



I.B. TAURIS

TURKISH INTELLIGENCE & THE COLD WAR

THE TURKISH
SECRET SERVICE,
THE US AND THE UK

EGEMEN BEZCI

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List of Abbreviations

AFTAC	Air Force Technical Applications Center
ASA	Army Security Agency
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CHP	Republican People's Party
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
EKSA	European Kurdish Students Association
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
GC&CS	Government Code and Cypher School
GCHQ	Government Communications Headquarters
GRU	Main Intelligence Agency
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
JUSMATT	Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey
KGB	Committee for State Security
MAH	Milli Emniyet Hizmeti (National Security Service)
MGB	Ministry for State Security
MI5	Security Service
MI6	Secret Intelligence Service
MSYK	National Defence High Commission

NATIS	NATO Information Service
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIE	National Intelligence Estimates
NKGB	The People's Commissariat for State Security
NRO	National Reconnaissance Office
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
NKVD	People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PSB	Psychological Strategy Board
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SSU	Strategic Services Unit
TGS	Turkish General Staff
TKP	Communist Party of Turkey
TUSLOG	The United States Logistics Group

Introduction: Dark Origins of the Turkish-British-American Alliance

This book examines the hitherto unexplored history of Turkish secret intelligence cooperation with the United States and the United Kingdom during the early Cold War. Located at the intersection between comparative politics, international history and security studies, it shows that our understanding of the Cold War as a binary rivalry between the Western and Eastern blocs is too simple an approach and obscures the specific characteristics of intelligence cooperation between the various allies. The question is whether there can be an examination of Turkish-Western relations during the early Cold War that transcends the context of binary rivalry between East and West. Turkish decision makers used secret intelligence liaison during the early years of the Cold War to deceive and manipulate their Western partners to obtain their commitment to Turkish strategic imperatives which were not necessarily aligned with the Cold War context. This caused the Turkish-Western Alliance to be built on distrust at its inception. Shedding light on the missing dimension of the origins and development of Turkish secret intelligence during the early Cold War transforms our understanding of Turkey as an ally on NATO's Southern Flank during the crucial early period in the history of the Cold War.

There are various ways to demonstrate Ankara's distrust of her Western Allies. The literature on Turkish Foreign Policy argues that during the early Cold War, Ankara pursued an inward and passive foreign policy while widely employing a cautious approach

with a strong Western commitment during the Cold War's bipolar world order.¹ Moreover, incidents such as US President Lyndon Johnson's letter of 5 June 1964, which warned Turkey not to expect US protection should the Soviets intervene as a result of a possible Turkish intervention in the ethnic conflict between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, and the US arms embargo on Turkey following Turkish intervention in Cyprus in July 1974, proved that Ankara had compelling reasons to be wary of her Western Allies.² Therefore, this research demonstrates that in the Cold War origins of the Turkey-Western Alliance, each side showed considerable distrust of the other. Such distrust pushed Ankara to treat engagement with the West as an episodic and tactical relationship rather than as a strategic alliance. Short-term goals stemming from concrete external threats and an agenda imposed by domestic political challenges helped shape Turkey's attitude to her Western Allies.

The book also seeks to enhance our understanding of intelligence cooperation more broadly by developing a model called intelligence diplomacy. This model explores a vital, if little understood, aspect of contemporary international relations given the prevalence of transnational threats today. Intelligence diplomacy is the conduct of diplomacy to reflect an understanding obtained by intelligence activities. Intelligence diplomacy involves negotiations and the use of different aspects of joint intelligence activities and is mostly synchronized between diplomats and specialized intelligence officers. Moreover, while such efforts often result in overlap between diplomats and intelligence liaison efforts, there is an indication that the acts of intelligence services vary from the instructions of their foreign ministries. More specifically, the book argues that a pragmatic approach allows states to seek new means of influence by conducting intelligence diplomacy in order to influence crucial areas such as nuclear weapons, and to exploit cooperation in pursuit of their own national strategic imperatives. Therefore, it is important to explain initially what is meant by the term 'intelligence diplomacy' in this work.

Intelligence diplomacy

Intelligence diplomacy aims to bridge the gap between intelligence cooperation and conventional diplomacy. Diplomacy is a form of artful communication between states, or through their designated agents, to conduct foreign policy without resorting to force, law or propaganda.³ Intelligence cooperation, however, includes a variety of tools distinct from diplomacy where the use of force (such as in covert action) or propaganda is rather frequent. The distinction between intelligence cooperation and diplomacy can be identified by the nature of the conduct. Diplomacy is a medium of state behaviour in which the exchange between agents and structures must be confined within the limits of international law; thus, there is an international audience for this exchange.⁴ In intelligence cooperation, however, either the means to execute an action, or the action itself, is highly secretive and not necessarily confined by international law. Therefore, intelligence diplomacy emerges as a useful concept to cover the grey area between intelligence cooperation and conventional diplomacy.

Intelligence diplomacy is not a novel concept. Sir Stephen Lander, former Director-General of Britain's Security Service, MI5, defines the term as 'the recognition by governments that there are relationships and understanding in their intelligence communities which can be used diplomatically'.⁵ Lander argues that the conduct of intelligence diplomacy increasingly became a phenomenon in the post-Cold War era. Intelligence diplomacy has become more prominent since the disappearance of the Soviet threat, as the main enemy, has facilitated more channels and manoeuvre arenas for minor states to operate. However, this argument is a product of a Cold War historiography that undermines the agency of the minor states, and falls short of explaining certain characteristics of intelligence cooperation.

While the examination of intelligence diplomacy in the academic literature has been slim, the majority of existing studies focus on the topic as a part of intelligence liaison, referring to cooperation between

intelligence services in either multilateral or bilateral agreements by employing theoretical conclusions from international relations.⁶ Also, attention is paid in the academic world to the study of intelligence cooperation with a particular focus on the field of counterterrorism.⁷ Both streams in the literature are limited since they overlook the diplomatic ramifications of the intelligence cooperation.⁸

Recently, a remarkable contribution was made to the field by Chikara Hashimoto, who provided an analytical account of British intelligence liaisons in the Middle East during the Cold War.⁹ Although Hashimoto creates an analytical framework to demonstrate how intelligence liaison can also be used as a method of diplomatic influence in the Middle East, he encountered a methodological hurdle due to the fact that he did not exploit the archives of the regional governments, a hurdle that means his conclusions do not quite reveal the asymmetrical nature of intelligence diplomacy. In particular, Hashimoto's work does not thoroughly investigate how local governments exploited intelligence liaison as a leverage against their Western partners. It is important to take into account local particularities such as historical lessons or domestic considerations and not to discard facts for the sake of the narrative.

Particularly in the Turkish context, the spectre of the Ottoman past has haunted the memories of Turkish intelligence officers and shaped intelligence diplomacy as well. There are two important internal army studies reflecting this: The first is by Captain Sadi Koçaş (who became the deputy prime minister following the 1971 military intervention) whose *Intelligence Requirements for the Third World War* of 1959 argued that during the Gallipoli campaign in 1915, the lack of proper intelligence and the failure of the German General Otto Liman von Sander's counter strategy against the Allied amphibious operations cost the lives of 200,000 Turkish soldiers.¹⁰ This episode, showing how trusting a Western power could lead to catastrophe, was still extant in Turkish officers' minds decades later. Also, Koçaş further revealed their thinking that the Soviet Union, as a non-democratic state, was not bound by democratic procedures and the rule of law; thus, its intelligence

apparatus was more vigorous, even ruthless, in its operations. At the end of the study, he hinted that the Turks did not believe that the Western secret intelligence services were ready for the coming Third World War, which some Turkish officers saw as inevitable.¹¹ This insight from the Turkish secret intelligence perspective illustrates that the existence of a shared perception does not necessarily facilitate trust and efficient intelligence cooperation. Previous experience, and also the perception of partners' good will and capabilities, as well as the regime type of the countries involved, plays a significant role in intelligence cooperation. In this particular case of Turkish intelligence, although they saw a Third World War with the Soviets as inevitable, the imminence of a major conflict did not necessarily make Ankara trust its Western Allies.

Another illustrative internal study was written by Brigadier General İbrahim Ethem Tiryakioğlu, a former head of the Turkish Military's Intelligence School, as a response to rising Parliamentary enquiries in the mid-1960s regarding Turkish intelligence cooperation with foreign powers. His insight revealed that the weaker partners in intelligence cooperation are always concerned at being a 'stooge' or 'regional pawn' of the stronger partner in the alliance. To describe this, he used a Turkish idiom, *El verirken Kol Kaptırmak*, which translates as 'give someone an inch and he'll take a yard'.¹² And he warns that intelligence cooperation should always be coordinated with the foreign ministry, to have a synchronized approach among the institutions, and that there can never be a long-term strategic-level intelligence cooperation that would risk the minor country being reduced to a mere stooge. Thus, he adds intelligence cooperation could only be on an ad hoc basis and on a tactical level.¹³ This insight illustrates that the weaker partner in an intelligence cooperation alliance is aware of the dangers of being over-exploited by the powerful partner, and at the end being 'the errand boy' in the alliance. Thus, intelligence diplomacy necessitates a mechanism of self-protection through political leverage in order not to fall under the total hegemony of the powerful partner in the alliance. This is mainly done by using intelligence diplomacy as a political leverage mechanism.

Intelligence diplomacy also works as a means of exerting political influence on the behaviour of partners in the realms of diplomacy, the military and internal security.¹⁴ Such a leverage mechanism is well embedded in the intelligence liaison process, one of the main pillars of intelligence diplomacy. Neutral Turkey as a weaker state, for instance, provided the British with intelligence on German Abwehr agents in the Middle Eastern theatre in the Second World War, and hoped to receive economic and military aid in return.¹⁵ Similarly, assisting foreign security services through intelligence liaison can be a means of implementing foreign policy. The methods used to increase a friendly state's capacity-building can be used as a leverage mechanism in intelligence liaison, and this trade-off between military aid and intelligence gathering also constitutes an element of intelligence diplomacy. For instance, the assessment of the Soviet threat during the post-war era remained the ultimate task for the Turkish intelligence community. However, the Turkish intelligence community lacked technical capacities, methods and training for both acquiring a broad range of intelligence on the Soviet Union and conducting espionage and counter-espionage missions at home and abroad. Therefore, the Turkish intelligence community underwent a series of capacity-building initiatives via the country's mutual security arrangements with the United States and the United Kingdom. For instance, the Anglo-US alliance established several Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) posts to monitor Soviet activities.¹⁶

Western aid to increase Turkey's SIGINT capabilities reached such a point that a British agent, who took part in these capacity-building arrangements, remarked that 'Turkey's Black Sea coasts were prominent destinations for us during the Cold War before the country's Mediterranean coasts became a tourist destination.'¹⁷ He was referring to a vast network of undercover British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and American National Security Agency (NSA) bases set up along Turkey's Black Sea coast to spy on the Soviets. As the asymmetrical partner in the intelligence liaison process, Turkey both benefited from building up its capacity and was able to exploit the existence of crucial SIGINT sites on its territory as diplomatic leverage

to gain further Western commitment and economic aid for the country. For their part, the United States and the United Kingdom also used the existence of these sites for diplomatic purposes, in particular to make sure that Turkish foreign policy aligned with British and American aims in the region.

Similar methods and practices used in intelligence diplomacy during the Second World War and Cold War can also be found in contemporary counter-insurgency campaigns, where providing security training to local authorities has been essential for keeping incumbent regimes in power.¹⁸ Lander noted that operational collaboration takes place 'where there is a pressing shared need that goes beyond the capacity or capability of one country to address'.¹⁹ This was particularly obvious for Turkish intelligence diplomacy during the Cold War, as counter-subversion units in both the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) focused on communist activities in the region, and Ankara needed both training and an enhanced intelligence collection capacity to suppress the Kurdish nationalist movement in the country. Thus, the Turks used intelligence diplomacy to widen the intelligence liaison from a one-sided flow into a comprehensive mechanism designed to convince their Western partners to collaborate against the Kurdish movement.

Intelligence diplomacy also functioned as a supplement to conventional diplomatic relations. These are often termed 'clandestine diplomacy' or 'back-channels'.²⁰ Depending on the political situation in a country, an intelligence liaison channel often works as a substitute for conventional diplomacy.²¹ A recent work on the roles of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers in the Middle East shows that intelligence officers maintained a closer link with Gamal Abdul Nasser, the Egyptian President, and had more influence over him than the US Ambassador in Egypt.²² Recently in the Turkish case, Turkey's current spymaster Hakan Fidan has been visiting Washington, Baghdad and Moscow among others to engage in diplomatic affairs.²³ Yet, it is not exceptional for Ankara to use its spies to conduct diplomatic missions. As will be shown in this book, during the early Cold War Turkey's

intelligence officers regularly conducted intelligence diplomacy, and mostly acted independently from the instructions of the Turkish Foreign Office.

The role of intelligence diplomacy as a generator of influence is identified in the academic literature as part of special political action (a form of 'covert action'), and is more specifically referred to alongside 'agents of influence', whose task is to 'influence directly government policy rather than to collect information' in the intelligence liaison process.²⁴ However, intelligence diplomacy is both a tool for intelligence collection and an agent of influence. In this context, the subjects of diplomacy and special political action certainly overlap.²⁵ Additionally, looking at intelligence diplomacy as a means of exercising influence on the policy of a foreign government also raises the question of the distinction between conventional diplomacy (conducted by a diplomatic service) and secret diplomacy (by an intelligence service). Conventional diplomacy and intelligence diplomacy usually overlap when both countries engage in joint covert action, since both countries try to shape joint plans in line with their own strategic goals. However, there is a danger in this overlap since it may backfire due to tactical level differences between the countries. Moreover, negativity created at the tactical level may easily spread into the strategic dimension of diplomatic relations due to the blurred lines between intelligence and conventional diplomacy.

This is particularly true for Turkish intelligence diplomacy. The Turkish intelligence service remains among the essential tools for the country's foreign policy and security planning.²⁶ Foreign policy and security planning are derived from the assessment of threats and risks that the country confronts.²⁷ Efficiently devising a country's intelligence community as an additional influence generator is a vital task for pursuing a coherent foreign policy as a weak state and for providing intelligence to the policy makers. Blurring the lines between secret intelligence and conventional diplomacy, while examining Turkey's relations with her Western friends, requires a comprehensive archival study to reveal the characteristics of Turkish intelligence diplomacy

through empirical episodes from the early–Cold War era. However, due to the secret nature of intelligence activities, it will be useful first to examine the methodological hurdles that arise when conducting an academic enquiry into state secrets.

Secrecy and the study of intelligence

The study of secret intelligence serves to further our analysis of national security and foreign policies. Any account of foreign policy and national security that fails to consider the role of secret intelligence ‘is bound to be incomplete’.²⁸ Intelligence studies in recent decades have devoted significant attention to the topic, but most scholarly work has been produced in the Anglo-American sphere and deals with the intelligence organizations and activities of American and British governments.²⁹ The large-scale declassification of American and British archival material accelerated the production of scholarly works in the field, whilst the lack of extensive declassification outside of this sphere traditionally made a comparative approach to the study of intelligence difficult. Particularly in the last decade, partial declassification of archives in NATO, Germany, other continental European countries, as well as a few Middle Eastern countries such as Israel, has enabled some valuable efforts to broaden intelligence studies in a comparative way.³⁰ In Turkey, however, engagement with the field of intelligence studies has largely been absent. Turkish archives on intelligence-related matters have not yet been extensively declassified. Thus, the historiography of its foreign and security policy has been left without the all-important secret intelligence dimension.

Moreover, a comparative analysis of the secret intelligence machinery of the United States, the United Kingdom and Turkey reveals that, in the Turkish case, secret intelligence was more a tool for gaining political power and protecting the incumbent regime. It should be noted that in the Turkish case, the intelligence service does not completely serve as the secret police of an authoritarian regime. Literature discussing

the role of intelligence in non-democratic regimes argues that, in such regimes, the intelligence apparatus acts as a secret police with a primary focus on oppressing domestic political dissidence, protecting the party and leader, and furthermore maintaining their political power within the system.³¹ However, Turkish intelligence fits into practitioner-turned scholar from South Africa, MA van den Berg's typology of intelligence services in hybrid regimes.³² Hybrid regimes, as referred to by Thomas Carothers:

Have entered a political gray zone. They have some attributes of democratic political life, including at least limited political space for opposition parties and independent civil society, as well as regular elections and democratic constitutions. Yet they suffer from serious democratic deficits, often including poor representation of citizens' interests, low levels of political participation beyond voting, frequent abuse of the law by government officials, elections of uncertain legitimacy, and very low levels of public confidence in state institutions, and persistently poor institutional performance by the state.³³

According to van den Berg, intelligence services of the hybrid regimes can be categorized as a Political Intelligence Service.³⁴ The term 'Political Intelligence Service' is a perfect fit for the Turkish intelligence service:

[It] contains elements of both a democracy and authoritarian regime. In short, such intelligence practices are less democratic and more supportive to the political party in power which leads to a situation of politicised intelligence. More so, the focus of intelligence is more on the protection of the political regime and specifically the power elite, rather than the constitution and the welfare of the people. These services are continuously restructured and legislation amended to suit the needs of the power elite and to ensure that they remain in power. Intelligence is vulnerable to be misused as a tool against any opposition.³⁵

In the Turkish case too, secret intelligence was less important for informing policy decisions with a clear set of intelligence targets and priorities, and to develop the capabilities that Turkey needed to meet

the challenges of the Cold War. As the US National Security Council observed in 1960, 'Turkey's political problem has been one of tyranny by an unchecked majority, and what the Turkish political system requires is an appropriate set of institutional checks and balances on pure majority rule.'³⁶ Turkey, thus, fits into the definition of a hybrid regime, where there is an unconsolidated democracy based on charismatic political leadership which derives its legitimacy from elections. Turkey's intelligence community has become politicized, and vulnerable to political influences due to lack of accountability. However, in contrast to totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, in these hybrid regimes political exposure of the security services may also backfire, as was the case in Turkey in 1960. The National Security Council explained the reason for the 27 May 1960 coup d'état as follows: 'Growing indications that Menderes [the ousted Prime Minister] was preparing to use the army and the security forces to crush his opponents led a group of military officers, despite aloofness of the military from politics since the time of Atatürk, to carry out the May 1960 coup.'³⁷ This book contributes to literature on the politicization of the intelligence services by exploring a case study from Turkey. The Turkish case not only contributes to the literature on political intelligence services in hybrid regimes, but also demonstrates how the politicization on one side of the intelligence diplomacy affects the characteristics of the whole relationship.

Secret intelligence, while essential for a comprehensive study of national security and foreign policy, is also covered with a thick veil of secrecy due to the nature of the work itself. In the Anglo-American sphere, the issue of secrecy before the large-scale declassification efforts did not prevent scholars, former officials or journalists from contributing to the field.³⁸ In the Turkish case, however, the lack of memoirs from intelligence officers and the lack of specialized journalists working on security affairs have placed limits on the information available to scholars.³⁹ Academics have refrained from focusing on secret intelligence issues in this highly secretive and politicized realm, such that the official government approach has been to police the past rather than keep the record intact and inform the public. To illustrate

the point, the Turkish National Intelligence Agency published a brief but official history covering its early period until 1965, which is simply a dull government pamphlet, without any substantial contribution to the literature.⁴⁰

This book covers secret intelligence activities, as coordinated between the United Kingdom, the United States and Turkey, particularly against the Soviet Union, during the early–Cold War era between 1945 and 1960. Attention is also devoted, initially, to the interwar years and the Second World War in order to trace the origins of modern Turkey's secret intelligence apparatus and its role in security affairs and foreign policy more generally. During the era of the Cold War, the secrecy that shrouded intelligence work could never be lifted; there was a concern not to reveal essential methods, sources or details of the capacities of Western intelligence services against their Cold War adversary. Hulnick demonstrates a particular example of CIA secrecy by noting that, when the agency was established in 1947, 'the law creating the agency was suitably vague, so much so that early leaders of the CIA wondered from time to time about the limits of their charter'.⁴¹

After the end of the Cold War, secrecy over the CIA's activities was perceived as less necessary, and the agency made a partial attempt to establish a balance between secrecy and a degree of openness, while not hampering its activities.⁴² This partial attempt to expose the agency to public scrutiny enabled students of secret intelligence to conduct research on the declassified materials of the early–Cold War period. This was true not just for the CIA but, albeit to a limited extent, for other parts of the US intelligence community, such as the NSA and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).⁴³ Earlier activities of the NSA fall within the scope of this book whereas those of the NRO, founded only in 1961, do not. It is also important to note that the Army Security Agency (ASA), responsible for SIGINT activities, falls within the scope of this research since the records suggest that this agency engaged in cooperation with Turkey while it was under the supervision of the NSA and CIA. Traces of ASA's activities can be found in the relevant archives and recently surfacing memoirs of former officers. There is also recent

scholarship that suggests that the Drug Enforcement Agency engaged in high levels of cooperation during the Cold War against transnational drug and smuggling cartels. However, since crime is police work, which did not necessarily have a substantial effect on strategic intelligence and diplomacy matters, it will not form a part of this book.⁴⁴

In contrast to the partial openness in the American example, both the British and Turkish secret intelligence services, mainly the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), and the National Security Service (MAH),⁴⁵ still throw a thick veil of secrecy over the activities they undertook during the Cold War era. There may be a 'special relationship' between the US and British intelligence agencies, but in terms of their obsession with secrecy and keeping the intelligence service records sealed it is the Turks and British who share a similar attitude, summarized thus by wartime intelligence officer turned author Malcolm Muggeridge:

Secrecy is essential to intelligence as vestments and incense to a Mass, or darkness to a spiritualist seance, and must at all costs be maintained, quite irrespective of whether or not it serves any purpose.⁴⁶

The very issue of secrecy, as Joshua Rovner points out, may lead to a politicization of the intelligence by the decision makers, through knitting a layer of secrecy into the formulation of foreign and national security policy.⁴⁷ The politicization of intelligence behind closed doors creates what Rovner calls a 'pathologic relation' between the policy making and intelligence communities. Due to the secrecy and lack of public scrutiny of intelligence matters, the realm of intelligence is open to more politicization. Thus, the politicization could lead to a pathological relationship between decision makers and the intelligence community resulting in the manipulation of intelligence products to reflect policy preferences. These policy preferences are not necessarily based on a consensus on national security matters but may also reflect the political leader's domestic concern to gain more public support.

Therefore, it is crucial to address this issue at the outset. How did this perceived or accepted understanding of 'secret intelligence' shape institutions, the attitudes of intelligence consumers and producers, as

well as intelligence activities themselves? Michael Herman, intelligence practitioner-turned-scholar, argues that 'before the emergence of private newspapers and press freedom, governments tended to see all information as their property, secret to some extent; the distinction between information in the public domain and classified official information is a modern one'.⁴⁸ Similarly, in analysing the American example, Thomas Troy points out that 'by the end of the eighteenth century, when our National Intelligencer was established, the private newsletter was being dwarfed by the rise of the modern newspaper'.⁴⁹

Thus, the study of intelligence is crucially linked to the secret characteristics of the work itself. However, when the definition of secrecy has changed through the creation of a distinction between public and classified official information, a specialized institution has been required to acquire this 'necessary information' for policy formation, and to keep such information secret. Therefore, the development of national secret intelligence services as a government institution emerged due to a perceived need to handle the collection of secret information, to implement special skills for this process, and also to avoid the danger of duplication of efforts where there were different intelligence consumer institutions within the government.⁵⁰

Modern conceptualization of secret intelligence refers to three particular aspects of the process: 'a kind of secret knowledge', a 'type of organization that produces that knowledge' and 'the activity pursued by that organization'.⁵¹ In the Anglo-American sphere, secret intelligence is mainly crafted for the following aims: (1) to avoid strategic surprises, (2) to provide long-term expertise, (3) to support the policy process, and (4) to maintain the secrecy of information, needs and methods.⁵² In all these areas, secret intelligence may be defined as 'information that meets the stated and understood needs of policy makers and [that] has been collected, processed and narrowed to meet those needs'.⁵³ However, every nation employs a different, though not necessarily unique, approach to it. There is evidence that policy makers who may not be especially interested in processed intelligence may nonetheless have a tendency to see raw intelligence as a base from which their

policies derive. In the Turkish case, it has been particularly true, as the heavily politicized realm of the security institutions exploit the intelligence apparatus for domestic political gains, aided by the lack of accountability of the intelligence services. Raw intelligence provides more opportunities for manipulation and exploitation due to room for 'interpreting' its precise meaning. For instance, Turkey's first spymaster, Colonel Şükrü Ali Ögel, resigned from his post in 1941 because decision makers did not value his intelligence assessments, and because Prime Minister Refik Saydam tended to use the MAH for the surveillance of domestic political dissidents, instead of focusing on the urgent need to collect foreign intelligence during the Second World War.⁵⁴ Although this example is from the war years, the characteristics of the Turkish conceptualization of intelligence have survived long after the war, partly because there has not been any reform since then to implement a mechanism to oversee the relationship between the intelligence apparatus and policy makers.

The above conceptualization of secret intelligence has traditionally been associated with defence and foreign policy formation. However, when new methods of information collection and communication were introduced, particularly during the Second World War, other sources of secret information gathering such as Signals Intelligence, or 'non-communications' emissions such as radars, also became significant. As Aldrich states, 'With the onset of the Cold War, SIGINT seemed equally important for a dangerous new era of nuclear confrontation'.⁵⁵ Hence, this new growing and prominent aspect of secret intelligence gathering also required its own institutionalization beside the traditional human-intensive clandestine services. The later introduction of covert satellite missions also falls within the scope of this book. The CORONA mission launched by the United States in 1958 is especially noteworthy, in that it aimed to realize a comprehensive image of the United States' main Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union. Such technological advances could themselves create differences between intelligence services. As discussed in this book, both the British and the Americans felt that Ankara's perspective on intelligence failed to adapt to new methods

of intelligence gathering, instead tending to prioritize its conventional approach of relying on human agents.

The departmentalization of secret intelligence activities increased over the course of the Cold War, partly due to these new technologies. However, the finished intelligence or 'end-product' collected by the single-source or all-source agencies was still presented to policy makers through a single process, such as the National Intelligence Estimates in the United States, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in the United Kingdom or the National Security High Commission in Turkey. Over the years these specialized collation and assessment bodies became, as Johnson calls them, 'the Domino's Pizza of information delivery to high-level officials'. They developed a distinct sense of collating information and established a skilled process of rapid processing and distribution of the information through reports and briefings.⁵⁶ Ultimately, the secret information collection process within modern governments could be summarized as the gathering and analysing of political, social, biographic, economic and security-related information on state or non-state actors, without the target's cooperation or knowledge, and mostly through covert means to penetrate the target's organized secrecy.⁵⁷

The term 'intelligence', while referring to secret government activities for the collection of information, also refers to two other aspects of intelligence, which are operational rather than solely focusing on secret information collection. These are *covert operations* and *security intelligence*. During the Cold War, countries typically experienced the development of subversive activities in the domestic arena, which were connected with the foreign adversary in the eyes of their political elites and thus acquired a dual significance.⁵⁸ Security intelligence, which mainly focuses on domestic targets, took on a transnational nature because of the subversive activities encouraged by the Cold War. According to Herman, security intelligence can have some purely domestic targets as well as overseas ones, but even the domestic ones are 'foreign' in the sense of being outsiders, with an 'otherness' rejecting or threatening the state or society in some

special way. The practice of security intelligence on domestic targets, embedded with other domestic concerns, left countries such as Turkey without a necessary oversight mechanism on security affairs, leading in turn to the politicization of intelligence and a tendency to characterize political dissidents as 'outsiders'. This tended to make intelligence more about 'them' and 'us', rather than about gaining deeper self-knowledge from which to construct a more genuinely secure polity.⁵⁹ In authoritarian countries, such as Turkey between 1945 and 1960, there was no debate based on professional consideration in the intelligence process – collection, processing and production. As Bar-Joseph argues, the intelligence process is geared from the start to meet the mindset or political needs of the leader, even in the most crucial matters.⁶⁰ In the Turkish experience, a poisonous politicization of the intelligence process resulted in catastrophic incidents, such as the anti-Greek pogroms of 6–7 September 1955, or in fiascos such as Turkey's Syria policy, which brought the two countries to the brink of war in 1957. These incidents and their relation to the politicization of intelligence will be further analysed in this book.

Herman's explanation sheds light on two important dimensions of the nature of secret intelligence during the Cold War. Initially, since the nature of subversive activities during the Cold War had a transnational element, the security intelligence institutions of the various governments also sought cooperation from their allies in the overseas arena. For instance, within the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), a Western alliance centred on the Middle East during the Cold War, there was a counter-subversion mechanism of intelligence sharing among the member states' head of security intelligence agencies. A similar mechanism was implemented by the NATO Special Committee to exchange information on designated communist activities in Europe. One of the advantages of intelligence pooling via CENTO was that members shared their knowledge of communist activities, which enabled the member states to obtain a wider picture of the local threats posed by international Communism. These discussions were highly important, not only to the British and the Americans who

sought to gain an insight into the hidden, underground activities of communist movements in the region, but also to the security services of the regional powers themselves, in terms of their abilities to counter internal threats which potentially undermined the stability of their respective governments.

The subjects of information exchange included, for instance, the strength and activities of the Communist Parties in each signatory to the Treaty; propaganda broadcasts by the various radio stations of the Eastern Bloc countries, aiming to instigate subversive activities in the region; and any scheduled communist-sponsored international meetings.⁶¹ The exchanged information also included a list of known communist members in the region; a 'watch list' containing forthcoming communist and relevant non-communist meetings; and actions needed to be taken by the relevant authorities to combat them. These actions, for instance, involved making recommendations to their own authorities to refuse any applications by any individuals for exit visas in order to participate in the events.⁶²

However, such cooperation between the security intelligence services was also a highly risky process since informers were most of the time the only means of gathering information on subversive movements.⁶³ Thus, sharing secret intelligence on subversive elements even among allies could risk the exposure of sources and methods of intelligence gathering concerning subversive movements. As we will see in this book, the forming of multilateral intelligence mechanisms also required crafting an intelligence sharing mechanism that could undertake the essential tasks of preventing subversive activities in the region, as well as keeping a tight veil of secrecy over the nation's intelligence capabilities and methods. Thus, in terms of intelligence sharing, bilateral mechanisms between the United Kingdom, the United States and Turkey, or between Turkey and Middle Eastern countries, were preferred over the lengthy bureaucratic processes needed at the multilateral level. Countries also found it more convenient and effective to cooperate bilaterally to prevent any leakage or exposing their weaknesses and strengths in a multilateral setting.