

THE
CAMPAIGN OF 1866
IN
GERMANY

COMPILED BY
THE DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY HISTORY
OF THE PRUSSIAN STAFF



PREPARED AT THE TOPOGRAPHICAL AND STATISTICAL DEPARTMENT
OF THE WAR OFFICE

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TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY
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PREPARED AT
THE TOPOGRAPHICAL AND STATISTICAL DEPARTMENT
OF THE WAR OFFICE

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BOOK THE FIRST.

CHAPTER I.

DIPLOMATIC PRELIMINARIES AND PREPARATION.

THE war of 1866 between Prussia and Austria was a necessity of the history of the world; it must have sooner or later broken out. The German nation could not for ever exist in the political weakness into which it had sunk between the Latin West and the Slavonian East, since the early and glorious age of Germanic Emperors. During the centuries in which, with the exception of Italy, all the neighbouring States consolidated themselves, broke the power of their vassals, and firmly knitted together the forces of often heterogeneous races, an independence of the different parts sprung up in Germany, which condemned the whole to a state of impotence. The experiment of installing some thirty sovereignties as the constituent members of a Confederation which should take its place as an European Power, was successful neither as regarded its internal or external relations. A deep inclination towards unity was current in the whole German nation, but for the sake of unity neither were the princes prepared to sacrifice their rights nor the people their peculiarities. The experience of fifty years had shown that the goal of unity was not to be attained by means of moral advancement, but that to achieve it a physical compulsion on the part of some German Power was necessary. The gradual development of events had now left only two great European Powers in Germany, each too strong to submit to the other; on the equal balance of power of both existed the minor States in the fatherland. Germany's importance in the European world, whenever Austria and Prussia followed a mutual external policy, has always been proved by the results obtained by their alliances, but in Germany itself their interests were irreconcilable. In Germany there was not room for both, one or the other must succumb. Austria had an existence foreign from Germany. Prussia could not give up her Germanic situation without being annihilated.

During a century's apparent peace between Prussia and Austria this antagonism of the two States had never died. One of the links in the chain of contest for the leadership of Germany was the strife for the Elbe Duchies, but this was only a single symptom of the deep-seated contest which the Campaign of 1866 brought to a decision.

The United success of the Prussian and Austrian arms against Denmark in 1866 had led to the Peace of Vienna, by which King Christian IX. surrendered all his rights over the duchies of the Elbe to the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria. Further arrangements depended upon the accord of

these two sovereigns without the power of interference on the part of any third. The territory thus acquired lay entirely within the sphere of Prussia's power. Austria could claim as little title to participation therein as if Prussia and Austria together in Italy had acquired Modena and Tuscany. The expedient of a cession of the Austrian right to the Elbe Duchies in return for some other indemnity did not appear impossible, and was even sought for. The Emperor Francis Joseph was unwilling to cede his claims without a concomitant cession of territory to Austria on the part of Prussia, and against any such cession King William had openly expressed his views, so that the Duchies remained under the common administration of the two Powers. Such a system soon conduced to not only great disadvantages for the territory itself, but also to an increasing discord between the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin.

Once more the Convention of Gastein, framed in August, 1865, caused a momentary understanding: by the terms of this Convention, Lauenburg, in return for the payment of one and a-half millions of thalers, passed into the sole possession of the King of Prussia, while in future Prussia alone was to carry on the administration of Schleswig, and Austria that of Holstein; but this arrangement was only a postponement, not a definite settlement, of the question at issue.

To prevent the increase of power of her neighbour in the north, Austria strove to create a minor State of the Duchies, although she, equally with Prussia, had ever combated against the development of minor States, and brought forward as Pretender to the crown of this minor State a Pretender whom she had hitherto never recognized. This pretender was supported by a political party which Austria, no less than Prussia, had always opposed at home. The creation of a new minor State on the Eider must involve Prussia in another war; for besides that financial ruin must be the lot of a sovereign Schleswig-Holstein, its military power would never have sufficed to hold its own against Denmark, and the protection due to it from the German Confederation must always come from Prussia.

Austria had full right to expect compensation if she consented to yield her rights to Prussia; but as long as the territory was held in common, it was a breach of existing conventions that the Austrian Administration of Holstein permitted such public meetings as took place in Altona in the commencement of 1866, the direct aim of which was to transfer Holstein, which was co-possessed by Prussia, to Duke Frederic. At these meetings South German democrats encouraged the people to refuse the payment of taxes, made, with the concurring sanction of one, the most invidious attacks against the other possessor of the Duchy, and planted revolutionary ideas in an essentially conservative and loyal population.

26th January. In a note of the 26th January, the President of the Prussian Ministry protested against such a breach of the principle of

sovereignty, under the protection of the double eagle, and demanded the maintenance of the common rule of the Duchies in *statu quo*, asserting at the same time that no infringement of it would be permitted. He desired no diminution of the Austrian rights, but solely the maintenance of the rights of both Powers. He added that if the Imperial Government returned a negative or evasive answer it would be evident that it was no longer willing to act side by side with Prussia, in which case the latter would regain her full political liberty of action, and must avail herself of it in her own interest.

An answer did not come from Count Mensdorff until the 8th February, in which it was pointed out that it was Prussia's 8th February own fault that no arrangement had as yet been made with regard to the Duchies, that the Austrian administration of Holstein depended on Austrian ideas alone, but the reply was silent on the main point adduced by Prussia that this administration affected perniciously the rights of Prussia. No answer was sent to Vienna, and it appeared as if the relations between the two Cabinets would have been broken off.

In the meantime agitation continued in Holstein, and matters arrived at a crisis which might easily lead to either peace or war. It was necessary to consider whether a lasting and sincere friendship with Austria might be obtained by further concession, not in this special case alone, but in the whole Holstein question, or whether it was the policy of Vienna here, as elsewhere, to suppress Prussia, and to prevent her free development in Germany by means of the press, the elements of revolution, the power of the Confederation, overtures for an alliance with France; in fact by every possible means.

On the 28th February a council was held in Berlin, under the presidency of the King, to which, among others, the Governor of Schleswig and the Chief of the Staff of the Army were called, because, there being the possibility of a rupture, military consequences must be considered.

It is said that on this occasion everybody agreed in the view that no retraction was possible in the matter of the Elbe Duchies without a humiliation of the honour of the country, and a wounding of national feeling, and that it was necessary to proceed in the way hitherto pursued, even at the risk of a war. No warlike preparation was at this time decreed, for practically the matured organization of the army insured a proper display of military force at any time, if it were required for the defence of the fatherland, and the King's feelings were averse to an offensive war.

In Vienna also, on the 10th March, there was held a Council 10th March. of General Officers, to which General Benedek was summoned; immediately afterwards an increased activity was manifested both in the political and military departments.

On the 16th March the Cabinet of Vienna despatched to 16th March. several German Courts a secret circular note which, though at first denied, ultimately became known, holding out a prospect

of the Schleswig-Holstein question being eventually settled by the Confederation, but expressing the expectation that the VIIth, VIIIth, IXth, and Xth Corps of the Federal Army would be prepared for war and would co-operate with the Austrian forces.

All this was proposed "in case that Prussia should cause an open breach," and "with reference to Prussia's preparations for war."

The Austrian Government thus overrode the stipulations of the Conventions of Vienna and Gastein, as well as the normal relations of the Germanic Confederation, on the supposition of warlike preparations, which notoriously had not been made in Prussia, while at that time in Austria reserves had already been called in, troops had been transported from Moravia, Galicia, and Hungary to Bohemia, and the fortresses nearest the Prussian frontier had been repaired.

The distribution of the Austrian troops in the middle of March was known, it was—

	Field Battalions.	4th Battalions.	Squadrons.	Batteries.
In Bohemia:—				
Infantry	18	10	10	19
Jägers	3
In Moravia:—				
Infantry	12	4	12	10
Jägers	2
In Western Galicia:—				
Infantry	6	4	12	4
Jägers	1
Total	42	18	34	33

By the 28th March these were reinforced by—
In Bohemia—

The Brigade Ringelsheim from Cracow, namely—

The "King of Hanover" Regiment, No. 42;

The Würtemberg Regiment, No. 73;

Jäger Battalion, No. 26;

Besides the Constantine Regiment, No. 18, from Pesth;

The Regiment of Radetsky Hussars, No. 5;

The Regiment of Hesse Cassel Hussars, No. 8, from
Upper Austria.

In Galicia the seven battalions which had been moved were replaced by three field battalions which had formerly been quartered further eastwards, and three 4th battalions augmented to a war strength.

The 30th Jäger Battalion came to Teschen.

The troops in Bohemia were thus reinforced by ten battalions and ten squadrons.

Besides, there were twenty squadrons, namely,—

The Uhlans* of Archduke Charles, No. 3;

The Uhlans of the Emperor Francis Joseph, No. 6;

The Uhlans of the Archduke Charles Louis, No. 7;

The Uhlans of Count Mensdorff, No. 9;

on the march from Hungary and Siebenbürgen to Bohemia; two other regiments of Cavalry had already reached Moravia from Galicia.

All these measures could hardly be considered as solely a distribution for peace. Some, indeed, of the regiments moved to Bohemia were thus quartered in the vicinity of their recruiting districts, but on the other hand, those whose recruiting districts lay in other provinces were not removed from Bohemia. The Jewish† riots did not afford a sufficient motive either, as the troops were for the most part quartered near the Prussian frontier where such broils had never occurred. The Austrian press was cautioned to publish nothing concerning movements of troops, and this secrecy, and official denials of preparatives for war, increased distrust.

On the 28th March, a Council of State was held in Berlin, 28th March. in which, before everything else, the military situation was considered. Without reckoning the troops on the march there were now, as shown above, in the Austrian territories bordering on Silesia, 71 battalions, 44 squadrons, and 33 batteries. The Cavalry was fully prepared for war, the Artillery mustered 240 horsed pieces, and it wanted only the calling in and the very easy transport of the Reserves of the Infantry to form in those parts within a few days an army of 80,000 men. In Silesia, to face these, there were 38 battalions, 29 squadrons, 18 batteries, about 25,000 men, scattered in the garrisons ordinarily occupied in time of peace. Men on furlough and soldiers of the Reserve had not been called in, and the complement of horses of the Artillery and Cavalry was only on a peace footing.

If Prussia had had a breach with Austria in view the pretext 29th March. was thus given. But the King, rejecting all proposals for more extensive preparation, limited himself to purely defensive measures.

As Austria in peace held nine-tenths of her guns horsed and Prussia only five-eighths, the following Decrees were issued on the 29th and 31st March. The regiments of the Field Artillery of the Guard, of the IIIrd, IVth, and VIth Corps, and the 1st and Horse Division of the Vth Corps, were to be placed on a war strength by calling up the junior men on furlough and have their dépôts formed. The necessary horses were to be bought.

The battalions of regiments in the provinces immediately threatened—that is to say, those of the 12th, 11th, 9th, 5th, and 7th Divisions, as well as those of the four new regiments

* Lancers.

† Some riots took place in Prague during the early part of 1866, caused by the antagonism of the Christian population towards the Jews.

of the Guard, and of the 72nd Regiment in garrison at Torgau, were to be placed on the same peace strength as the Guard, —686 men.

The Infantry and Artillery of the VIth Corps, quartered in the Elbe Duchies, were similarly strengthened; three ammunition columns were forwarded thither by railway, and there horsed.

The fortresses of Cosel, Neisse, Glatz, Torgau, and Wittenberg, received their full war garrisons of Artillery and Pioneers, as well as the guns still necessary for their armament, while in Glogau, Spandau and Magdeburg the above-mentioned troops were raised to the strength fixed for the first mobilization period. In Cosel, Neisse, and Glatz, the batteries for sallies were horsed.

When now the Austrian Government declared that an attack upon Prussia was far removed from the ideas of the Kaiser, and expressed the hope that the Prussian Cabinet would also clearly express its disinclination for a breach of the peace, the latter could be given with a clear conscience, but it was coupled with the remark that the measures taken by Prussia had only been called forth by Austria's previous military preparations; the priority of armaments, however, the Austrian note of the 7th April steadily disputed. "No considerable concentration, no unusual purchase of horses, no recall of men on furlough to any amount worthy of notice had taken place." On the contrary, Count Mensdorff complained of measures for the preparation of "mobilization in Prussia."

It was easy to perceive the purely defensive extent of the preparations undertaken, so transparent is the organization of the Prussian Army, and so full the freedom of the Prussian press. Not a single body of troops had really been mobilized, the battalions could not leave the fortresses because no *Dépôt* and Landwehr battalions were disposable for their relief, and all that had been decreed made only a single division available for the defence of the frontier. On the other hand, it was difficult to discern what went on in Austria. It is true that the reports of preparations there may have been manifoldly exaggerated, but there were no means afforded to test their veracity. All assertions coincided in stating that men on furlough had been called in, that numerous military trains had been despatched to the north, and that at the least the 4th Battalions had been placed on a war footing.

As the Austrian note of the 7th April regretted that no news had been received that in consequence of the peaceable declarations of the Kaiser the Prussian "order for mobilization" of the 28th March had not been put into execution, the Prussian Cabinet, on the 15th April, sent a message to say that first the distribution of troops acknowledged by Austria and similar measures undertaken before any preparation was made on the Prussian side should be repealed.

On the 18th April, in reply, Count Mensdorff declared that,

in order to afford satisfactory results to the exchange of friendly declarations on either side, His Majesty the Kaiser was prepared to repeal the distribution as yet ordered, and such measures as had been taken towards preparing the army for war, by an order of the 25th of that month, provided that the Court of Berlin would promise to issue on the same or the following day an order to place all its forces on a peace footing.

The Prussian Cabinet entered into this proposal. It promised on the 21st April to cancel any preparations undertaken in the same proportion as the Austrian Court did the measures which had caused them. As the disarmaments went on communication was requested, so as to allow matters on the Prussian side to proceed in equal degrees. The expectation was also expressed that the other German States should cancel their preparations. So for a time it appeared as if the threatening danger of war was to pass over, but this episode did not long endure. 21st April.

Even before the arrival of the Prussian answer in Vienna the *Abendpost* announced: "The Imperial Government will "under all circumstances adhere to the programme which "will lead to a solution of pending questions on the basis of "the national interest and the necessities of the German "people." These ambiguous phrases were explained by a despatch from Count Mensdorff, dated the 26th April, which proposed, in consideration of certain advantages to Prussia, to yield the Elbe Duchies to the pretender to them who could show the best title, and that the Germanic Confederation should decide upon who this should be. Such a decision could only be valid if both possessors consented thereto. Not the less Austria declared her intention alone to pursue this policy in default of a common agreement. A fresh despatch ensued in relation to the question of disarmament after the term fixed for its commencement had elapsed.

His Majesty the Emperor, as Count Mensdorff wrote on the same 26th April, was fully ready to cancel the order for the reinforcement of the garrisons of Bohemia, but it appeared from the latest intelligence from Italy that the latter State contemplated an attack on Venetia. It was therefore necessary to increase the means of defence of the empire in another direction, and to place the Austrian Army in Italy on a war footing, which could not be done without considerable movement of troops in the interior of the empire, which, however, would not prevent the Prussian Government from reducing its mobilized corps. If these two despatches were placed side by side, the result would be that while Prussia disarmed, the middle German States, under Austria's presidency, and influenced by the democratic current of feeling in favour of the Prince of Augustenberg, would decide on Prussia's right to the Duchies, and Austria would have time and leisure to put as much of her army as she liked on a war footing undisturbedly. It was immaterial whether this was done in Bohemia, as was hitherto

the case, or in Hungary or Illyria, in either case a strong army would be quickly assembled on the Lower Po or the Upper Elbe. In the latter case the Prussian Army had not only to make the necessary march, but to be previously mobilized, and must necessarily arrive too late for the occasion.

It could hardly have been believed in Vienna that the Prussian Cabinet would agree to such a proposition. There arose in Berlin a deep and general distrust of the neighbouring Power, the more so as it was well known that Italy was at that time by no means prepared for war. The less security Prussia found in the German Confederation the more was she compelled to seek for an ally elsewhere. Such a one was Italy, either with or without an express treaty of alliance. War between the two German Powers offered to King Victor Emmanuel the opportunity which he could not well slip if he wished ever to make good his claims to Venetia. Prussia indeed naturally wished that Italy should be prepared to act in case of war against such a formidable enemy as Austria, but could not expect that she would arm only in case of an eventuality. The Cabinet of Florence must naturally in its own interest be assured that the armies of both States were at the same time prepared for war, for this Prussia could fix no given period, because she did not contemplate an attack on Austria. Under these circumstances it is manifest that hitherto only general stipulations could be discussed with General Govone, the Italian envoy to Berlin. The despatches of the 26th April gave a new energy to these negotiations, in which full care was taken of the interests of Germany, and as Austria had caused the first preparations on the part of Prussia, so she now called those of Italy into action.

In his answer to the Austrian despatch, Count Bismarck expressed his opinion that according to the ideas of the Prussian Government Austria had no cause to prepare for war to defend herself against Italy, and that Prussia could not enter into the impending, so important, negotiations with the Imperial Government, unless a perfectly equal footing were maintained in the war preparation of both powers.

30th April.

On the 30th April, Count Mensdorff declared that in consequence of this declaration the Austrian Cabinet must regard the negotiations for a *pari passu* disarmament as void of effect.

It is now necessary to cast a glance on the attitude of the other German Powers.

Prussia had, in a circular despatch of the 24th March, asked the German Courts what assistance she might expect from them in case of being attacked by Austria, and at the same time had pointed out the necessity of a reform of the Germanic Confederation. The answers thereto were evasive and referred, with regard to the desired assistance, to the 11th Article of the Constitution of the Confederation: Herr Von Beust,* especially in a note of the 6th April, expressed the view

* At this time Herr Von Beust was Prime Minister of Saxony.

that, to remove the threatening dangers, the application of the existing laws of the Bund alone was necessary.

According to this article, Austria and Prussia should bring their disputes before the Diet, which should endeavour to mediate by means of a committee, and if that failed the matter in dispute should be decided by the Confederation, which should compel the obedience of the disputing parties.

The paragraph referred to leaves nothing to be desired with regard to clearness, but does not state what is to be done if, as was here the case, the two conflicting parties—here two European Powers—could not be compelled to obedience.

It is hardly credible that statesmen could have expected that the course of affairs would rest quiescent until a well-ordered Committee of the Confederation had declared its decree. The result was much more calculated to demonstrate how rotten was the whole constitution of the Confederation unless it were supported by the common action of Austria and Prussia.

The present moment was not considered convenient for a reform of this constitution; but no other opportunity had ever been found which appeared to the various Courts suitable. Prussia reverted, in a further despatch of the 11th April, to the question of reform. After giving the outlines of the proposed reform she recommended an immediate assembly of a common Parliament as the sole still remaining means of preserving peace.

Among the Middle States, Würtemberg, and particularly Saxony, had lately assumed a hostile attitude towards Prussia. In that State recruits had been called in as early as March, and the purchase of horses had been ordered.

If it had been possible for Saxony to maintain neutrality it would willingly have been accepted by Prussia, as the Marks and Berlin would thereby have been covered from every attack. But the case to be considered was rather that if Saxony desired to remain neutral, whether her neutrality would be respected. The Saxon arms could insure the security of that country neither against Austria nor against Prussia, they rather compelled her to assume the cause of one or the other side. It must be conceded that the Saxon Government lay in a very difficult position between the two contending Powers. But it was the grossest political error to foment their quarrel. The Middle States could hardly doubt that their separate existence, at least in their present independent state, was seriously threatened if a breach of the peace occurred, and perhaps not least if Austria gained the upper hand.

When the Cabinet of Berlin now threatened Saxony with corresponding measures on account of her preparations, Herr Von Beust appealed to the Confederation, in order through it to demand a promise from Prussia that would accommodate herself to the 11th Article.

On the 9th May ten votes, among which was Hanover, declared themselves in favour of the motion.

What could be the result of such a step? All the Governments had solemnly declared that they contemplated no attack; but all armed, even those who declared that, from the theoretical view of the German Confederation, a war was impossible, and whose armaments were consequently a breach of the Confederation. Prussia notoriously only armed unwillingly and *pari passu* with the other armaments. Notwithstanding, the majority of the members of the Confederation called, not upon Austria and Saxony, but upon Prussia to abstain from violating the peace. This declaration showed what Prussia had to expect from the Middle States, and how she must, with all energy, take precautions for her own safety.

As far as Cabinets foreign from Germany were composed, there were no signs that they would not hold themselves apart from any struggle between Austria and Prussia.

Denmark had not armed, and from France, at least, immediately, a well-meaning friendly neutrality might be anticipated.

Strengthening of Prussia to the extent that apprehension of her western neighbour would no longer induce her to lean unconditionally towards Russia or Austria was not antagonistic to the interests of France.

The establishment of a fleet of the second class would be pleasing to France, as it would aid in the balance of the command of the sea against the existing monopoly of England.

Napoleon's policy, since the commencement of his reign, had been friendly towards Prussia; but it was necessary to expect that in the course of events he could not remain an impartial spectator, and the prospect of his ultimate interference was a danger not to Prussia individually, but to Germany universally, if the latter were not first united.

To this reflection, and to the decided aversion of the King to wage war except for the honour and safety of Prussia, it must be ascribed that from March to May, no further defensive measures were undertaken.

In the meantime the Austrian armaments had uninterruptedly continued.

The Infantry regiments quartered in Bohemia, Moravia, and Western Galicia, as well as the greatest part of the 4th Battalions, had been augmented to a war strength; the carriages of the former had been horsed, and the depôts (200 men in strength) had been formed.

Two regiments of Hussars from Galicia, and three regiments of Uhlans from Hungary and Transylvania had been moved into Bohemia and Moravia. The ammunition wagons of the Artillery had also been horsed.

Theresienstadt and Josephstadt had been armed, and a strained activity had been apparent in the strengthening of Cracow and Königgrätz.

Troops had been assembled in Pesth, Vienna, and Laybach.

The border regiments had, by being placed on a war footing, supplied an available reserve of 40 battalions.

The recall of men on furlough of all arms, as well as of the Transport Train, caused the Austrian armaments, in the beginning of May, to appear nearly complete; they had already thus an advantage of five weeks, and Silesia and the Marks lay defenceless.

Such was the condition of affairs when the two despatches already mentioned (the 26th of April) reached Berlin.

The Councillors of the Crown now expressed their opinion that immediate measures should be taken to guard the honour, security, and independence of Prussia. The mobilization of the Prussian Army is a measure which interferes with all civil, as well as military, relations, and makes a deep impression both on public and private life, both on the palace and the cottage. But it is so fully prepared in peace, and organized in the minutest detail, that a superior order alone is necessary to cause it to be fully completed in a quite regulated period.

A partial or successive mobilization is more complicated and difficult for the executive authorities; it necessitates special regulations, which must differ from those already laid down.

A General Order from the Cabinet, on the 3rd May, ordered a preparation for war of the whole of the Cavalry of the Line, and of the Artillery, but of the Infantry only in the territories immediately menaced—that is to say, in the VIth, Vth, IIIrd, and IVth Corps d'Armée. In these, as well as in the corps of the Guards, the battalions of Infantry, Jägers, and pioneers were augmented to a complete war strength, and the necessary dépôts were formed. It was only in the districts occupied by the Vth and VIth Corps that the Landwehr were called upon, and then only in small numbers, to furnish the necessary garrisons of the fortresses.

Of old it was possible to prepare the Prussian Army for war without actually calling it into action. This can hardly ever now be the case. In 1866, certainly, everyone was convinced that if the Army in its entirety was once called out it could not be dismissed without a struggle. The mobilization of the Army was then in fact war, and for that very reason every possible delay was made in speaking the decisive word, for even in May the hope that hostilities might still with honour be avoided had not been entirely abandoned.

It cannot be doubted that the decided declarations of both the Emperor Francis Joseph and King William were intended to be honestly acted up to. But Austria could well foster the hope that, by her political and military display of strength, Prussia, as in 1850, might be forced into compliance with her demands. The handing over of the question of the Elbe Duchies to the Confederation won popular opinion, led by democracy, in the small and Middle States; and the Princes, fearing a diminution of their power from Berlin, hung towards Vienna. None of the members of the Confederation had as yet declared for Prussia. The

latter stood totally isolated in Germany among estranged or neutral neighbours. Internal affairs also appeared to throw great difficulties in the way of the Prussian Government. The re-organization of the Army had been carried out in opposition to the majority of the House of Deputies, which also refused the financial means for carrying on a war. Representatives of the Prussian people, in public speeches, advanced the cause of the Augustenburg Pretender. Public meetings passed resolutions hostile to the Government, and petitions came in from different parts of the kingdom, which begged the King, very unnecessarily, to preserve peace.

But Austria deceived herself concerning the military strength of Prussia, which afterwards showed itself a match for all its enemies. Austria deceived herself concerning the real opinion of the Prussian people, which had not been expressed in party speeches. Men of the Reserve and Landwehr joined the ranks, it is true, without enthusiasm for a war the cause of which they did not comprehend, but obediently and with a calm resolve. The Austrian preparations had convinced the multitude that the measures adopted were unavoidable; and the personality of the King was a warrant that the country would not, except in case of the most urgent necessity, be exposed to the costs of war. Austria also deceived herself in the firmness of the King and his Councils, whom neither the threat nor the actual danger of war would ever have induced to allow Prussia to be thrust back into her former position, in which she played the second part in Germany, and no part at all in Europe.

But although an offensive war may have never been originally contemplated by either one side or the other, the preparations of the one compelled new gradations in those of the other, until both reached a pitch which must infallibly lead to a breach.

The order of the Cabinet of the 3rd May was quickly followed by others of the 5th, 7th, 8th, 10th, and 12th May, the general result of which was to call out the whole Field Army.

The troops of all branches of the Service were filled up to war strength by the youngest men of the Reserve, the *Depôts* were formed, and as far as necessary completed by the introduction of recruits.

The regiments in the Elbe Duchies, and in the fortresses on the Rhine were also mobilized, but no transgression of the garrison arranged by Treaty for the federal fortresses was allowed, as the number of battalions were there either correspondingly diminished, or the men required for their augmentation were held back.

Finally, the pontoon trains of the Guard, of the IInd, IIIrd, Vth and VIth Corps d'Armée were mobilized, as well as six light field bridge trains, and four field telegraph divisions.

Of the Landwehr in Silesia and Posen, at first, only *cadres* of 300 men had been called up. These 24 battalions were

increased to an individual strength of 806 men, and besides, for the defence of the threatened frontier, four regiments of Landwehr (Cavalry, the 2nd and the 6th Landwehr Hussars, and the 1st and 2nd Regiments of Landwehr Uhlans were mobilized.

As in the majority of the fortresses only the ordinary peace garrison duty had to be performed, it was deemed admissible to employ part of the Landwehr for other purposes. There were, therefore, in the territory of the IInd Corps, the 9th and 21st Landwehr Regiments; in that of the VIIth Corps, the 13th and 15th Landwehr Regiments, as well as the 12 Battalions of the Landwehr of the Guard—in all 24 battalions,—raised to the strength of 806 men, mobilized and armed with needle-guns. Besides, the 7th Regiment of Landwehr Heavy Cavalry, the 2nd Regiment of Landwehr Dragoons, the 1st, 5th, and 10th Regi- 20th May. ments of Landwehr Hussars, and the 3rd, 4th, and 8th Regiments of Landwehr Uhlans; altogether 32 squadrons of Landwehr were mobilized; the 16th and 17th Regiments of Landwehr were increased to 806 men, but without being mobilized.

All other battalions of Landwehr intended for the garrisons of fortresses were formed of a strength of only 500 men, and were armed with Minié rifles.

The full power of the country, especially in Cavalry, was not yet exerted.

Besides the fortresses of Cosel, Neisse, Glatz, Torgau and Wittenberg, Magdeburg and Spandau were also armed against a *coup de main*, and provided with a full complement of artillerymen and pioneers. The batteries for sallies were horsed, and the detachments of garrison cavalry formed.

Glogau, Coblenz, Cologne, Wesel, Stettin, and Dantzic, as well as Sonderburg, received the first augmentation of garrison gunners and pioneers. Glogau was afterwards armed against a *coup de main*. The maritime station of Kiel was also strengthened, and the marine battalion increased to a war strength.

Pari passu with the Prussian preparations, those in Austria, Saxony, Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Hanover had gone forward. From the last State a distinct declaration of their purpose was demanded, as a hostile action on the part of Hanover could have severed the communications between the two halves of the Prussian monarchy.

On the 20th May eight of the Middle States, of which two had armed, proposed a general disarmament. This motion, however, naturally had no effect on the course of affairs. More important was the proposition made by France, Great Britain, and Russia, on the 27th May, to Austria, Prussia, Italy, and the Germanic Confederation, to take part in negotiations at Paris for the preservation of peace.

Prussia consented to this proposition without reserve; Austria coupled her possible compliance therewith with the condition that every combination should be set aside from dis-

cussion which might lead to the increase of the territorial power of any State which took part in the negotiations—a condition which, to be satisfied, required that everything
 2nd June. should remain in the existing state of suspense. Austria besides declared that she could make no alteration in the attitude she had assumed towards the Government of Victor Emanuel, and demanded further that the Papal Government should be represented in negotiations concerning the “Italian question.” The endeavours of foreign Powers for the preservation of peace could after this be only regarded as of no avail.

Although Austria, by the 1st June, had already placed the entire decision of the question of the Elbe Duchies in the hands of the Confederation, and so withdrawn from the Convention of Gastein, she still on the 5th ordered her Commissioner in Holstein to assemble the Estates of that Duchy on the 11th. In consequence of the exercise of this one-sided act of sovereignty Prussia declared that she now considered the Convention of Gastein as cancelled, that she returned to the basis of the Treaty
 5th June. of Vienna, and had entrusted the guardianship of her common rights to the Governor of the Duchy of Schleswig.

The strife hitherto carried on in the form of negotiations appeared now to be immediately trenching on the field of active hostilities.

Not less urgent were affairs in the Federal fortresses which were occupied in common. The troops on both sides, in those places, preserved chivalrously an outwardly friendly attitude; but most bloody and tragical conflicts must necessarily ensue between the equally strong contingents if matters came to an open breach between the two Governments, and this was possible at any moment. A shot fired in Holstein would suffice for this.

It must then be considered as a fortunate solution of this difficulty that a motion proposed by Prussia, and seconded by Bavaria, was accepted by the Confederation. The result of this motion was that the Prussian as well as the Austrian troops were withdrawn from Mayence, Frankfort, and Rastadt, and replaced by troops belonging to other States of the Confederation. Mayence was to be guarded by Bavaria, Weimar, Meiningen, Anhalt, Schwarzburg, Lieppe, and Detmold; Rastadt by Baden, Altenburg, Gotha, Waldeck, and Reuss; and in Frankfort one Bavarian battalion was to remain. In Rendsburg and Kiel also, the friendly relations which were preserved to the last moment between the Governor of Schleswig and the Commissioner of Holstein prevented collisions between the troops on either side, which might have easily occurred, and which could be of no use.

In the meantime the political situation had entered upon a stage which left no hope of a peaceful issue. On the 5th June (the day on which the last trains of Prussian troops reached the frontiers of the Marks and Saxony, and of Silesia and Bohemia,

and so eight and a half corps ready for action were there assembled) the order was issued by which Lieut. Field-Marshal Von Gablenz, by desire of the Emperor of Austria, summoned the Estates of the Duchy of Holstein to meet on the 11th at Itzehoe. No more unfortunate instant could have been selected. On the following day General Van Manteuffel, in accordance with his instructions, declared this one-sided summons to be an encroachment on the rights of the King of Prussia, and requested the Austrian Commissioner to recall it. He at the same time communicated to him, that, in execution of the revived right of Prussia to a share in the occupation of Holstein, he would occupy some places in that Duchy not held by garrisons, and would next morning enter Holstein for that purpose.

It was requested that the authorities of those places should be furnished with the necessary instructions, in order to avoid conflicts; and it was enunciated that this step was one of a purely defensive character.

In his answer, which was sent by return of post, Lieut. Field-Marshal Von Gablenz declined to withdraw the summons for the assembly of the Estates which had been issued by order of the Emperor; protested against the contemplated inroad, which he on his side declared to be a violation of the Convention of Gastein; and at the same time indicated that he would remove the seat of the Government of the district to Altona.

In the meantime General Von Manteuffel had concentrated his troops opposite Rendsburg. This fortress had a Prussian Commandant, and the Prussian garrison therein was superior to the Austrian; consequently the passage of the Eider at that point, which afforded immense advantages by being the key of the road and railway communication with Itzehoe and Altona, was assured under all circumstances; orders had also already been issued for the most rapid assembly of troops possible on that point. On the evening of the 6th, the corps (which mustered 12,000 men, including the garrison of the fortress, and consisted of 11 battalions, 6 squadrons, and 4 batteries) stood *echeloned* on the road between Schleswig and Rendsburg. Only one battalion remained in garrison at Sonderburg, which was provisioned for three months for 8,000 men and 600 horses. Two squadrons were in Lauenburg.

In Holstein there was of Austrian troops only the Kalik brigade, which mustered about 4,800 men, viz., two regiments of Infantry, one battalion of Rifles, two squadrons, and one battery.

Lieut. Field-Marshal Von Gablenz was therefore not in a position to oppose the inroad of General Von Manteuffel with a much superior force of troops. He could reckon on no support from Austrian reinforcements, and the artificially excited enthusiasm of the Holsteiners for the Duke was far removed from such intensity as to provoke an effective action on the part of the population. Lieut. Field-Marshal Von Gablenz therefore

pursued the only course that the situation in which his Government had placed him allowed, and immediately withdrew all his troops in the direction of Altona.

7th June. At daybreak on the 7th June, the Austrian garrison, conducted by the Prussian officers, quitted Rendsburg, and a few hours later General Manteuffel crossed the Eider. The head of his column advanced to Brinjahe, two German miles further on the road to Itzehoe. The troops were ordered not to disturb places occupied by the Austrians, and to avoid any conflict.

8th and 9th June. On the 8th the advanced guard reached Neuenkrug, and on the 9th Grönland. The main body occupied Itzehoe.

Since the protest against the assembly of the Estates by Austria had remained disregarded, Prussia now assumed the administration of the government of Holstein also. The Government of the Duchies which had hitherto existed was dissolved, and Baron Von Scheel-Plessen was entrusted, as President, with the administration of both Duchies.

10th June. On the 10th June the troops rested. In the course of this day the Estates of Holstein assembled at Itzehoe, and were collected in considerable numbers.

General Van Manteuffel had orders to prevent their meeting. The most considerate method of doing so appeared to be the removal of the Imperial Commissioner, who was to open the assembly on the following day. He was accordingly compelled to withdraw to Rendsburg during the night, and to remain there for the next few days.

11th June. The Deputies, in consequence, quitted Itzehoe on the 11th, without any open breach of the peace. The population remained altogether passive. The same day General Von Manteuffel pursued his march on Altona, reached Borstell and Thimen, and occupied Pinneberg. On the approach of the Prussians the Austrians, who were quartered round Altona, withdrew all their troops into the interior of this town. In the meantime the 16th and 17th Regiments of Prussian Landwehr, which were destined as depôt troops for the Duchy of Schleswig, and had been moved into Lauenberg, had there united with the two squadrons of the 6th Regiment of Magdeburg Dragoons, and had been set in motion on Altona, so that, mustering 5,000 men, they had already reached the vicinity of New Balsdorf, one march from Altona.

The position of Lieut. Field-Marshal Von Gablenz had become extremely difficult. Circumstances threatened that at any time there might be a conflict. On the Elbe, near Altona, there lay the Prussian armour-plated ship "Arminius," and several gunboats. If war were declared, the Brigade Kalik stood opposite to three times its strength, without any possible retreat.

12th June. Under these circumstances Lieut. Field-Marshal Von Gablenz made a speedy resolve and crossed in the night between the 11th and 12th with his troops to Harburg, whence in the next few days they were transported by railway to Southern Germany.

General Von Manteuffel on the 12th entered Altona; the detachment coming from Lauenburg occupied Wandsbeck.

The operations of General Manteuffel were so arranged and conducted with so large a force that they relieved the weak Austrian brigade from the necessity of a conflict for the honour of its arms, and it was a fortunate solution that no bloodshed ensued between Austrians and Prussians on the same ground that they had occupied as friends and allies.

As Austria was thus compelled to relinquish the Duchies without a struggle, it was the more certain that she would enforce her claims on another field. A more decisive step was now made. The Austrian Cabinet declared that Prussia by the invasion of Holstein had broken the peace of the Confederation, and on these grounds proposed to the Bund on the 11th the mobilization within fourteen days of all federal corps which did not appertain to Prussia. This was the virtual dissolution of the Confederation, since one portion thereof declared war against another.

This motion which, according to the constitution of the Bund, was untenable, and against the rapid entertainment of which the Prussian envoy energetically protested, was put to the vote in the memorable sitting of the 14th June. Prussia 14th June. took no part, and there was no vote for Holstein Lauenburg.

There voted with Austria, Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, Würtemberg, the two Hesses, the 13th and the 16th Curiae.

With regard to the last the voting Deputy declared that he had not sufficient instructions, but, nevertheless, gave a vote against Prussia. It was immediately disavowed by his Government, but the President of the Diet had decided that the motion was carried by nine votes against six.

The Prussian envoy left the assembly after declaring that his Government considered the Germanic Confederation as dissolved, but still adhered to the unity of the German nation, and was ready to conclude a new Confederation on the basis of the proposal for reform of the 10th June, with such Governments as were inclined to enter into it.

The majority of the Middle and minor States had pronounced their own judgment. Countries, especially such as lay intruded between the two halves of the Prussian State, could not possibly deceive themselves on the consequences of a hostile attitude towards Prussia.

In consequence of the entrance of the Prussian troops into Holstein, on the 12th June, the Imperial Ambassador was recalled from the Court of Berlin; the Prussian quitted Vienna a few days later, and diplomatic intercourse between the two Powers was broken off. On the 15th June, the day after 15th June. voting in the Diet, the Prussian ambassadors at Dresden, Hanover, and Cassel, delivered similar notes, in which the neutrality of their territories and a guarantee of the sovereign rights of the Princes were offered to both Kings, and to the Elector, if they would agree to the proposal of reform of the

10th June. The period allowed for the replies to these notes was till the evening of the same day.

The Saxon Government immediately declined the proposal, and as no peaceful answers were received by midnight from the two other Powers, the three ambassadors declared war against Saxony, Hanover, and Electoral Hesse.

CHAPTER II.

CONCENTRATION AND FIRST MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMIES.

THE Prussian Staff had estimated the probable strength of the Austrian Army of the North at 240,000 men, a calculation which afterwards proved very near the truth.

It could be easily foreseen that in the approaching war Austria would make every exertion to enter into the struggle as strong as possible in Germany.

Supported in Italy on the Quadrilateral, she was able, by making short offensive movements, to act on the defensive for a long time with but comparatively trifling forces. The Italians could hardly be suspected capable of difficult or lengthy sieges. They could less reckon on directly acquiring Venetia by the power of their own arms than on gaining the possession thereof, if the general operations of the war compelled Austria to resign it.

The decisive blows, however, which could alone induce her to do so, must, in all probability, be struck not south of the Alps, but north of the Danube.

It was known that the Austrian Army was formed in ten Corps d'Armée, of which the Vth, VIth, and IXth were being concentrated against Italy.

• As far as very defective intelligence could be relied upon, towards the middle of May there were stationed—

The Austrian Ist Corps in Northern Bohemia, along the frontiers of Saxony and Silesia, from Komothau to Wildenschwerdt.

The IInd Corps in Moravia and Austrian Silesia, from Wildenschwerdt to Oswiecim.

The IVth Corps in Western Galicia.

The mobilization of all other parts of the Army in their stationary quarters was so far advanced that it might almost be regarded as completed. The formation of the staff of each Corps d'Armée, as well as of the head-quarters, was complete, and Feldzeugmeister Benedek had come to Vienna on the 12th May after he had given over the command of the Southern Army to the Archduke Albrecht. All preparations for the movement by railway of the masses of troops which had been

assembled at Pesth, Vienna, and Laibach had been made, and the systematical transport of soldiery had commenced on the 11th May. By means of much exertion, a considerable number of men, both of Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Transport Corps could, by the expiration of the month, be assembled, both on the Saxon and the Silesian frontier. The Cavalry for some time had been marching in these directions. On the side of Prussia at the same time, the middle of May, the orders for mobilization had only just been issued. The troops were quartered in their ordinary peace garrisons, and were awaiting their reinforcements of men and horses. The transport of one Corps d'Armée with its appurtenances (whether for a long or a short time) requires from nine to twelve days if all ordinary traffic is not suspended, and if a few trains of the Intendance were allowed daily to pass along the line. Thus it could be precisely calculated that the arrival of the Corps d'Armée from the different parts of the monarchy on the frontier could not be accomplished earlier than the first week in June.

This result even could only be achieved if all through lines of rail were used, and if none of them transported more than one Corps d'Armée, since each successive Corps would cause a delay of from nine to twelve days.

The corps of which the mobilization had been first decreed were ordered to assemble on the 8th May as follows:—

- The VIth at Neisse,
- „ Vth at Schweidnitz,
- „ VIIIth at Coblenz,
- „ IIIrd and IVth between Torgau and Cottbus.

Of the last Corps the 8th Division remained at Erfurt until the armament of that place had been accomplished, and the 32nd Brigade of Infantry was concentrated at Wetzlar.

The Corps of the Guards was to assemble at Berlin, the 13th Division of the VIIth Corps at Minden and Bielefeld, and the 14th Division at Münster and Hamm.

As a general rule such concentrations of large bodies of troops previous to their transport are not advisable. They practically make the future transport more difficult than if the troops are marched direct from their garrison to the suitable points of embarkation. But under existing circumstances the first strategical positions of the army could not yet be fixed. It was as yet hardly known who in the approaching conflict would be friend or foe. It was still hoped that Southern Germany, led by Bavaria, would assume a favourable, or at least a neutral attitude towards Prussia, and negotiations still pended with Hanover and Hesse Cassel likewise.

As was shown in the previous sketch, circumstances became even more serious in the course of the month. Prussia had to recognize that in the war which threatened she must be all alone and dependent solely upon herself, and would have, besides Austria, all the States of the Confederation against her.

Under these circumstances there could be assembled by—

North Germany about	36,000 men.
Southern Germany about	100,000 ,,
The Austrians and Saxons.. ..	264,000 ,,

These three hostile groups had a very different value. Hanover and Electoral Hesse could be in the highest degree inconvenient, if they were left unobserved in rear, as they severed all communications with the Rhine and with the Elbe Duchies. Still it was open to question whether these would commit themselves to the chance of open hostilities, in any case it was tolerably certain that their possible concentration could be prevented, and accordingly, the actual loss of time which might thereby be occasioned was all that was to be considered.

The Southern Germans were, notwithstanding all the preparations which had taken place in Württemberg, Bavaria, and Hesse Darmstadt, a not very formidable foe. It was known how little in peace they were prepared for war. The want of a single guidance and organization bespoke little results from those troops, which were good in themselves, and it was to be expected that they would only commence their action late and dissevered. In this direction the most secure action was an offensive one, which should employ them in their own territories.

The third group, however, stood a strong well-organized Army already prepared for battle.

There lay the key of the whole question. A victory over the Austrian Army must paralyze all other enemies, but the seven corps of the eastern monarchy did not suffice to assemble the forces necessary thereto. If the two western corps were drawn to the main decision, the Rhine provinces would remain palpably undefended; and it would be possible to oppose only a very inferior strength to the Southern Germans.

Nevertheless, His Majesty the King came to this difficult decision, which was, however, crowned with fortunate results, by which alone it was afterwards possible to enter in sufficient might on the spot where the main question was to be decided, and even to approach the hostile capital. The strong fortresses of the Rhine provinces, sufficiently garrisoned by Landwehr, could not indeed prevent an invasion of that territory, but could prevent an enemy from there firmly establishing himself. If victory could be won in the east, it would be easy to regain anything that had been lost in the west.

In order to prevent, as far as possible, a hostile invasion of this territory, a special army was formed out of a portion of the troops in Schleswig-Holstein, and from the regiments destined for the defence of the fortresses, to which the 13th Division of Infantry was attached as a nucleus. The latter could in a very short time be assembled from its cantonments around Minden, in the immediate neighbourhood of the Hanoverian capital.

It could be calculated that if Hanover and Hesse Cassel were disarmed, this army could proceed against Bavaria. This improvised army had a twofold superiority against it, and must by energy and rapidity retrieve its want in strength.

The next consideration was now to determine where the important strength of troops destined for the eastern theatre of war should be assembled, and whither they should be transported.

The outposts of the first Austrian Army were placed near Tetschen, Reichenberg, and Trautenau. Under cover of these, on one of these three points, 60,000 to 80,000 could, by aid of the existing railways be assembled; this force would not suffice to carry out a real offensive war against Prussia, but could seriously threaten either Berlin or Breslau. In the one direction stood the Saxon Army as a powerful advanced guard only six or seven marches distant from the Prussian capital, which is protected against the south by no considerable vantage ground; in the other Breslau could be more easily be reached in five marches, because, trusting to the former federal compact with Austria, Schweidnitz had been given up as a fortress.

Nothing was to be more desired than that the whole Prussian forces should have found a position which at once would have covered Berlin and Breslau, even if they could not for the moment protect the territory on the left of the Elbe and on the Upper Oder. The most favourable point for this was Görlitz.

The difficulties of supplying with food a quarter of a million of men could have been overcome if an immediate advance had been contemplated; but they were insuperable if an assembly of so great a number was to be anticipated for a totally undetermined time. The concentration of the whole Army on one point, whether at Görlitz or in Upper Silesia, demanded a considerable expense of time. If the whole force would have to be transported by few and ultimately by only one line of railway, the arrival of all would be delayed for several weeks. The Marks and Silesia required, however, an immediate defence, and the preparation of two separate armies was consequently necessary.

That a concentrated Austrian army could throw itself on the half of the Prussian was clear, but whatever arrangement was determined upon, none could alter either the geographical circumstances of the theatre of war or the fact that an enemy stationed in Bohemia intervened between Lusatia and Silesia.

There was only one way of anticipating this inconvenience, which was that the Prussians themselves should invade Bohemia.

In any case, the Corps d'Armée must in the first instance be brought as near the frontier as the railway transport would allow.

If it had not been necessary to respect the Saxon territory, the lines leading from the Rhenish provinces, Westphalia, Pomerania, and the Marks, could have been used to assemble a

formidable army at Dresden. But practically for the Prussian transport these lines ended at Zeitz, Halle, Herzberg, Görlitz, Schweidnitz, and Neisse. At these points, which formed a theatre of war of 300 miles in length, it was necessary to relinquish railway transport, and to march. This was palpably not the real strategical march of the army for concentration, but only the first step thereto. Whether the further marches of the still separate parts of the force should be made towards different points of this periphery, or towards the centre, depended whether it was decided to assume the offensive or the defensive.

In accordance with orders already issued, the 11th Division of the VIth Corps d'Armée had been assembled at Frankenstein, the 12th at Neisse, the reserve brigade of Cavalry, and the Artillery at Münsterberg. The 51st Regiment and the 6th Battalion of Jägers had been pushed forward to Glatz and Silberberg, the 10th Regiment and one battery remained in Schweidnitz until the Vth Corps, which was already marching in that direction, should enter that place.

There were besides, for the protection of the frontier of Upper Silesia, posted under General Von Knobelsdorff between Leobschütz and Oderburg, the 62nd Regiment of Infantry, the 2nd Regiment of Uhlans, and one battery. Besides, there was formed there, under General the Count of Stolberg, a special detachment consisting of the 6th Brigade of Landwehr Cavalry and six Landwehr battalions of the second levy.

On the 24th May it was ordered that the VIth Corps d'Armée should take up cantonments round Waldenburg and the Vth round Landshut. The reserve Cavalry of the two Corps was united in one division at Striegau. All these divisions were under the command of His Royal Highness the Crown Prince, to form the second or Silesian Army.

Similarly, in accordance with the orders issued, the IIIrd and IVth Corps d'Armée were assembled in Lower Lusatia between Torgau and Cottbus. Their advanced posts were on the Black Elster, at a short distance from the Saxon frontier. The 8th Division, which had hitherto been retained at Erfurt, was now moved up, and on the 16th May the second Corps d'Armée was ordered to move, per rail, from the province of Pomerania by way of Berlin, to Herzberg. The Corps of the Guards, after completing its mobilization, was to march to cantonments between Baruth and Luckau.

The four divisions of the IIIrd and IVth Corps d'Armée were not retained in their corps, but were individually placed under the command of His Royal Highness the Prince Federic Charles of Prussia; to them the IIInd Corps d'Armée and the Guards were to be added. A special Cavalry corps was to be formed out of the reserve Cavalry of these four corps, and the whole, under the command of the above-mentioned Prince, was to form the 1st Army. Also, on the 16th May, the 1st Corps d'Armée was warned to *échelon* its troops along the railway between Königsberg and Kreuz, to be transported to Görlitz. The corps

was then to preserve the communication between the 1st and IInd Army, and stood available to strengthen either the one or the other, as circumstances demanded.

The earlier arrangements for the VIIIth Corps d'Armée were altered, inasmuch as the 15th Division was to be assembled at Cologne, the 16th at Coblenz, and thence to be transported by rail by way of Hanover to cantonments round Halle.

Of the VIIth Corps, the 13th Division remained in its usual quarters, the rest was to be moved by rail by way of Paderborn and Cassel, into cantonments round Zeitz, and with the VIIIth Corps to form a third army, or Army of the Elbe, the command of which was given to General Herwarth Von Bittenfeld.

The Brigade Beyer of the VIIIth Corps, which had already been moved to Wetzlar, and which, by the addition of a portion of the garrisons of the fortresses that had become available had attained the strength of a strong division, remained there. To it were added—

From Mayence, the 32nd Regiment ;

„ Luxemburg, the 20th Regiment ;

„ Coblenz and Cologne, the 19th and the 39th Regiments.

The 9th Regiment of Hussars and three batteries were attached to this new Division Beyer, so that it attained a strength of 18 battalions, 5 squadrons, and 18 guns.

Finally, on the 19th May, the formation of a Reserve Corps was ordered at Berlin, which was formed of 24 battalions, and of 24 squadrons of Landwehr, which then were mobilized, and to them a newly-formed reserve regiment of artillery was added. This corps was intended to occupy the posts in rear of the Field Army, but was sufficiently prepared to be able to take its place in the line of battle at any moment. The command of this corps was given to General Von der Mülbe.

Thus, under the command of the King, who assumed in person the chief command, there stood at that time—

The 1st Army in Lusatia ;

„ IInd Army (Silesian) in Lower Silesia ;

„ Elbe Army in Thuringia ;

„ 1st Corps d'Armée at Görlitz ;

„ Reserve Corps at Berlin ;

and the Army of the Maine, which was, as operations proceeded, formed of the 13th Division, the Division Beyer, and the troops of General Von Manteuffel.

It was expressly stated, however, that no union of armies was to be considered as definitive, since His Majesty reserved to himself the right to transfer corps or divisions of one army to another according to the course of circumstances.

The details of the Staff and the special disposition of the troops can be found in the Appendix.

In consequence of the orders issued on the 15th and 16th May, and after the necessary preparations on the main lines of railway, the transport of the troops was effected between the

16th May and the 5th June. The marches by road were so arranged as to be accomplished in the same time.

The whole of the marches and of the railway movements were so arranged by the General Staff in harmony with the railway department that in their execution, in which both the military and civil powers were concerned, no impediments or delays could occur.

The result of these arrangements was, that in the 21 days allowed, 197,000 men, 55,000 horses, 5,300 wagons were transported for distances varying between 120 to 300 miles, without any failure, and in such a manner that they attained the required spots at the very hour requisite.

Details of
Transport
Appendix
I.

The details can be found in the Appendix.

In preparation, Austria had gained an important advantage. This was, however, counteracted in the transport of the troops, since she could only use the one railway which, from Vienna to Lundenburg has two lines, but beyond that point in the direction of Olmütz and Brünn, has only one line. In Prussia, on the other hand, there were five through lines of railway, with their several branches, available.

The Prussian frontier was more or less in danger during the month of May, but soon a time arrived when forces superior to those of the adversary were assembled there.

All military reasons urged that the campaign should be commenced by Prussia on the 6th June. It is necessary, however, to recollect that it was only on the 11th June that Austria introduced her motion to the Diet. At the beginning of this month it was still possible to hope for a peaceful solution of the pending differences, and under these circumstances King William would never have decided to take steps towards causing a war, the consequences of which for Germany it was impossible to foresee.

When, on the 14th June, the hostile motion was adopted by the Diet, the Prussian Government, as shown above, could not postpone energetic steps, but by this time the transport of the Austrian troops was also practically concluded.

While still the main portion of the corps were being moved by railway, the necessary orders were issued to move the IInd, IIIrd, and IVth Corps nearer to the IInd Army in Silesia.

This could only be accomplished if the troops marched along the frontier, through a comparatively poor country, in great heat, and along sandy lanes. The cantoned troops must also keep before their eyes that at any moment a concentration might be necessary. Besides, such a transverse movement always throws great difficulties in the way of sustenance. This march towards the left was, however, ordered on the 30th May, and could be completed by the 8th June in such a manner that the IIIrd Corps d'Armée closed up to the Ist at Görlitz, the IVth Corps d'Armée arrived at the neighbourhood of Hoyerswerda, and the IInd reached Senftenberg. Behind these the Guards were collected in cantonments round Cottbus.

On the 6th June, the last *échelons* of the 1st Corps d'Armée entered Görlitz, and on the 7th that corps commenced its march in the direction of Hirschberg.

At the same time as this movement towards the left was made, the three divisions of the Army of the Elbe were moved from Zeitz and Halle to the Elbe.

Thus the width of the forces available for action was reduced by nearly one-half.

The Army of the Elbe took up cantonments on both sides of that stream, between Mulde and Elster. On the right bank the advanced guard was posted at Mühlberg; the 16th Division and the Reserve Cavalry at Liebenwerda; the Reserve Artillery near Torgau. On the left bank, the 15th Division was posted at Belgern, and the 14th at Schildau and Düben. The permanent bridge at Torgau, and a pontoon bridge thrown near Belgern, made it possible to assemble the Army within 48 hours on either bank of the stream.

The first certain intelligence of the situation of the Austrian Army was received in Berlin on the 11th June by means of the "Order of Battle," which was then made known. Thus it was found that the principal Austrian force was not stationed, as had been hitherto supposed, in Bohemia, but that of seven Corps d'Armée five were still in Moravia.

The "Austrian Military Journal" states as a reason for such a withdrawn position "that the Army had indeed concluded its concentration on the 10th June, but that it was "numerically too weak for an aggressive advance against the "Prussians."

It may perhaps be asserted that the concentration was indeed not yet finished, because the brigades of Abele (formerly of Kalik), and of Prohaska had not yet come up, as well as a part of the Artillery Reserve, but that the forces already available, including the Saxons, were numerically about equal to the enemy, as a reckoning which we shall give later will show.

It was besides announced that "the position at Olmütz held "Prussia in doubt, and had compelled her to divide her force." We shall see that, as soon as the position near Olmütz was known, every doubt vanished. An invasion of Prussian territory could only be directed against Silesia; corresponding measures were taken, and no care was hereafter requisite for the security of Berlin.

It appears that at Vienna people believed in earlier and more extensive preparations on the part of Prussia than had really occurred through the defensive measures of the 29th March, that, therefore, alarm was felt in case of a disturbance out of their own concentration, and that it was desired to make it more certain by a considerable distance, and by the shelter of the fortresses. Also the protection of the railways contingent to the Silesian frontier had to be considered.

Added to this the corps were, it is true, with the above-

mentioned exceptions, complete as to the number of their troops, but it is acknowledged that there was still much to be done by the "Intendence."

The Austrian Army was really not fully prepared to enter upon operations. Time was required to complete its preparations, and its allies also required time.

Council was held in Olmütz, in the middle of June, with these allies, on the subject of the general operations. The Bavarian Army, which consisted of from 40,000 to 50,000 men, was to form an independent corps under Prince Charles of Bavaria, under whose command also were placed the contingents of Würtemberg, Baden, Hesse, and Nassau. The Prince was to conduct his operations in accordance with directions given to him from the Imperial Commander-in-Chief. Since a concentration of all the armies of Southern Germany in Bohemia could not be accomplished, the protection of the territory of the different States engaged in the struggle was to be united with the most practicable service of the combatants in respect to the main object. Austria engaged to conclude no independent peace; and in case that territorial alterations should result from the war, to protect Bavaria from any loss, and to take care that the latter should be indemnified for any sacrifices. The 5th Article of this Treaty of the 14th June says, "The 'Bavarian Army shall by the middle of June have taken up 'a position in Franconia, and in the vicinity of the railways.'" Such a concentration would have been the most advantageous for Saxony and for Austria.

If then the Prussians advanced through Saxony into Bohemia, the Saxon Army would move off in the direction of Plauen, thus avoiding their superior forces. If the Army of the Elbe followed, it would be separated entirely from the 1st Army; if it pushed forward into Bohemia, the Saxons united with the Bavarians, and forming a force of from 60,000 to 70,000 men, could well hope to reoccupy their country, and seriously to threaten the communications of the Prussian Army.

The collection of magazines in Annaberg and Schneeberg, of which news reached Berlin, seemed to show that at Dresden this plan was willingly entertained; but it was a great exaction from Bavaria that her battalions should fight in Saxony or Bohemia for Austria, while her own territory was threatened from the Rhine. Würtemberg and Baden, still more so Darmstadt and Nassau, remained then entirely dependent on their own strength.

In any case, neither on the 15th, nor even within the next few days, could a formidable force be assembled in Upper Franconia, for the Bavarian troops still stood upon the Danube and the Maine, without being ready to march.

In consequence of all these circumstances, it is said that on the 30th June, it was finally determined that Bavaria should first unite her Army with the VIIIth Federal Corps, and then

assume the offensive in a north-westerly direction. There remained now to the Saxon Army no prospect except quitting its own territory to fight as an auxiliary force in Bohemia—a lamentable situation into which the ruler of the Saxon policy had drawn a brave and patriotic army.

What was expected from an offensive movement in a north-westerly direction, which at a great distance could only lead to Coblenz or Cologne, it is difficult to see. If the support of Hanover was contemplated, an immediate and powerful aid could have been afforded to that power by means of the Brigade Kalik. It would have formed the nucleus to which the Hanoverian and perhaps the Electoral troops of Hesse might have attached themselves; but this brigade, as indeed every available force, was drawn to the Northern Army. The Brigade Hahn alone, formed of the garrisons drawn from the Federal fortresses, was attached to the VIIIth Federal Corps. No other sacrifices did Austria make for her allies.

As soon as the distribution of the Austrian Army was known at Berlin, it was recognized that the enemy's march was a threatening, not against Berlin nor west of the county of Glatz, but in the east, not by way of Schweidnitz, where the Silesian Army was posted, but by way of Neisse; and that some five or six corps could in about eight days be concentrated on the line between Grulich and Troppau.

The Commander of the IInd Army had already requested permission to march towards the Neisse. A position behind this river covered the greatest part of Silesia. It also prevented the Austrians from operating against Breslau, and forced them to attack it, if they were not willing utterly to sacrifice their communications. The fortress of Neisse supported the left wing, and in an attack on the right the assailant would have had Glatz and the mountains in rear. The proposed measure appeared therefore in itself advantageous, but had the disadvantage that by means of it the distance between the Ist and IInd Army was still further increased by about five or six marches, and that two Corps d'Armée, even in a strong position, could not have resisted such superiority of strength as threatened them. His Majesty the King accordingly permitted the advance of the IInd Army, but ordered at the same time that it should be reinforced, and that the Ist Army should continue its move to the left.

The Ist Corps, after it had been relieved in Görlitz by the IIIrd, had already been placed under the command of the Crown Prince, and stationed in Hirschberg, Warmbrunn, and Schönau. It had to watch the roads leading over the mountains from Friedland and Reichenbach, as well as that from Trautenau. The Guards Corps was also now attached to the IInd Army. Nine battalions of this corps were still in Berlin and Potsdam; these were at once put in movement to Brieg, on the railway which now became free by way of Frankfort and Breslau. The rest of the troops of this corps were placed in cantonments

east of Cottbus towards Sorau and Sommerfeld, where they could be successively placed in the railway.

The Guard arrived in this manner on the left wing of the position which the IInd Army purposed to take up on the Neisse.

The Ist Army received orders to concentrate, from its cantonments in Lower Lusatia, in such a manner round Görlitz that it stood ready as well for operations in Silesia as for an advance into Saxon Upper Lusatia.

In case a closer concentration was not ordered, the new cantonments were to extend from Niesky to Hirschberg, so as to make as many roads as possible available for that advance.

According to these orders there marched, of the IInd Army—

The VIth Corps, by Reichenbach, Frankenstein, and Ottmachau, to Steinau;

The Vth Corps, by Schweidnitz, and Lauterbach, to Grottkau;

The Ist Corps, by Kupferberg, Schweidnitz, and Nimptsch, to Münsterberg;

The Cavalry, by Metkau and Jordansmühl, to Strehlen.

The columns arrived at their destinations respectively on the 16th, 17th, and 18th, by which time also the greater portion of the Guard had already reached Brieg.

Of the Ist Corps a detachment of six battalions, two regiments of Cavalry, and four batteries, had remained at Waldenburg, to watch the passes from Landshut to Charlottenbrunn.

As a summons from Austria was every day to be expected, all preparations were made for a rapid concentration of the IInd Army.

Of the Ist Army there marched—

The IIIrd Corps to the vicinity of Löwenberg, Friedeberg, and Wiegandsthal;

The IVth Corps to the district of Lauban and Greiffenberg;

The IInd Corps to the country between Niesky, Reichenbach, Görlitz, and Seidenberg;

The Corps of Cavalry to quarters on both sides of the Bober, round Löwenberg.

The roads leading through the mountains to Löbau, Zittau, Friedland, and Reichenberg were occupied and guarded; for a similar purpose a detachment of three battalions, one squadron, and one battery was pushed forward to Warmbrunn. All these marches of the Ist Army were accomplished in the same time as those of the IInd Army—that is, by the 18th June. On the other hand, the Army of the Elbe still remained in the cantonments which it had taken up on the 8th. With regard to Saxony, it was impossible that it could follow the movements of the two former.

General Von Herwarth had charge over 38 battalions, five regiments of Cavalry, 28 batteries.

If the Saxons remained without foreign aid, they had only the choice either to fight against twice their number or to quit their land without a blow.

If they withdrew into Bohemia they could reinforce the Austrian Army, but then the whole Army of the Elbe could follow them thither. If they moved to Bavaria it was necessary that a Prussian corps should follow to watch them. Under all circumstances a powerful force was wanted on the Elbe.

It was hardly to be supposed that the Austrians would leave their most zealous allies without any support. It was rather expected that at least the 1st Austrian Corps would be told off to unite with the Saxons. The huge materials of land and water transport assembled at Bodenbach appeared to be collected for this purpose.

The Saxons had concentrated near Dresden on the left bank of the Elbe; only a few detachments were pushed forward on the right bank as far as Grossenhayn; but the corps could at any moment cross the Elbe. If united with an Austrian corps it assumed one of the strong positions for the defence of Dresden which the country affords in plenty, this could not, even with much superior strength, be assailed from the opposite bank with chance of success. Also, it was impossible to march past such a strength of troops as could debouch from Dresden in rear of the movement.

It was thus unavoidable that the Army of the Elbe should remain in the position assigned to it, which allowed it as requisite to act on the one or the other bank.

If the corps of Count Clam joined the Saxons, their total force, without the brigade Abele (Kalik), would be increased to 48 battalions, 10 regiments of Cavalry, and 23 batteries, then the Army of the Elbe would not be strong enough to repulse them. It was therefore determined that the Reserve Corps which was being assembled at Berlin and Brandenburg should be despatched immediately in the direction of Torgau.

The arrival of this corps brought the strength of the Army of the Elbe up to 62 battalions, 9 regiments of Cavalry, and 44 batteries. Berlin and the Marches were still sufficiently covered.

It would have been possible to push the march of the 1st Army closer to the Hind, but we know that at this time the hostile decisions had already been passed by the Bund, which made war unavoidable, and released Prussia from all former obligations with regard to procuring peace. Diplomatic proceedings henceforth sank into the back-ground, and the purely military developed their whole importance.

The Prussian main armies at this time stood in three groups at Torgau, Görlitz, and Neisse, which were distant from each other from 100 to 125 miles. The most rapid concentration was to the front, and lay in the enemy's territory.

The advance into Saxony was necessary, not on political

grounds alone, but also because it made the strategical advance of the 1st Army, and of the Army of the Elbe,—i.e., their concentration,—possible on the line between Dresden and Bautzen by means of numerous and converging roads in few marches. Then the Prussian force formed two armies, the conduct of which so as ultimately to insure their mutual co-operation in the decisive moment was the difficult but soluble problem placed before its leaders. Armies of over 100,000 men are tolerably independent, and the Austrians could not develop their whole force against the one as they must resist with detachments the other. The shortest road to their junction lay forwards, and to clear it the hostile opposition must be broken down.

From the moment when the Decree of the Bund of the 14th June was passed, the King determined to wage an offensive war. There was now no more talk of defensive flank marches; it was determined to seek the enemy on his own soil.

As we now pass to the account of the operations themselves, it is necessary to cast a glance over the strength of the troops which were brought into operation. In reckoning these, we can naturally have recourse to States alone. These are a sure guide as far as regards the Prussian Army, as all the troops included therein were complete. If on the other side the effective strength did not come up to the strength on paper, the true information can only be obtained from those concerned; it may, however, be correctly assumed that, after a long preparation, the differences are not sufficient to cause a very practical diminution. Casualties in sick, men on command, &c., must be considered on both sides, and those on either side would be about equal.

The details of the "Order of Battle" of the armies of all the States allied against Prussia are given in Appendix.

I. Austrian Army of the North.

	Combatants.
Ist Corps, with its four brigades, in Teplitz, Prague, Theresienstadt, and Josephstadt, and 1st division of Light Cavalry posted from Königshof to Reichenberg, in Northern Bohemia, mustered	36,000
IInd Corps, in Wildenschwerdt, Böhmisches Trubau, Zwittau, Brüssau	31,000
IVth Corps, on the right of the above, in Sternberg, Zittau, Troppau, and Teschen	31,000
Vth Corps, in rear round Olmütz and Leipniz ..	30,850
IIIrd Corps, with three Brigades, at and south of Brünn	23,750
Xth Corps, in Brünn and Meseritsch	30,250
VIIIth Corps (furthest to the rear) in Auspitz, Austerlitz, Seelowitz, and Paulowitz	31,000
2nd division of Light Cavalry on the Silesian frontier east of the county of Glatz	3,350
Carried forward	217,200

	Combatants.
Brought forward	217,200
Ist Division of Reserve Cavalry at Prossnitz ..	4,270
IIrd " " Kremsier ..	4,270
IIIrd " " Wischau ..	4,270
Reserve Artillery of the Army	3,000
By the arrival of the brigades of Kalik and Prohaska	14,000
In Moravia and Austrian Silesia	211,000
Austrian Army of the North, including 1st Corps ..	247,000
Saxon Army at Dresden	24,000
	<hr/> 271,000 <hr/>

II. *The Forces of Southern Germany.*

Bavarian Army.

One division at Schweinfurt, detachments at Frankfort and in the Palatinate	11,450
One division at Bamberg	11,450
One division on the Lechfeld	11,450
One brigade on the railway from Regensburg to Amberg	5,700
One brigade at Munich	5,700
The Reserve of Cavalry and Artillery south of the Upper Maine	6,200
Total of Bavarian Army	<hr/> 52,000 <hr/>

(About 10,000 more were in Bavaria, but not with the Field Army.)

Wurtemberg Contingent, the troops still in their ordinary garrison	16,250
Baden Contingent mobilized troops	10,850
Grand Duchy of Hesse	9,400
Nassau	5,400
South German troops not yet concentrated, <i>circa</i>	<hr/> 94,000 <hr/>

III. *The Contingents of North Germany.*

Hanover effective strength	18,400
Electoral Hesse	7,000
In their garrisons	<hr/> 25,000 <hr/>
Austria and Saxony	271,000
Southern Germany	94,000
North Germany	25,000
	<hr/> 390,000 <hr/>

IV. *Prussian Army.*

Combatants.

IIInd (Silesian) Army :—

The Guard, 1st, Vth, and VIth Corps, and a division of Cavalry in Cantonments on the Neisse, between Brieg and Patschkau; detachments at Waldenburg and in Upper Silesia 115,000

Ist Army :—

IIInd, IIIrd, and IVth Corps, and Corps of Cavalry, near Görlitz, between Niesky, Bunzlau, and Wiegandsthal; a detachment in Warmbrunn. . . . 93,000

The Army of the Elbe :—

VIIIth Corps and 14th Division in Cantonments round Torgau, between Düben and Elsterwerda .. 46,000

Reserve Corps :—

At Berlin (still in the course of formation) .. 24,300

13th Division round Minden 14,300

Manteuffel's Corps at Hamburg 14,100

Beyer's Division at Wetzlar 19,600

326,000

Against total of enemies. . . . 390,000

Of which in the east of the monarchy, Prussia .. 278,600

Against Austrians and Saxons 271,000

In the west, Prussia 48,000

Against the former Federal Contingents 119,000

Thus, in the east, Prussia was stronger by about 7,600 combatants; in the west, weaker by about 71,000 combatants than her enemies.

On both sides the combatants only of the Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery are reckoned, and given in round numbers. Naturally, the troops are not counted in the Field Armies, which remained as garrisons for fortresses, or to assure the tranquility of districts.

To the latter category belonged the detachments in Upper Silesia :—

					Men.
General Von Knobelsdorff	3,844
General Count Von Stolberg	5,358
					<hr/> 9,202

On the Prussian side, Mülber Reserve Corps of 24,000 men is reckoned, which was formed and in reality only employed as such, but was so organized as to act as field troops. On the Austrian side, the fourth battalions are not balanced against this, although they actually were brought into action. It is easy by subtraction of the Reserve Corps, which was formed

of Landwehr, and never came into action, to perceive that the remaining 255,000 Prussian combatants in the east opposed 271,000 hostile combatants.

We can then discard all the assertions which were designed to attribute the success of Prussia in the eastern theatre of war solely to numerical superiority.

CHAPTER III.

THE OPERATIONS AGAINST HANOVER AND ELECTORAL HESSE.

THE result of the Federal vote of the 14th June was known the same evening to General Von Manteuffel, who, as shown above, since the 12th had been with his corps in and round Altona. The outbreak of hostilities with Hanover, which had declared against Prussia, was to be expected; and it was necessary to secure the important passage of the Elbe at Harburg. The vessels stationed on the Elbe were placed under the command of General Von Manteuffel. Harburg was without a garrison. The place could, however, be occupied from the fortress of Stade, which lay near, and which lately had received a stronger garrison: thus rapid action was necessary.

At the time of the transport of the Kalik Brigade through Hanover, the Prussian Government requested, and after some delays obtained, permission for the passage of its troops in Holstein in the direction of Minden. On the ground of this, the advanced guard of General Von Manteuffel on the 15th ^{15th June.} moved to Harburg, and on the 16th the remainder of the corps ^{16th June.} followed.

The passage was very quickly accomplished, as the troops moved partly by means of the Hamburg steam-ferry and by the island of Wilhelmsburg, and partly were transported by the Prussian gunboats and private steamers. The heads of the columns, on the 16th, advanced about ten miles on the roads to Lüneburg and Celle. The Generals Von Falckenstein and Von Beyer, in accordance with their instructions, also commenced their operations on the 16th June. War was formally declared, and the advance therefore fully justified.

The former advanced with Goeben's Division from Minden towards Hanover as far as Stadthagen; the latter from Wetzlar, in the direction of Cassel, to the neighbourhood of Bellnhausen.

Neither in Hanover nor Hesse Cassel does it appear to have been sufficiently clearly perceived what consequences would necessarily ensue from their hostile attitude towards their neighbour State, they seem rather to have believed that they could still restrain Prussia by diplomatic negotiations. It can only so be explained that the declaration of war found both these countries fully unprepared in military circumstances.

In Hanover, indeed, the spring manœuvres which usually took place only among the Cavalry and Artillery, were extended to the whole Army. The different regiments had been assembled for drill for some time, and in the next few days combined brigades were to be assembled at various points for exercises with all arms. The regiments were already partly on the march for that purpose.

The troops also, by the calling in of men on furlough, had been placed on the highest strength for manœuvre; the battalions mustered 560 men, exclusive of recruits; the squadrons 80 to 90 horses; but no preparation had been made for a mobilization, and especially no purchase of horses had been made.

In Hesse Cassel the troops were entirely on a peace footing. The rapid action on the part of Prussia caused the imbecility of these states to become apparent. It was impossible for them to think of defending their territories, and no possibility of resistance lay except in the most rapid retreat on the contingents of Southern Germany.

The King of Hanover, on this account, at noon on the 15th, immediately after the arrival of the news of the occupation of Harburg, resolved to concentrate his army at Göttingen. The telegraph forwarded the necessary orders through the whole country, and on the same afternoon the troops everywhere put themselves in motion. The whole of the Infantry, some batteries, and much material, were forwarded by the railways, on which the trains were moved uninterruptedly till the 17th June; the remainder marched.

The Hessian troops which garrisoned Cassel and Hofgeismar, six battalions, ten squadrons, and four batteries (4,200 men, 800 horses, 16 guns), were, on the news of the advance of General Von Beyer, also immediately set in motion towards the southern part of the country. They went by rail to Hünfeld, and then, as may be mentioned prematurely, by way of Fulda to Hanau, where they arrived on the 22nd June; and being reinforced by the four battalions which garrisoned the two last-named places, remained there till further orders.

The unexpectedly rapid occupation of Holstein by the Prussians, the energetic measures connected therewith, the retreat of the Austrians without resistance, and the hasty flight of the Prince of Augustenburg, did not fail to make a deep impression in the Duchies. In Schleswig, a careful and provident administration had already for some time awakened the sound sense of the people, and shattered the democratic and Augustenburg intrigues; but also in Holstein the political agitation of late times quickly yielded to the sober presence of mind natural to the character of the people. The Prussian troops had everywhere been received with the greatest friendship, and nowhere was any trace of hostile feeling exhibited.

Under such circumstances, not only was it possible to detach the whole of Manteuffel's Corps for future operations in Ger-

many, but it appeared also admissible to diminish the garrison troops which at the beginning had been determined upon for the Duchies. Of the latter, the 4th Westphalian Landwehr Regiment, No. 17, was first handed over to General Von Manteuffel, who also brought forward the two battalions of the line left in Souderburg and Rendsburg. Some days later the 10th Regiment of Landwehr Hussars, which had gone to Altona, advanced into Hanover. There remained then only the 3rd Westphalian Landwehr Regiment, No. 16, the *dépôt* battalions of the 11th and 25th Regiments, one company of garrison Artillery, the 7th Regiment of heavy Landwehr Cavalry, which had come from Halberstadt, and the Marine Battalion, about 5,000 men in all, under the command of the Commandant of Rendsburg, General Von Kaphengst, in Schleswig-Holstein.

The functions of Governor, during the absence of General Von Manteuffel, were handed over to President Von Scheel-Plessen.

General Von Manteuffel, on the 17th, advanced from Harburg towards Hanover. One column, under General Von Korth (8 battalions, 4 squadrons, 2 batteries), marched in the direction of Lüneburg; the other, under General Von Flies (6 battalions, 4 squadrons, 2 batteries), on the direct road to Celle. The former reached Lüneburg, the latter Heber, on the 18th. The railway could not be used, as all the material had been carried away by the Hanoverians. 17th and 18th June.

It had been ascertained that a quantity of material of war lay in Stade, and that a great part of the garrison of that place had marched in the direction of Bremen. The fortress could therefore only be occupied by a small strength, and it was determined to take it by a *coup de main*.

To gain information of the locality, during the night between the 16th and 17th, Captain Werner, with the ironclad "Arminius," and the gunboats "Tiger" and "Cyclops," had made a reconnaissance from the Elbe, by which the Hanoverian coast battery at Brunshausen had been spiked.

Late in the evening of the 17th, Lieutenant-Colonel Von Cranach started from Harburg with the Fusilier battalion of the 1st Rhenish Infantry Regiment, No. 25, in the "Loreley," the "Cyclops," and a private steamer. About 1 A.M. on the 18th he reached Twidenfleth, where the troops disembarked, and began their march to Stade, which was about five miles distant.

A Cavalry outpost, quickly retreating, alarmed the garrison, but Colonel Von Cranach succeeded, after bursting open the gate, in entering the town before any opposition could be offered. First, in the vicinity of the market-place, in the middle of the town, a close detachment with charged bayonets attacked the Prussians, and some shots were exchanged; but further conflict was prevented by an officer who hurried up with the declaration that the Commandant was inclined to negotiate.

Soon a capitulation was agreed upon, by which the fortress was given up. The Hanoverian officers were allowed to depart free with their arms; the men, about 500, partly undrilled recruits, were dismissed to their homes.

Rich material of war fell into the hands of the Prussians. Among others, a 6-pounder rifled battery, fully equipped with everything except horses; eight rifled 12-pounders, seven rifled 24-pounders, many other guns, 14,000 new rifled arms, 2,000 cwt. of powder, 1,000,000 cartridges, 11,000 woollen blankets, &c.

The occupation of the Hanoverian coast batteries on the Ems and the Weser, by the Prussian ships, followed in the few next days after the capitulation of Stade, by which a large number of heavy guns were taken. The garrison of Emden capitulated on the same conditions as that of Stade.

In the meantime General Von Falckenstein, on the evening of the 17th, after a twelve hours' march, entered Hanover with Goeben's Division.

The rich stores which were found here were used to complete much that was wanting, and especially to organize a light field bridge train and a light field hospital. Also horses were demanded, partly to complete the necessities of the troops, partly for the formation of a horse dépôt. General Von Falckenstein immediately assumed the administration of the country. A Prussian civil Commissioner was placed at the head of the Government, but in other respects all Hanoverian officials continued their functions, so that all stagnation of business was avoided.

General Von Beyer marched on the 17th to Kirchhain and Neustadt. He also could not make use of the railway, because the rails in places had been torn up, and the material had been carried away for the transport of the Hessian troops to Cassel.

The General, on his side, had the railway to Frankfort entirely destroyed, in order to secure his rear against the assembling Federal troops there. In a northerly direction, the line was again laid down by officials detached for that purpose.

It was ascertained that the Electoral Hessian troops stationed at Cassel had left, and at the same time that considerable war material still remained there. In order to prevent its removal it was necessary to destroy the railway to Bebra as soon as possible.

For this purpose, at Marburg, a small train was put together of some carriages found there, which carried a company to Gensungen; thence it marched to Melsungen on the Frederic-William Railway, where this object was effected without hindrance.

By a lucky chance, at that station there was a considerable train of empty wagons, of which possession was taken, and by means of which it advanced to Guntershausen. A detachment of Hessian troops stationed there were taken prisoners and the

existing railway material seized. Early on the 18th, the company moved with two strong trains towards the division which in the meantime had advanced to the vicinity of Gilserberg.

General Von Beyer now directed a great part of his troops on Zimmersrode, whence the railway transport to Guntershausen began.

By noon on the 19th, five battalions, half a squadron, and one battery were there assembled; and on the same evening, General Von Beyer at their head, entered Cassel. On the 20th the remainder of the division followed, partly by rail, partly by marching by way of Fritzlar. 19th and 20th June.

As in Hanover, also in Cassel, a Prussian Government was established, and the Hessian Ministers alone removed from their functions. The Elector himself, who had not left Wilhelmshöhe, remained there; but was afterwards, when he again refused to accede to the Prussian reform of the Confederation, removed to Minden, and later to Stettin.

The stores found in Cassel were particularly welcome to the corps of General Von Beyer, which in peace had formed no organic band of troops, but, as already shown, formed at the last moment from single regiments, wanted much in the material of equipment. The field equipages of the regiments were completed; a hospital, a provision column, an intendants detachment, and a dépôt of horses were formed.

General Von Falckenstein had received orders above all things to force the Hanoverian Army out of the field, and as far as possible to disarm it, in order to have his troops afterwards available for other operations. If it were desirable, in consequence, to push forward with Goeben's Division as rapidly as possible to Göttingen, Hanover could not be left without a garrison. The troops of General Manteuffel, who had been placed under Falckenstein's command, were accordingly drawn in that direction.

In the course of the 18th it was possible to get some railway material together, and send it to Lüneburg. Two locomotives of the Berlin-Hamburg Railway were also transported across the Elbe at Lauenburg on the steamers lying there; and on the night of the 19th the transport of Korth's Detachment at Lüneburg was commenced to Hanover. Goeben's Division, on the 19th, consequently began its march on Göttingen, reached the line Nordstemmen, Hildesheim, and on the 20th as far as Alfeld.

The railways leading to Göttingen were so thoroughly destroyed that their restoration required several days. The transport of Korth's Detachment was continued on the 19th, his troops halted on the 20th at Hanover. General Flies marched on the 19th to Bergen, on the 20th to Celle.

On the Hanoverian side it had been possible, by great exertions, to assemble all the troops of the contingent, with the exception of small detachments at Göttingen, on the 18th. The Hanoverian force had consequently gained a considerable

start, and could count upon several days' rest. The mobilization of the Hanoverian Army was first ordered on the 17th, and now was the opportunity to make it fit to undertake operations as far as means would allow. The march southwards had been made with the greatest haste, and the troops consequently were in general badly provided with field equipment. Before the arrival of the Prussians it had been possible to despatch considerable supplies of clothing, equipment, arms, and ammunition from the magazines of Hanover by rail to Göttingen. Here it was then possible to make the troops to some extent fit to take the field, especially the recruits and furlough men called to the colours in consequence of the decree of the Bund of the 14th June, of whom about 3 000 joined the Army at Göttingen, without arms and without clothing. It was attempted to complete the want of horses by purchase and requisitions, so that all the field batteries and the guns of reserve were horsed up to a peace footing. The ammunition columns, the pontoon train, the field hospital, and all the regimental carriages, were dependent on relay horses.

By the 20th the Army was placed in a tolerable state of preparation for operations or battle. The battalions averaged 700 men, the squadrons about 90 horses. The total strength of the Army mustered 15,000 Infantry (inclusive of 2,000 not yet drilled recruits), 2,000 horses, 42 guns (of which 22 were rifled 6-pounders), besides 10 guns of reserve. It was divided into four Infantry brigades, to which the necessary Artillery and Cavalry were attached, with the reserve Cavalry and reserve Artillery. Details are given in the order of battle, Appendix II.

As long as the Army was being organized, it was necessary to remain on the defensive at Göttingen. Measures were therefore taken both to throw difficulties in the way of the enemy's advance, and to oppose with advantage any casual attack.

One brigade was pushed forward on each of the roads leading to Hanover, Münden, and Witzenhausen; the rest of the troops were cantoned at Göttingen. On the news of the occupation of Cassel, the railway leading thither was rendered impassable, the passage of the Werra at Münden placed in a state of defence, further back in the valley of the Schede earthworks were thrown up, and an advantageous position south of Dransfeld entrenched. Also, on the road to Witzenhausen, troops advanced to the Leine, and occupied its passages. Against the enemy marching from Hanover, a position was selected near Nörten, and entrenchments begun therein. Opinions had from the first differed as to the next operations; but as the troops became more ready for battle, the voices of those who advocated a march southwards to unite with the Bavarians, began to preponderate in the counsels of the King, and on the 20th the order was given to break up the position on the following day. It was wished, at first, to take the most direct road by Witzennaussen, Allendorff, and

Eschwege. But, as it might be expected, there to come upon the troops of General Beyer and then to be engaged in the difficult defiles of the Werra and Meizner under circumstances extremely unfavourable for action, at the last moment the direction of Heiligenstadt was adopted.

On the 21st June accordingly the army marched and, with- 21st June.
out any encounter, reached the village of Heiligenstadt. The advanced guard was pushed forward towards Mühlhausen as far as Helmsdorf. The rear-guard, which all day occupied Nördheim, in the evening moved to Geismar, two miles south of Göttingen.

It had been anticipated at Berlin that the Hanoverians would attempt to move through the Eichsfeld, and measures had been provided accordingly.

On the 20th June, General Von Schack, at Magdeburg, received notice thereof. He, on the 21st, sent two battalions of the 20th Landwehr Regiment (Brandenburg), and the Depôt Squadron of the 10th Magdeburg Hussars, under General Von Seckendorf, by rail to Nordhausen, whence they marched, the same evening, to Bleicherode. The battalions mustered 400 men, the squadron about 100 horses.

The Commandant of Erfurt also received orders to send from his garrison three Landwehr battalions, one squadron, and a sally-battery to Eisenach. As the Duke of Coburg-Gotha had declared for Prussia, his regiment of Fusiliers which had been assembled at Gotha, was also sent to Eisenach.

Thus, on the 21st, there were at Eisenach 5 battalions, 1 squadron, 1 battery; together 2,250 men, 75 horses, 4 guns. The command of these was given to Colonel Von Fabeck, Commander of the Regiment of Gotha. The Prussian Landwehr battalions mustered on the average, only 350, the Gotha battalions hardly 650, since the regiment had not completed its mobilization, and the reservists were only partly clothed.

General Beyer, who was warned from Berlin of the sending of this detachment, despatched on the afternoon of the 20th, under the command of General Von Glümer, a mixed detachment of 1 battalion, 1 squadron, and 2 guns, to watch the roads leading from Göttingen southwards by Witzenhausen and Allendorf. The Infantry was placed in wagons, and next morning the detachment reached Reichensachsen. The remaining troops of Glümer's Brigade followed in the same direction, and, on the evening of the 21st, there were 8 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 1 battery in the triangle Lichtenau, Allendorf, Reichensachsen.

As, by reports coming in early on the 21st, Münden was occupied by the enemy General Beyer despatched General Von Schachtmeyer with 4 battalions, 1 squadron, and 1 battery in this direction. The town, which had been in the meanwhile abandoned by the Hanoverians, was occupied in the evening by the Prussians.

General Beyer himself remained with the detachment of Colonel Selchow, six battalions, two squadrons, one battery, in Cassel.

The direction which the Hanoverians might have determined to take to break through into Southern Germany was not known, and the orders on the Prussian side could only have the object of observing all roads leading there. The detachment of troops was consequently unavoidable. It was requisite first to face the enemy wherever he might appear, to sustain a first opposition, and then to assemble decisive forces. General Falckenstein, on the 21st, began his march from the north to Göttingen. Goeben's division advanced to Einbeck and Gandersheim. Of Manteuffel's troops, early in the morning the transport of Korth's detachment commenced on the restored Hanover-Brunswick Railway to Seesen, whence the advanced guard marched to Echte. Flies's detachment halted at Celle.

Since Goeben's advanced troops came upon the Hanoverians' rear-guard near Nordheim, the hostile army was expected to be at Göttingen, Falckenstein determined to advance thither on the 22nd, and attack on the 23rd. He sent a warning to Beyer, who was placed under his orders, to waylay the retreat of the enemy southwards.

The most different and contradictory reports of the movements of the Hanoverians had reached Cassel. According to intelligence from Berlin, they were said to have taken the direction of Mülhausen; but there the outposts had reported nothing; General Beyer, therefore, determined to approach Göttingen, and so to concentrate more closely his separated divisions. For this purpose, Glümer was to concentrate along the Werra, between Allendorf and Witzenhausen, Schachtmeyer was to move to Dransfeld, and Selchow to Mürden. Late in the evening of the 21st, to Falkenstein also, the advance of the Hanoverians on Mülhausen was communicated from Berlin, and the proposition was made to send troops circuitously by way of Magdeburg to Gotha, and so to hinder the retreat of the enemy through the Thuringian forest.

22nd June.

Still, after the experiences as yet derived from the use of the railways in Hanover, it was doubted whether the detachment could arrive in time at its destination. The troops were not sent, and no alteration was made in the existing dispositions.

But when, on the morning of the 22nd, the retreat of the enemy from Göttingen was also confirmed by General Goeben, orders were sent to Beyer to advance to Ottmanshausen.

The latter, by this time, had received indubitable intelligence of the march of the Hanoverians on Mülhausen. The order to concentrate at Ottmanshausen was immediately published; but reached the troops already in motion so late that only Selchow could be moved back to Kauffungen.

Goeben's division marched to Göttingen, Manteuffel, with Korth's detachment, to Nordheim; Flies's detachment went by rail from Celle by Brunswick to Seesen, and thence advanced

to Nordheim. The head-quarters were moved to Göttingen and the South Hanover Railway could thus, for the first time, be made use of as far as Salzderhelden.

For the occupation of Hanover there remained two battalions of the 17th Landwehr Regiment and the 10th Landwehr Hussars which were drawn from Altona. The 3rd battalion of the 17th Regiment returned to Harburg and Stade, and, in exchange, General Manteuffel drew forward the Fusilier Battalion of the 25th Regiment, which had remained there.

Colonel Fabeck, on the report that the enemy was advancing against the defiles of the Werra, had moved with his detachment from Eisenach to Mibla, but, when he found this news to be untrue, had returned in the evening to Eisenach.

The Hanoverians had, on the 22nd, made their march from Heiligenstadt to the neighbourhood of Mühlhausen. A detachment had been sent to Wanfried. But when it was found that, on the 21st, Prussian troops had already appeared in the Eschweg, and therefore on this day all passages over the Werra might be expected to be occupied, this detachment was withdrawn to Mühlhausen. On all grounds, a difficult contest in the defiles of the Werra was to be avoided, and it could not be supposed in the Hanoverian head-quarters, that Beyer's movement to the left had for the moment left them open.

The road by Mühlhausen had the advantage that by it the Werra was altogether turned, and it passed far from Cassel, whence, at the moment, the greatest danger threatened.

The results of the movements of the 22nd were particularly favourable to the Hanoverians.

Beyer's division was from two to three severe marches distant, and was therefore as much as the main body of Falckenstein in no position to overtake within the next few days the retiring enemy, who had only the weak detachment of Fabeck in front of him.

On the 23rd June no alterations of any importance occurred 23rd June. in the situation.

Goeben's division, after four severe marches, had to halt at Göttingen. Manteuffel's corps, the last troops of which—Flies's detachment—in the course of the day reached Nordheim from Celle, by way of Seesen, remained in the cantonments of the previous day.

The arrival of the Hanoverians at Mühlhausen was telegraphed from Berlin, and troops were ordered to be sent thither by way of Cassel. This could not be done by rail, since the line was broken up; orders were, therefore, given to General Beyer to march to Eisenach.

In the afternoon Glümer reported from Witzenhausen that, after an unsuccessful contest, the enemy had retired to Heiligenstadt; consequently, General Von Wrangel was, in the night, pushed forward to Siemerode with three battalions, two squadrons, and one battery.

Of Beyer's troops two battalions had remained as a garrison

in Cassel. Selchow, with four battalions, two squadrons, and one battery, in pursuance of orders, reached Ottmanshausen. Glümer, in accordance with the earlier order, had already reached Friedland when the countermand reached him. He could only reach his former quarters, between Witzenhausen and Allendorf. On the assumption that the Hanoverians had returned to Heiligenstadt, he occupied, with a few battalions, an advantageous position near Hohengandern, where, in the evening, Schachtmeyer, coming from Dransfeld, bivouacked.

Fabeck's troops, early in the morning, moved by rail from Eisenach to Gotha, as it was supposed that the Hanoverians would take their way thither.

At Berlin it was considered urgently necessary to occupy the Thuringian Forest in greater force. As the despatch of troops from Hanover had not taken place, two battalions of the 4th Regiment of the Guard received orders to start by railway from Berlin. The first arrived in the afternoon, the second about midnight at Eisenach. Besides, in the course of the day, the detachments already ordered arrived at Gotha, namely, the dépôt battalion of the 3rd Thuringian Regiment of Infantry, No. 71, and a squadron of Landwehr Dragoons from Erfurt, and two batteries of Horse Artillery from Dresden.

The Hanoverians actually advanced in the direction of Gotha, and in the evening, their main body tolerably concentrated, was between Gross-Gottern, Langensalza, and Oster-Behringen. Their advanced troops were pushed forward as far as Henningsleben and Gross-Behringen, on the roads to Gotha and Eisenach. The rear-guard occupied Mühlhausen.

The original intention had been to march by Eisenach; but the news that the enemy's troops had been seen on the road thither, led it to be feared that opposition might be met with in the roads of wooded Hainich, in themselves sufficiently difficult, so the straight road to the south was abandoned, and the critical circuit by Langensalza undertaken.

This starting back before every difficulty allows it to be presumed that the determination to cut a way to South Germany was already practically abandoned. But, nevertheless, when advanced patrols of Cavalry, on the 23rd at midday, found Eisenach unoccupied, it was decided to attempt to break through there. Early on the 24th, the troops were already paraded at Oster-Behringen and Langensalza ready for the march, when the order came to return to cantonments.

Colonel Fabeck had received orders from Berlin to propose to the Hanoverian Commander to lay down his arms, as he was surrounded on all sides. This proposal, sent by an officer on the 23rd, was rejected; but the Hanoverians took the opportunity to make counter proposals, with which a *parlementaire* was sent to Gotha. He asked a free passage for the Hanoverians to the south, on condition that for a year they did not fight against Prussia. As no answer to this had come from Berlin early on the 24th, and that *parlementaire* announced

that stronger forces of the enemy were already in Gotha and Eisenach, the movement against those places was for the time stopped.

The Hanoverian Colonel Bülow, stationed at Bebringen, had learned during the night that Eisenach was again occupied, but only by two battalions. He thought right, under these circumstances, to depart from the order to return to camp, and advanced with his brigade direct on Eisenach to Lupnitz and Stockhausen. At the same time, one battalion, a detachment of Pioneers, a squadron, and two guns, the first in wagons, were sent to Mechterstädt to destroy the railway, and prevent the passage of any train from Gotha to Eisenach.

The report of this, and a request for further orders, was sent to head-quarters at Langensalza, and, since an answer might be expected about 3 P.M., the Prussian Colonel Osten, commanding in Eisenach was told to surrender the town of his own accord, or threatened with bombardment.

The King of Hanover not only approved of the measures of Colonel Bülow, but also ordered the negotiations at Gotha to be broken off, and the march of the whole Army on Eisenach that afternoon. Colonel Osten had no intention to quit the town, and the troops sent to Mechterstädt came upon Prussian Infantry on the other side of the place. A combat of skirmishers had commenced, when, on the Hanoverian side, a telegraphic despatch came, to avoid hostilities, as the Prussians had agreed to the proposals made. The action was broken off, and a truce upon both sides provisionally agreed to.

The totally impracticable proposals of King George had not been, indeed, agreed to at Berlin; but negotiations had been entered into. It was hoped that, during these, the Prussian detachments arriving from all points would be assembled in such superior strength that the Hanoverians would be relieved of the duty of engaging in a totally hopeless battle, solely for the honour of their arms.

King William was determined, above all things, to render the Hanoverian Army harmless, but was induced, under the sad condition in which it was, to grant it generous conditions.

The Hanoverian *parlementaire* still in Gotha had on his side considered that he ought not, without further orders, to break off negotiations, and asked for new instructions. He now sent to General Bülow, whose orders were known to him, the despatch above-mentioned, in order to avoid useless bloodshed.

The latter was about to attack the town, but now concluded, in order to give his tired troops rest at least over the night, an armistice till 8 in the morning.

King George was willing to enter into negotiations with a Prussian Plenipotentiary, in order, as his letter says, "to avoid bloodshed and the injury of the inhabitants," but would not suspend the operations against Eisenach under the conditions proposed to him.

The Army accordingly advanced. The Hanoverian General

in command learned late in the evening that, in consequence of the interference from Gotha, Eisenach was not taken by Bülow's brigade. The armistice, however, was agreed upon, and night came on. The army remained between Stockhausen, Mechterstedt, and Reichenbach; one brigade only, as a precaution, was placed in the direction of Gotha at Henningsleben; and Langensalza was occupied by a weak rear-guard. The Hanoverian head-quarters were at Gross-Behringen.

There next day it was discovered that the enemy during the night had seriously strengthened himself at Eisenach. The opportune moment for an operation in this direction thus appeared passed. The Prussian Plenipotentiary also was expected, and consequently a day of rest was given to the Army on the 25th.

In the morning, General Von Alvensleben came from Berlin to Gross-Behringen. The King of Hanover desired a space of 24 hours to decide on his proposals; this was agreed to, and a further armistice was concluded.

In the meantime, at Berlin, continuous efforts had been made to strengthen the military power at Gotha and Eisenach, and General Von Falckenstein had received positive orders to send troops to Gotha, by way of Magdeburg, from Göttingen.

With regard to further operations by way of Cassel, Goeben's division went there early on the morning of the 24th on the railway which was repaired as far as Münden, and Manteuffel's corps marched to Göttingen, whither also General Wrangel returned from his reconnaissance at Siemerode.

General Falckenstein now sent five battalions of Infantry and one rifled 4-pounder of Manteuffel's corps, under the command of General Flies, by way of Magdeburg and Halle, to Gotha, and desired General Goeben to march as quickly as possible with all available troops from Münden to Cassel, in order thence to be able to detach by railway to Eisenach. Besides this order, an urgent request came direct from Colonel Osten, at Eisenach, to General Goeben for support, since, as we know, the Hanoverians were before the town and threatened it with bombardment. The General on this account accelerated his movements as much as possible, and towards evening the first battalions reached Cassel, whence they were forwarded by railway to Eisenach. During the night and next morning the transport continued uninterruptedly, and by mid-day on the 25th, 5 battalions, 2 squadrons, and $3\frac{1}{2}$ batteries were at Eisenach, under General Von Kummer. The rest of the division, which General Wrangel also joined on the 25th, remained at Cassel.

Of Manteuffel's corps, on the 25th, 4 battalions, 6 squadrons, 2 batteries, went to Münden; 3 battalions, 2 squadrons, 1 battery, held Göttingen.

General Falckenstein himself, since the Göttingen-Cassel Railway was again practicable went to Eisenach on the 25th. General Beyer was requested also from that place to furnish

support, and received orders from Berlin to move as quickly as possible. He had allowed his troops to rest on this day, but now moved with Selchow's detachment, which was at Ottmashausen, to Kreuzburg, where he arrived about midnight, and on the morning of the 25th moved to Eisenach.

General Glümer also, on the evening of the 24th, moved from his cantonments at Allendorf and Witzzenhausen, and at mid-day on the 25th reached Kreutzburg and Treffurt. General Schachtmeyer, on the 25th, reached Frieda, on the right bank of the Werra, between Eschwege and Wanfried. Colonel Fabeck remained on the 24th and 25th at Gotha, and was reinforced by General Seckendorf, who marched there during the preceding days from Bleichenrode, by way of Ebeleden.

On the evening of the 25th the first troops of Flies's detachment, the march of which had been somewhat delayed by want of transport, entered Gotha from Göttingen. The remainder followed during the night.

At the distance of one march there now stood, in a semicircle round Langensalza,—

At Gotha, General Flies, with 13 battalions, 3 squadrons, and 4 batteries, about 8,150 men, 225 horses, 22 guns.

At Eisenach, 12 battalions, 4 squadrons, $4\frac{1}{2}$ batteries, altogether 12,000 men, 550 horses, 28 guns. Here General Goeben assumed the command.

At Krouzburg and Treffurt, General Von Glümer, with 8 battalions, 2 squadrons, 1 battery, 8,000 men, 250 horses, 6 guns.

Thus the result could be assured with sufficient strength.

On the afternoon of the 25th the King of Hanover had sent an officer with his definitive answer to the proposals of General Von Alvensleben.

This envoy took the road to Berlin, by way of Eisenach. General Von Falckenstein, who had shortly before reached that place, and who knew nothing officially of the conclusion of an armistice, did not permit his further journey, and the officer returned to the Hanoverian head-quarters. From various observations at Eisenach, he believed that precautions should be taken against an attack, and for this reason in the evening Bülow's brigade was drawn back to a position round Gross-Behringen; and at the earliest dawn of the 26th the remainder of the Army, with the exception of the Brigade Knesbeck, which remained at Henningsleben, was concentrated between Gross- and Oster-Behringen. Here news was received that General Von Falckenstein had learnt of the armistice, and would respect it, whereon the Army marched to Langensalza, to take up wider cantonments for purposes of supply. The head-quarters of the King were removed to this town. 26th June.

The conviction had been arrived at that escape was not possible, but it was not wished to capitulate without a contest.

The moment that diplomatic negotiations were entered upon

at the Hanoverian head-quarters, the fate of the army was decided. From that point we meet with repeated vacillations between determination for decisive military movements and the inclination for amicable interposition.

On the afternoon of the 23rd the Hanoverians opened negotiations with Berlin, but broke them off in the evening to break through at Eisenach the next day. The troops already assembled were next morning sent back to their cantonments, because first they wanted to await the answer from Berlin; but before this arrived a fresh determination was formed to commence operations against Eisenach, and the troops, who had hardly reached their quarters, were again ordered to advance. They declared then to wish to break off all diplomatic negotiations, but were ready to receive the expected Prussian Plenipotentiary to avoid bloodshed. Thus they went only half-way in either direction; they wanted to capitulate, but would make no concessions; they wanted to break through the hostile lines, but wanted to avoid an action.

We shall not err if we attribute the causes of this to the different influences of the opposing parties at head-quarters. The war party, if we may so call it, had triumphed at Göttingen, and the march to the south prevailed, but the many difficulties which its execution entailed—the great heat, scanty provisions, deficient equipment, &c., brought forward again the views of the opposition, that the battles which must be expected, and the march across the Thuringian forest, which would be especially difficult, on account of want of provisions and through scanty transport, would cause a disproportionately great loss, and that it appeared questionable whether the Army could reach Southern Germany in a position sufficiently ready for battle.

Now, in addition, the aid expected thence had not arrived. From Hanover and Göttingen trusted persons had been sent to solicit the support of the South Germans, but they were not in a condition to afford such. The 8th Federal Corps was at Frankfort, employed in its formation, and could therefore undertake nothing; and the Bavarian troops were being transported to the Maine when the Hanoverian envoy, on the 19th, met Prince Karl at Schweinfurt. The latter declared himself ready to move his army as quickly as possible towards the Hanoverians, and on the 22nd began to move on Fulda.

This direction was, however, altered, as on the following day intelligence came in that the Hanoverians, on account of the occupation of Cassel, would march through the Prussians on Eisenach, and on this day, the 26th June, the main body of the Bavarian Army was still south of the Franconian Saale, between Neustadt, Münnerstadt, Lauringen, and Königshofen; the reserves at Schweinfurt, one Infantry Brigade was, as an advanced guard, pushed forward to between Unsleben and Mellrichstadt, and had weakly occupied Fladungen and Tann. The Light Cavalry Brigade, late in the evening, reached Meiningen.

In this position a halt was made, as later intelligence did not arrive from the Hanoverians.

Rumours of the advance of the Bavarians were brought to General Von Falckenstein on the 25th, at Eisenach, which made it urgently desirable to finish the operations against the Hanoverians as soon as possible. The attack was accordingly ordered for 4 o'clock on the morning of the 26th, and the necessary dispositions taken.

The armistice concluded by General Von Alvensleben necessitated, however, the postponement of this undertaking.

In the afternoon the Prussian Colonel Von Döring appeared at Langensalza, to again propose an alliance on the basis of the conditions of the 14th June. The King of Hanover most decidedly refused this, whereupon Colonel Von Döring gave notice of the termination of the armistice.

In consequence, the Hanoverian Army, after a new idea to break through at Gotha had been abandoned, on account of the great fatigue of the troops on the night before the 27th, took up a defensive position on the left bank of the Unstrut, between Thamsbrück and Negelstädt, where a possible attack might be awaited. Langensalza remained occupied.

At Berlin a telegram had arrived on the night of the 26th, by which the Hanoverians were said to have drawn off in a northerly direction by way of Mühlhausen, already on the previous evening.

This news, which was afterwards found to be false, awoke the fear that the Hanoverian Army might attempt to return to its own home, whereby Falckenstein's Army for a longer time would be distracted from the special object of its operations—the Army of Southern Germany.

General Falckenstein received orders to immediately follow the enemy. The troops not required were alone to watch the Bavarians at Eisenach. General Von Manteuffel was to march from Göttingen against the Hanoverians.

General Von Falckenstein took this occasion to send the two battalions of the Guard from Eisenach by railway to Göttingen, to strengthen General Von Manteuffel, to whom also the troops of Goeben's division, remaining at Cassel, were given over.

General Von Flies received orders from Gotha to follow the Hanoverians, while General Von Schachtmeyer was charged to march parallel to this line of march and occupy the defiles of the Werra, to prevent escape in that direction. He moved at once to the vicinity of Eschwege.

The detachments of Von Glümer and Von Selchow were placed in cantonments round Gerstungen, to rest for further operations, and of the troops of General Von Goeben, a strong detachment of three battalions, $1\frac{1}{2}$ squadrons, went towards Vacha to get further intelligence of the Bavarians. Three battalions—half a squadron, three and a half batteries—remained at Eisenbach.

General Von Flies, who had advanced at 6 in the morning,

from Gotha on Langensalza, soon discovered the falsehood of the intelligence. His patrols came upon the Hanoverians marching from Behringsdörfer to Langensalza, and he accordingly took up a position between Bollstedt and Hochheim, but retreated in the evening to a bivouac at Warza.

General Von Falckenstein heard this in the course of the forenoon. As the Hanoverians had left the position which they had occupied opposite to him, and had withdrawn to Langensalza, it was desirable to await the result of the mission of Colonel Von Döring, as a preliminary measure no alterations were made in the arrangements already settled, except that General Von Flies was ordered not to attack the Hanoverians as long as they remained at Langensalza, but to remain close on their heels.

After the proposals of Colonel Von Döring had not been accepted, late in the evening orders came from Berlin to concentrate all available strength, and to force a capitulation, as it was feared that the enemy still might retreat by way of Tennstedt.

th June. The troops of General Goeben and Beyer's division remained on the 27th in their cantonments; only the detachment sent to Vacht returned to Gerstungen, as nothing had been seen of the Bavarians. General Falckenstein himself went on the 27th on administrative business to Cassel.

The news of the retreat of the Hanoverians still prevailed on the night of the 26th-27th June. General Flies determined, in accordance with his orders, "to remain close upon the enemy," to advance from Warza to Langensalza on the morning of the 27th June, at half-past seven o'clock.

BATTLE OF LANGENSALZA.

pendix IV. The almost improvised detachment of General Flies, of which the greater part was not intended for service in the field, and still less equipped with that view, numbered 8,150 Infantry, 225 Cavalry, and 24 guns, of which six only were rifled.*

pendix V. On the same night, between the 26th and 27th, the Hanoverian Army, 20,500 men strong, with 52 guns,† had left the cantonments hitherto occupied, and taken up a defensive position on the left bank of the Unstrut. At daybreak, Bülow's brigade was, with the reserve Artillery at Thamsbrück, Vaux's brigade at Merxleben and Knessebeck's brigade in rear of it; at Nügelstedt was Bothmer's brigade, and the Reserve Cavalry

* The battalions numbered about 900 men each, the Coburg-Gotha regiment, in two battalions, 1,300; the Landwehr and Depot Battalions between 300 and 400 men per battalion. Besides, the Landwehr were equipped only with Minié arms, and the Sally batteries with limber ammunition.

† Of these 16,177 men and 42 guns took part in the action of Langensalza.

was at Sundhausen. The detachments had outposts on the right bank of the Unstrut. Three-and-a-half-squadrons were pushed forwards on the road to Gotha, as far as Henningsleben, and to support them Langensalza was occupied by one battalion of Vaux's brigade. To protect the right flank, some earth-works had been commenced half-way between Thamsbrück and Merxleben by the two companies of pioneers and 400 men of Bülow's brigade.

The head of the Prussian advanced guard, watched by the retreating Hanoverian Cavalry, appeared about 11 A.M. before Langensalza, where it was received with Infantry fire. After a short skirmish, the 1st company of the Coburg-Gotha Regiment pushed into the town; the enemy evacuated it, but sought to prevent the *débouché* on the north-eastern exit. Here, driven back by the 1st, 2nd, and 5th companies, he retreated on Merxleben. On the Hanoverian side the advance of the Prussian troops had been regarded only as a strong reconnaissance, and, in order to prevent Langensalza, an important support of the army, from falling into the hands of the enemy, Knesbeck's brigade was ordered to advance. Bothmer's brigade was also instructed, in case of a further advance of the enemy, to fall on the latter's right flank. Not far from Callenberg's Mill the head of Knesbeck's brigade came upon the retreating advanced troops; at the same time it encountered Artillery fire from Blottnitz's battery, which had unlimbered near the Siechenhof, while detachments of Prussian Infantry appeared on the Judenhügel. Made aware of the greater strength of the advancing enemy, General Knesbeck covered the retreating troops with both battalions of the Leib Regiment, and then followed with the latter to the left bank of the Unstrut. The regiment of the Guards remained on the west of Merxleben, while the rest of the brigade retired to the reserve position intended for it, 2,000 paces north of that place.

Of the Prussian advanced guard, four companies of the Coburg-Gotha Regiment occupied the Judenhügel, the remainder of the regiment the northern exits of the town. The main body and the reserve had meanwhile formed line; the former was directed on the south-eastern corner of Langensalza, towards the Judenhügel, the latter to the Siechenhof. The advance was made under the fire of the enemy's batteries, which were in position on the further side of the Unstrut. The horse batteries of the Prussian Artillery developed themselves on the Judenhügel, but difficult ground prevented them from appearing, except one after the other. A little later the eight guns of the advanced guard came up on their left. Two companies of the 1st battalion of the 25th Regiment and three squadrons of Cavalry covered the Artillery.

A hot fire was now opened at a range of about 2,000 paces. The enemy had 15 guns (12 rifled 6-pounders and three 12-pounders) on the Kirchberg, and six rifled 6-pounders (Egger's battery) in position on the west of Merxleben; he

was, besides, soon reinforced by four rifled 6-pounders, and four horsed guns of Bothner's brigade (Müller's and Merten's batteries), which, west of Nügelstadt, at a distance of 1,700 paces flanked the position of the Prussian guns. Bothner's and Bülow's brigades, directly after the commencement of the action, had approached the centre; the former moved from Nügelstedt halfway to Merxleben; the latter came on the north-west of this place, near Knesebeck's brigade, whither the reserve Cavalry also moved. In this strong and concentrated portion it was easy to remain till the enemy, not half so strong, attacked.

12 o'clock.

Of General Flies's detachment, the 8th Company of the 11th Regiment, and a troop of the Merseburg squadron, were sent to cover the left flank towards Thamsbrück, whither somewhat later the 6th and 7th Companies of the Coburg-Gotha Regiment also followed. The place was found unoccupied; on the further side two squadrons of the Crown Prince's Dragoons and one battalion of the 4th Hanoverian Regiment showed themselves, with which a skirmish at a far distance was for some time maintained.

In the front, Colonel Hanstein pushed forward the 2nd Battalion of the 25th Regiment, on the road towards Merxleben, to which the 3rd Company of the Coburg-Gotha Regiment closed up. In columns of separate companies, these detachments extended from Gräser's Fabrik, by the Callenberg Mill, to the Bad Plantation. The left wing succeeded in crossing the Salza, and in opening fire upon the enemy's columns posted at Merxleben. An attempt of the 7th Company from Callenberg's Mill to cross the bridges of the Unstrut failed at first, but when the 2nd and 3rd Companies of the regiment entered into the action of the 2nd Battalion, and the 1st and 4th Companies advanced beyond the Bad Plantation, some detachments of skirmishers succeeded in wading through the Unstrut, and establishing themselves on the further side. The near fire of the skirmishers caused the three 12-pounders on the Kirchberg to retire, and some of the enemy's detachments, which in close order, assumed the offensive, were repulsed by file firing.

2.30 o'clock.

At half-past 12 o'clock, the Fusilier Battalion of the 11th Regiment also engaged in the fight; the 9th and 12th Companies occupied Callenberg's Mill, the 10th reinforced the line of riflemen in the left of the high-road; the 11th Company remained on the left of it. Three companies of the 25th Regiment drew towards the Bad Plantation, into which the 1st Battalion of the 11th Regiment had already entered, and whither later also the 2nd Company of the Dépôt Battalion, as well as the Potsdam Landwehr Battalion were sent from the Reserve.

It appeared now necessary for the protection of the right flank also to occupy the Erbsberg, as Bothner's Brigade was making preparations to cross the Unstrut in its neighbourhood. The 1st Company of the Dépôt Battalion which was then sent

there succeeded, although its leader and only officer was severely wounded, in driving off Müller's battery. About one o'clock, Major-General Seckendorff followed hither with the first line of the Reserve, the 3rd Company of the Dépôt Battalion, and two 6-pounder guns of the Sally Battery. The 10th and 11th Companies of the Aschersleben Battalion, and the 11th Company of the Naumburg Battalion drove back the enemy's detachments (of the 1st Battalion of the 7th Regiment), which had waded through the river, the guns took post on the hill, and fired upon Bothmer's Brigade with canister.

Somewhat later the last detachment of the Prussian Reserve, the Landwehr Battalion of Treuenbrietzen, was brought here, and carried on a musketry action with the Hanoverians in the valley of the Unstrut, while the Torgau Landwehr Battalion, from the main body, maintained the communication between the Erbsberg and the Bad Plantation.

Under these circumstances it was not possible for Bothmer's Brigade, the Jäger Battalion of which was engaged opposite the Bad Plantation, to cross the river.

While thus the Infantry battle on the Unstrut was more and more developed, about one o'clock the force of the Artillery fire somewhat slackened. On the Prussian side two howitzers had to retire behind Langensalza. They were provided only with limber ammunition, and had fired this away except two rounds. Blottnitz's battery was also compelled, in order to engage Müller's hostile battery, to take post at Siechenhof for a time. On the Hanoverian side the three 12-pounders on the Kirchberg had been compelled to retire; of the two 6-pounder rifled batteries one retired to complete its ammunition; the other, through a misunderstanding. Müller's battery had also been compelled to sacrifice its flanking position.

General Arentschild had, at Merxleben, eight battalions and opposite the Erbsberg four battalions engaged, there remained still eight fresh battalions of Bülow's and Knessebeck's brigades. From the hill of Merxleben the General had scrutinized the strength and dispositions of his adversary. When then it was reported to him, about one o'clock, that General Bothmer contemplated crossing the Unstrut, he considered the moment favourable for assuming the offensive generally, and sent orders to Bülow's and Knessebeck's Brigades to cross the Unstrut, and attack the Prussian left wing.

General Flies had only three intact companies of the 2nd Battalion of the 11th Regiment to oppose to this offensive attack made with fresh forces. On the Erbsberg indeed the Prussian troops succeeded in repelling all attempts of the four battalions of Bothmer's Brigade to cross the river, so that General Bothmer, after a loss of 14 officers and 119 men, gave up these attempts and withdrew his troops out of the valley of the Unstrut to a more covered position on the hills in rear. On the other hand, the few Prussian companies which for a long time had been engaged on the left wing, and had no support

worthy of the name behind them, were not in a position to repulse the attack made upon them by seven Hanoverian battalions.

While in the front the artillery fire grew hotter as the rifled 6-pounders, and the battery of 24-pounder howitzers of the Hanoverian Reserve Artillery drove up on the Kirchberg, and .30 o'clock. were anew joined by the battery of Vaux's Brigade, Bülow's Brigade, about half-past one o'clock, reached the Unstrut. It succeeded, in conjunction with the Regiment of Guards, in crossing the river west of Merxleben, and forcing the Prussian skirmishers behind the Salza. One battalion, as well as the battery of the brigade, and the regiment of Crown Prince's Dragoons, had taken up a covering position towards Thamsbrück, but the battalion soon followed across the Unstrut.

In the centre the advance of the Jäger Battalion of Bothmer's Brigade dislodged the Prussian skirmishers, who had already established themselves on the left bank. A similar attempt of the Jäger Battalion of Vaux's Brigade to advance from the heights of Merxleben had been frustrated. After two o'clock, 2 o'clock. Colonel Vaux, in person, succeeded in leading this battalion, as well as the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Regiment, down to the Unstrut, and, in company with the 3rd Jäger Battalion, in pushing over the river east of the bridges. The bridges and the bed of the Unstrut were occupied by portions of Vaux's Brigade. The defenders were confined to Callenberg's Mill, the avenue leading to Bad, and the Bad Plantation.

To further strengthen the attack, the Jäger Battalion of Guards, and the 2nd Battalion of the Leib Regiment of Knesebeck's Brigade advanced over the Kirchberg; the latter, however, here suffered such serious loss—in a few moments six officers and about 50 men—that it had to draw back. The battery of Knesebeck's Brigade also again took part in the fight; its first division which came up directed its 12-pounders on Callenberg's Mill, and compelled its defenders to evacuate it. As, however, their retreat was rendered impossible by the fire of the Hanoverian detachments, which had already crossed the Unstrut and Salza, they again established themselves in the mill, and laid down their arms here to the hostile companies which came to storm it.

Considering the serious superiority of the adversary, a further prosecution of the fight did not appear advisable to General Flies; besides, the object of the action—the detention of the Hanoverian army—had been fully accomplished, and indeed too much had already been done for the purpose. The retreat was ordered.

Of the three companies of the 11th Regiment still in reserve, the 7th was sent forward in the direction of Gräser's Fabrik, to support the left wing, which was ever gradually losing more ground, Colonel Zglinitzki led the 5th and 6th Companies to the churchyard, at the Erfurt Gate, where the 8th Company of the Coburg-Gotha Regiment joined them. Colonel Fabeck received orders to hold the Judenhügel with four companies of

the latter regiment, until the Artillery and the troops engaged in front had withdrawn.

General Seckendorff was also directed to retire the right wing from the Erbsberg in the direction of Siechenhof.

The left wing strove with all its strength to detain the advance of Bülow's Brigade and the Guards, but one after another all the points outside of the town, Gräser's Fabrik, the Rasen Mill, the brick-field (Ziegelei), and the hospital (Lazareth), fell into the hands of the assailants. Under a hot fire, the retreat was commenced through Langensalza, on the Gotha road. It was not long before the detachments at the Erfurt Gate and on the Judenhügel received fire in flank and rear from the enemy's Infantry, which was spreading out in the town, and were also compelled to retreat after Major Petzel had withdrawn the batteries to a covering position south of Langensalza. In this position the 3rd 4-pounder battery, which was standing without protection on the east of the road, was suddenly attacked in rear by a hostile squadron. Captain Blottnitz reversed his guns while loading, repulsed the attack with canister, and then resumed his fire in the original direction. South of the town General Flies, about 4 o'clock, assembled 4 o'clock. his detachments, returning singly from the fray. General Seckendorff also moved here with the battalions from the Erbsberg; he had conducted his march along the Klinggraben unmolested by the hostile Infantry; only three squadrons of the Cambridge Dragoons, who had crossed earlier by Nägelstedt, showed themselves on his right flank. One of these squadrons attacked the two guns of the Sally Battery, which were marching with the 3rd Company of the Dépôt Battalion, now numbering only 30 men, in the middle Illeben Road. Notwithstanding canister fire and two salvos from the Infantry, several Dragoons, with the squadron leader Captain Einem at their head, burst into the artillery division, but were for the most part either killed or taken. The remainder fled, pursued by the garrison squadron of the 12th Hussars. The draught horses were however frightened, bolted, and fell in a hollow road immediately in rear, out of which it was impossible to get them. In vain several detachments of Infantry manned the guns. As no means of dragging them out could be sent, they were obliged to be left lying, and were so found by the Hanoverians. By desire of the Duke of Saxe Coburg-Gotha, who came upon the field later, indeed some relay horses were sent with the Stendal squadron for them, but found the guns already removed.

The situation of these troops, which formed the garrison of the Bad Plantation, and had not followed the main body at the same time, had become peculiarly difficult. There were here, besides the 1st Battalion of the 11th Regiment, several companies of the 25th Regiment, the Potsdam Landwehr Battalion, and two companies of the Dépôt Battalion. After the Judenhügel had also been abandoned by the Prussian troops, the greatest part of the enemy's artillery concentrated its fire on

the Bad Plantation. This was, however, although attacked on three sides by Vaux's brigade, the available battalions of Knesebeck's brigade and the 3rd Jäger Battalion, for a long time held, and the retreat was commenced very late.

Now the Hanoverian Cavalry also advanced. Some time before two squadrons of the Queen's Hussars had crossed the bridges of the Unstrut, but had found themselves compelled in column of fours, to seek shelter north of Callenberg's Mill, in the narrow defile between the Salza and the *chaussée*. The two other squadrons of the regiment which somewhat later tried to follow from Merxleben, came unexpectedly upon the column halted in the defile, and a portion of them were forced, through want of room, to go back again. Some horsemen were thereby forced into the Salza and Unstrut. So the reserve Cavalry now ordered forward came upon the Hussars, and the delay thus caused, and accompanied with loss, was taken advantage of by its battery to unlimber on the bank, and to fire some rounds of canister against the Bad. When, immediately after this, the Bad Plantation was abandoned on the receipt of the first order which had arrived for retreat, and the Prussian Infantry in loose order after several hours of a musketry action, were entering open ground, the Queen's Hussars burst forth.

Several detachments, before they had time to form squares, were ridden down, others scattered, while the Infantry remaining behind in the plantation fell into the hands of the attacking hostile Infantry. It was, however, possible to unite the supports and the best part of the retiring skirmishers into two columns, which commenced their retreat by way of the Siechenhof, and here picked up a few detachments.

First, in the middle and upper Illeben Weg, east of the Klinggraben, were these columns reached by the hostile reserve Cavalry, while the Cambridge Dragoons, at the same time, sought to waylay their further march. The two columns were separated about 700 paces from each other, south of the Klinggraben. The western, under the command of Captain Rosenberg, of the 11th Grenadier Regiment, formed of men of the 3rd Company of this regiment, and the remains of the 9th and 12th Companies of the Potsdam Landwehr Battalion, and detachments of different troops, was on the upper Illeben Weg, first attacked by the Garde-du-Corps. The attack, made with two squadrons in the first and one in the second line, did not succeed. In passing, the squadron received fire from both flanks, and lost 2 officers, 16 men, and 42 horses.

Almost at the same time the second column, on the middle Illeben road, came in contact with the hostile Cavalry. Under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel des Barres, the column, composed of the main portion of the 1st Battalion of the 11th Grenadiers, the remains of the 10th and 11th Companies of the Potsdam Landwehr Battalion, and scattered men of different troops, had already, not far from the Bad Plantation, repulsed the attack of the Hussars of the Guard; its further march had been accom-

panied by hostile Artillery fire. On the rise of the middle Illeben road, Cavalry was seen, towards which Colonel des Barres, as he thought it Prussian, rode. It happened, however, this was the three squadrons of Cambridge Dragoons: their leader approached Colonel des Barres, and requested him to surrender. This proposal was declined, but, almost at the same time, the head of the quickly formed squares was attacked from the centre by the Cuirassier Regiment of the Guard which came up from the north; this advanced with two squadrons in the first line, while the third followed as a reserve, and a fourth was further in rear as escort to the horse battery. The attack was repulsed, also a second which the Cambridge Dragoons made against the rear of the column, and a third which the two Cuirassier squadrons, when again rallied, made. Some horsemen, as well as riderless horses, forced into the squares at each of these attacks, and men were thrown and wounded; the Infantry had reclosed its ranks with undisturbed coolness. In the presence of the strong hostile Cavalry to which now were added the Hussars of the Guard who had come from Ngelstedt, and which now mustered 16 $\frac{3}{4}$ squadrons, and under the enemy's artillery fire, the retreat was conducted in the direction of Henningsleben, and a junction was there effected with the remaining portions of the detachment of General Flies, who in the meantime had marched off along the Gotha road. 6.30 o'clock.

The enemy's infantry brigades assembled in and near Langensalza. Some squadrons resumed the positions held by the outposts in the morning.

General Flies continued his retreat from Henningsleben to Warza. Here also came, on the morning of the 28th June, the left flanking detachment, which, on the afternoon of the 27th, soon after 4 o'clock, had learned at Thamsbruck the result of the fight. Its march, accompanied by hostile Cavalry and Artillery, and molested by some shells, had been by Ufhofen and Grumbach.

The losses in the battle of Langensalza were, on both sides, under the circumstances, very considerable.

The Prussian loss in killed and wounded was 41 officers and 805 men.

	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Men.
Coburg-Gotha Regiment	2	11	3	44	1
25th Infantry	4	59	11	191	20
11th Grenadier	3	56	9	253	9
Depôt Battalion, 71st Regiment	3	2	16	..
Landwehr Battalions, Torgau and Naumburg	} ..	5	1	13	..
Landwehr Battalion, Aschersleben	8	2	29	3
Landwehr Battalions, Potsdam and Treuenbrietzen	} 1	11	2	41	..
12th Hussars, Depôt Squadron	6	..
3rd 4-pr. Battery, 6th Artillery Regiment	1	..	5	..
3rd Horse Battery, 7th	1	..	8	..
4th	1	2	..	2	..
Sally Battery, 4th Artillery Regiment	2	..	5	..
Total.. .. .	11	159	30	613	33

Lieutenants-Colonel Von Westenhausen and Von Oettinger were among the wounded; the former died of his wound. Colonel Fabeck and Major Büsse had horses shot under them.

The extraordinary heat of the 27th June, as well as the hot fight, had taxed the strength of the men to the utmost. For example, in the 1st Battalion 11th Regiment, when it had advanced into the Bad Plantation, already 50 to 60 men had sunk exhausted; consequently a not inconsiderable number of wearied men fell into the hands of the enemy during the retreat. On the Prussian side, the number of men taken prisoners was not ascertained, as they, on the 28th, again returned to their regiments; according to Hanoverian reckoning, it was said to have been 10 officers and 897 men. The Hanoverian loss amounted to 102 officers and 1,327 men killed and wounded, of whom 10 were Staff Officers. Vaux's brigade suffered most, as its Infantry and Jägers lost 24 officers, 492 men; while the Cambridge Dragoons attached to it lost 5 officers and 51 men. On the night after the battle, from the Hanoverian side, an armistice for several days was requested from General Flies, and, at the same time, a free passage to the south was requested on condition of not fighting against Prussia for two months; these proposals were declined.

As soon as the result of the battle of Langensalza was known in Berlin, positive orders were sent to General Falckenstein and direct to the divisions, to advance against the Hanoverians without any regard to the probable approach of the Bavarians with all forces disposable, and to accomplish their disarmament. This order reached Cassel at midnight, whence General Falckenstein immediately went to Eisenach after he had telegraphed the necessary orders.

Before receiving them, General Goeben during the night

moved the troops stationed nearest the railway from Eisenach and Gerstungen to Gotha, so that General Flies early on the 28th was reinforced at Warza by several battalions and two batteries.

All the rest, except the troops of General Schachtmeyer, which only reached Kreuzburg, were assembled in the course of the forenoon at Eisenach, whence Generals Goeben and Beyer in the afternoon, with 11 battalions, 6 squadrons, and 4 batteries advanced on Langensalza. Not less also General Manteuffel pushed forward against the Hanoverians. His movements from Göttingen were as follows:—

On the very early morning of the 26th he received intelligence from Berlin of the retreat of the enemy through Mühlhausen with orders to advance against him. The northerly direction which the Hanoverian Army was said to have taken led him to push forward the troops stationed at Göttingen, under General Korth, as an advanced guard to Duderstadt. The detachment sent on the previous day to Minden, and General Wrangel with four battalions and one battery of Goeben's division from Cassel, were drawn to Göttingen by rail, which they entered together towards evening and marched successively to the vicinity of Beyenrode. Two battalions of the Guard which had been sent from Eisenach to Göttingen arriving late in the evening remained there for the night. Also a rifled 6-pounder battery, the material for which was found in Stade, and which General Manteuffel had horsed and provided with men, came up to-day as a reinforcement to the corps. In the course of the day the march of the Hanoverians was not corroborated, and the Cavalry patrols, pushed forward to Bodungen, Worbis, and Kreuzeber heard nothing of the enemy. For this reason a more southerly direction of march was taken on the 27th.

By midday on the 27th General Korth reached Worbis—the other troops, Dingelstedt and Heiligenstadt. Here six squadrons of reserve Cavalry of Goeben's division, with a horse battery from Cassel, joined Manteuffel.

The latter, in the afternoon, heard of the battle of Langensalza, and at the same time the certain announcement that the Hanoverians had again taken up their position at Merxleben. He determined to attack them there next day, and in the evening drew the troops from Heiligenstedt to Dingelstedt, whither Korth was also to move.

The latter had received a report that the enemy was drawing off on the road to Sondershausen, and had moved in this direction as far as Elende. Thus no disposition could be made with this detachment, and there remained to General Manteuffel only about 8,000 men, with whom he marched to Mühlhausen early on the 28th.

There it was learned that the support of General Goeben, which had been requested by telegraph, could not that day be depended upon, and as the enemy showed no sign of quitting his position, the attack was put off till the following day. The troops advanced in the afternoon to the line between Gross-

Gottern and Welsbach. General Korth in the evening entered Kirchheilingen.

The enemy's outposts on the approach of the Prussians withdrew rapidly to Langensalza.

Thus, on the evening of the 28th, at last the circle was completed, and the Hanoverians were surrounded by more than 40,000 men. The wavering decisions of the Hanoverian headquarters, the frequent false reports of the movements of the Army had hitherto much hindered and delayed this.

The assurance now of being surrounded by such a serious superiority of strength, the exhaustion of the troops, the want of ammunition and provisions, and the losses in the battle, convinced the King of Hanover that a further contest could only lead to useless bloodshed.

Unconditional submission was accordingly determined upon, and a messenger was to take the notice thereof to Berlin.

General Flies, to whom he was first sent to request a preliminary armistice, and to declare that the Hanoverian troops had orders to make no further resistance, could not, on account of the instructions he had received, allow him to proceed, but reported to Berlin and to General Falckenstein at Eisenach.

A second *parlementaire* in the neighbourhood of the Behringers villages, fell in with Generals Goeben and Beyer, who, under existing circumstances, halted. It seemed useless to march the tired troops further; they bivouacked round Hütscherode, and the advanced guard occupied Behringsdörfer.

In regard to the brave resistance which the Hanoverian Army had offered, the King of Prussia was inclined to grant such conditions as would for all futurity remove the sting of a grievous remembrance. General Manteuffel was specially commissioned to arrange this matter.

29th June. When he for this object, on the forenoon of the 29th, reached Langensalza, he found an unconditional capitulation which had been already concluded between Generals Falkenstein and Arentschildt. Nevertheless, the milder stipulations granted by His Majesty, which are in the Appendix, were added to the original capitulation, and a clear stipulation made for the return of the Hanoverian troops to their homes.

Appendix
IV.

They remained on the 29th in cantonments round Langensalza, and in the course of the 30th June and 1st July moved from Gotha by railway through Magdeburg to Celle and Hildesheim, whence the men were dismissed to their homes.

The Prussian troops on the 29th took up wider cantonments in the districts they occupied, and halted on the 30th June.

CHAPTER IV.

INVASION OF BOHEMIA AND SAXONY.

WHILE in North-Western Germany, by the occupation of Hesse Cassel, and the capitulation of the Hanoverian Army, the imminent danger of a separation of the two halves of the Prussian Monarchy was fortunately avoided, the main armies had not remained inactive. The army of the Elbe stood ready at Torgau for the invasion of Saxony, with the same object the reserve corps concentrated at Berlin had been put in motion by marches and railway, besides, the first army was moved close to the Elbe with its right wing through Upper Lusatia.

Warned by the Chief of the Staff that the advance would probably take place on the 16th June, General Von Herwarth received his latest orders to move direct on Dresden, where it was hoped that he would fall in with the enemy.

The advanced guard, General Von Schöler, stood at Fichtenberg, close to the frontier, Etzel's division directly in rear of it; both concentrated on the right bank of the Elbe. A bridge was at once thrown at Lösnig by the pontoons of the Hind Corps, to carry these detachments to the other bank. There Canstein's division was assembled between Auszig and Staritz, and Münster's division at Schildau and Sitzendorf.

It had been anticipated that the large railway bridge at Riesa was prepared to be burnt, and was occupied by a detachment of pioneers. To prevent, if possible, the unnecessary destruction of such a costly erection, the first battalion of the 34th Regiment was placed on the proposed evening in the quick train going to Dresden with orders to move direct on Riesa, but before the battalion arrived the bridge was seen in flames. The Saxon post at Lösnig had been alarmed by the defile of the advanced guard over the pontoon bridge at Lösnig, and the work of destruction was at once begun at Riesa, by which a considerable loss of material, without any military advantage, was caused to the Saxons.

The Prussian advanced guard reached Riesa in the night, and the restoration of the bridge at the cost of the country was at once ordered. The detached battalion closed up to the 16th Division from Burxdorf by way of Lösnig.

One battalion of the 12th Division had occupied the bridge of the Mulde at Wurzen.

Only the first echelons or the reserve corps had, as yet, reached Roederau, and there was no intelligence whether the Saxons at Dresden had been reinforced by the Austrian 1st Corps. Nevertheless, on the 16th June, General Herwarth, 16th June. early in the evening, crossed the frontier in three columns; the advanced guard pushed its outposts to Johannishausen, Etzel's

division reached Riesa, Canstein's division, Seehausen, and Münster's division, Zöschau.

It was now ascertained that Dresden was abandoned by its garrison, the Saxon troops were marching on Pirna, and that King John had gone there.

Horn's division of the 1st Army had, on this day, entered Löbau.

17th June. On the 17th June the Elbe Army pursued its advance, the advanced guard to Bockwen, Etzel's division to Meissen, Canstein's division to Canitz and Seehausen, Münster's division to Leippau and Eula, and a detachment of the latter of all arms was pushed to cover the right flank to Ostrau and Döbeln.

On this day Horn's division occupied Bautzen. At Meissen, the bridge over the Elbe had been found destroyed; the pioneers with the pontoons of the IIIrd Corps d'Armée had already placed a bridge on this day at Riesa.

18th June. On the 18th June, General Von Schöler advanced through Dresden, and Etzel's division followed him into the town. The people were quiet and conciliatory. Refreshments were willingly brought to the soldier's, and no difficulty was experienced in providing quarters for them.

Canstein's division marched to Kesselsdorf, and pushed its advanced guard to Tharand and Potschappel; Münster's division reached Leinbach and Tannenberg, its advanced troops Herzogswalde.

The Pontoon column of the IIInd Corps this day placed a bridge at Meissen, after it had removed that at Lösnig on the afternoon of the 16th.

The Commander of the 1st Army had pushed the 4th Regiment of Uhlans and the 5th Hussars under Major-General Count Bismarck to Bischofswerder. After severe marching, this detachment, on the following day, reached Dresden, and so took up the communication between the 1st and the Elbe Army. The latter halted on the 19th. The advanced guard occupied the line Pillnitz, Nieder-Zedlitz, and Lockwitz with its outposts.

The Saxon Army had received no support from the Austrian. In the face of tremendous odds it could only evacuate its territory which lay open to the Prussian invasion, supported as it was by strong reinforcements.

But more was to be done than only to occupy Saxony. The Elbe Army had become available for operations against Austria, its distance from the 1st Army shortened by one half, had even the communication from Dresden to Bohemia on the right bank of the Elbe. This must be protected, and Dresden held, as the whole country on the left of the Elbe might be lost if a Bavarian reinforcement supported an advance of the Saxon Army. Measures were immediately taken to fortify Dresden against an attack from the west, the main body of the Prussian Army defended its presence from the east. The occu-

pation of this important point was entrusted to the 2nd Division of the Reserve Corps, which was sent by rail to Herzberg, and thence by way of Riesa and Meissen entered Dresden on the 22nd.

To immediately occupy the most important points of the country on the 18th, a battalion of the 4th Regiment of Guards and a weak detachment of Cavalry had already, on the 18th, been ordered to Leipzig. Unmobilized Landwehr battalions from Stralsund and Stettin also arrived there on the 30th.

General Mülbe was appointed Military Governor of Saxony. With the small means at his disposal it appeared necessary to throw obstacles in the way of a Bavarian advance, and, therefore, the railway leading to Hof was broken up on the further side of Werdau. Colonel Mertens was entrusted with the fortifying of Dresden. After all had been done for the security of Saxony, which immediate circumstances demanded, all other mobilized troops which had entered that country were intended for the decisive main movement in Bohemia.

By a royal order of the 19th June, the Elbe Army was united with the 1st Army, and General Herwarth placed under command of His Royal Highness Prince Frederick Charles.

The 1st Division of the Reserve Corps was transported to Bittenfeld by rail; it marched by Eilenburg, Wurzen, and Döbeln, and entered Meissen on the 21st. This division—12 battalions, with 2 Cavalry Regiments, and 2 batteries—was placed under the direct orders of General Herwarth.

The intelligence of the position of the Austrian Army was various and partly false. It all tended to say that the 1st Corps which had been nearest the frontier on both banks of the Elbe had been reinforced by the IInd Corps, and that even the Saxon Corps had been added.

Further, that the IIIrd Corps was marching on Pardubitz, the VIIIth on Brünn, and the IVth moving in a westerly direction. The manifesto of the Emperor Francis Joseph allowed a speedy commencement of hostilities to be anticipated, and it was at least not improbable that the Austrian main Army proposed a concentration in Northern Bohemia, where it would have stood united on an interior line between the Prussian Armies. Such a situation could not be disregarded, but the assembly of the Prussian forces had to be undertaken to counteract it. Appendix VII.

Austria had taken the initiative in arming; it was not desirable to yield up to her that of action. The advance into Bohemia was ordered.

On the 18th June, King William published a proclamation to his people. Appendix VIII.

On the same day Austrian Hussars crossed the frontier of Upper Silesia at Klingbeutel, and fired on Prussian patrols.

A special declaration of war against Austria did not