

Dinda L. Gorlée

**Wittgenstein in Translation**

# **Semiotics, Communication and Cognition**



Edited by  
Paul Cobley and Kalevi Kull

## **Volume 9**

Dinda L. Gorlée

# **Wittgenstein in Translation**

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Exploring Semiotic Signatures

**DE GRUYTER**  
MOUTON

ISBN: 978-1-61451-144-1  
e-ISBN: 978-1-61451-113-7  
ISSN: 1867-0873

**Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data**

A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress

**Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek**

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie;  
detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at <http://dnb.dnb.de>.

© 2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston

Typesetting: Meta Systems, Wustermark

Printing: Hubert & Co. GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen

♻️ Printed on acid-free paper

Printed in Germany

[www.degruyter.com](http://www.degruyter.com)

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For my son Jorrit



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*Worte sind Taten* (“Words are deeds”)  
(Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*)





# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Facts and factors — 1</b>
1.1	Preface — 1
1.2	Acknowledgments and beyond — 11
<b>2</b>	<b>Building a semiotic bridge — 17</b>
2.1	Semiotics and translation — 17
2.2	Wittgenstein's semiotized sources — 23
2.3	Facts and transformations — 30
2.4	Leading principles of semiotics — 39
2.5	Language and metalanguage — 48
<b>3</b>	<b>Fragmentary discourse — 59</b>
3.1	Criss-crossing across Wittgenstein's discourse — 59
3.2	Vision and revisions — 66
3.3	Art-science myth-making — 77
3.4	Translation of fragmentary mosaics — 85
3.5	Fragments and whole — 91
3.6	Bricolage, paraphrase, manuscript — 98
<b>4</b>	<b>Turning words into deeds — 107</b>
4.1	Plato — 107
4.2	Saint Augustine — 114
4.3	On the Trinity — 121
4.4	Interpretative translation — 128
4.5	Picture theory of thought — 139
4.6	Words into deeds — 147
4.7	Language-games of translation — 157
<b>5</b>	<b>Translated and retranslated fragments — 171</b>
5.1	Name, proposition, logic — 171
5.2	Translation and self-translation of <i>Culture and Value</i> — 187
5.3	Facts and cultural impressions — 201
5.4	(Re)translated language-games — 212
<b>6</b>	<b>Global language-games — 219</b>
6.1	Global translations — 219
6.2	Tone, token, type of <i>Brown Book</i> — 226
6.3	Clue to clue — 231

6.4	Transcultured words and sentences —	<b>237</b>
6.5	Significance and sensitivity in clues —	<b>253</b>

**7 Certainty and uncertainty — 273**

7.1	Knowing and guessing —	<b>273</b>
7.2	Gestures as words and deeds —	<b>282</b>
7.3	Groundlessness —	<b>288</b>
7.4	True or false —	<b>297</b>
7.5	Epiphany —	<b>306</b>

**8 Concluding with anticipation — 319**

**References — 327**

**Index — 353**

# 1 Facts and factors

I'll endeavour deeds to match these words.  
(Shakespeare, *Troilus and Cressida*)

## 1.1 Preface

This book adds to the already enormous and still growing scholarship of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) as a fundamental philosopher of language. The specific aim of the following chapters are contained within an argument about the “marriage” of Wittgenstein’s philosophical works and motifs with a specialized scholarship: the semiotic approach of the translations of Wittgenstein’s works into a variety of languages. Wittgenstein was able to enter philosophical and linguistic domains as a “hidden hero” of semiotics (Greimas/Cortés 1979: 171, English trans. 1982: 142), blurring the boundaries of “old” philosophical theory and practice to study the translations of Wittgenstein’s “new” work and the methodology of semiotics – particularly the semiotics of Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914) – as applied to a semiotic translation theory, called *semiotranslation* (Chapter 2 and *passim*).<sup>1</sup> The semiotic interpretation of Wittgenstein’s style will answer the upcoming issues in the translation of philosophical texts interrelated with the semiotic concept of translation theory. The focus of controversy of Wittgenstein as a semiotician of language means that the book *Wittgenstein in Translation: Exploring Semiotic Signatures* in the Mouton series *Semiotics, Communication and Cognition* will construct a fresh landscape to Wittgensteinian scholarship, dedicated to the microscopic and macroscopic view of semiotic translation criticism.

In this exploration, I give an interpretative and technical assessment of the elements and choices in Wittgensteinian translatology from semiotics. Complementing Peircian semiotics, the traditio-historical and sociohistorical contexts are woven together for a broader horizon of the tapestry of criticism found in the linguistic-and-cultural issues of translation in and of Wittgenstein’s works and writings. Roland Barthes (1915–1980) defined that “[c]riticism is not a translation but a periphrase”, adding that one “cannot claim to redis-

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<sup>1</sup> The change and growth of translation between languages or the interpretation between other speeches respond to my concept of “semiotranslation” (or “semio-translation,” with hyphen), coined in Goriée (1994: 226–232) and further unfolded in Goriée (2003, 2004 [particularly 99–143], 2007, and later publications).

cover the ‘essence’ of the work, for this essence is the subject itself, that is to say an absence” (1987: 87). Paraphrased into Wittgenstein’s coded diaries, he noted on 12 August 1946 that “*Jeder Kritiker kritisiert mit seinem eigenen Ich und sein Mass zeigt sich nicht in seiner Kritik*” (Each critic criticizes with his own self and the measurement [of knowledge] is not shown in his criticism) (Typescript coded writings, my trans.)

Let me give some simple illustrations of the English translation of Wittgenstein’s double sentence as a jigsaw game, full of ambiguities and contradictions. In the last example, for example, the German word “*Ich*” can not only be translated by a “self” – a “myself” interconnected with other “selves” – but also by the solipsistic “I,” “the subject,” “the person,” or “the ego,” depending on the psychic (or psychoanalytical), linguistic, and socio-historical categories the translator will decide to involve. “*Mass*” indicates in Wittgenstein not only the whole “measurement” or standard of knowledge but, figuratively or metaphorically, operates to show the whole “world” of “reality”<sup>2</sup> (Schulte 1992: 17–21). Each of these Wittgensteinian terms appeals to its own concepts in history and geography, used by him but also going back to other previous philosophers.

Wittgenstein concentrated on including the immediate presence of his “*Ich*” in his mathematical and linguistic discourse, stressing a dialog of the objective with his own subjective. In his *Philosophische Bemerkungen*, he wrote about the privileged status of the self-reflective word “I” used in language (PB 1984: 88ff., trans. in *Philosophical Remarks* PR 1975: 88ff.).<sup>3</sup> It seems that the self-oriented alternative, implying both monolog and dialog, must be treated

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2 Human “reality” is a solipsistic term of defining the limits of human existence. “Reality” involves no analytical algorithm nor even divine truth. Logical truth remains outside. Hence the quotation marks is used in the vulgar forms of human “reality” (Sebeok 1999: 14ff.). Wittgenstein’s solipsistic union of both terms is described in what is called “my world.” The *Tractatus* starts with “*Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist*” (The world is everything that is the case) to pursue with “*Die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt*” (*The limits of my language mean the limits of my world*) (TLP 1922: 1, 5.6; emphasis in italics is here underlined). *Welt* is literally (not figuratively nor metaphorically) translated as “world” in order to give the limited knowledge of the intelligent agents, that echo choices and decisions in the light of their incomplete information. In parenthesis, Steiner suggests here “an awareness that *der Fall* is also ‘the Fall,’ that ‘the case of man’ is his fallen condition – a condition whose fatal consequences were Babel and the maddening difficulties we find in seeking to communicate with each other and with reality?” (1971: 84). For references of TLP 1922, a 1962 reprint is used (see References).

3 In the translation of Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Remarks*, the anonymity of translators is happily “violated” by a “Translator’s Note” (PR 1975: 352–354) and first-level footnotes indicating doubts and decisions made by the translators, Raymond Hargreaves and Roger White.

as basic to the analysis of linguistic and discursive resources of Wittgenstein's writings. In reference to the noun "*Mass*," Wittgenstein defined in *Philosophical Investigations* the limits of the human "measure" writing that:

*Eines ist, die Messmethoden zu beschreiben, ein Anderes, Messungsergebnisse zu finden und auszusprechen. Aber was wir "messen" nennen, ist auch durch eine gewisse Konstanz der Messungsergebnisse bestimme.* (It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call "measuring" is part determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement.) (PI 1953: 242–242e; further argued in Chapters 2: 4 and 5: 2, 3): 4).

Since the terms – "*Ich*" and "*Mass*" but also other terms – are thematically related but not the same in Wittgenstein's publications and writings, where his "confusion" of the translated terms becomes a struggle of "meaningless" words. Thanks to the contextual thinking of "meaningful" sentences and key-words, in the translator's view those words will be to some degree understandable as well as recoverable.

In the "technical" analysis of philosophical discourse, any term must have one strict word containing the rule for the correct interpretation to solve the puzzle of translation. In Wittgenstein's writings, the "technical" terminology is often used (even mixed together) with "non-technical" prose of a rhetorical nature as in the case of the literary overtones of his autobiographical genre, the questions-and-answers, and other literary or rhetorical genres. To free the critical discourse from the burden of paraphrase and the debilitating tendency toward cryptic formulations, the translator generates his or her own specific thematic space for the imagination and the "reality" of his or her "world." Beyond the fixed rules, the translator needs a "creative" treatment of words and sentences. This inward and outward "space" presumes work (and undoing the work) beyond the interpretation and theorization, to complete the text-critical issues of the translation of philosophy. The translation always remains an unfinished task that must end in a harsh judgment of the fact – evaluating the final translation in the definitive publication. For the translator, the Wittgensteinian authority of the source reference remains largely obscured. The translator's imagination means a relative openness and sensitivity to nurture the Wittgensteinian value of all the possible meanings, reformulated in new words and sentences in other target languages. These various ways mean that the act of translation must step into Wittgenstein's concept of "language-game", where speech interacts with variant patterns taken from culture (see Chapter 4: 7).

Wittgenstein was both a translatee and a translator. His professional preoccupations and his globetrotting existence meant that he had to live abroad and became "a citizen of no community" (Monk 1990: 551–575). He mastered for-

eign languages and grammars, but his own linguistic pluralism – Wittgenstein’s cultural “unhousedness” (Steiner 1971: 10, 14) – comes from his native “at-homeness” (Steiner 1971: 15) in German or better Austrian-German<sup>4</sup> translated into several languages.<sup>5</sup> He did criticize some of his translated works and worked as an “international” philosopher in the English language. Wittgenstein “spoke excellent English, with the accent of an educated Englishman, although occasional Germanisms would appear in his constructions” (Malcolm 1959: 24). Posthumously, Wittgenstein’s publications and writings have been “internationalized” for future success within translations into a variety of languages. This globalization means that Wittgenstein’s works have been actively interpreted or re-interpreted, read and reread, by many editors, as well as translated or co-translated by himself and many other translators. Deciphering Wittgenstein’s personal style of writing, the translators have given his or her fragments of text new literary and philosophical “signatures” (Burke 1995), discussed throughout this book.<sup>6</sup>

*Signature is a relatively free space marked by the internalized voice and style of the translator or translators beyond any “signatory” held by the author’s own ethical intentions and philosophical beliefs of his oeuvre.* After Wittgenstein’s death, the translator has changed into a meta-author or even a co-author (Barthes 1987a; see Pease 1995: 271f.). The “archaeology” of this book studies the metatextual accounts of the “thoughts, representations, images, themes, preoccupations that are concealed or revealed” (Foucault 1992: 138) in the translated discourses of Wittgenstein’s writings. In the analysis, the discourses are studied as “practices obeying certain rules” (Foucault 1992: 138) to protect or violate the meaning of the originals. Within the pragmatic practices of the language-game of translation, the words of speech of Wittgenstein’s

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4 In the editorial preface to Wittgenstein’s diaries, Somavilla notes Wittgenstein’s orthographical remarks and his use of his local Viennese dialect (1997: 12–13).

5 Steiner’s variety of themes in language revolution in *Extraterritorial* (1971) is throughout this book intertextually examined to understand Wittgenstein’s “new” philosophy. Semiotranslation gives an intertextual sense of the semiotic doctrine of signs, transfigured into translatology, which helps to expand Steiner’s *After Babel* (1975).

6 The term “signature” – often metaphorically used with quotation marks (Fowler [1926]1984: 348–352, 480, 566–571) – ascertains from the OED ([1933]1989: 15: 456) as a legal signature, a name or code used with the intention of authenticating the writing. The modern use is the “distinguishing mark” written as a “pattern or characteristic” on any page after page of the “physical object”, substance, etc. by which it can be identified. Used here as the translator’s mark on the translation, the signature “solves” the personal ambiguities and disambiguities of language in translation. The modern term signature is the (de)constructive action of the text (word, phrase, and language), demonstrated by the particular “voice” of the translator, on the analogy of Derrida’s *The Post Card* [1987].

“document” uncover the semiotic signs of his cultural “monument” (Foucault 1992: 138f.).

Wittgenstein was greatly interested in translation of all kinds, not only philosophical and linguistic, but also literary translation. He judged other translations and translated other favorite works of literature by the Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) and other literary and mystical writers (Glock 1996: 251–253). Writing about Tagore, Wittgenstein emphasized that a translation had to be as emotional and lyrical as the original. However, Wittgenstein stated that the “translation leaves a chasm which I cannot bridge,” and he added that “I read *with interest* throughout, but without being gripped. That does not seem to be a good sign ... I merely understand the allegory in an abstract way” (Monk 1990: 408). In the double ways of understanding translation, Wittgenstein crossed from the Augustinian “natural” sign to the “artificial” sign – that means, from belief to knowledge and *vice versa* – but felt a vacuum in the translation. The penetrating question was: can Wittgenstein’s concept of literary translation or biblical translation also be applied to specialized translation, such as the translation of philosophy?

The translations of Wittgenstein’s writings have now turned into a debate. Kenny has exposed the danger, postulating that:

Wittgenstein’s works have now been translated with the approval of the trustees, into many different languages, including Chinese. From time to time proposals have been made to the trustees for complete translations into other languages of the entire *Nachlass* as exhibited. Hitherto they have refused permission, and in my view rightly. The study of Wittgenstein at a level which demands the kinds of comparison between variants and revisions which only the entire *Nachlass* permits cannot be profitably undertaken except by scholars who understand German. The production of entire-*Nachlass* translations into many languages could only divert Wittgenstein studies into an amateur scholasticism. (Kenny 2005: 354)

Facing the insufficient understanding of the translators, Kenny added as a final remark that:

A related object can be made to the proliferation of different translations in the same language (such as English). We are fortunate in that most of the English translations of Wittgenstein’s works are of a high standard. When errors are found in them, it is better that they should be remedied in a second edition of the existing translation, rather than in the production of entirely new translations. Otherwise, readers ignorant of German may take differences between translators’ styles for evidence of variation or development in Wittgenstein’s own thoughts. (Kenny 2005: 355)

A criticism about the shaky ground of the translations of Wittgenstein’s writings is pressed for time. This book grounds the cross-disciplinary and cultural

studies required of the knowledge of the philosophical translators, in order to bring their beliefs and knowledge into a sharpened focus.

Wittgenstein's activities was much wider than imagined and that its sources have been only patchily cultivated as sources, is clear. Although Wittgenstein used in his philosophy a range of literary sources with a religious (or pseudo-religious) taste, such as the perhaps strange sources of Plato, St. Augustine, Goethe, Shakespeare, Tolstoy, Rilke, Heine, William James, and others. Philosophy, as seen today, was marginal for him: his philosophical calling rests on a spiritual inquiry. As a young man, Wittgenstein admired Tolstoy's (1828–1910) *Gospel in Brief*, written in Tolstoy's later life (from 1881) during his spiritual journey from anarchism to his conversion to Christianity (Malcolm 1959: 42f., 52, 70, High 1990, Peters 2000). Reading Tolstoy's religious work helped Wittgenstein survive the horrors of the First World War.

To give a satisfactory overview of Wittgenstein's prophetic persona, his spiritual pilgrimage had a primary source in the priest-translator, Saint Augustine of Hippo (354–430) (discussed in Chapter 4: 2, 3). His ancient writings were qualified for modernity by Wittgenstein, whose chronology of Augustine's historical words and paragraphs for the sake of the rhetorical, religious, and philosophical effects deeply influenced Wittgenstein's life and writings. Augustine was the Roman-African *Doctor doctorum* who, after his education in Carthage, was converted to the early Christian church in 386 and baptized one year later. Away from Rome and across the Mediterranean Sea, the Christians in North Africa had a vivid life of the expanding church, "caught up in the struggles, tensions, victories, defeats, heroism, and cowardice, which mark their words" (Kydd 1997: 65). In the high drama of Augustine's *Confessions*, he described the strain on his personal character, written in his lyrical Latin, telling in his diaries how he crossed from sin to sainthood. In his spiritual way of life, Wittgenstein struggled to follow Augustine's testimony, the devouring desire to reach the heart of God.

Augustine's *charisma* carried over into Wittgenstein's time. Augustine's leadership was marked by the conversion of the Roman Empire into Christendom. At this hazardous time, the old Roman Empire and the cultural and educational Roman system, which had shaped Augustine's mind, were collapsing under the weight of the invading heretical Vandals. The sacking of Rome by the Goths took place in 410. Augustine critically replied to the Romans who attributed the fall of Rome to the spiritual power of the rise of Christendom. His life as an early Christian theologian was the adventure of a transitory mystic, a translator between paganism and Christian life in the Mediterranean-wide culture, adjusting to an adieu to the Greek age and a welcome to a Latin world, including the appearance of the theology and philosophy of the Rome-centered clergy of the Middle Ages (Deely 2001: 161ff.).



Standing at the other end of history, the pre-modern Austrian soldier of Jewish-Christian creed, Wittgenstein, had no easier time. His life had strong similarities with Augustine's courage and pre-medieval intellectual spirit (Peters 2000: 360f.), that he saw reflected in the fate of political absurdities and ideological problems involved in the war zone of the post-imperial world. Wittgenstein himself experienced the collapse of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire; he volunteered for military service in the First World War and at the end of the war was exiled in Italy. Afterwards, he escaped from the Nazi army by settling in England, thereby fleeing the holocaust of the Jews during Second World War. Wittgenstein was burdened by memories that make the heart ache, or worse.

Spiritually indebted to Augustine's autobiographical *Confessions*, Wittgenstein survived vice and virtue in his hazardous lifetime and also kept abreast of opportunity in matters of conflict, transcending his own real and spiritual abysses of horror (Eco 1985). Both Augustine and Wittgenstein sought and found, in disparate times, wisdom in prayer to God. Wittgenstein revealed Augustinian signs, words, and sacraments into his modern life and philosophy. Their task was to write a new and unusual version of philosophy, unburdened by history, dedicated to give voice to one's own thoroughly modern terminology and methodology. Both Augustine and Wittgenstein decided at some point to use common language as a native vernacular of the new philosophy, that they then enriched, modified, and transplanted into a foreign one (Latin and English). The use of language suggests a common but "hidden" perspective of the imaginative speech of conventional scholarship to be realistically interpreted and translated in all languages in their time and afterwards.

In *Confessions*, Augustine's memory for the first time takes a text-based tradition of close reading (and reading aloud) as a basis for inner reflection, thereby abandoning the old oral teaching of Plato (427–347 BC) and other philosopher-teachers. In Augustine's "modern" world, "many texts did circulate, in economical, non-nonsense form, bound like modern books [and] [i]t was precisely in this period that the more clumsy scroll was replaced by the codex, made up of bound pages" effecting a "revolution in the technology of communication" (Brown 2008: 51). This new technical fact meant that "missionary" communication became a possibility. Augustine had North African roots (in what is now Algeria) but he spoke and wrote in Latin, the church language. In terms of foreign languages, Augustine disliked the study of Greek and his interest lay with the exclusively Latin culture, then the language of the future. The "alien" fact of Augustine's own Latinization was transplanted in the inner conflicts of his writings, including the chasm of translation as a convenient mobility in his flow of "translated" words. His concerns of transla-

tion in those days involved mainly the Bible, sermons, and other theological documents, translated from the devaluation of Greek and Hebrew to the “superlanguage” Latin. Augustine, the provincial Berber, had to reconvert himself into the Latin rhythm and flavor of a cosmopolitan Christendom. After Augustine’s gradual transition from alien to native – his own transition or translation – he studied the functions and limits of human language in the Middle Ages, inaugurating the basis of the “semiological consciousness of the Christian West” (Vance 1986: 34, 1986a: 62).

As a universal bridge-builder of one culture and religion with the next, Saint Augustine as an early translation critic communicated that a translation must be painstaking and accurate, bringing about, in the imagined reconstruction of a past prophetic world, a new world to suit future generations. But he was aware that translation was a slippery term, since the cultural-linguistic sensibility needed to be a “virtuous” and divine activity. Haunted by the profane poetry of the pagan gods, the translation now centered on the moral and epistemological principles of the new religious beliefs and practices. A translation agreed with God’s will working in the soul, integrating not only cupidity (*cupiditas*) but also the Pauline principle of charity (*caritas*) (Ward 1987).<sup>7</sup> The use and abuse of the Augustinian virtues should obey the desire and enjoyment of God, and lead to the truth or falsity of the translation (Markus 1967: 1: 203f.).

Augustine’s translation of the verb “*interpretari*” had a triad of purpose: to interpret, explain, and translate (Kelly 1973: 134). “*Interpretari*” is indeed an umbrella word in early religion, showing the divine opposition between oral performance of interpreting and the written activity of translation, that conceals some unity (Vance 1986: 318f.). *Autre temps, autre mœurs*. Roughly one and a half millenium later than Augustine’s “historical” thoughts, Wittgenstein’s new use of reading and translation coincided with Augustine’s spirit in terms of the renewed study of philosophico-narrative discourse. Yet Wittgenstein’s philosophy about the meaning of sacred texts and the translation of

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<sup>7</sup> In the *King James Version* – the contemporary version of *The Holy Bible* (1611) used in the biblical citations – *agapè* is misleadingly translated as “charity,” concerning bounty, benevolence, clemency, and piety (Ps. 111: 9, 2 Cor. 9: 9). However, *agapè* functions through faith, mercy, and grace, perhaps a more adequate translation would be “love,” Augustine’s key or standard term (Gorlée 2005: 47). “Charity” means goodness, to be accepted by God. However, in the Old Testament, there is a slightly different sense: “charity” was used literally as “justice,” meaning the compliance with the rigid code of law (Torah) (Deut. 15: 6 and elsewhere). If love comes from justice, and the roots share the faith or the distinctive way of experiencing human life, there may be found no contrast but a parallel between the Old and the New Testament.

their verbal signs followed the logical approach but, at the same time, radiated an Augustinian “function of divine illumination, which acts on our intelligence as it seeks truth” (Kelly 1973: 135; see Vance 1986: 41). Translation is an outward act of transition, but it takes from the spiritual workings of an inner activity.

As noted by Sebeok (1988), “Saint Augustine must figure as the outstanding semiotician of antiquity” because his “[c]onsideration of the doctrine of signs leads Augustine to pose the question: how (if at all) is it possible to teach men anything by means of *verba*?” In his time, Augustine proposed his way of verbal signs – the genesis and growth of general semiotics applied to theology and education – and became an early semiotician of North African roots writing in “modern” Latin (Deely 2001: 212–224). His general notion of signs was codified in writing and thereby survived the so-called Dark Ages (Deely 2001: 135, n.123, 212, 213 fn.1). Following Augustine, the doctrine of Augustinianism was developed into the theology of the Middle Ages and rediscovered by Martin Luther (1483–1546), John Calvin (1509–1564) and other Reformers, becoming a “multidisciplinary” (or “transdisciplinary”) exegesis to both Catholicism and the rise of Protestantism. Augustine’s semiotic way “leads unerringly, if through a wasp’s net of perplexities, in the direction of Locke” (Sebeok 1988). John Locke (1632–1704) suggested the name “semiotics” and his main thesis was that words stand for, or signify, ideas and the transferral of good and evil ideas. Semiotics thus survived for future generations and “in due course, climbs the pinnacle attained by the doctrine of signs so far in the works of Peirce” (Sebeok 1988) to reach the works of Wittgenstein (Steiner 1975: 141ff.). Peirce was the American forefather of logical semiotics, and will center the pragmatic argument of this semiotic book about the translation of ideas in writing – called semiotranslation in Peirce’s footsteps.

The role of the signification of the teaching styles of Augustine and Wittgenstein has developed into the practical (or pragmatic) basis for solving the Peircean riddles and fragments of their philosophical and aesthetical work (Gorlée 2004: 10), read both in the monasteries of the Middle Ages and in the electronic age of the twentieth-first century (Eco 1985). Reading and reflecting their craftsmanship and artistry, a manuscript or book (and its chapters and other parts) can proceed from Augustine’s different types of *verba*. The linguistic signs of practicing science as an attitude of personal research leads to human “reality” and, methodologically, into the “dogma” of semiotic theory – which is not a religious dogma, but a non-dogmatic strategy or mode of thought. This early semiotic experience reflected the methodology of ancient rhetorics, but did not approximate what was considered religious truth. The methodology of reading and translating Wittgenstein’s fragments has a modern

equivalent, but his “polyphonic” structure evolves “not in a single line of thought, but in several superimposed strands at once” (Ehrenzweig 1967: xii; Pichler 2002 [Chapter 3: 6 fn.]). The both vague and clear significations of Wittgenstein’s numbered paragraphs deal in a positive style with the “therapy” of his moods of doubt (including his self-doubt), including the ecstasy of silence – the deep mystery of the non-written Beloved that silently represents what Wittgenstein’s radical fragments do not picture at surface level. This narrative style has divined the intention behind the semiotic essays about the translation of Wittgenstein’s works and life, which will be argued here.

Wittgenstein has bequeathed the following generations with his fragments, the trademark of his own style of writing. In his aphoristic style – perhaps imitating Tagore’s haiku-like poetry of *Stray Birds* (1917) – we can find “die Lösung eines Vexierbildes” (the solution of a puzzle picture) (PI 1953: 2: 167–167e; see BBB 1958: 163, 168). Wittgenstein’s solution for the confusions of language, if his “mystical” fragments would enable us to solve his “broken” and “unbroken” signs and propositions. Wittgenstein was a “broken vessel” (Ps. 31: 12), an allegorical or semiotic interpretation of the wholeness, that was held to be a key to “hidden” truths, as explored in the kabbalistic system. Benjamin wrote in 1923 that:

Fragments of a vessel which are to be glued together must match one another in the smallest details, although they need not be like one another. In the same way a translation, instead of resembling the meaning of the original, must lovingly and in detail incorporate the original’s mode of signification, thus making both the original and the translation recognizable as fragments of a greater language, just as fragments are part of a vessel. (Benjamin 1968: 78).

Following the apostolic message: “As the vessels of a potter shall they be broken to shivers” (Rev. 2: 27) announced by Jeremiah’s parable of God as potter and man as clay (Jer. 18: 1–10, 19: 1, 10–11) (Chapter 7: 5), Wittgenstein as a linguistic “prophet” broke the jug apart and filled it again with “pure language” which seems to be “unconditionally translatable” (Benjamin 1968: 77ff., 82; see Gorrée 1994: 142f.).

Reflected theoretically and practically in my essay “Broken signs: The architectonic translation of Peirce’s fragments” (Gorrée 2007), Wittgenstein’s style can be applied with a study of his radical fragmentariness of writing. This fragmentariness gave a particular kind of episodic significance not only to the words and fragments themselves but also to the whole structure of Wittgenstein’s works. The readers – including the translators, or “specialized” readers – need to read and translate, reread and retranslate, the quick or loose glances of Wittgenstein’s words and propositions in separate fragments; but at the same time they need to imagine and speculate about the total message of

his oeuvre, when possible (or even impossible). Translating is in itself a special “language-game” and becomes a special kind of “*Rätsel raten*” (PI 1953: 23), creatively translated as “guessing riddles” (PI 1953: 23e). Peirce called it a “guess at the riddle” (CP: 1.354–1.416 = W: 6: 165–210).

In the translation of Wittgenstein’s fragments, there is no angelic metamorphosis from one language to the next; rather, translation is a tragic art of giving and taking meaning, despite the paradoxes. Wittgenstein’s message can change or vary from one fragment to the next, while the fragments seem to flow without real end or entire completion. The picture of the universe contrasts fixed space with a flow of time. This experience of “eternity” gives a psychological, an anthropological, and a quasi-religious tone to Wittgenstein’s infinite and radical form of fragmentariness. This brings his fragmentary style into the sharpened focus of a computerized paradigm, now a commonplace reasoning procedure (Chapter 8). Yet in Wittgenstein’s day such a computer-aided design was his absolute “discovery” used as an effective teaching tool. Wittgenstein was no computer scientist, but his fragmentary writings are remarkable in themselves, the question of how his artificial intelligence came to produce his writing style is almost more intriguing (Chapter 3). For Wittgenstein’s translators, the radical translation of fragments will remain at an impasse with obscure meaning, becoming an object of speculation and guessing at the real meaning. The translators have reacted in practice with new and renewed overtranslations and undertranslations of Wittgenstein’s writings, as explained in later chapters.

## 1.2 Acknowledgments and beyond

I recognize the debt to earlier contributions that brought semiotics and translations made of Wittgenstein’s works to the fore. The “earlier generation” – of publications of others and myself – started with Ferruccio Rossi-Landi’s (1921–1985) “Wittgenstein, old and new” pronounced at the 2<sup>nd</sup> World Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies (IASS) in Vienna (1979) (posthumously published by Petrilli in Rossi-Landi 1992: 87–108). Some semiotic scholars in all parts of the world have centered on Wittgenstein as a semiotician. Lange-Siedl’s semiotic article in Sebeok’s encyclopedia *The Semiotic Sphere* (1986: 180) encouraged semioticians to play a role in Wittgensteinian scholarship. Indeed, Wittgenstein’s philosophy plays a fundamental and far-reaching role in the semiotic scholarship of, in chronological order, Garver (1973), Ransdell (1976), Gullvåg (1981), Bambrough (1981), Eschbach (1984, 1988), Hintikka and Hintikka (1986), Bezzel (1988, 1992a, 1992b, 2005), Tra-

pani, Ravera, Barranco and Salvatori (1989), Nubiola (1994, 1996), Deledalle (2000), Post (2000), Chauviré (2004), Utaker (1990, 1992, 2002), and the commentaries written by Kevelson (1977), Boghossian and Drewniak (1995), Nubiola (1999), and Deely (2001). In translation studies, the remarks about the translation of Wittgenstein, particularly Innis' translation and introduction in Brand's *The Central Texts of Wittgenstein* (1979: xi-xii) and Schulte's work (1998) have been useful, as well as Macquarrie (1967), Steiner (1975), Robinson (1991), Venuti (1998), and Kripke's comments (1982: 48f., 72).

Within the union of semiotics and translation studies, which has been my scholarly task, my earlier publications about the semiotic translation of Wittgenstein can be found for my previous insight (Gorlée 1989, 1989a, 1989b, 1994: 87–114, 2008, 2008a, 2010a). I have been greatly helped by discussing the specialized translation of philosophical discourse in the graduate seminar *Translating Philosophical Discourse* (Gorlée 1996) I directed at the *Institut für Übersetzer- und Dolmetscherausbildung* of the University of Vienna (1996) and the *Institut für Translationswissenschaft* of the University of Innsbruck (1998). There exists a more or less continuous tradition from global semiotics to Wittgenstein's philosophy, but the tip of the "iceberg" (Rossi-Landi 1992: 89–93) of semiotic scholarship in Peirce's sense is still limited.

*Wittgenstein in Translation: Exploring Semiotic Signatures* contains the prolongation of the previous articles, but the ideas presented here have developed gradually over the previous half a decade. The chapters in this volume concern the ideas that have been central to my thinking about Wittgenstein's concern with types of translation: his fragmentary works and his fragmentary style of writing, as well as the empirical ideas of the language-game (*Sprachspiel*) and forms of life (*Lebensformen*), both undefined but exemplified by Wittgenstein. The result is the epistemology coming out of Wittgenstein as a semiotician, as groundwork of the translations of his works in many languages. I recognize that readers are likely to attend most carefully to those chapters of the book dealing with their particular interests. I have therefore retained some repetition in parenthesis, since the problems thread themselves throughout the chapters. The fact that a number of ideas and concepts appear in different works and contexts may stimulate the reader to a depth of further understanding. Each chapter can be appreciated on its own. For a closer observation of the subjects discussed in the volume, the index can be consulted for detailed references.

With an effort to domesticize (certainly not to exotize) Wittgenstein's tell-tale sign of the translation from German into English, I used in writing this book older manuals that were available in Wittgenstein's time. These manuals are still practical for consultation, such as the English style-guide *A Dictionary of Modern English Usage* ([1926]1984) by H.W. Fowler, based on the 20-volume

*The Oxford English Dictionary* (OED([1933]1989), made in effect from the 1880s to the 1920s, as well as Cassell's dictionaries available after Wittgenstein's death: *Cassell's German & English Dictionary* ([1957]1964), edited by Harold T. Betteridge, and *Cassell's Latin Dictionary* ([1987]1955), edited and revised by J.R.V. Marchand and Joseph F. Charles. These "archaic" but useful manuals were probably used by Wittgenstein's trustees – Elizabeth Anscombe, George Henrik von Wright, and Rush Rhees – particularly Anscombe as translator of Wittgenstein, followed by all further translators of his works.<sup>8</sup>

Today I also use the vast supply of modern literature on translation studies and semiotic studies to learn more about Wittgenstein's book *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (also called briefly *Tractatus*) and numerous posthumous works, including the masterwork *Philosophical Investigations*, available in a variety of published fragmentary revisions and editions. These "historical" and "present" facts mean we cannot expect such things as authoritative editions, but rather authoritative reconstructions of what is here theoretically and practically called complex and unstable textual fragments.<sup>9</sup> The translations of Wittgenstein's oeuvre are made by a specific translator for future generations, but are always given by a translator in a specific time and place. A translation gives an authoritative treatment supported by documentary evidence and poised or stabilized into the proverbially thousand tongues – until after a certain time achieving the measure of Peirce's pragmatic or fallibilistic "sign-burden" (CP: 5.467) of needing retranslations of previous translations.

Lacking a multilingual glossary for translating the German writings by Wittgenstein – such as the helpful and instructive *Guide for Translating Husserl* (Cairns 1973) from German into English – the translation of Wittgenstein is and will remain individual work performed by individual translator(s), but cannot be the groundwork for philosophical reasoning in the target countries. In the

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**8** Note that Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, here studied in Anscombe's original translation (PI 1953), appeared at the end of 2009 in a revised 4th edition, as this book was ready for publication. Consequently, this new edition (Wittgenstein 2009) with novelties such as a large number of changes to Anscombe's "standard" translation and the renaming of Part II of *Philosophical Investigations* as "Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment" will not be discussed here.

**9** If we read "Wittgenstein" we read not Wittgenstein, but a history that is "separated by far too many intermediaries, too many of whom have left their touches" (Montgomery 2000: 283). Indeed, the "history of passage for any particular work cannot be defeated by the attempt to freeze a particular, assembled version of it. There is always the possibility for other, perhaps even more Frankensteinian constructions. I do not say 'reconstruction,' for the fact is that the manufacture has no hope of bringing back something pure and original. History, time, and use have annihilated this entity; what lives is an assortment of fragments of its transmission" (Montgomery 2000: 283).

absence of a Wittgenstein compendium, a comparison of proposed translations fills this urgent need for translators of philosophical work.<sup>10</sup> Cairns concentrated in his *Guide* his knowledge and experience of 30 years of translating Edmund Husserl (1859–1938). In his preface, he explicitly mentioned the main difficulties of the translation he encountered in philosophical discourse, since:

... the guidance offered by ordinary bilingual dictionaries is inadequate in opposite respects. On the one hand, there are easily translatable expressions for which numerous such dictionaries offer too many equivalent renderings. On the other hand, there are difficultly translatable expressions that any such dictionary either fails to translate at all or else translates by expressions none of which fit the sense. In following such dictionaries a translator must therefore practise consistency on the one hand and ingenuity of the other. (Cairns 1973a: v)

All terms used by Husserl are listed in alphabetical order and followed by Cairns' translation, and other possible translations in English (sometimes with indications why these were rejected).<sup>11</sup> Cairns gave cautionary advice about the requirement of absolute synonymy, explicitly stating that:

So far as possible someone who translates such writings as Husserl's into another language should always render the same German expression in the other language. In many cases he must choose among a number of obvious legitimate renderings and, to insure consistency, record his choice. Accordingly this glossary includes German expressions concerning which the only important problem has been that of ascertaining and sticking to the best uniform rendering. For this reason not all renderings rejected in this glossary are, in my opinion, "wrong." (Cairns 1973a: v).

Cairns' perfectly reasonable watchfulness suggests the prudence of generating synonymy to translate words and sentences of philosophical vocabulary. His guidelines will, in some commonly shared words, control the mechanism of the translations in Wittgenstein's works.

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<sup>10</sup> Glock's terminology, called *A Wittgenstein Dictionary* (1996), is a technical glossary with explications in English, published by *The Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries*; the same procedure, without translations, is followed in the Blackwell series of René Descartes (1596–1650), Georg Hegel (1770–1831), Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), John Locke (1632–1704), and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). In other philosophers, see for ex. Runes' glossary in *Spinoza Dictionary* (1951), without translations (Baruch Spinoza 1632–1677). However, Sass' associates compiled a "Heidegger glossary" (1982) and Inwood wrote a *A Hegel Dictionary* (1992) including within the explanations of the list of words translations of words and terms into English (Hegel) and multilingual glossaries of terms into English, French, Italian, Spanish, Chinese, and Japanese (Heidegger).

<sup>11</sup> For further insight, Cairns also used French expressions used by other translators.



The norm (or ideal) of synonymy (Alston 1967: 5: 239f.) between source term and target term as a point of strategy must be strictly followed, but is often violated, as shall be demonstrated in many translations of Wittgenstein's work, in which the critical discourse can be freed from the debilitating burden of synonymy and become a paraphrase, or deconstructive set of homonyms. The dimensions of the French, Portuguese, or other languages translation can become thematic criticism expected to follow the French or Portuguese target mind, largely obscuring the authority of Wittgenstein's source reference. In contrast with other literary genres with a primarily aesthetic content (say, a lyrical poem or a dramatic novel), synonymy in the translation of philosophical reasoning included logical sameness of sense but not sameness of reference. Philosophical thought is pursued systematically as a comprehensive and speculative discipline to understand some version of existence and truth. To interpret the vocabulary and terminology of philosophical thought involves conceiving the expository matter "under a certain name or description and attributing something to the subject according to a fairly specific form of attribution" (Aune 1967: 8: 100). Translation of such knowledge must honor the specifications and coherences of the philosophical author (Wittgenstein), giving relevant and definite answers to build in referential and conceptual identity and to maintain the contrast of meaning with other terms of the author. The starting point of formal synonymy is the only appropriate basis of the philosophical translator's ethical belief or opinion. Other constructive forms of "semantic translation" create "quite a wide choice of usually equally and indistinguishably imperfect but adequate translations, and are no perfect translation" (Newmark 1982: 98). To judge a philosophy in translation is to take a risk.

My debts are great. My interest in harmonizing the semiotic methodology of Wittgenstein and Peirce has been re-awakened since I worked as general linguist in the beginning years of the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (Norway), under the aegis of Claus Huitfeldt. The digitalized work of Wittgenstein Archives direct the learning of Wittgenstein's text and image in the digital world for generations to come. As an independent scholar, I work and study in the Wittgenstein Archives as research fellow, enabling me to write this book about the concept of translation, both within Wittgenstein's works as well as the translations of his work. The extensive material used as source is not only Wittgenstein's published works and lectures, but also the study of parts of the total heritage. Wittgenstein's voluminous *Nachlass* has been edited by the Wittgenstein Archives in coded form, providing a construction and reconstruction of the assortment of fragments in its machine-readable transmission. Above all, my sense of gratitude to my friend and colleague Alois Pichler, director of Wittgenstein Archives, is deep. I am particularly indebted

to his very penetrating and helpful comments on Wittgenstein's oeuvre and for his help with accessing relevant citations from Wittgenstein's *Nachlass*. I wish to thank Jorrit van Hertum and Myrdene Anderson for reading my manuscripts containing bits and pieces and giving me the wisdom of their advice and recommendations. I also owe a special thanks to the editors, Paul Cogley and Kalevi Kull, for making my book welcome in the De Gruyter Mouton series *Semiotics, Communication and Cognition*.

As a concluding note in introducing this semiotically oriented book, I need as a pragmatic scholar to follow Peirce's encouraging words to the translator, giving him or her a "power of *constructive translation*," opposing the translator's scriptures to those of the "ordinary analyser, logical or not, [who] *takes to pieces* (and in the process reduces the living unit into the dust-grain!) but you [the translator] create, or rather perhaps follow creative footsteps" (SS: 131). But, as William James (1842–1910) – Peirce's lifelong friend and a source for Wittgenstein's thought – rightly observed, after ending a book the writer must "throw my description into the bubbling vat of publicity where, jostled by rivals and torn by critics, it will eventually either disappear from notice, or else, if better luck befall it, quietly subside to the profundities, and serve as a possible ferment of new growths or a nucleus of new crystallization" (James 1904: 533). This I will do now.

## 2 Building a semiotic bridge

The bridge can only be crossed when we get there, *not before*.  
(Wittgenstein, MS 211)

### 2.1 Semiotics and translation

The language in and translation of Wittgenstein's works can be studied from a semiotic – that is a critical, linguistic, and cultural – viewpoint. The semiotic vocabulary, divisions, and analyses of Wittgenstein's original and edited works are the source text of his translated works, visible in the new target text. The term “translation” is everywhere in Wittgenstein's publications – including the staggering number of the records with the string “\*übersetz\*” in the electronic edition of the *Nachlass*<sup>1</sup> – to be translated into different languages.

The main methodology here is the semiotic theory, to apply to the works and terminology of Peirce, Jakobson, and Bühler, with further help from Sebeok, von Uexküll and other semiotic scholars. To keep the systems of language and translation in historical and contemporary perspective, we should note that the general theory of semiotics rests on entirely different theoretical foundations, although language and translation are overlapping areas, when joined together as semio-linguistics and semiotranslation. But the penetrating question is: do semio-linguistics and the specialization of semiotranslation speak, as it were, the same language? Is Wittgenstein's work his own kind of modernization of the semiotic theory of his and earlier times? Or has he created his own theory (or theories) of semiotics which can be compared through similarities and differences to other semiotic analyses in the foreseeable future?

Following the title of Sebeok's article “Signs, bridges, origins” (2001: 59–73) and Kevelson's “Bridging the human sciences” (1998: 13–28), this chapter bridges Wittgenstein's discourse, translation theory, and semiotics relying mainly on Peirce's philosophical writings. Believing in the harmony felt between the three fields, the investigation will look for a single edifice – in Wittgenstein's sense, a total “framework” (Glock 1996: 135–139) – to elicit a disciplinary wholeness within Peirce and Wittgenstein.

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<sup>1</sup> The sections contain each a number of relevant (parts of) sentences and paragraphs in which Wittgenstein used “übersetz” in words such as “übersetzen,” “Übersetzung,” “Übersetzer,” “übersetzbar,” “Übersetzungsregel,” and its grammatical and terminological derivatives.

Beyond being a concrete image, a bridge is a metaphor, bringing together a symbolic development, in Peirce's sense, that represents an inner and outer transition, a growth providing both linguistics and translation theory as an inter-scientific movement in growth. Being more representational and organic, rather than merely picturesque, a bridge points to a greater capacity for the dynamics of linguistic expression in culture. A semiotic bridge expresses the future trend of *The Time of the Sign: A Semiotic Interpretation of Modern Culture* (MacCannell and MacCannell 1982) where semiotics is further refined in three areas:

- (1) An approach to communication that does not necessarily involve human individuals as senders and/or receivers, (2) an integrated semiotics of communication and structure, and (3) applications of semiotics to diverse fields in inquiry, a diversity that ought to recast the divisions of knowledge – from veterinary medicine to comparative literature, from the practice of translation to the psychoanalysis of philosophy. (MacCannell and MacCannell 1982: 152)

*Semiotics investigates a theory of mind studying all signs and sign functions. It is also concerned with sign users – sign senders and sign receivers, including translators who are special senders and receivers – and how signs composing messages are transmitted, coded, and interpreted, and the cultural context in which such exchanges are carried out.*<sup>2</sup> Semiotics is regarded as a constellation of beliefs, values, and techniques which serve as a unifying matrix or technique mediating knowledge. The search for theoretical foundations and for an interdisciplinary method among the sciences and humanities is called general semiotics. Comparative semiotics deals with the establishment of common methodological techniques. A third, applied semiotics, involves the practical applications of empirical researches in different types of channels of communication and types of codes, as found in various genres and media. Transposed into a basic semiotic superstructure, the procedure of translating as the exchange of messages or texts from one language into a different language and culture is the practical “use” of linguistic communication. Wittgenstein's vocabulary is inconsistent, but when contextualized, it becomes more clear.

*Translation is a translator's particular concretization in a different language of the thematic, spatio-temporal, and conceptual fabric of the source text into the target text.* In general terms, translation is characterized as a sophisticated adaptation of general semiotics, which I follow in my semiotic work of transla-

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<sup>2</sup> For an introduction into Peirce's semiotics, see Savan (1988–1989) and Sebeok (1999). For a shorter version, see Gorrée (1994: 31–66).

tion and is called *semiotranslation*.<sup>3</sup> Semiotranslation concerns a unidirectional, future-oriented, cumulative, and irreversible process, a growing network of directing ideas of different values (that means, including both “good” and “bad” translations). Translation is a framework not to be pictured as a single line emanating from a source text toward a designated target text. Rather, we must conceive of any number of such translational lines outside any combined or isolated enclosure of minor or major signs, an organism radiating in all directions of time and space from a starting state to end-states of variable value – much like the cultural genesis of a large stock of “individuals” of the same species of signs performing a specific translational function. Semiotranslation advances, in and by successive instances – including both victory and failure – toward higher rationality, complexity, coherence, clarity, and determination, while progressively harmonizing chaotic, unorganized, and unintegrated translations (and elements and/or aspects of translations), as well as neutralizing dubious, misleading, and false ones. By steadily integrating new pieces of linguistic and cultural information about the object(s), translations and retranslations make the real meaning of the original ever more complete, detailed, and continuous. Yet it seems that informational lacunae will always remain. By this token, a translation is never finished and can, however minimally, be improved upon and become of better quality. The survival of text-signs lies in their being continued and changed version, that are translated and retranslated. An ideal or standard translation or “authorized version” is in fact an oxymoron (Gorlée 2004: 103f.).

A translation is always translatable and retranslatable in any language or speech. The translation happens through making selections and choices; these are continually made by a human translator governed by different temporal and spatial emotions, tastes, and rules. A translation is meant to be something new on a particular day and space, not merely an echoic exercise of the original text copy-pasted to a different language. Whereas René Descartes (1596–

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<sup>3</sup> This semiotranslational characterization about the semiotic growth of translation studies is a qualification of standard translation theory for semiotics. The theory of translation is a serious discipline in the scholarship since the twentieth century – despite a typically piercing footnote (2006) about the bizarre use of theory of translation (and implicitly about semiotic theory), speculating that “Nowadays, there are ‘experts’ both in and outside institutions of higher education who regard translation not just as a ‘province’ of literature but as a ‘field.’ Hence the birth of Translation Studies, or, to use a more gilded term, Translation Theory – glorified workshops, really” with an addendum with a fair beginning and an awful ending: “... a translator needs two minor but by no means negligible gifts: tact and good judgment – and these, unfortunately, you can’t pick up in a workshop and certainly not in a Theory This or That course” (Aciman 2006: 71, with his capitalizations and quotation marks).

1650) identified the human body with a machinery (that humans share with animals and plants), Peirce has been eager to correct the Cartesian bias in favor of the superior knowledge of the human mind, including a prominent role of the knowledge of the human body. Significantly, Peirce stressed in 1906 the living metaphor of the “growing tree,” pointing to translation:

Interpretation is merely another word for translation; and if we had the necessary machinery to do it, which we perhaps never shall have, but which is quite conceivable, an English book might be translated into French or German without the intervention of translation into the imaginary signs of human thought. Still, supposing there were a machine or even a growing tree which, without the interpolation of any imagination were to go on translating and translating from one possible language to a new one, will it be said that the function of signs would therein be fulfilled. (MS 283: 97–98 = EP: 2: 388).

Interpretation and translation are close synonyms. Both deal with the action of “a decipherer of alien, ‘secret’ scripts and words, and a teacher, a disseminator, of that which has been deciphered and handed down by tradition” to become the sacred “*philosophemes of the alien word*” (Vološinov [Bakhtin] 1973: 74) of an ideological or even political origin. The changing interpretations of the foreign-language word from the original word signify the time and space effect of a myriad of ideological revolutions – involving all kinds of migrations, transitions, and personal/electronic transmissions as well as their cultural, sociological, and political readings and misreadings. The “word” could extend into a group of words, a sentence, a paragraph, or even an entire text, and all are filtered in the translator’s and interpreter’s practices to establish their entire or available knowledge of speech. The action of translation seeks to produce an ever-increasing variety and growth of all aspects (external and internal) of the original text, whether those productions are good, bad, or somewhere in between. In the beginning, the change in language gives “imaginary signs” in an unknown language – a formal *interlingua*. This visionary and nonverbal sign-system “would not be signs at all, since they would not, little or much, fulfill the function of signs” (MS 283: 99–100 = EP: 2: 388). Later, the reinterpreted transpositions grow into a real translational draft and finally into one translation of logical signs.

Despite the pros and contras of automatic translation, Peirce’s utopia of MS 283 did not (yet) come true, not in his day and not today. Translation is certainly not fabricated by an efficient multilingual mechanism but remains a human action with a bilingual (or multilingual) translator and native receiver(s). Translation is a learned and scholarly “game” played by a human translator. He or she flourishes in a professional spirit, implying a love for learning and knowledgeable study according to his or her own slice of “reality” – and trying to exclude unavailable knowledge, that is not infertile but inevitable and effectual learning, here made impossible in the professional sphere. The articulate form of transla-

tion, chosen and presented by the translator, remains a slippery art – according to Peirce, a fallible game (Gorlée 2004: 145–239) – since it posits that not only knowledge but also the intuition will remain vague and never fixed or finite. A translation is never alone, but acts in company. The knowledge and intuition of another translator could in fact transpose the source text into another target text with totally different elements and characteristics. Also, the translator's task is not to integrate word equivalencies but to translate situations and contexts, implying the translator's own choices and options. This idea of building a bridge from comparison to representation is the moral task of the multiple process of making translations.

The “reality” of Wittgenstein's discourse about language – the source and target texts of the translational inquiry – is the human (anthropomorphic) *Gestalt* to understand human “reality.” The human activity is able to “play” with representations in language and culture – despite famous references to the comparison of the talkative lion as expressed in Wittgenstein's “*Wenn ein Löwe sprechen könnte, wir könnten ihn nicht verstehen*” (If a lion could talk, we could not understand him) (PI: 1953: 2: 190 and 190e; see Glock 1996: 128). This nonhuman definition of animal language – since people learn language while other animals do not – is no more than a “historical” argument about genetic skills and intentions, retraced in Wittgenstein's pragmatic fashion dealing with the ethics of feelings and attitudes, and then retaken in modern semiobiotics. William James wrote in 1907 in *Pragmatism*: “Were we lobsters, or bees, it might be that our organization would have led to our using quite different modes from these of apprehending our experiences. It *might* be too (we cannot dogmatically deny this) that such categories, unimaginable by us today, would have proved on the whole as serviceable for handling our experiences mentally as those we actually use” (1978: 84). Also consider the example of a squirrel clinging to a tree, moving around so that the “human witness tries to get sight of the squirrel by moving rapidly round the tree” (James 1978: 27).

Wittgenstein's lion image posits the premise that “we can say that if a giraffe could imagine, we could not understand him, so we can say that a giraffe could imagine, we could not recognize the meaning. We are not nibbling off treetops and gazing across savannah from a great height!” (Elshtain 2005: 248). Despite its long neck, the giraffe is a silent animal, but has a “voice” in paralinguistic communication (Bateson 1972: 371). Harley Shands (1916–1981) focuses on the interpretive context of animals, and their difference from the wider context of human cognitive abilities: “Does the lion feel ‘angry’ with his victim? I would think not, any more than the diner feels ‘angry’ with his steaks as he destroys it, or than the businesslike slaughterer in the abbatoir”, and he concluded that “If we undertake to make judgments on the basis of the introspective descriptions

of the self ... we must at least allow them equal value in the ultimate judgment reached" (Shands 1977a: 14).

Decentering the limited zoosemiotic contextual capacity, the individual's immediate context makes both free and bound analogical reasonings possible. Wittgenstein's human "reality" is playfully focused on the game of "linguistic animals," echoing how we build our civilization "as a social order promoting cultural creation" (Deely 2001: 11). The art of cultural knowledge and linguistic erudition represents all subtleties of language and is more reliable than the nonhuman information and lore.

In *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein's famous "duck-rabbit" paradigm remains an ambiguous image, since it "can be seen as a rabbit's head or as a duck's" (PI 1953: 2: 165e, with illustration PI 1953: 2: 166–166e<sup>4</sup>; see Deledalle 2000: 147–154). This contradictory and complementary sign can be "seen as" blending at the same time two visual aspects, changing from rabbit to duck and back again. Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit assemblage must be "seen as" a human (not an animal) *Gestalt* picture we visualize, through internal senses and memory, as external objects in different cases of "seeing-as" (PI 1953: xi: 188 ff.; see Merrell 2009: 107 and Chapter 7: 5). The rabbit-duck "faults" come from human psychology and the therapeutic method used – what Peirce called the "perception" of the setting of visual, auditive, and other sense-semiotic signs when seen from the mind's eye.<sup>5</sup> The sketch-images perceive not only seeing the contradictory "rabbit-

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<sup>4</sup> For PI 1953 a [1958 (2001)] reprint is used (see References).

<sup>5</sup> Peirce's perception is both of things-in-the-world and of God: "Man is just an animal feeling, the word is just as much as written feeling" (CP: 7.586). Peirce added there about the man/word analogy: "But is there not this difference. Man's feelings are perceptions, he is affected by objects. He sees, hears, etc. A word does not. Yes; that is true, but perception, plainly, depends upon having an animal organism and therefore there is here no further difference beyond the obvious two mentioned at first. Yet even here, there is a correspondence between the word and the man. Perception is the possibility of acquiring information, of meaning more; now a word may learn. How much more the word electricity means now than it did in the days of Franklin; how much more the term planet means now than it did in the time [of] Hipparchus. These words have acquired information; just as a man's thought does by further perception. But is there not a difference, since a man makes the word and the word means nothing which some man has not made it mean and that only to that man? This is true; but since man can think only by means of words or other external symbols, words might turn round and say, You mean nothing which we have not taught you and then only so far as you address some word as the interpretant of your thought. In fact, therefore, men and words reciprocally educate each other; each increase of a man's information is at the same time the increase of a word's information and vice versa. So that there is no difference even here" (CP: 7.586). For perception of body and mind in Wittgenstein's days, see Maurice Merleau-Ponty's (1908–1961) pre-structuralist and psychosemiotic concerns of human "reality" in his 1945 volume, translated as *The Phenomenology of Perception* (1996: 130ff.) (Sebeok 1991: 120).



duck” or the “duck-rabbit,” but also the “lion” speaking to humans, the “goose,” the “cow,” the “dog” (PI 1953: 2: 188 ff.), as well as the “parrot” (PI 1953: 344, 346) in order to deal with the nonhuman ability of animals to speak some “speech” – communicating together with the analogs of the Russellian “rhinoceros” and “hippopotamus” (Wittgenstein 1979: 70, McGuinness 1981: 434, Noll 1998: 83ff [with ill.], Nedo 2005: 25) (Bertrand Russell 1872–1970).

The animal word-names in Wittgenstein are slightly ambiguous animal-figures, but they have the meaningful message of half-hidden metaphors.<sup>6</sup> Such fictitious (that is, non-existent and non-understandable) names are rooted in the surface of a communicative *Gestalt*, rejecting and abandoning in the anthroposemiotic mind the “lower” zoosemiotic effects as we functionally and pragmatically introduce the “superior” human language. The mysterious *Gestalt*-image seeks to place animal word-names in their broader context than the assumptions of a non-sign natural world. Yet the hidden goal would make us notice from the second-hand picture the dynamic (operative) change, variety, and modification of some aspects of semiotic “reality” as depicted and studied. Human reality gives one common ground for semiotic “use” – that is “seen as” in the processes of interpretation and translation made and changed by human individuals. This is followed in *Philosophical Investigations* (PI 1953) of Wittgenstein’s late period.

## 2.2 Wittgenstein’s semiotized sources

Although not regarded a semiotician (Rossi-Landi 1992: 93–100, Eschbach 1988: 391–405), Wittgenstein was relatively known in the semiotic circles of his day. While he had no acquaintance with his contemporaries Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945), Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944), or other semioticians, he built a bridge to reach semiotics. Perhaps he knew Karl Bühler (1879–1963), who was from 1922 a professor of psychology at the University of Vienna in Wittgen-

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<sup>6</sup> For intersemiotic comparison, see the drawing of the fantasized rhinoceros of the painter Albrecht Dürer (1471–1528). An image of an exotic animal made in 1515, made long before the advent of photography, relies on “secondhand evidence which he filled in from [the spectator’s] own imagination, colored, no doubt, by what he had learned of the famous of exotic beasts, the dragon with its armored body” (Gombrich 1969: 81). Art imitates art and not nature, since Gombrich added that “this half-invented creature served as a model for all renderings of the rhinoceros, even in natural-history books, up to the eighteenth century” (1969: 81). See Job 41, where a “leviathan” is described as a large, strong, and formidable water-animal. A leviathan is a visionary mythological monster, perhaps a hippopotamus, whale, dragon, or crocodile (illustrated by William Blake [1757–1827] in *Behemoth and Leviathan* of 1825: <http://www.tate.org.uk/servlet/ViewWork?workid=1060&searchid=15329>).

stein's home town – at the same time when Wittgenstein began to travel abroad (McGuinness 1988). Bühler directed the Vienna Pedagogical Institute and was a leading figure of the *Wiener Schule der Entwicklungspsychologie*, the Austrian School Reform movement.<sup>7</sup> Bartley (1974: 104ff.) speculated that there could have been a close working relation between Bühler's child psychology – in the early days of psychology a *Gestalt* novelty – and Wittgenstein's period after the First World War as a primary schoolmaster where he taught a radical pedagogy to the Austrian schoolchildren (see Peters and Marshall 1999: 180–191, Kaplan 1984: 219–223, Sebeok 1981a: 91). The new pedagogy propagated by the Vienna Movement moved from the traditional passive memorization by the students to a progressive school environment where they learned through dynamic interaction, moving from monolog to dialog.

In terms of the theoretical background of the developmental psychologism, Bühler had been influenced by his associates, particularly his wife and colleague, the psychologist Charlotte Bühler (1893–1974), and by Jean Piaget (1896–1980). Wittgenstein met Karl and Charlotte Bühler for tea at his sister Margaret's *Palais* in Vienna (February 1927), but Wittgenstein's "stammering way of formulating philosophical thoughts, vacillating between modesty and rudeness" (Wijdeveld 2000: 69) did not produce any philosophical intercourse. Piaget's three modes of cognitive awareness – schemas, adaptation, equilibrium – seemed to echo Peirce's modes of being: qualitative possibility, actual fact, and law. In fact, Piaget's triad of modes strongly influenced Bühler's semiotics. Bartley's guess about Wittgenstein was that, "Although his name appears in no list of Bühler's students, it appears that among the most eminent of those who learned from Bühler was Wittgenstein" (Bartley 1974: 106), but there is no proof of this (Eschbach 1988: 402–404).<sup>8</sup>

Bühler's masterwork *Sprachtheorie. Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache* (1934)<sup>9</sup> anticipated "not perhaps accidentally" (Innis 1992: 551) Wittgenstein's later work, departing from the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and towards the

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7 Wittgenstein's influence by Bühler is discussed in Kaplan (1984) and particularly the parallels indicated by Eschbach (1988). For further sources, see Eschbach (1988: 386).

8 The relations between Bühler and Peirce are discussed in Palek (1984) and some observations in Gorlée (2008b: 351, 356, 361).

9 The English translation *Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language* was published 36 years later in 1990 [referred as Bühler (1990)]. Innis (1992) dealt with discussing his works, whereas Sebeok (1981a: 91–108) pictured the trajectory of Bühler's life, repeated in Sebeok (1987: 129–145), without the Appendix, the "slightly emended transcript of Bühler's autobiographical sketch" dated 21 May 1938 to avoid his and his Jewish wife Charlotte's arrest by the Austrian Nazis. They had to emigrate to the United States and Bühler became, despite his previous achievements in Europe, a "neglected figure in the history of semiotic inquiry" (title of Sebeok 1981a).

“key themes” (Innis 1992: 551) of *Philosophische Untersuchungen* (Sebeok 1981a: 91).<sup>10</sup> Without stretching here into a discussion of Bühler’s *Sprachtheorie*, his model was confined to three psychophysical functions with a qualitative difference: the context of the source addresser (*Ausdrucksfunktion*), of the receiver or addressee (*darstellende Funktion*), and of the destination or representation of the message (*appellative Funktion*). In Bühler’s “organon model,” the aspects of the speech sign – Bühler used the “three semantic functions of language” (1990: 34f., trans. of 1934: 28) – are called “signals,” “symptoms” and “symbols.” In Bühler’s view, linguistic signs demonstrated the aspect of “a *symbol* [happening] by virtue of its coordination to objects and states of affairs, a *symptom* (*Anzeichen*, *indicium*: index) by virtue of its dependence to the sender, whose inner states it expresses, and a *signal* by virtue of its appeal to the hearer” (1990: 35, trans. of 1934: 29). Bühler’s way was semiotically oriented, and his signals, symptoms, and symbols are reminiscent of Peirce’s categories, but Bühler’s semiotics was in fact, as Sebeok stated, “an excessively simplistic model of the communicative act” (1979: 216).

Bühler gave a central place to the “subspecies of indexes” (Sebeok 1976: 127) by his emphasis of the “genuine sentences” as significative units in a linguistic act – a procedure followed by Wittgenstein but without abandoning the other sign functions as Bühler did.<sup>11</sup> Bühler seemed to point in the direction of Peirce’s indexicality, exemplifying the object referred in the sign and pointing to the object – an exemplification called “ostension” or “showing” by Wittgenstein (Glock 1996: 274–278, Hintikka and Hintikka 1986: 154–156). Glock stated that Wittgenstein’s strategy requires “[a] sentence [as] a minimal unit for making a move in the language-game,”<sup>12</sup> but he suggested that “[t]his con-

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**10** Bühler’s work influenced Jakobson. In 1956, Jakobson referred in his article “Metalanguage as a linguistic problem” to his “traditional model of language” (1980: 83) and to contrast with his own new model, as discussed in Gorrée (2008b).

**11** Peirce distinguished three ways of a sign referring to the object: “icon” or resemblance, “index” or dynamic action, and “symbol” or law and rule. An iconic sign, such as a portrait, a photograph, or a map, represents its object by virtue of its similarity with it. An icon is a picture-image stands on its own and grounds the likeness or resemblance. An indexical sign stresses not likeness but its contrast, difference. An index stands in a causal relationship to the object it signifies and it points to the object. An example is smoke meaning fire and fever meaning illness. Genuine signs are symbols. They are the only triadic signs, because in order to function they must agree with a rule. The meaning of a symbol is an open guess, unless they receive a collective meaning. A dove can mean peace, a piece of cloth attached to a rope can symbolize a country. Language is a system of symbolic signs, including iconic and indexical elements (words and sentences). Later in this chapter and beyond, Peirce’s categories will be discussed: an icon is a First, an Index a Second and a symbol a Third (discussed in Savan 1988–1989: 33ff., Gorrée 1994: 54ff.).

**12** For a definition of Wittgenstein’s “language-game,” see Chapter 4: 7.

ception may have been partly inspired by Bühler, but [it] starts out from the earlier view that only propositions, not individual words, say or communicate something (a view shared by Plato, Aristotle, Bentham and Frege)" (1996: 318). In Bühler's view, the object is the deictic "working" definition of the narrated facts represented (or maybe non-represented) as one sign function in the text, but this function has no meaning about the nature of the meaning. This means that, for Bühler, the text only structured the "*Deutungsleistung des Interpreten*" (the direction of the referent to the interpreter) (Eschbach 1984: 199). Although indexicality is an essential function of the sign, to emphasize indexes alone would be a misconstruction of the genuine signs. Indexical signs must live "in both paradigmatic systems and syntagmatic chains" (Sebeok 1976: 127), requiring an accompanying system of iconic and symbolic signs in order to focus on the complex, not simple, meaning-properties of the words and its parts, the sentence, and the text.

In Bühler's functional view, the fusion of the three abstractive sign aspects will create a semantic structure of "homogeneous" signs (1990: 35, trans. 1934: 29). His essence of language, based only on indexical signs, words or sentences, "steer a common action, or express a desire, warning, reaction, and so forth" (Innis 1992: 556). His *Gestalt*-like social procedure is radically different from Peirce's substantial and fluid division of the three categories rendering an integral meaning. Bühler's model is close to the expression and representation of the real sign-action itself; yet Peirce's strong emphasis is not on Bühler's actual message (or text) source and the object of the communicative act, but on what Bühler himself explicitly called, in Latin, "'*appellare*' (English: to appeal, German: more or less '*ansprechen*')", and Bühler added that "as everyone knows today there is sex appeal and in addition to that *speech appeal*..." (1990: 35, trans. 1934: 28–29). Such self-aware and intentional sign-activity with a specific goal is a semiotic recycling of the text and its transposition to acquire a new meaning, concerning what Peirce called the "interpretant" to determine the sign-activity of translation from sign to object (Savan 1988–1989: 40ff., Gorlée 1994: 56ff., Sebeok 1999: 12ff.). The sign is not something only formally standing for something else (the *aliquid stat pro aliquo*), but in order for it to be a semiotic sign, it must function as a real and genuine sign, i.e., be interpreted and through the recycling by an interpreter receive a new meaning. A version of Peirce's interpretant is dealt with in Bühler, but he did not press the point long or far enough and it finds little relevance in his whole theory of language.

Eschbach has critically upgraded Bühler's "*Zwangsjacke des Bedeutungsstarrheit*" of his "*Deutung*" (straight-jacket of a referential theory of inflexible meaning) and directed the reader/interpreter (1984: 193) into Wittgenstein's

triad of “*Interpretation*” (interpretation of the sign) “*Deutung*” (what the sign referred to) and “*Übersetzung*” (translation of the sign) (1984: 194ff.). This triad introduces Wittgenstein’s pragmatic theory of meaning, integrating the translation from the study of the sign and its object into the varieties of the interpretant. In his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein advocates that his “*Zeichensprache*” (symbolism) is used, meaning interpreted and translated, “*indem sie nicht das gleiche Zeichen in verschiedenen Symbolen, und Zeichen, welche auf verschiedene Art bezeichnen*” (by not applying the same sign in different symbols and by not applying signs in the same way which signify in different ways) (TLP 1922: 3.325). Significantly, Wittgenstein added that “*Um das Symbol am Zeichen zu erkennen, muss man auf den sinnvollen Gebrauch achten*” (in order to recognize the symbol in the sign we must consider the significant use) (TLP 1922: 3.326). Symbolism is for Wittgenstein not only a linguistic problem, but a obscure linguistic use occurs whenever the words, the passages, or the text have a meaning extended beyond that implied a surface value to a symbolic meaning.

Historically, the “systematic fusion of categories, concepts, and distinctions of diverse provenance” (Innis 1992: 550) gave Bühler an importance to the linguistics and philosophy of language. Despite the incongruencies, Bühler’s work is considered a forerunner to Wittgenstein’s trajectory from word to deed, as will be argued here, and Bühler will inspire the theory and examples of translating Wittgenstein’s works, albeit in an implicit way. Yet the third aspect of the sign, Peirce’s interpretant, which is missing in Bühler, will be crucial and will determine the sign-activity of translation. Apart from the differences between Bühler and Peirce, as touched upon here (see further Mulligan 1997), there are strikingly similar ideas within Wittgenstein’s later theory, where Wittgenstein foregrounded a social cognitive model in language and in language theory. Innis (1992: 80f.) posited that his philosophical “language-game” from his *Philosophical Investigations* is close to Bühler’s social focus. Language-game can be called a Bühler-like game of human action engaging in a common and intentional activity with concrete and social situations. The parties of the language-game “speak” with the rules interwoven in their own game. Translation is a functional and social language-game, as will be argued.

Wittgenstein’s later work was familiar with semiotics, since one of his friends in Cambridge, Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1903–1930), the young British mathematician and philosopher, introduced him to semiotics. Although Ramsey died prematurely at twenty-six years old, he is and remains well-known for his work on the foundations of mathematics. Ramsey was indeed “a keen reader of Peirce’s published writings” (Bambrough 1981: 263, Gullvåg 1981: 73ff.) and could certainly have discussed semiotic themes, and particularly

Peirce's semiotics, with Wittgenstein (Hardwick 1977: xxxi, Nubiola 1996: 286ff., Deledalle 2000: 88, Monk 1990: 215–231, 256, 288f.). Deledalle even suggested that what Wittgenstein with his domineering and argumentative style of writing and lecturing

... owed to Peirce is not easy to say, because he could apparently think for himself, and had read [William] James, and had many talks with Ramsey who had a great esteem for Peirce's logic and philosophy ... and [Ramsey] used Peirce's distinction between [t]ype ([l]egisign) and [t]oken ([r]eplica) to explain Wittgenstein's thought in his thorough review of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* ... which review Wittgenstein read and discussed with Ramsey. (Deledalle 2000: 88, with further references; Deledalle 2000: 138ff.)

Although there is clearly “no reference to Peirce ... in the *Investigations*, and perhaps Ramsey used one of Peirce's slogans [CP: 5.265, PI 1953: 67<sup>13</sup>] without referring to its thought,” even so

... that phrase was not coined by Peirce, and expressed a thought found in other authors who do not use the phrase at all, it seems likely that he was consciously using Peirce's terminology. This impression is reinforced when we notice that there are numerous other and louder echoes in Wittgenstein of ideas and phrases, analogies and similes, that are now familiar from the eight volumes of Peirce's *Collected Papers*. (Bambrough 1981: 263).

This guess that Wittgenstein was familiar with Peirce's work through Ramsey is a possibility, but there is, alas, no actual proof.

Bambrough suggested that the influence of Peirce on Wittgenstein could have been confused by Ramsey's style of writing, including the writing style of his second-hand translations – Ramsey co-translated the English version of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, with Charles K. Ogden (1889–1957) as main translator. A paradox, since Ogden “had either known little or no German” (Sebeok 2001: 168), meaning that the first translation of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* was translated by Ramsey. The translation happened before the publication in 1922, one year before the publication of the semiotic volume, *The Meaning of Meaning* (Ogden and Richards 1923). Brimming with fresh kinds of symbolicity and symbolisms, this ani-

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<sup>13</sup> In Peirce's metaphorical terminology, the “reasoning” of philosophy “should not form a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibers may be ever so slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected” (CP: 5.265). This image can be compared to Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblance of building material “*beim Spinnen eines Fadens Faser an Faser drehen. Und die Stärke des Fadens liegt nicht darin, dass irgend eine Faser durch seine ganze Länge läuft, sondern darin, dass viele Fasern einander übergreifen*” (spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres) (PI 1953: 67). In this book, the technical tools and material find its right translation to concern “games” in Wittgenstein's language-games.