

Ancient
Commentators
on Aristotle

GENERAL EDITOR: RICHARD SORABJI

ALEXANDER OF
APHRODISIAS:
Ethical Problems

Translated by
R.W. Sharples

B L O O M S B U R Y



Alexander of Aphrodisias
Ethical Problems

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In memoriam
William Arthur Sharples
13 June 1917 – 27 September 1988

Introduction

Alexander and the *Ethical Problems*

These *Ethical Problems* attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias have never before, to my knowledge, been translated into English or into any other modern language. They deserve our attention for a number of reasons. Like the other minor works attributed to Alexander, they have their apparent origin in discussion and debate of Aristotle's works and thought by Alexander himself and his associates or pupils. They thus throw light, even if a dimmer and more fitful light than we might wish, on the functioning of a philosophical 'school' in the early years of the third century AD;¹ and, in their concern to remove apparent contradictions and anomalies, they exemplify an aspect of the process by which Aristotle's thought was, over the centuries, organised and formulated into the doctrine of Aristotelianism. The issues with which these *Problems* deal derive from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, perhaps the work of ancient philosophy most widely studied today, at least in Anglo-Saxon countries, among those whose concern with philosophy is not primarily historical;² and some of these issues are not without direct relevance to public life and the conduct of politics in the last decades of the twentieth century – such as the attack on the demand for usefulness in everything in *Problem 20*, or the assertion of the importance of political community (*koinônia*) at the end of *Problem 24*.

The extant Greek commentaries on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* that can be reliably dated are either very early (second century AD) or very late (twelfth to fourteenth centuries). There is no commentary by any of the greatest commentators from the period 200 to 600 AD. But the present collection is the next nearest thing. The problems it contains reflect the work of the greatest exponent of Aristotelianism, and they address themselves closely to some

¹ I have endeavoured to say more about the evidence the minor works attributed to Alexander can give us for the functioning of his 'school' in Sharples (1989). (For works cited by author's name and date only, see the Bibliography, p. 89.)

² It is not indeed possible to study the history of philosophy without engaging with philosophical issues, consciously or unconsciously; and, conversely, philosophising is likely to be better philosophising if it takes account of earlier discussions of the same and similar problems. But there can still be a difference of emphasis between an approach that is primarily historical and one that is not.

portions of Aristotle's text, although in a problematic rather than an expository style.

Despite their focus on Aristotle, these *Problems* are often couched in the language of the Hellenistic philosophy that had intervened since his time.³ This is not something that is peculiar to Alexander and his associates; by the Imperial period many terms that originally had a technical sense in the usage of a particular school of philosophy had come to be used in a more general way by members of many different schools. The *Ethical Problems* also show how a master of the Aristotelian school, or his pupils, would answer various theses of Stoic or Epicurean moral philosophy. They may also provide a glimpse of the arguments used by the Stoics or Epicureans for these theses (cf., for example, *Problem 3*, on the Stoic thesis that there is no intermediate state between virtue and vice); but it is important to remember that the discussion is carried on in the context of *Aristotelian* philosophy, and that arguments raising difficulties for Aristotelian positions might well be devised in the context of such discussions by Alexander himself, by his pupils, or by earlier Peripatetic tradition. Even where such difficulties are formulated in consciousness of Stoic or Epicurean positions, it does not follow that the *arguments* themselves represent Stoic or Epicurean ones, or that they would have been accepted by members of those schools.⁴

Alexander of Aphrodisias, known by later generations as *the* commentator on Aristotle,⁵ was appointed by the emperors as a public teacher of Aristotelian philosophy at some time between 198 and 209 AD.⁶ As a public teacher it is likely that he had, in some sense, a school; and among the works attributed to him there survive a considerable number of short texts, some of which seem to be related in various ways to his teaching activities.⁷

Some of these texts survive in collections apparently made in antiquity. Three books of these collected discussions are entitled *phusikai skholikai aporiai kai luseis*, 'School-discussion problems and solutions on nature' (often cited in modern literature as Alexander's *Quaestiones*); a fourth is titled 'Problems on Ethics' but

³ cf. Todd (1976) 27-8; and below, n. 49 to *P. Eth.* 5; n. 100 to *P. Eth.* 9; n. 162 to *P. Eth.* 18; n. 170 to *P. Eth.* 19; n. 220 to *P. Eth.* 25; n. 253 to *P. Eth.* 27; n. 282 to *P. Eth.* 29.

⁴ On Alexander's developing in purely Aristotelian contexts of controversies connected with the doctrines of other schools cf. Todd (1976) 75-88; and on his constructing of objections purely in order to argue against them cf. R.W. Sharples, *Alexander of Aphrodisias On Fate*, London 1983, 159-60 and 176-7. Cf. also n. 138 to *P. Eth.* 14; n. 162 to *P. Eth.* 18; n. 240 to *P. Eth.* 27.

⁵ cf. Simplicius in *Phys.* 707,33; 1170,2; 1176,32; Philoponus in *An. Pr.* 136,20.

⁶ cf. Todd (1976) 1 n. 3.

⁷ Surveys of these may be found at Bruns (1982) v-xiv; Moraux (1942) 19-28; Sharples (1987) 1189-95.

sub-titled, no doubt in imitation of the preceding three books when it was united with them,⁸ *skholikai êthikai aporiai kai luseis*, 'School-discussion problems and solutions on ethics'. A further collection was transmitted as the second book of Alexander's treatise *On the Soul*, and labelled *mantissa* or 'makeweight' by the Berlin editor Bruns. Other texts essentially similar to those in these collections survive, some in Greek⁹ and some only in Arabic;¹⁰ and there is evidence that there were other collections now lost.¹¹ The circumstances in which these collections were put together are unclear; it was not always expertly done, and while some of the titles attached to particular pieces seem to preserve valuable additional information, others are inept or unhelpful.¹² (In the *Ethical Problems* themselves the compiler failed to realise that *Problem* 26 was simply a repetition of the latter part of *Problem* 23; it is not therefore translated here.) Nor is it clear at what date the collections were assembled.¹³ Sometimes the views expressed in a particular text are so different from those in other works by Alexander that it is difficult to believe that they are those of Alexander himself (though as it happens there are no very clear examples of this in the *Ethical Problems*); more often there are no very clear reasons to suppose a text is not by Alexander himself, but equally no way of proving conclusively that it is. In the notes I have sometimes for the sake of convenience referred to the author of a particular text as 'Alexander', without thereby intending to express a definite view as to its authenticity.

In addition to (i) 'problems' in the strict sense with their solutions, these minor works include¹⁴ (ii) expositions (*exêgêseis*) of

⁸ So Bruns (1892) v. The *Ethical Problems* are thus sometimes cited as '*Quaestiones* book 4', a title that has no MSS authority. The *Ethical Problems* should be distinguished from the (spurious) *Medical Puzzles and Physical Problems* also attributed to Alexander and edited by J.L. Ideler, *Physici et Medici Graeci Minores*, Berlin 1841, and H. Usener, *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis quae feruntur Problematorum libri 3 et 4*, Berlin 1859. Cf. Sharples (1987) 1198.

⁹ Notably the two edited by G. Vitelli, 'Due Frammenti di Alessandro di Afrodisia', in *Festschrift Theodor Gomperz*, Vienna 1902, 90-3. It is hoped to include these as an appendix to *Quaestiones* book 2 in the present series of translations.

¹⁰ cf. Sharples (1987) 1192-4, and the modern secondary literature referred to, 1187.

¹¹ 'Scholia logica' are referred to in what may be a gloss at Alexander in *An. Pr.* 250,2; and an 'Explanation and summary of certain passages from (Aristotle's) *de Sensu*', which Moraux suggests may have been a similar collection, is referred to by a scholion on *Quaestio* 1.2. Cf. Moraux (1942) 24; Sharples (1987) 1196.

¹² cf. the discussion at Bruns (1892) xi.

¹³ Alexander's commentary on the *de Sensu* cites not only the lost *de Anima* commentary (167,21) but also a section of the *mantissa* (*in Sens.* 31,29, citing *mantissa* 127-30; cf. P. Wendland, preface to CAG 3.1, v; P. Moraux in G.E.R. Lloyd and G.E.L. Owen (eds.), *Aristotle on Mind and the Senses*, Cambridge 1978, 297 n. 71.

¹⁴ The following summary account (which is not exhaustive) of the various types of texts to be found among the minor works may be supplemented by the discussions in n. 5 above.

particularly problematic Aristotelian texts, (iii) short expositions of Aristotelian doctrine on a particular topic, and (iv) straightforward and sometimes tedious paraphrases of passages in Aristotle's writings; both (iii) and (iv) alike seem to be described as *epidromai* or 'summaries'. There are also (v) collections, one might almost say batteries, of arguments for a particular Aristotelian position.¹⁵ It seems likely that (iii), (iv) and (v), in particular, reflect teaching activity; it is difficult in some cases to see why else they might have been written. Some of these texts may be Alexander's own expositions of particular topics, while some may be more in the nature of exercises by his students.¹⁶

Some of the short texts attributed to Alexander are clearly related either to his monographs¹⁷ or to Aristotelian works on which he wrote full-scale commentaries. The *quaestiones* include a number of discussions of passages in Aristotle's *de Anima*, and Moraux pointed out that these actually follow the sequence of Aristotle's own treatise, though interspersed with other material in the collections as they now exist.¹⁸ Where the *Ethical Problems* are concerned, however, the matter is less clear. Many of these texts are related explicitly or implicitly to particular sections of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*; but they do not follow the sequence of topics in that work¹⁹ – indeed, there is no very clear principle of arrangement that can be discerned. Nor is it clear whether Alexander himself wrote a full-scale commentary on the *Ethics*.²⁰

¹⁵ As Bruns (1892) xii-xiii notes, these are characteristic of the *Mantissa* rather than of the *Quaestiones*; they also occur in the *Ethical Problems*. (*Quaestio* 2.28, however, approaches close to the type.)

¹⁶ cf. Bruns (1892) ix. Different discussions of the same topic (*Problems* 2, 9 and 13; 7 and 16; 8 and 28) sometimes read 'almost like (answers to) exam questions set in successive years' (Professor Sorabji's description). In terms of modern analogies, though, one might also think of a philosopher writing an article in a learned journal to set forth what he thought was a better solution to a particular problem than that in some earlier article, without particularly wanting to engage in direct controversy with his predecessor; true though it is that *modern* conventions make this less common in an article than in a book. Cf. my discussion cited in n. 1 above, and n. 94 to *P. Eth.* 8 below.

¹⁷ For example, the last four sections of the *Mantissa* (pp. 169-86) are linked by subject matter with Alexander's treatise *On Fate*. Cf. Moraux (1942) 24; and on the exact nature of the relation in the case of two of these sections cf. R.W. Sharples, 'Responsibility, chance and not-being (Alexander of Aphrodisias *mantissa* 169-72)', *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 22 (1975) 37-63; id., 'Alexander of Aphrodisias' second treatment of fate? (*De anima libri mantissa* pp. 179-86 Bruns)', *ibid.* 27 (1980) 76-94.

¹⁸ Moraux (1942) 23.

¹⁹ cf. the Index of Passages Cited.

²⁰ That he did so is suggested by a reference to '*hupomnēmata* on the *Ethics*' at Alexander in *Top.* 187.9-10; but this is the only evidence. The reference might rather be to these *Problems* and especially to *Problem* 11 (q.v.); it must be admitted, though, that the term *hupomnēmata* is elsewhere applied by Alexander to commentaries. Cf.

The chief interests of the *Ethical Problems* are in the solution of difficulties in the application of logical distinctions to ethical subject-matter (for example, the way in which pleasure and distress are opposites) and in topics (such as responsibility for actions) which Alexander dealt with in independent treatises. Concern with logical distinctions in ethical contexts is not indeed foreign to Aristotle himself.²¹ Madigan has drawn attention to the way in which these *Problems* go beyond Aristotle in introducing themes from Aristotelian physics into ethical contexts.²² That they do so is in accordance with Alexander's concern to interpret one part of Aristotle's writings by another, the consequence of which is a tendency to establish, as far as possible, a unified Aristotelian system.²³

Whether or not Alexander himself wrote anything on Aristotle's *Ethics* beyond these *Problems*, they do have a place in the series of ancient Greek and Byzantine works on Aristotelian ethics, and a brief comparison with some other works may be useful. The earliest works after the revival of interest in Aristotelianism in the first century BC, the summary of Aristotelian ethics by Arius Didymus – himself a Stoic²⁴ –, the treatise *On Virtues and Vices* falsely attributed to Aristotle, and the work *On Emotions* wrongly attributed to Andronicus²⁵ are essentially doxographical in nature,

R.W. Sharples, 'Ambiguity and opposition: Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Ethical Problems* 11', *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 32 (1985) 109-16, at 113.

²¹ cf. Sharples (cited in previous note) 113 n. 1.

²² Madigan (1987) 1279: his examples include the pervasive use made of the theory of contrariety (on which cf. the Subject Index to the present translation); the use of the physical notion of mixture in *Problem* 28 to illustrate a point about the virtues, and the appeal to the order of the universe to argue that activity is superior to pleasure (*P. Eth.* 23 144, 17ff.)

²³ cf. Sharples (1987) 1179-80.

²⁴ Arius' work is preserved in Stobaeus *Ecl.* 2.7 pp. 37-152 Wachsmuth; 116-52 is the specifically Aristotelian section, but there are also references to Aristotle's views in the thematically arranged introductory section at pp. 37-57. Giusta has argued not only that Arius' work has not been preserved in its original form, but also that it was as a whole arranged by arguments rather than by schools. Cf. H. von Arnim, *Arius von Didymus' Abriss der peripatetischen Ethik*, Sitzb. Wien 204 (1926) no. 3; M. Giusta, *I dossografi di etica*, Turin 1964-67, *passim* but especially vol. 1 pp. 58-62, and id., 'Ario Didimo e la diairesis dell'etica di Eudoro di Alessandria', *Atti dell'Accademia delle Scienze di Torino*, cl. di Scienze Morali etc., 120 (1986) 97-132; P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen* 1, Berlin 1973, 305-418; W.W. Fortenbaugh (ed.), *On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: the Work of Arius Didymus*, New Brunswick 1983 (*Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities*, 1), especially 1-37 and 121-236; H.B. Gottschalk, 'Aristotelian philosophy in the Roman world', *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, Part II 'Principat', vol. 36.2 'Philosophie und Wissenschaften', Berlin 1987, 1079-174, at 1125-29.

²⁵ cf. Moraux, cited in the previous note, at 138-41; Gottschalk, *ibid.*, 1129-31. [Andronicus] *On Emotions* (or *On Passions*) is edited by A. Glibert-Thirry in *Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum*, Suppl. 2, Leiden 1977. Gottschalk points out that the *last* chapter of this work does show a desire to relate

concerned to set out doctrine in a systematic way, rather than to consider problems in the interpretation of Aristotle's own writings. In this respect they may seem not unlike the first type of Alexander's *epidromai* mentioned above: but Alexander's *epidromai* show more concern to elucidate the *arguments* by which an Aristotelian position is reached, and to do so by drawing on Aristotelian texts. Nor do they show the overriding concern for division and classification that is characteristic of Arius.²⁶

The earliest surviving full-scale commentary on an Aristotelian ethical treatise, and indeed the earliest surviving full-scale commentary on *any* Aristotelian text, is the commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* by Aspasius, from the first half of the second century AD.²⁷ Later in the second century AD Adrastus of Aphrodisias wrote a work on Theophrastus and on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* which seems to have been not a full-scale commentary, but rather an explanation of the historical and literary allusions in Aristotle's treatise. Adrastus' work itself is now lost, but material from it was incorporated into scholia on *Nicomachean Ethics* 2-5; the material from Adrastus is more valuable than the rest of the scholia.²⁸ These scholia were later incorporated into the

the lists of virtues and vices explicitly to Aristotle's principles as expressed in the Aristotelian text.

²⁶ cf. A.A. Long, 'The diaeretic method and the purpose of Arius' doxography', in Fortenbaugh (ed.), *On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics* (above, n. 24) 15-37.

²⁷ Aspasius' commentary is published in CAG vol. 19 part 1. Cf. P. Mercken, *The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle*, Leiden 1973 (Corp. Lat. Comm. in Arist. Graec. 6.1) 28*-29*; P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen* 2, Berlin 1984, 249-93; Gottschalk, cited in n. 24, 1156-8. Aspasius includes the 'common books' (*Nicomachean Ethics* 5-7 = *Eudemian Ethics* 4-6) in his treatment of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but seems to regard them as Eudemian, the original *Nicomachean* books having been lost. A. Kenny, *The Aristotelian Ethics*, Oxford 1978, 29ff., argues that it was none the less Aspasius himself who was responsible both for the placing of the common books in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and for the subsequent tradition of treating the *Nicomachean* rather than the *Eudemian Ethics* as the definitive Aristotelian work; but on the first point at least his conclusions have been called into question (cf. Gottschalk, 1101 n. 112 and 1158 with n. 375). The *Ethical Problems* follow the standard post-Aspasius pattern of concentrating on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, including the 'common books'. (It is notable that there is apparently no reference in the *Ethical Problems* to *EN* 8 and 9; friendship, the theme of those books, is perhaps a somewhat self-contained topic.) Alexander was aware of Aspasius' work in another area, noting the similarity between an aspect of Aspasius' views on the motion of the heavens and those of his own teacher Herminius; Simplicius in *Cael.* 430,32-431,11; cf. Moraux, op. cit., 240ff. and 361 n. 5.

²⁸ cf. Athenaeus, 15.673e; Mercken, cited in n. 27, 14*-22*, and also in ch. 18 of R. Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle Transformed: the ancient commentators and their influence*, London 1989; Moraux, cited in n. 27, 324-30, and also in his *d'Aristote à Bessarion*, Laval 1970, 24f.; and Gottschalk, cited in n. 24, at 1155 and n. 363. The date of compilation of the scholia themselves is uncertain (Moraux, 324 and n. 115). Both Mercken (in Sorabji, cited above) and Moraux (p. 327) favour a date late in the second century AD, but Professor Sten Ebbesen has indicated doubts about so early a date. Kenny, cited in n. 27, suggested (37 n. 3) that the scholia were themselves the work of

composite commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, most of which now appears as volume 20 of *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*; in addition to these the composite commentary contains the commentary of Aspasius on book 8 (in CAG vol. 19.1), commentaries by Michael of Ephesus (first half of the eleventh century) on books 5 (in addition to the scholia mentioned above; Michael's commentary is in CAG 22.3), 9, and 10, commentaries by Eustratius (c. 1100) on books 1 and 6, and anonymous scholia on book 7 which seem still later.²⁹ A paraphrase of the *Nicomachean Ethics* of little value is attributed, probably falsely, to an otherwise unknown Heliodorus of Prusa; it was composed at some time before the fourteenth century (the date of the earliest surviving manuscript).³⁰ The *Ethical Problems* would in any case be of interest as evidence for the thought of Alexander and his associates; the relative paucity of ancient commentary material on the *Ethics* increases their interest further.

The present translation

Something should be said here about the procedures followed in the present translation. I have endeavoured – with what success, the reader must judge – to produce a translation that is close to the original Greek while still being readable. One immediate difficulty is the length and complexity of sentences that is characteristic both of Alexander's own writings and of those attributed to him. The long periods found in these texts have here been broken up into more manageable units.

A second and greater difficulty is consistency in the translation of particular Greek words. The range of meanings of a word in one language does not correspond exactly to that of any one word in any other language. It is desirable to translate the same Greek word by the same English word as far as possible, in order to indicate – especially to the Greekless reader – that there is a single Greek word in question; and this applies especially in the case of texts like those with which we are here concerned, replete with technical terminology in the original language. But there is also something to be said for deliberately varying the English rendering of a single Greek term in a single context just in order to give a sense of its range of meanings, where an author is exploiting this range.

Adrastus, but the arguments against this of Gottschalk and of Ebbesen (in Sorabji, *op. cit.*) seem decisive.

²⁹ On the composite commentary, and in particular on the question of the identity of the compiler, cf. Mercken, cited in n. 27, 3*-14* and 22*-28*; also the discussions by Mercken and Ebbesen in chs 18 and 19 of Sorabji, cited in n. 28 above.

³⁰ On the question of authorship cf. Moraux, cited in n. 24, 136-8. This commentary is published in CAG vol. 19.2.

Translation of a single word in one language by a single word in another seems increasingly common as familiarity with the ancient languages declines; it may reflect the need for those who do not know the original language not to be misled, but it may have the effect of insulating us from even that degree of access to the thought-world of the *original* language that is still possible even through the medium of translation.³¹ Comparison with the techniques adopted in Arabic translations from ancient Greek, or medieval and Renaissance translations of Greek or Arabic into Latin, is not irrelevant here.

Two examples may illustrate the point. *Aretê* in Greek means the 'excellence' of any thing or creature, but, at least from Aristotle onwards, it has a particular application to the moral *virtues* as the particular *excellences* of man. How then is one to translate the word in texts, like *Problems* 25 and 27 here – or Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1 – that argue *from* excellence in general to virtue in particular? What I have in fact done here is to compromise – to use 'excellence' or 'virtue' as seems most appropriate in the context, and 'excellence or virtue' – which does *not* represent a double expression in the original – sufficiently often to bring out the connection in the argument between the two. Again, in rendering Alexander's discussions of voluntary and involuntary action, based on *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.1, I have generally used 'compulsion' rather than 'force' to render *bia*, coupled with ignorance as the two possible grounds for regarding an action as involuntary, for this generally gives more natural English and makes the argument easier to follow. But I have not for that reason felt obliged to translate *biazomenos* at *Problem* 12 133,5 by 'compelled' rather than by 'forced', even though – or perhaps *because* – the noun *bia* is translated by 'compulsion' in the immediate context; the use of both renderings in the *same* context, I would contend, far from misleading the reader, helps to make it clear what sort of compulsion is meant. All occurrences of key terms like *aretê* or *bia* and its cognate expressions have been listed in the Greek-English index, which should resolve any doubts over what Greek term is

³¹ It is because of considerations like these that, in *Plato: Meno*, Warminster 1985, I translated *aporein* and *aporia* at one point by 'be perplexed' but at another by 'at a loss' in rendering 80A, and similarly in 84A. This has puzzled at least one reviewer; but 'at a loss' serves to bring out the connotations of poverty and powerlessness in the word, which are important (cf. the uses of *aporia* and *porizesthai* at 78c-e). Guthrie in his translation (*Plato: Protagoras and Meno*, Harmondsworth 1956) used both 'perplexed' and 'helplessness' in his translation of 80A. It might be thought that the wordplay characteristic of Plato is far removed from the prosaic and pedantic style of Alexander, but similar issues can in fact arise.

being translated at any particular point, and assist the reader who wishes to consider all the passages in which a particular Greek term is used.

A further difficulty arises from the different syntactical range of Greek and English forms. The Greek *haireton* can be translated just by 'to be chosen', the opposite of 'to be avoided'. Sometimes, however, 'worthy to be chosen' or 'deserving to be chosen' may seem to make the sense clearer and produce more natural English. However, while 'worthiness to be chosen' is more natural as a *noun* than 'deservedness to be chosen', for verbal expressions, 'deserves to be chosen' often seems more natural English than 'is worthy to be chosen'. Since the latter does not seem intolerable, I have indeed generally opted for 'worthiness' and 'is worthy' rather than 'deservedness' and 'deserves'; but this may still serve as an example of the type of difficulty that can arise. 'Choiceworthy' and 'choiceworthiness' I have avoided as philosophical jargon; it could be argued that Alexander's philosophical jargon in Greek should be translated by philosophical jargon in English, but it seems preferable to make his meaning as clear as possible.

In general, I have sought consistency within a given problem rather than between different problems with different subject-matter. Thus in *Problem 1*, where the question is whether life in itself is good or *haireton*, I have translated *haireton* by 'valuable', following a suggestion from Dr Kenny, and similarly in *Problem 20*; but in *Problems 2, 6 and 7*, where what is at issue is a distinction between pleasures that are *hairetai* and those that are to be avoided, 'to be chosen' seems the more appropriate rendering. To discuss whether life in itself is a thing 'to be chosen', or whether certain pleasures are 'valuable' or not, does not seem to fall naturally on the English ear. 'Choiceworthy' as a rendering for *haireton* might meet the need for a single translation in both contexts, but at the cost of not writing natural English in *either*. In *Problem 1*, *kakos* has been rendered by 'bad' rather than 'evil', for it is more natural to say that having a bad sea-voyage is bad than that having an evil voyage is evil;³² but in *Problems 5, 6, 7 and 16* 'evil' has been used for *kakos* and 'bad' for *mokkhthêros*, since this makes possible a less stilted rendering of discussion whether something is 'a good' or 'an evil'. For similar reasons, *einai* and *ousia* have been translated sometimes by 'being' and sometimes by 'essence'. The Index may help to clarify these and similar points. I have also sometimes translated the optative with *an* by a present or future indicative; the tentativeness of the potential form sometimes seems

³² 'Bad' has also been used for *kakon* in *Problem 9*, where the question of whether or not people are aware that bad things are bad for them is at issue.