk in East Lothian, to match Scottish pilgramage to Durham, Walsingham or Canterbury).[26] But the degree to which this Anglo-Scottish traffic of people survived and altered with the accession of the Stewarts in 1371 has still to be fully explored.

Of course, the experience of travel in war and its consequences could often be the actual mechanism, or an accelerant, for the exchange of such spiritual and cultural ideas, just as war transmitted disease on a devastating scale in this period. The search for solutions to everyday Anglo-Scottish tensions in

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[24] *Rot. Scot.*, i, 815–16; Penman, *David II*, 190; D. Ditchburn, *Scotland and Europe. The Medieval Kingdom and its Contacts with Christendom, c.1214–1560. I: Religion, Culture and Commerce* (East Linton, 2001), 144–85; R. H. Britnell, *Britain and Ireland, 1050–1530. Economy and Society* (Oxford, 2005), chs 16–17.

[25] Pollard, 'Introduction', in *North-East England*, ed. Liddy and Britnell, 5.

[26] J. R. Bliese, Saint Cuthbert and War', *JMH* xxiv (1998); M. Penman, 'The Bruce Dynasty, Becket and Scottish Pilgrimage to Canterbury, c.1178–c.1406', *JMH* 32 (2006); Ditchburn, *Scotland and Europe*, ch. 2; D. Webb, *Pilgrims and Pilgrimage in the Medieval West* (London, 2001), 213–24.

the long fourteenth century was also boosted by a reaction to the deeper conflicts and regional problems predating 1357. The work of Cynthia Neville has been seminal in further illuminating the development of Border law and Days of March in the fourteenth century, particularly under the kingship of Edward III.[27] The overlap of noble personnel (Percies, Nevilles, Cliffords, Douglases, Dunbars, Stewarts, etc) involved in these days of peace as well as in inter-realm pilgrimage and tournaments (and even trade), but crucially also as the instigators and leaders of raids and official war, underlines the complexity of the Anglo-Scottish dynamic in the later century. Indeed, Days of March themselves sometimes became the occasion of conflict rather than resolution, as in 1377, when an alleged English assault of one of the retainers of the earl of Dunbar at a March Day resulted in a Scottish reprisal raid on Roxburgh market on St James' day.[28]

This overlap of individuals and interested parties also reminds us of the direct relationship between Anglo-Scottish relations and the balance of political power within the respective realms. Historians of late medieval Scotland have perhaps been more sensitive to the way in which her position as the weaker realm could affect internal politics. This was of course a central imperative of the first phase of the Wars of Independence and could affect English internal affairs, too: witness the crises in England of 1297, when the costs of Edward I's Scottish campaigns provoked a major crisis which almost escalated into a magnate revolt; 1311–12, when Edward II's Scottish expedition became embroiled in the dispute over Piers Gaveston; 1314–19, when the incompetent conduct of the Scottish wars fuelled the mutual recriminations of Edward and Thomas of Lancaster; and 1327–28, when the abject failure of the Weardale campaign, and the 'Shameful Peace' with Scotland, served to discredit the Mortimer regime. But recent scholarship has highlighted the continuing importance of this theme later in the century. In Scotland, David II's antagonism towards his heirs presumptive, the Stewarts, and his capture and costly release, involved him on several occasions (1352, 1359, 1363–68) in talks to admit an English prince to the Scottish succession, thus provoking magnatial reactions in Parliament and a rebellion in 1363. Similarly, the reluctance of the Stewart monarchs, Robert II (1371–90) and Robert III (1390–1406), to commit to war against England saw their reigns compromised by bloodless coups in Councils

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[27] C. J. Neville, *Violence, Custom and Law. The Anglo-Scottish Border Lands in the Later Middle Ages* (Edinburgh, 1998); eadem, 'Scottish Influences on the Medieval laws of the Anglo-Scottish Marches', *SHR* lxxxi (2002); eadem, 'Remembering the Legal Past: Anglo-Scottish Border Law and Practice in the Later Middle Ages', in *North-East England*, ed. Liddy and Britnell; eadem, 'Scotland, the Percies and the Law in 1400', in *Henry IV*, ed. Dodd and Biggs.

[28] *Bower*, vii, 369–73.

of the Scottish estates in 1384, 1388, 1399 and 1402.[29] In England, relations with Scotland arguably had a less immediate or direct impact on central affairs after 1357, but were undeniably a factor in such episodes as John of Gaunt's exile following the Great Revolt of 1381; the discrediting of the Appellant regime in 1388–89, following its military failures against Scotland, as well as in France; and, into the fifteenth century, Hotspur's rebellion in 1403; and rumours of the survival of the Mammet Richard II (given refuge in Stewart Scotland) as a threat to the usurper Henry IV.[30] The question of the Scottish card in English internal politics after 1328 is surely a matter worthy of further study.

It was in just such a spirit of historical inquiry that a symposium of postgraduate and postdoctoral scholars gathered at St John's College at the University of Durham in September 2004 under the banner of 'War and Peace: New Perspectives on Anglo-Scottish Relations, *c*.1296–*c*.1406'. The resulting papers, eight of which are reproduced here, prompted discussions which served to further illuminate the complexity of Anglo-Scottish interaction in this period through a snapshot of current research. This work reflects the truism that the contemporary sources, by their very nature and survival, reveal more of the tensions and direct confrontations of the age; but it also suggests that medieval historians are now better prepared – in the light of the recent work outlined above – to probe beneath the surface to explore less well-known paths. And these reveal that relations between Englishmen and Scots could sometimes be warily friendly, or even inherently pacific, in what might otherwise seem a century of persistent and hardening conflict.

The volume begins with three papers on aspects of warfare. David Simpkin examines the organisation of the English army which Edward II led to Scotland in 1310–11, showing how the men-at-arms raised by feudal levy were fully integrated in the same retinues with those serving voluntarily or for pay; the disastrous performance of English armies in Scotland under Edward cannot therefore be attributed to their 'feudal' organisation. Iain MacInnes investigates

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[29] M. Penman, 'Parliament Lost – Parliament Regained? The Three Estates in the Reign of David II, 1329–1371', and S. Boardman, 'Coronations, Kings and Guardians: Politics, Parliaments and General Councils, 1371–1406', in *Parliament and Politics in Scotland, 1235–1560*, ed. K. M. Brown and R. J. Tanner (Edinburgh, 2004).

[30] A. Goodman, *John of Gaunt* (London, 1992), ch. 5; N. Saul, *Richard II* (London, 1997), 198–9; P. J. Eberle, 'Richard II and the Literary Arts', in *Richard II. The Art of Kingship*, ed. A. Goodman and J. L. Gillespie (Oxford, 1999), 238–9; Macdonald, *Border Bloodshed*, 149; G. Dodd, 'Richard II and the Transformation of Parliament', in *The Reign of Richard II*, ed. G. Dodd (Stroud, 2000), 75–7; P. McNiven, 'Rebellion, Sedition and the Legend of Richard II's Survival in the Reigns of Henry IV and Henry V', *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* lxxvi (1994); P. Morgan, 'Henry IV and the Shadow of Richard II', in *Crown, Government and People in the Fifteenth Century*, ed. R. E. Archer (Stroud, 1995), 9–10.

the effects of deliberately targetted 'terror' warfare on civilian populations by both English and Scottish forces in the second phase of the Wars; he details its greater impact on the rural lay populace, and how the Anglo-Balliol camp's failure to sustain such warfare after 1337 assisted the Bruce cause. Then David Caldwell argues that the main reason the Scots did not adopt artillery after *circa* 1350, following England's lead, was the unimaginative David II's desire to reassure England of his peaceful intentions.

A second group of papers then focus on aspects of identity and loyalty. Amanda Beam offers a re-evaluation of the life and career of Edward Balliol, son of King John of Scotland (1292–96). She focuses on his family heritage of close English service, lost cross-border lands and following, and his upbringing at the English royal court, to better explain his political allegiance and failed bid for the Scottish kingship. Michael Brown further develops this theme of trans-national loyalties by examining Scots in English allegiance (*Anglicati*), revealing a pattern which continued beyond the Bruce settlement by the 1330s and which saw a number of politically dissident and malcontent Scottish lords in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries preferring obedience to the English Crown. Approaching the same theme from a rather different angle, Andy King looks at the nature of cross-border relations and land-holding in the Anglo-Scottish Marches, arguing that although there were many points of contact across the border, these had little practical impact on the political allegiances of the marchers. Allied to this, Richard Oram offers a preliminary exploration of the sorely under-studied pattern of restored cross-border landholding of monastic houses and competing Border benefice provisions after 1328. He focuses on the Scottish monastic houses of Melrose, Kelso and Dryburgh to reassess historical understanding of the impact of over a generation of English occupation and, after 1378, of the Schism.

A third group of papers considers issues of policy and its expression. Sarah Layfield demonstrates that though Pope John XXII's policy towards the Anglo-Scottish dispute may have been rather hesitant and ineffectual, he was nonetheless rather more sympathetic to the Scottish position than has previously been recognised. Though anxious to avoid alienating the English Crown, his excommunication of Robert Bruce reflected the latter's contumacious treatment of his emissaries, rather than any hostility to Scottish independence *per se*, and he did little to actually further English claims to overlordship. Gwilym Dodd examines petitioning from Scotland to English parliaments, and shows that although Edward I encouraged the practice as a means of emphasising English claims of overlordship, Edward III took a rather different stance deliberately using the arrangements for receiving petitions in parliament as a diplomatic means of signalling his willingness to abandon these claims. Then, in a close linguistic analysis of chronicles and Crown documents, Andrea Ruddick looks at the tension between differing concepts of allegiance and nationality; while

the English Crown tended towards an 'allegiant' model of identity, willing to accept anyone who entered its allegiance as its subjects, many English commentators took an instinctively more 'nationalistic' approach, viewing Scottish adherents of the English Crown as inherently suspect and potentially disloyal, though neither viewpoint was applied with any great consistency. Michael Penman's study seeks to explain the political, cultural and practical reasons behind the curious absence of Anglophobic racial abuse and invective from Scottish writings of the long fourteenth century, a stark contrast to the many Scottophobic extant English chronicles, poems and songs.

To close, Anthony Goodman reflects on late-fourteenth-century episodes of acculturation, moments when the English and Scots found common grounds to 'manage' their relations, through pilgrimage, tournaments and combats and ongoing peace talks, based, in particular, on connections forged between Richard II, John of Gaunt and the Scottish comital houses of Stewart, Douglas, Dunbar and Lindsay and their followings. It is to be hoped these papers form the basis of future expanded studies and further encourage scholars in a re-evaluation of Anglo-Scottish relations in the Later Middle Ages.

The English Army and the
Scottish Campaign of 1310–1311

*David Simpkin**

T HE DEVASTATING DEFEAT of the flower of the English aristocracy at
Bannockburn in 1314 has long cast a spell over medieval military historians.
Despite the incessant warfare of the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,
large battles were rare in this period. Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish warfare
repeatedly pitched forces of unequal strength against one another, and only the
most foolhardy opponents of Edwardian conquest, such as William Wallace,
were willing to risk the lives of their fellow countrymen, and their long-term
political objectives, in full-scale engagement. Therefore it is not surprising
that this battle, which undermined the apparent invincibility of the English
heavy cavalry, and which saw an unpopular king of England being driven from
Scotland by a patriotic hero, has received so much attention from historians.[1]
Unfortunately the difficulties involved in trying to reconstruct the composi-
tion of the English army that was crushed at Bannockburn are immense. The
loss of nearly all documentation giving details of the cavalry force that served
in 1314 means that we can do little more than make informed guesses about
the size, structure and composition of Edward II's force.[2] In this paper I aim

[1] Among the major works published on the battle are: J. E. Morris, *Bannockburn*
(Cambridge, 1914); P. Christison, *Bannockburn: The Story of the Battle* (Edinburgh,
1960); Barrow, *Bruce*, ch. 12; P. Reese, *Bannockburn* (Edinburgh, 2000); W. W. C. Scott,
Bannockburn Revealed: A Reappraisal (Rothesay, 2000); A. Nusbacher, *The Battle of
Bannockburn* (Stroud, 2002).

[2] J. E. Morris observed that 'for the year 1314 almost every document has disappeared.
We have no Marshal's Register because it was not a strictly feudal campaign; we have
no Pay-Roll and no Horse-List'. Morris, *Bannockburn*, 24. The proffer roll must in fact
have been lost because the summons for the campaign was for the traditional *servicium
debitum*.

to provide a much more detailed account of an English army that served in Scotland just four years earlier, and for which the military service records are more revealing. The evidence relating to the Scottish campaign of 1310–11 might well hold the key to a better understanding of English military institutions on the eve of Bannockburn.

The invasion of Scotland in 1310 was, in its own right, a very important turning point in the series of conflicts that had begun with Edward I's attack on Berwick in the spring of 1296. No king of England had been seen north of the border for three years, and the political settlement that had been achieved in 1305 was already a distant memory. The ultimate failure of the campaign not only diminished the hopes of those northerners seeking a respite from the looming Scottish threat, but also gained Robert Bruce enough time to build up the strength of his kingship before the real hammer blow fell in 1314. Between the summer of 1311, when Edward II departed from Scotland, and the arrival of the ill-fated English army for the Bannockburn campaign three years later, Bruce, James Douglas and their followers were able to re-capture a large number of key fortresses from the occupying English garrisons. Following the sack of Perth in January 1313 the English-held castles of Buittle, Dumfries, Dalswinton, Roxburgh and Edinburgh all fell quickly into Scottish hands, enabling Bruce and his men to adopt a more aggressive stance.[3] By surviving the invasion of 1310, the Scottish king therefore strengthened his hand enormously, and gained a victory no less important than that which he later won through battle.

Edward II's motives for raising an army to go against the Scots in 1310 were questioned at the time and have been sceptically interpreted ever since, but pro-Lancastrian sentiment among many of the chroniclers should immediately put us on our guard against any unfounded criticisms. The author of the *Vita Edwardi Secundi* noted the prevailing view that Edward 'was not going at last to Scotland in order to fight Robert Bruce, but so that he might prudently avoid the king of France's summons'. The king was convinced, he went on, that if he obeyed the summons of the king of France and left his favourite Piers Gaveston in England 'in the midst of his enemies, death, imprisonment, or worse would perhaps befall him'.[4] Circumstantial evidence suggests that political motives might have played some part in Edward's decision to launch the expedition, not least because of growing unrest within the realm. The summons from Philip IV, requesting Edward to do homage for his lands in Gascony, could not have come at a worse time given the growing opposition to Edward's rule in both England and Scotland, and there is evidence that the king tried to use the Scottish expedition as a way of drawing some of the Ordainers away

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[3] Fordun, i, 346.
[4] *Vita Edwardi Secundi*, ed. W. Childs (Oxford, 2005), 23.

from London.[5] Yet only the likelihood of civil war had prevented Edward from launching campaigns in 1308 and 1309, and later in his reign the king would pass many months in the border castles of Scotland, desperately struggling to bring the country back under English control. He wintered in the castles of northern England and Scotland five times in the years between the campaign of 1310 and the inglorious conclusion to the siege of Berwick in 1319.[6] Indeed many of the problems facing the English during these years were due not to any disinclination to go to war on Edward's part, but rather to the non-cooperation and jealousies of large sections of the baronage.

Edward arrived at Berwick with Gaveston (now accorded the rank of earl of Cornwall) and two other earls, Warenne and Gloucester, at the beginning of September. The fortifications of the town and castle had been strengthened in advance, being 'enclosed with a strong and high wall and ditch'.[7] This suggests that Edward expected to stay in Scotland throughout the winter, a necessary approach given that Scottish affairs had been put on hold for the previous three years. The king's clerks had issued two forms of summons for the campaign. The first, dated 18 June, had been a request for the traditional *servicium debitum*; that is, the feudal quotas to serve for forty days at their own expense. An additional summons sent out on 2 August requested the magnates to bring with them as large a force as possible.[8] Although Michael Powicke suggested that the non-feudal summons might have been issued due to opposition to the original feudal summons, Michael Prestwich has since shown that the second summons was an addition to the first, not a replacement.[9] Whilst the first, feudal summons included ecclesiastical and female tenants-in-chief, the second, non-feudal was directed only to those male tenants-in-chief who were expected to appear at the muster in person (*in propria persona vestra*).

The response from the most important members of the Edwardian military community, the earls, was very poor; but the 42 knights and 477 sergeants sent

[5] On 21 November Edward firmly ordered one of the ecclesiastical Ordainers, Simon of Ghent, the bishop of Salisbury, to come to Berwick-upon-Tweed 'en propre persone'. This had nothing to do with feudal service as the bishop had made his proffer earlier in the autumn, and might well have been an attempt to thin the ranks of the king's opponents. *Registrum Simonis de Gandavo, diocesis Saresbiriensis 1297–1315*, ed. C. T. Flower and M. C. B. Dawes, Canterbury and York Society xl (2 vols, 1934), i, 392. The war did enable the king to draw the earl of Gloucester, one of the comital Ordainers, away from London, and one of the baronial Ordainers, William Mareschal, also appears to have served on the campaign.
[6] M. Powicke, 'Edward II and Military Obligation', *Speculum* xxxi (1956), 95.
[7] *Lanercost*, Stevenson, 214.
[8] *Parl. Writs*, II, ii, 394–5, 399.
[9] M. Powicke, *Military Obligation in Medieval England* (Oxford, 1962), 139; M. Prestwich, 'Cavalry Service in Early-Fourteenth-Century England', in *War and Government in the Middle Ages*, ed. J. Gillingham and J. C. Holt (Woodbridge, 1984), 152.