

Princeton Theological Monograph Series

Dikran Y. Hadidian

General Editor

22

THE WILL OF GOD AND THE CROSS

JONATHAN H. RAINBOW

The Will Of God And The Cross

An Historical and Theological Study of
John Calvin's Doctrine of
Limited Redemption

☞PICKWICK *Publications* • Eugene, Oregon

Pickwick Publications
An imprint of Wipf and Stock Publishers
199 W 8th Ave, Suite 3
Eugene, OR 97401

The Will of God and the Cross
A Historical and Theological Study of John Calvin's
Doctrine of Limited Redemption
By Rainbow, Jonathan H.
Copyright©1990 by Rainbow, Jonathan H.
ISBN 13: 978-1-55635-005-4
Publication date 5/13/2009
Previously published by Pickwick, 1990

To Pat
my partner in life
in redemption
and in writing about redemption

CONTENTS

Preface	ix
I. Amyraut's Thesis	1
II. Augustine: The Omnipotence of God and the Death of Christ	9
III. Limited Redemption Forgotten and Rediscovered	23
IV. Scholasticism: Limited Redemption Survives Another Synthesis	33
V. Martin Bucer and the Defense of Limited Redemption Against the Anabaptists	49
VI. Christ and Election in Calvin's Theology	64
VII. Christ's Death and Calvin's Larger Soteriology	89
VIII. Christ's Death for the Elect	110
IX. Calvin's Denial of Universal Redemption	117
X. Whom Does God Will to Save? Calvin on I Timothy 2:4	136

XI. Christ the Redeemer of the World	148
XII. Do "Souls Perish for Whom Christ Died"?	159
XIII. Calvin the Calvinist	175
XIV. Reformed Theology in Perspective	181
Selected Bibliography	186
Index	197

PREFACE

The final shape of a work of historical research seldom reflects the strange and unexpected circumstances of its birth and formation. Historians are like detectives, working from clues, expecting to be led down one path but forced into others, never in control of the evidence but (if they are good historians!) controlled by it.

I do not mind admitting, therefore, that my interest in Calvin's theology of the extent of redemption was aroused while I was pursuing a completely different line of research. At one time during my doctoral studies I fully intended to write my dissertation on the revolutionary Anabaptist kingdom of Münster of 1534-35. During the process of collecting and surveying original and secondary sources on Münster I was inevitably exposed to the writings of Bernhard Rothmann, the Münster theologian; I noted with curiosity how Rothmann in several places emphasized that the Münster Anabaptists believed that Christ's death was intended for each and every human being. He did this, not casually, but polemically, as if there were someone out there saying the opposite, someone against whom the doctrine of universal redemption had to be defended.

I say that I noted this with curiosity, because I was at the time under the influence of what I call in this book the "Amyraut thesis," the view that the doctrine of limited redemption was not introduced into Protestant theology until much later in the 16th century, by Theodore Beza. So I wondered: who was teaching limited redemption in the 1530s? A brief search led to Martin Bucer. Then I wondered: is it possible, given the close personal and theological connections between Bucer and Calvin, that they held radically different doctrines of something as central as the death of Christ? This led to a reevaluation of Calvin's theology. and I wondered also: Is there some tradition preceding Bucer? This question led to a survey of medieval theology that led finally back to Augustine.

So the Anabaptist Bernhard Rothmann, who in the final orderly scheme that I have imposed on the material to shape it into a book is a very minor figure, mentioned only in passing, was actually the one

who gave me my topic. I want to acknowledge his help.

Acknowledgment and gratitude must also go to many people whose conscientious work contributed to the writing of this book. I am grateful to the professionals of the Interlibrary Loan Department of the UCSB Library, who ransacked the libraries of America and Europe to find the materials I needed; to Profs. Jeffrey Russell and J. Sears McGee for constructively critical readings of my work as it progressed; to Prof. Dr. Peter Manns, Dr. Rolf Decot, and Dr. Markus Wriedt of the Institut für Europäische Geschichte for their encouragement to me during the writing of my dissertation and their patience with my German; to the Protestant Seminary of Strasbourg for access to early edition of Bucer's works; to Dr. Richard Muller of Fuller Theological Seminary, for his careful reading of my work and his helpful comments; and to my doctoral advisor, Abraham Friesen of UCSB, with whom I first read Calvin's Institutes as an undergraduate, and who was somehow able, while supervising me and guiding me, to treat me as a grown-up and a friend. Thanks, Abe.

Working with Dikran and Jean Hadidian of Pickwick Publications has been a delightful experience, for which I am also grateful.

I dedicate this book to my wife, Pat, for all she has done to see me through the labor of which this book is the most tangible fruit. The challenge of my going back to school, and then to West Germany for a year, with three small children, was one which she met victoriously, so much so that those years will always be for us a golden time.

Jonathan Rainbow
Porterville, California
January, 1990

AMYRAUT'S THESIS

Moyse Amyraut, professor of theology in the French Reformed academy of Saumur, said something that troubled the Reformed churches of the mid-seventeenth century: Christ, he insisted, died for each and every human being.

The question of whom Christ died for was not a new issue for Reformed theology. By Amyraut's day the Reformed creeds, preeminently the Canons of Dordt (1619) and the Westminster Standards (1647), had affirmed, as over against Roman Catholicism, Lutheranism, and the Dutch Remonstrants (or Arminians), that Christ died only for the predestined, or elect. But when Amyraut maintained the death of Christ for every single human being, he did so in a way that posed a new challenge to Reformed theology.

Defining the crucial terms

Before describing the precise nature of Amyraut's argument, we must define some of the basic terminology that will be used throughout this study. English speaking theologians often describe the view that Christ died for every human being as "universal atonement," and the view that he died only for the elect as "limited atonement." The term *atonement*, however, is peculiarly English, for which reason I prefer and will consistently use the term *redemption*, which in its Latin form *redemptio* is one of several words (Calvin used *expiatio*, *satisfactio*, and *reconciliatio* also) used by virtually all the theologians we will be examining, from Augustine to Calvin, to denote the meaning of the death of Christ. If what took place, then, in the death of Christ was redemption, the question is: was this redemption achieved for every person or only for the elect? In this study I will refer to those who maintained that Christ died for every person as *universal redemptionists*, and to those who maintained that he died

only for the elect as *limited redemptionists*.

It should be emphasized also that universal redemptionists, except where otherwise indicated, did not maintain that every human being will be ultimately saved. Universal redemption, in other words, did not imply *universal salvation*. The doctrine of universal salvation is sometimes known as the doctrine of *apokatastasis*, or simply *universalism*. It should not be confused with the doctrine of universal redemption as we encounter it throughout this study.

Amyraut's argument

Moyse Amyraut (1596-1664) taught divine predestination just as Reformed theology had come to define it; he also taught that Christ died for every human being. This concatenation of particular election and universal redemption was a new problem for the Reformed; it was not the frontal assault on particularism to which they had become accustomed, but neither was it orthodoxy as defined by the Reformed confessions, especially the definitive ones of the seventeenth century, the Canons of Dordt (1619) and the Westminster Confession (1647). An alternative kind of "Reformed" theology had appeared.

Amyraut's theology precipitated a new period of intramural debate within Reformed theology about the extent of Christ's redemption. It was, above all, a theological and biblical issue to be settled. But Amyraut also made a disconcerting historical claim. He claimed that his understanding of the extent of redemption was in fact that of the "father" of Reformed theology, John Calvin himself. He claimed that Calvin had taught universal redemption, and that the doctrine of limited redemption was actually the construct of Theodore Beza (1519-1605), Calvin's protégé and successor as the leading theologian of Geneva. Thus, in Amyraut, a distinctive view of Reformed history emerged: that the purity of the Reformed gospel, as taught and preached by Calvin, had been seriously compromised by Beza, that the Reformed churches had in the meantime followed Beza, and that Amyraut's own theology, with its doctrine of universal redemption, was in fact the recovery

of genuine and original "Calvinism."¹ Reformed theology, through its consolidation in the seventeenth century, had comfortably assumed John Calvin as its founding father. Now Amyraut was saying that the great Reformed confessions, Dordt and Westminster, which held limited redemption, were not really "Calvinistic" at all.

Amyraut did not go unchallenged. His doctrine of universal redemption was set upon by the orthodox Reformed establishment, including defenders of the orthodox position such as André Rivet, Frederick Spanheim, and, most importantly, Pierre du Moulin.² These contestants also took issue with Amyraut's thesis about Calvin and Reformed history. The lines were drawn: one side claimed Calvin for universal redemption, the other for limited redemption, and both sides appealed to evidence from Calvin's own writings for proof.

The theological question is clearly an important one. But it is the historical question that concerns us here. Is the "Amyraut thesis" (that Calvin held universal redemption) correct? What did John Calvin really believe and teach about the extent of Christ's redemption?

Amyraut and the scholars

This question has become a contemporary one as scholars have given attention to seventeenth-century Reformed theology,

¹ Amyraut's interpretation of Calvin is found in *Defense de la doctrine de Calvin sur le sujet e'Election et de la Reprobation* (Saumur: Desbordes, 1644); *Brief Traité de la Predestination. Avec l'Eschantillon de la doctrine de Calvin sur le mesme suiet* (Saumur: Desbordes, 1658); *Fidei Mosis Amyraldi circa errores Arminianorum declaratio* (Saumur: Lesnier, 1646). For a complete Amyraut bibliography see Roger Nicole, *Moyse Amyraut. A Bibliography with special reference to the controversy on universal grace* (New York, London: Garland Publishers, 1981).

² Cf. André Rivet, *Andreae Riveti . . . synopsis doctrinae de natura ert gratia. Excerpta ex Mosis Amyraldi . . . tractatu de praedestinatione . . .* (Amsterdam, 1649); Frederick Spanheim, *Disputatio de gratia universali* (Leyden, 1644); Pierre du Moulin, *De Mosis Amyraldi adversus Fridericum Spanheimium libro judicium* (Rotterdam, 1649); *Esclaircissement des controverses Salmuriennes* (Leyden, 1648).

and to Amyraut in particular. Amyraut's claim has sent theologians and historians back to Calvin, and various answers have emerged. Some have concluded that a firm judgment about Calvin's doctrine of the extent of redemption is not possible. Others--Louis Goumaz, John Murray, J. I. Packer, Ian McPhee, and Paul Helm, who wrote a monograph entitled *Calvin and the Calvinists* (1982),¹ to date the most thorough attempt at rebutting the Amyraut thesis--have concluded that Amyraut was wrong about Calvin. But the predominant viewpoint in the recent scholarly discussions has been the view of Amyraut, the "Amyraut thesis," that Calvin was an advocate of universal redemption.

This interpretation of Calvin has sometimes emerged in connection with the study of what has come to be called "Reformed scholasticism," which is also in its way a revival of the historical critique offered by Amyraut. In the view of scholars like H. E. Weber, Ernst Bizer, Walter Kickel, Basil Hall, and David Steinmetz², the phenomenon of "Reformed scholasticism" was the hardening and rationalizing of Reformed theology which began to occur after Calvin's departure from the scene. According to this interpretation, there was, under the leadership of Beza, a

¹ Louis Goumaz, *La doctrine de salut (doctrina salutis) d'après le commentaires de Calvin sur le Nouveau Testament* (Lyon, 1907). John Murray, review of Paul van Buren's *Christ in our Place*, *Banner of Truth* 234 (March 1983): 20-22. J. I. Packer, *Calvin the Theologian*, in *John Calvin: A Collection of Essays*, ed. G. Duffield (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1966), p. 151. Ian McPhee, *Conserver or Transformer of Calvin's Thought? A Study of the Origins and development of Theodore Beza's Thought 1550-70* (Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge, 1979). Paul Helm, *Calvin, English Calvinism, and the logic of doctrinal development*, *Scottish Journal of Theology* 34, No. 2 (1981): 179-85; *Calvin and the Calvinists* (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1982).

² Basil Hall, *Calvin against the Calvinists*, Duffield. Walter Kickel, *Vernunft und Offenbarung bei Theodor Beza* (Neukirchen, 1967). Ernst Bizer, *Frühorthodoxie und Rationalismus* (Zurich, 1963). Hans Emil Weber, *Reformation, Orthodoxie, und Rationalismus, Beiträge zur Förderung Christlicher Theologie*, vols. 37, 51 (Gütersloh, 1937, 1951). David Steinmetz, *Reformers in the Wings* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), p. 167.

discernable shift away from the biblical-humanistic theological method of Calvin to one governed by an Aristotelian-deductive epistemology. In Reformed theology, so reconceived, the doctrine of predestination became the logical starting point for the whole system. Some scholars of "Reformed scholasticism" assert that the doctrine of limited redemption was one of the results of this new method. Again, and in a roundabout way, the Amyraut thesis concerning Calvin and Reformed history has been revived. Amyraut was a much harassed man in his time; perhaps he has begun to have his posthumous revenge three centuries later, for his interpretation of Calvin has come to be shared by the majority of historians who study such things.¹

The most important recent statements of the Amyraut thesis were in books by François Laplanche, Brian Armstrong, and R. T. Kendall. Laplanche's 1965 study was the pioneering modern investigation of Amyraut.² In the process of setting out the theology of Amyraut, Laplanche had numerous opportunities to comment on the doctrine of redemption, and he concurred with Amyraut that Calvin held universal redemption.³

The tendency to appraise Calvin through the eyes of Amyraut was continued by Brian Armstrong in a 1969 study which centered, like Laplanche's, on Amyraut, but which also dealt extensively with

¹ A recent, very refreshing exception to the predominant trend in recent scholarship was Richard Muller, *Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins* (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1988). Muller argued convincingly that Reformed theology after Calvin, while often organized differently, was the same in substance as Calvin's. Muller also maintained that Calvin held limited redemption.

² François Laplanche, *Orthodoxie et Prédication. L'Oeuvre d'Amyraut et la querelle de la grâce universelle* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965). Laplanche's work was actually preceded by the doctoral dissertation of Jürgen Moltmann, *Gnadenbund und Gnadenwahl: Die Prädestinationslehre des Moyse Amyraut, dargestellt im Zusammenhang der heilsgeschichtlich-foederaltheologie Tradition der Akademie von Saumur* (Ph.D. dissertation, Göttingen, 1951).

³ Laplanche, pp. 24, 115.

Amyraut's relationship to the entire Reformed tradition.¹ Armstrong cast the struggle within the French Reformed Church as one between a humanistically grounded Reformed tradition (Calvin, Amyraut) and Reformed scholasticism (Beza, du Moulin). He blamed Theodore Beza for engineering a major departure from Calvin; he attributed the "rigid teaching" of limited redemption to Beza and saw it as a necessary deduction from Beza's supralapsarianism and Aristotelianism², and he agreed with Amyraut that Calvin held universal redemption. He cited in a lengthy footnote several Calvin texts to prove this last point. Amyraut, he concluded, was the real "Calvinist."

This thesis was also employed by R. T. Kendall with reference to the English theological context, in **Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649** (1979).³ Kendall argued that English Calvinistic theology followed the lead of Beza and other "Reformed scholastics" like Ursinus, Martyr, and Zanchius rather than that of Calvin; to be specific, it lost Calvin's doctrine of saving faith and got mired in the problem of Christian assurance. Kendall attributed this directly to the introduction of the doctrine of limited redemption. According to him, Calvin's doctrine of assurance as the essence of faith was rooted in the doctrine of universal redemption, and with the introduction of the Bezan doctrine, the focus of assurance shifted away from Christ to the subjective spiritual condition of the believer and thus made assurance to rest on shifting sand. Because Kendall's whole thesis thus rested on the alleged theological chasm between Calvin and Beza, his exposition of Calvin's theology was much fuller--and, one must say, much more basic to the validity of his thesis--than those

¹ Brian Armstrong, **Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy: Protestant Scholasticism and Humanism in Seventeenth Century France** (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1969).

² Armstrong, pp. 41-42.

³ R. T. Kendall, **Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649** (Oxford: The University Press, 1979). Mention might also be made of John Bray, **Theodore Beza's Doctrine of Predestination** (Nieuwkoop: B. de Graaf, 1975). Bray was clearly dependent on Armstrong for his evaluation of Calvin's doctrine of redemption.

of Laplanche and Armstrong.

In Kendall's analysis, Calvin emerged in the image of Amyraut, as a theologian who taught both particular election and universal redemption. Christ's death was not the effectuation of the decree of election for Calvin, said Kendall--if it were, of course, it would be limited, like election, to the elect portion of the human race¹--rather, the effectuation of election was achieved by Christ's intercession at the right hand of God: "What Calvin does not do is to link the scope of Christ's intercessory prayer to Christ's death, as those after him tended to do."² Christ's death, in Kendall's analysis of Calvin, was universal, but his intercession is only for the elect. Because of universal redemption, said Kendall, Calvin's doctrine of assurance was Christocentric, while for his successors it became introspective and anthropocentric. "It must therefore be argued that, as a result of this soteriological position [limited redemption] Beza's doctrine inhibits the believer from looking directly to Christ's death for assurance."³ Kendall also attempted to distance Calvin's exegesis of the relevant biblical texts from that of the Bezan tradition: Calvin, he said, never resorted to the device of interpreting the terms "all" and "world" in a less than universalistic way, as those after him did.⁴ Kendall recognized that the use of such hermeneutical devices would fundamentally change the manner in which Calvin's universalistic language should be understood.

Kendall's book was generally received as a major contribution

¹ "The decree of election, however, is not rendered effectual by the death of Christ. For if that were true, it follows that (1) Christ obviously did not die for the whole world after all, or (2) since he died for all, all are elected." Kendall, p. 15. Kendall was working backwards from the assumption that Calvin believed in universal redemption to the conclusion that therefore the death of Christ cannot have carried out the decree of election. This is impeccable logic, but, as we shall see, the starting point is wrong.

² Kendall, pp. 14 (footnote 1), 17.

³ Kendall, p. 29.

⁴ "He [Calvin] generally leaves verses like this alone, but never does he explain, for example, that 'all' does not mean *all* or that 'world' does not mean *world*, as those after him tended to do." Kendall, p. 13, footnote 2.

to the history of Calvinist history and theology. It is to date the most ambitious modern defense of the Amyraut thesis.

The flaws of the Amyraut thesis

But the Amyraut thesis is seriously flawed. For one thing, its proponents have depended almost exclusively on a proof-text method which consists largely of extracting various statements of Calvin to the effect that Christ died for the "world" or for "all," and insisting that these prove the case. It should be said too that those who have recently written against the Amyraut thesis have tended to do the same thing. Neither viewpoint has adequately addressed the evidence presented by the other. Conspicuous by its absence so far is any systematic treatment of Calvin's thought on the extent of redemption from the inside of his whole theology, in relationship to its dominant themes, including an analysis of both the universalistic statements and those that qualify them. It is one of my goals to provide such a treatment in this book. Calvin's doctrine of the death of Christ deserves to be lifted from polemics; Calvin deserves to speak for himself, and at length.

The Amyraut thesis has also been flawed by a fundamentally unhistorical approach. The scholars have come at Calvin backwards, through events and theologies which came after he was dead and gone, whether "Reformed scholasticism" (Steinmetz, Bray), Amyraut (Laplanche, Armstrong), or Puritanism (Kendall). Calvin has been repeatedly interpreted through the lense of some later development. It is obvious that Calvin cannot have been influenced by these things. Consequently, there is a need to set Calvin in his own historical-theological context, in the stream which flowed to him from the past, and to place him methodologically at the *end* of the history of the doctrine rather than at its beginning. To be blunt, there is a need to get Amyraut out of the picture.

The proponents of the Amyraut thesis take little account at all of the history that preceded Calvin; they are, it seems, unaware that Calvin the predestinarian theologian inherited a thousand-year tradition that taught limited redemption. It is a major goal of this book to identify that tradition and to show Calvin's relationship to it and dependence upon it.

AUGUSTINE: THE OMNIPOTENCE OF GOD AND THE DEATH OF CHRIST

Augustine of Hippo (d.430) is well known as a defender of predestination. What is not often noted is that Augustine's doctrine of double predestination, forged in his controversies with the Pelagians, had as its less conspicuous sibling the doctrine of limited redemption.¹

The omnipotence of God

The granite foundation of Augustine's mature soteriology was the omnipotence of God. The Apostles' Creed itself, he noted, begins with the declaration of the divine omnipotence: "I believe in God the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth."² The act of *creatio ex nihilo* provides the pattern for all that God does.

Augustine, of course, was not alone in asserting the divine omnipotence; it was part of the common stock of Christian theology. Even Augustine's Pelagian opponents would have agreed in principle that God is omnipotent. It is how Augustine interpreted God's omnipotence which was decisive for his

¹ On Augustine's doctrine of predestination, see J.B. Mozley, *A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination* (London, 1855). A standard history of atonement theory is R.S. Franks, *The Work of Christ* (London and New York, 1962). It is occasionally still asserted that Augustine did not teach double predestination (e.g. Larry Sharp, *The Doctrines of Grace in Calvin and Augustine*, *Evangelical Quarterly* 52 (1980):89), but in our judgment double predestination was clearly his mature view.

² *Contra secundam Juliani responsionem opus imperfectum*, Migne, *Patrologiae cursus completus, Series Latina* 45:1072. (Migne after this cited as MPL.)

soteriology. The Pelagians, trying to make room for human freedom, saw divine power as a kind of limitless potentiality, rather like a powerful engine running at idle speed. In other words, they saw omnipotence as *capability*: God can do whatever he wills. On this basis it was possible for them to assert that God, although omnipotent, has by his own choice opted not to use the fullness of his power, has voluntarily relinquished a portion of the determination of events to the will of man. So it is possible for God to will something but for that which he wills not to come to pass.

For Augustine divine omnipotence was not mere capability; it was *effectuation*. God always and actually *does* what he wills. There is for God a perfect correspondence of will and act, of volition and effectuation. "The will of the Omnipotent is never defeated. . . . God never wills anything which he does not perform."¹ The universe and human history, both on the grand and the minute scales, are the product of the putting forth of divine power according to the divine will. "Therefore nothing is done except the Omnipotent wills it to be done."² And genuine contingency--contingency on the same level of causation as the will of God--is eliminated. "The will of God is the necessity of things."³

It is likely that Augustine's understanding of God's omnipotence was, in part, a reaction against Manicheanism, to which he had once been attracted. The God of Mani was one whose power was severely limited by the existence of an equally aggressive and ultimate evil principle in the *kosmos*. Although the good God eventually conquers evil, the struggle is a close one, and the good God often appears passive while evil rages.⁴ The God in whom Augustine, prodded by the Pelagians, came finally to believe is, by contrast, nothing if not active, a willing, acting, doing God in a monistic *kosmos*. The Manicheans were willing to have a less

¹ Enchiridion 102, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina (after this cited as CCSL) 46:104.

² Enchiridion 95, CCSL 46:99.

³ Gen. ad litt. 6.15.26, MPL 34:350.

⁴ Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography* (London, Boston: Faber & Faber, 1967), pp. 52, 394-5.

than omnipotent God in order to achieve a clean solution to the problem of God's association with evil; Augustine was willing to face this problem, or at least to leave it in mystery, for the sake of a truly omnipotent God.

This was supremely important to Augustine because the omnipotent God who creates out of nothing was the *sine qua non* of his doctrine of grace. For grace, like omnipotence, can be understood as a kind of potentiality. For the Pelagian, grace was God's willingness to save fallen humans; God has gone to great and even sacrificial lengths to reveal this willingness to mankind; but all of God's willingness does not, in and of itself, save a single human being. God may will to save and yet not save, if the will of man intervenes against the will of God. For Augustine, however, grace was not simply God's will to save but also the omnipotent effectuation of that will. Grace was quite simply, for Augustine, the salvation of fallen human beings. And this was so because grace, like all of God's decisions, is omnipotent and therefore irresistibly effectual. When God wills to save, he saves.

Limited redemption

The omnipotence of God was the presupposition of Augustine's doctrine of redemption. The death of Christ, as an omnipotent act of divine grace and divine will for the salvation of men, is irresistibly effectual. Whom God wills to save through the death of Christ, he does in fact save, and so the intent of Christ's sacrifice can be measured by the result. Since not all men are finally saved, it must be that Christ did not intend by his death to save all men, but only those whom he actually saves, that is the predestined. So ran Augustine's theological thinking about the death of Christ.

The limitation of redemption to the elect appeared occasionally in Augustine in contexts where the doctrine of Christ's death was not the principal topic. In one sense, such offhand remarks are a more revealing witness to his belief in limited redemption than are the longer texts which will be examined shortly, because they show that this belief was a deeply held assumption capable of being called into service without much provocation. For example:

What did he mean, then, in saying to them [the unbelieving Jews], "You are not of my sheep"? That he saw them predestined to everlasting destruction, not won to eternal life by the price of his own blood.¹

The apposition of the phrases *ad sempiternam interitum praeordinatos* and *non ad vitam aeternam sui sanguinis pretio comparatos* was theologically significant; it showed that in Augustine's mind predestination to destruction and not having been won to eternal life by the blood of Christ were parallel concepts, for both concepts described those who are not "sheep." And the sheep in this context were the elect. In a similar remark, Augustine asked his listening congregation:

And why is it that you have thus willingly listened to Christ in me? Because you are the sheep of Christ, purchased with the blood of Christ . . . He and only he was the purchaser, who shed precious blood, the precious blood of him who was without sin. Yet he also made precious the blood of his own [people], for whom he paid the price of his own blood.²

This passage was pervaded by the assumption that the blood of Christ is a special gift of Christ to the sheep.

For Augustine, the death of Christ did not accomplish the mere possibility of salvation, but actually saved those for whom it was intended.

Through this Mediator God makes known that he makes those whom he has redeemed from evil by his blood, everlastingly good.³

The kingdom which Christ now gathers, and which will constitute the final number of the redeemed, is composed of those whom he has redeemed with his blood, and, by clear implication, not others:

¹ CCSL 36:415.

² CCSL 36:404.

³ *De correptione et gratia* 30, MPL 44:935.