



The Dark Side of Paradise

POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN BALI

Geoffrey Robinson

The Dark Side of Paradise

A volume in the Series

Asia East by South

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THE DARK SIDE OF PARADISE

Political Violence in Bali

GEOFFREY ROBINSON

Cornell University Press

ITHACA AND LONDON

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
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For Lovisa



1. Indonesia

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Preface

WHEN I FIRST VISITED BALI IN 1978 I was, like most outsiders, deeply impressed by its physical beauty and by the richness of its culture. Unaware of how many others had had the same thought, I also imagined that the Balinese had discovered a uniquely peaceful and harmonious way of life; and I held to this belief even when I saw and recorded evidence to the contrary. On 18 April 1978 I wrote in my diary:

As we walked through Ubud we were overwhelmed by the number of armed men who hovered about. Apparently six or seven people have been murdered by these local paramilitaries. These have all occurred in Kuta, but there is a real fear that the trouble-makers (Javanese according to the Balinese) will soon be in Ubud to terrorize residents and tourists alike. There is nothing light-hearted about it at all. Even Ketut, who's about 14, was out most of the night with a large club. Other men carry sickles, axes, spears etc. Something very serious may be in the offing. There is a sense of excitement on the part of the men of the night-squads. A certain gruesome glee which they derive from the involvement (or potential involvement) in violence.

This event should have told me that everything was not as beautiful and harmonious as it seemed. But I was under Bali's spell. In the following days I made no further reference in my diary to violence or paramilitaries. Despite the evidence, I managed to preserve my image of Bali and to forget what I had seen. So complete was my amnesia that when, in 1985, I set out to research political violence in Indonesia in the 1950s, I decided to focus on the rebellions in Sulawesi and Sumatra, and to look at Bali only as a place that for some reason had escaped such political troubles. I hoped to discover why rebel movements had emerged in some parts of Indonesia but not in others.

At the outset I was confronted by two perplexing problems. The first was that I could not find a single book or article that set out clearly what had actually happened in Bali in the previous century or so. Frustration gave way to puzzlement. Why, I wondered, had no one bothered to write a political history of this extraordinary place? The second problem was that the available sources made it clear that Bali had suffered an unusually turbulent and bloody history. It was a picture that fitted very poorly with the pleasing and romantic image of Bali with which I was familiar.

After spending some time examining the colonial archives in the Netherlands and conducting field work in Bali, I shifted my focus to the political history of modern Bali, paying particular attention to the periods and issues that I had found so conspicuously absent in the available literature. At the same time I hoped to trace the origins of the romantic image of Bali and to examine its political implications.

Those aims have, to a great extent, determined this book's shape. Whenever I have had to choose, I have opted for historical richness and accuracy over theoretical elegance, for so little is known about what actually happened in Bali, who the principal characters were, and so on. Still, I have also addressed broader questions and have allowed myself to be guided by analytical approaches that I thought might be helpful in doing so. Earlier investigators have either ignored the periods of political violence in Bali or portrayed them as historical aberrations from an ostensible norm of social and political harmony. In contrast, I show that violence and conflict are integral parts of Balinese history. I have also provided an extended historiographical critique of prevailing scholarly, popular, and government discourse about Balinese history and politics. I have paid particular attention to the tradition that views Balinese society as essentially harmonious and apolitical and explains Bali's politics and history principally in terms of presumed features of its culture and religion.

Owing to the scarcity of secondary sources on the modern political history of Bali, this book is based primarily on archival sources, interviews, unpublished theses—mostly in Indonesian—and accounts from Indonesian-language national and local media. The materials available on the colonial and revolutionary periods are plentiful, but sources on the Japanese period are extremely limited, in part because much was destroyed in advance of the arrival of Allied forces in 1946. The disappearance of vast quantities of documents in the aftermath of 1965 and the tragic deaths of tens of thousands of suspected communists make the period 1950–65 especially difficult to document. The problem is compounded by the fact that it is still a serious crime in Indonesia to have any link with the Communist party, so that few people wish to discuss the period openly, still less to admit any deep knowledge of the party.

I was fortunate in gaining access to a substantial number of official Dutch and Indonesian archives—some of them only recently opened to the

public—both from the period of the Revolution and from the prewar years. These archives contain detailed political, military, and economic reports from Bali, as well as documents captured from the Balinese resistance in 1946–49. In Indonesia and in the Netherlands, I was also given generous access to private collections containing materials from the colonial, Japanese, and revolutionary eras. Interviews conducted in Bali, Java, and the Netherlands over the course of two years contributed substantially to my understanding of events and were indispensable in the interpretation of the archival evidence. The people interviewed included dozens of Balinese and many former Dutch colonial officials and military officers who had served in Bali. All interviews cited were conducted by me unless I indicate otherwise. I have supplemented the information obtained from interviews and archives with accounts from national Indonesian newspapers and local Balinese papers and magazines published between the 1920s and the 1960s.

In writing this book I have accumulated substantial debts of gratitude. I first thank George Kahin, Benedict Anderson, and Vivienne Shue of Cornell University for their rigorous criticism. Ben Anderson has taught me a good deal of what I know about Indonesia, but his greatest contribution has been in reminding me of what I did not know or had too readily forgotten. Vivienne Shue provided valuable comparative comment on earlier drafts of this book and encouraged me to make it more accessible to a wider audience. A very special debt of gratitude is due to George Kahin, who from the day of our first meeting in 1980 has been a source of inspiration and personal support. Without his encouragement and his example of scholarly excellence and intellectual integrity, this book would not have seen the light of day. Through their friendship and their generosity, he and Audrey Kahin have helped me over many hurdles along the way. I also owe a great intellectual debt to many teachers and friends, including Daniel Lev, Ruth McVey, the late Milton Barnett, John Wolff, Alexander Woodside, David Marr, Diane Mauzy, Stephen Milne, and the late John Holmes. In their own ways they have helped to shape and to enrich my appreciation not only of Southeast Asia but also of history and politics generally.

Though I disagree with much that has been written about modern Balinese history and politics, my own work could scarcely have begun had it not been for the rich body of scholarship about Bali. I was fortunate to meet several students of Balinese history and culture in the Netherlands in 1985. In the early days, Henk Schulte Nordholt, Tessel Pollman, and Margaret Wiener helped me to navigate the waters of popular and scholarly discourse about Bali, and later they generously shared their ideas and their notes on subjects of mutual interest. To the former Dutch colonial officials who found time to speak to me about their experiences, I offer my sincere thanks and my hope that the history I have written does not diverge too dramatically from the events they remember.

The politically sensitive subject matter of this work makes it inadvisable for me to mention by name the people in Bali and other parts of Indonesia who have helped me in so many ways over the years. I trust that they will accept this general expression of my deepest thanks for their generosity of spirit and for tolerating yet another foreign researcher in their midst. I hope, too, that they will not feel that I have done much injustice to their history.

I also express my appreciation to the organizations and institutions that have assisted me in this research. Financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and from Cornell University's Southeast Asia Program, Department of Government, and Graduate School sustained me in both hemispheres. A Killam Postdoctoral Fellowship at the University of British Columbia allowed me to make crucial final changes to this book, and a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities helped to cover the publication costs.

A version of Chapter 5 appeared as "State, Society, and Political Conflict in Bali, 1945–1946" in *Indonesia* 45 (April 1988): 1–48. A version of Chapter 10 appeared as "The Economic Foundations of Political Conflict in Bali, 1950–1965" in *Indonesia* 54 (October 1992): 59–93. I thank Cornell University's Southeast Asia Program Publications for permission to use this material here.

In the Netherlands, the professionalism and courtesy of the archivists and staff at the Algemeen Rijksarchief, the Centraal Archiefdepot of the Ministerie van Defensie, the Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis, the Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogs Documentatie, the Hendrik Kraemer Instituut, and the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde made the use of their vast archival sources both rewarding and enjoyable. In Indonesia, special thanks are due to the helpful staff members at the National Library (Perpustakaan Nasional), the National Archives (Arsip Nasional), the Center for Military History (Pusat Sejarah ABRI), the archives of the *Bali Post* in Denpasar, the Gedung Kirtya-Liefdrinck in Singaraja, the office of the Governor of Bali, and a variety of other government offices at the subprovincial level. Without their help, it is unlikely that this project could ever have been properly completed. I also thank the Indonesian Academy of Sciences (LIPI) and other official bodies in Indonesia for permission to pursue this research in Indonesia from 1985 to 1987.

To my colleagues at the Research Department of Amnesty International in London I offer my sincere thanks, and also an apology for the times when, because of my preoccupation with finishing this book, they were saddled with an unfair share of the burden. For their friendship and for more than the odd cup of coffee over the years, I thank Carol Grumbach, Michael Cohen, Kamala Soedjatmoko, William Sunderlin, Thaveeporn Vasavakul, David Baldwin, Donna Amoroso, Jojo Abinales, Vincent Boudreau, Myo Myint, Saya Shiraishi, Ben Abel, Dolina Millar, and other members of the

102 West Avenue and 640 Stewart Avenue gangs. Special thanks are also due to friends who made me feel at home in the Netherlands, including Mevrouw Dubois-Raupp, Doris Classen, Steven Tabor, and Anneke De-Lorm.

I am most deeply indebted to my parents, to my family, and to my wife, Lovisa, for reasons that are too obvious to mention.

GEOFFREY ROBINSON

London

A Note on Spelling and Translation

IN GRAPPLING WITH THE PROBLEM of variation and change in Indonesian spellings I have opted for simplicity and consistency, while trying to maintain historical accuracy. I have spelled the names of people and institutions consistently throughout the book, generally using the simpler modern spellings rather than the older ones: *u*, not *oe*; *j*, not *dj*; *y*, not *j*; and *c*, not *tj*. The only exceptions to this rule are quotations from other sources and citations of authors and titles that use the old spellings. I have also retained the old spellings of the names of people who are best known by, or continue to use, those spellings.

The arcane vocabulary of Indonesian politics presents special translation problems, for the literal meanings of the terms are often either uninformative or misleading. To minimize confusion I have sometimes provided a gloss as well as a literal translation. All of the translations from Indonesian and Dutch sources are my own unless I have indicated otherwise.

Abbreviations and Foreign Terms

abangan	nominal Muslim, Java
ABRI	Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia)
adat	customary law
AFNEI	Allied Forces, Netherlands East Indies
aksi sepihak	“unilateral actions” by PKI and affiliated organizations to implement land-reform legislation
Amacab	Allied Military Administration, Civil Affairs Branch
Ansor	NU-affiliated youth organization
APRIS	Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat (Armed Forces of the United States of Indonesia)
Baliseering	“Balinization”
banjar	hamlet, Bali
Baperki	Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia (Deliberative Association for Indonesian Citizenship)
BKD	Badan Keamanan Desa (Village Security Body)
BKN	Badan Keamanan Negara (Body for the Defense of the Realm)
BKR	Badan Keamanan Rakyat (People’s Security Organization)
BPH	Badan Pemerintahan Harian (Executive Council)
BPI	Badan Pusat Intelijen (Central Intelligence Agency)
BPP	Badan Pemberantas Pengacau (Body of Fighters against Terrorists)
BTI	Barisan Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Peasants’ League)
bupati	administrative head of a kabupaten, a subprovincial administrative unit
CIA	[United States] Central Intelligence Agency
daidan, daidanco	[Japanese] battalion, battalion commander
desa	village, a territorial unit
Dewan Raja-Raja	Council of Rajas, Bali
DPD	Dewan Pemerintah Daerah (Regional Government Council)

DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People's Representative Assembly)
DPRD	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Regional People's Representative Assembly)
DPRD-GR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, Gotong Royong (Gotong Royong Regional People's Representative Assembly)
DPR-GR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Gotong Royong (Gotong Royong People's Representative Assembly)
Dwikora	Dwikomando Rakyat (the people's two mandates: to crush Malaysia and defend the Revolution)
Gerpindo	Gerakan Pemuda Indonesia (Indonesian Youth Movement)
Gerwani	Gerakan Wanita Indonesia (Indonesian Women's Movement)
Gestapu	Gerakan September Tiga-puluh (Thirtieth September Movement)
GMNI	Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia (National Students' Movement of Indonesia)
GNI	Gerakan Nasionalis Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Movement)
GSNI	Gerakan Siswa Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National School Pupils' Movement)
G-30-S	Gerakan Tiga-puluh September (Thirtieth September Movement)
Hansip	Pertahanan Sipil (Civil Defense Force)
HIS	Hollandsch-Inlandsche School (Dutch Native School)
"Indonesia Raya"	"Great Indonesia" (national anthem)
IRMI	Ikatan Rakyat Murba Indonesia (Indonesian Murba People's Union)
ITI	Ikatan Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Farmers' League)
jero	noble house, Bali
kabupaten	regency, administrative district
Kaigun Heiho	[Japanese] Land-Based Navy Auxiliary
Kenpeitai	[Japanese] Military Police
kepala daerah	regional head
kerajaan	kingdom or principality
KNI	Komite Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Committee)
KNIL	Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger (Royal Netherlands Indies Army)
KODAM	Komando Daerah Militer (Regional Military Command)
KODIM	Komando District Militer (District Military Command)
Kopkamtib	Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order)
KOSTRAD	Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (Army Strategic Reserve Command)
KPDI	Kesatuan Pamong Desa Indonesia (Indonesian Union of Village Officials)

KPNI	Kesatuan Pemuda Nasionalis Indonesia (Indonesian Union of Nationalist Youth)
Lekra	Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat (Institute for People's Culture)
LOGIS	Lanjutan Organisasi Gerilya Indonesia Seluruhnya (Continuation of the All-Indonesia Guerrilla Organization)
Masyumi	Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims)
MBI	Markas Besar Istimewah (Special Headquarters)
MBU-DPRI-SK	Markas Besar Umum, Dewan Perjuangan Republik Indonesia, Sunda Kecil (General Headquarters, Resistance Council of the Republic of Indonesia, Sunda Kecil)
merdeka	freedom, liberation
MPRS	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara (Provisional People's Consultative Assembly)
Nasakom	Nasionalisme, agama, komunisme (nationalism, religion, communism)
Nefis	Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service
negara	principality or state
negara-bestuurder	ruler of a principality
NICA	Netherlands Indies Civil Administration
NIT	Negara Indonesia Timor (State of East Indonesia)
NU	Nahdatul Ulama (Council of Muslim Scholars)
OKD	Organisasi Keamanan Desa (Village Security Organization)
ormas	organisasi massa (mass organization)
padi	unhusked rice
PADI	Partai Demokrat Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party)
Pancasila	Five Principles (national philosophy)
Pangdam	Panglima Daerah Militer (Regional Military Commander)
Paras	Partai Rakyat Sosialis (Socialist People's party)
Parindra	Partij Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesia party)
Parrindo	Partai Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian People's party)
Partai Buruh Indonesia	Indonesian Workers' party
Partindo	Partai Indonesia (Indonesia party)
Paruman Agung	Legislative Council of Bali
Paruman Negara	Legislative council of each kingdom or negara in Bali
PDRI	Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia (Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia)
pedanda	Brahmana priest, Bali
pemuda	youth
Pemuda Rakyat	People's Youth (PKI-affiliated youth organization)
pencaik silat	traditional martial art
Pepelrada	Penguasa Pelaksanaan Dwikora Daerah (Regional [Military] Authority to Implement Dwikora)
Peperda	Penguasa Perang Daerah (Regional War Authority)
Peperpu	Penguasa Perang Pusat (Central War Authority)
Peperti	Penguasa Perang Tinggi (Supreme War Authority)
perbekel	subdistrict head, Bali
Permesta	Perjuangan Semesta (Sulawesi-based rebel movement)

Pesindo	Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia (Socialist Youth of Indonesia)
Peta	Pembela Tanah Air (Defenders of the Fatherland)
Petani	Petani Nasionalis Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Farmers)
PGSI	Pasukan Gerilya Seluruh Indonesia (All Indonesia Guerrilla Force)
PKD	Pembantu Keamanan Desa (Village Security Auxiliary)
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist party)
PNI	Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist party)
PPN	Pemuda Pembela Negara (Youth for the Defense of the Kingdom)
PPP	Pemuda Pembela Pancasila (Youth for the Defense of Pancasila)
Prayoda Corps	Balinese military auxiliary corps
PRI	Pemuda Republik Indonesia (Youth of the Republic of Indonesia)
PRN	Partai Rakyat Nasional (National People's party)
PRRI	Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia)
PSI	Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist party)
punggawa	district head, Bali
puri	noble house, Bali
Raad van Kerta	Judicial Council for Native Law, Bali
Resident	Dutch administrator, beneath governor
RIS	Republik Indonesia Serikat (United States of Indonesia)
romusha	[Japanese] forced labor
RPKAD	Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat (Army Paracommando Regiment)
Rukun Tani	farmers' cooperative organization
santri	committed Muslim, Java
sawah	irrigated rice field
SEAC	South East Asia Command
sedahan	irrigation and tax officer, Bali
sedahan agung	chief irrigation and tax officer, Bali
Seinendan	[Japanese] Young Men's Association
Sendenbu	[Japanese] Department of Propaganda
SOB	Staat van Oorlog en Beleg (State of War and Siege)
sudra	commoners, Bali
Taman Siswa	Garden of Pupils (Indonesian nationalist school system)
Tameng Marhaenis	Marhaenist Shield (PNI-affiliated vigilante network)
TKR	Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (People's Security Army)
TOM	Tim Penerimaan Operasi Mental (Operation Mental Information Teams)
triwangsa	three highest castes or orders: Brahmana, Satria, and Wesia
wayang kulit	traditional Balinese and Javanese puppet drama
zelfbestuur	self-government
zelfbestuurder	ruler of a self-governing territory

A Brief Chronology

1846	First Dutch military expedition to Bali
1848	Second Dutch military expedition to Bali
1849	Third Dutch military expedition to Bali; Buleleng and Jembrana defeated, brought under indirect rule
1882	Jembrana and Buleleng brought under direct rule
1896	Karangasem brought under indirect rule
1901	Gianyar brought under indirect rule
1906	Badung defeated, brought under direct rule
1906	Tabanan defeated, brought under direct rule
1908	Klungkung defeated, brought under direct rule
1909	Bangli brought under indirect rule
1917	Earthquake in Bali destroys temples and villages
1917	Bangli and Gianyar brought under direct rule
1921	Karangasem brought under direct rule
1922	New land-tax ordinance in Bali
1929	Former rajas granted royal titles and privileges
1938	Restoration of <i>zelfbestuur</i> in Bali
18 Feb. 1942	Japanese forces occupy Bali
9 March 1942	Netherlands Indies authorities surrender to Japanese
24 May 1945	Sukarno visits Bali
14 Aug. 1945	Japanese capitulate
17 Aug. 1945	Indonesian independence proclaimed
8 Oct. 1945	Japanese transfer civil administration in Bali to local Indonesian National Committee (KNI-Bali)
November 1945	Pemuda groups PRI and Pesindo established in Bali
13 Dec. 1945	Republicans attack Japanese installations in Denpasar
29 Jan. 1946	KNI-Bali transfers authority to rajas and Paruman Agung
2 March 1946	Netherlands Indies (KNIL) troops land at Sanur Beach
	State of War and Siege (SOB) declared in Bali
11 March 1946	Governor I Gusti Ketut Puja and other KNI-Bali members arrested by KNIL forces in Singaraja
July 1946	Malino Conference to discuss formation of federal states

November 1946	Linggajati Accord between Netherlands and Republic of Indonesia drafted
20 Nov. 1946	Battle at Marga; 96 Republican troops killed in one day
6 Dec. 1946	Partai Rakyat Indonesia (Parrindo) formed in Bali
December 1946	Denpasar Conference to establish federal states
	State of East Indonesia (NIT) established
25 March 1947	Linggajati Accord ratified by Netherlands
April 1947	Balinese resistance organization (MBU-DPRI) frames “Minimum Program” in response to Linggajati Accord
April 1947	Elections for Paruman Agung; results annulled in Badung and Buleleng
June 1947	Parrindo banned
21 July 1947	First Dutch military action begins on Java
July 1947	MBU-DPRI issues “New Struggle Program” in response to Dutch military action
15 Jan. 1948	Renville Agreement signed
17 Jan. 1948	Republic of Indonesia recognizes NIT
24 May 1948	MBU-DPRI issues “special instruction” leading to “surrender” of at least 1,000 resistance fighters
September 1948	New elections for Paruman Agung
19 Dec. 1948	Second Dutch military action begins on Java
3 Mar. 1949	Civil authority transferred to chair of Council of Rajas
7 May 1949	Roem–van Royen Agreement signed
Mid-1949	SOB lifted in Bali
August 1949	Festival of Jayaprana at Kalianget, Buleleng
17 Aug. 1949	Gerakan Nasionalis Indonesia (GNI) formed in Bali
5 Sept. 1949	Gerakan Pemuda Indonesia (Gerpindo) formed in Bali
December 1949	Transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia
January 1950	SOB declared in Bali
August 1950	Unitary Republic formed
	Suteja selected as kepala daerah of Bali
September 1950	Paruman Agung dissolved, replaced by DPRD-Bali
15 May 1951	SOB lifted in Bali
December 1951	Thirteen Balinese pemuda to Jakarta to meet Sukarno
29 July 1955	National parliamentary elections
15 Dec. 1955	National elections for Constituent Assembly
14 May 1957	Declaration of martial law (national)
14 Aug. 1958	Bali gains provincial status
	Suteja selected as governor of Bali
July 1959	1945 constitution restored
1960	Sukarno assumes role of Supreme War Authority
1960	National land-reform laws enacted
17 March 1963	First eruption of Gunung Agung
1 May 1963	Martial law lifted
16 May 1963	Second eruption of Gunung Agung
1 Oct. 1965	Untung coup (G-30-S) and Suharto countercoup
7 Dec. 1965	RPKAD and Brawijaya troops land on Bali from Java, massacre begins

The Dark Side of Paradise

I *Political Conflict and Violence in Modern Bali: An Overview*

IN THE WAKE OF AN INDONESIAN MILITARY COUP in October 1965, the island of Bali erupted in political violence in which an estimated 80,000 people, or roughly 5 percent of the population, died.¹ In its intensity and in the proportion of the population killed, the violence on Bali probably exceeded that witnessed on Java in the same period.² The populations of whole villages were executed, the victims either shot with automatic weapons or hacked to death with knives and machetes. Some of the killers were said to have drunk the blood of their victims or to have gloated over the numbers of people they had put to death.

One might have expected that these events would stimulate some serious discussion about Balinese society and politics. After all, a massacre did not fit well with the widely accepted view that Bali was an earthly paradise, whose artistic and deeply religious people lived in harmony with nature and with one another. Yet, far from provoking a reconsideration of the prevailing images of Bali or a debate about its politics, the massacre has been treated either as proof of Bali's presumed exoticism or as an unpleasant anomaly that would be better forgotten.

The best-known references to the killings draw attention to the calm and dignified manner in which suspected communists allegedly allowed themselves to be executed, as if to suggest that a massacre was just another of the many mysteries of exotic Bali, or that if the Balinese were able to treat death with such resigned indifference, so might we. The authors of a *National Geographic* article written a few years after the massacre had few qualms about reiterating the familiar lore about Balinese culture and society:

¹ The coup and the massacre are discussed in detail in chapter 11.

² On the postcoup violence in Java, see Robert Cribb, ed., *The Indonesian Killings of 1965–1966: Studies from Java and Bali*, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, no. 21 (Clayton, Victoria, 1990).

Hiking through peaceful villages in central Bali, we found it difficult to envision the fires of retribution that lit the island's skyline just four years ago. Nowhere does the Balinese instinct for beauty and creativity find more fluent expression than in the clusters of palm-shaded islands that float unobtrusively amidst a convoluted sea of thirsty paddy. Here man has not intruded upon nature but has enhanced the original design, blending his own patterns and hues into the harmony of greens, grays, and ochers. Even the bronze bodies match the tone of the rich soil. But flaming hibiscus interrupts the awning of green foliage that shades the villages, and flashes of brightly colored sarongs accent the landscape.³

Within the community of Bali scholars, the events of 1965–66 have been treated as a kind of academic no-man's-land. No doubt they too have found it “difficult to envision” the gruesome reality of those years. To the extent that it has been discussed at all by academics, the postcoup violence has generally been portrayed as a historical aberration, caused by the lamentable meddling of outsiders—communists, Sukarnoists, Javanese—thereby casting no doubt on prevailing views of a harmonious, apolitical Bali.⁴ Some accounts have drawn, though only in the most cursory way, on other elements of the standard discourse about Bali, such as the deep religiosity of the people and the exotic wild side of their culture, to explain the violence. The massacre has often been described, for example, as the consequence of a religiously rooted “Balinese” desire to rid the island of evil and restore a cosmic balance. The “frenzy” with which it was carried out has been attributed to schizophrenic tendencies in the “Balinese character” and to a cultural predilection for going into a trance.⁵ Analyses of the violent conflict of 1965–66 as a political problem with historical origins have been conspicuously absent.

This lacuna is all the more striking in view of the fact that the twenty years before the 1965 coup were marked by chronic political violence among Balinese, as were the years before the final imposition of Dutch colonial rule at the turn of the twentieth century. In the precolonial period Bali existed in a more or less constant state of political rivalry and war among petty princes (rajas) and lords. The Netherlands' final subjugation of the last three of Bali's kingdoms, between 1906 and 1908, was accomplished amid considerable bloodshed and only after several Dutch military campaigns against

³ Donna K. Grosvenor and Gilbert Grosvenor, “Bali by the Back Roads,” *National Geographic*, November 1969, pp. 667–70.

⁴ See, for example, Willard Hanna, *Bali Profile: People, Events, Circumstances* (1001–1976) (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1976).

⁵ Such references allude to the classic anthropological studies of Balinese “temper” and “character” from earlier periods. See, for example, Jane Belo, *Trance in Bali* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960); Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead, *Balinese Character: A Photographic Analysis* (New York: Special Publication of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1942).

other kingdoms on the island commencing in 1846. Even during the period of Dutch rule, the apparent “peace and order” (*rust en orde*) masked serious conflicts over caste, as well as political and economic issues. During the National Revolution (1945–49), which was ostensibly a conflict between “Indonesians” and “Dutch,” roughly 2,000 Balinese died, about a third of whom had been fighting on the Dutch side. In 1950–51, immediately after independence, a spate of politically motivated beatings and killings left hundreds dead, and from 1953 to 1956 armed gangs roamed the interior with impunity, engaging in extortion and acts of political intimidation and murder, many of them related to the national elections of 1955. In the early 1960s, antagonism between the two major political parties—the Communist party (PKI) and the Nationalist party (PNI)—and bitter conflict over land reform led to violent mass confrontations, arson, beatings, and killings.

The urge to write the conflict and violence out of Balinese history is part of a much larger problem in the field of Bali studies: the tendency to leave history itself, and particularly modern political history, out of the picture altogether.⁶ Perhaps uniquely among societies that have experienced two decades of violent political conflict, modern Bali has not been the subject of any serious political historical study. A thorough history of the Japanese occupation has yet to be written. The only substantial history of the National Revolution in Bali, written by a Balinese freedom fighter and published in 1954, has not yet been translated into English.⁷ The situation is not much better for the years 1950–65, for which only a handful of works address political and economic issues in any detail.⁸ Compared to the depth and breadth of historical studies for this period on Java and many other parts of Indonesia, this is a most extraordinary gap.

Other themes are also missing from the literature on Bali. Writers on the colonial period seldom squarely address the impact of colonial policy and practice on Balinese social relations, class formation, and political development. They tell us little about the heavy tax burden in Bali, the system of corvée labor, how these burdens were experienced by various groups and classes, and what the political implications were. Likewise, though it is generally accepted that economic conditions had badly deteriorated by 1965, we still have no detailed analysis of Bali’s economy between 1950 and

⁶ Studies of Balinese religion, dance, music, art, architecture, and so on we have in abundance, but, with very few exceptions, they have been written with only scant attention to the broader historical and political context.

⁷ Nyoman S. Pendit, *Bali Berjuang*, 2d ed. (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1979).

⁸ The exceptions include Jef Last, *Bali in de Kentering* (Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 1955), and Max Lane, “Wedastara Suyasa in Balinese Politics, 1962–1972; From Charismatic Politics to Socio-Educational Activities,” B.A. thesis, Sydney University, 1972. In his recent cultural history of Bali, Adrian Vickers has gone further than most in trying to elucidate this period. See Vickers, *Bali: A Paradise Created* (Victoria: Penguin, 1989). Several students in the History Department at Bali’s Udayana University have written theses about various aspects of this period, to which I refer where appropriate.

1965.⁹ And despite their obvious significance for the political violence before and after the coup, we do not yet have a single study of changing rural relations in Bali's countryside, or of the land reform of the early 1960s. Under the circumstances, it is scarcely surprising that the violence of 1965–66 appeared to come out of nowhere and that its causes have remained a mystery.

This book is an effort to fill the gap in historical scholarship on modern Bali from the imposition of Dutch rule at the end of the nineteenth century to the massacre of 1965–66. I shall describe and attempt to explain the political conflicts and violence that have gripped the island repeatedly over this period. The transformation of political, economic, and social conflicts in Bali through the colonial period (1882–1942), the Japanese occupation (1942–45), the National Revolution (1945–49), and the postindependence years culminating in the massacre of 1965–66 are examined, with special attention to the years 1945–66.

Bali in Historical Perspective

In addition to providing a political history of Bali, this work also offers an extended historiographical critique of academic, popular, and official government discourse about Balinese society and politics. This critique runs parallel to the narrative of the text, so that prevailing perceptions and views may be contrasted with the historical evidence. Of particular interest is the elaborate myth in which Bali appears as a fertile land of material abundance and social harmony, whose peaceable, artistic people have little interest in things “political.” Although there have been some signs of change in recent years, this image still lies at the heart of much that is written about Bali. The historical analysis presented in subsequent chapters will demonstrate, I think, that it is seriously misleading. More important, I hope that this book will point the way toward a more comprehensive and satisfactory debate about Bali's political history, based in part on some of the general arguments outlined below. What follows here is a brief introduction to the genesis of the prevailing discourse on Balinese politics, viewed against the background of Bali's modern political history.¹⁰

⁹ Virtually the only work on the subject of any value is the economic survey of Bali by I Gusti Gde Raka, *Monografi Pulau Bali* (Jakarta: Jawatan Pertanian Rakyat, 1955).

¹⁰ For works that consider the origins and development of the image of Bali, see, for example, James A. Boon, “The Birth of the Idea of Bali,” in Benedict R. O’G. Anderson and Audrey Kahin, eds., *Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate*, Interim Report Series, no. 62 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1982), pp. 1–12; James Boon, *The Anthropological Romance of Bali, 1597–1972: Dynamic Perspectives in Marriage and Caste, Politics and Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Vickers, *Bali, A Paradise Created*; and Tessel Pollmann, “Margaret Mead’s Balinese: Fitting Symbols of the American Dream,” *Indonesia* 49 (April 1990): 1–36.



1. A Balinese beauty, about 1910. Photographs of bare-breasted Balinese women, encapsulating and reinforcing the image of Bali as an erotic paradise, were common fare in the travel literature, art books, and tourist brochures of the 1920s and 1930s, and helped to obscure the political and economic realities of Dutch colonial rule. (*Photo and print collection of the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Leiden*)

The image of a harmonious, exotic, and apolitical Bali gained wide acceptance in the late 1920s, when Dutch colonial power in Bali was at its height and the restoration of Balinese “tradition” had become a central feature of a conservative Dutch colonial strategy of indirect rule. By the 1930s, the

bureaucratic memoranda of Dutch colonial officials had, with a tedious uniformity, begun to describe the people of Bali as more interested by nature, in art, culture, and religion—dance, music, painting, carving, ceremonies, festivals, and so on—than in “politics.” The generally unspoken assumption in colonial circles (and in the foreign anthropological and artistic community in Bali) was that “culture” and “politics” were mutually exclusive categories, and that a “cultural” people could not at the same time be a “political” one. So long as Balinese “culture” remained strong, the reasoning went, “political” influence would be weak. This perception powerfully influenced colonial policy in Bali from about 1920 to the collapse of Dutch power in 1942.

It was within this historical and political setting of late Dutch colonialism that the still dominant scholarly tradition of “Baliology” emerged. Dutch scholars and colonial officials—notably F. A. Liefcrinck and V. E. Korn¹¹—had laid the foundations of scholarship on Bali through a series of ethnographic, philological, and legal studies conducted from the late nineteenth century to the 1920s, but it was through a handful of American anthropologists and their circle of friends that knowledge of Balinese culture and society reached a wider academic audience, both in North America and in Europe.¹²

While their portrayals of Balinese society were by no means uniformly romanticized, they carried in them sufficient raw material from which such an image could easily be developed. Even the most sophisticated anthropological analyses of the period, for example, suggested that “balance,” “harmony,” “order,” and “happiness” were inherent in Balinese culture and social organization. Signs of tension or disharmony—the “frenzy” of trance dancers or the phenomenon of “running amok”—were understood essentially as the functionally integrative mechanisms of a “well-ordered” “traditional” society.¹³ These themes became the cornerstones of the exotic image of Bali.

Observing Balinese behavior and “character” within the narrow, and historically atypical, confines of the colonial order, Margaret Mead, Gregory Bateson, Jane Belo, and others took the “harmony and stability” of Balinese society as an ethnographic given. They appear not to have reflected seriously

¹¹ Dr. V. E. Korn, *Het Adatrecht van Bali*, 2d ed. (The Hague: G. Naeff, 1932); F. A. Liefcrinck, *Bali en Lombok* (Amsterdam: J. H. de Bussy, 1927). The contributions of these and other authors are discussed in greater detail in chapters 2 and 3.

¹² The core group of anthropologists who lived and worked in Bali in the 1930s were Margaret Mead, Gregory Bateson, and Jane Belo. Also part of the circle, and influential in developing the prewar discourse about Bali in the 1930s, were the artist Walter Spies, the musician Colin McPhee, the dancer Katherine Mershon, and the Mexican illustrator Miguel Covarrubias.

¹³ See, for example, Jane Belo, “The Balinese Temper,” in *Traditional Balinese Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); Bateson and Mead, *Balinese Character*; and Gregory Bateson, “Bali: The Value System of a Steady State,” in Belo, ed., *Traditional Balinese Culture*, pp. 384–401.

on the political and historical conditions within which they were making their observations, nor did they consider how changes in those conditions might influence the way Balinese “character” might manifest itself. Indeed, little attention was paid in any of the prewar ethnographic studies of Bali to the larger political environment—Dutch colonial power in particular—within which Balinese society existed. The assumption appeared to be that “politics” could somehow be factored out of the ethnographic picture, that there was an essential Balinese character which transcended politics and history.

The ahistorical and apolitical quality that marked the original corpus of prewar discourse continued to be distinguishing features of scholarly works, official perceptions, and received wisdom about Bali after the war. Indeed, as we shall see, the highly romanticized notions that Dutch military and civilian officials brought with them as they prepared to reoccupy the island in 1946 had an important effect on their strategy and on the course of politics during the National Revolution.

The idea of a harmonious and apolitical Bali, however, was not just an obsession of Dutch government and military officials. It was still widely accepted in “intellectual” circles as well. In his account of the Indonesian Revolution, published in 1948, the British author David Wehl wrote: “Indonesian Republicans from Java made a determined effort to set up the Republic in Bali, but in that beautiful land of beautiful, dreamy and artistic people, the call to battle sounded strangely and was little heeded.”¹⁴ Wehl’s description was highly inaccurate, but it was representative of the view held by most people with knowledge of Indonesia and Bali at that time. In 1949—that is, four years into the Revolution—Gregory Bateson published an article, based on his prewar field research, in which he continued to claim that Balinese culture and personality were characterized by balance and stability. He argued, moreover, that the distinguishing feature of Balinese society was its avoidance of “climax,” competition, rivalry, and competitiveness.¹⁵ He made no mention of the war or the Revolution.

The image of a Bali aloof from politics also survived the fifteen-year period of chronic political conflict from 1950 to 1965. Following in the footsteps of the prewar anthropologists, Clifford Geertz and Hildred Geertz established the terms of discourse for postwar Bali studies through a series of publications based on field work conducted in the late 1950s.¹⁶ Important

¹⁴ David Wehl, *The Birth of Indonesia* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1948), p. 8.

¹⁵ Borrowing a term from communications engineering, Bateson characterized Balinese society as a “steady state,” and said that individual Balinese were principally concerned with maintaining that condition: “Bali: The Value System of a Steady State,” p. 398.

¹⁶ Among the more important works from this period are Hildred Geertz, “The Balinese Village,” in G. William Skinner, ed., *Local, Ethnic, and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia: A Symposium*, pp. 24–33 (New Haven: Yale University Cultural Report Series, 1959). Hildred Geertz and Clifford Geertz, *Kinship in Bali* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975); Clifford Geertz, *Peddlers and Princes: Social Development and Economic Change in*

as they were as anthropological studies, to a political historian these early postwar works are remarkable for their lack of attention to time, place, or historical and political context beyond the village level.

Only a few years before the Geertz arrived in Bali, Indonesia had experienced its first general elections, in which the Socialist party (PSI) had come second only to the Nationalist party (PNI) in Bali, and the Communist party (PKI) had come a convincing third. Moreover, by the late 1950s, when the Geertz were conducting their field work, the PKI was growing steadily more powerful. Yet, in their studies based on this field work, the Geertz made only the most fleeting reference to the realm of political parties, the national state, or political conflict. In his study comparing entrepreneurs in Tabanan (Bali) and Modjokuto (Java) in the 1950s, for example, Clifford Geertz referred casually to political party affiliation as a “reflection” of “traditional” groupings, but otherwise offered no analysis of politics.¹⁷ Indeed, there is little indication in these works that Bali had been through decades of colonial rule, more than three years of Japanese occupation, and a bitter war of independence. There is no hint that, through all of this, Bali’s social structure had continued to change and that Balinese were political actors in their own right within the national political arena.

The violent clashes over land reform, which began in 1963, and the massacre of 1965–66 produced no appreciable impact on academic discourse about Bali. In her introduction to a collection of (largely prewar) anthropological works published in 1970, Jane Belo reiterated the familiar themes of harmony, balance, and prosperity, avoiding any mention whatsoever of the grisly events just four years past, which contrasted so dramatically with all that she and others had written.¹⁸ Three years later, in *The Interpretation of Cultures*, a collection of his own works which became a classic in the field of anthropology—and which contained at least three articles specifically about Bali—Clifford Geertz devoted one sentence to the events of 1965–66 in Bali: “[After the 1965 coup] there followed several months of extraordinary popular savagery—mainly in Java and Bali, but also sporadically in Sumatra—directed against individuals considered to be followers of the Indonesian Communist Party.”¹⁹ His highly acclaimed work *Negara*, published in 1980, was one of the first works to address explicitly the question of the state in Bali. Notably, however, the discussion was framed so that it stopped abruptly with the imposition of Dutch colonial rule over the southern part of the island. After that date, he seemed to imply, the discussion of Balinese politics would take one beyond the realm of the

Two Indonesian Towns (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); and Clifford Geertz, “Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight,” in *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

¹⁷ Geertz, *Peddlers and Princes*, p. 22.

¹⁸ Belo, *Traditional Balinese Culture*.

¹⁹ Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution,” in *Interpretation of Cultures*, p. 282.

“authentic” or original Bali, and into the sordid modern world of automobiles, tax officials, poverty, and political conflict. Though Geertz clearly intended his analysis to have some relevance to debates on the state, he conspicuously avoided even the faintest allusion to the transformation of the state in Bali after 1906.

In recent years, somewhat greater attention has been paid to historical context and political issues in works about Bali.²⁰ Yet despite these signs of change, the scholarly study of Bali remains very much the preserve of anthropologists, ethnomusicologists, and art historians, and continues to reflect the particular preoccupations and limitations of those disciplines. There is, of course, much to appreciate in these works; yet one consequence of the continued dominance of these disciplines and traditions has been that certain questions, analytical approaches, and methods have scarcely begun to be explored. It is my hope that, in addition to providing a more comprehensive political history of modern Bali, this book will provoke more of that sort of exploration. Toward that end, I shall here outline briefly the broader analytical issues that have arisen in the course of writing this history and explain how I have tried to deal with them.

States, Society, and Political Conflict

A political history of modern Bali must provide plausible explanations for at least two major historical problems. First, it must be able to explain the considerable variation in the patterns of Balinese politics from one period to the next. For while it is important to draw attention to the conflict and violence in Balinese history, one must also address analytically the periods of apparent harmony and political calm. Second, it must account for the character of Balinese politics and, in particular, for the ways in which it differed from politics in other parts of Indonesia. Why, for example, has Balinese politics in this century principally come to express conflicts among Balinese—based on caste, class, familial ties, and the like—and not between Balinese and some other ethnic group, or between Bali and the central government? In other words, we must account for the historical absence of strong ethnically based or regionalist political movements in Bali, and simultaneously for the strength of intra-Balinese political conflict.

In grappling with these problems of variation and difference, I have found it useful to think in terms of the external parameters shaping Balinese poli-

²⁰ See, for example, Boon, *Anthropological Romance of Bali*; C. Fasseur, “De weg naar het paradijs: Nederland en Bali,” *Spiegel Historiael* 20 (December 1987): 535–42; Henk Schulte Nordholt, “Een Balische Dynastie: Hierarchie en Conflict in de Negara Mengwi, 1700–1940,” Ph.D. diss., Vrij Universiteit te Amsterdam, 1988; Vickers, *Bali: A Paradise Created*; and Hildred Geertz, ed., *State and Society in Bali: Historical, Textual and Anthropological Approaches* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1991).

tics, which have changed rather strikingly during the twentieth century, rather than look exclusively at the cultural and psychological makeup of “Balinese,” which is more notable for its continuity. Just as the recurring political violence suggests that there is nothing inherently peaceable or harmonious about Balinese society, so the long periods of apparent political quiescence under Dutch rule (and again under President Suharto’s New Order) lead one to doubt that there is anything inherent in Balinese culture or society which alone can account for the periods of open political violence. Furthermore, because intense political conflict and civil war were not unique to Bali during this period of Indonesian history, efforts to understand Balinese politics by reference to culture or personality alone seem likely to miss the mark or to provide only partial explanations.

On the other hand, dramatic changes have occurred over the last century in Bali’s political environment. Particularly noteworthy, I think, have been the shifts in the character and the policies of the various states under whose authority Bali has fallen: the Netherlands Indies colonial regime, the Japanese military administration, the revolutionary Republican government on Java, the State of East Indonesia (NIT), and the Old Order regime of President Sukarno. These changes at the center have coincided, more or less, with broad shifts in the pattern of Balinese politics, suggesting that there is a connection between the two. For example, the thirty-five years of apparent peace and order before World War II coincided with the imposition of a single, overarching colonial state authority throughout the island. In contrast, violent political conflict among Balinese broke out—notably in 1945–49 and 1965–66—when there was a sudden collapse of or acute division in central state power. At the most basic level, this suggests that political turmoil and violence did not emerge simply because of a certain configuration of societal forces—although it was partly that—but that they were structured and conditioned by the character of the state.²¹

The term “state” is used here *not* in the sense of a single, autonomous actor with its own particular interests, nor does it denote a mere “arena” within which social groups “make demands and engage in political struggles or compromises.”²² I use the term to mean a set of potentially powerful political structures and institutions whose precise historical significance varies depending on their relationship with societal forces. These include systems of administration, justice, and coercion; mechanisms of surplus extraction; and institutions that both reflect and sustain the ideological

²¹ Skocpol labels this approach “Tocquevillian,” in that it focuses on the structural “impact of states on the content and working of politics.” “In this perspective,” she explains, “. . . states matter not simply because of the goal-oriented activities of state officials. They matter because their organizational configurations, along with their overall patterns of activity, affect political culture, encourage some kinds of group formation and collective political actions (but not others) and make possible the raising of certain political issues (but not others):” Theda Skocpol et al., *Bringing the State Back In* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 8, 21.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

preoccupations and cultural norms of those in power. This does not mean that the state apparatus is necessarily a tool of a particular class, although in some historical circumstances it might be.

From the considerable body of literature on the nature of the state, I have found several arguments especially useful in making sense of the historical evidence from Bali. The first is that divisions within a state may create opportunities for the emergence of political protest, resistance, or conflict.²³ In states that are incohesive or divided, it is argued, there is a greater tendency for open political conflict.²⁴ The reason lies not simply in the absence or weakness of state authority but in the active participation of elements of the state apparatus in the process of political protest or conflict. This argument offers a valuable insight into the pattern of politics in Bali. It suggests, for example, that the roots of the political conflict and violence from 1945 to 1966 may be located in the actual participation of elements of the state—or the use of state institutions—on either or both sides of various political struggles.

A variation on this argument is that the existence of more than one state claiming authority within a given territory, or competing for the allegiance of a single community, is likely to increase the incidence of political conflict and violence.²⁵ In the Southeast Asian context, the claims of national or central states have often overlapped or conflicted with those of “local states.”²⁶ The term “local state” is coined here to denote a range of statelike

²³ A large body of literature within the general field of social movement theory deals with the way states and political systems may structure the “opportunities” of social movements. One of the formative works on this subject was Eisinger, “The Conditions of Protest in American Cities,” *American Political Science Review* (APSR) 67 (March 1973): 11–28. Other important studies include Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978), chap. 4; Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Poor People’s Movements* (New York: Random House, 1979), Introduction and chap. 1. Sidney Tarrow, “Struggling to Reform,” paper no. 15 (Ithaca: Cornell Western Societies Program, 1984), chap. 3, provides a crisp synthesis of major theoretical contributions to this field of study.

²⁴ This is hardly a new idea; Aristotle and Plato both understood it quite well.

²⁵ The existence of discrete but overlapping levels and types of statelike authority is most evident during periods of political transformation or confrontation, but even in times of peace and stability such overlapping authorities are not unusual. Wars of independence or secession, for example, may be understood as conflicts between at least two rival claimants to state authority over a territory and population. In times of peace, challengers at the center may try either to seize control of the old state apparatus, or they may attempt to establish an independent state apparatus including militia, judicial structures, systems of taxation, ideological norms, etc. In peripheral areas of a country, political challengers more often attempt the latter; that is, to set up an alternative state apparatus.

²⁶ In thinking about this problem I have found Ruth McVey’s discussion of the integral relationship between the “center” and the “locality” very useful. What colonialism did, writes McVey, was to “destroy the autonomy of the small communities, transform the position of local elites and cause spheres of action to be reshaped or rendered irrelevant until all meaningful power relationships followed the pattern of the state”: “Local Voices, Central Power,” in *Southeast Asian Transitions: Approaches Through Social History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). Although she uses different terminology, Audrey Kahin’s edited volume on the regional dynamics of the National Revolution has also been most helpful: *Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution: Unity from Diversity* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985).

structures at the subnational level that vary in their degree of independence of the central state. I do not mean to imply a simple dichotomy between “central” and “local” states. On the contrary, state systems that vary in kind and in geographical extent may develop and compete for the loyalty of populations at the subnational level, and may be founded on very different ideological or cultural principles and institutions. These variations, in themselves, are important factors in the patterns of political conflict that develop.

Despite these variations, however, the basic argument about the political significance of central and local states remains more or less the same. When the central state is not strong or unified and a local state is, the conditions exist for political conflict between the two, in the form of either a civil war or a local rebellion. A local state that is relatively weak or divided and lacks autonomy is much less likely to form a focus of local solidarity or opposition to the center or any other group. It is far more likely to be easily penetrated by or to reflect the movements and conflicts emanating from the center.

In twentieth-century Bali, there have been at least two types of state authority beneath the various central states: those with their locus in the island’s individual kingdoms and those encompassing the entire island of Bali. Both types have been arenas of political contention, and both have been potential loci of political allegiance for Balinese. I think it can be shown that the historical weakness of local states encompassing the whole of Bali has contributed significantly to the pattern of recurrent political conflict among Balinese and the absence of strong regionalist or ethnic-based movements there. This pattern has been accentuated by the existence of relatively well established state systems at the kingdom level.

It goes without saying that it is not only the relative strength or cohesiveness of central and local states that shapes political relations within a given community. Equally significant are the unique structures, styles, and policies of those states and the cultural forms in which they are embedded. Moreover, to focus on the character of states is not to dismiss the role of cultural and societal forces in political conflict. On the contrary, it requires us to examine the historical relationship between political structures and influences emanating from the center and the political, economic, and cultural forces at the local level. Because, while the character and policies of the center inevitably shape politics locally, the particular course of politics depends on the configuration of such local forces. The task of the political historian is to show how a state—its administrative and judicial structures, its coercive apparatus, its means of surplus extraction, and its policies, ideological preoccupations, and cultural forms—intersect with specific social and economic forces, such as class structure, ethnic identity, and cultural institutions, to influence the formation of politically relevant categories, patterns of political relations, and the detailed course of historical change. In this book I have tried to provide a plausible explanation for the historical variation in Bali’s modern politics and for the particular salience of conflict