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GOD WITH US

*A THEOLOGY OF TRANSPERSONAL LIFE*



# ***GOD WITH US***

*A Theology  
Of  
Transpersonal Life*

Second Edition, Enlarged

***JOSEPH HAROUTUNIAN***

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## INTRODUCTION

"I have been trying, mainly in articles (a volume of which appeared under the title *God With Us: A Theology of Transpersonal Life*), to feel my way toward a theology which shall explore fellowmanhood as a correlative of a doctrine of God. If God has a peculiar business with man, as suggested by the places of Jesus the Christ and the Church as God's people in the Christian faith, I think it will be helpful to learn what this business is and *how* God does it."<sup>1</sup> Published a few years before his death in 1968, *God With Us* was Joseph Haroutunian's last major attempt to consider these issues.<sup>2</sup> The essays reflect Haroutunian's lifelong effort to craft a theology faithful to the essentials of Protestantism and the cultural experiences of North American Christians. The result was a substantial theology of communion by a "major Reformed theologian."<sup>3</sup>

Haroutunian set the stage for this work in the 1930s. In "Modern Protestantism: Neither Modern nor Protestant," he rejected liberalism and Neo-orthodoxy as viable theological options for Americans in Reformation traditions.<sup>4</sup> He recognized in liberalism a kinship with the service-oriented bent of American Christianity, but its theological anthropocentrism made it irrelevant to moderns who were unable to believe in a "man writ large" Deity. Although Neo-orthodoxy gave notions of God's sovereignty and "otherness" a fresh hearing in the twentieth century, its theological roots and political context made it largely untranslatable into the North American situation. What Haroutunian strove for was a theology true to the Biblical and Reformed traditions which could plumb, probe, and shape a North American ethos.

*God With Us: A Theology of Transpersonal Life* is a programmatic essay for that theology. It is a theology of the "'communion of saints,' or life together in Christ's company, by the interdwelling of the Spirit of the living God."<sup>5</sup> Haroutunian argued against individualistic theologies by arguing for communion as the precondition of person-

hood. He invented the word "transpersonal" to stress that an individual becomes a person in community only by the power of the Holy Spirit who works communion in the church. Christians have a new self-awareness as "a koinonia, a communion, who severally exist as a covenanted people, to be and behave as fellowmen, as Christ's fellowmen and therefore fellowmen with all people."<sup>6</sup>

Haroutunian could still assert *extra ecclesiam non sit salus*, but only with a twist. Instead of the church as the place where God is known by an exercise of the traditional means of grace, God is known in and by communion. The church is a means of grace because persons in the church love and forgive one another. They are so enabled because Jesus Christ "was the Son of God and Savior as a fellowman".<sup>7</sup> When Christ is "God with us" Christians partake of his communicating nature, and externalize inter-Trinitarian love. There is no salvation outside the church for Haroutunian "because salvation is communion and communion is the church."<sup>8</sup>

Any novelty in *God With Us* lies in the author's rigorous prosecution of communion as an organizing principle for theological reflection. Haroutunian readily conceded that the communion model would have an impact upon the loci communes and envisioned a rethinking and restating of them in this light. His book, however, is a restatement of the tradition in terms compatible to that tradition, not a replacement of it. To this end, he took special care to place his argument in a broad ecumenical context. In so doing, he engaged in conversations with Augustine, Calvin, Barth, and a host of other theologians, philosophers, and social scientists. Haroutunian's life-long fascination with Jonathan Edwards, his interest in George Herbert Mead, and his sense that American Christianity has a pragmatic bent to it, have an impact on the book and illustrate his use of distinctly American sources for constructive theological work. Given the present concern for contextual theology, Haroutunian's conscious debts to the American philosophical and theological traditions make his work worthy of particular attention.

The appearance of this volume marks the first in Pickwick Publications' reprint of the works of Joseph Haroutunian. Volumes to follow include *Piety Versus Moralism: The Passing of the New England Theology* (1932), *Wisdom and Folly in Religion: A Study in Chastened Protestantism* (1940), and *Lust for Power* (1949). A volume of previously unpublished materials, together with a substantial introduc-



tion and bibliography, will complete the series. *God With Us* is being reprinted first to meet the need for a theology text that is grounded in the Reformed tradition, sensitive to the American situation, and germane to the church's quest for identity as a community in a post-Christian world.

The Pickwick edition of *God With Us* contains two chapters not in the Westminster edition. "The Worship of God" and "Education and Humanity" were deleted from Haroutunian's manuscript, presumably the result of an editorial decision. They are included here as an appendix because there is insufficient evidence to determine where Haroutunian envisioned them in relation to the book's other chapters.<sup>9</sup>

Haroutunian wrote in a time when inclusive language was not an issue. The text of *God With Us* is being reprinted as it appeared in 1965 as a reminder that forward-thinking men and women do not see all things even in the most enlightened of ages, including our own. The index has been expanded to give readers better access to Haroutunian's rich background of reading. Proper names from the notes are indexed only when there is no referent in the text. Subject entries were left intact except for several minor changes.

For years I knew of Joseph Haroutunian only as the author of *Piety Versus Moralism* and *God With Us*. When dissertation research led me to investigate how and why Jonathan Edwards was recovered by American "Neo-orthodox" theologians in the 1930s, I discovered Joseph Haroutunian, the man. At first I viewed this Armenian immigrant who taught at Wellesley, McCormick Theological Seminary, and the University of Chicago, as a minor American theologian standing in the shadows of H. Richard Niebuhr. Ten years of reflection have convinced me that he may well be the most significant American *Reformed* theologian of this century. That his thought may no longer be neglected, I am delighted to cooperate with Pickwick Publications to make his works available once again.<sup>10</sup>

Stephen D. Crocco  
Pittsburgh Theological Seminary

## NOTES

1. Joseph Haroutunian. Untitled essay. *Criterion* no. 6. Spring 1967, 18.
2. Joseph Haroutunian. *God with us: A Theology of Transpersonal Life* Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1965.
3. In his review of *God With Us* Terrence N. Tice portrayed Haroutunian in this way. *Scottish Journal of Theology* vol. 20, 1967, 353.
4. Joseph Haroutunian. "Modern Protestantism: Neither Modern nor Protestant" *American Scholar* vol. 8, no. 4, October, 1939, 479-93.
5. Haroutunian. *God With Us*, 303f.
6. *Ibid.*, 37.
7. *Ibid.*, 288.
8. *Ibid.*, 96.
9. "The Worship of God" was a 1963 convocation address at McCormick Theological Seminary and was published in *McCormick Quarterly* (vol. 17, no. 1, 1963, 3-15). A typescript of this essay in the Haroutunian Papers at the University of Chicago Library has "Chapter V" at the top of the first page which may indicate its place in *God With Us*. "Education and Humanity" was a lecture at Teacher's College, Columbia University in May 1959 and was published in *Teacher's College Record* (vol. 60, no. 8, May 1959, 415-425).
10. Stephen D. Crocco. "Joseph Haroutunian: Neglected Theocentrist" *The Journal Of Religion* vol. 68 no. 3, July 1988, 411-425.

## Preface to the 1991 edition of *GOD WITH US*

A second edition of *God With Us* has been under consideration for seven years. When Dikran Y. Hadidian suggested reprinting a trilogy of Joseph Haroutunian's out-of-print books, to introduce them to today's theology students, no clear answer was known as to how relevant his theology was perceived to be by current theological thinkers.

A year later answers began to come. The first arrived in an enthusiastic letter from Stephen D. Crocco, a recent Princeton University graduate who had discovered Haroutunian while doing his doctoral research. In the following year, his article, "Joseph Haroutunian: Neglected Theocentrist" (*Journal of Religion*, Vol. 68, No. 3, July, 1988) revealed his knowledge of Haroutunian's writing, as well as his strong empathy for Haroutunian's point of view. Stephen Crocco's interest continues.

First published in 1965, *God With Us* was the author's last published book. It comes close to summarizing his theological preoccupations (excluding the subject of the Holy Spirit, on which he was working at the time of his death). The content is based on lectures, addresses and articles originally prepared for specific occasions during the preceding decade. Although out-of-print for several years, the book has continued to be used in theology courses.

Readers who have matured in consciousness of the "Language Revolution of the Eighties" may find models of "non-inclusive language" in the pages of *God With Us*. The most common "fault", the generic use of masculine nouns and pronouns, could be "corrected" easily, by the substitution of gender-neutral words. Beyond that, lacking an editorial policy appropriate to its content, the text resists further editing from the inclusive language point of view. For example, a good gender-neutral equivalent for *fellowman* and *fellowmen* is hard to find. The au-

thor coined and used those words repeatedly, to expound a favorite theological issue. His interpretation of the theme of *communion* unifies the chapters of *God With Us* and leans heavily on those words as keys to further insight. A similar problem arises when trying to edit the author's closely analyzed passages concerning "the Nature Of---" (the Church, Man, God, the Persons of the Trinity, etc) through the lens of inclusive language, especially when these passages are woven with quotations from or references to historical sources.

The decision to reprint the 1991 edition of *God With Us* in its original form was based partly on the above reasons, partly on practical reasons and partly on the desire to make the original work available, as he wished it. To refrain from editing an author according to linguistic standards he never held seems only fair, and pays respect to the integrity of the author and his text.

Joseph Haroutunian wrote and taught during the period between the late 1920's and the late 60's. He was multi-lingual, with English and Armenian his first languages. His prose style was modeled on the conventional academic rhetoric of his period and environment. It reflects the social and cultural attitudes of his time, when the generic use of man and mankind was traditional, following an ancient, universally accepted convention.

In *God With Us*, the author's exposition of the theme of *communion* unfolds gradually and can provide fertile theological ground in which new concepts can grow freely and abundantly.

April, 1991

Helen H. Haroutunian  
Milbridge, Maine

## FOREWORD

The word "transpersonal" in the subtitle of this book does not appear in the text. It came to me while I was trying to find a word that might capture the point of the following chapters. For a while I considered the word "interpersonal," but finally had to reject it because that word usually implies the priority of persons to their interactions. "Interpersonal" does not indicate that persons come into being in the process of their conversation and cooperation one with another, or that they come to exist as persons by their transactions. The word "transaction" was used by John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley in *Knowing and the Known* to state explicitly that both organisms and their environment acquire their characteristics in a process that is prior to either. I have used "trans" instead of "inter" to point out that the individual human being emerges by way of communion. In my judgment, this thesis, properly elaborated and understood, points to an image of man as fellowman that has weighty theoretical and practical consequences.

The second half-word in the subtitle—that is, "personal"—requires no lengthy explanation at this point. By combining it with "trans," I want to say that by our transactions in the human community we exist as persons; or that our transactions are such that they transform organisms into persons. Thus we become persons who are organisms, rather than organisms with personal traits. I wish to indicate that the communion of fellowmen is discontinuous with the transactions of organisms, although fellowmen are in obvious respects organisms. A person is a social and not a natural entity. On the other hand, he is a social and not a higher than natural, though still natural, entity. He is born with certain physical capacities for human life; but the actuality of his life as a fellowman or person is a consequence of communion. The point, however, here, is that by communion he is a person or a fellowman. I am sorry if the word "transpersonal" does not seem elegant. But it does suit my purpose in putting this book together.

The word "life" is quite vague, but it has a glory of its own, and I prefer it to such words as "relations," "existence," "process," etc., which I find no less vague and not quite so suggestive.

As for the word "theology," I used it instead of "theory" or "conception" because I take the transpersonal life of the Christians with Jesus Christ to be the paradigm, or model, of the life of fellowmen. As a Christian, I may not forget that all the life I have with my fellowmen is a life I have also with Christ, and that communion by which I exist is at once a communion with Christ and with my other neighbors. Wherever my neighbor and I are present, Christ is present with us and to us. Whatever goes on between me and my neighbor is determined by "the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ," so that I cannot understand our life together except under this grace. But the grace of Jesus Christ as the model of the grace in transpersonal life is the grace of God, because it is grace toward fellowmen as well as among them. Therefore, the title of this book is "God with Us," and its subtitle, "A Theology of Transpersonal Life."

I am grateful to many friends who have urged me, off and on, to publish the material in this book under one cover. Mrs. Esther Swenson, of Maryville College, and Professor John Burkhart, of McCormick Theological Seminary, both former colleagues at McCormick, have been especially persistent. I want also to thank Professors Joseph Sittler and Bernard Meland, of the Divinity School, The University of Chicago; Principal Stanley Glen, of Knox College, Toronto; Professor Seward Hiltner, of Princeton Theological Seminary; Dean Gordon Jackson, of Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, who have encouraged me with their kind responses to several of the lectures contained in this book. I wish to thank Dean Jerald C. Brauer, of the Divinity School, The University of Chicago, for giving me leave of absence during which I prepared this volume.

The Introduction and the Conclusion have been newly written. Chapter 1 is a lecture delivered at Bethany Theological Seminary, in July, 1964. Chapter 2 is an almost completely revised version of "The Spirit of God and the People of God," published in *Union Seminary Quarterly Review*, May, 1957. Chapter 3 is an extensively revised version of an address given at Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, in September, 1961, and published in *Pittsburgh Perspective*, December 1961. Chapter 4 is a lecture given at Princeton Theological Seminary

during the Gallahue Conference on Psychiatry and Religion, April, 1963. Chapter 5 is a presidential address given before the American Theological Society, Midwestern section, in April, 1958, and published in the *Journal of Religion*, April, 1960. Chapter 6 is an expanded version of an address given at the Centenary Convocation of Knox College, Toronto. Chapters 7 and 8 are the Stephen Greene Lectures for the fall of 1958, given at the Andover Newton Theological School and published in the *Andover Newton Bulletin*, April, 1959. Chapter 9 is a revised and expanded version of an article published in *Social Progress*, in the November, 1958 issue.

J. H.

Chicago, Illinois





## INTRODUCTION

### *Toward a New "Image" of Man*

#### 1. CRITIQUE OF WESTERN INDIVIDUALISM

It is no longer possible to do "business as usual" in theology without condemning it to futility. The same human condition that has made it necessary for economists and statesmen, moralists and philosophers, to forego obvious dictates of tradition and common sense makes it necessary for theologians to venture into new ways of thinking. The same setting of human life that has made people critical of laissez-faire capitalism, of the principle of national sovereignty, of "natural law" ethics, and of some traditional metaphysics, has also made people critical of traditional theologies, whether "natural" or "revealed." It is no longer a matter of common sense to believe that we live under the providence of a just and almighty God, so that we are destined for an "after-life" that will be the solution of "the problem of evil." A man can no longer argue from nature to God, or prove that we are immortal, with the hope of being certain of his logic or persuasive to thinking men around. Such arguing and proving, which used to be a matter of common sense to deists and atheists alike, is today suspect both to believers and unbelievers. Reason and theology are today uneasy bedfellows. In fact, they have moved not only to separate beds but also to different rooms.

The time has come for the kind of thinking that will not take things for granted; that will reexamine deep-seated assumptions, and will consider new thoughts, no matter how strange or even unpromising; that will go slowly and laboriously from one thing to another, with the hope of some limited insight into "the human situation" and into the

problems that have our backs against the wall. Theology is not excused from such thinking.

Since our embarrassments have grown out of concatenations of things obviously true and good, it is these things which require sustained effort at criticism and judgment. It is our common sense that has produced our confusion; therefore, every utterance of common sense today is suspect. It is suspect because it is precisely our common sense that has presented us with problems that have become our embarrassment, not to say our despair. Our common sense, for instance, tells us that the value of a thing varies with supply and demand. If a thing is plentiful, it will be cheap. If it is scarce and in great demand, it will be dear. But the fact is that in our society, advertising is a successful suspension of the "natural" law of supply and demand. Again, our common sense tells us that nations in possession of great economic and military power will be able to follow their interest successfully in their dealings with nations that are not as strong. But a power like Russia is unable to have its way with Albania, and the United States has not been able to change the regime in Cuba; and neither Russia nor the United States is able to have its way in our world. No nation today is sovereign. Again, it is common sense that a man should follow his enlightened self-interest and practice the Golden Rule as a way to both success and happiness. But, in fact, doing to others as we would have them do to us is a guarantee neither of success nor of happiness. It often completely dehumanizes our relations one with another and frustrates all parties involved in it. There is no principle of common sense, private or public, that does not enter into our private and public difficulties and our sense of helplessness with regard to them.

If there is one thing in our society that deserves to be called an unquestionable utterance of common sense, it is the principle of individualism. Everybody, as it were, knows that the given, atomic, primordial real thing among us is the individual with his mind and body, his birth and death, his impulses and desires, his thoughts and actions, his duty and destiny. We look in the mirror and see our own face, and not another's. If we see another's, we know that it is his face and not ours. We look around us and we see many people, each with his name. We confront a man and recognize him as this person, with his own clothes, gait, looks, and manner, his own five senses and his own seeing and hearing; his own feelings and emotions and actions; his own attitudes and purposes and sensibilities. He is this discrete body bounded by his

skin and he occupies one space and not another. This is the individual who exists by birth and dies his own death, and between the two things is identical with himself and other than everybody else. It is obvious to him and to everybody else that he is an "individual substance" and subject of all his experiences and the agent of all his thoughts.<sup>1</sup>

Ever since the ancient Greeks defined man as a "rational animal" and Boethius defined a person as "an individual substance of a rational nature," Western man has seen himself as an individual substance endowed with certain powers and potentialities by virtue of his nature, which is his by birth. Even though man is clearly also a political animal and in all his doings exists in the society of his fellow man, his basic self-image has been that of an individual entity who interacts with others for the fulfillment of his own life and destiny. Although he belongs to the human species and exemplifies the human race in general, his own actions and passions are ultimate as his own and have their meaning as well as reality within himself. His characteristics may be universal to the human race and they may depend upon structures and functions he shares with all his fellowmen. Nevertheless, in some mysterious way he is this unique individual, having the principles of his being and action within himself as this "individual substance of rational nature." One may speak of individual men or of man in general. There has been much debate as to the reality of the one or the other. But it is a fixed thing in our minds that the individual exists by birth, and has his powers by birth, or that he is what he is by "nature."

Such individualism was deeply established in the Western mind by its tradition of thought and life since Augustine, or since the earlier fathers. One should not forget Socrates' discovery of the mind by subjecting thought itself to critical scrutiny; Plato's poetic construction of a realm of ideas open to contemplation by the human mind; Aristotle's view of substance as the principle of individuality; Stoic universalism, which turned the individual into or upon himself; the Hellenistic mind with its quest for salvation from the vicissitudes and sins of the world. When Christianity became the established religion of the Roman Empire, it was already self-evident that the end of religion is immortality and that it is the being with a "rational soul" that may seek it and hope for it. It would be hard to overestimate the effect of universal concern with "future life" and the promises made by the church concerning it upon the basic intuition of Christendom that the individual who is born and dies exists by creation and nature as a unique and ulti-

mate entity. In any case, it became axiomatic that the individual, with his mind and body, with his spiritual and physical nature, with his supernatural destiny, is man and the bearer of "rational nature." When philosophers and theologians (Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, Descartes, Locke, Kant, Bergson) sought to understand man, they turned their attention to the thinking, feeling, acting individual, with his nature and faculties and powers. And common sense itself was on their side in that "every man" thought of himself as this individual who had received his life and nature from God and lived with the hope of the Good now and hereafter. The characteristic institutions of the Western world, as they have developed especially since the sixteenth century—scientific, economic, political, industrial, educational—have been constant sources of the individualism characteristic of our culture and received by common sense among us as "God's own truth."

It is not necessary to speak elaborately of individualism as a momentous accomplishment of the Western man. Nature, as it were, does not care a straw about an individual living thing. It performs amazing feats of ingenuity for the preservation of the species, but in the process of breeding and feeding, it sacrifices individuals, in numbers large and small, without any regard for their own existence. It appears that in primitive societies, the individual is regarded as a bit of the corporate being of the clan or tribe, so that his life or his death is a matter of relative indifference to the ongoing reality of the group in whose existence he participates.<sup>2</sup> In noncivilized societies, neither god nor man appears to have regard for the private life, experiences, or destiny of the individual unless he is regarded as the bearer of the power and dignity of the tribe. In peace he is used for the well-being of the prince, and in war he is sent to fight, and perchance to die, for victory over the enemies of the prince, who embodies the destiny of the tribe. What counts is the existence of the tribe, and its power and security. The individual does not exist; he inheres and he is readily replaced in the tribe, which is an organism rather than a society. Such an attitude is so deeply ingrained in even so-called civilized societies that people are readily persuaded to shed off their existence as "individual substances" and to find happiness in becoming "mass men." Individualism is a priceless fruition of civilized life; a "new being" realized through centuries of struggle, both political and intellectual. The loss of it would mean the loss of humanity as the Western man knows it and the undoing of his culture. It would be the death of us.

Nevertheless, there is many an indication, from every phase of civilized life in the West, that traditional individualism is no longer viable either in theory or in practice.<sup>3</sup> Even while individualism was a salutary and immensely enriching overcoming of tribalism, and in its way gave us our civilization and way of life, it was, or is now, a distortion of reality that has become intolerable. The age of science, and age of power, the nuclear age, the age of world wars and dictatorships, the age of anxiety and frustration—this age of unfulfilled promises and dire threats—constrains us, willy-nilly, to reconsider that individualism which has dominated Western mentality and ethics to this very day. We are now forced to ask with a new seriousness whether the true and the good as envisaged by individualism are not to us a source of lies and evil that may become the undoing of the gains of civilized life in the West.

The thing in question is the traditional Western notion that the unit or atom of human society is "the individual substance of rational nature," who appears in this world endowed with traits and powers that go into the making of our common life. Is it true that the individual human being exists by birth equipped with a "human nature," which makes him the being he is and forms his conduct in our common life? Is it true that we are to see ourselves and others as the atoms of society and to deal one with another accordingly? Is this how we are to live together and to engage in our economic and political activities, trying to prosper and find our peace?

The question of truth comes first, and there are a number of ways we may argue that human beings exist as fellowmen, or that "human nature" is a matter, not of birth, but of our life together.

We do not know our "nature" except in our transactions with our fellowmen.<sup>4</sup> We do our speaking and thinking, our purposing and acting, in the process of our mutual transactions. Even our perceptions and emotions, our eating and drinking, and our loving and hating occur in a social process that makes them what they are. Whether we act by habit or by reflection, whether mechanically or freely, we act in the context of social institutions, and by reacting. In short, human behavior, in its interiority or exteriority, in its concrete occurrence, with all its aspects or dimensions, is a matter of transaction and response, without which we are not human beings. Psychologists speak of "field theory," "interpersonal relations," "dynamic interaction," etc. Sociologists see the individual in the context of institutions and common life in its vari-

ous aspects. Philosophers have come to center attention on language as a key to human behavior and to recognize that language is a matter of signs, respondings, and communication. Ethicists are now aware that good and evil, right and wrong, freedom and responsibility, and even pleasure and pain, are to be understood, not in terms of action on the part of the individual, but in terms of interaction. Men of science, whether physical or biological, no longer deal with atomic entities but with the dynamics of a field or a whole in which entities have their being by virtue of their inclusion in a process. The point worth emphasizing, in view of the deep-seated prejudice of common sense, is that it is a distortion to see a space or field as occupied by preexisting and definable things, or the whole as made up of its parts. It is not true that the field or the whole is made up of interacting entities which are physically and logically prior to the process in which they interact. What is prior is the transaction or response by virtue of which each individual does what he does and is what he is, or is found to possess such and such a nature.

Nor is the situation a matter of "the hen and the egg." It makes all the difference in the world whether transaction or interacting things comes first. To look at a thing outside of the dynamic context in which it acts is to distort its reality, and leads to consequences that are frustrating both in theory and in practice. It is to misunderstand it, to misjudge it, to misuse it, and to abuse it. In the physical realm, it prevents comprehension and control. In human affairs, it leads to inhumanity and common misery. In economic life, it produces attitudes and behavior that obstruct public prosperity and common well-being. In political life, it leads to lack of intelligence in the ordering of our common life and results in injustice and confusion. In the ethical life, it produces prejudice against justice and faithfulness, which makes men bitter and inhuman. When people see themselves first and others second, when they give the "I" a logical and natural priority to the me," they do not merely put the hen before the egg; they kill the hen and crush the egg, and the outcome is hunger for which there is no food.

We have become sensitive to the priority of transaction to interaction, of context to entity, not because of a sudden outburst of intelligence in our times, but because of a common mind that is relatively new and peculiar to our age.

It is hardly possible to overestimate the influence of Darwinism upon our minds. Even perhaps more significant than the theory of

evolution has been the Darwinian insistence upon seeing the organism in its physical environment, and as living and changing in its give-and-take with it. Thus, Darwinism has given a tremendous and irresistible impetus to the understanding of the organism in its context. Darwin tried to explain the structure and characteristics of herd and beast in terms of their survival in a milieu in which they lived and ate and fought. There may still be argument as to the relative effectiveness of "the nature" of an organism and the environmental conditions under which it lives in the process of evolution. However, Darwinism, with all the debates and discussions it has produced, must be set down as a major intellectual impetus against the kind of individualism that seeks to understand beast or man apart from its involvement in a transaction that is physically and logically prior to it. Darwinism in the above sense is a fact of our intellectual life and has taught us, indirectly perhaps, to see ourselves as fellowmen.

It is interesting that Darwinism appeared in the machine age. It may well be that the new dependence of the individual upon economic processes that characterize the industrial age was not without its influence upon Darwin's quest. In any case, we are now living in an environment that is dominated by technological organization and the economic and political processes that have grown out of it. The story of the age of "science and industry" has been told so often and so thoroughly that here we may be brief about it. Still, it is surprising how often men of "common sense" on every side, more or less cultivated, put on blinders when it comes to seeing and understanding the radical ways in which transaction in a humanly produced world of "men and machines" has made the traditional individualism of the Western world not only a distortion of reality but also a source of unrest and peril in our time.<sup>5</sup>

The transition from a physical environment to one produced by science and industry (which we shall call an artifactual environment) has meant a radical change in the transactions of human beings one with another and with their world. Once we recognize that the individual and his world emerge from transactions, we may well expect that the individual living and moving in the city built by man is not the same as the individual who lives and moves in the "nature" of physical forces.<sup>6</sup> He is a physical animal interacting, not with animals and vegetation, but with other men in a milieu of machines and goods. Both his dependence and his freedom take on new dimensions in his artifactual world. He has a new power with regard to the constructs of human

mind and technology, and at the same time he is dependent upon social process in a new way.<sup>7</sup> In the physical world, good and evil are from "nature," and a man enjoys the one and suffers the other with those around him. In the artifactual world, good and evil arise within the social process. When a man enjoys good, it is in a social process, and when he suffers evil, it is again through the doings of man. He subsists, not so much in nature as an organism, as by institutions and in organizations as a citizen. Those around him are not so much people who happen to share with him a common physical world as they are agents of good and evil in a man-made world of things. If he is dependent upon them for his good, he also holds them responsible for his evil. Living in a world of human agency rather than of natural process, he both judges and is judged by his fellowmen with a new passion. His business, for good or evil, for hope or despair, is with his fellowmen; it is from them that he distinguishes himself as this individual who must provide for his needs and achieve his security. He is at one and the same time under the necessity of getting along with others and of pursuing his own "enlightened self-interest." The more he has to conform to instituted common ways, the more he has to protect his own being and space as this individual and the more he has to contradistinguish himself from his neighbor, who is engaged in a similar conformity and a similar practice of individuality. In the civilized life of our day, men exert among themselves a pressure that produces a peculiar variety of humanity and a peculiar type of the individual man.

The tendency of city life is to produce the "mass man," who has become a serious concern, if not the obsession, of many thinkers in our day. We hear about the lonely crowd, the other-directed man, the man who has lost identity, selfhood, freedom, and vocation and destiny.<sup>8</sup> We hear of men possessed by anxiety; of neurotics, paranoiacs, psychotics; of bondage to institutions, to advertising and propaganda, to images and attitudes induced by social forces of which nobody is master and everybody is a slave.<sup>9</sup> There is a "general will," a superego, an irresistible other, an It, which may well be a fiction; but it is a fiction with the quasi-divine attributes of omnipresence, omniscience, omnipotence, a god, a monster, a tyrant combined. It makes people ill, and it is the threat of destruction in our "Age of Power."<sup>10</sup>

The above characterization of our age will appear exaggerated to some, especially to those who are, quite reasonably, impressed by the goods and the promises of good in our society and by its over-



whelming achievements toward the increase of prosperity and pleasure in the civilized world. There is hardly a perennial evil, such as poverty or ill health, that may not be removed through the powers of man available in our world. It is a fact that societies which possess the knowledge and power provided by science and industry have achieved human well-being that must be recognized as wondrous improvement over the condition of man in societies that were without them. No one in his right mind will be other than elated with the prospect of universal human participation in the benefits of the Power Age and therefore in the increase and spread of a civilized way of life in our world.

## 2. THE PROBLEM OF HUMANITY TODAY

Nevertheless, men of intelligence and imagination who have been prophesying evil must be heeded. Kierkegaard, Marx, Samuel Butler, Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger, Berdyaev, and others cannot be brushed aside as false prophets. The wars, tyrannies, massacres, fanaticisms, frustrations, no-exits, of our age cannot be set aside as so many accidents or aberrations of wicked men. This is an age of fears and playing with fire, and of apparently inscrutable problems that turn our dreams of human happiness into nightmares of human misery present and to come. How can a man be blamed if he sees the travails of the age as symptoms of a deep-seated and chronic disease or the sign of a terrible failure in human intelligence and insight? What if, in fact, there has been some fateful oversight (or of course more than one) or fatal miscalculation while the civilized world, inebriated with its new powers, has rushed headlong with the overwhelming prospect of boundless power and felicity in a world of artifacts?

Could it be that in the process of organizing our common life for the creation of a world over which we would be lords and in which we would have all things at our disposal for performing endless miracles of "human betterment" we have, in fact, been losing our grip upon ourselves and our humanity? One may well be excused for suspecting that in our zeal for increasing knowledge and power we have lost sight of a "life together" which is the very source of human existence. If our troubles are deep and pervasive and we see no way of overcoming them, it may well be that there is a failure of intelligence among us, and with it a failure of our very existence as fellowmen. A whole dimension

of humanity may have been obscured, and we may be like blind men groping in the dark, which is today a most perilous affair.

A vague but promising answer to the question posed by the above paragraphs is quite readily available. We have been told by men like Berdyaev and Buber, and may well observe for ourselves, that there is among us a breakdown in communion, or in human transaction as such.<sup>11</sup> Our way of life as civilized people, and our self-understanding that goes with it, has led to a preoccupation with the individual as he seeks his goods in the institutions that are his effective environment. We think readily in terms of the individual and society. We think of a man in terms of the economic, political, social institutions and organizations within which he lives and finds good and evil. We try to understand his place in these institutions, his problems, his prospects, his successes and failures within them. It is clear to us that his "life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness" depend upon the workings of social habits and ways of action.<sup>12</sup> These habits and ways in our society are extremely complex as well as crucial for human life. Therefore, we fix our attention upon them, and they occupy our minds to the full extent of their power. Who really understands the workings of the cluster or clusters of institutions that constitute our society, and who is able to comprehend the actualities of the ways in which they mold the life of the individual? Here is a field of endless observation and study, and one that is truly absorbing as well as illuminating. In fact, in civilized life the individual exists in the context and by the dynamics of organized, massive institutions; and it is only rational that he should understand himself as interacting with a "generalized Other" or Society as such.<sup>13</sup> It is no surprise that those who make it their business to understand man's ways should look at him as he lives and moves in our cluster of institutions: that is, as he is related to an "it" which we call Society.

In the city, the power that makes the difference between good and evil, a source of well-being or misery, is "the generalized Other." This Other is a potent abstraction that forms the attitudes and minds of the people. It is the ultimately Real, which determines men's judgments, their goals, and motivations. As the source of real promises and real threats, of life and death in the city, the Other takes on the quality of Power, of the Holy, of Deity. It acts as, or is, the superego that dominates the ego, and as the Dangerous Thing, it forms the individual's conscience and passes judgment upon him and holds him in its grip as a person in the ambiguous state of dependence and guilt. Thus at the core

of his being the individual feels that his business is with It in the first place and with his neighbor secondly.

Thus the individual's neighbor becomes to him, first of all, not his fellowman, but the representative and symbol of Power, of the Other as It. Not only men of power and authority in the organizations that constitute It, but also any man, people as such and universally, become possible and probable means of the individual's weal and woe—not as neighbors or fellowmen, but as bearers of the power of the Other. As the vicars of Society in which the individual lives, moves, and has his being, they take on the quality of Society, and function not as fellowmen but as powers that are refractions of Power. Thus one's neighbors are powers before they are people, even though they are people who exist by the love of their fellowmen. It is indeed true that love still gives the community its being as a transaction of fellowmen. But Power takes priority over love and dominates the individual as "the determiner of destiny"; and the neighbor is felt and more or less acknowledged as Its functionary. It becomes a habit to look at another man not as a fellowman but according to his function and power in Society—so much so that thinking men see the person as the sum of the roles he plays in the cluster of institutions in the city. Men are known as businessmen, government men, doctors, teachers, "working men," etc., first, and as fellowmen secondly; and this means that it is their power and not their fellowmanhood that impresses those who have communications with them. It is not true that fellowmanhood becomes inoperative, because if it were, the common life itself would collapse. But still, it becomes habitual to see people as roles first and as fellowmen secondly. And here order makes the difference between fulfillment and frustration.

Institutions are organized habits of people engaged in a common life with common goals that have to do with the satisfaction of certain needs, such as food, clothing, shelter, security. In civilized life, institutions achieve a high degree of success in providing the people with goods that not only satisfy their needs but also increase and intensify their satisfactions. People have more things to enjoy, and develop capacities for enjoying new things. One would think offhand that the more civilized a society, the more the people enjoy themselves and the happier they are. But the truth is that enjoying things and being happy are not the same thing, and that one may enjoy much without being happy, and that one may be happy without having many goods to enjoy. It is also true that being unhappy, one may not enjoy the goods in

one's possession. In short, there is no necessary congruity between possession and happiness.

The reasons for this difficulty are many and complex. Many city people may be unhappy with their goods because they work too hard and are tired; they may be too ambitious and are impressed with what they do not have and not with what they do have; they may be ill adjusted to their work; they may be involved with some struggle for power or advancement that drains their energies; they may suffer from fear, or guilt, or insecurity, etc. However, the problem usually is that common life and activity in institutions is characterized by common enterprise rather than by transaction as fellowmen. The plain, if vague, truth is that people attending to institutional purposes and processes, in their pursuit of the goods that institutions provide, may and do ignore one another as fellowmen, and in so doing, they frustrate one another. Their common sense dictates that they should be concerned with the business on hand rather than with their so-called "private lives." It is understood that they are engaged in an enterprise that may issue in a common good or the good of each man. The benefit each man derives from the enterprise is his own rather than the other's. A man is not expected to be interested in what the other person does with goods. He may well ignore whatever role the other man plays besides the one that goes with their economic activity in an institution. He need not be offensive in his ignoring, but it is understood that men's business one with another has to do with the roles they play in their common undertaking and that anything else which may concern them severally is a matter of secondary consequence. But in this way they do not meet as fellowmen; and since they are fellowmen, their meeting is a not-meeting and a frustration of humanity. Therefore, people commonly complain of a failure of humanity in civilized life and become quite bitter about it. That is one reason, perhaps the decisive one, for unhappiness in a society where many goods are enjoyed by many people, or for the failure of joy in an "affluent" society.

In truth, we are hardly able to speak intelligently about fellowmanhood. The very notion of fellowmanhood has become extremely vague and hardly intelligible among us. We can think with immense productivity about our engines and our institutions, about the manufacture and sale of our goods, about efficiency and improvement in our artifactual world. We are incredibly ingenious with the making of better goods, and our minds are reasonably devoted, with all the power of sci-