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ETHNOGRAPHIES OF U.S. EMPIRE

Carole McGranahan & John F. Collins | EDITORS

Ethnographies of U.S. Empire

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Ethnographies of U.S. Empire

Carole McGranahan & John F. Collins,
EDITORS

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Printed in the United States of America on acid-free
paper ∞
Designed by Matt Tauch
Typeset in Minion Pro by Westchester Publishing
Services

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: McGranahan, Carole, editor. | Collins, John F.,
[date-], editor.
Title: *Ethnographies of U.S. empire* / Carole McGranahan
and John F. Collins, editors.
Description: Durham : Duke University Press, 2018. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017060940 (print) | LCCN2018001556
(ebook)
ISBN 9781478002086 (ebook)
ISBN 9781478000099 (hardcover : alk. paper)
ISBN 9781478000235 (pbk. : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Ethnology. | Imperialism. | Postcolonialism. |
Ethnicity—Political aspects—United States. | United States—
Foreign relations—History.
Classification: LCC GN316 (ebook) | LCC GN316 .E78 2018
(print) | DDC 305.800973—dc23
LC record available at <https://lccn.loc.gov/2017060940>

Cover art: Andrea Coronil, *Papi's jokes didn't cover this
part / Papá nunca contó chistes de esto*, 2015. Wax pencil
on acetate, metallic paint on inkjet print on acetate (of
a declassified FBI file on Fernando Coronil).

Portions of chapter 13 appear in Erin Fitz-Henry, “‘But
There’s No American Base Here’: Becoming Domestic in
a Foreign Sense,” in *U.S. Military Bases and Anti-Military
Organizing: An Ethnography of An Air Force Base in
Ecuador*, 47–80 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

An earlier version of chapter 20 appeared as, “Reporting
Cambodian Refugees: Youth Activism, State Reform,
and Imperial Statecraft,” in *Positions: East Asia Cultures
Critique* 20, no. 3 (2012): 737–62.

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Acknowledgments

This volume had its beginnings in a Wenner-Gren workshop held in April 2011, in New York City. Fifteen of us gathered in the Empire State for several days of intense debate about U.S. empire. Since then, our conversations have continued over email and in panels at the annual American Anthropological Association conference and elsewhere. And we have invited other colleagues to join in to help us extend the depth and breadth of our coverage of U.S. imperial reach. Like all ethnographies, this volume is a work in progress that draws on stories that continue to unfold, that are not yet over, that shift and duck and dodge at times, and that we hope speak boldly into an imperial wind tunnel whose effects may become strangely visible if engaged creatively and carefully.

We are deeply grateful to the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research for funding our workshop, and for its support in the years since. We also appreciate the support for our initial meeting in New York offered by the Union Theological Seminary and the Queens College and CUNY Graduate Center Departments of Anthropology. Most of all, we thank the contributors to this volume, both the original workshop participants and those who joined the project soon after. Your collective insights, commitments to the volume, and recognition of the importance of considering empire beyond individual cases or types were crucial in building our overall arguments. Your scholarship makes up a formidable ethnographic force—impactful on its own, but truly powerful in this side-by-side format that pulls together so many perspectives on U.S. empire. The perspective achieved by juxtaposing and grouping these ethnographies and histories has permitted us, as editors, to appreciate individual cases and their details in novel ways. We hope the same is true for readers of this volume. And we hope those readers might begin to make out U.S. empire in its full and devastating—and thus at times partial and disaggregated—force across time and around the world: from the Mohawk and Osage Nations to Puerto Rico and Samoa, from the Philippines to Hawai‘i and on to U.S. military bases and prisons at home and abroad, to Tibet and “highland” New Jersey, to Korea and Vietnam, to company towns in Suriname and rocket bases in Brazil, and to immigrants, refugees, and military dissenters in the United States.

Duke University Press has been a generous partner throughout the process of producing this volume. Thank you to all at Duke who made this volume a reality, especially Elizabeth Ault and Editorial Director Ken Wissoker. We are grateful for your wisdom and patience, for your confidence in the importance of the text, and for engaging stellar reviewers who were both critical and insightful in ways that improved the end result. Ben Joffe was an excellent research assistant and Alison Hanson contributed detailed, thoughtful work on the entire manuscript.

Here it is important to note that the ideas for this volume were sparked well before 2011. Yet as ethnographers have emphasized in so many ways, the contours of historical events are typically open to disagreement, and too much of a focus on the event itself may obscure the processes that cause that figure to take on its symbolic weight. A related insight girds our approach to empire and its ethnography, a journey that began in different forms much earlier, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, in the mid-1990s. There, while students at the University of Michigan, we had the privilege of immersing ourselves in what was then called “colonial studies” in dialogue with Ann Laura Stoler. In spite of the fact that both of us worked mostly outside of the accepted parameters of that colonial studies—Carole in Tibet and John in Brazil—Ann’s fearless, rigorous brilliance shaped how we understood empire through both anthropological and historical perspectives, as well as how we understood anthropology through an uncompromising imperial critique. Ann has long thought through and beyond anthropology’s limits and possibilities, struggling to make out archives as ethnographic spaces and always emphasizing the importance of forms of critique that depend on a constant turning over and refinement of one’s standpoints and fidelities. Within colonial studies in the 1990s, Ann’s work charted out especially new terrain that would mark the critique produced across multiple disciplines. Her analysis brought the intimacies of race, class, gender, and sexuality into dialogue with intrusive colonial state policies marking who was “European” or “native”; opened a creative new page for analysis of the presence and policies toward white women, children, and poor white men in the European colonies; and highlighted (along with Fred Cooper in *Tensions of Empire*) the epistemological, and not just economic or political importance, of empire for the metropole. Or, put slightly better, Ann’s interventions into accepted ways of doing colonial studies came to suggest not simply that intimate matters are indeed matters of state, but that empire as a political economic formation relies, and even piggybacks, on epistemological contests. For her students, Ann was, and remains always, a generous mentor. Her scholarship grounds this collection in relation to attempts at thoughtful and sometimes devastating detail, as well as in the new terrain she has opened up, and on which contributors to this

volume seek to build. It was our honor and pleasure to have Ann participate in the initial Wenner-Gren workshop for this project, and to conclude the volume with an afterword in the form of a conversation with her.

We dedicate this volume to the late Fernando Coronil—teacher, interlocutor, colleague, and inspiration. Fernando was one of our first professors in graduate school, coteaching with Nicholas Dirks “Traditions I,” or the theory seminar required of all incoming anthropology graduate students. In Fernando’s hands, anthropology included poetry and history as well as both classical and iconoclastic readings on capitalism and the state. His insights on U.S. empire were both academic and personal, something captured powerfully in his article from 1996 “Beyond Occidentalism: Toward Nonimperial Geohistorical Categories.” Fernando was supposed to have participated in the original “Ethnographies of U.S. Empire Workshop” held at Union Theological Seminary. But illness prevented him from doing so, and he passed away soon after. Then as now, he is greatly missed. We are grateful for all we learned from him and touched to showcase the art of his daughter Andrea Coronil on the cover. With much respect, we offer this volume in the spirit of political intervention so clearly embodied in Fernando’s anthropology.

Finally, as is common at moments like this, we thank the members of both our families for putting up with the long hours spent crafting a volume that, in spite of its size and attention to comparison, never pretends to be encyclopedic. Ana, John, Riley, Liya, and Gabriel—thank you. Thanks also to John J. Collins, whom the world lost as this book was nearing completion. Such thanks, and personal stakes, are emblematic not simply of the multiple influences and supporters that have structured this book, but of our hopes for a future whose outlines must necessarily engage, and emanate in some way in relation to, the structures of U.S. empire we seek to make apparent in the pages that follow. A volume such as this one—necessarily flawed, partial, and scarred by the imperial formations it engages through an ethnography similarly marked by empire—seems especially important at a moment when U.S. electoral politics have come to turn ever more explicitly on a dizzying mix of foreign intervention and internal violence. It is our intention to make clearer not simply the components, but the often-missed processes, sediments, and precipitations so much a part of empire as a poisonously productive ecology of North American life.

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INTRODUCTION

Ethnography and U.S. Empire

JOHN F. COLLINS AND CAROLE McGRANAHAN

The United States of America has long been an empire in denial. If European incursions into the “New World” so often rested on an imperial bravado in which inhabited territories were construed as empty, available, or filled with ostensible primitives awaiting missionization, the foundation of the United States rested on a rejection of British rule and an inauguration of an anti-imperial politics that continues to do much to define the country and its discourses of freedom today. Throughout U.S. history and historiography, then, political actions are often situated against empire and discussed in seemingly empire-neutral registers.¹ Engaged from such well-camouflaged blinds, the occupation of Native American lands takes form as destiny or “expansion” rather than “colonization.” Attempts by the United States to piggyback upon Latin American independence movements become wars against European colonial powers rather than a usurpation of slaves’ and creole pioneers’ struggles for emancipation. The cultivation of global influence during the Cold War emerges as “politics as needed” rather than the seizure of a gap opened by decolonization. And overseas military interventions were (and remain) a paternalistic or even “democratic” responsibility rather than linked strategies within shifting constellations of imperial aggression. Nonetheless, in settler colonialism as in slavery, in territorial “acquisitions” and in hemispheric empire in the Americas since 1898, and during the Cold and Vietnam Wars as well as the current period of renewed militarism around presidential decree, a series of contradictory imperial formations arise, structure political possibilities, and are nonetheless denied or rendered deniable. The imperial bluster evident during the early stages of Donald Trump’s presidency seems to enunciate publicly the imperial volition we argue has so often been occluded. And yet, the Trump administration couples imperial bluster and violent politics at home and abroad with a rhetoric of turning inward, of responsibility, and of caring for one’s own while excluding and leaving ostensible others to what come to be configured as their self-administered fates. Once again, the fundamentals and ongoing practices of U.S. nation-state

consolidation and imperial politics fail to cohere as a linear history of clear perception, easily partible epochs, stable forms, and heroic actors. Instead, they form something akin to what Ann Stoler, resituating Clifford Geertz's insight, calls "blurred genres," or an ensemble of colonizing practices and policies full of contradictions, hubris, and imperial refusals.²

If political discourse, academic geography, and historiography have conspired to energize and legitimate denials of empire that operate alongside the sporadic celebration of the importance of empire to what the United States is and does, anthropology as a discipline has played at least a supporting role. Over the last century our scholarship has engaged U.S. empire erratically and inconsistently. Empire hovers in the shadows of many ethnographies. It is untended to, even when hiding in plain sight or cohabiting with critique in murky bundles of practices and epistemological initiatives so much a part of the everyday life and disciplinary norms accepted as fully North American, and productive of new, even politically aware, analysis today. Nonetheless, and in what might be read as yet another aspect of imperial formations' ability to shape-shift so as to deceive while nonetheless motivating long-standing global inequities, over the last four decades anthropology as a discipline has turned a critical eye toward European empires. In conjunction with the work of Edward Said and the rise of postcolonial studies, anthropologists have issued sustained and often searing critiques of the discipline's imperial genealogies.³ They have sought to expand and decolonize by rethinking accepted or acceptable subjects of research; subject/object binaries and the limits of the human; representational strategies; methodological and theoretical approaches to the past; and personal relationships to, and especially researchers' emplacements within, particular communities and intellectual traditions.⁴ This work has added substantially to the interdisciplinary study of empire, especially in relation to the transport of ethnographic sensibilities to the writing of histories.⁵ Yet engagements with empire and its contemporary forms suggest a need to augment analyses of the past, even as analyses of the past are never simply interpretations of what has passed.⁶

For some time now, anthropologists have launched serious political protests against U.S. imperialism and the use of anthropological scholarship in wartime.⁷ This has been most notable in relation to the Cold War, Vietnam, and the more recent invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.⁸ And yet, in spite of this increasingly sustained disciplinary engagement with empire, the ethnographic—as opposed to historical—scholarship on U.S. empire at home and abroad remains thin, at least in relation to the world historical gravity of its object of inquiry.

Contributors to the present volume engage contemporary U.S. empire from an ethnographic perspective. This means that we hope to add field-

based anthropological research findings, questions, contradictions borne of embodied experience, and manners of examining systems of knowledge and social ontologies to the historical and political analyses that have dominated the field of colonial and imperial studies. But it also means that we are seeking to do more than “add ethnography and stir,” or inject some facile, presentist perspective into the sort of interrogation that requires analysts to consider empire as not simply an object, but as an assemblage of shifting conjugations that alter the grammars within and through which we find ourselves making claims. Therefore, in taking up calls for more and sharper ethnographies of empire, and in agreeing that empire “is in the details,” we seek to perform a collective double move.⁹ This involves bringing anthropology and its established methods to bear on U.S. empire, but also considering carefully how empire in turn shapes and reshapes ethnography, and thus those methods. What, we ask, does it mean to examine empire ethnographically? How might an apparently enduring or reanimated imperial present be addressed and contested through painstaking, self-reflexive, and empirically grounded anthropological research; and what might *empiricism* look like in such contexts? How might anthropologists develop ethnographic questions, agendas, and methods adequate to considerations of contemporary imperial formations? What might such an anthropological project mean in relation to broader politics and knowledge practices outside academia? Most basically, then, how does the study of empire alter what ethnography is and does, and how might such shifts contribute to political change in the world?

We seek to encourage, and perform, a social science that is up to the task of producing new knowledge about the diffuse and yet sometimes tightly bundled practices and phenomena that make up the slippery entity dubbed *empire*. In doing so, then, we hope to inflect the very nature of ethnography and its place in imperial knowledge practices. This is not a detached activity or a historical project that considers where we may have been and what we have gotten wrong so that we may seek absolution in the present. It is instead a program undertaken in the present that considers how we as ethnographers might alter what anthropologists think they know already, so as to clarify the stakes of that present, the retrospective histories it produces, and the futures it may engender. This effort involves taking into account the quandaries of a modern knowledge spawned by what is today a United States–dominated imperial order, while continuing to develop the powerful forms of intercourse, debate, embodied and affective practice, and personal engagements that are so much a part of contemporary ethnography.¹⁰

How might the ethnographic study of empire change ethnography without doing away with the incompletely and tentatively shared horizons of ethnography’s different forms, or what we see as its ongoing and productively ragged

potential for questioning shifting political rationalities, and thus the “contemporary”?¹¹ The authors included in this volume see ethnography as providing four much-needed methodological and theoretical approaches: (1) studying empire as it actually unfolds, (2) capturing the rhythms, sentiments, logics, and violence of U.S. empire as lived and experienced by its agents, subjects, and objects, (3) considering the historic and geographic range of U.S. imperial formations and the perspectives in the present from which they arise and do so much to gird, and (4) revealing how arenas of North American life previously analyzed as separate from empire may both contribute to and develop from the United States’ role as an imperial power. This fourth point is especially important in light of what Ann Stoler has referred to, in another context, as “historical negatives.”¹² These are social forms, objects, and ideas whose very inconsequentiality, incompleteness, or subservience to habitual epistemologies or the business of empire might give rise to unexpected perspectives and deeper insights into the slippages that make empire both so invisible, and yet so easy to talk about. In this volume, then, we seek not only to read empire against the grain, but also “with the grain.”¹³ If the first approach is one of confronting empire, the second means getting inside it; both strategies are needed in order to ask and answer questions of U.S. empire and its multiple logics. In this way we strive to come closer to apprehending its contradictory, obvious, and yet so often easily deniable impacts on lives, institutions, politics, and the grounds from which they emanate.

At a juncture at which empire is more a “way of life” than a discrete aspect of foreign policy—even as it is fundamental to that policy—research is needed that will enable us to assess empires *in and as* the present, and not solely as either precursors or novel entities to that present or to a United States taken as a stable geographical entity onto which foreign ventures taken as the real or demonstrable form of empire boomerang, to return in new form.¹⁴ In bringing together an interdisciplinary group of ethnographers conducting fieldwork on empire, our intent in this volume is to tend to the specific formations and types of linked experiences engendered by empire on a global scale and within North American communities. We seek to interrogate not simply the construction of the United States as an empire, but the extent to which this nation-state has become unthinkable except in relation to an array of patterned denials that appear to coexist with a scattered recognition of what living in and with empire has wrought. Our focus is thus on classically “deep” fieldwork, rather than historical-archival research or a discursive analysis of politics and readily available public representations. Such ethnographic insights, and engagements with the intimacies of everyday life and the production of shared representations, are needed in this current mo-

ment so as to sharpen understandings of U.S. imperial formations as they are forged, resisted, celebrated, and lived around the world.

EMPIRE AND ETHNOGRAPHY

Despite their similarities in modern English, *empire* and *empiricism* are not closely related in an etymological sense. However, in terms of a social, intellectual, or political history, the two are bound tightly, and ethnography is thus, we hope, a disciplinary practice that might be put to use to confound the borders between social, intellectual, and political work without doing away with existing insights. Anthropology's relationship with empire dates to its earliest days as a discipline, when armchair anthropologists turned to reports and travelogues from colonial officials and informal agents such as missionaries, traders, and explorers. As it developed into a field-based science, anthropology relied heavily on relatively privileged, if often disaffected, access to colonial territories—Franz Boas among Native Americans, Bronisław Malinowski in the Trobriand Islands, E. E. Evans-Pritchard in the Sudan, Alfred Radcliffe-Brown in India and Kenya, Julian Steward in Puerto Rico, and Margaret Mead in American Samoa to name just a handful of well-known, pioneering fieldworkers. It is important to remember that these scholars did not necessarily see themselves as imperial actors any more than do scholars today who head to the field with a Fulbright grant or other government funding. Such fieldwork, and associated insights and forms of blindness, have been a cornerstone of the discipline since its inception, weathering paradigm shifts and providing a consistent ground for a discipline often inconsistent in other ways. In short, “being there” enabled and enables anthropologists to get at the quotidian, the lived, the vital, and, it has been argued forcefully, an elusive “real.”

If, as social scientists, we are committed to pushing social ontologies and modern institutions severed from empire and disaggregated from one another back into a more global, albeit multiplex, field of analysis, then embodied, fieldwork-based attempts to disentangle naturalized evidentiary paradigms and truth claims would seem a powerful step. But in light of the well-developed literature on a “classical” European colonialism, one that has emphasized the extent to which colonists' most modern of social scientific methods served as key accessories to colonial expansion, this ethnography cannot be simply a resolution or panacea for the contradictions faced by anyone who analyzes empire today.¹⁵ In this volume, then, we join others in working to decolonize anthropology, and we do so through a study of empire itself.¹⁶

The ethnographic turn enacted in this volume rests on recognizing that empire is a moving target and that this mobility is a prime source of its enduring yet oft-denied influence. Imperial formations are always politics of deferral, dislocation, and dispersion, but not always politics of denial.¹⁷ Thus, one challenge involves thinking through and expanding collectively upon ways for uncovering—if this recourse to depth is really the correct metaphor for the problem at hand—that which is not apparent.¹⁸ One strategy involves exploring the often contradictory matrices that gird historical junctures and the political rationalities that both structure and emerge from them.¹⁹ Here Europe and its possessions, economies and politics, metropolises and peripheries, and empire and the nation-state emerge as what pass for qualitatively different entities in spite of their coconstruction.²⁰ One goal, then, is to make the historical sundering of empires' complementary parts more clearly analyzable in relation to mobile techniques of governance, exploitation, and even enjoyment and emotional identification.

Yet an emphasis on mobility, however descriptive of actually existing empire, seems also to require a certain temporal distance. How, we ask, does one make out movement when one is caught within that movement? Field-based ethnographic research on contemporary empire is not necessarily the same as mapping the shared logics of ostensibly competing agendas on the basis of work in colonial archives. But nor is it necessarily separate or separable from such tasks. One of our starting points is joining with E. E. Evans-Pritchard and his evocation of F. W. Maitland in asserting that anthropology must be historical, if it is to be anything.²¹ No ethnography of contemporary empire can ignore the past or claims about its influence and ongoing production in relation to presentist concerns. But how anthropologists might build upon such productive openings is something still to be worked out.

Basic to the approach we seek to put into practice across this volume's chapters are issues of availability, appearance, and thus, at least implicitly, a "problem of presence" more typically ascribed to overarching, puzzling phenomena such as religious belief and its material instantiations.²² While anthropologists have long defetishized, deconstructed, and denaturalized, it is clear that we continue to miss and misinterpret much that surrounds us, and much that we might otherwise make apparent. If empire is indeed about a blurring of boundaries that plays out alongside the determined policing of those borders, and thus involves, for example, the movements of capital and the machinations of capitalists, the love of families, the very epistemological formations brought to bear in its analysis, and the overlaps of differently conceived forms of value, how might an engaged ethnography keep up with or describe such shifts in scale and object?

Scholarship on U.S. empire, seemingly even more so than in many other areas of political analysis, makes up a literature in formation. Newly energized in the post-9/11 period of roiling exceptions that when examined closely are not necessarily novel, and with a president who in 2016 argued that his predecessor erred by not holding onto more of Iraq's oil, anthropologists have increasingly applied an imperial framework to work on and in the United States.²³ In so doing, they bring into dialogue peoples, places, and politics long considered independent of one other and subject to particular analytic frameworks indebted to more regional debates. We are not the first to make such connections. Indeed, one pivotal earlier moment was the late 1960s/early 1970s. Among a group of scholars calling attention to U.S. empire in that time was Vine Deloria. In *Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto* (1969), Deloria mocked President Johnson's promises to Southeast Asian allies in the Vietnam War, positing them as the latest version of centuries of broken treaties the U.S. government made with American Indian groups. Out of this key moment in linking identity, territory, and empire in relation to the politics of the present, scholarship expanded into formations such as the Black Atlantic or considerations of Aztlán.²⁴ Yet such redefinition of world regions and scholarly intervention was not always approached ethnographically, or via an imperial lens. More recently, however—in ethnic studies and cultural studies, in anthropology and sociology, in history and literature—frames for investigation have once again begun to congeal around empire through genealogies both shared and specific, such that we may now return in new ways to Deloria's prescient focus on imperial connections in the face of ongoing denial.

What new questions can we raise now about colonial experiences and exchanges, about citizenship and sovereignty, by apprehending empire as a political phenomenon and analytic framework that brings together ostensibly distinct topics and peoples? A central element in this move involves claiming U.S. empire historically as a colonizing force, as Alyosha Goldstein and a group of interdisciplinary scholars do in *Formations of United States Colonialism*.²⁵ Colonialism was not solely the province of European empires. Other imperial polities were colonial as well as imperial, including the United States of America.²⁶ A colony of the United States for almost fifty years, from 1898 through 1946, the Philippines now has both an imperial and postcolonial relationship with the United States of America.²⁷ The relationship is postcolonial in its well-worn routes to and from former metropole and colony, in a linking of sensibilities and practices, and in the sense that an end of some sort was reached in the relationship. And it is imperial in that the relationship continues, not as a sort of benevolent colonialism, but

as a putatively friendly or generous form of assistance made manifest in numerous national obligations and expectations, most visibly the massive U.S. military presence in the Philippines. As Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez argues, the post-9/11 period has involved the reterritorialization of the Philippines as “an American laboratory for technologies and techniques of surveillance, discipline, and war.”²⁸ For Filipinos, the colonial period might be over, but the imperial continues. And this insight might do something to resituate our interpretations of Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte’s recent brutal, nationalistic, and U.S.-DEA-snubbing shift in illegal drug policy.²⁹

How might thinking of U.S. imperial *and* colonial formations alter contemporary approaches to belonging and political struggle for peoples of Native North America, Guam, Hawai‘i, Puerto Rico, Samoa, and beyond, including most recently, Muslim immigrants to the United States?³⁰ Could such a cross-border and imperial perspective be brought to bear more fully on class formation and labor struggle in ways that augment understandings of the making of particular working classes?³¹ Might this and other nascent strategies help social scientists, citizens, and policymakers think through experiences and histories that take shape around a U.S. military presence such as in Japan, Diego Garcia, Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, Iraq, and so many other places around the world?³² One intellectual and political move we make in this volume involves presenting scholarship from across a breadth of U.S. imperial formations—settler colonialism, overseas territories, communities throughout Latin America impacted by U.S. military and capitalist interventions, Cold War allies and enemies around the world and the post-imperial milieu they now experience, the many societies and territories around the world occupied by the U.S. military, and most recently, new forms of U.S. empire after 9/11. That we bring these together in one analytical move is especially important given the glaring omission of discussions of empire in related scholarship. Why has empire been so absent, in particular or even patterned ways, from our conversations?

Described by some as a phantom traveling in disguise, one of the many covers with which U.S. empire cloaked itself was decolonization.³³ Cold War politics, for example, married anticommunist rhetoric with new global and older, North American anti-imperialist discourses.³⁴ This period shelters forms of empire that boast most openly about its covert nature: CIA operations; innumerable unnamed political and military interventions, assassinations, and coups in corners of the globe far and wide; the development of nuclear power at home; and continuing from earlier periods, the cultivation of markets abroad; and certain nations or regions as “rent-capturing” or “nature-intensive” commodity producers.³⁵ Many such endeavors involve unofficial agents of empire who, as with European colonialism, may be

Christian missionaries, or other familiar figures of liberal humanism such as teachers, health professionals, or development workers.³⁶ Living in empire, after all, is not just something that happens elsewhere, but is rather something cultivated and normalized at home within the United States.³⁷ At the same time, this everyday life of empire provokes a questioning of the boundaries of the nation-form that mimics the uncertain yet palpable borders between individual subjects and the imperial nation-state.³⁸

In moving to apprehend distributed imperial experiences, we are indebted to scholars who have led the way in raising questions via cases that challenge the conventions of the imperial register. We think of Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease's groundbreaking volume *Cultures of US Imperialism* (1993), of Fernando Coronil's persistent pressing on questions of capitalism and imperialism across the Americas, of Ann Stoler's provocative volume *Haunted by Empire* (2006), which set the predominantly European-focused colonial studies literature in dialogue with U.S. histories of empire, the Social Science Research Council's volume *Lessons of Empire: Imperial Histories and American Power*, historical sociologist Julian Go's work on thinking through colonized political culture in the Philippines and Puerto Rico, Greg Grandin's historicization of U.S. hegemony in relation to what he describes as a long-standing development of techniques of imperial control across Latin America in *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (2006), and Alfred McCoy and Francisco Scarano's volume *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State* (2009). We understand these works in dialogue with numerous other examples of novel approaches to empire ranging from legal studies to American studies, and on to a new roster of anthropological scholarship on militarism in the present.³⁹

The above-mentioned works help lay out U.S. empire in its sprawl and its histories of denial. They thus provoke the question: What sort of empire is the North American variant? Is it even an empire? Or is this query, and its responses, yet another way of veiling the reach of imperial violence through a compartmentalization of terms and a dogged recourse to exceptionalisms?⁴⁰ Can we as ethnographers make powerful contributions to a phenomenon we cannot define? If so, how might we conduct such an investigation? And if not, shall we move to define it?

U.S. IMPERIAL FORMATIONS

There is no single modality of U.S. empire. That is, there is no unitary form or even genealogy of U.S. empire, but instead a series of chronological and coeval imperial formations. If we consider empires to be plural, and to rest on

different series of moving and even contradictory parts, then U.S. empire is plural in the most simple of senses: it is composed of plural forms, strategies, justifications, and disguises. This is an empire in place, one in which settler colonialism obscures the very ground of imperial expansion in the form of the fifty states of the United States of America. It is an empire abroad, one in which territories and peoples are tethered to the metropole and suspensions of sovereignty mark indelibly the Native American communities directly and territorially incorporated into it. It is a military empire, claiming space and bodies and redefining territorial sovereignty in the name of democracy and freedom. In fact, imperial technologies cultivated over the centuries are familiar to students of empires, as well as democracies, across the globe. U.S. imperial formations drew, and continue to draw, on the spread of capitalism and Christianity, on truncated possibilities for citizenship, on historiographic rewrites of particular political moments, and on a clunky flexibility, not so much agile in form as adept in distraction, and thus skilled in redirecting narrative, attention, and desire. The United States is an empire still unfolding, with populations both colonial and imperial, in a world supposedly decolonized and postcolonial. Today's U.S. empire is neither singular nor past, but instead persists, continuing to incorporate new peoples and practices while leaving behind others, in ruins.

Our volume's organizational logic is both chronological and thematic, designed to establish the diffuse and discrete parts of U.S. empire as imperial and linked. This is thus an exercise in making U.S. empire recognizable and easy to think, albeit in new ways. We start with "Settlement, Sentiment, Sovereignty," and essays on issues of settler colonialism, new indigenous demands, and the empire that will not go away. From here we move to "Colonialism by Any Other Name" and discussions of the territories of 1898 of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Samoa. Colonial in another era, these polities and their residents remain imperial, though not directly incorporated into the United States as was Hawai'i.

War, Christianity, and capitalism have been central to U.S. imperial formations from the beginning. Our next section, "Temporality, Proximity, Dispersion," explores these and other technologies of imperialism with essays on mining in South America, Korean Christian proselytization in the Muslim world, Cold War empire, and time as an imperial standard. Making the world safe for U.S. corporate and government interests is the job of the military. It is a job it has long done without apology, and yet with sometimes devastating repercussions at home and abroad. The next section, "Military Promises," takes an ethnographic approach to military empire, including the semantics and wordplay involved in military operations and service. "Residue, Rumors, Remnants" next brings us to questions of an aftermath of empire that is not

quite over, via contemporary explorations of the Korean War, CIA involvement in the Tibetan resistance movement, the Iran-Contra War, and persistent U.S. interventions in Latin America. The final section is “9/11, the War on Terror, and the Return of Empire,” in which we directly confront subjects newly recognized as imperial: Muslim youth, Cambodian refugees, working-class white hunters in New Jersey, and political prisoners in the Global War on Terror. From settler colonialism to Guantánamo, the volume covers the pliant reach of U.S. empire, and does so through a methodological and theoretical commitment to ethnography demonstrated in each of its chapters.

Settlement, Sentiment, Sovereignty

Living within empire is not a singular experience. Of all North American peoples, however, indigenous peoples of what is now the United States have lived with the longest duration and closest proximity to U.S. empire. What are the effects of this duration and proximity? For the Osage, Jean Dennison shows that imperial authority works through both structural and affective forces. Osage modes of relations and governance are entangled with imperial ones in ways that foreclose alternative forms and futures. Writing a Constitution, managing a mineral estate trust, trusting in the familiar, determining who is and is not Osage, and even what such a determination means, all reverberate with a fear cultivated over generations. This is a fear, Dennison claims, that is deeply rooted through domestication and discipline in which the language available to speak back to empire shifts over time. Claims to sovereignty return, and rights discourse is appropriated by colonizers, as J. Kēhaulani Kauanui demonstrates in the case of Hawai‘i. There, New Right activists work in racist ways against the Hawaiian sovereignty movement, deploying a form of what Kauanui, building on the work of Renato Rosaldo, calls “imperial resentment.” What drives resentment among these conservative activists, and what does that resentment perform in relation to national politics? Discourses of U.S. exceptionalism herald not only the desirability of association with the United States, but also a long-standing refusal to see Hawai‘i as a “site of ongoing colonial and racial domination.” Instead, Hawai‘i appears as “part of” the United States, a designation which dismisses the imperial in favor of the shared and the codified. It is, after all, a right.

Nonetheless, the rights of settler societies are not those of indigenous societies. Plowing through existing boundaries and communities, rewriting a history of conquest as one of discovery, and declaring an imperial society to be one of immigrants—these are the rights of settlers. This is true in both Canada and the United States of America, as experienced by the Kahnawake Mohawk and other peoples whose indigenous lands precede imperial

boundaries. Building in part on Patrick Wolfe's scholarship, and joining Kauanui in refusing to reduce indigenous difference to a racial logic, Audra Simpson contends that the operations and secrets of dispossession that are part of settler colonialism are persistent structures, not onetime events. The imperial work of keeping indigenous sovereignty in the past tense is ongoing, and is troubled by indigenous peoples' insistence in the present that they are indigenous and not just Canadian or American. As Simpson shows from the standoff at Oka to the residential schools' sexual abuse scandal to the need to perform forgiveness in the face of imperial apology, this is life lived through an "idiom of pain" that rejects the suggestion that the forms of settlement and attendant political technologies that have produced the United States present liberal, representation-based resolutions to historical violence.

Colonialism by Any Other Name

Pain is often at the heart of empire. If colonialism creates certain sorts of subjects, colonial discourses pathologize them in certain ways—the lazy, indolent native, for example, or ideas of poverty, lack of ambition, and addiction. In the case of colonialism denied, as Adriana Garriga-López argues for Puerto Rico, drug addiction is a part of the island's colonial history. This is a history not located only on the island, but also in the well-worn routes connecting Puerto Rico to the U.S. East Coast and its illegal as well as corporate-led drug markets. Yet an ability to narrate this history, as well as possibilities for independence, is not held back by addiction. It is not necessarily drugs in one's system that shut down narrative coherence, but the indeterminacy of a status neither independent nor fully incorporated. In this light, Garriga-López asks whether numbness to empire might be a strategy of resistance. What possibilities exist for Puerto Ricans to engage the political in the neither foreign nor domestic space of the "oldest colony in the world"? Ambivalence, a register found not only in addiction, might be one available strategy.

Waiting is a well-honed practice of imperial subjects. Waiting for change, waiting for something better, waiting for independence. As an element of decolonial praxis, Melissa Rosario suggests that at times Puerto Rican activists locate freedom in the apparent banality of waiting, developing anti-imperialist politics through individual autonomy and a valorization of process as a critique of expected forms of resistance. In the case of activists squatting on a beach slated for private ownership, activism "requires comfort with not-knowing, and not-deciding what the solution may be before arriving." This is a protest composed not out of, but in the experience of the banal, of still-undetermined everyday life in a beachside camp. Here, squatting in empire takes form as a passage that opens up an ambivalent but persistent call to re-

claim territory and time. Such structures of feeling are found across U.S. territories. American Samoa, for example, shares issues of deferred possibilities and the particular pains of becoming certain sorts of subjects of U.S. empire.

What does empire look and feel like in “American” Samoa? Fa’anofo Lisacaire Uperesa contends that neither macroanalyses nor surface-level perspectives reveal “how empire is sustained in and through nonstate activities and micropractices of the body.” Turning to an ethnography of football, she asks how capitalism and colonialism collude to produce an unexpected range of imperial figures in the form of football coaches and clinics. Training for empire might be supported by different interests—Christian, humanitarian, community—all maneuvering within a tight, but never simple, space of imperialism. Samoans serve empire on the football field, or by performing exceptionalism through a cultivation of a certain type of masculine body. In the postcolonial Philippines, imperial service is performed through similarly exceptional skills, in this case, the ability to speak English in a U.S.-friendly, and thus recognizable, affective register. In fact, Jan Padios argues that some seven decades after the end of direct U.S. rule in the Philippines, Filipinos are “still suspended . . . within U.S. imperialism.” Call center labor epitomizes this continuing relationship as desired qualities such as a certain accent or an ability to perform compassion are linked to both modern Americana *and* the ability to be oneself, to be Filipino. The creativity and exceptionalism—and thus, strangely enough, the recognizability—of the Filipino subject or the Samoan one or the Puerto Rican one “underwrites U.S. imperialism” in an important way, and has since at least 1898.

Temporality, Proximity, Dispersion

The technologies of empire are no surprise: naming, mapping, converting, conquering, extracting, rewriting, recalibrating. They are not new, but instead shared and inherited across empires, generated in moments of comparison and competition within and across imperial formations. For example, U.S. empire and its reach stretch through multinational corporations, across the Americas, to Mexico and Central America, and on to Suriname and Maroon communities. There, fieldwork among the descendants of escaped slaves recognized as indigenous peoples of the Amazon by both the Dutch colonial state and the United Nations today permits Olívia Maria Gomes da Cunha to write an ethnographic history of Ndyuka Maroons in Moengo, Suriname, as a formation drawn into, and yet capable of mobilizing in a very different vein, colonial activities as well as U.S. imperial history. Maroons drawn originally to Moengo by Dutch and U.S. bauxite mining, like their descendants today, conceptualized the arrival from afar of an extractive industry not as a

circumscribed event, but as part of their own, ongoing reconfigurations of landscape, life, and spirits. Reflecting on such divergent ontologies, Gomes da Cunha's ethnographic vantage point mitigates against both a facile enrollment of Maroon histories into an ostensibly larger, global history of empire and an anthropological erection of a "radical opposition between the geometric, disciplinary, and colonial model of Moengo and the spatiotemporal configurations of place in which spirits, kin, non-kin, and other agents dialogue with each other." Even now, so many years later, the territorializations that accompany and fill in empire in Suriname are not just about geography or spatial relations. Instead, Gomes da Cunha contends, they remain a sanction as well as an occupation of agency and of possible modes of existence and enunciation that resist the totality of U.S. empire.

Imperial efforts to shape and order populations are often undertaken by imperial proxies, such as influential capitalists. Yet of the many individuals and groups who have claimed to act on behalf of U.S. and European empires, one of the most persistent are Christian missionaries. But are all missionaries acting as imperial proxies? Ju Hui Judy Han contends that U.S. empire serves as catalyst for Korean evangelical Christianity via a Cold War connection that grounds a certain sort of Korean Christian international vision. This is not just about religion. Han argues instead that the concept of "proxy" falls short in that Korean evangelicals are not seeking solely to carry Christianity to new domains in a sort of postimperial service to U.S. expansion. Instead, Korean Christians' goals extend to their own "neocolonial or subimperial ambitions." These goals include geopolitical reach, capitalist gain, humanitarian service, and a proselytizing heavily directed against Islam. As such, a twenty-first-century collusion between evangelical Christianity and U.S. imperialism offers a wide-angle lens for considering the spaces opened for an at times surprising array of imperial actors. Korean religious designs provide an especially important node for considering such imperial historicity, as well as the almost mythic accounts of good, evil, and global redemption that seemingly do so much to motivate action.

Was the Cold War imperial? Occupying historically the space of European decolonization and post-World War II realignment, the Cold War is commonly portrayed as a battle between two great powers—the USA and the USSR. According to Heonik Kwon, such a portrayal misses two key components: the plural and the global. Kwon identifies these as (1) local-level, ethnographic experiences of the Cold War rather than just political or historical narratives and (2) experiences of the Cold War beyond Europe. His resultant reassessment of the Cold War through ancestor worship rituals in both Korea and Vietnam aims to provide an ethnographic rendering of U.S. empire, and to raise questions about the social orders, not only the geopolitical ones, of the

Cold War then and now. Kwon's optic gathers together the imperial and the postcolonial in order to consider local efforts "to come to terms with the ruins and enduring wounds" of U.S. empire during the Cold War.

The "post" to U.S. empire is coterminous with the imperial. In an example of the sorts of braidings that, contradictorily, so often accompany moments of imperial aphasia, many of the chapters in this volume suggest that temporal periods may be inhabited simultaneously. Perhaps unsurprisingly, one domain in which contests over empires' temporalities come to the fore is time itself, or more specifically, the setting of "standard" time by means of an international project dominated by the United States via satellites, GPS, and computer networks and examined ethnographically by Kevin Birth. Birth argues that the politics of actual time reveal important facets of the scientific infrastructure of contemporary U.S. empire. Aligning his research among U.S. government scientists with Prasenjit Duara's notion of a "new imperialism" in today's historical moment, Birth finds ethnographic evidence of complicity and coordination, as well as political divergences, in the science underlying U.S. approaches to the time standards so important to satellite, and thus financial as well as missile and cellular, technologies. The technologies of empire, then, are as important as the institutions; the one requires the other.

Military Promises

The U.S. empire is a military empire. Has there ever been a time this was not so? From the earliest days of settler colonialism on to the concrete lines and video cameras of Guantánamo Bay Detention Camp today, this militarism has taken different forms. David Vine's work illustrates how, and with what local effects, an extensive network of military bases grounds U.S. empire. This territorial model is not so much a new structure as a return to an earlier one, including that used by earlier European empires. In light of the spiraling productivity of never-implemented colonial blueprints, of colonizing schemes gone array, and of impossible attempts to separate out people and places, none of this can be taken as given: not the logics of bases such as Diego Garcia, nor the experiences of displaced and indigenous peoples such as the Chagossians, nor the contradictions of the U.S. government officials involved in administering and planning such bases. A politics of concealment and linguistic sleight of hand often accompanies U.S. military bases overseas. In Manta, Ecuador, Erin Fitz-Henry was repeatedly told "there is no U.S. military base in Manta." In fact, "legally" there was no base in Manta, since the United States rented space from the Ecuadorian military. As Fitz-Henry argues, this was strategic ambiguity at work, a geopolitical "interpretive gap

exploited by agents of empire.” In spite of the U.S. troops and material, there was no U.S. military base on Ecuador’s north coast. Such denial and word-play have purchase in imperial politics and military theaters.

What sort of institution is the military? One might approach the U.S. military ethnographically as an institution of “hierarchy, coercion, and obedience” in which an ironic rhetoric of choice also exists. This involves the “choice” to join, as well as the choice to leave and to choose dissent. Matthew Gutmann and Catherine Lutz argue that ideas of choice saturate U.S. discourses of citizenship, empire, and masculinity, and these play an important role in assigning particular values to military “service” to the nation, and the world. Why then, they ask, do U.S. soldiers abandon the military? What sort of moral and political crises and epiphanies arise for these lowest-level agents of the imperial military missions? The repercussions for some of the soldiers who choose to step away from empire involve a type of imperial debris, a state of cast-off being and, at times, uncanny insights.⁴¹

Residue, Rumors, Remnants

Militarized ecologies are an intrinsic, and yet thoroughly hybridized, part of empire.⁴² Generative and destructive at the same time, war wreaks havoc on the natural landscape, and empire provides a particular sort of narrative—and even presence—that accompanies these destructive processes. Drawing on the work of Rob Nixon, Eleana Kim contends that the Demilitarized Zone, or DMZ, between the Koreas is still “armed and dangerous” due to the just barely concealed presence of landmines. These lie as a material token of U.S. imperial power, and work unexpectedly to keep the peace through their “material and affective traces.” Even in its ruins, then, imperial power is efficacious, felt and feared, and generative of a range of responses including from the ethnographer. Ruined landscapes are also human ones.

Ruins offer new opportunities for action. In 1959, some Tibetans escaped the invasion and colonization of their country by Mao Zedong’s People’s Republic of China, fleeing to India, where they established a refugee community under the leadership of the Dalai Lama. Different groups mobilized to provide aid to these new refugees, including the CIA. Carole McGranahan explores the covert side of empire in assessing sympathy and sincerity in two CIA-Tibet operations: (1) a homegrown citizens’ army that fought against the Chinese People’s Liberation Army with help from the CIA, including secret training in Colorado, and (2) the American Emergency Committee for Tibetan Refugees, a CIA front operation that appeared publicly as a legitimate aid group. We cannot presume to know or to dismiss the sentiments involved in such covert humanitarianism, nor can we assign agency only to the CIA.

Instead, McGranahan argues, we need to consider how although humanitarianism “provides cover for empire,” the covert is a space that is deeply human.

“What kinds of life are possible under imperial conditions? And whose knowledge of that life counts?” Joe Bryan asks such questions in the case of Miskito former soldiers supported and then discarded by the United States during the Contra War in late twentieth-century Nicaragua. Miskito Indians are not just “indigenous peoples,” as they are often named. They are also imperial subjects who recognize and respond to the geohistorical *and* discursive power of U.S. empire, albeit from a position of marginalization and abandonment that nonetheless takes very different forms in relation to distinct locations within, or at what pass for the edges of, U.S. empire. Life in the space of imperial discard and disregard on Nicaragua’s Atlantic coast thus involves continuing efforts to activate imperial connections, even those that appear fleeting and out of reach. Such encounters with empire in the field, especially when an ethnographer is ostensibly researching something else, have become an important trope within a number of recent studies around the world. The discursive power inherent in renaming empire as anything other than *empire* here becomes relatively more important, as do the secrets and denials that have long supported U.S. imperial formations. The realization that “conspiracy disrupts this discursive economy” propels Bryan into an ethnographic account that “does not explain imperialism so much as provide pause for reflection on how knowledge of it adheres to a discursive economy that sets limits on whose knowledge counts.”

What, then, if one cannot visualize empire? In his research on Brazil’s spaceport and the circulation of accusations and disavowals of empire, Sean T. Mitchell explains that U.S. empire did not have a clear presence in his ethnographic data. In an argument reminiscent of Peter Redfield’s focus on scale and visibility in his ethnography of French rocket bases in French Guiana, Mitchell suggests that U.S. empire shape-shifted and came to impact unexpected processes and relations in hard-to-trace manners.⁴³ Specifically, U.S. imperial practices and discourses helped shape a nationalist and technocratic or military-linked paranoia about United States interference and the racial politics of Afro-Brazilian mobilization around the spaceport. Drawing on the work of Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Mitchell argues that postcolonial societies remain under the discipline of foreign entities in ways that ethnography helps us perceive as not just localized experiences, but as part of broader global epistemic conditions. In spite of, or perhaps due in part to its motility, the imperial remains a structural feature of the contemporary world system. As true of this is of places and peoples incorporated into the imperial domain outside of the United States, it also remains true in the metropole.

9/11, the War on Terror, and the Return of Empire

The events of 9/11 changed—or rendered more easily apparent—much about social power in the United States, perhaps more so for Muslim Americans than for any other group. How do Muslim youth experience everyday life in this political moment? What would it mean to put imperialism and its apperception, rather than ethnicity or religion, at the center of the story of Muslims in the contemporary United States? Drawing on ethnographic research in Silicon Valley, which is now more timely than ever, Sunaina Maira shows that Islamophobia, racism, and imperial violence at home and abroad are visible, tangible components of the lives of Muslim youth. This is not solely about being a target of empire, but also of building alliances within and against certain facets of empire. Maira argues that possibilities for political expression by Muslim youth in the United States take form around questions of empire, especially imperial intervention abroad. As such they exceed well established discourses of liberal “tolerance” and diversity that shape, as well as contain, cross-racial and interfaith affiliations. Such moments of excess beg for ethnographic analysis, for a dedication to making apparent the conjuncture of lived experience and cultural logics and political realities.⁴⁴ Here ethnography would seem to have the potential to disrupt history, to open up national amnesias about past and not-quite-past moments and the imperial subjects created within them.

Immigrants and refugees are two types of subjects produced in and by empire. Soo Ah Kwon argues that Cambodian refugees in the San Francisco Bay Area, when disciplined into a familiar imperial mode of gratitude, occupy a precarious sort of deportable citizenship. But community efforts to halt deportations connect Cambodian youth activists with other immigration activists revealing the broader scope of U.S. empire and tie Southeast Asians to the political struggles of Central Americans and others deemed “undesirable.” The imperial heartland is no easier a space to reside in than its fringes and, indeed, one of the projects of the present volume is to peer into imperial folds rather than define cores and peripheries. Through an example of how such doublings take form, Kwon documents how imperial statecraft is implicated not only in deportation regimes in the United States, but also in “producing the contexts of violence from which Southeast Asian refugees fled in the first instance.”

Soldiers and the nightly news bring war home with them too, from Vietnam and the Gulf, and from Iraq and Afghanistan. In this contemporary period, how does empire arise as a way of life in those parts of the United States usually not approached as imperial? In his research on human-animal relations among hunters of white-tail deer in New Jersey, John Collins considers how

an emotional ecology tied tightly to empire permeates the changes taking place as different classes mark land in ways that halt the efforts of the others not just to hunt, or to gather berries or hike, but also to be good people in the ways they have been trained and forced by necessity to be, for so long. “It’ll be all right,” a grandfather tells his grandson, easing the blow of a certain sort of pain. But, as Collins notes, “in an imperial United States” such an attempt at “making things ‘all right,’ or livable, rests on dislocations of violence.” Violences of history, and violences of class, can be hard to transcend. Serving one’s country, helping the less fortunate, doing good, making things right: these are not just fantasies or legitimating props put forth by people invested in that which oppresses them, but moral discourses cultivated through imperial sentiments and even potentially violent practices at home and abroad. Such hybrid and untrustworthy but nonetheless influential sentiments developed through violent and often unwanted juxtapositions—on the battlefield, in the news media, and in the space from forest to food bank—mark a nation in which many “us” and “them” groups coexist. This is part of knowing, being, and being political in a contemporary United States in which resentment too often seems to replace engagement. In response, Collins follows the hunting of deer and the exchange of meat in order to reveal how denials of codependence, and thus denials of a coconstruction of ethics and environments by people who often configure themselves as standing on opposite sides of the hunt, are themselves effects of imperial violence, especially when they promise a neat redemption from that violence.

Claiming to be singular, to be exceptional, and then to produce such exceptions, has long been part of imperial formations from England to China to the United States and beyond.⁴⁵ As academics and citizens, we seem to know this. Yet we are still learning the ways in which such exceptions are forged anew in the twenty-first century through new sorts of extraterritorial arrangements and extralegal statuses. Drawing on his research with “out of place Muslims” in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Darryl Li suggests that plural and external conceptions of sovereignty are at work in the Global War on Terror that “exceed” current anthropological theory. Given that the Global War on Terror is both everywhere and nowhere, relying on logics of circulation in moving other countries’ citizens through the well-traveled carceral routes of the post-9/11 world, U.S. “empire mobilizes multiple state sovereignties as a way of structuring and mediating unequal power relations.” Imperial subjects recognized such connections and networks early on, without waiting for theorists to catch up with them. Meeting with Abu Hamza, a detainee at the Reception Centre for Irregular Migrants outside of Sarajevo, Li finds him dressed in a bright orange *jalabiyya*, reminiscent of the orange jumpsuits prisoners at Guantánamo wear, and sporting a baseball cap with *BOSNATANAMO*

inscribed upon it. Forcibly taken from the Spanish, Guantánamo Bay became part of U.S. empire in 1898 and now hosts Muslim and other imperial prisoners in its new post-9/11 guise as GTMO. This is one return of empire that illustrates, as part of a broad historical arc, how analysis of circulation may bring into clearer view the workings of the exception, and thus the inadequacy of that exception for explaining sovereignty in an imperial system in which power is so often exercised informally, and through third-party actors.

Finally, we close the volume with an afterword—Ann Laura Stoler in conversation with Carole McGranahan on disassemblage in rethinking U.S. imperial formations. How, asks Stoler, has the delinking of territories, peoples, and practices come to define U.S. empire? Taking disassemblage as an object of inquiry reveals the relational histories that gird imperial politics. We see this for example in practices of proxy and surrogate colonialism, in the ways histories of Israel and Palestine have and have not been written, and in the framings of histories of racism and slavery in relation to capitalism but not necessarily to empire. Instead, Stoler suggests, “naming those things we’ve been educated not to see allows us to get at the tensions of certain moments.” Naming directly challenges denial, those denials of imperial actors as well as those of scholars, including our own expectations of what empire is and does.

CONTINGENCY AND CONCLUSION: A CAUTION

In setting out the problems and questions above, we have suggested not simply the importance of understanding empire, but the need to expand what counts as empire. Yet this involves certain dangers. Principal among these is a repetition of an earlier moment in which anthropological knowledge about putative Others was understood as but a means of improving the lives and perspectives of those within the metropole. While a duplication of such a perspective seems unlikely, or at least undesirable, in studying U.S. empire we do risk folding unrelated or particular struggles into an umbrella that is already too powerful, if still relatively undertheorized and understudied (at least in terms of direct study). But this points to some of the challenges at hand: If, as historian Greg Grandin posits, struggles in Latin America served to develop strategies later deployed by the United States elsewhere in the world, including at home, then how does one begin to understand such contacts and confrontations as anything but components of U.S. empire?⁴⁶ Here our study of empire touches upon familiar concerns enunciated in subaltern studies’ critiques of colonial power in that, just as writing histories that are more than particular instantiations of a European, Christian, universal history presents a new series of conundrums, so too does expanding what counts as empire

without adding to the power of imperial formations.⁴⁷ This is a fear, and a challenge, that sticks with all contributors to this volume as we consider the details of, and possibilities brought forth by, an expanded ethnography of empire.

NOTES

- 1 Chang, *The Color of the Land*; Kaplan, "Left Alone with America." We emphasize, however, that the widespread imperial myopia we associate here with U.S. claims about the United States is often punctured by historical, and even popular, analyses from different world regions, especially Latin America. See, for example, Escobar, "Beyond the Third World."
- 2 Stoler, *Haunted by Empire*.
- 3 Said, *Orientalism*. For an influential example of pioneering anthropological engagements, see especially Asad, *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter*.
- 4 Dirks, *Colonialism and Culture*; Richard Price, *The Convict and the Colonel*; Redfield, *Space in the Tropics*; Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire*; and Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power*.
- 5 Cohn, *An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays*; Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge*; Comaroff and Comaroff, *Ethnography and the Historical Imagination*; Dirks, *Colonialism and Culture*; Etienne and Leacock, *Women and Colonization*; Stoler, "Rethinking Colonial Categories"; Stoler, "Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers"; Taussig, "Culture of Terror—Space of Death"; Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*.
- 6 Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*; Stoler, "On Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty"; Stoler and Bond, "Refractions off Empire." On empire and temporality, see especially Wilder, *Freedom Time*; Scott, *Conscripts of Modernity* and *Omens of Adversity*; as well as Stoler, "The Rot Remains."
- 7 Diamond et al., "Anthropologists Speak Out on Nuclear Disarmament"; Frese and Harrell, *Anthropology and the United States Military*; Gusterson, "Anthropology and Militarism," "Project Minerva and the Militarization of Anthropology"; Gough, "Anthropology and Imperialism," "New Proposals for Anthropologists," "Anthropology and Imperialism' Revisited"; Lucas Jr., *Anthropologists in Arms*; McFate, "Anthropology and Counterinsurgency"; Nader, "The Phantom Factor"; David H. Price, *Cold War Anthropology* and "Interlopers and Invited Guests"; Weltfish, "Racism, Colonialism, and World Peace." For sociology, see Steinmetz, *Sociology and Empire*.
- 8 On the Cold War and Korea, see especially David H. Price, *Threatening Anthropology*; and Wax, *Anthropology at the Dawn of the Cold War*. Especially salient works related to the Vietnam War are Berreman, "Is Anthropology Alive?"; Sahlins, "The Destruction of Conscience in Vietnam"; and Wakin, *Anthropology Goes to War*. For more recent conflicts, ranging from Grenada to Iraq and Afghanistan, see especially

- Gonzalez, *Anthropologists in the Public Sphere and American Counterinsurgency*; Network of Concerned Anthropologists, *The Counter-Counterinsurgency Manual*; and Sluka, "Curiouser and Curiouser."
- 9 Lutz, "Empire Is in the Details."
 - 10 On U.S. geography and its imperial entanglements, see especially N. Smith, *American Empire*.
 - 11 Rabinow et al., *Designs for an Anthropology of the Contemporary*.
 - 12 Stoler, "Developing Historical Negatives."
 - 13 Stoler, "Developing Historical Negatives."
 - 14 Stoler, *Duress*; Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life*.
 - 15 Asad, *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter*; Comaroff and Comaroff, *Ethnography and the Historical Imagination*; Dirks, *Colonialism and Culture*; Cooper and Stoler, *Tensions of Empire*.
 - 16 Harrison, *Decolonizing Anthropology*.
 - 17 Stoler and McGranahan, "Introduction: Refiguring Imperial Terrains."
 - 18 On the seductiveness, and importance to modern politics, of the representation of knowledge production as a hermeneutics of depth, see Collins, *Revolt of the Saints*.
 - 19 D. Nelson, *Reckoning*; Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire*; Stoler, *Haunted by Empire*; Stoler, "On Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty"; Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State*.
 - 20 Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic*; Coronil, "Beyond Occidentalism"; Wilder, *Freedom Time*.
 - 21 Evans-Pritchard, "Social Anthropology."
 - 22 Engelke, *A Problem of Presence*; Richard Price, *Travels with Tooy*.
 - 23 Maskovsky and Susser, "Introduction: Rethinking America."
 - 24 Influential works that mark and add to such redefinition of scholarly interests, political mobilization, and geographic areas include Anaya and Lomelli, *Aztlán*; and Gilroy, *Black Atlantic*.
 - 25 A. Goldstein, *Formations of United States Colonialism*.
 - 26 Stoler, McGranahan, and Perdue, *Imperial Formations*.
 - 27 On the Philippines and U.S. imperialism, see Anderson, *Colonial Pathologies*; Choy, *Empire of Care*; David, "The Sexual Fields of Empire"; Espiritu, *Homeward Bound*; Go and Foster, *The American Colonial State in the Philippines*; Kramer, *The Blood of Government*; Manalansan, *Global Divas*; Rafael, *White Love*, "Translation, American English, and the National Insecurities of Empire," and "Translation in Wartime"; Rosaldo, "Imperialist Nostalgia"; Tadiar, *Fantasy-Production and Things Fall Away*.
 - 28 V. Gonzalez, *Securing Paradise*, 219.
 - 29 For a critical history of the importance to U.S. empire of efforts to control flows of illegal drugs, see Reiss, *We Sell Drugs*.
 - 30 On colonialism and native peoples of North America, see especially Byrd, *The Transit of Empire*; Cattelino, *High Stakes* and "Anthropologies of the United States"; Dennison, *Colonial Entanglement*; A. Simpson, *Mohawk Interruptus*. Diaz, "Deliberating 'Liberation Day,'" is a fascinating analysis of politics in Guam, and Imada, *Aloha America*, and Kauanui, *Hawaiian Blood* and "Colonialism in Equality," offer

- important contributions in relation to the United States' fiftieth state. Meanwhile, Derby, "Imperial Secrets," and Silver, "'Then I Do What I Want,'" offer critical perspectives on Puerto Rico as a territory, while Salesa, "Samoa's Half-Castes and Some Frontiers of Comparison," extends a complementary analysis to American Samoa. For valuable perspectives on issues faced by Muslim and Arab Americans, see especially Abraham, Howell, and Shryock, *Arab Detroit 9/11*; Maira, "Belly Dancing, Arab-Face, Orientalist Feminism, and U.S. Empire" and *Missing*; Mamdani, "Good Muslim, Bad Muslim"; Rana, *Terrifying Muslims*; Shryock, "Cracking Down on Diaspora"; and Shryock and Howell, "New Images of Arab Detroit."
- 31 Chomsky, *Linked Labor Histories*; Rodney, *A History of the Guyanese Working People*.
 - 32 For Japan, Frühstück, *Uneasy Warriors*; Inoue, *Okinawa and the U.S. Military*; and C. Nelson, *Dancing with the Dead*. On Diego Garcia, see Vine, *Island of Shame*. For Korea, Höhn and Moon, *Over There*; J. Lee, *Service Economies*; and Oppenheim, "On the Locations of Korean War and Cold War Anthropology." For Vietnam, Espiritu, *Body Counts*; Kwon, *After the Massacre and Ghosts of War in Vietnam*; and Schwenkel, "Recombinant History" and "From John McCain to Abu Ghraib." Gutmann and Lutz, *Breaking Ranks*, deals with the trauma and the traumatic history of more recent conflicts in Iraq.
 - 33 Ho, "Empire through Diasporic Eyes"; Stoler, *Haunted by Empire*.
 - 34 Louis and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Decolonization"; McGranahan, "Empire Out-of-Bounds"
 - 35 On interventions, Gill, *The School of the Americas*; and McGranahan, *Arrested Histories* and "Truth, Fear, and Lies." On nuclear development, Gusterson, *Nuclear Rites*; and Masco, *The Theater of Operations* and *The Nuclear Borderlands*. Mitman and Erickson, on markets, "Latex and Blood." On ground rent, oil, the Venezuelan nation-state, and imperial inequality, Coronil, *The Magical State* and "Towards a Critique of Globalcentrism."
 - 36 Collins, "'But What if I Should Need to Defecate in Your Neighborhood, Madame?"; Cueto, *Cold War, Deadly Fevers*; J. Han, "Missionary"; McAlister, "What Is Your Heart For?"
 - 37 Feldman, "On Cultural Anaesthesia," "Securocratic Wars of Public Safety"; Foster, *Under Construction*; Friedman, *Covert Capital*; E. Kim, *Adopted Territory*; Lutz, *Homefront*; Nugent, "Knowledge and Empire"; Wainwright, *Geopiracy*.
 - 38 Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism* and *Black Skin, White Masks*.
 - 39 See Burnett and Marshall, *Foreign in a Domestic Sense* in relation to critical legal studies. For American studies as a discipline, some of the more helpful, recent works include Campomanes, "New Formations of Asian American Studies and the Question of U.S. Imperialism"; Fujitani, White, and Yoneyama, *Perilous Memories*; J. Kim, *Ends of Empire*; Rafael, "Translation, American English, and the National Insecurities of Empire"; and Shigematsu and Camacho, *Militarized Currents*. And, finally, on militarization, see especially Borneman, "Responsibility after Military Intervention"; Forte, *The New Imperialism*, vol. 1; Kelly et al., *Anthropology and Global Counterinsurgency*; Kosek, "Ecologies of Empire"; Lutz, "Making War at Home in the United States" and *The Bases of Empire*; and Robben, *Iraq at a Distance*.

- 40 Stoler, *Haunted by Empire* and “On Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty.”
- 41 See Stoler, “Imperial Debris,” and the collected essays in Stoler, *Imperial Debris*.
- 42 Kosek, “Ecologies of Empire.”
- 43 Redfield, *Space in the Tropics*.
- 44 Da Col and Graeber, “Foreword.”
- 45 Stoler and McGranahan, “Introduction: Refiguring Imperial Terrain.”
- 46 Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre and Empire’s Workshop*.
- 47 Guha and Spivak, *Selected Subaltern Studies*.

I

Settlement,
Sentiment,
Sovereignty

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Empires take shape through a series of entanglements. These ties manifest as strategic policies, premeditated institutions, and lingering affective flows that connect peoples, senses of materiality, and politics in irreducible and irreconcilable ways. The heterogeneous emotions generated by living within empire both mark and perpetuate the unequal power dynamics at play across the globe. Such affective linkages, while far less traceable than the policies and institutions that scholars usually refer to as imperialism, are no less powerful in giving empire authority.¹ As a result, we must understand empire not only as a power structure constituted through governmental policies and planned wars, but also as an entity kept in place by emotional disruptions.

Given both the duration and proximity of their experiences with the empire of the United States, Native nations provide particularly keen insights into the nature of such experiences.² Using the Osage Nation as a lens, this chapter demonstrates how the affective processes of empire are at work in the space of settler colonialism in the twenty-first century. Patrick Wolfe describes this process of settler colonialism as “an inclusive, land centered project that coordinates a comprehensive range of agencies, from the metropolitan centre to the frontier encampment, with a view to eliminating Indigenous societies.”³ Elimination, however, is just one of the many strategies at work within empire building that operate to redirect bodies, emotions, processes, structures, and laws. Within empire, affective flows are often directed toward the construction of a particular entity as central, federal, and ubiquitous.

Specifically, this chapter demonstrates how empire fosters a deep-seated pessimism about what change will bring, leading some Osages to trust in the current status quo, no matter how problematic it may be. Nowhere were such concerns more evident than in the 2006 Osage Nation constitutional discussions about the Osage Mineral Estate Trust. U.S. Code Title 25 defines the Osage Mineral Estate as “any right, title, or interest in any oil, gas, coal, or other mineral held by the United States in trust for the benefit of the Osage Tribe of Indians under section 3 of the Osage Tribe Allotment Act.” This

notion of a trust relationship between the U.S. government and American Indian nations is a particularly powerful entanglement of empire, worthy of further interrogation. It signals the way in which the government of the United States has positioned itself as “protector” of American Indian nations even as it is often their worst enemy.⁴

My central contention is that the imperial legacy of failed trusteeship creates distrust well beyond its source. The Osage Mineral Estate Trust has generated a legacy of cynicism so deep that when the colonial mandate for full U.S. control is removed, some Osages question the wisdom of increased Osage control. Trust, then, is more than a federal policy; it is an affective cord that works to bind an empire together. Signaling this dual movement of entrenching American authority and inculcating cynicism throughout indigenous governance, I will investigate how *(dis)trust* manifests within Osage politics in the twenty-first century. (Dis)trust thus signals not only how the federal government has continually failed its trust responsibility, but also how it has fostered wider pessimism, all the while maintaining the ultimate authority as trustee.

In following the debates concerning the Osage Mineral Estate, this chapter will mark the transformations at play within empire building, as well as the prospects that have been rendered almost unimaginable. In highlighting the affective manifestations present in several Osage Government Reform Meetings during the writing of the constitution of 2006 and the online blogs following the passage of the constitution, this chapter focuses an ethnographic eye on the entanglements of empire. This investigation illustrates that empire is not an organized or even wholly deliberate master plan, as much as it is a series of loosely associated and deeply layered interactions that disrupt politics in ways that limit their ability to challenge a particular axis of power.⁵ Looking at empire as a disruption of resources, desires, bodies, loyalties, and securities can shed light on how the United States continues to maintain authority in the twenty-first century and, perhaps, even what is needed to disrupt this hegemony.

“YOU ALL STAY OUT OF IT”

The apprehension in the car was palpable as several of the reform commissioners, their lawyer, and I made the trek out to Grayhorse, the most remote Osage community, in January 2006. I was engaged in research on the Osage Nation reform process taking place in 2004–6 and I traveled almost everywhere with reform commissioners. While I got to hide behind my camera during the community meetings, they had to sit center stage, spearheading

the citizenship and governmental reform process. The Grayhorse Indian camp was known not just for its isolation, but also for its inhabitants' fierce independence and skepticism, especially concerning issues of Osage governance. In the late nineteenth century, they were the last of the three Osage districts to settle on the Osage reservation, making the migration from the Kansas lands only with great trepidation.⁶ Grayhorse community meetings were frequently contentious, often involving circular discussions that left little opportunity for finding common ground.

Additionally, this was the first community meeting to be held after the referendum vote of 2005, where all but one issue was decided by a large margin. From 2004 to 2006 the Osage Nation went through a government and citizenship reform process that led to the implementation of the Osage Nation Constitution of 2006. After the Osage Tribal Council (OTC) successfully lobbied the United States Congress to pass Public Law 108-431, "to reaffirm the inherent sovereign rights of the Osage Tribe to determine its membership and form of government," they appointed ten Oklahoman Osage Shareholders to the Osage Government Reform Commission (OGRC) to survey the Osage people and write a constitution. In their efforts to gain citizen input into the writing process, the OGRC held over forty community meetings around Oklahoma, Texas, and California; circulated a questionnaire; operated a web page with feedback forums; solicited individual Osage input; and held a referendum vote.

By January 12, 2006, the most contentious remaining issue the OGRC had to deal with was how the Osage Mineral Estate was going to be incorporated into the new government. For the Osage annuitants, or those individuals holding a share/headright in the nationally owned Osage Mineral Estate, this created consternation. Some Osage annuitants were deeply skeptical of any change to the original 1906 Osage Allotment Act (34 Stat. 539), arguing throughout the community meetings that the Osage Mineral Estate should be left alone. A desire to leave things alone, however, was at odds with the desires of a majority of Osages—annuitants and nonannuitants alike—who argued that nonannuitants be allowed to vote in Osage Nation elections. There was no way to include nonannuitants and not change the structure of the Osage government, especially because annuitants did not want nonannuitants having a say in Mineral Estate affairs. General Osage governance and the Osage Mineral Estate had to be separated, thus changing the current structure.

When we walked into the aluminum-sided community building in the center of Grayhorse, we were greeted by the stares of two dozen citizens who were already waiting for the meeting to begin. The long and narrow room was filled with tables and folding chairs facing a single table, reserved for the

commissioners, at the front of the room. Behind the audience, the kitchen sat dark and empty, evidence that the meeting was held with little advance notice. Unlike the earlier meetings, when the commissioners went to great lengths to encourage participation, which included offering elaborately catered meals by well-known Osage cooks, this round of meetings had few such attractions and was solely intended to address the vocal minority of annuitants who had concerns about the proposed constitution.

From the beginning of the meeting, it was clear that the apprehension felt on the long drive across the reservation was well-founded. At Grayhorse, the concern surrounding the future of the Osage Mineral Estate took on even more force, with tensions reaching a peak. One middle-aged annuitant from Fairfax, the nearest town to Grayhorse, grew visibly upset, repeatedly pounding his fist on the table and yelling, "It's ours!," asserting that all of the natural resources on the Osage Reservation, and even the casino gaming proceeds, belonged to the Osage annuitants alone. Even though all of the commissioners were annuitants, he continued, yelling: "You all need to stay out of the Mineral Estate. You all stay out of it. You have no business in there." This stopped the room cold, leaving the reform commissioners unsure of how to proceed.

If not always as visible as in this moment, concerns that the new Osage Nation Constitution was going to do something to harm the Osage Mineral Estate were a constant roadblock throughout the Osage reform process of 2004–6, and continue to plague the Osage Nation to this day. While U.S. Public Law 108–431 acknowledged the Osage Nation's ability to create an entirely separate structure for governance from what had been imposed on the Osages for a hundred years, it could not erase the affective forces of empire still at play in the Mineral Estate. The policies undergirding U.S. empire work not just to insist that the United States has ultimate authority over the entire territory, but also to instill distrust so potent that moving toward self-control feels impossible. Such change is understood as a serious threat to existing Osage rights, authority, and income. This, then, is one of the real potencies of empire. While the structures themselves can be challenged and overturned, the (dis)trust accompanying empire is much more deeply rooted.

"AT ONE TIME WE OWNED EVERY INCH OF THIS GROUND—
AND NOW WE HAVE HARDLY ANYTHING"

Throughout the reform process, most discussions of what an Osage Nation future should entail devolved into discussions about ongoing settler colonial processes. Specifically, a majority of the community meetings, no matter what

their intended focus was, were spent discussing the Mineral Estate, with the commissioners repeatedly assuring those in attendance that their headrights were protected by the legislation itself. These declarations could never quite calm vocal annuitants, however, making it clear that these tensions were not just about the right to profit from the Mineral Estate. After almost a hundred years of colonial attempts at eliminating the Mineral Estate, vocal annuitants were convinced that any change would be detrimental to their livelihoods, the Osage Mineral Estate, and even the Osage Nation.

Cora Jean Jech, an annuitant who would in 2009 be the first plaintiff in a court case challenging the authority of the 2006 Osage Constitution over the Mineral Estate, frequently expressed her concern about the new government. During the question-and-answer period at the beginning of one government reform meeting, she drew a strong connection between past encroachments and the current reform effort. She argued: "There are several Osages that think that there is a plot going on to try to get the Minerals from underneath the Estate. [They think] that the [new Osage] government will actually end up with the Minerals and it will no longer be ours. [They think] that it will be turned over to somebody else because it goes back to greed. When you look at this land all around us and think at one time we owned every inch of this ground—and now we have hardly anything."⁷ Referencing the greed that motivated settler colonial encroachment on Osage land, Jech here demonstrates powerfully the way (dis)trust works to stymie change.

To understand the logic of Jech's statements, it is vital to understand U.S. territorial and political expansion in the context of the Osage Nation. The U.S. government has continually made promises that Osage lands would remain intact, only to renege on its agreements, including most recently in the federal courts' denial that the Osage reservation continues to exist despite the existence of no federal legislation terminating it.⁸ From 1808 until 1839, there were seven treaties under which the Osage Nation lost control of over 151 million acres of land in Oklahoma, Kansas, Missouri, and Arkansas, receiving only minimal compensation.⁹ Loss of land, however, was just a small part of the U.S. empire's disruption of the Osage Nation.

The history of the Osage Mineral Estate itself marks a key disruption, especially its entanglement with corporate interests, which frequently work in tandem with empire. Oil production on Osage land began at the end of the nineteenth century, with a blanket lease to the entire reservation going to Kansas railroad man Henry Foster and his brother Edwin in 1896. The Osage agent H. B. Freeman, the Office of Indian Affairs (OIA), and Foster negotiated the deal. Only after the fact did the governing body of the 1881 Osage Constitution, the Osage National Council, put it to a vote. The initial lease passed by the narrow margin of 7 to 6, but a little over a year later the National

Council voted to annul the contract. William Pollock, Freeman's successor as Osage agent, overrode the National Council seven months later, reinstating the contract.¹⁰ Given the competitive advantage lost with the blanket lease, it is hard to understand the OIA motivation here as anything but an example of early corporate lobbying, not unlike what happened later across Indian Country, and what continues to happen across the globe.¹¹

During the allotment era (1887–1934), the United States government claimed control over almost a hundred million acres of American Indian land and, perhaps most problematically, encouraged white settlement directly within indigenous territories. Unlike other American Indian nations, the Osages were able to negotiate a unique deal. While they agreed to allow the allotment of the surface of the Osage reservation, the subsurface—including rights to oil, natural gas, and other minerals—was left in the communal ownership of the Osage Tribe. The most common narrative about this unique allotment is that Chief Bigheart was able to negotiate a better deal because the Osage Nation had purchased their reservation land and understood the importance of collective ownership. It is also likely that the oil lobby played a key role in preventing the allotment of the subsurface.¹² In the congressional hearings concerning allotment, they specifically discussed this unique arrangement, which included reference to both keeping costs low for the oil company and sharing the wealth equally among all Osages.¹³

As historian Alexandra Harmon points out, the argument of equity does not make sense given the strict cut-off date for the Osage allotment roll of 1906, which was used to determine who was eligible to vote, receive a land allotment, and a quarterly payment from the minerals proceeds.¹⁴ In the last hundred years, the Osage Mineral Estate has created a deep divide between Osage “haves” and “have-nots.” Osage descendants born after July 1, 1907, were not only landless and excluded from the proceeds of the communally owned Mineral Estate—which was distributed equally among all those listed on the roll of 1906—but they were also given no say in Osage politics. Tying Osage citizenship to the Mineral Estate created high tensions among Osage descendants, thwarted earlier attempts at reorganization, created many obstacles during the 2004–6 reform process, and greatly distracted the elected officials of the newly reconstituted Osage Nation. This history also worked to instill in many Osages a deep-seated concern that others, whether Osages or non-Osages, were going to take their annuity check away.

Like many legacies of empire, the creation of the Osage Minerals Estate had an impact far beyond shifting structures of power. My grandfather, George Orville Dennison, was born eighteen months before the July 1, 1907, cut-off date, and so he received three 160-acre parcels of land within the Osage reservation, a 1/2,230th share of all monies produced from the Mineral Estate, and,

when he turned twenty-one, a vote in Osage elections.¹⁵ His two brothers, who were born after the 1907 cut-off date, received nothing and had no voice in the government. This led my great-grandmother to distribute my grandfather's portion of Mineral Estate money among the three boys, until my grandfather married and his wife put an end to the redistribution. These Mineral Estate proceeds divided the family, leading my great-grandmother to favor the brothers' children at gift-giving occasions, rather than my grandfather's children. This estranged my father and his sister from the larger family, who as children did not understand why they were not receiving presents from their grandmother as the cousins did.

As a growing percentage of Osage descendants were disenfranchised, they began fighting for equal voting rights through organizations such as the Osage Nation Organization (ONO).¹⁶ My grandfather—and more frequently my grandmother—often voiced disapproval of such nonannuitant Osages, especially within the family, by saying “they are just trying to get our money.” In this way, the authority of U.S. empire was strengthened by connecting Osage livelihoods and political identities to a U.S. created structure and by breeding wider scale suspicion, even (especially) among family members. Such deep-seated (dis)trust stymied the ONO and all other Osage government reform efforts until 2004.¹⁷

The concern that the nonannuitants were going to find a way of accessing the Mineral Estate proceeds was only further reinforced by the troubles of the roaring 1920s. After the discovery of oil in 1897, the market for Osage oil grew dramatically, bringing much wealth to Osage annuitants. At its peak in 1925, when each annuitant earned \$13,200 per quarter, many people came onto the Osage reservation as legal guardians, merchants, suitors, swindlers, and murderers in search of access to this wealth.¹⁸ The Osage Nation eventually paid the FBI to investigate the murders of sixty Osages, which ended in several convictions.¹⁹ This did not, however, end the millions of dollars being lost to price-gouging shop owners and legal guardians, who, as Harmon states, “could skim money from their charges’ account with an ease too tempting for many to resist.”²⁰ Such colonial legacies could not help but breed wide scale distrust. The terror from this period also created lasting legacies of suspicion within Osage families, as children have had to make sense of fathers who murdered aunts and uncles in search of additional Osage wealth.

(Dis)trust surrounding the Osage Mineral Estate was further deepened by the many battles the OTC had to fight for its own preservation. In the original Osage Allotment Act of 1906, the Mineral Estate, and the accompanying government to administer it, were only set up to last for twenty-five years. Through various creative tactics, the OTC was able to extend the Mineral Estate until 1958 and then again to 1983. In 1978, the OTC convinced the U.S.

government to change the language concerning the duration of the Mineral Estate from “until otherwise provided by an Act of Congress” to “in perpetuity.”²¹ Additionally, in 1953, the Osage Nation, along with over a hundred other American Indian nations, faced termination through House Concurrent Resolution 108 because the federal government saw them as successfully assimilated into American society. The Osage Nation, understanding the importance of federal recognition, sent representatives to Washington, where they were able to successfully negotiate for continued recognition by promising to pay their own operation costs through Osage Mineral Estate proceeds.

These battles for preservation took place even as the Mineral Estate fostered deeper entanglements with empire. In addition to the introduction of the oil lobby into Osage Nation affairs and the arrival of many non-Osages in search of Osage wealth, the Mineral Estate also increased the role of the U.S. government in Osage affairs. From the beginning of the oil production on the reservation, the OIA overrode Osage decisions and created policies that went against Osage desires and interests. In 1921, the U.S. Congress went so far as to pass a law that “noncompetent” Osages, generally those listed as having over one-half Indian blood, could have access to only \$4,000 of their annuitant payments per year.²² Withholding this money was justified as an attempt to obstruct Osage consumption patterns and the flagrant fraud occurring throughout the reservation. Both justifications, however, worked to strengthen the U.S. empire. As Harmon points out, Osage consumption was on par with the spending habits of others in their income bracket during this time, but it was disconcerting because it challenged stereotypes of the poor Indian in need of U.S. protection. As for the outright fraud happening across the reservation, this would have more appropriately been dealt with by punishing the perpetrators rather than the victims.²³

While many Osages did fight the rigid caps imposed on their funds, others developed an ambivalent relationship with U.S. guardianship. Given the murder and fraud brought on by the Mineral Estate, it is easy to understand why protection would be desirable. But there is a good deal of evidence suggesting that U.S. officials continually failed to live up to their trust responsibility. In 1917, the OTC complained that Superintendent George Wright was “more greatly concerned about and . . . favorable to the interests of big oil companies and men of large financial means and political influence than . . . to the interests of the Osage people.”²⁴ The OTC went on to argue that the agency was spending Osage annuitant money needlessly and without their consent.²⁵

This mismanagement is, sadly, not limited to the early twentieth century. On October 14, 2011, after the U.S. District of Columbia Court had heard extensive discovery, motions, and rulings, the Osage Nation and the U.S. government negotiated an agreement for \$380 million to compensate for

mismanagement of Osage Mineral Estate funds that occurred between 1972 and 2000.²⁶ This result, as well as continued evidence of mismanagement since the settlement, illustrates the failure of the United States to act as a responsible trustee of Osage affairs. However, many Osage annuitants point out that it is the trust relationship itself that forces the federal government to compensate the Osage for this mismanagement. The affective force of empire is thus built not on a trust in the aptitude of imperial systems, which is frequently questioned, but from concern that change is likely to bring about more loss. When the cards are so clearly stacked against you, few people are willing to bet the house.

Finally, the Osage Minerals Council became a less trustworthy structure over time, as a higher percentage of Osage descendants were without the right to vote. By 2004 only four thousand of the roughly sixteen thousand Osage descendants could vote, based solely on their possession of a headright. Furthermore, this system was focused primarily around the extraction of minerals, to the detriment of other issues such as territorial control. However, since the termination era, as well as the battles required to maintain the Osage Mineral Estate, many Osage had concerns that changing this system would only lead to further loss. By making the Osage Mineral Estate the primary system by which the U.S. government recognized Osages and by tying it to personal revenues, U.S. empire was able to establish overlapping affective ties that are hard for some Osages to remap.

Through these intertwined forces of (dis)trust, the Osage Mineral Estate has worked to bolster U.S. empire. It limited options for the Osage Nation, discouraged Osages from maintaining territorial control, and instilled deep skepticism of any change. The hidden ties to oil corporations; the fostering of divisive internal politics, privilege, status, U.S. guardianship; and the precarity surrounding the Mineral Estate were all still very much present during the Osage reform process of 2004–6. In light of this history, along with the money and authority at stake, it is little wonder that some Osages focused their energy and concern on the Mineral Estate trust, limiting the space available for other visions of an Osage future.

"OUR PEOPLE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN MOVING FORWARD"

Not all Osages, however, agreed that change was dangerous. By 2004, it was clear to most Osages that a structure focused on the Mineral Estate was limiting the potential of the Osage Nation. Only those who had inherited a share in the Mineral Estate, or a headright, had the right to vote for elected officials. Many voters had only a fraction of a vote, while a few had multiple votes.

Although all lineal descendants of the roll from 1906 were eligible for membership cards in 2004—in addition to eligibility for tribal services such as health care and partial college scholarships—they could not elect tribal officials or run for office unless they held a headright. Nonannuitant Osages were counted in order to gain access to more federal grant dollars, but these same individuals had no say in how those funds were spent. Furthermore, all informal institutions—from Osage naming ceremonies to the five-person committees in the districts—were open to and included all Osage descendants, not just headright holders. It was less clear whom the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) recognized as the Osage Nation, with some evidence pointing only to the original annuitants (all but one of whom had died by this time), excluding even those who had inherited their headright. This led to a concern among some Osage officials that when the last original annuitant passed, the BIA would simply terminate its relationship with the Osage Nation.

Given these concerns, there were few during the reform process who argued for continued limitations on citizenship. One of the debates specifically treating this subject occurred during a Pawhuska community meeting. In response to the impassioned plea of an older Osage annuitant to leave the Mineral Estate voting system in place, one middle-aged annuitant responded: “We’ve been dealing with this for years and years. Like he said, the 1906 [Act] has been very good to us. But our people have always been moving forward and we always change, and change is needed. We have to make some changes because there are Osages that are totally estranged from their own nation.”²⁷ While the Mineral Estate is presented here as a beneficial entity, this speaker also highlights the need for change because of the disenfranchisement of Osage descendants who, holding no headright, are disqualified from participating in the official Osage political structure. The majority of Osages embraced change as part of who the Osages are.

When the OGRC asked all lineal descendants of the original allottees who had addresses listed with the nation whether government reform was needed, 77.3 percent of the 1,379 respondents answered in the affirmative. Only 38.5 percent of the total respondents were nonannuitants, likely because this population had long been alienated from Osage politics. This meant that while several annuitants spoke vocally against reform, they did not represent the majority even of those Osages who held headrights. Change was ultimately embraced as a central part of the Osage story, something that even the affective entanglements of empire couldn’t block.

In the Osage Nation Constitution of 2006, the Osage Mineral Estate was incorporated into the new government as a minerals council with limited authority. This meant that instead of acting as the sole authority of the nation, the officials elected by the annuitants served on a board within the larger

government of the Osage Nation. Even though some Osage annuitants were wary of any change in the authority of the Mineral Estate, the constitution passed by a two-thirds majority of the Osage voters, placing the minerals squarely under the authority of a larger Osage government. Article XV, section 4, of the Osage Nation Constitution of 2006 created a minerals management agency, which was named the Osage Minerals Council. This agency was, as the constitution reads, "established for the sole purpose of continuing its previous duties to administer and develop the Osage Mineral Estate in accordance with the Osage Allotment Act of June 28, 1906, as amended, with no legislative authority for the Osage Nation government." In this way, the Osage Minerals Council was created as an independent board within the new Osage Nation government.

To assure that the Osage Minerals Council did not violate Osage law, the same section of the constitution includes this stipulation: "Minerals leases approved and executed by the Council shall be deemed approved by the Osage Nation unless, within five (5) working days, written objection is received from the Office of the Principal Chief that the executed lease or other development activity violates Osage law or regulation. Any dispute that arises through this process may be heard before the Supreme Court of the Osage Nation Judiciary." Particularly important here is the fact that those annuitants voting for the new system, including the members of the current OTC, voted for a system in which they were going to lose their monopoly over general Osage affairs.

Affective forces within empire can be understood as not denying possibilities completely, but instead rendering them much more cumbersome. Throughout the reform process, the majority of the energy was spent on what to do with the Minerals Estate, rather than on what structures made the most sense for the Osage Nation. (Dis)trust realigned the present focus into a discussion about the past, limiting the time and energy available for planning a future. In such spaces of colonization, efforts to build a stronger future are drained of energy, left to move forward with only part of the attention they deserve. Empire in such moments is best understood as a parasite, extracting not just resources, but the vitality needed to imagine alternative futures.

"KICK THAT HATEFUL LITTLE WHITE-MAN
RIGHT OUT OF YOUR HEAD!"

While I followed online discussions during the reform process, it was not until I was away from the reservation that I truly appreciated the Osage territory that existed on the World Wide Web. No Osage group was more active on

the web following the passage of the 2006 Osage Nation Constitution than the members of the Osage Shareholders Association (OSA). This group of Osage annuitants organized in 1994 in Pawhuska, Oklahoma, for the purpose of encouraging efficient management of the Osage Mineral Estate; protecting the federal trust relationship with the Mineral Estate; encouraging better management of the Mineral Estate by the BIA; and calling for laws to protect the Mineral Estate against theft, fraud, and conflicts of interest. They took a vocal stand against the 2006 constitution and have led multiple initiatives against its passage and for its reform.²⁸ Shortly after I began my research, the group created a web page with an online discussion forum. This forum was the home of the most aggressive criticisms of the Osage Constitution of 2006 until it was taken offline for financial reasons in 2012. Like the views expressed in the OSA meetings, the postings generally focused on finding a way to undo the changes made by the passage of the Osage Constitution of 2006. While certainly not representative of a majority of Osages, the group is made up of the most vocal and politically active of the citizens and therefore continues to play a formidable role in Osage politics.

Contributors to OSA's discussion page included discussions about potential and actual lawsuits, all of which argued that the Osage Mineral Estate had been diminished by its new placement within the larger Osage Nation. Contributors to the forum expressed their concerns that this new system gave the nation and the chief too much authority over the Mineral Estate, especially since it was not required that the chief be an annuitant. Other concerns were that the Minerals Council no longer had a chief or assistant chief, leaving it with just eight council members. Moreover, there had never been a vote by just the Osage annuitants that reform should even take place. They also expressed concerns similar to those expressed during the reform process, with a growing certainty that the Osage annuitants had been wronged by the 2006 constitution. The OSA web page became the primary space in which these assertions gained traction.

Maintaining the existing relationship with the United States was a central motivator behind many of the concerns found on the OSA web page about the changes the Osage Constitution had implemented. For example, Galen Crum, an annuitant who, after unsuccessfully running for the Osage Congress in 2006, was elected to the Osage Minerals Council in 2010 and 2014, took an early role in fighting against the changes that he felt had been imposed by the successful passage of the 2006 constitution. Crum was from Kansas and had made his name known among a wider Osage population through his presence on the OSA discussion board. He argued in a post to the OSA's web page in October 2006 that change might cause problems for the minerals trust held by the U.S. government:

It's all about the legal concept of a trust and about keeping the Osage Trust intact, so that the special relationship the 1906 Act gives all the Osage people with the federal government, will not be destroyed. A trust can be thought of as a box in which something of value is kept safe for the owners. It is usually meant to keep the valuables safe not only from outside forces, but also from unauthorized use from the owners. So there are special rules as to its use and a trustee is placed in charge of both protecting the valuables and regulating their use. As long as the box is kept intact and all the rules are followed the trust itself can be thought of as being intact and unassailable. . . . I want agreements made that are consistent with the CFR.²⁹

Crum's main point here is that changes made during the reform process would require a change in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), thus creating an opening for the federal government to dissolve the entire Mineral Estate trust and perhaps even the nation.³⁰ Because of the effort to extend the Mineral Estate in perpetuity, there is substantial historical evidence behind these concerns. Osage assertions of sovereignty, through the formation of the new government, were going to require the BIA to rework its laws, a process which historically had almost always led to further erosion of Osage authority.

The U.S. government in its earliest treaties established itself as "protector" of American Indian nations. The 1808 and subsequent Osage treaties are riddled with such phrases. For example, Article 10 of the 1808 Osage treaty reads: "The United States receives the Great and Little Osage nations into their friendship and under their protection; and the said nations, on their part, declare that they will consider themselves under the protection of no other power whatsoever." The Supreme Court first suggested the existence of a trust relationship in *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia* (1831). Chief Justice John Marshall's majority opinion characterized the Cherokee Nation as "a domestic dependent nation . . . in a state of pupilage . . . Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian."³¹ Built out of settler colonial mentalities that indigenous people were fundamentally inferior to Europeans, the trust relationship has been a powerful tool of empire building. In 1942, the Supreme Court held that this promised protection created a unique bond between the United States and each recognized American Indian nation, imposing on the federal government "moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust."³² Since Congress claims plenary power, allowing it to change or negate any of its trust responsibilities, these are unenforceable "moral" obligations rather than any genuine guarantee of protection.³³

Another clear example of how (dis)trust worked to limit indigenous futures occurred in July 2007, when the shareholders' listserv became embroiled in

a battle over whether Chief Gray of the Osage Nation should assert more jurisdiction over the entire 1.47-million-acre Osage reservation. Gray had recently backed a bill in the Osage Congress to regulate environmental standards across the reservation, and he had kept Oklahoma state inspectors out of an Osage-owned grocery store, asserting accurately that they lacked jurisdiction and were thus violating Osage sovereignty. After having a government focused primarily on the extraction of minerals for almost 100 years, the state had taken over many jurisdictional functions that even the U.S. government recognized Native nations as having. Reasserting authority over these areas was going to be an uphill battle, but it was made even more complicated by a legacy of (dis)trust.

In response to the posts questioning the wisdom of asserting sovereignty over non-Osage living on the reservation, several people on the forum expressed outrage that any Osage would take the side of the “backward and superstitious” whites. They argued it was instead time to “civilize” the white population and educate them as to what having an Osage Nation would really mean. Such comments were arguing for Osages to put trust in Osage systems rather than systems that were so clearly designed to disenfranchise Osages. Furthermore, their aim was often to argue that a strong Osage Nation would be good for the entire area, particularly in terms of economic development.

To these and other accusations another contributor argued, “What’s being ignored, by our leadership and those that follow, is that we are a little bitty fish in a big pond and we don’t yet know if we even have any teeth. I don’t think anyone here is saying that we shouldn’t strive for sovereignty, inasmuch as the Yankee government in Washington will let us exercise it . . . It seems that the reality of our situation has been lost in the fervor of what we know to be right.”³⁴ This statement demonstrates clearly the affective power of empire, especially the ways in which colonial processes create lasting (dis)trust. Here, concerns about potential ramifications are privileged over “what we know to be right.” Even while this contributor accepts Osage National sovereignty as a fundamental truth, the possibility that the federal or state government would ever recognize fully this authority is rendered an impossibility. Such skepticism, allows U.S. empire to go unchallenged, furthering its hold on authority.

Twenty-first-century Osage nation building took place within the space of empire, where both structural and affective forces worked against assertions of Osage authority. Some Osages even went as far as to argue that the U.S. government’s recognition of Osage self-determination, such as in Public Law 108-431, was really their latest tactic to terminate their trust responsibility to the Osage people. Given the long history of U.S. expansion, especially the termination period, concerns that the federal government was just using self-determination as one more strategy to be rid of their “Indian problem” were

entirely reasonable. Within such a space of inequality and exploitation, (dis) trust is in fact the most logical response.

Not all of the Osage contributors to the Osage Shareholders Association web page agreed with this approach, however. To the above postings one person responded,

How sad it is that you perceive yourself, and all Osages, in such a sad pathetic light! Seriously, I really feel bad for you. It can't be comfortable to live such a diminished, marginalized existence. Did you go to a government boarding school? Did they, the U.S. government, do this to you? It doesn't have to be this way. God isn't white and the whites aren't gods. They're no better than we Osages . . . Formerly oppressed native peoples can and do move beyond the mental artifacts which make them prisoners in their own skins. You can as well. Kick that hateful little white-man right out of your head!³⁵

For the writer, asserting Osage sovereignty is part of the process of decolonization and moving past the discourses of conquest inherent within empire. Rather than feeling oppressed by the limitations inherent in Osage nation-building today, this contributor looks forward to a sovereign Osage future beyond the limiting narratives of the U.S. empire. In naming this (dis) trust as part of the ongoing process of colonization, the posting not only recognizes the source of the problem, but also attempts to get outside the colonizing narrative itself.

In 2009 the OSA took their concerns to federal court. Eight Osage annuitants sued the U.S. Department of the Interior, alleging that the department "unlawfully failed to hold the election for the Osage Nation Constitution as it applied to the Mineral Estate; have further unlawfully failed to hold elections for Minerals Council in accordance with the 1906 Act and 25 C.F.R. Part 90, and are unlawfully recognizing the Osage Nation Constitution as applicable to the Mineral Estate."³⁶ By turning to the federal government to settle the internal power struggle that they had lost during the election of 2006, these annuitants hoped to reinstate the Mineral Estate's authority, which they felt had been usurped by the Osage Constitution. Such a move is a clear example of the affective force of empire, which works here to jeopardize sovereignty by fostering internal divisions and (dis)trust.

The problem remained, however, that such a focus on the Mineral Estate occurs at the expense of a focus on wider Osage governance. As another OSA contributor, whose online name was Southside Osage, put it: "I love the idea of Osage government taking care of Osage, but I have seen nothing in my lifetime, from nearly all governments, not just the Osage, to suggest that would be the case."³⁷ Given the limiting structure imposed on the Osage Nation, which

focused on minerals extraction to the detriment of jurisdictional issues and infrastructure building, it is no wonder that many Osages are skeptical of the new constitution. This (dis)trust was deeply rooted, extending to all forms of governance that, as Southside Osage went on to explain, “reward people that have a self-interest.”³⁸ From these discussions, it is clear that for these OSA members, governments simply could not be trusted, Osage or otherwise. In addition to limiting the infrastructure necessary to develop a flourishing Osage Nation, U.S. expansion has created an entrenched skepticism of government more generally. Empire can thus also be seen as eroding trust, weakening populations’ faith in themselves, and humans more generally, to do what is right. By forcing trust in systems of exploitation and colonization, empires create much larger suspicion.

When heard by the District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, however, the case was quickly dismissed due to the plaintiffs’ need to first exhaust administrative remedies. The U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this decision in June 2012. In response, Galen Crum on the Minerals Council and Geoffrey Standing Bear on the Osage Congress put together a series of amendments to the Constitution. While controversial in nature, the intent of the amendments was generally to further protect the Mineral Estate from the influence of the Osage Nation.

The most extreme of the amendments proposed that “Article XV of the Osage Nation Constitution be amended to delete the existing language in its entirety and to replace Article XV with language on recognizing the authority of the Osage Minerals Council to manage the Osage Minerals Estate.” The attached description states, “the purpose of the proposed amendment to the Osage Nation Constitution is to remove the responsibility for the Osage Minerals Estate from the Osage Nation generally and instead recognize the authority of the Osage Minerals Council to manage the Osage Mineral Estate, including providing for the election of Osage Minerals Council representatives and terms of office.” This amendment would have created a separate entity from the Osage Nation in charge of overseeing the minerals estate.

Interestingly, other than the writers of the amendments, few Osages supported this legislation openly on the Osage Shareholders web page or the newly formed Facebook group “Osage Community for Responsible Citizenry.” In both spaces, it was once again the trust relationship that most Osages worried was in danger. Osage annuitant and lawyer Wilson Pipestem posted, “I think it would be a bad idea to mess with the foundations of the federal trust system that’s been in place since 1906. The 1906 Act, and amendments to it, protect the mineral estate and its trust status, which is why we still have it in its entirety over 100 years later. Changing the ownership, management, and control of the mineral estate would require an act of Congress, and

I have not heard any good arguments of why this would be a good idea."³⁹ As U.S. Code Title 25 states, the Osage Mineral Estate is held in trust for the Osage Tribe of Indians; it would thus require an act of Congress to change ownership, and thereby full control, to only the annuitant-elected Osage Minerals Council.

As this posting supports the constitution of 2006, it is a helpful example in illustrating the power that the trust relationship holds today. The importance placed on the trust, at least in this context, went beyond desire for exclusive authority by the Osage annuitants. These postings, while often signaling complex debates over authority, property, and privilege, also reveal the affective authority of the entanglements of empire. The federal trust relationship, a legal concept with a strong emotional undercurrent, is a telling example of how the U.S. empire creates and maintains authority through the fostering of (dis)trust.

While the amendments all received a majority approval, they did not pass by the required supermajority requirement of 65 percent. Geoffery Standing Bear, the Osage congressman who most actively spearheaded the amendments, later explained in an interview that all of the work he put into the amendments "took away from getting people together on the issues I am working on now . . . on rebuilding our child care, elder housing and community centers, rebuilding our reservation housing through opening access to financial markets for housing, rebuilding our arbors, education, and a lot of other matters."⁴⁰ Standing Bear, who went on to become Chief of the Osage Nation, has implemented such rebuilding efforts. They include taking over the running of the health clinic from the BIA, purchasing a 43,000-acre ranch, and creating an Osage Nation immersion language school. While some have critiqued the decision to dive into so many initiatives at once, Standing Bear argues that there is no reason to have an Osage Nation unless it is asserting sovereignty over and investing in Osage health, land, and cultural practices like language.

The Osage Minerals Council, however, continues to question the Osage Nation authority and puts its faith in the federal government to address its concerns. In September of 2017 the Osage Minerals Council passed a resolution to sue the Osage Nation in federal court over the ownership of the Osage Mineral Estate. During the meeting, Councilwoman Cynthia Boone said that she put her full faith in the 1906 Act of Congress and that she would be fine if this lawsuit meant the dissolution of the entire Osage Nation government. Given that there is no current evidence that the Osage Nation is doing anything to diminish the proceeds made from the Mineral Estate, the legacies of (dis)trust appear to be at work here. Not only does the majority of people sitting on the Osage Minerals Council in 2017 believe that the federal

government is the best protector of its assets, but given the legacies of colonialism, they have no trust in their own system of government.

In investigating the space of empire, it is essential that we not only look for the material evidence of entanglement but that we also interrogate its affective flows. While brute force is powerful in creating a short-term restructuring of power, fostering (dis)trust has a much more long-lasting impact. There has been a long philosophical (and more recently societal) debate about whether or not humans are naturally trusting and what can be done to make people more trusting.⁴¹ From the vantage of Osage politics, I have focused on a different question: What are the forces that impact our ability to trust?

The federal government's trust relationship with American Indian nations is a potent example of how empire fosters (dis)trust. Throughout Osage discussions during and subsequent to the decade following the 2006 Osage Constitution, it was (dis)trust far more than any other emotion that dictated the future of the Osage Nation. (Dis)trust limited conversations, focused energy on maintaining the status quo, and undermined efforts to build a stronger Osage Nation. It manifested in the form of fist pounding, yelling, and many stinging satirical comments. (Dis)trust was so powerful that it worked as a political impediment to nation-building efforts, limiting the time and energy that was available to discuss matters outside the Mineral Estate. (Dis)trust was in fact the primary motivation for much of the participation in the reform process, working to focus far too many of the conversations around what would best preserve the trust relationship, rather than what would best serve the Osage Nation. Tensions with the Osage Minerals Council will continue to take up Osage resources and energy. Given the continuance of empire, perhaps trust is not really a reasonable response. But the question remains, "How do we kick that hateful little white man out of our heads?"

NOTES

- 1 Stoler, McGranahan, and Perdue, *Imperial Formations*.
- 2 For a discussion of how indigeneity and empire are intertwined in the United States, see Goldstein, *Formations of United States Colonialism*.
- 3 Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native."
- 4 Tsosie, "Conflict between the Public Trust and the Indian Trust Doctrines," 271.
- 5 Stoler, McGranahan, and Perdue, *Imperial Formations*.
- 6 Burns, *A History of the Osage People*.
- 7 Government Reform Meeting, September 26, 2005.