

**THE LAST BRITISH  
LIBERALS IN AFRICA:  
Michael Blundell and  
Garfield Todd**

*Dickson A. Mungazi*

**PRAEGER**





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*To L. Kay Walker, my co-author, colleague, and  
friend, whose interest and service in Africa  
extended far beyond the ordinary*



*We cannot avoid the African majority government and therefore our policies should simply and clearly be designed to see that this great mass of people is well educated.*

—Michael Blundell in 1957  
[cited in Blundell, 1994]

*The Africans are aware that educated people can be governed but they cannot be enslaved forever. They are no longer willing to be controlled in the manner in which they have been controlled in the past.*

—Garfield Todd, 1947





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# Preface

## PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this book is to present evidence that substantiates the following arguments: From 1948 to 1962 Michael Blundell played a major role in the political transformation of Kenya. From 1946 to 1980 Garfield Todd played a similar role in Zimbabwe. The two men were motivated by the liberal philosophy that had been evolved early in the 20th century in Britain. Blundell and Todd understood that philosophy to mean that political leaders had a responsibility to serve the needs of the people as a condition of national development. The colonization of Africa by European nations beginning with the conclusion of the Berlin Conference in February 1885 had a profoundly negative impact on the lives of the Africans.

By the time that Blundell and Todd became involved in the politics of Kenya and Zimbabwe in 1948 and 1946, respectively, they sought to correct that negative impact by putting their positive views of Africans into practice. The events that were taking place in 1907, the year that Blundell was born, and in 1908, the year that Todd was born, laid the foundation upon which these two men built a set of ideas and philosophy that they utilized in their endeavors to bring about the transformation of these two countries for the benefit of all. These two men succeeded in accomplishing what they did only because they were liberals. This enabled them to see the need for change far more than their fellow settlers did.

## **QUESTIONS ANSWERED AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED**

In furnishing the evidence that will substantiate this conclusion, this book furnishes answers to the following questions: Who were Michael Blundell and Garfield Todd? What kinds of environments produced them? What conditions prevailed in the world at the time of their birth to suggest their liberal views? Who are some of the people who influenced them? What conditions prevailed in both Kenya and Zimbabwe that demanded their involvement? What difficulties did they encounter? How did their fellow settlers and Africans respond to their initiatives? How did they respond to British policy? In furnishing answers to these and other questions, the book utilizes various sources, both primary and secondary, that the author obtained during three trips to Kenya and Zimbabwe between 1985 and 1997.

## **CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS**

The violent manner in which European nations subjected Africa to colonial rule remained a black spot in the history of colonial adventure in Africa. As colonization was effected, the colonial systems sought to control the Africans in order to control their action. There was serious conflict between European perception of Africans and Africans' perception of themselves as a people. This cultural conflict led to political conflict after the Second World War. This is the period of the rise of African consciousness. Blundell and Todd fully recognized it and suggested taking it into account in designing colonial policy.

Because the colonial governments failed to see things from the perspective that Blundell and Todd did, colonial policy led to serious conflict within the colonial establishment itself. While colonial governments designed strategies for controlling Africans to serve their own political and economic interests, Africans themselves designed their own effective strategy not only to ensure their survival in the colonial setting, but also to initiate a process for the restoration of their sense of self. In doing so they found reliable allies in Michael Blundell and Garfield Todd. Although in recent years democracy in both Kenya and Zimbabwe has been brought to the test, it is alive and well today. Thanks to the democratic traditions that Blundell and Todd established for them, Kenya and Zimbabwe have a challenge to honor these traditions. They must not betray them.

# Acknowledgments

The task of conducting a study about the political philosophy and action of two leading characters in two major countries under colonial control is hard enough in itself. But given the complicating factor of the dynamics of human interaction in colonial settings, that task becomes a challenge that only those who desire to know can accept. This is the perspective from which the author undertakes this study. However, in order to take all relevant aspects of this study into account in recording accurately all the pertinent information about the roles that Michael Blundell and Garfield Todd played in the political transformation of Kenya and Zimbabwe, the author utilized original materials on these two men supplemented by secondary sources.

It is for this reason that the author wishes to express his special appreciation to the Kenya National Archives for letting him have access to materials on Michael Blundell and the Zimbabwe National Archives for those on Garfield Todd. He also wishes to thank Ruth Washa, his research assistant in Nairobi, for collecting and dispatching the materials he requested from various sources in Kenya; and Mellyse Otieno, a secretary in Nairobi, for her insights into political developments in Kenya—especially the contribution that some members of her ethnic group, the Luo, made to the political transformation of Kenya.

The author would like to record his special appreciation to Judith Todd, daughter of Garfield Todd, for furnishing him with information that he requested about her father and the Todd family in general, as well as photographs that are used in this book. He is particularly thank-



ful to her for sending him a copy of her book, *The Right to Say No: Rhodesia 1972*, and her "The Thoughts of Ian Smith," both of which offer some penetrating and troubling insights about the character of the Rhodesia Front government that Smith led from 1964 to 1979, and which placed both her and her father in prison in 1972 for expressing opposition to its policy and for their liberal views on the future of Zimbabwe.

The author would also like to express his appreciation to the National Social Science Association for critique of parts of the manuscript offered while he was presenting papers at conferences from 1995 to 1998. He also wishes to thank his secretary, Charlene Wingo, for helping to type parts of the manuscript, and to Linda Gregonis, indexer and proofreader; Betty Russell, computer specialist at Northern Arizona University, for her technical assistance in the production of the manuscript; and Karl Doerry, Director of International Education and the Office of Regents Professors at Northern Arizona University, for financial support of the project to enable him to travel to Britain and Africa to conduct the research needed to complete the study. Finally, the author wishes to thank William G. and Vernah Kodzai for their hospitality extended while he was conducting research for this study in Zimbabwe from 1995 to 1997.

# Introduction

## THE SETTING

In 1944, when Swedish sociologist and researcher Gunnar Myrdal concluded in his study, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*, that the American social problems rose from the conflict between idealism and practice, he was recognizing the cruelty of the struggle between white America and black America. That white America and black America perceived the structure of the American society from two opposing points of view suggests the elusiveness of human thought process and action to project a future different from the past. It is this conflict of perception that often translates into social conflict of major proportions posing fundamental questions as to what organized society is all about.

Myrdal could have chosen colonial Africa as a setting for his study. In 1944 the elements of social conflict that he discussed relative to the United States were present in Africa. At that time South Africa, for example, was going through a painful period of trying to structure the future different from the past. In 1944 the Nationalist Party, led by Daniel F. Malan, was putting together components of a policy that became known across the world as apartheid. Until April 1994 South Africa experienced social conflict in a way that threatened to disintegrate its social institutions. This is why in 1990 the government of South Africa, led by F. W. de Klerk, and the African National Congress, led by Nelson Mandela, made a gallant effort to search their own minds to put society back

on track because apartheid was destroying the most valued resources that the country needed to ensure not only its survival, but also its development.

It is important to remember that the character of society is determined by the action of individuals, who, while acting on their own, must remember that they are part of a society in which collective action is necessary. Individual action and collective initiative both require the observance of rules of conduct and behavior that have been evolved over an extended period of time. In this behavior individuals are either liberal, conservative, or moderate. How one adopts one of these three forms of political ideology depends upon their orientation and background. Some are influenced by members of their families. For example, in the United States, the Kennedy and Roosevelt family members seem invariably to subscribe to the liberal philosophy of the Democratic party, while members of the Goldwater and Lodge families have subscribed to the conservative philosophy of the Republican party, and members of the Rockefeller family have subscribed to the moderate philosophy of the same party.

These three forms of political ideology exist, as they must, in countries that espouse democracy. This allows the voters to exercise their free choice of the kind of political leaders they believe should hold public office. Without this choice the government that emerges can only be regarded as a dictatorship. The purpose of this study is to present a line of argument that suggests the conclusion that in their respective roles in Kenya and Zimbabwe, Michael Blundell and Garfield Todd subscribed to the liberal political philosophy that enabled them to make a unique and rare contribution to the political transformation of these two British colonies. In furnishing the evidence that substantiates this conclusion, the book begins with a brief discussion of both men cast in the historical context of both countries. The convening of the Berlin Conference in December 1884 is the proper place to start.

## THE COLONIZATION OF AFRICA

In order to have a clear picture of the role that Blundell and Todd played in the political transformation of Kenya and Zimbabwe, it is important to have an understanding of broader events that were unfolding in Africa during their time. The knowledge among Europeans that Africa contained large quantities of raw materials needed to improve the standard of living in Europe strengthened the myth that had started during the Enlightenment that Africans were less intelligent than Europeans. The reality that came out of this conclusion is that Africans and their continent were now being subjected to a new form of campaign by European colonial enthusiasts. The publication in 1859 of Charles Darwin's

*Origin of Species* and of Charles Dickens's *A Tale of Two Cities* provided new ammunition to colonial forces as they now braced themselves to engage in the battle to control Africans and the raw materials. Dickens's concept of the best of times and Darwin's view of the survival of the fittest were utilized to strengthen the belief among colonial enthusiasts in the perception that Europeans had never had it so good in their strategy for dominance of the presumed intellectually weak Africans. When Darwin published his *The Descent of Man* in 1871, colonial enthusiasts hailed it as a blueprint of their opinion of the people of the "Dark Continent" that they lacked intellectual potential. It did not worry these colonial enthusiasts that they were reading into Darwin's book things that he never intended. What was important was the effect that they were exploiting his ideas to promote their own political agenda. It was open season for European nations in Africa, anything that stirred was fair game.

By the time the Berlin Conference was held at the end of 1884 to map out the colonization of Africa, Africans had been reduced to the level where European nations could manipulate them in a way that served their own political and economic interests. The brutality and the lack of concern for the welfare of Africans became a distinct characteristic behavior of colonial entrepreneurs. The process of control of Africans was now under way as the game of the survival of the intellectually fittest started in a deadly combat of wills. For European colonial adventurers the best of times was here and now, as nothing seemed to stand between them and the goals they had set. To them it was an exciting feeling to know that the vast resources in Africa and its people were at their disposal to do with as they pleased, because Africans were presumed not to understand what was happening.

As the colonization of Africa became *fait accompli*, the colonial systems designed policies to govern their African empires in accordance with the specifications of the Berlin Conference and their own colonial principles and policies. By the beginning of the First World War only three countries were politically independent in Africa. The first country was Liberia, which was founded in 1823 by the American Colonization Society as a country for freed slaves from the United States. It is ironic that in 1990 Liberia subjected itself to a brutal betrayal of itself in form of a cruel civil war that left it devastated. The second independent country in Africa by 1914 was Ethiopia, which claimed its independence from biblical times. It is equally a tragic fact that in 1974 Ethiopia endured the agony of the betrayal of itself by deposing Emperor Haile Selassie in a military coup and installing a Marxist regime that was so oppressive that it was turned out of office in 1990. The civil war that had been raging for years over Eritrea's claim of independence reached a decisive stage when the Marxist regime was removed from power. But the end of the civil war

did not result in the restoration of Ethiopia, a definite pattern of events in Africa.

The third independent country in Africa by 1914 was South Africa, the land of the infamous policy of apartheid until 1994. South Africa had gained independence in May 1910 following a bitter war between the British and Boers in which the Boers were slaughtered. The introduction of the policy of apartheid was intended to ensure full control of Africans. But, again in 1990, South Africa was paying the price of trying to sustain a political and social system that left a trail of racial bitterness unparalleled by that of any other country of Africa. These three examples of countries that gained independence prior to 1914 illustrate a very important consideration presented in this book: the colonization of Africa was effected at a high price in that material comfort, not human relations, became the major focus of colonial entrepreneurs.

During the height of the colonial systems, from 1885 to 1914 and from 1920 to 1939, the colonial governments formulated policies that can only be understood in the context of their effect on their intent to control Africans through the application of various forms of colonial policy. For example, Germany formulated the policy of *Deutsche Kolonialbund*; France and Belgium introduced the policy of *evolué*; Britain developed a policy known as indirect rule; Portugal had a policy known as *Estado Novo*; and the Boers had apartheid. In addition to seeking full control of Africans, these policies had two other components in common. The first was to instill upon the Africans that they were inferior to the white man. The myth that had been evolved during the Age of Reason was now being relived in the Africans in painful ways. For the colonial governments happy days were here again. The second component was that at no time would the Africans ever hope to achieve equal status with settlers.

To strengthen their hold on their African empires, the colonial governments enacted laws that left no room for doubt as to the place of Africans in the colonial society. As Ethel Tawse Jollie, one of the first women to sit in a colonial legislature, put it bluntly in 1927, the purpose of the colonial policy was to strengthen the position of whites and weaken that of Africans. Nothing else mattered. Severe penalties were meted out to those Africans who dared question their subjection. Thus began a period that theoreticians have appropriately called "the colonial culture of violence." The imprisonment of Nelson Mandela for 27 years for suggesting that apartheid was wrong furnishes one of the clearest examples of the concept of colonial culture of violence. The supply of labor to produce the materials needed to enhance the standard of life in Europe was the only function Africans were required to fulfill.

The control of Africans was now complete and the colonial establishments looked to the future with great expectations to create a social

utopia. Once the control of Africans was fully established, the colonial governments did not worry about their action because, so they believed, Africans had been tamed and broken like horses controlled by the bridle of psychological conditioning. This is what Godfrey Huggins, who was prime minister of colonial Zimbabwe from 1933 to 1952, had in mind when he argued in 1954 that the policy of his government was designed to promote partnership between the Africans and the whites, the kind of partnership similar to the one that "exists between the horse and the rider."

The maps of Kenya and Zimbabwe at the end of this chapter show demographic and political conditions in these countries in 1940, when Blundell and Todd were becoming active in their respective nations.

## **THE RISE OF AFRICAN CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SELF**

Huggins's definition of the place of Africans in the colonial society is one reason that Africans used to arouse a new level of consciousness among them. In 1939 the hope that the colonial governments had expressed at their inception, following the conclusion of the Berlin Conference that they would last at least a millennium, was shattered by events in Europe, not in Africa. The outbreak of the war in 1939 permanently altered the course of events in Africa as well as in the rest of the world, and changed the relationships that colonial governments had established between themselves and Africans. The rise of Adolf Hitler and his Third Reich was a phenomenon whose impact was profoundly felt on the African continent in ways far more serious than European nations could imagine.

Having invaded Poland and paralyzed France and the Low Countries in rapid succession, Nazi forces launched a relentless blitz on Britain in an effort to force it to sue for peace on Hitler's terms. By 1941 the Nazi forces were within striking distance of bringing Britain to its knees, as the second stage of Hitler's objective of bringing the entire world under his rule. Winston Churchill, the beleaguered British leader who had succeeded Neville Chamberlain who died suddenly in 1940, felt that Britain was fighting the battle for democracy alone and requested the support of the United States in the war against the Axis powers. On August 11, 1941, still feeling the pressure to do something dramatic to turn the war around in favor of the Allies, Churchill and President Franklin Roosevelt met secretly and issued the famous Atlantic Charter, stating that their governments respected the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they would live and that they wished to see sovereign rights and self-determination restored to those who had been forcibly deprived of them.

With this statement the Allied nations that had colonies in Africa began a vigorous campaign to recruit Africans into the ranks of their armed forces, promising improved conditions of life as a reward of their part in defeating the forces of the Axis powers. The Africans could not believe what they were hearing in both the Atlantic Charter and the recruitment campaign. They regarded both as a solemn promise to allow them an opportunity to exercise the concept of self-determination. Although the war was not their own making, the Africans responded enthusiastically. Some joined the colonial armies from the desire to see Europe. Others did so from the compulsion of curiosity. Some did so to gain for themselves the respect of the white man. The response of the Africans in deciding to join the colonial forces against the Axis powers raised a fundamental question: Did the colonial governments now think that the Africans had an intellect that could be utilized to eliminate the threat of Nazi domination? There was no point in the Africans trying to find an answer to the question in the climate of the war, but as soon as the conflict was over in 1945, the colonial governments could no longer avoid the question because it was foremost in the minds of Africans.

As soon as the war was over and the threat of Nazi domination was finally eliminated, Africans turned their attention to the restoration of their rights as human beings in accordance with the pledge made in the Atlantic Charter and the promise made by the colonial governments of improved conditions of life. Africans had at last come of age, the genie was out of the bottle and could not be put back in. While in the war service, the Africans learned as much as they could about life in Europe and came to two basic conclusions: the white man had both positive attributes and negative features that characterized life everywhere, and contrary to his claim of intellectual superiority, the white man had nothing more than a political strategy to subject Africans to oppressive conditions. One of the Africans who participated in the war, Waruhiu Itote from Kenya, used the knowledge he gained in the jungle of Burma to launch a military attack on the colonial establishments as a Mau Mau leader.

This development represents the rise of African consciousness, which manifested itself in the political activity that was fundamental to the Africans' political aspirations and to their awareness of the need to restore their position in colonial settings. Meeting in London to design a strategy for action to realize their new political objectives, Africans recognized that the war had an impact on their thought processes in ways that the colonial governments could not expect to understand. Once they put that strategy in place, Africans were determined to put it into effect and expected to see the results they had anticipated. First, they demanded an improvement in the conditions of their lives as promised by the Atlantic Charter. But when the colonial governments declined to in-

itiate that improvement, Africans decided to adopt the next phase of that strategy, which was to demand political independence. They knew that they risked imprisonment and death in adopting the strategy of confrontation with the colonial governments. The colonial culture of violence found an expression and a target in Africans' demand for fundamental change.

Twelve years following the end of the war, Africans scored a resounding victory in their struggle against the colonial governments. The strategy of survival they had learned during the height of colonization and during the war now found an appropriate forum in confronting the colonial powers. The attainment of independence for Ghana in 1957 signaled a spiraling series of events that finally led to the fulfillment of the objectives Africans had designed as a result of the end of the war. Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, Milton Margai, Albert Luthuli, Joshua Nkomo, Patrice Lumumba, Edwardo Mondlane, and others became undisputed leaders in a new phenomenon of the rising African political aspirations. Indeed, independence for Ghana triggered developments that led to the untimely collapse of the colonial empires in Africa, well short of the thousand years that some colonial enthusiasts, such as Cecil John Rhodes and others, had predicted as their minimum duration. In 1986 Africans knew that only the Afrikaners of South Africa were still trying to mislead them was the reason why there was an intense struggle between them and Africans. If history is any thing to go by, the Afrikaners would be well advised to listen to the voice of reason and to realize that they were fighting a losing battle. The Afrikaners failed to realize that no colonial power, no matter how oppressive and brutal, can win a struggle against the colonized once they have decided to restore their sense of pride. It is not surprising that with the independence of Namibia in 1990 following 70 years of brutal rule by South Africa, South Africa itself was now the only colonial power on the continent. The end of the apartheid system came only four years later, in April 1994.

The rise of African consciousness and the struggle for political independence following the end of the Second World War was also the result of the action taken by colonial governments themselves. Tragic as it was, the war gave Africans a new opportunity to study the behavior of the white man in relationship to his thought processes and toward them. They saw for themselves the misery and the suffering that the vast majority of people in Europe endured. The Industrial Revolution of the 19th century had helped improve conditions of life of some people, but it had also left many more sinking in the dark shadows of a social utopia and economic millennium that was envisaged

Above all else the Africans who went to war learned that the character of social institutions in Europe was determined by the character of political behavior of individuals, and that no single individual had an ab-



solute monopoly of knowledge about human conditions and political knowledge. Winston Churchill, Clement Attlee, Charles de Gaulle, and Antonio Salazar were not Edmund Burke, Julius Caesar, Thomas Hobbes, and Machiavelli reincarnate. They were human beings of simple and ordinary political ability of questionable nature.

The conclusion that the Africans reached about the limitations of the colonial society translated into an action as a result of the high level of African intellect the colonial governments could not understand and control. Africans were now conscious of the fact that in terms of political thought process and action they were capable of measuring up to expectations. In this context the cards were on the table and the colonial systems and Africans were now ready to engage in a game of wills. The wind of change surging in the form of a breeze that turned into nationalistic storm aided Africans in charting a new course to self-determination and independence and derailed the game plan of the colonial officials. The days of the colonial domination of Africans were clearly numbered as the dawn of the rise of their political independence heralded the daybreak of a new era.

## **THE COLONIZATION OF KENYA AND THE CRUCIBLE OF CULTURAL CONFLICT**

In presenting these features of the political conditions in Africa as a result of the Second World War, this book addresses some developments that were taking place at the time Blundell and Todd were born in 1907 and 1908, respectively, to suggest how they were exposed to that liberal philosophy. Cast in colonial setting in Africa, where the exercise of democracy was virtually impossible for Africans, Blundell and Todd responded to a call to rise up to the occasion and exercise the influence only they could exert in the Africans' struggle for freedom from colonial domination. In doing so the two men paid a heavy price for their beliefs and actions. They were condemned by their fellow settlers, they were threatened with arrest and charges of treason. While Blundell was not arrested, Todd was actually arrested and placed in detention and house arrest for nearly five years. In 1958 his entire cabinet resigned in protest of his liberal views and the efforts he was making to bring about meaningful change in the lives of Africans. In 1972 he was placed in detention for an extended period of time and was charged with treason for which he could have been hanged were it not for intervention by the British government.

Although the book begins with an account of events beginning with the colonization of Kenya in 1895, its major focus is when Blundell arrived in Kenya in 1925 at the age of 18, hardly an age when one can

travel by oneself and live in a strange country. The account of the system of commissioner under Arthur Charles Hardinge from 1895 to 1900 ends with that of James Hayes Sadler from 1905 to 1909. This account is intended to give a narrative of the development of the colonial system. When Sadler provided a period of change from the system of commissioner to the beginning of that of governor in 1906, important developments began to take place, especially the evolution of the land policy which, by 1952, caused so much conflict between the colonial government and the Africans. Blundell's arrival in Kenya coincided with the appointment of Edward Grigg as governor in 1925.

Grigg, who had previously served in the British Parliament as a member of the Liberal Party, and Blundell had something in common in their backgrounds: they were introduced to liberal philosophy early in their lives. But, due to the demands of the office he held, Grigg abandoned his liberal philosophy in order to assert his authority as governor. Although Blundell and Grigg did not have an opportunity to work together, Blundell later learned about some of the mistakes Grigg made in dealing with critical national issues, especially the nature of relations between the colonial government and Africans. In 1922 Grigg's two predecessors, Edward Northey, who served from 1919 to 1922, and Robert Coryndon, who served from 1922 to 1925, came face to face with a powerful and proud African nationalist, Harry Thuku. Recognizing the arrogant manner in which Northey and Coryndon carried out their duties, Thuku refused to submit to the wishes and demands of colonial officials who showed neither understanding nor knowledge of the needs of the Africans.

In an effort to reduce Thuku's ego, Northey and Coryndon acted in a manner that invoked strong reaction from Thuku himself. On July 1, 1921, Africans formed the East African Association with Thuku as president. In 1922 Thuku was advocating civil disobedience among Africans as a response to the manner in which Northey and Coryndon carried out their responsibilities. He was arrested and imprisoned for nine years. Although Grigg finally ordered Thuku's release in 1930, he had been part of his continuing imprisonment for nearly five years after Coryndon had retired. Neither Coryndon nor Grigg nor their successors were aware that in taking this action against Thuku they were planting the seeds of a major conflict in the future. In this context the colonial government created Kenya as a crucible of cultural conflict.

From time to time since 1930 the crucible of conflict widened to include a mixture of elements that tarnished it beyond repair. By the time that Philip E. Mitchell was appointed governor in 1944, the crucible of cultural conflict was beginning to take serious dimensions. In that year Eliud Wambui Mathu was appointed the first African to sit in the legislative council. The appointment was made not so much with the pur-

pose of having him represent the interests of the Africans, but to give the impression that he was, in effect, representing their interests. But it turned out that Mitchell, in accordance with the expectations of the appointment, expected Mathu to remember that he held office at his pleasure.

This development created a situation that Africans saw Mathu as a representative of colonial interests. Although Mathu tried to function in a manner that reflected his understanding of responsibilities to Africans, he could not eliminate the impression that he was being used to promote the interests of the colonial government. However, Africans did not turn their rage at Mathu, but at the colonial government for putting him in a position of conflict of interest. However, until 1957, when the Lyttleton constitution came into being, Mathu did his best to represent the interests of his fellow Africans. By this time Michael Blundell used the end of the Mau Mau rebellion in 1957 to make a major pronouncement of his philosophy, saying that settlers would be unable to stop the advent of the African government and that while it was still possible the colonial government must design a policy to ensure that Africans were adequately educated to assume their responsibility for the future of the country.

But in taking the position that he did toward the Mau Mau rebellion in 1952, Blundell, unlike Todd, compromised his liberal principles. The result was that the Mau Mau rebellion left a trail of racial bitterness that came to an end only with Kenya's attainment of independence in December 1963. If Blundell had remained true to his original principles, it would have been possible to minimize the effect of the Mau Mau to the extent that bridges of communication would have been built for the mutual benefit of both sides. However, Blundell tried to initiate contact with the leaders of the Mau Mau movement, but he was condemned by his fellow settlers.

Throughout his political involvement in the transformation of Kenya, Blundell walked a political tightrope. On the one hand he tried to represent the interests of the settlers. On the other hand he tried to have meaningful relations with Africans. As a result his balancing act left much to be desired, although he proved to be a gallant soldier in the struggle for political advancement of Africans. When Kenya achieved independence in December 1963 Blundell had a place of honor in Kenya, just as Todd did when Zimbabwe gained independence in April 1980.

## **TODD'S ROLE IN COLONIAL ZIMBABWE: SEEKING AN END TO THE CULTURE OF VIOLENCE**

Although the drama of conflict between Africans and the colonial government in Zimbabwe, the former British colony of Southern Rhodesia,

began at the inception of the colonial government in September 1890, it took a dramatic turn for the worse between 1964 and 1979 when Zimbabwe, then Rhodesia, was subjected to the political behavior of the Rhodesia Front (RF) government led by white men who were so obsessed with sustaining political power that nothing else mattered. In a unilateral declaration of independence on November 11, 1965, Ian Smith, unaware that he would be the last colonial leader, claimed that his government took this action because he believed that the mantle of the colonial pioneers had fallen on the shoulders of its members to sustain Western civilization in what he called a primitive country. It did not occur to him and his associates in government that the mantle had, in effect, fallen from their shoulders. The attitude and the policies of the RF government demonstrate the tragic nature of its political behavior.

One must not, therefore, conclude that this institutional conflict was a racial war, because it was not. This was a conflict between the vestiges of the colonial establishment and the rising tide of African nationalism. Race, indeed, became only an incidental factor when the RF government, by its own admission, made it so. But what is important to keep in mind is that the extreme positions which the combatants took suggests the critical role of the forces behind it and the explosive nature of the conflict. On the one hand was Ian Smith, the last colonial political leader of Zimbabwe, and, indeed the Pied Piper of the old era of colonial political objectives. He was a man whose political philosophy manifested a behavior that upheld and reflected the views that Cecil John Rhodes expressed at the height of his political power in 1896. It was Rhodes's absolute belief that the white man must retain political power for at least a thousand years, for he had concluded that Africans would take that length of time to acquire the elements of Western culture, without which, he argued, they would remain primitive and unable to run a government efficiently.

Smith's belief in Rhodes's views became an obsession in his action to formulate political objectives and policies of his own administration. For Smith and his government the alternative would be a return to what he called the days of African barbarism. Therefore, in declaring Zimbabwe independent unilaterally in an attempt to foil the efforts of Africans toward their own definition of self, Smith believed that he had a duty to launch a *kamikaze* assault on the rising tide of African nationalism unmindful of the consequences of his action. He failed to realize that this action was bound to turn out to be an ill-conceived strategy that meant his own ultimate self-deception because it proved to be the lull before the storm.

On the other hand were the African nationalists who believed that they had a solemn responsibility to liberate their people and to rescue their country from what they regarded as colonial usurpers who were ex-

plotting them under the aegis of Victorian principles of the profitability of founding colonies. This belief inspired their determination to fight for their cause. It is this kind of setting that produced an environment ripe for a major conflict. One must now ask the question: What were the real causes of the war of independence? The answer depends on who one asks. Smith told this author in July 1983 that it was caused by the African nationalists who, he argued, were seeking to replace what he claimed was a democratic government with a Marxist dictatorship.

The African nationalists argued that the war was caused by the RF's oppressive policies, especially the denial of equal educational opportunity, through which they were denied equal opportunity in society. Assuming that the reasons advanced by both sides were plausible, one must find a more reliable basis of determining the actual causes. This author believes that there are four basic reasons why the war could not be avoided: historical precedence, the rise of African nationalism, the policies of the RF government itself, and the role that Garfield Todd played in bringing about the political transformation of colonial Zimbabwe. Let us take each one at a time and discuss briefly how it stands as a cause of the war.

As soon as the British South Africa Company established a colony in September 1890, Leander Starr Jameson, the first administrator who served from September 10, 1890, to April 1, 1896, operated under the Victorian principle that the Africans must be trained to fulfill the labor needs of the country. For the next six years a philosophy steadily developed which embraced the belief that practical training and manual labor should form a major component of the curricular content in African schools. Therefore, from the beginning of the colonial government in Zimbabwe, educational policy for Africans became an integral part of its political agenda. Until the end of the RF government in 1979, the educational process acquired political implications far beyond the level of educational policy.

During the period which Earl Grey served as administrator from April 2, 1896, to December 4, 1898, this practice had become an official government policy. Indeed, in 1898, during a debate on the first education bill which became law in 1899, Grey argued that the best way of promoting the advancement of Africans was not through the introduction of Christian values the missionaries were trying to promote, but training them to function as cheap laborers. The church-state crisis, which is discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, began to form with Grey's views and the reaction of the church leaders to them. The cooperation that had existed between the missionaries and the European entrepreneurs, and which David Livingstone so eloquently advocated in 1864 as the best means of advancing British commercial interests in Africa, suffered a severe setback as a result of Grey's attitude and the policy of his administration.

Within this context a triangle of badly strained relationships began to form at the conclusion of the war in 1897. Chapter 2 discusses a set of conditions created by the colonial government to show that the seeds of conflict between the Africans and the colonial government were sown right at the inception of the colonial system.

However, it was the administration of Godfrey Huggins from September 12, 1933, to September 6, 1953, which established a strong precedence that the RF government effectively used in designing its own set of policies making the road to conflict a truly perilous one. Huggins's definition of the policy of partnership between the Africans and the whites as "that kind of relationship which exists between the horse and the rider" is what the RF government used as the basis of its own policies and political action. Not only did Smith admire Huggins and accept him as his mentor, he also adopted all of his policies, programs, and philosophy.

Arguing that there was nothing wrong with the policies of his administration beyond the reaction of misinformed individuals, Smith told the author in 1983 that they were part of the history of policy in Zimbabwe, and that to expect his government to change history was unrealistic. He preferred to neglect the reality that because conditions from Jameson to Huggins had changed, there was need to change both attitudes and policies to suit these new conditions. The reason why the RF government did not think much of the policies of the administration of Garfield Todd from September 7, 1953, to February 16, 1958, and that of Edgar C. Whitehead from February 17, 1958, to December 16, 1962, is that both tried to reverse the policies that Huggins had pursued for many years. Smith and his RF government so admired Huggins and the policies of his administration that they used them as their own model, neglecting the fact that new conditions demanded a fresh appraisal and new policy elements. Failure to understand this basic and simple fact constituted the elements of the tragedy of the RF.

The second cause of the war is the rise of African nationalism. The Second World War had a profound effect upon the Africans and in ways that neither they nor the colonial governments could have foreseen. Indeed, the colonial governments all over Africa asked the Africans to fight against possible Nazi oppression, yet they returned home to endure old forms of colonial oppression. They had asked them to fight for the freedom and rights of all people, yet the Africans returned home to experience a lack of freedom and a continual denial of equal rights. They had asked them to fight to end racism, yet the Africans returned home to face new colonial racism. That the Africans grasped the effect of this contradiction on their lives suggests how the war had aroused a new level of consciousness among them.

The reality of this awareness had its basis in the conference that African leaders held in London at the conclusion of the war in 1945. Not

only did they assess their contribution to the war efforts of the Allies, but they also made an evaluation of themselves as a people in light of the colonial conditions. From that moment out of the Africans' understanding of what it meant to be human, African Nationalism was born. The return of Kwame Nkrumah to Ghana in 1947 following the completion of his educational safari in Europe and the United States gave a new meaning to a momentum that was building up rapidly. When Nkrumah was elected prime minister of Ghana in 1950, he began to work toward its independence as a prelude to the struggle for the liberation of the African continent. Indeed, at the inauguration of independence for Ghana, Nkrumah made a solemn pledge to launch a continental campaign to rid Africa of colonialism because, he argued, the independence for Ghana was meaningless unless it was dedicated to the liberation of the African continent.

The attainment of independence for Ghana in 1957 altered the political landscape in all of Africa. Suddenly Ghana and Nkrumah became a symbol of a new era of consciousness in Africa, the twin-beacon lighthouse giving direction to the African political boat sailing in the troubled waters of colonial high waves. The British imperial ship sailing in the equally troubled waters on the Dark Continent had hit an iceberg and was now beginning to sink. Nkrumah's role in the founding of the Organization of African Unity on May 25, 1963, ushered in a new level of African Nationalism and offered the British an opportunity to make a political SOS call. It really is not surprising that the very first target of the African Nationalists was the system of education under colonial rule, because it determined every other aspect of national life, such as employment opportunity and the general standard of living.

The inauguration of African National Congress (ANC) in Zimbabwe in 1957—the year Ghana achieved independence, and Martin Luther King, Jr. and Rosa Parks were making news headlines in the struggle of African Americans for civil rights—was an event that was destined to alter the course of political events in the country. When Edgar Whitehead outlawed ANC in February 1958, the relationship between the Africans and the government entered a new phase. The formation of the National Democratic Party (NDP) in 1959, its banning, again by Whitehead, in 1960, and the formation of Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), also in 1960, were developments which suggest that the colonial governments failed to accept African nationalism as a major factor shaping political development of the country. The RF's failure to accept this reality would have dire consequences for the future. When two powerful forces, the rising tide of African nationalism and the might of the RF determination to preserve white political institutions, clashed the outcome was devastating.

The third cause of the war is the policies of the RF government itself.

When Ian Smith told the author on July 20, 1983, that because the policies of his administration were part of the history of government policy in Zimbabwe, he justified them on that basis alone. He felt that easing them would lead to the formation of an African government, the prospects of which he detested completely. This is why the RF declined to consider changing them. But neither Smith nor his RF government would be aware that in remaining rigid about the influence of past policies on those of their own, they were inadvertently accelerating the advent of an African government itself.

The fourth cause of the war was the role that Garfield Todd played in bringing about the political transformation of Zimbabwe. In discussing this cause one must understand that Todd was responding to the irrational behavior of the RF. While Todd tried to respond in a manner that showed respect for the government under which he lived, the RF showed no respect for him as a person whose security and welfare it must protect. Todd and the colonial government came into conflict in 1958 when he was removed from the office of prime minister. In February 1959 he opposed the declaration of the state of emergency by Edgar C. Whitehead, the man who replaced him. In 1964 Todd and the RF began the saga of conflict when Winston Field was removed from the office of prime minister in a political coup that was led by Ian Smith. Smith and Todd would never agree on anything. In July 1964 Todd openly supported Bishop Ralph E. Dodge when he was deported for opposing RF policy. He also opposed the RF's extension of the state of emergency, which was in effect from 1964 to 1979. There is no question that Todd's opposition of the RF policy offered the Africans the encouragement they needed to wage a struggle against it.

When the advent of an African government became a reality on April 18, 1980, well short of the thousand years that Smith and Rhodes had predicted it would take for Africans to acquire elements of Western culture, Smith was stunned by the turn of events that he could not control. Where did he and Rhodes go wrong in their prediction? It is clear that the historical significance which the RF used as a basis of its own policies had a profound effect on the relationships between itself and the church, and between itself and the Africans. That this conflict began with the announcement of a new educational policy and the enactment of the infamous Land Tenure Act, both in 1969, shows how the RF government's policy was at the center of the triangle of badly strained institutional relationships. The reason why this study addresses the conflict that emerged between Todd and the church and the RF is that each wanted to exercise dominant influence on the position of the Africans. But the effect of that conflict readily translated into conflict between the RF and the Africans.

In reacting to the church's and Todd's support of the Africans' de-