



Talking Back to Globalization

TEXTS AND PRACTICES

EDITED BY Brian Michael Goss,
Mary Rachel Gould, & Joan Pedro-Carañana

"Global what? Global how? Global who? We're all struggling with how to make sense of globalization. Through an agile blend of interview, theorization, and case study, the editors of *Talking Back to Globalization* have both answered these questions and added a further—how to respond, how to contest, how to think otherwise. Bravo!"

—**Toby Miller,**

**Universidad del Norte,
Colombia**

"This wide-ranging collection highlights how opportunities for cultural mixing are both bait and consequence of a pervasive social system prioritizing market-driven exchange. The chapters stress the importance not just of 'talking back' but of completely reframing conversations about neoliberal-driven globalization."

—**Erika Polson,**

University of Denver

www.peterlang.com

Globalization is one of the most widely circulated, high-stakes buzzwords of the past generation; yet discussion of the topic is often encased in paradox and contention over what globalization is, to whom and where it may (or may not) apply, and to what effect. In *Talking Back to Globalization: Texts and Practices*, contributors provide a series of case studies that stress the interplay between culture, politics, and commerce.

Interviews with Natalie Fenton and Radha S. Hegde survey globalization and its interpenetration with the spheres of journalism, activism, social media, and identity. The overview furnished by the interviews is followed by the volume's two additional extended sections, "Texts" and "Practices."

Chapters in the "Texts" section seek clues about globalization through its insinuation into mediated forms. The diverse selection of cases cover television, films, online travel web pages, blues music, and the political valences of Portuguese neo-fado.

Chapters in the "Practices" section address more diffused cases than media texts. Their analyses largely orient toward institutional concomitants of globalization that precede the subject's experience of it. Chapters cover the trajectory of the European university, campaigns to shape journalistic practice during the Cold War, the posture of intellectuals vis-à-vis globalization, and the ideology that animates the Facebook experience.

Brian Michael Goss (Ph.D., University of Illinois) is Program Director for Communication at Saint Louis University's Madrid Campus. His two most recent books are *Global Auteurs: Politics in the Films of Almodóvar, von Trier and Winterbottom* (Lang, 2009) and *Rebooting the Herman and Chomsky Propaganda Model in the Twenty-First Century* (Lang, 2013).


Mary Rachel Gould (Ph.D., University of Utah) is Associate Professor of Communication at Saint Louis University's Missouri Campus. Her research interests include the study of travel and tourism, documentary studies, digital storytelling, and popular culture.

Joan Pedro-Caraña (Ph.D., Complutense University of Madrid) is Assistant Professor in the Communication Department at Saint Louis University's Madrid Campus. His multilingual publications and research interests address the social mediations performed by communication and educational systems and processes.



**Intersections
in Communications
and Culture**

Talking Back to Globalization



Intersections in Communications and Culture

Global Approaches and Transdisciplinary Perspectives

Cameron McCarthy and Angharad N. Valdivia
General Editors

Vol. 33

The Intersections in Communications and Culture series
is part of the Peter Lang Media and Communication list.

Every volume is peer reviewed and meets
the highest quality standards for content and production.



PETER LANG

New York • Bern • Frankfurt • Berlin
Brussels • Vienna • Oxford • Warsaw

Talking Back to Globalization

Texts and Practices

Edited by Brian Michael Goss,
Mary Rachel Gould, and Joan Pedro-Carañana



PETER LANG

New York • Bern • Frankfurt • Berlin
Brussels • Vienna • Oxford • Warsaw

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Goss, Brian Michael, editor. | Gould, Mary Rachel, editor.
Pedro-Carañana, Joan, editor.

Title: Talking back to globalization: texts and practices /
edited by Brian Michael Goss, Mary Rachel Gould, Joan Pedro-Carañana.

Description: New York: Peter Lang, 2016.

Series: Intersections in communications and culture:
global approaches and transdisciplinary perspectives; vol. 33 | ISSN 1528-610X
Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2015038797 | ISBN 978-1-4331-2966-7 (hardcover: alk. paper)
ISBN 978-1-4331-2965-0 (paperback: alk. paper) | ISBN 978-1-4539-1736-7 (e-book)

Subjects: LCSH: Globalization—Social aspects. | Globalization—Economic aspects.
Culture and globalization. | Communication and culture.

Education—History—21st century.

Classification: LCC HF1359.T354 2016 | DDC 303.48/2—dc23

LC record available at <http://lcn.loc.gov/2015038797>

Bibliographic information published by **Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek**.

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the “Deutsche
Nationalbibliografie”; detailed bibliographic data are available
on the Internet at <http://dnb.d-nb.de/>.

© 2016 Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., New York
29 Broadway, 18th floor, New York, NY 10006
www.peterlang.com

All rights reserved.

Reprint or reproduction, even partially, in all forms such as microfilm,
xerography, microfiche, microcard, and offset strictly prohibited.

This volume is dedicated to all of the people and organizations—almost invariably with names we will never know—who blunt the ferocious oscillations of globalization by making common cause with the vulnerable, the vagabond, the refugee, the stubbornly unrealistic aspirant, the traveler, the human rights abuse victim, among other players.

Acknowledgments

This volume's gestation period, from the time it was proposed to hard copies coming off the presses, was two years—one of which was devoted to briskly cycling through drafts of chapters and subsequent revisions. Alongside the contributors who composed chapters for *Talking Back to Globalization* and whose names garland the “Table of Contents”, a diffuse team of supportive people have facilitated the completed form of this work across those two years. Their efforts demand the warm glow of appreciative acknowledgment.

Cameron McCarthy gets the first “shout out” as he endowed the project with encouragement at the outset, as a Series Editor at Peter Lang Publishing and as a friend. Appreciation is apportioned to the Faculty Professional Development Advisory Committee at Saint Louis University in Madrid, Spain for furnishing funds that assisted with the completion of the book.

We dial up the kudos for Daphne Binioris and Edison Liwen in recognition of their quality work on transcribing the recordings of the interviews. To Erika K. Polson and Toby Miller, we extend gratitude for not only agreeing to compose blurbs for the book but for doing so with panache.

We are very grateful to the experts who acted as external reviewers of chapters and/or who inspired our efforts: Anne Dewey, C. Michael Elavsky, Richard Elliott, Des Freedman, John C. Nerone, Simona Elena Rentea, and Mike Wayne.

At Peter Lang, Mary Savigar shepherded us through the process while Bernadette Shade marshaled the forces of proofreading, formatting, and final composition of the text into the form you find in your hands. Sophie Appel furnished the striking

cover art augmented by imagery from “*el kiosko de la Plaza Puerta Cerrada en la zona querida de La Latina*”. We also thank the anonymous reviewers of our proposal and of the completed manuscript whom Lang summoned for the generosity and insight that they exhibited.

The rehearsals that eventually became *Talking Back to Globalization* occurred at the <<Globalization: Texts · Performances · Practices>> conference that was convened at Saint Louis University in Madrid in April 2014, although the resultant volume departs from the conference in terms of the contributors and the projects that it engenders. Completing the volume and seeing it move into circulation among publics with interest in globalization is immensely gratifying; our joy is nevertheless tempered. After the *Talking Back to Globalization* volume moved into its production phase, we learned that one of our <<Globalization>> conference colleagues, Dr. Gisela Gil-Egui of Fairfield University in Connecticut, died in a car accident. We take this opportunity to enduringly honor Gisela for her generous contributions to the <<Globalization>> conference and to the study of communication.

Table of Contents

Introduction: Washed Up on the Shores of Neoliberal Globalization	xi
Brian Michael Goss, Joan Pedro-Carañana and Mary Rachel Gould	

Section One: Interviews

Preface to the Interviews	3
Chapter One: A Conversation With Natalie Fenton: "Resocializing the Political and Re-politicizing the Economy"	5
Joan Pedro-Carañana and Natalie Fenton	
Chapter Two: A Conversation With Radha S. Hegde: Globalization: "It's Everywhere; It's Nowhere"	21
Rae Lynn Schwartz-DuPre and Radha S. Hegde	

Section Two: Texts

Chapter Three: "Petting the Burning Dog" of Orientalism: Implications of <i>Occupation</i> (2009) and <i>Generation Kill</i> (2008) for Cosmopolitan Assumptions About Globalization	39
Brian Michael Goss	
Chapter Four: Courting the LGBTQ Consumer: A Global Perspective	59
Christopher Chávez and Mary Rachel Gould	
Chapter Five: The Globalization of Blues: Rural, Urban, Transatlantic	81
Josep Pedro-Carañana	

Chapter Six: *"Ai, é tão bom ser pequenino!"*: OqueStrada's
Fado-Chanson-Ska and Local Sustainable Capitalism. 105
Michael Arnold

Section Three: Practices

Chapter Seven: The Globalization of Universities: European Higher
Education Area Viewed From the Perspectives of the
Enlightenment and Industrialism 129
Joan Pedro-Carañana

Chapter Eight: Strategic Sociability: US-led Journalist Reorientation
Programs and Cold War Media Practices 153
Marion Wrenn

Chapter Nine: Defending Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century:
Where Have All the Intellectuals Gone? 171
Staša Tkalec

Chapter Ten: Facebook's Global Imaginary: The Symbolic Production
of the World Through Social Media 193
Delia Dumitrica

Afterword: The Global City and the Uses of the New Multiculture. 215
Cameron McCarthy

Contributors..... 223

Index..... 229



Introduction

Washed Up on the Shores of Neoliberal Globalization

BRIAN MICHAEL GOSS, JOAN PEDRO-CARAÑANA,
AND MARY RACHEL GOULD

In April 2015, the world witnessed the courage and sacrifice of 34-year-old Antonis Deligiorgis. An off-duty Greek army sergeant, Antonis bolted from a nearby beach-side café to hoist twenty immigrants to safety from a capsized vessel off the Island of Rhodes (Smith, 2015). Antonis's heroic acts were captured in a photo by Argiris Mantikos that quickly circulated around the globe. In the photo, burly Antonis shepherds an obviously frightened Eritrean, Wegasi Nebiat, from what could readily have been the pregnant woman's death in the treacherous waters.

At the same time that Antonis is rightly celebrated as a hero—one of countless unnamed people who have selflessly assisted migrants in peril in recent years—the photograph is saturated with relations of power (Castells, 2009; Freedman, 2014; Flew, 2007, pp. 4–8; Thompson, 1995). In the economic realm, the neoliberal economic program that has rampaged across the world in recent decades has generated sufficient “push” that immigrants are willing to risk uncertainty, harm and even death for opportunities in the world's wealthier precincts (Harding, 2012; Wearing, 2015). No person or cabal enforces the power that drives this type of migration; it is power expressed quietly and impersonally, as it compels this person to leave his or her country to find work, or that one to speculate on currencies.

Immigrants who defy the regime of entry visas that is meant to stymie their efforts to reach Europe (or other destinations) are increasingly subject to what Thompson calls “coercive powers” (1995, p. 17) that effectively criminalize them. However much one may yearn for orderly governance of immigration processes (cf. Sassen, 2005), being without documents effectively amounts to the

criminalization of a person as a function of his or her nation of origin; for being relatively poor, for being from the “global south,” for wanting something more out of one’s life, as poignantly captured by director Michael Winterbottom’s quasi-documentary *In This World* (2003, United Kingdom).

Finally, the photo of Antonis’s rescue of Wegasi is laden with what Thompson terms “symbolic power.” As a white man sacrifices to save the dark-skinned female subject, tropes of western benevolence echo and chime with centuries of Orientalist tales (and Orientalist photos, and news reports, and films). In this view, the western subject is *always already* positioned as a selfless actor, or even a victim assuming burdens. There are, of course, some important material concomitants that animate these tropes. A European photographer brought this scene to the world’s attention, because this globalization drama occurred on Europe’s shores. Europe’s longstanding economic prowess both summoned the immigrant—and Europeans’ symbolic power to capture that summons in photography as well as in tropology, since economic power seeps into and permeates the register of symbolic power. At the same time the photo transmits a poignant message about sacrifice and hope, about deeply held dreams of global togetherness via the stout European and a frightened but determined African. Moreover, Antonis’s own nation, on the edge of Europe, is increasingly a victim of the same abusive neoliberal policy package that exerts palpable power over the stream of migrants to Greece’s shores (Kuttner, 2013).

Antonis and Wegasi’s story testifies that globalization is haunted by the spectre of socio-economic class in all of its dimensions, including mobility. But hold on: Does that sound like overheated, precious academic rhetoric, delivered from a heroic, if slightly stilted, seminar room posture? Consider that in Europe right now, within the continent’s chimerical responses, increasingly hard-edged forms of power are directed at migrants seeking refugee status (alongside, at times, more emollient public posturing from elected officials). Countless people have now undertaken dangerous, often deadly journeys—on sea and land, shepherded by shadowy fixers, within a legal twilight in which one’s mere presence in a given place is criminalized. They are driven in the tens of thousands by, for example, escape from the gruesome civil war in Syria and the ongoing instability and mayhem in Iraq and Afghanistan that has followed long-term US intervention. While Europe has witnessed extraordinary grassroots mobilization (along with spontaneous assistance) on behalf of migrants, in the long haul, the fortifications are hardening into place: scrutiny is intensified, walls are being built and processing center installations planned further from the continent’s perimeter. Fences always have holes—and conservative business interests may even welcome the expansion of the “reserve army of labor” through the mass introduction of ostensibly docile immigrant populations. Nevertheless, the props of coercive power and control are being assembled against the aspirations of migrants.

At the same time, and putting aside the services afforded to free-spending tourists, very rich subjects are being welcomed and ushered to the front of the line for five-star treatment. The willing rich are right now being garlanded with the offer to buy into Europe—that is, to literally *buy* European Union citizenship. In particular, Malta offers an EU member nation passport at an all-inclusive cost of 1.2 million euros (Anderson, 2015). One American expatriate, currently resident in non-EU Switzerland and for whom price is no object, enthuses that, “It’s an incredibly powerful passport.” The future is at stake for this nakedly post-national subject: “My kids will have the ability to live and work anywhere in the E.U.,” he adds. While there is opposition to the scheme in Malta, it also bears mention that Spain had already implemented a similar (if less extreme version of the) program in which buying property in the country is rewarded with legal residency (Domínguez & Samavati, 2013).

Barriers alongside “benjamins” (or “big bucks”): Such is the strange world of globalization.

In talking back to globalization, a conundrum arises at the start: There is evident difficulty in ascertaining what globalization means, even beyond contestation about whether globalization is even occurring to widely assumed specifications (Hafez, 2007; Martell, 2010, pp. 8–11, pp. 19–36). Consider the game efforts of Manfred B. Steger (2009), a leading scholar of globalization, as he attempts to clarify what the phenomenon is. He observes that globalization has been taken to flag “a process, a condition, a system, a force, an age” with attendant cross-hatchings between them (2009, p. 8). In an effort to sort it out, Steger ventures the new term “globality.” Whatever the phenomenon shall be called, Steger oscillates as he construes globalization as of the present *and* as a force that will mainly play out in the future. More concretely, he identifies globalization as “a *social condition* characterized by tight global economic, political and cultural interconnections” that is distinguished by transformative impacts and ruptures (original emphasis, 2009, p. 8). Transformations implicate “shifting forms of human contact” (2009, p. 9), as well as the imaginary realm of “people’s growing consciousness of belonging to a global community” (2009, p. 10).

While Steger may understate the countervailing frictions around globalization—notably with respect to oppositional movements and the marked asymmetries of (economic and symbolic) power that structure the global scene—we take up his assumptions about a multifaceted social condition. In aligning our approach with a critical interpretation of globalization, we further assume that few people actually stepped up and placed an order for globalization to, in some measure, steer our destinies. People, Karl Marx maintained, “make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past” (1852, p. 1). In this view, globalization is largely imposed on publics that negotiate its conditions as best they can.

If one grants that globalization is already in motion, one may also ask *since when?* Timothy Brook (2008) observes that by Johannes Vermeer's time (1632–1675), all Dutch households could be assumed to harbor ceramics from export-oriented Chinese workshops halfway around the globe. Vermeer's paintings of Delft, Holland unselfconsciously capture further manifestations of globalization already in motion: Hats from North American pelts, rugs from Turkey, offices of the Dutch East India Company looming in the cityscape. In that case, when did globalization begin to scale up to recognizable proportions? 1492? 1789? 1945? 1973? 1989? What about 1978's advent of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" that inaugurated liberalization of the national economy and its insertion into the global system that it increasingly influences (Fenby, 2012)? When globalization is thought to have spiked to a transformational tipping point may depend on where one looks, as evident in Armand Mattelart's (2000) thoughtful grand tour of globalization's stops and starts since the end of the eighteenth century.

Without succumbing to the seductions of "presentism", we maintain that there is something different about the present time that, in turn, drives a volume such as this one. Live, global events were first evident through early television and satellites in the 1950s and 1960s (Schwoch, 2009). The tempo of live, global events has since stepped up dramatically, from global sport and celebrity pseudo-events to the heinous spectacles of terror franchises and asymmetric violence between and within nations (often misleadingly called "wars", even when one side brings all the firepower). Something may be said to be different about the present when secular, profit and non-profit organizations that transcend nations and nationalism in the first instance have proliferated and are consequential actors (European Union, Amnesty International, World Bank, Al Jazeera, Fédération Internationale de Football Association [FIFA]). Eric Hobsbawm deflates facile assumptions of a static and insulated world in previous generations when he observes that the years from 1880 to 1914 featured "the greatest migrations [of people] yet known, within and between states" (1992, p. 91). Nonetheless, and even given prior incarnations of massive global porosity, we contend that something may be different when, to an unprecedented degree and with as yet unknown possibilities, faraway people and obscure information may be readily and directly encountered without leaving one's salon.

We provisionally resolve the puzzles that we have introduced as follows: Globalization can be understood as both a universal and a particular phenomenon that is embedded in the everyday and the local (Ballesteros, Luján, & Pedro, 2010). As a form of spatial expansion, globalization processes and practices have taken place since the origins of humankind (Steger, 2009, pp. 19–26). These processes have intensified in different moments of history, reaching their highest expression in the ongoing technological revolution and worldwide expansion of the capitalist system. But, more specifically, how do globalization processes play out?

THREE PARADIGMS: DIFFERENTIALISM, CONVERGENCE, MIXING

Three paradigms that have discursively circulated around globalization reveal its contradictions when considered together. Following Terry Flew's terminology that pulls together previous literature, these three paradigms may be called "differentialism," "convergence," and "mixing" (2007, pp. 162–169).

On a differentialist view that emphasizes the ostensibly timeless local rhythms of classical conservatism, movement toward globalization is inevitably checked by irreducible, recondite differences between cultures. Samuel P. Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" thesis is a clear exemplar of differentialism in positing six global cultures that are fundamentally incommensurate with each other (Huntington, 1993). In making his differentialist case, Huntington thunders, "Islam has bloody borders" (1993, paragraph 35)—thusly ignoring Europe's exceptionally gory history through the mid-twentieth century as well as the United States' continued adventurism along whatever it construes as the perimeter of its interests (considered contemporaneously by Chomsky, 1993). Huntington's contention that different cultures reside in different worlds is not debilitated by a mere failure to striate the globe into enough distinct cultures—astrology would be equally superstitious if it posited 18 astrological signs rather than 12—but by the principle of culture as a hermetically sealed entity. Nonetheless, theories can be wrong and still attract ardent adherents (at least provisionally). To cite one recent example: the clash-of-civilization electoral warriors of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)—a party hostile to immigration and that agitates for the UK to exit the European Union—was the third biggest vote-winner among British parties in the May 2015 general election with 3.8 million votes (British Broadcast Corporation, 2015). Moreover, the biggest vote-winner in the same election, the Conservatives, minted the same anti-immigrant and anti-Europe rhetoric, albeit in less volatile terms.

By contrast, the convergence and mixing paradigms have more in common with each other than either does with differentialism. They are, nonetheless, distinct. In the mixing (or "postmodern") view, the world is constituted by bricolage of global influences and its subjects constantly cut and paste them into novel configurations. Arjun Appadurai (1996) may be taken as an intellectual lodestar of globalization as mixing, with its attendant cosmopolitan accents. More concretely, in joining Chinese-inspired noodles to tomato cultivation imported from Latin America, Italian cooking may be said to enact the global that is inscribed within the national; that is, before Italian cooking once again busted out of the national to circulate internationally as a concomitant of Italian emigration to the US and Argentina (Severgnini, 2015). Similarly, mega-pop star Shakira surfs on the

mixing wave. Colombian-born and raised, resident in Spain, with an Arabic stage name, Lebanese ancestry, and bilingual (Spanish/English) versions of her songs, Shakira Isabel Mebarak Ripoll operates as a flagship for the mixed subjectivities found all over the globe (in her case, to the tune of vast commercial success).

Globalization-as-convergence adherents similarly maintain a world of places articulated to each other and open to influences from beyond their own borders. However, rather than the free play of bricolage, convergence posits a transnational order in which heightened homogeneity is the rule; an incipient “end of history”, as posited in a leading convergence manifesto (Fukuyama, 1992). In this view, events continue to occur, presidents and prime ministers come and go, market shares shift—but the fundamentals do not change. Mass republics and market-driven economics are, by convergence logics, the only remaining contenders with respect to how to organize people. The advent of the euro across Western Europe as a transnational currency is a harbinger of convergence; as is the global ascendance of the English language that you are reading right now. Spoken by relatively few people as a first language, English is spoken with some degree of fluency by literally billions of people as a second (or third, or fourth) language (Steger, 2009, pp. 80–83).

These three paradigms may be taken to abet the many doubts around globalization rehearsed earlier (for example, *when* did it begin?). Taken together, the litany of unanswered questions may suggest a world of nebulous formations and depthless ambiguities, a hall of mirrors in which everything is up for grabs. However, we do not assume that lumpy formlessness characterizes globalization’s contours. It is a given that talking about, or back to, globalization is complex; no surprise, considering the scope of the phenomenon that is signified in the term itself. However, we maintain that distinct and legible patterns emerge in globalization.

In this view, how does one make sense of Flew’s three paradigms of globalization? It is reasonable to maintain that all three may be in play at once—albeit, in different registers and with varying intensities across time and global space. Within the same city, some *barrios* are more evidently globalized via, for example, tourist brigades and services that cater to them, immigration patterns with their attendant ensemble of restaurants and cyber cafés, and the farrago of languages cascading on the street. In Madrid, the Puerta del Sol-Lavapiés corridor in the city’s center is highly globalized by these informal indices. At the same time, the center is grounded in local history: keyhole architecture may remind the contemporary *flâneur* that the name “Madrid” is a corruption of the city’s original Arabic name (طريجم) bequeathed by Moroccan invasion, alongside the statues of medieval Castilian kings of central Iberia. In the same city, at the same time, some other peripheral *barrios* are relatively sparse in these signs of globalization.

Similarly, within the nation of Spain, the main cities are more evidently shaped by global currents (international airports, hosting Olympic games and

World Exhibitions) than the smaller provincial capitals and their satellite villages. Yet, all share US televisual productions clotting the screens, Chinese restaurants tucked onto side streets, German-manufactured cars rumbling along the road-way—along with resentments against these, and other, perceived intrusions. In other words, the three paradigms discussed above may coincide in time and space in densely layered forms. As will be further elaborated, globalization phenomena exhibit variations according to the particular context of each society and the concrete configuration of the power relationships between local and global actors.

Nations No More? Not Really!

The paradoxes, contradictions and discontinuities of globalization suggested above may also be mapped by a quick look at where the nation stands. As Immanuel Wallerstein points out (1991, pp. 132–134), the nation is constructed and contingent, however much its contours are subsequently taken as given, even in historical studies. The successful implementation of the nation has brought with it the infrastructure of nationhood: standardized language (or official compromise on languages), schooling, roads, research and development, industrial policy, holidays, flags and other chains of often inconspicuous symbols that consolidate nationhood while marking out differentiations beyond precisely mapped boundaries (Billig, 1995/2010).

Unruly and aberrant subjectivities within the nation have largely been glossed over or damped down under a single flag (e.g., submerged ethnicities, regional nationalisms), often through the bureaucratic reach of State services in a form of *endo*-convergence (Hobsbawm, 1992, pp. 30–39). In turn, a central paradox is that the rise of national entities across the past several centuries has been the precondition of what we construe as globalization. As nations consolidate, each can be inserted as a coherent node within a similarly coherent network of nations. Contradictions multiply. The nation may depend on a widespread popular sentiment of nationalism—and the subject’s internalized image of the nation pivots on strong feelings of distinction from other peoples’ nations, even as the nation itself has been the necessary precondition for organized transnational cooperation (Mattelart, 2000).

At the same time, national space intersects with—indeed, may be transformed by—globalization in other respects. Affluent, cosmopolitan residents in the core of a globally connected city—say, São Paulo—may readily have more in common with affluent New York cosmopolitans than with people a few kilometers away on the outskirts of their own metropole. The resultant “archipelago economy” signifies a strong, albeit class-based convergence for the globe’s gated communities (Mattelart, 2000, p. 99). As concerns space in a global milieu, Mike Davis (2000, pp. 93–107) describes the bottom-up construction of “transnational suburbs” as

enclaves of Latin Americans in the United States that have retained substantial “economic and cultural umbilical cords” with home countries (2000, p. 96). Transnational suburbs are facilitated by low-cost telephony and air travel even as they reshape the terrain (through concepts about use of public space, entrepreneurial activity) of their host nations. Much the same can be said of transnational suburbs constructed in bottom-up fashion that connect Spain and Romania, France and Algeria, and most everywhere that harbors the vast expatriate populations of China and India—in all cases, with their attendant mixing.

At the same time, differentialist frictions are evident *vis-à-vis* globalization. Differentialist anxieties were in play in the US, when one of its flagship soft drink firms uncorked a Super Bowl advertisement that featured eight languages. The ad flaunted the fact that, like other transnational firms, it could care less in what idioms orders are placed or in what currency bills are paid; an affront to traditional-minded differentialists who hallucinate megabrands as being as tightly girdled within the nation as the Main Street family-run store (wholly marginalized by transnational enterprise).

More interesting than the dead end offered by revanchist resentments are the ostensibly “successful” instances of convergence that, nevertheless, reveal the fault lines and contradictions that cross-hatch transnational convergence. On the one hand, the euro currency is the paradigm of a technocratic success of globalization as the currency used daily by more than 300 million people (European Central Bank, n.d.), many of whom have been historically hostile to each other. On the other hand, the “success” of the euro has simultaneously exposed significant fissures. German national exports benefit tremendously from a transnational euro that is artificially devalued *vis-à-vis* the national *deutschmark* it supplanted. At the same time, the euro has wounded the lower productivity economies of Greece and Spain through the very same fiscal regime (Kuttner, 2013).

SEEING THE BIG PICTURE: BASE/SUPERSTRUCTURE AND POWER

As noted earlier, there is considerable debate about the what, how, and when of globalization. We assume globalization to be steered by the global expansion of the social systems implicated in capitalism—more specifically, the *neoliberal* capitalist program that supplanted the post–World War II Fordist “compromise” between capital and labor. Neoliberalism haltingly began in the 1970s and has arguably accelerated after the economic crash of 2007–2008. Neoliberalism may, in turn, be characterized as a totalizing social model in its ambitions, driven by an ideology that attempts to place social life increasingly under the rules of the market (Giroux, 2008; Harvey, 2003, 2005).

What are these rules? Neoliberal doctrine posits that markets should be largely unfettered from State intervention, aside from a distinctly limited remit that includes enforcement of property rights and other juridical questions, printing money (albeit with restraint as to not raise inflation), and national defense (Friedman & Friedman, 1980). While neoliberals differ in the details, they look askance at long-established government interventions into markets that include universal public schooling, research and development, minimum wages, antitrust enforcement, taxes and tariffs, and labor organization. In turn, Adam Smith's "invisible hand" (1994) is posited to generate optimal economic and social solutions to all problems, with an acumen that, for apostles of neoliberalism, industrial planning cannot achieve.

Despite the often heated anti-State rhetoric in which neoliberalism is couched, its policy package presents an unacknowledged but palpable re-calibration of government activity. That is, neoliberalism in practice moves the State's center of gravity away from regulation, social investment (e.g., universal public schooling), and mild redistributions of wealth; and moves that center instead toward indulgence of corporate interests (e.g., tax breaks), bailouts, and heightened policing of the social disaster associated with unrestrained markets. Recessions, bailout episodes, crises, collapses, and low growth rates with broadly stagnant or declining standards of living also characterize the outcomes of the neoliberal program (Duménil & Lévy, 2011; Harvey, 1989, 2005; Klein, 2007). At the same time, neoliberalism presents an irreducible class dimension in practice since wealth is effectively siphoned upward in the class pyramid.

Neo-Marxist political economists John Bellamy Foster and Robert McChesney (2012) define the current neoliberal period as monopoly-finance capitalism, noting the intensification of the system's tendency toward economic concentration with its attendant warps in the allocation of property, wealth, and power. Financialization can play out as Romneyism: Buying firms, carving them into constituent parts while slashing payroll, and then selling off the pieces. Financialization achieved (*sans* production nor innovation)! Monopolistic and financial capital also target non-speculative "virgin territories" that may in turn reproduce marketization through an ideological inscription on less tangible products; notably, culture, knowledge, and communication. In this vein, Núria Almirón (2010) documents the convergence of interests between the owners of media groups and the commanding heights of finance when media circle back to promote the logic of financialization in symbolic forms.

Homo Economicus?

Why dwell on economic doctrines? An answer implicates the economic base (or structure) and the superstructure that has been the subject of extended discussion

(Hobsbawm, 1962/1996, 1973; Martín Serrano, 1986/2004). Where the economic base is concerned, material allocations of resources are broadly steered by prevailing economic programs and set the conditions of everyday life. Pulling harder on this thread, economic programs can be characterized as generating not just industries and their associated products that are privileged by particular configurations of the economy; the economic base also fashions, in diffuse terms, the kind of culture and subjectivity (superstructure) that is enabling toward the continued perpetuation of the base's social relations of production. A medieval feudal economy, in this view, pivots on agriculture; and it cultivates not only crops but a static, fatalistic kind of subject who accepts his or her role in the means of production (reinforced by legal and religious regimes that support the economic base (Jones, 2006, pp. 27–34). Whether a society (even provisionally) tolerates mass poverty and widespread lack of essentials (shelter, healthcare, schooling) can be read back to its economic program and the superstructures that support it—superstructures that may extend from the vulgarities of mass media (which constitute an industry with an interest in the economics of deregulation) to the rarified enclave of the university's economics seminar. Hard-edged, deeply classist neoliberalism may thusly be (re)packaged in carnivalesque and convulsive “fun”; notice, for example, Martin Scorsese's wide-eyed version of Jordan Belfort's life, in which being a market buccaneer is shrouded in booze and “babes,” a rascal's “rebellion” and redemption (*The Wolf of Wall Street*, 2014).

A liberalized market economy is characterized by relative dynamism and convulsive shifts (boom-to-bust cycles, “sunrise” as well as declining “sunset” industries). In turn, a market economy hails a subject more adapted to the constant change and newness (new fads, new product lines that, in turn, stimulate cascades of consumption). Indeed, the subject may be recruited into regarding one's self as a monadic “corporation” within a competitive ecosystem, with associated practices such as writing “mission statements” for “Me, Inc.” (Goss, 2000)! In a provocative analysis, Mark Andrejevic (2004) theorizes the contemporary configuration of the base and superstructure. He argues that the more recent crystallization of a post-industrial, service/information economy in Atlantic societies has spawned the culture and subjectivity that further enable and advance its economic model. In particular, Andrejevic posits the rise of a new subject who welcomes surveillance in order to be better “served” by niche-driven market mechanisms that pivot on consumer information within a milieu of “mass customization”.

Other configurations of the relations of production present their associated superstructure. Stalinism imposed an anti-dialectical, determinist approach in which the sphere of culture was understood as subordinated to the material objectives of the Communist Party (industrialization, economic growth, centralization and concentration of economic resources, as well as maintenance of the party's power). According to British cultural-Marxist Edward P. Thompson (1957), the

ideology of Stalinism denied the creative and conscious agency of human labor, and thus the value of people as agents in the making of history. The anti-Soviet revolts of 1968 for democratic and humanistic socialism in several satellite countries was a refutation of the technocratic model of globalization forwarded in the Soviet Union; human subjects do engage in the active transformation of society, even in the teeth of significant constraints.

However, doctrinal differences aside, carnivalesque neoliberalism and stone-faced Stalinism covertly share the conviction that economic doctrine produces the necessary subjectivity to live through its preferred “facts on the ground”. In the course of her government’s efforts to turn Britain from a measure of social democracy to an unfettered market, Margaret Thatcher thusly expressed the faith: “Economics are the method ... but the object is to change the soul” (quoted in Harvey, 2005, p. 23). While acknowledging that the subject is surely and deeply impacted through prevailing conditions of the economic system and its associated culture, we are also alive to the slippages between base, superstructure—and subjectivity. Moreover, as exploitation and the harsh disciplines of market-driven scarcities are ratcheted up, idealizations about the neoliberal economic model are increasingly difficult to square with its résumé of abject economic failure as well as the dire experience of everyday “market discipline.” For these reasons, neoliberalism has spawned discontents and ruptures.

Out of this discussion, some general principles can be derived that provide a structure for the case studies addressed in this collection. The first principle is that culture operates within pre-existing material conditions (capitalist globalization’s milieu). The second principle posits *relative* (not *absolute*) autonomy (Jones, 2006, p. 34) in the functioning of the economic and the cultural spheres, even as base and superstructure bi-directionally influence each other. That is, the economic system and the culture that surrounds it may be construed as on a leash that is longer and looser—or shorter and tighter—depending on the particulars of time and place. The degree of autonomy between base and superstructure and their dynamic, dialectical relations are finally a matter of observation in specific case study analyses that also take into account relationships of power that animate prevailing conditions; and power is the topic that we will now address.

Theorizing Power

In his prolific, Weberian approach that focuses on power’s institutional and cultural dimensions, Manuel Castells posits that, “power is the relational capacity that enables a social actor to influence asymmetrically the decisions of other social actor(s) in ways that favor the empowered actor’s will, interests, and values” (2009, p. 10). As Castells recognizes, coercion and domination are central to some forms of exercising power, while other methods operate in more subtle (arguably, more

flexible and enduring) registers by recruiting subjects' more-or-less willing participation (cf. Eagleton, 1991; Foucault, 1977). Castells is, however, cognizant that power is not reproduced inertly: "When resistance and rejection become significantly stronger than compliance and acceptance, power relationships are transformed: the terms of the relationship change, the powerful lose power, and ultimately there is a process of institutional or structural change, depending on the extent of the transformation of power relationships" (2009, p. 11). At the same time, holders of power do not readily cede its privilege and authority; pushback against power is perpetually in motion even if (as a matter of definition) it is typically below a revolutionary threshold.

Cogent analysis of power and communication has emerged from the materialist approach to media power that has been developed by a team of scholars at Goldsmiths College of University of London (a group that includes Nick Couldry, James Curran, Natalie Fenton, and Des Freedman). Their approach to power is alert to relationships of domination, dependence, and resistance between actors and institutions. These investigators analyze the material relations that organize the allocation of resources that drive inequality within and beyond the media system. From this perspective, structural inequalities of power in society are replicated in the material relations that impact the media; to wit, operations of the State, the market, elite networks, patterns of ownership, policy-making and regulation, corporate strategy, as well as disparities of audience access to informational briefings. In other words, a chain of material relations fosters the production of symbolic goods, such as news, that reproduce established patterns of power in both the media and their associated social system (Curran, 2011, pp. 28–60).

At the same time, power relations are not frozen in place as they are impacted by contradictions that provoke disruptive *dis*-adjustments as concerns the media. Disruption tends to be resolved through subsumption (or integration) of opposing and alternative practices by market and State forces. In this vein, consider the Internet's trajectory from an uninhibited, free-fire zone that was disruptive of prevailing business models, to an entity that is increasingly co-opted to and bent to the will of prevailing centers of power (Curran, Fenton, & Freedman, 2012; Mackinnon, 2012; Morozov, 2011). These critical scholars, however, acknowledge the possibility of expanding the spectrum of opinion presented by the media and provoking transformations when the power relations oscillate and vacillate. For instance, while rejecting the logics of what he describes as the pluralist-driven "chaos" of presumptively diffused power (2014, pp. 19–22), Freedman excavates the conditions that prompted the British tabloid *Daily Mirror* to adopt an anti-Iraq War position. These conditions included divisions among elites, audience pro-activity, and the paper's market-niche problems with declining newspaper circulation. Contradictions coalesced around the newspaper and finally erupted on the tabloid page. In this spirit of being alive to power *and* contradiction, the

chapters in this volume track the centripetal and centrifugal forms of globalization acted out through media—text and practice—in the contemporary milieu.

STRUCTURE OF THE VOLUME

In the effort to make sense of the structures of globalization, the volume is organized as follows. Section I is entitled “Interviews” and the reader becomes party to two extended exchanges with a pair of leading academic investigators of globalization-related phenomena. Section II of the book, called “Texts,” seeks clues about globalization through its insinuation into mediated forms. This section addresses media new and old: television films, online travel web pages, blues music, and the political valences of Portuguese neofado. Section III takes up “Practices” that tend to be more diffused than media texts. The analyses developed in this section largely orient to institutional concomitants of globalization that precede the subject’s experience of it. The line-up of Section III investigates an array of sites in which subjects may be always already inserted into practices: the trajectory of the European university, campaigns to shape journalistic practice during the Cold War, the posture of intellectuals *vis-à-vis* globalization, and the ideology that animates the Facebook experience.

What, more specifically, does each chapter argue? In Chapter 1’s interview, Joan Pedro-Carañana queries Natalie Fenton on capitalism, media ownership, and activism in the current globalization environment. Natalie’s focus on equality as the keystone to substantially realized democracy is a motif that runs through her observations. Even as she details her own participation in media activism, Natalie argues against media-centricism and orients to the fundamentals of the economic base as preferred nexus of political action.

In Chapter 2, Rae Lynn Schwartz-DuPre converses with Radha S. Hegde. In their exchange, Radha stresses the continuing perils that surround constructions of identity in the new millennium in which suspicion and chauvinism have found new oxygen online, as in errant Internet sleuthing that followed the April 2013 terror attack in Boston. In mapping the coordinates of post-colonial theorization into the present through a variety of striking examples, Radha shows that enabling features of new media (for example, transmission of traditional food knowledge) are qualified by enduring social and economic hierarchies that gain new impetus from globalization’s advance.

In the opening of the “Texts” section in Chapter 3, Brian Michael Goss approaches globalization via two television films, Home Box Office’s production of *Generation Kill* (2008) and the British Broadcasting Corporation’s *Occupation* (2009). Applying Edward W. Said’s concept of “Orientalism” to the two texts (Said, 1979), Brian posits that *Occupation* clearly privileges British subjects and reproduces

Orientalist assumptions about Iraqis as, for example, intrinsically chaotic and materially deprived. However, *Occupation* also constructs several narratively significant Iraqi characters who resist quick-sketch caricature and disrupt Orientalist tropes. By contrast, *Generation Kill* unswervingly enacts a strong form of Orientalism in which Iraqis never emerge from the background—or from pre-modern tropes. In *Generation Kill*, Iraqis babble incoherently, exhibit no capacity to organize themselves, and die. Even if the US is often not efficacious in *Generation Kill*, it is always the active and “complex” agent that sets the tempo. Brian concludes by cross-examining the theoretical status of cosmopolitanism in the light of the case-study texts’ commitment to differentialist logics.

Profit-driven marketers have designed specialized campaigns targeting the ostensibly high-spending Lesbian, Gay, Bi-Sexual, Transgender, and Queer (LGBTQ) niche. In Chapter 4’s response, Christopher Chávez and Mary Rachel Gould examine Online Travel Agencies’ (OTAs) ideologically saturated recruitment of LGBTQ travelers. Based on a critical reading of the visual and written rhetoric of the three major online travel sites (Expedia, Orbitz, and Travelocity), Christopher and Mary argue that OTAs create global nodal points of economic and cultural privilege by advertising certain locations as “gay friendly”. In doing so, OTAs perpetuate social and economic inequalities that are endemic to globalization—and, at the same time, the industry’s niche-marketing reproduces pre-fabricated, de-politicized concepts of LGBTQ identity and history as they intersect with “feel good” prerogatives of tourism.

In Chapter 5, Josep Pedro-Carañana examines the globalization of blues music, from its original development in the African American community to its current globalized status. Focusing on the genre’s rural, urban, and transatlantic dimensions, the discussion addresses the main musical forms, cultural meanings, and intercultural relationships embedded in blues. Josep also explores some of the deeply entrenched identity and representational conflicts in blues culture while conceptualizing mythical figures such as the “outsider storyteller”. He proposes a chronological framework with three overlapping historical periods: the agrarian Jim Crow era (1876–1965), the post–World War II industrial society (1945–1975), and the contemporary, “post-industrial” globalized context (1975 to the present). This approach demonstrates that blues has developed through a dialectical relationship with the economic structure of the base, evolving through different geographically grounded subgenres and cultural productions. At the same time, Josep contests limiting, linear narratives about the genre by emphasizing the interconnection of the rural, urban, and transatlantic aspects of blues.

In Chapter 6, Michael Arnold employs Lisbon’s indie neofado musical scene as a metonym for a cross-section of Portuguese youth. Though eager to belong to a European and global community, they are increasingly uneasy with the disintegration of national identity/sovereignty as a product of Anglophone cultural

hegemony and European Union-driven economic austerity. Michael discusses OqueStrada's 2009 neofado release *Tasca Beat*, with an accent on the band's cultural proposal of "going local" with its attendant sustainability and economic multiplier effects. Without nostalgia, OqueStrada presents a complicated stance regarding globalization, as the band celebrates Lisbon's new immigrant communities, yet resists cultural homogenization and the loss of Portugal's sovereignty. In Michael's account, the band members are not nationalists indulging a nostalgic version of Portugal, but valorize the nation's patrimony in advocating local commerce. To employ a musical term from a different context, Michael's chapter also executes a compelling segue into the volume's third section that addresses practices more squarely.

Section III's cross-examination of "Practices" is inaugurated with Joan Pedro-Carañana's contribution in Chapter 7. At a time when higher education institutions are facing complex processes of restructuring and reimagining, Joan provides a socio-historical framework for understanding the ongoing reforms proposed by the so-called "Bologna process" or European Higher Education Area (EHEA). By excavating the main missions of universities during the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, and the post-World War II consensus, Joan analyzes the reforms proposed by the Bologna process and their profound implications for both knowledge and society. In contrast to Enlightenment educational views, and in alignment with the positivist counter-utopia that was forwarded during industrialization, the EHEA fashions a blueprint for incorporation of universities, knowledge, and human subjects into the processes of production of private profits. Joan critiques this mission for the university as it prioritizes the reproduction of cultural frameworks demanded by the globalized capitalist system.

Drawing on extensive archival research, Marion Wrenn's Chapter 8 examines the American initiative to reorient international journalists in the aftermath of World War II through seminars organized by the United States' government and private sector. The seminars circulated seemingly "commonsense" mid-century ideals about American journalism—particularly the strangely American notion of a "free press" as formally independent of State intervention but wholly enmeshed with the marketplace. Through the seminars, professional journalists from across the globe were seduced and enlisted as potential cultural cold warriors. While the seminars' purpose was to advance democracy and thwart the global spread of totalitarianism, they also fostered a highly social professional exchange. The seminars manufactured what Marion calls "strategic sociability" and illuminated a heady mix of a utopian belief in cultural exchange and the social power of market-driven consumerism that was marshaled to recruit international journalists to Cold War objectives.

Staša Tkalec's contribution in Chapter 9 addresses the role of contemporary intellectuals in the promotion of human rights. She observes that the new

millennium has been marked by the idea of human rights as presumed *lingua franca* of the globalized world. However, the discrepancy between ubiquitous (and affirmative) discourses on rights and their poorly realized implementation is striking. Staša assays to understand the relative absence of intellectuals in the contemporary public human rights discourse via an account of the opportunities and constraints for intellectuals in the era of globalization. In her attempt to transcend the question of where have all the intellectuals gone, she presents a case study of the 1960s Russell Tribunals. From this forum's discourse, Staša teases out the emancipatory potential of human rights beyond the existing (constrained, liberal) human rights law.

In Chapter 10, Delia Dumitrica confronts the daily Facebook News Feeds that compile content produced by institutions, targeted advertising, and trending news in a customized update on the world; all delivered through a personalized algorithm that contrasts with “top-down” mass media systems. Via an auto-ethnographical method, Delia performs an ideological critique of the symbolic production of the “global imaginary” through Facebook’s cycle of production, circulation, and consumption of symbolic content. She contends that Facebook’s production of the “global imaginary” appears to merely mirror our choices. In turn, “choice” is celebrated as the epitome of agency and central to a neoliberal ideology that has worked to efface and discredit the effects of social structures. While granting that Facebook has facilitated social ties, Delia recovers the fact that its opportunities are a largely class-based privilege. Moreover, the “global imaginary” shaped by Facebook participation aligns with a neoliberal order where the expression of one’s preciously cultivated individuality is the normative strategy for leading a “good life.”

Finally, in the “Afterword”, Cameron McCarthy meets the mighty task of pulling together the sweeping panorama presented by this raft of interviews and case studies. He telescopes in on city space within the global, neoliberal regime; to wit, the city’s continuities with hard-edged, established hierarchies that strate classes and ascriptive identities, as well as gesturing toward challenges to that regime.

DIRECTIONS, INTERVENTIONS

We are painfully aware that a volume such as this can capture only a series of snapshots of global currents. Furthermore, we are also cognizant that, as the volume is partly grounded in the “Globalization: Texts · Practices · Performances” conference that was convened in Madrid in April 2014, some of the “perspectivism” that shapes academic conferences may be replayed. To wit, delegates from the Atlantic societies of the “global north” (North America, Western Europe) travel