

# INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN MODERN WAR



SCOTT NICHOLAS ROMANIUK  
STEWART TRISTAN WEBB



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# Introduction

*Somewhere, a True Believer is training to kill you.*

*He is training with minimal food and water, in austere conditions, day and night.*

*The only thing clean on him is his weapon.*

*He doesn't worry about what workout to do ... his rucksack weighs what it weighs, and he runs until the enemy stops chasing him.*

*The True Believer doesn't care how hard it is; he knows he either wins or he dies.*

*He doesn't go home at 1700; he is home.*

*He only knows the Cause.*

*Now ... who wants to quit?*

## —US NCO at SF Assessment

Many have seen the effects of insurgent and terrorist activities on television screens from the mayhem that ensued in India's most populated city, Mumbai, when the city came under siege in 2008 by gunmen and bombers; the effect of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) on coalition troops leaving Iraq and Afghanistan; and of course the iconic image of the planes crashing into the World Trade Center (WTC) towers on September 11, 2001 (9/11). These events are part of the continuous interaction among states, violent nonstate organizations (VNSOs), terrorists, extremist ideologies, and insurgencies. Neither terrorism nor terrorists are new to conflict. Rather, they are as old as civilization and conflict itself. The history of insurgency is a history of ethnic, religious, and political conflict and change. Insurgent organizations can be described as “an organized, violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as a challenge to established authority” (United Kingdom [UK] Ministry of Defence [MoD], 2010, pp. 1–4). Although insurgencies use terror and violence as weapons, they seek political change as their primary goal and reflect the socioeconomic, political, religious, cultural, and ethnic schisms within and among states.

Insurgencies have shaped our past and will be part of our future. They are a complex part of the development of our past, present, and future of people, states, social structures, political institutions, economic arrangements, and cultural fabric, and they are here to stay. The diversity of state and nonstate responses to insurgencies seen historically and in modern times reflects the diversity of the threat and challenges posed by the insurgencies themselves. For example, the materialization of varied counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrines reflects a plethora of disciplines and approaches. COIN operations, to be sure, are more of an art form than a science. The tragic events of 9/11 in New York and the subsequent United Nations (UN) sanctioned intervention in Afghanistan (and eventually the United States–led invasion of Saddam Hussein's Iraq) have brought insurgencies back into popularity for defense academics, analysts, military personnel, and politicians. Decision makers need to comprehend how insurgencies form and operate, but also how they evolve. Some insurgency groups evolve from merely conducting propaganda campaigns into a group that is able to conduct low-level operations, while others evolve into legitimate political groups. The Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham\* (Syria or sometimes “Greater Syria”) (ISIS) took the world by storm when it successfully captured and controlled a huge swathe of territory in Iraq and Syria. ISIS's social media campaign attracted foreign fighters across the globe. ISIS did not exactly appear out of nowhere. ISIS evolved from al-Qaeda (in Iraq) (AQ[I]) and later was denounced by the AQ leadership and lost its

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\* “ISIL” or “ISIS” has become the acronym for a mere moniker of place names referring to historical lands of which the conflicting and war-torn fiefdoms of Syria and Iraq are a part.

affiliation. ISIS proves to be one of the many examples of evolving insurgent groups. As insurgent groups evolve, COIN operations need to evolve with them in order to be effective.

For the West, the art of COIN was forgotten during the Cold War and shuffled away after the US defeat in Vietnam. It took the United States a number of years of operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq before it developed a clear, contemporary COIN doctrine. One only has to look at the neo-Taliban and Iraq insurgency involvements to understand why insurgencies have become a gripping topic for military and government officials alike. The lack of a concise plan proved to be a setback from the beginning in Afghanistan and Iraq as insurgents started to reverse initial coalition successes. The conventional interstate war era has diminished, becoming an era of prolonged and sustained insurgencies. Old lessons on insurgencies from T. E. Lawrence's experiences in the Middle East and Russia's experiences in Afghanistan have been dusted off and reread. Old COIN and counterterrorism (CT) doctrines have been crafted anew with an emphasis on winning the battle for the "hearts and minds" in order to achieve victory over the greater economic and sociopolitical war. While COIN doctrines have been revived, insurgency doctrines have enjoyed a period of refinement and success. Modern insurgent tactics have likewise evolved and proliferated across the globe. This has been facilitated, in part, by the absorption of foreign insurgents in new insurgencies. These insurgents provide their skill sets and knowledge in person and over the Internet and in other digital forums. As such, Internet traffic monitoring has become common among national security services and brings them a wealth of information, but is at the same time a valuable medium with which contemporary insurgencies have been able to gain exposure and facilitate their cause.

Over time, organized insurgent networks have learned that by working in smaller groups, they promote security for their members, especially for those working in hostile territories. This is because smaller groups are harder to detect than larger ones. Detection of cells precipitates not necessarily the capture of individuals comprising the cell nor necessarily its destruction. Instead, if cells are detected, insurgent operations can still continue as a result of the divorced structural framework of the organization. COIN doctrine has come under increasing fire over the past decade for the ineffectiveness of its detection measures, and it was not until 2007 with the Petraeus doctrine that Western COIN effort received a much-needed framework within which to work. Ensuring the security for large populated areas was part of the US COIN doctrine and a large contingent of soldiers was deployed to both Afghanistan and Iraq to ensure this, and to conduct operations aimed at destabilizing insurgent operations. In addition to this, there was a renewed emphasis on deployment projects and the goal to improve the socioeconomic conditions for indigenous populations. The aim of these policies recognized the need for the indigenous population to feel secure, but also to improve their situation and shift any collusion with the insurgent force. Since 2007, the United States was able to turn back the insurgency in Iraq. The amount of daily violence decreased, a modicum of political order was reinstated, and by the end of 2007, the security situation was the best it had been since 2004. But once again, the gap between insurgency tactics and operation and COIN doctrine applications has become apparent. A similar "surge" was deployed to Afghanistan; however, results have been mixed, and the Taliban continue to operate as a sociopolitical force in the country. In the face of the world's latest outbreak of insurgencies, enhanced global efforts may be needed to improve cooperation between affected states and develop new techniques and doctrines to combat them.

This book concentrates on the intricacies of insurgency. We address the issue of insurgency formation as well as provide an examination of the history of particular insurgent groups, the histories of prolonged insurgencies, and the broad spectrum of insurgency tactics and strategies. The case studies not only provide a concise look at modern-day insurgencies and demonstrate that they are indeed a worldwide phenomenon, but also illustrate that many modern-day insurgencies have deeply historical and nonresolved contentions. The various insurgent groups have their historical foundations entrenched in ethnic, religious, political, and socioeconomic factors and are unique. Each chapter provides detailed analyses demonstrating this and will provide an insightful look on both historical and contemporary (COIN) operations.

## CONCEPT OF COMPETITIVE CONTROL

Insurgencies start with a shot that is heard around the world. It is, therefore, quite fitting that this book begins with an exploration of unconventional warfare (UW) (also referred to as irregular warfare or asymmetric warfare). Insurgent tactics have frustrated conventional armies for centuries. Military forces are also primarily trained and organized for conventional interstate conflicts and not to quell low-level insurgencies that utilize UW tactics. Insurgencies do not have the luxury of having a large and consistently well-equipped force to meet opposing troops squarely on the battlefield. Government forces are usually well supplied and sometimes benefit from the support of neighboring regimes. Moreover, successful COIN operations require a particular closeness with populations. Insurgents often cozy up to populations. As a result, bonds are built between people and insurgent groups, and even though they may be tenuous at times, the major advantage for insurgent groups is that they are able to maintain closer ties with communities than governments and their military forces. As Gavrilis (2009) noted in a recent study on population-centered warfare from both theoretical and practical points of view, “whoever sleeps in the village at night with guns dictates the political order and allocation of resources” (p. 9). For these and many other reasons, guerrillas and insurgents have employed UW tactics as their principal weapon to further their political movements. Theories and models of UW, such as people’s war, Foco theory, urban guerrilla, Palestinian model of terrorism, ethnonationalist terrorism, suicide terrorism, and prospect theory are investigated. Furthermore, the efficacy of UW is analyzed in the areas of US UW campaigns, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a proliferation of intrastate conflicts that primarily consist of insurgent organizations or VNSOs. In order to combat the deadly use of UW, one must understand the multitude of models and theories that have gone into developing it.

For the West, the largest unconventional terrorist attack in recent history propelled the United States and its global allies into the “War on Terrorism” (WoT). AQ operatives hijacked four commercial passenger planes and launched a tumultuous attack that fundamentally altered security arrangements around the world. The 9/11 attacks directly caused the deaths of 2996 people and injured more than 6000, propelling the Bush–Cheney administration into waging what was almost immediately termed an “endless war.” The 9/11 attacks, and Europe’s devastating experiences with terrorism several years later, demonstrated the destructive threat that an attack against a vital transportation infrastructure can have on the West. The last decade has witnessed a disparate and fragmented campaign by individuals or small groups inspired by AQ ideals that have planned attacks within the countries they live. This has created an inherent challenge in trying to predict future terrorist intentions. Olivier Lewis examines CT and its schools of thought in order to address its shortcomings of being undertheorized in Chapter 1. Although there has been a compare-and-contrast of the various forms of CT by scholars, Lewis argues that because no one has actually sought out and defined what CT actually encompasses, there is a gap not only in the literature but in the actual theory and its practice. Both COIN and CT aim to stop forms of political violence; yet definitions of COIN and CT differ, as does their definitions of the combatant. Lewis discusses what degree of abstraction is necessary in the comparative study of transatlantic CT, and whether more interpretive conceptual analyses (such as radial categories or family resemblances) might be required. One group has propelled insurgency and terrorism studies into the forefront for the twenty-first century, and naturally, that group is AQ.

Insurgent tactics have been honed to create an atmosphere of terror in host countries, but insurgencies themselves require organization and management. Insurgents operate within coordinated and organized structures, and insurgencies become aligned with overarching issues within states whether they are political, economic, or social. To understand how insurgent networks are formed and to develop a COIN model, Shane Drennan utilizes social movement theory (SMT) to understand the underpinnings of insurgencies. SMT has been used to further the understanding of revolutions in the past, but not insurgencies. Insurgencies, Drennan argues, have been consistently viewed through a politico-military lens, giving precedence to the utilization of force and the political

influence of the populace. While these aspects are indeed essential to insurgencies, insurgency and COIN analysts often ignore the very social underpinning of insurgencies. In some respect, most analyses categorize insurgencies as terrorism although revolutions and insurgencies are not societal aberrations. Drennan argues that although revolutions are not always violent, the two overlap and therefore overlap in scholarly literature should also exist. Both insurgencies and revolutions rely on a sympathetic populace to support their structures. This sympathy is borne of shared grievances with the governing body that is sometimes fueled by a common ideology. SMT has been adopted to understand revolutions, and some attempts have been made to understand and analyze insurgencies using SMT approaches. However, these attempts have been informed by older, structure-oriented SMT approaches with little investigation as to which aspects of social movements, and insurgencies specifically, are the most relevant to the COIN problem in question. Drennan reasons that we cannot stop here. He believes that an analysis of the literature on insurgencies and revolutions, and precise points of connection, are needed to identify which SMT approaches are appropriate for understanding and analyzing the formation and continuation of insurgencies that naturally rely on interactions between the state, the insurgents, and the indigenous population. Consequently, Drennan draws parallels in the literature of insurgency leaders, COIN analysts, and revolution analyses by SMT academics. He also describes why these elements are the most germane to an SMT approach to COIN and suggests how these SMT approaches may be applied to COIN in practice. His findings constitute a considerable contribution to the field of scholarly inquiry regarding insurgency and COIN. He explains on what grounds frames and frame resonance, perceived access to change affecting institutions, and perceived opportunities for action are the key social elements affecting insurgencies.

Insurgent and terrorist activities rely on the use of small and independent cells, as they are harder to detect and their autonomy tends not to affect the organization as a whole if eliminated or captured. This ability allows for sustained insurgencies and increases the ability to wear down government or occupying forces. However, sustained insurgencies also prove to be detrimental for the economy of failed or weak states in which they exist and operate. Daniela Irrera explores the intrinsic nature behind the crime–terror–insurgency nexus that occurs in countries affected by long-term insurgencies. The nexus between terrorism and organized crime is seen as the strategic alliance of two nonstate actors, able to exploit illegal markets and influence policymaking at the global level. Drug production and trafficking, ransom demands, and illicit resource production are common in countries that have long-term insurgent groups. This is not only because the local law enforcement agencies are unable to combat this illegal activity owing to instability, but also because insurgent networks take advantage of this instability (or weakness). At times, insurgent organizations provide protection for criminal groups so that they can more comfortably conduct their activities and extract a fee for their protection and cooperation. Both states and international institutions must confront these challenges, as they have impact on politics and policies at the national and international level. In the broader context of multilateralism, the EU is developing its own strategy, which involves both internal and external security. The use of military and civilian missions to foster rule of law, police, and justice reform may constitute a significant innovation in understanding the underpinnings that continue to drive this nexus and the integrated strategy developed by the EU to combat this nexus. In the first part of Irrera's chapter, the nexus is analyzed against the rise of nonstate actors, and in combination with additional threats, namely, weak and failed states. In the second part, an analysis of the integrated strategy developed by the EU is based on the empirical evaluation of the impact of both ended and ongoing missions. In the last part, the nexus is compared to the present set of strategies and approaches developed by the leading political actors in the conceptual framework of multilateral cooperation.

Roger P. Warren examines the ideological motivations of Arab fighters from the days of the Soviet Union occupation of Afghanistan to the present-day civil war in Syria. Using a personal database of over 2500 Arab foreign fighters (in effect, *mujahedeen*), Warren's exceptionally unique research presents a healthy scope of emerging trends indicating that many Arab foreign fighters

followed a trajectory that led them to become terrorists. The data are extracted from martyrdom biographies, interrogation notes from Guantanamo Bay detainees, and Arabic language jihadi websites (particularly from Syria). Warren examines the political and religious ideological motivations of these Arab foreign fighters, starting with Arab-Afghans and moving on to those who fought in the insurgencies in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, Afghanistan (post 2001), Iraq (post 2003), and the current Syrian conflict. Warren explains that many Arab fighters were discouraged from returning to their home countries after the Soviet Union withdrawal and were not welcomed in Kashmir. The notion of a *career jihadist* came about with the spread of Islamic jihadi ideology and new theaters opening up. During the early 1990s, Pakistan attempted to deal with the corpus of ex-mujahedeen within Pakistani territory and many of these fighters found themselves offering their services to the conflict witnessed in Bosnia. Approximately a quarter of the Arab fighter cohort served in Afghanistan as Arab mujahedeen. This phenomenon continues in Chechnya, Iraq, and in present-day Afghanistan and Syria. The context (democracy, human rights, education, and socioeconomic) of the Arab world from where they originate is also explored. Thus, his work brings to the table a very praiseworthy cross section of scholarly domains and is therefore truly multidisciplinary in nature. The key ideological trends that emerged from the research include, but are not limited to, the centrality of Islam, the social economic backgrounds, the role of kinship and friends, and the increased commitment to jihad, leading to more than 30% of Arab foreign fighters (veterans from insurgencies) becoming radical Islamist terrorists. Warren asserts that the implications of the research highlight two alarming contemporary themes. First, the Syrian conflict continues to attract hundreds of Arab foreign fighters, a mobilization based on multifarious motivations, but where increased exposure to jihadi violence and insurgency creates the conditions for the emergence of terrorist tactics, including suicide bombings. Second, the potential threat posed by the returning mujahedeen to their native Arab lands demonstrates a threat that may apply more widely to include mujahedeen originating from Western countries.

Michael F. Morris (US Marine Corps [USMC] officer) argues that AQ should not be seen simply as a terrorist network, that rather it should be understood as an insurgent network that is based on a social antimovement. He notes that, despite the lack of consensus in academia and government on what constitutes terrorism, conventional wisdom holds that AQ is a classic transnational terrorist organization. Morris shows that particular circles of scholarship have challenged that verdict, arguing instead that AQ denotes the emergence of a global Islamic insurgency. The distinction between terrorism and insurgency is not merely theoretical, argues Morris, as the appropriate state responses to the two phenomena differ significantly. Therefore, the argument is presented that the United States has mischaracterized its primary and most immediate threat, and in doing so has pursued the wrong path in combating it. AQ's goals of overthrowing governments, imposing a strict (even anti-Islamic) interpretation of Shari'a law, and blocking military and cultural influences from the West are clearly political goals. AQ's goals are limited to regimes in Islamic countries and limiting Western influence by targeting the US and European (including EU) countries. The application of Wieviorka's (1988) inversion theory is made in order to analyze AQ as something much different than what it has previously been accepted as; the results of this methodology suggest that the network represents an incipient insurgency rather than a strain of terrorism. The examination presents a critical comparative analysis of AQ's strategy to that of doctrinal insurgent templates to determine the likelihood of the movement achieving its revolutionary objectives. Policy prescriptions flowing from the preceding assessments are provided to refine the existing national strategy for the WoT.

Colin Maclachlan examines how the threat to transportation infrastructure is still significant and will be economically detrimental by using the example of the Trans-European high-speed rail network and the Madrid train bombings. He draws on modern research such as EU Council directives, National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) reports, RAND terrorism database, and WITS worldwide trend data. This is complemented by the theories raised by modern scholars on the topic. Maclachlan argues that past trends indicate a common theme in rising attacks on Europe, infrastructure, and specifically transport networks despite the vast number of governing bodies set up

to counter such threats. He concludes with a study of the Trans-European high-speed rail network (TEN-R), which links Western Europe through a series of corridors, and how corresponding characteristics fit within terrorist targeting frameworks. Several themes are raised, including the conflict between national security and information sharing between states, and technological advances and reliance and the rise in terrorist-related websites. Until such problems are solved, terrorist groups such as Global Salafi Jihad (GSJ) have clear areas of weakness to exploit. As Maclachlan states, “terrorism is meant to terrify” and affect an audience, but there are no set limitations on the element of terror. Indirect victims of terrorist attacks carry the acts of terror to tremendous depth within and societies.

Oren Magen examines the need for states to take into account domestic-level considerations and the possible emergence of VSNOs. Magen points out that such reflections occur rather infrequently because of moral issues with state-level policy as many approaches include the coercive manipulation of populations. These practices usually lead to retaliations that involve civilian suffering (RICS). RICSs can be counterproductive to a government if its legitimacy is lost among the domestic population, especially when the populace rallies with an insurgent force and supports a violent approach against the government. Groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah are good examples of this, according to Magen, as they have vied for political influence over the populace for its support while the population endures RICS.

Even further direct case studies are made in this volume through investigations of latent terrorist and insurgent forces in developing countries and states considered comparably susceptible to the insurgent practices. Indonesia is the world’s most Muslim-populated country, and its insurgent groups are numerous and diversified. Paul J. Carnegie examines Indonesia’s battle against extremism, which remains a politically sensitive issue given the country’s authoritarian history. The jihadist community faces a lack of popular support among Indonesian Muslims, but remains a credible threat in the country and abroad. The author begins by looking at the transition that Indonesia began in the late 1990s from authoritarian rule. This led many commentators at the time to express concern about the security threat posed by potential Islamist militancy. Initially, Indonesia, states Carnegie, witnessed a proliferation of Islamist paramilitary groups in the wake of Suharto’s downfall that heightened its threat environment. However, the author presents the argument that in the decade and beyond since that time, the dire predictions have largely failed to materialize, at least strategically. This outcome raises some interesting questions. *Has Indonesia really contained its extremist and latent insurgent threat? If so, how, and what lessons, if any, can we draw?* This chapter examines the extent to which Indonesia’s security concerns have actually and alarmingly diminished.

Like many examples of an ethnic insurgency, Mali’s is rooted in colonialism and pursuit of ethnic autonomy. The Tuareg people are a nomadic people living in North Africa in Libya, Mali, and Niger, and their ambitions for an independent region, or *Azawad*, in Mali continues from the days of French colonialism. In 1916, the first Tuareg rebellion occurred when the French colonialists did not give an independent Azawad. Strife between Mali’s government forces and the ethnic Tuareg group has been a part of Mali’s history since becoming an independent state. Two Tuareg rebellions for autonomy occurred in the 1960s and 1990s. The most recent rebellion in 2012 was significantly different from the previous conflicts. The Tuareg rebels aligned themselves with Islamist terrorist groups, including AQ in the Islamic Maghreb and Ansar Dine. The conflict was fueled by the situation in Libya. The on-the-ground situation in Libya deteriorated after anti-Gaddafi forces were supported by a NATO air operation. The Muammar Gaddafi regime actively recruited ethnic Tuaregs, but many of them returned to northern Mali after the conflict and helped lay the foundations for the next rebellion. These ethnic Tuaregs from Libya had connections with Islamists who operated within the Gaddafi security force and those who operated during the conflict. With Libya destabilized, this also allowed for the freer flow of arms, supplies, and insurgents.

The conflict began in January 2012 and it took a year until it was apparent that the Malian government was on the verge of collapse. The government was also weakened by a coup and the Malian army was poorly trained and equipped. At this time, the insurgent coalition controlled an

area the size of France. The Islamist insurgent groups hijacked the rebellion for their own purposes and pushed aside the MNLA (Mouvement National de Liberation de l'Azawad [National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad]) and their hopes for national autonomy. The Islamists imposed Shari'a law on the secular population and even attempted to destroy one of the oldest libraries in existence—only to be hindered by an illiterate gentleman. When French and regional African forces intervened, the insurgent coalition quickly fell apart. The MNLA, who was betrayed by the Islamists, switched sides, as they did not want to be associated with the Islamists and thought that backing the intervention would give them a stronger position at the negotiating table. French and African forces concentrated on the Islamist insurgent groups with the assistance of the MNLA. In order to resolve the conflict, the Malian government and the Tuareg nationalists will have to reach a negotiated settlement. Given the amount of negotiated settlements and the history of the country, however, Stewart Tristan Webb argues that another rebellion can be expected.

The conflict in Mali was not the only story that held international headlines in 2013. The Boston Marathon bombings brought many defense analysts back on television sets to explain the ongoing situation in Chechnya due to the Tsarnaev brothers and their link to Chechnya. Chris Murray traces the historical roots of the modern insurgency in Chechnya and the Caucasus. Today, the Caucasus is a region of both tremendous geopolitical significance as well as instability. One need only look to a map to recognize the Caucasus as a civilizational crossroads. The confluence of ethnic, religious, and nationalistic conflict combined with significant foreign influence and interest in the region is one with deep historical roots. To understand the current situation in the region, one must first trace its historical roots at the very least to the waning days of the Soviet Union. It was in this sociopolitical maelstrom that the emergence of nationalist awakenings, modern independence, and religious movements in the region developed. Beyond this historical foundation, one must also appreciate, according to Murray, the intricacies of modern insurgency, the nature of guerrilla warfare, and the role of breakaway states within a modern global context. Within a region such as the Caucasus—rich not only in increasingly significant energy resources, but also sociocultural, political, ethnic, and religious diversity—there is no shortage of conflict born from competing interests. This chapter traces the historical roots of these conflicts following their evolution from the era of rising national consciousness during the late stages of the Soviet Union through the transition into the post-Soviet era and into the post-9/11 period and the era of the WoT.

An appreciation of the region's position within the contemporary international political landscape is established. Additionally, an examination of the region's instability and its relationship with tensions throughout the international community is made. Accordingly, issues such as radical Islam; competing ambitions regarding energy resources; a rise in international criminal cartels dealing in narcotics, arms trafficking, and money laundering; and Russia's quest for regional dominance in the face of fears (whether legitimate or unfounded) of Western encroachment are pursued. Understanding the nature of conflict in the region and why insurgency has been so extensive and enduring in the Caucasus fulfills a critical role in providing insight into the nature of the contemporary international climate. Murray places considerable importance on the insight of this understanding because it lends itself to grasping the nature of breakaway states, modern insurgency, and COIN operations. He also emphasizes the importance on factors influencing them, which include the uncertain future of the WoT, and the role that the Caucasus might play in coming events. Although Russia declared victory in its CT operations, violence linked to Chechen insurgents is on the rise. Murray warns that the violence, which has spread to the North Caucasus as a whole, is no longer directly linked to a Chechen uprising; instead, it is part and parcel of a broad regional Islamic insurgency. Murray argues that the Chechnya insurgency has endured because Russia has forgotten the basic principles of COIN operations: presence, patience, persistence, and professionalism.

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) gained notoriety on the international stage in 2008 with the Mumbai attacks. This orchestrated series of attacks and bombing lasted for several days and claimed more than 160 lives. In spite of this, the history of LeT goes back to the later years of the Soviet Union

invasion of Afghanistan and the aftermath of Islamist jihadi fighters returning to Pakistan. LeT was established in Afghanistan, but because of the rise of the Taliban LeT relocated to the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir. The organization took up the cause for a free Islamic state. It is believed that elements of currently serving or retired Pakistani military and intelligence officials are providing some support to LeT. President Musharraf banned the organization in 2002 after the Indian Parliament attacks and the military standoff that subsequently occurred. Despite the 2002 ban, LeT continues to survive. It has proven itself to be the most inclusive terrorist organization, both ethnically and religiously. LeT has been able to provide services that the Pakistani government cannot fully provide, such as medical and educational support. Its madrassas even teach both English and the sciences, in stark contrast to other groups and overall Western perceptions. LeT's leader, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, has openly led protests that aim to win over the hearts and minds of the Pakistani population. LeT is primarily focused on South Asia, conducting operations in Kashmir and India while organizing protests against NATO and the US drone campaign in Pakistan. It is speculated that LeT has international aspirations and has been known to work as a minor actor abroad in conjunction with AQ and other causes. There have been cases of LeT operatives being recruited and operating abroad. Owing to the WoT, LeT has formed affiliations with other groups internationally, including AQ. An individual associated with LeT was arrested in the United States, and there have been cases of other operatives. Whether this represents the beginning of a shift in policy within the organization or isolated incidents is Webb's aim.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan did not only have the rise of the neo-Taliban to contend with after initial operations in 2001. The reemergence of the Haqqani Network in 2007 proved to be a thorn in the side for coalition partners. The Haqqani Network was able to harness its political shrewdness and ability to be a middleman for the Taliban. Scott Nicholas Romaniuk and Stewart Tristan Webb examine the Haqqani Network's insurgency dating back from the Soviet Union occupation of Afghanistan. It was then when Jalaluddin Haqqani became an idyllic mujahedeen leader who gained praise from even infamous US Senator Charlie Wilson. Jalaluddin also made significant connections with Saudi Arabia and also Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. After the Soviet Union withdrawal, Jalaluddin demonstrated his shrewdness by becoming a minister for the Taliban. After 9/11 and the subsequent intervention in Afghanistan, the vexation of the Haqqani family began to simmer. Even though Jalaluddin was a Taliban minister, he was not invited to the Bonn Conference, but his archrival, who was from a different subtribe and was a US supporter, was. The formation of the Haqqani Network occurred when the Haqqani's supporters lost their faith in the local UN mission as their objections against US aerial bombings went unheeded. The Haqqani Network began low-level hit-and-run attacks from across the Pakistan border and minor propaganda activities. The Haqqani Network evolved and reestablished links with the insurgent leaders by utilizing three decades' worth of interpersonal contacts and relationships. This has allowed the Haqqani Network to develop close ties with the Taliban insurgency, but also has attracted foreign fighters with the Haqqani's links with the Middle East. Although the Haqqani Network operates predominately in Eastern Afghanistan, it has become an insurgent force to be reckoned with. While the AQ network assumed a globalized persona, with its affiliate groups scattered in numerous regions, events around the world further captured the international media's attention. The world's attention was gripped by the Mumbai attacks in 2008 as members of LeT ravaged the city in a torrent of violence. This attack provided the world with a reminder of the ongoing insurgency India has against supposed Pakistani proxy groups and that insurgencies in South Asia are not only in Afghanistan. These proxy groups have been able to exist in Pakistan with the complicit, active or inactive, support of current or former members of the Pakistani government and military services.

India is not the only rising power that is facing prolonged insurgency. China's insurgency history goes as far back as the tenth century. The region commonly known as Manchuria in history and as northeast China today has a legacy of being a conflict zone with the infamous Opium Wars and later the Japanese invasion in 1931, and is well known for launching insurgent movements, which

not only succeed in the periphery to which they were born but also have become successful in core regions of China. The Manchurian insurgency case proves to be interesting because its success laid with its pragmatism of being open and tolerant instead of being centered on ethnic or religious considerations. This allowed for the collaboration needed to uproot elites. By looking at the examples of the Khitan Liao in the Middle Ages, the Manchu Qing in the seventeenth century, and finally the troubled fate of the region in the twentieth century, first as the centerpiece of Japanese imperial expansion into China and then as the springboard for communist resurgence and eventual victory in the Chinese Civil War, Christopher Mott hopes to establish that historical Manchuria was a uniquely beneficial place for insurgent movements. By combing through the case studies and showing their unique geopolitical circumstances through multiethnic power bases, tolerance for nonnative cultures, and cultivation of defectors from the core area, an alternative possibility to the more common nationalist and religiously inspired insurgencies which so frequently occur today can be shown, as well as the dangers to core states of any such movement which might one day resemble the various insurgencies of Manchuria.

China has also been attempting to contain dissidents in Xinjiang and Tibet. Francis Grice analyzes the present-day COIN operations, strategies, tactics, and perceptions of the Chinese government. Some of the operations examined include China's actions against the ongoing Islamic insurgency in Xinjiang in northwest China; the pacification of the abortive 2008 uprisings in Tibet, which were timed to coincide with the Beijing Olympics; and the suppression of dissident movements such as the Falun Gong. During the Maoist era, armed suppression was a common method, but China's COIN approach evolved. It eventually encompassed the use of more persuasive methods of economic development, the use of propaganda, and function of education. Today, China is integrating the use of modern technology in its policing and identification of potential dissidents. Xinjiang separatism has become a serious concern for China. This was demonstrated by how China attempted to convince the United States after 9/11 that Xinjiang dissidents were terrorists. Grice considers how the current Chinese government's conceptions of COIN, both within China's own borders and its immediate periphery, link to its broader beliefs about security and military strategy. A major distinction between the Chinese COIN approach and that of the West, the author shows, is that Chinese COIN operations are carried out at home. This has become a catalyst for Chinese military spending and indeed presents pathways for complex but potentially fruitful debate.

The insurgency in Burma has been going on since the 1940s, after Burma won independence from the United Kingdom. The Karen nationalist movement (Karen National Union [KNU]) in Burma is one of the longest-running insurgencies in the world. Tens of thousands of people have been killed, with refugees scattered around South East Asia (SEA). Scott Nicholas Romaniuk analyzes the intricacies of the KNU, a Sino-Tibetan ethnicity that comprises approximately 7% of the Burmese population. However, much of the Karen population has been displaced and has sought refuge in Thailand. As Romaniuk shows, the existence of certain conditions dictates whether an insurgent group (i.e., insurgents, militants, separatists, rebels, and guerrillas) will be successful in its cause. Most insurgencies throughout history have failed. Some succeed. He poses the simple question: *Why?* In some cases, all of the preconditions for success need to be met. In other cases, only some or a combination of those preconditions are required. He examines how the requisite conditions of an effective insurgency campaign can potentially inform attempts at combating and possibly preventing the formation of insurgency.

Since 9/11, the UN has adopted strong measures aimed at reducing the activities of terrorists. However, from 2001 to 2015, several major terrorist attacks in some parts of the world have been carried out successfully. Insurgent and terrorist organizations, such as AQ, rely on international financial support and an influx of foreign fighters. Sometimes international cooperation is needed—more so than what an ostensible “coalition of the willing” can or is *actually* “willing” to provide. Emeka Thaddeus Njoku analyzes the measures the UN has undertaken to combat international terrorism. For *realists*, the UN has no role to play, but for *idealists*, the UN has a multitude of organizations at its disposal to combat international terrorism. The UN has adopted numerous legal

instruments since 9/11. The UN has proven itself a highly capable actor, able to freeze financial assets of terrorist organizations, but the lack of a clear definition of what constitutes a terrorist or terrorist organization quite often supplants efforts to enact policy that would otherwise do much to neutralize the critical funding sources of both. In addition to the lack of acceptance of a universal definition of terrorists and terrorism, the major stumbling block for the UN is, ironically, the lack of funds for many of its CT initiatives. The UN can provide a comprehensive and global approach through economic and human rights initiatives. It also creates an arena for global coalitions to be formed through meaningful dialogue.

Another initiative that the UN adopted was the Right to Protect (R2P). R2P proposes that member states have the moral obligation to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity (UN, 2005, p. 30). The catalyst behind R2P was the genocidal events during the breakup of the now deceased state of Yugoslavia in 1991. Marinko Bobić examines the breakup of Yugoslavia. In doing so, he seeks to show that promises of a foreign military intervention do encourage a party in conflict to change its tactics and strategy, namely, by provoking or staging civilian victimization. R2P raises a serious hazard for the international community when a party seeks victimization to receive special benefits. Evidence from the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo show that the concept of moral hazard advances our understanding of behavior in armed conflict, especially during a prolonged insurgency or civil war, by providing a key rationale regarding why victimized civilians are collectively a strategic asset.

The field of security studies has become heavily focused on the issues of insurgency and COIN within less than a decade. Social scientists, security experts and specialists, military professionals, policymakers, and the general readership have grown increasingly interested in the subject matter and its many cognate fields. Some of the world's critical geopolitical results have been driven by irregular and asymmetric conflict and warfare waged by insurgents around the world. COIN planning and operations now constitute a cardinal factor in what has been termed the "American way of war" and has assumed prominent positions in the strategic military doctrines of the world's leading military actors and rising powers. Their operations are directed and indirectly connected to the issues of national and territorial security, the safeguarding of populations, nation and state formation, winning both small and large wars, and the ongoing conflict with current and emerging radical terrorist threats. The very idea of insurgency has even assumed a global specter with the idea of transnational terrorist networks constituting still-growing threats that have proven very difficult to contain. Insurgency is able to exist and thrive in remote parts of the globe—even beyond the reach of governments with the most technologically advanced weapons systems and capabilities, and sophisticated intelligence operations.

The concept of this book grows from the need to look beyond actors such as the United States as the preeminent COIN actors in the contemporary world while reassessing some of the latent and burgeoning insurgent groups, organizations, and networks at home and abroad. This volume, therefore, adopts a diverse lens of analysis, as illustrated in the previous pages, in order to explore and examine such elements as insurgency aims, beliefs, and motivations; their formation, recruitment, leadership, planning, and operations; and responses to state and nonstate actors' efforts to contain their efforts. In part, this book seeks to address the oversaturation of readership with titles that focus either much too broadly on the history of COIN, which claim to be definitive accounts of insurgency across the ages (even hundreds of years) but only take into consideration few and typical cases, or that are entirely too committed to the continued concentration on the United States and its principal allies, particularly as they pertain to the US-led WoT.

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# 1 Conceptualizing Counterterrorism

*Olivier Lewis*

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Now I myself, Phaedrus, am a lover of these processes of division and bringing together, as aids to speech and thought; and if I think any other man is able to see things that can naturally be collected into one and divided into many, him I follow after and “walk in his footsteps as if he were a god.”

**Socrates, in Plato’s *Phaedrus***

## INTRODUCTION

Research in counterterrorism (CT) is currently under-theorized. One possible reason for this is the lack of formal concepts. This chapter will attempt to contribute to the study of CT by providing a review of issues that would need to be considered when conceptualizing the field. This chapter begins with a description of the state of CT literature today. It then reviews common definitions of terrorism and CT. By means of a logical analysis of these definitions, this chapter suggests some basic ways of conceptualizing CT. The two major proposals are to view CT as a purposive activity, and to view CT in opposition to both passivity and terrorism. After discussing the political aspects of CT and the danger of political bias in CT research, this chapter goes on to suggest typologies that could be used to structure essential attributes of CT. This chapter concludes with a brief review of the difficulties that are inherent to the operationalization of CT and its more general study.

## STATE OF THE ART

*What do we know about CT?* Currently, CT studies tend to either describe or evaluate strategies and practices pertaining to one or several states seeking to counter activities conducted by one or

several substate organizations. Although many studies have conducted normative (i.e., ethical) critiques of CT, relatively few go so far as to *explain* either the causes or effects of CT (Foley, 2013, p. 7). When CT studies do go beyond the evaluation of CT ethics, efficiency, or effectiveness, they tend to use nonstructured comparative methods, which prevent the development of generalizations. The abundance of facts, combined with the absence of explanations to account for these facts, leads one to conclude that the study of CT is currently under-theorized (Argomaniz, 2011, p. 8). Reasons for the paucity of CT theories are probably several, and such a question would be of great interest to anyone trained in the sociology of scientific knowledge.\*

In the context of this chapter, it will be assumed that explanatory research does indeed possess (intrinsic or instrumental) value. But what would be necessary for the future development of CT theories? As of now, the most pressing issue for CT theorists is *concept formation* (for a detailed discussion of the lack of conceptualization in CT research, see Omelicheva, 2010). The current dearth of concept formation in CT studies is astonishing, for well-developed concepts benefit not just explanatory research, but also the type of research that currently dominates the field, namely descriptive research. It is true that conceptualization is primordial to the elaboration of generalizations via structured comparisons. But it is also true that if one seeks to discover differences between cases, then one needs to specify “what” exactly is being compared (Sartori et al., 1975). Beyond qualitative and quantitative comparative studies, it could also be argued that *descriptive* CT research is rarely limited to what is directly observable, and thus would also benefit from forming concepts in a more systematic manner (Gerring, 1999, p. 360). Overall, concept formation can improve construct validity (i.e., proper linking of data to concepts) (Trochim, 2010), and thus can be seen as a means to increased “knowledge-production transparency” (Lupia and Elman, 2014).

From what has been mentioned earlier, one might surmise that no scholar has sought to define CT, to discuss its multiple attributes and types, or to even compare instances of CT in search for differences and similarities across cases. Such surmising would be incorrect. Analysts have produced many parsimonious and eloquent definitions of CT (see section “Defining Terrorism”). Similarly, CT scholars have sought to compare and contrast various approaches to CT (Alexander, 2002; Art and Richardson, 2007; Charters, 1994; Crelinsten and Schmid, 2012; Davis and Cragin, 2009; Fair, 2005; Foley, 2013; Orttung, Makarychev, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], 2006; Roach, 2011), albeit only few of these have done so in a systematic manner (Lum et al., 2006). Finally, many authors have synthesized the numerous CT strategies available to states (Crelinsten, 2013; Forest, 2007; Ganor, 2005; Maras, 2012). What is currently lacking in this field is the conceptualization of CT via one of the many descriptive typologies available (i.e., classical, radial, and family resemblance, among others). Never have the sufficient and necessary conditions “for locating examples” (Gerring, 2001, p. 45) of CT been explicitly enunciated.†

Like many subjects in the social sciences, conceptualization is a contested practice, with a number of “schools of thought.” Each school advocates one of the descriptive typologies mentioned earlier. According to Gerring (1999), these typologies are contested because they each have their methodological strengths and weaknesses. In fact, Gerring argues that all typologies involve trade-offs between the numerous functions concepts play in the social sciences, namely familiarity, resonance, parsimony, coherence, differentiation, depth, theoretical utility, and field utility. To highlight the importance of concept formation in the study of CT, this chapter will limit itself to a nonexhaustive review of the concept, thus not putting forward any supposedly methodologically ideal concept-type. The hope here is that CT scholars will debate the issues brought up and form concepts tailored to specific research projects. Only then, will the risk of “faulty inferences” and “self-delusion” be reduced (Sartori et al., 1975).

\* We could speculate that the absence of structured comparisons and explanatory theories is linked to the policy-oriented nature of CT studies. Yet, its sister subject, terrorism studies, is both policy-oriented and rich in theories seeking to explain the causes and consequences of terrorism throughout human history.

† If any such conceptualizations do exist, they have not been widely discussed in the English-language CT literature.

Before starting this review, it should be noted that a concept is traditionally composed of three parts: the term (a.k.a., word, label, or symbol), the definition (a.k.a., meaning, properties, attributes, characteristics, intension, and connotation), and the (potential) referents (a.k.a., objects, phenomena, instances, extension, and denotation). The term, definition, and its referents are interdependent—"a change in any one aspect of a concept will normally affect the other two" (Gerring, 1999, p. 389). Thus, any (re)conceptualization put forward automatically demarcates the relationship between the three aspects of a concept. In this chapter, I will keep the term (i.e., "counterterrorism") fixed, and focus on its definition. As the contested aspects of the definition are discussed, its relation to possible referents will change. Consequently, this chapter will be more analytic than synthetic: this chapter will use logic to form the concept and will not rely on empirical examples (Goertz, 2012, p. 39).

## DEFINING COUNTERTERRORISM

According to Goertz (2012, pp. 6–15), the definition of a concept tends to be composed of three levels: the basic level, the secondary level, and the tertiary level, with the basic level being the most abstract and the tertiary level being the most observable. The basic level defines CT and its opposite (Goertz, 2012, p. 35). The secondary level defines the concept's structure (i.e., what is necessary and sufficient to identify phenomena as CT (Goertz, 2012, p. 39). The tertiary level defines the concept's operationalization (i.e., what indicators can be used to measure the concept) (Goertz, 2012, pp. 95–107). In his guidelines for concept analysis, Sartori (1987) recommends: (1) collecting a representative set of definitions, (2) extracting their characteristics, and (3) constructing matrixes that organize such characteristics meaningfully. This is what this chapter shall endeavor to do.

## DEFINING "TERRORISM"

According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), CT is a noun defined as "political or military activities designed to prevent or thwart terrorism" (Stevenson, 2010). The actors in this somewhat-ambiguous definition are categorized as either political or military, indicating that the authors see military combatants as nonpolitical agents. Both of these actor-types are goal-oriented however, the purpose of CT is "to prevent or thwart terrorism," which according to the OED is defined as "the unofficial or unauthorized use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims." Here then no CT actor or method is provided, and the definition of the noun is entirely dependent upon the definition of terrorism. Most scholars agree that terrorism is a political phenomenon (see e.g., Morgenthau et al., 1977, pp. 5–6), but *politics* is also a contested concept.

In sight of this infinite regress, it could be argued that much of the ambiguity of the terms "terrorism" and "counterterrorism" lies in the difficulty of defining and identifying political acts (see Schmitt, 2007; Slomp, 2009). Some authors would argue that the decision to recognize an act as political is not neutral and in fact carries within it *political* consequences (see section "Defining Terrorism") (Crelinsten, 2013, pp. 52, 66–7; Kochi, 2009). Yet, to define CT, a working definition of political violence needs to be established. In this instance, two standard references can be used: Lasswell's (1968) definition of politics as "who gets what, when, where, how," and Sartori's (1987) definition of politics as "collectivized decisions," understood as decisions that are binding on a collectivity (pp. 214–6). If these working definitions are accepted, then political violence can be defined as a form of violence that is not done for personal purposes, but for a goal related to a collectivity.

If the definition of CT is dependent on the definition of terrorism understood as a form of political violence, then terrorism must be differentiated from other forms of political violence. Many scholars argue that what distinguishes terrorism from other forms of political violence is its *deliberately indiscriminate* nature: the potential victims of terrorism include noncombatants, civilians, and the innocent, that is, those often considered, both in democracies and autocracies,

and in times of both peace and war, as *illegitimate targets* (Miller, 2009, pp. 53–4; Morgenthau et al., 1977, p. xi; Wilkinson, 2011, pp. 4–17). Consequently, it could be argued that the more a form of political violence is applied discriminately (i.e., the more it is targeted), the less it can be considered terrorism.

The OED defines terrorism not just in relation to politics and violence, but also in relation to intimidation. Similarly, Merriam-Webster (M-W) defines terrorism as “the systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion” (M-W, 2005). Thus, another distinguishing feature of terrorism (as opposed to other forms of political violence) is *the use of terror* (i.e., intimidation) as a means to a political end. The study of what causes such fear is a research topic in itself (see Ganor, 2005, pp. 251–73; Sinclair and Antonius, 2012), but it seems safe to assume that any sense of security (i.e., the absence of fear) that exists prior to the terrorist attacks largely depends on the political context in which the illegitimate targets live. Thus, what seems important in the definition of terrorism is not so much that illegitimate targets actually be frightened, but that such intimidation is one of the goals of the violent act—in Clausewitzian terms, terrorism is a tactic used toward psychological aims and political goals (Strachan and Herberg-Rothe, 2007, p. 188). Therefore, the more a form of political violence does not deliberately seek to intimidate, the less it can be considered terrorism. Any political violence that is not deliberately intimidating and deliberately indiscriminate is not terrorism. Insurgents, revolutionaries, and freedom fighters, for example, can only be considered terrorists if they fall within these criteria.

## DEFINING “COUNTER-”

Indicatively, M-W (2005) does not provide a definition of CT, but rather only provides a definition of “counter-,” understood as (1) contrary/opposite, (2) opposing/retaliatory, (3) complimentary/corresponding, and (4) duplicate/substitute. In fact, many CT scholars have made the distinction between *counterterrorism* and *antiterrorism*, where the former is reactive and the latter is preventive (Celmer, 1987; Nacos, 2008; Shor, 2011, p. 52). This sequential differentiation debate lies at the heart of wider debates on self-defense versus preemption, and due process versus crime control (Crelinsten, 2013, pp. 64–88; McCulloch and Pickering, 2009; Miller, 2009). For simplicity’s sake, we will put the sequential differentiation to the side (see section “Isolating Counterterrorism” below), and state: if terrorism (by definition) is a tactic that deliberately uses indiscriminate violence to reach a political goal, and CT (by definition) seeks to prevent or thwart terrorism, then CT must be defined as an activity designed to prevent or thwart the indiscriminate use of violence for a political goal. With this dictionary-based definition of CT in hand, we can now “correct the defects of ordinary language” by theorizing the opposite of CT (Collier and Gerring, 2009, p. 128). It should be kept in mind, however, that in moving away from these common definitions, we move away from Gerring’s (2009) first criterion of conceptual goodness, namely familiarity.

## ISOLATING COUNTERTERRORISM

According to Goertz (2012), one way of building a concept at the basic level is to “analyze the negative pole;” “theorize the underlying continuum between the poles;” “theorize the grey zone;” “determine whether the concept should be considered continuous or dichotomous;” and “ignore the actual distribution of cases” (p. 35). Given that definitions serve a delimiting function (i.e., they specify boundaries), many other authors agree that searching for the contrary or the contradiction of a concept (a.k.a., *argumentum a contrario*) can greatly increase the general intelligibility of a concept (Gerring, 1999; Sartori, 1987; Sartori et al., 1975). Goertz (2012) recommends considering the question of how “the non-positive and the negative dimensions of the concept” differ (p. 33).

From what has been said so far, it would seem that the logical contrary of CT is enabling or supporting terrorism, and that these two poles include a third possibility, namely the absence of

activities designed to prevent or thwart terrorism (i.e., passivity vis-à-vis the threat of terrorism). This continuum could be represented as

Assisting Terrorism ↔ Passivity ↔ Countering Terrorism

It must be kept in mind, however, that the term “counterterrorism” is meant to denote all possible *reactions*. By definition, CT is always oppositional (Schmid and Jongman, 2005, p. 43). To develop this idea, it might be useful to conceptualize CT in analogy with terrorism, that is, as a purposive action where the “agent is aware of reasons for that action” (Butterfill, 2001).

Concerning the goals of CT much depends on whether one emphasizes the prevention of terrorism per se or the prevention of the *political goals* pursued via terrorism. Hypothetically, a counterterrorist actor could agree with the goals of a particular terrorist, all while seeking to oppose the use of intimidation and deliberately indiscriminate violence. The desire to prevent deliberately indiscriminate violence could be based, for example, on the notion that some means of political contestation are more legitimate than others (on the ethics of violence, see Arendt, 1970; Corlett, 2003; Held, 2008; Hoffman, 1994; Sorel et al., 2012). In this case, it seems less obvious that CT would fall within the remit of political violence. This decidedly non-Manichean distinction, however, depends on the possibility of political neutrality (see section “Defining Terrorism”).

When CT is used to oppose the political goals of a particular instance of terrorism, it could be said that this type of CT constitutes a political act; and if the act’s methods are violent, then this type of CT constitutes a form of political violence. Moreover, nothing logically precludes terrorist tactics from being used as a method to counter a particular instance of terrorism—whether “fighting fire with fire” is ethical, efficient, or effective are evaluative and normative questions that have often been addressed in the literature (see section “State of the Art”). When terrorism is used as counterterrorist method, then (by definition) this type of CT constitutes a form of political violence. More crucially, in terms of the methods employed, terrorism and CT are not necessarily oppositional terms. In fact, the neologism *counterterror* could be used to indicate a situation where, in a political conflict, terrorism is used to prevent or thwart terrorism. Taking inspiration from the third and fourth M-W definitions of “counter” (complimentary/corresponding and duplicate/substitute), it seems possible to propose an alternative continuum for our basic-level definition of CT. Here, CT is conceived as *a form of political violence* delimited by two poles: “passivity” and *counterterror*.

Passivity ↔ Counterterrorism ↔ Counterterror

This abstract continuum has not been considered by CT scholars, yet it greatly resembles liberal-state CT typologies brought forward by scholars such as Miller (2009, pp. 47–54), Wilkinson (2011, pp. 9–18, 75–103, 84–204), and Crelinsten (2013, pp. 56–7). Such typologies (i.e., under reaction ↔ proportionate reaction ↔ overreaction) tend to be used to evaluate either the ethics or the effectiveness of a state’s CT practices. Such evaluations, however, require legitimate violence to be defined in relation to statehood and might constitute a form of bias for any researcher seeking to remain politically neutral (see section “Defining Terrorism”).

According to Crelinsten and Schmid (2012), the legitimacy of state violence is largely based on its respect for the rule of law.\* These authors argue that terrorism and CT are best analyzed within the larger framework of political contestation, where both a governing regime (i.e., “forces of order” or “power holders”) and an oppositional movement (“forces of change” or “power challengers”) may choose between or combine violent and nonviolent tactics while perusing their respective political goals (Schmid and Jongman, 2005, pp. 56–9). Crelinsten (2013) also argues that when a state employs terrorism to combat terrorism (i.e., *counterterror*), the phenomena is correctly labeled

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\* Crelinsten (2013) defines legitimate state violence in terms of predictability and accountability, and it could be said that it is this predictability that contributes to any sense of security within a state.