

Studies in Biblical Greek

Verbal Aspect
in the Greek
of the New
Testament,
with
Reference to
Tense and
Mood

Stanley E. Porter

PETER LANG

This detailed work in Greek linguistics argues that the semantic category of synthetic verbal aspect provides a suggestive and workable linguistic model for explaining the range of uses of the tense-forms in Greek. The author addresses in particular those studying the hellenistic Greek of the New Testament, although those interested in Greek language from other periods, and in systemic linguistics and more general questions related to the study of ancient languages will benefit as well. This book will serve both as a textbook for advanced language classes, and as a reference tool for Greek language research.

“Stanley Porter has explored the significance of verbal aspect as a category for the investigation of the Greek of the New Testament, and has produced some important conclusions. His work is creative, but also meticulous in its attention to detail. He takes full account of recent developments in linguistics and argues on the basis of evidence from a wide range of primary sources. Exegetes will need to reconsider some traditional assumptions about the adequacies of grammatical models which depend solely on tense distinctions. Dr. Porter has anticipated possible objections to his arguments and for this reason has considered such issues as the possible influence of its Semitic background on the language of the New Testament. I have no hesitation in commending Dr. Porter’s study.”

Anthony Thiselton,
Professor of Theology
University of Nottingham
England

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Verbal Aspect in the Greek
of the New Testament,
with Reference
to Tense and Mood

Studies in Biblical Greek

D.A. Carson
General Editor

Vol. 1



PETER LANG

New York • San Francisco • Bern • Baltimore
Frankfurt am Main • Berlin • Wien • Paris

Stanley E. Porter

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EDITOR'S PREFACE	ix
AUTHOR'S PREFACE	xi
INTRODUCTION: GREEK GRAMMAR AS HERMENEUTICS, WITH AN INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEMIC LINGUISTICS	1
0. INTRODUCTION	1
1. RECENT DISCUSSION OF LINGUISTICS IN BIBLICAL STUDIES	2
2. SYSTEMIC LINGUISTICS: AN OVERVIEW	7
CHAPTER 1: RESEARCH INTO TENSE, <i>AKTIONSART</i> AND ASPECT	17
0. INTRODUCTION	17
1. HELLENISTIC GREEK GRAMMARS	18
2. 19TH-CENTURY AND TRADITIONAL GRAMMARS	22
3. COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY AND <i>AKTIONSART</i>	26
4. TRANSITIONAL APPROACHES	35
5. STRUCTURAL LINGUISTICS AND ASPECT	39
6. GRAMMARS OF HELLENISTIC GREEK FROM WINER TO THE PRESENT	50
7. CONCLUSION	65
APPENDIX 1A: PERFECTIVIZING PREFIXES	66
APPENDIX 1B: DISSENTING THEORIES	71
CHAPTER 2: A SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS OF GREEK VERBAL ASPECT	75
0. INTRODUCTION	75
1. GRAMMATICALIZATION OF TENSE	76
2. INTRODUCTION TO VERBAL ASPECT	83

3. DEICTIC INDICATORS AND TEMPORAL REFERENCE	98
4. STANDARD PATTERNS OF VERBAL USAGE	102
5. CONCLUSION	107
CHART 4: A SYSTEMIC NETWORK OF GREEK VERBAL ASPECT	109
CHAPTER 3: THE INFLUENCE OF SEMITIC LANGUAGES ON VERBAL ASPECT IN THE NEW TESTAMENT	111
0. INTRODUCTION	111
1. THE LANGUAGES OF PALESTINE AND THE NATURE OF NT GREEK	111
2. POSSIBLE INSTANCES OF SEMITIC INFLUENCE UPON NT GREEK	117
3. GREEK OF THE NT AS HELLENISTIC GREEK	141
4. CONCLUSION	156
APPENDIX 3A: SEMITIC VERBAL SYSTEMS	157
APPENDIX 3B: MARTIN'S SYNTACTICAL EVIDENCE	160
CHAPTER 4: THE AORIST AND PRESENT TENSES IN THE INDICATIVE MOOD	163
0. INTRODUCTION	163
PART I	163
1. THE MOODS AND ATTITUDES OF GREEK	163
2. MARKEDNESS AND THE ASSERTIVE ATTITUDE	178
PART II	182
3. PERFECTIVE ASPECT: RECENT DISCUSSION	182
4. PAST-REFERRING IMPERFECTIVE AND PERFECTIVE ASPECTS	188
5. INTRODUCTION TO NON PAST-REFERRING TENSES	208
6. NON PAST-REFERRING PERFECTIVE AND IMPERFECTIVE ASPECTS	211
7. CONCLUSION	239
APPENDIX 4A: PL. PHAEDR. 244-56 AND PLB. 6.24-25	240
CHAPTER 5: THE STATIVE ASPECT AND PERFECT TENSE	245
0. INTRODUCTION	245
1. MARKEDNESS AND THE STATIVE ASPECT	245
2. THE PERFECT AS STATIVE ASPECT	251
3. PRAGMATIC USAGE OF THE STATIVE ASPECT	260

4. VIABILITY OF THE PERFECT FORM DURING THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD	270
5. Οἶδα AND γινώσκω	281
6. THE PLUPERFECT	287
7. CONCLUSION	289
CHAPTER 6: CONDITIONAL STATEMENTS	291
0. INTRODUCTION	291
1. MAJOR VIEWS	291
2. NEW PROPOSAL	294
3. APODOSIS	316
4. CONCLUSION	320
CHAPTER 7: THE AORIST, PRESENT AND PERFECT IN THE NON-INDICATIVE MOODS	321
0. INTRODUCTION	321
1. THE SUBJUNCTIVE AND OPTATIVE	321
2. THE IMPERATIVE: COMMANDS AND PROHIBITIONS	335
3. THE PERFECT IN THE NON-INDICATIVE MOODS	361
4. CONCLUSION	362
CHAPTER 8: THE AORIST, PRESENT AND PERFECT PARTICIPLES AND INFINITIVES	365
0. INTRODUCTION	365
1. THE AORIST AND PRESENT PARTICIPLES AND INFINITIVES	366
2. THE PERFECT INFINITIVE AND PARTICIPLE	392
3. CONCLUSION	400
CHAPTER 9: THE FUTURE FORM: TENSE, ASPECT OR MOOD?	403
0. INTRODUCTION	403
1. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FUTURE FORM	403
2. FUTURE AS TENSE AND ASPECT	404
3. SEMANTIC DEFINITION OF THE FUTURE FORM	409
4. PRAGMATIC IMPLICATURE OF THE FUTURE FORM	416
5. PROSPECTIVE USE OF THE FUTURE FORM	427
6. CONCLUSION	438

CHAPTER 10: VAGUE VERBS AND PERIPHRASTICS:	
'EXCEPTIONS THAT PROVE THE RULE'	441
0. INTRODUCTION	441
1. DEFINITION OF ASPECTUAL VAGUENESS	442
2. PERIPHRASTIC CONSTRUCTIONS IN THE SECONDARY LITERATURE	447
3. Εἰμί AS GREEK AUXILIARY VERB IN PERIPHRASTICS	449
4. DEFINITION OF PERIPHRASTIC IN GREEK	452
5. FORMAL CATEGORIES OF PERIPHRASTIC IN NT GREEK	454
6. CONCLUSION	478
APPENDIX 10A: PERIPHRASTIC CONSTRUCTIONS	479
APPENDIX 10B: CATENATIVE CONSTRUCTIONS	487
 BIBLIOGRAPHY	 493
 INDEX	 545
NEW TESTAMENT	545
EXTRA-BIBLICAL GREEK	567
OLD TESTAMENT AND APOCRYPHA	580

EDITOR'S PREFACE

Studies in Biblical Greek is an occasional series of monographs designed to promote and publish the latest research into the Greek of both Testaments. The Series does not assume that biblical Greek is a distinct dialect within the larger world of koine: on the contrary, the assumption is that biblical Greek is part and parcel of the hellenistic Greek that dominated the Mediterranean world from about 300 B.C. to A.D. 300. If the Series focuses on the corpora of the Old and New Testaments, it is because these writings generate major interest around the world, not only for religious but also for historical and academic reasons.

Research into the broader evidence of the period, including epigraphical and inscriptional materials as well as literary works, is welcome in the Series, provided the results are cast in terms of their bearing on biblical Greek. In the same way, the Series is devoted to fresh philological, syntactical and linguistic study of the Greek of the biblical books, with the subsidiary aim of displaying the contribution of such study to accurate exegesis.

It is particularly gratifying to salute Dr. Stanley E. Porter's revision of his doctoral dissertation as the inaugural volume of the Series. Of few dissertations can it rightly be said that the work is both meticulously researched and frankly ground-breaking. This is one of the exceptions. I particularly welcome this study because of its explanatory power. In the dominant Greek grammars of our day, students are taught such labels as "historic present" and "gnomic aorist," but even where they are accurate descriptions of particular pragmatic uses it is not clear why an "historic present" might be called up to displace an aorist, why a "gnomic aorist" should be found where some might have expected a present. Dr. Porter's work is the first attempt to present a fully rigorous analysis of Greek verbal aspect, applying the categories of systemic linguistics to New Testament Greek with a

competence and a comprehensiveness that spans two major fields of learning. The result is a theory that provides more than labels: it explains.

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

The major assertion of this work in biblical Greek linguistics is that the category of synthetic verbal aspect--a morphologically-based semantic category which grammaticalizes the author/speaker's reasoned subjective choice of conception of a process--provides a suggestive and workable linguistic model for explaining the range of uses of the tense forms in Greek. An introduction places this work within the fields of linguistics and hermeneutics. Chapter 1 traces the history of Greek grammatical discussion from the ancients to the moderns, showing that tense-forms have traditionally been explained in terms of temporal categories, but that in some recent research the importance of verbal aspect has been recognized. Chapter 2 sets out a model of the three major aspectual categories using systemic linguistics, in which a verbal network consisting of distinct, formally-based verbal systems in opposition is posited as providing a stringent non time-based model for understanding Greek verbal usage. Chapter 3 responds to a possible objection that tense usage in the NT is not typical on the basis of Semitic influence by showing that in no cases of verbal aspectual usage is there evidence of interference from Semitic languages. Questions regarding multilingualism and the nature of NT Greek are discussed. Chapter 4 treats the major aspectual opposition in Greek: perfective (Aorist) and imperfective (Present/Imperfect) in the assertive attitude (Indicative), explaining the range of pragmatic uses--historic Present, gnomic tenses, etc.--as manifestations of essential semantic aspectual categories. Chapter 5 applies the same procedure to the stative (Perfect) aspect. Chapter 6 analyses conditional sentences, a major discourse mode in Greek, using non time-based aspectual categories and attitude of the protasis for classification. Chapter 7 discusses the Aorist, Present and Perfect tenses in the non-assertive attitude, including Subjunctive, Optative, and Imperative. Chapter 8 applies aspect and syntax to discussion of several problematic areas regarding the Participle and Infinitive. Chapter 9 shows that the Future form is not fully aspectual or attitudinal, but that it

grammaticalizes expectation. And chapt. 10 accounts for the few exceptions to the rule that verbs occur in aspectual opposition by showing that such verbs--e.g. φημί, εἰμί--play a special role in the verbal structure, especially the latter, which forms a vital component of periphrastics. Catenative constructions are treated in an appendix.

This work has benefited from the help and suggestions of many friends and colleagues: Mr. N.J.C. Gotteri (Sheffield), Rev. Prof. J.W. Rogerson (Sheffield), Rev. Dr. A.C. Thiselton (St. John's College, Durham), Dr. G.C. Horrocks (Cambridge), Mr. P.E. Satterthwaite (Cambridge and Manchester), Dr. J. Shanor (Irvine, California), and Rev. Prof. D.A. Carson (Cambridge and Chicago), who made the resources of GRAMCORD available, as well as invited this volume to inaugurate the series, *Studies in Biblical Greek*, from Peter Lang. Special thanks also go to Michael Thompson for advice on computer preparation of this manuscript, and especially to my parents. This work was substantially complete in July 1987, although I have tried to include later material which has come to my attention.

Presentation format conforms to MLA standards, with a few noteworthy exceptions: biblical abbreviations follow those in *JBL*; extra-biblical abbreviations are by author abbreviations found in Liddell/Scott, with abbreviated English titles of works (editions are standard; departures from them are noted); and references to secondary sources within the body of the work are by author and (usually) the first noun of the title, except for grammars, where the author's name alone is used.

INTRODUCTION: GREEK GRAMMAR AS HERMENEUTICS, WITH AN INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEMIC LINGUISTICS

0. INTRODUCTION. This work, integrating both linguistic theory and analysis of numerous examples from a sample language,¹ applies a version of systemic linguistics to discussion of the semantic category of verbal aspect in the Greek of the NT. The major assertion is that the category of synthetic verbal aspect--a morphologically-based semantic category which grammaticalizes the author/speaker's reasoned subjective choice of conception of a process--provides a suggestive, workable and powerful linguistic model for explaining the range of uses of the tense-forms in Greek. To my knowledge this is the first rigorous and thorough application of systemic linguistics to the verbal network of ancient Greek.

¹Although a range of ancient Greek writings is drawn upon, the major focus is the Greek of the NT analysed in terms of a single linguistic model. This comprises a profitable corpus for the following reasons: (1) One cohesive document includes a variety of texts (e.g. narrative, non-narrative, etc.) by at least eight authors. (2) The corpus compares favourably in size to other major collections analysed by scholars. For example, Mandilaras (59), in his treatment of verbal aspect in the papyri, bases his findings upon papyri with 3,525 individual verb forms, compared to the 28,000 contained in the NT. The text of the NT, by comparison, is approximately as large as if not larger than the corpus of Homer's *Iliad*, of Homer's *Odyssey*, of Sophocles, of Aeschylus, of Thucydides, of Xenophon's *Hellenica* and *Anabasis* combined, and almost as large as that of Herodotus, to name only a few well-known extra-biblical authors. Individual biblical books are comparable in size to other well-known classical texts: e.g. Plato's *Apology* approximates the size of Paul's *Romans* or *1 Corinthians*. All of these have served as primary texts for scholarly analysis (e.g. Chantaine [2 vols.]; Moorhouse). (3) The Greek of the NT comprises a reasonable representation of the common language variety of the hellenistic world (see chapt. 3). (4) Karleen (*Syntax*, 3) states, "little modern syntactic work has been done on [the NT]."

1. RECENT DISCUSSION OF LINGUISTICS IN BIBLICAL STUDIES. Since Barr published his *Semantics* (1961), biblical scholars have been forced to reckon with the role modern linguistics plays in interpretation of the sacred texts of Christianity (other scholars argued similarly before Barr [e.g. Birkeland, "Reflexions"] but he did so with persuasive force; see Tångberg, "Linguistics"; Erickson, *Barr*, who summarizes Barr's work up to 1974). Not all scholars welcomed Barr's penetrating comments about various abuses of modern structural linguistics (e.g. Friedrich, "Semasiologie"; Hill, *Words*, esp. 1-9; Boman, Review; Barr responded to critics in "Sense"),² like contrasting Hebrew and Greek thought patterns on the basis of perceived linguistic differences, using questionable etymologies to establish lexical data, and confusing word and concept, to name a few (see also Barr, "Hypostatization"; *Words*, *passim*, etc. [see bibliography]). Insights from structural linguistics were first appropriated in the study of lexis (e.g. Sawyer, *Semantics*; Burres, *Semantics*; Silva, *Change*), but of late an ever-growing number of scholars have shown sensitivity to the importance of various forms of structural linguistics in understanding grammar as well, resulting in monograph-length studies devoted to biblical syntax and semantics (e.g. Kieffer, *Essais*; Louw, *Semantics*; Silva, *Words*; Schmidt, *Grammar*; Wonneberger, *Syntax*; Nida *et al.*, *Style*; Levinsohn, *Connections*).³

Biblical Greek scholars cannot be blamed for being overly cautious in adopting structural linguistics, especially in semantics,⁴ since the field itself is one of ever-increasing diversity and specialization in method and approach. Most linguists agree that semantics is concerned with meaning in language, although its relation to such areas as phonology, morphology, and syntax is a matter of wide disagreement. In one sense, semantics must always have been at the heart of analysis of language, since to recognize a sound or written unit as significant is to attribute some 'meaning' to it. In another sense, however, the

²Much has been written on this issue. To the complaint often voiced that Barr was destructive rather than constructive cf. Max Black, *Models*, 242: "There will always be competent technicians, who, in Lewin's words, can be trusted to build the highways 'over which the streamlined vehicles of a highly mechanized logic, fast and efficient, can reach every important point on fixed tracks.' But clearing intellectual jungles is also a respectable occupation. Perhaps every science must start with metaphor and end with algebra; and perhaps without the metaphor there would never have been any algebra."

³Not all these studies are beyond criticism: see Ronca, Review; Collinge, Review of Wonneberger; Hewitt, Review. The best survey of semantics from a biblical scholar's perspective is Thiselton, "Semantics of NT Interpretation"; cf. Nida, "Implications"; Poythress, "Analyzing."

⁴Gibson (*Logic*) is quick to point out the shortcomings of various post-Barr biblical scholars, but his criticism in many instances seems overly harsh: e.g. he castigates Moule for entitling his book *Idiom Book*, when it treats the wider concerns of grammar and not specifically what is called idiom in linguistics (118-22). Cf. Thiselton, Review.

study of semantics as a discipline is only about a century old, and much more recent as an accepted discipline for the linguist. Though Bréal first coined the term semantics in his *Essai* (1897), semantics was long out of fashion primarily because of the influence of Bloomfield (1933), who argued against mentalistic theories of meaning and strove for a 'scientific' estimation of language (*Language*, esp. 139-57).⁵ The last thirty years, however, have seen a significant increase in concern for semantics as part of the science of linguistics, in Britain beginning especially with the work of Firth (esp. *Papers; Selected Papers*) and Ullmann (esp. *Semantics; Principles*) and culminating to date in Lyons's two volumes, *Semantics* (see also *Structural Semantics*, esp. 1-90; *Introduction*, 400-81; *Language, Meaning*; and *Language and Linguistics*, 136-75; cf. Leech, *Semantics*; Palmer, *Semantics*). The discussion of semantics has emphasized the fact that questions of meaning in language cannot be avoided, but that more precise, objective, and principled means must be formulated by which meaning may be discussed. (Robins [*History*, 198-240] traces the history of 20th-cent. linguistics, which is more complex than my short paragraph can convey.)

Kempson, for example, has recognized that linguistic theory is part of the general approach of the sciences, i.e. it is concerned with "construction of a system of abstract concepts which will account most adequately for the particular properties which languages display" (*Theory*, 1). From the standpoint of biblical studies this is very much akin to Thiselton's assertion that the semantics of biblical language is an aspect of hermeneutics ("Semantics of Biblical Language"). Many biblical scholars have come to realize that their analyses of biblical texts do not occur apart from an interpretative model, i.e. presuppositionless exegesis does not occur, but all interpretation occurs within an interpretative context (the classic essay is by Bultmann, "Exegesis"; cf. Stanton, "Presuppositions"; G. Turner, "Pre-Understanding"). It has long been a commonplace for discussion in the humanities (and is now increasingly being accepted in the hard sciences) that the paradigms or models of interpretation in a given discipline change or shift, perhaps not with regularity but on a regular basis, as subsequent generations reassess and expand a given body of data (Kuhn, *Structure*; cf. MacIntyre, "Crises"; Strug, "Paradigm").⁶ Such is the case with hermeneutical models used for interpretation of written texts, and, as importantly, such is the case with grammars of any language,

⁵A mentalistic theory is contained in Ogden/Richards, *Meaning*, though the book never uses the term "semantics" except in the appendix by Malinowski on primitive languages (298).

⁶For a critique see Suppe, *Structure*, esp. 1-232, 617-730. Also noteworthy is Popper, *Conjectures*, esp. 3-30. Application and assessment for theology are found in McFague, *Theology*, 67-144; Ratsch, *Philosophy*, esp. 13-105.

including (perhaps especially) an ancient language. As Hainsworth asserts, "Language, as described in grammars, is a convenient fiction" ("Greek," 856; Lyons [*Language and Linguistics*, 43] calls a language system a "theoretical construct"). This assertion implicitly contains an important distinction between the use of a language by a native speaker, and the grammarian's assessment of what transpires when a particular language is used (see Lyons, *Semantics*, 25-31; cf. *Language and Linguistics*, 38: "practical familiarity with language tends to stand in the way of its objective examination").

When the grammarian constructs his grammar of a language, using a particular linguistic model, what standards can be established for verification and falsification? The task for a "purely epigraphic language" (the terminology is from Collinge, "Reflexions," 79, cf. 79-82) such as ancient Greek is made more difficult because there are no native speakers to give opinions on the use of their language, the corpus of available material is limited, a skewing of registers (the oral level is completely missing) results, and the social context is difficult to recover. These factors, however, rather than causing despair should make more pressing the need to reevaluate constantly the interpretative models employed and to rely more heavily upon formal linguistic features of the extant corpus. Kempson notes that

the development of linguistic theory has generally followed a particular pattern: (i) constructing an abstract system (a theory) to account for a certain part of language structure, (ii) investigating the consequences of setting up such a system, and (iii) rejecting the system if it predicts certain facts which do not in fact obtain, and (iv) substituting an alternative system which is compatible with the facts. (*Theory*, 1)

Kempson realizes that the creation and alternation of theories is not quite so simple, though her abstraction of the process is essentially, though idealistically, correct. Several additional factors must also be taken into account. (1) Certain theories have a higher emotional appeal attached to them. This occurs for any number of reasons, but may include such factors as the personality of the originator of the theory or of its greatest proponents (Robins, *History*, 5), vested interests in the theory (like printing new textbooks), sheer length of time that a theory has been held, and supposed myths about its origin. In studying Greek grammar appeal is often made to the hellenistic grammarians and the comparative philologists of the 19th cent. as providing a definitive model (Gleason ["Contributions," 48] says, "Biblical scholars should deal just as critically with their tools as with their subject matter; by and large they have not done so with their linguistic tools"). (2) Competing theories may be current at the same time, especially in humanities subjects where the data are inherently ambiguous. In linguistics itself,

Chomskian and other forms of transformational-generative grammar, Pike's tagmemics, Hudson's word grammar, and systemic linguistics, to name only a few of the more prominent, are currently viable linguistic models within Britain. Though there is some question within the hard sciences about the co-existence of competing models (e.g. wave and particle theories of electromagnetic radiation), it is reasonable to believe that in the humanities, although certain models may appear better suited to particular purposes than others, models can co-exist (e.g. Wonneberger [*Syntax*] uses an early form of Chomskian grammar to create 37 rules for the syntax of NT Greek, but he does not discuss verbal aspect or *Aktionsart*). (3) The data for observation, especially in the humanities, are not objectively distanced from the observer, but are intimately part of the interpretative process, i.e. there are no uninterpreted facts (see Lyons, *Language and Linguistics*, 40-46). Instead, certain facts are agreed upon as constituting the essential data that must be explained (Kempson, *Theory*, 2; see Thiselton, *Two Horizons*, esp. 293ff., for similar findings in recent hermeneutical theory). In discussing Greek verbal structure, for example, an adequate explanation of the 'gnomic' uses of the tenses must constitute one portion of the data treated. As Gleason says, "the appraisal of a linguistic work can only be done within the framework of some general understanding of language, that is, a theory of linguistics" ("Contributions," 50).

In such a relativistic context, it may appear difficult to decide upon criteria for evaluation of a suitable linguistic model. Three criteria, however, demand satisfaction for any grammatical model to be considered adequate (P. Armstrong, "Conflict," 346-48):⁷ (i) in treating the data a model must be inclusive, i.e. it must incorporate within its explanatory model the largest number of pertinent pieces of data with the fewest items excluded;⁸ (ii) it must result in rational discourse, i.e. the results must be open for discussion and analysis by others, not merely grasped by the original investigator; and (iii) it must provide creative and provocative conclusions that offer potential for further analysis (Fawcett [*Linguistics*, 10] argues for the model that works). The construction of a grammar of a language, therefore, is a process of

⁷Lyons, *Structural Semantics*, 1-5; Robins, *History*, 5, cf. 3; Wonneberger, *Syntax*, 57-66; Moravcsik, "Introduction," 16-18, propose criteria of adequacy. See Butler, *Linguistics*, 227-30.

⁸This is reminiscent of the converse of Sapir's dictum that "all grammars leak." The ideal is to create a grammar that leaks less than competing models, always striving to incorporate greater numbers of pertinent facts. Collinge ("Reflexions," 83), however, provides a welcome reminder: "If an economic description of the *valor* of a structure, or a systemic term found in it, leaks some few apparently intractable examples, it is immaterial whether these are resolved by the admission that the analyst cannot know the full context or by his allowing for a feature of *parole* (provided one or other admission is credible)." Cf. similarly Berry, "Teacher," 53-61; McKay, 214.

constantly reassessing the data and making adjustments in the interpretative grammatical framework to arrive at a more convincing and powerful explanation. At times, when the previous model seems no longer satisfactory, the use of a new model becomes incumbent upon the linguist. Such a major shift in linguistics was seen as a result of the work of de Saussure, and such has occurred in the history of Greek grammar as well. (See chapt. 1 for historical survey and analysis.) Although the Stoic grammarians included analysis of kind of action, most of the hellenistic grammarians, while recognizing the importance of morphologically-based verbal categories, emphasized a primarily time-based framework (see Robins, *History*, 29; Lyons, *Introduction*, 313; idem, *Semantics*, 704), which failed significantly in its treatment of the Aorist, Present and Future tenses. This model provided the basis for virtually every subsequent treatment until the work of Curtius in the mid-19th cent., although some continue to utilize this framework. Curtius recognized that Greek verbs, although organized into categories according to morphology, were concerned primarily with describing 'kind of time' (*Zeitart*). This model was accepted readily by the comparative philologists of the 19th cent., like Delbrück and Brugmann, who utilized this understanding of Greek verbs to make detailed comparison of Greek with other languages. Despite its obvious limitations in attempting to arrive at objective descriptions of the various kinds of actions described, this model became the standard model for many classical Greek grammars and virtually every NT Greek grammar. In the 20th cent., after the advent of structural linguistics, several grammarians have attempted various approaches to the Greek verb on the basis of verbal aspect (to be defined below), having in common a structuralist view of the Greek language, i.e. the Greek language treated on its own terms comprises a self-referring language system. Only a few grammarians have proceeded very far in terms of a whole grammar of Greek, though serious efforts in the area are to be noted and welcomed (cf. Robertson, 32: "It is not possible then to write the final grammar of Greek either ancient or modern"; Cadbury, "Vocabulary," 153: "Although the language of the Greek NT has been studied as long and as intensively as that of any body of writings, the resulting knowledge in any generation cannot be regarded as final"). The theoretical models applied to analysis of the Greek language have traditionally been very few in number, and the previous attempts to describe Greek verbal usage have major, serious flaws that leave large portions of the language inadequately explained. In hopes that a new perspective might help to clarify several problematic areas, a previously relatively unused linguistic model, systemic linguistics, is drawn upon. (Butler [*Linguistics*, 40-57] treats systems

as the 'deep structure' of systemic linguistics; cf. Hudson, "Grammar," 804-05; Fawcett, *Linguistics*, 4-18, 69ff.)

2. SYSTEMIC LINGUISTICS: AN OVERVIEW. This analysis of Greek verbal structure exploits a functional linguistic model of fairly recent provenance, systemic linguistics (its chronological development is traced in Butler, *Linguistics*; see also Morley, *Introduction*; Hudson, "Grammar"; and the essays in Halliday/Martin, *Readings*; Halliday/Fawcett, *Developments*). It is a functional paradigm, thus it defines language in terms of its use as an instrument or tool for communication and social interaction. The study of any language, according to this model, occurs within a framework of actual language usage and provides a reciprocal relationship with its setting or context (see Dik, *Functional*, 4-5, who compares functional and what he calls formal [or transformational] paradigms; cf. Halliday, "Form," in Halliday, *Halliday*. I use "formal" as synonymous with morphologically-based features). In other words, the language must be studied in its "context of situation" (Firth, *Papers*, 144, 181, cf. 226).⁹ It is *prima facie* much more reasonable and potentially promising to approach a 'dead' language from a functional paradigm, in which instances of real language are cited, than from a 'formal' (psychological) model which must test user competence against an already finite set of sentences, with no possible recourse to native speakers for verification (see Lyons, *Structural Semantics*, 19. As Kempson [*Theory*, 7] says, "A collection of recorded speech events can therefore never record more than a subset of the required set of sentences"). The text of the NT constitutes a suitable corpus of material.

Systemic linguistics has generated a recent, significant increase in writing (see Butler, *Linguistics*, 231-44; add Halliday/Fawcett, *Developments*). Rather than summarize the entire theory, much of which addresses problems beyond the modest scope of this work, I assume basic principles found in major work by Fawcett, Berry, Butler, Gotteri, and Halliday, and select for special attention items most important for a discussion of verbal aspect in light of a systemic linguistic model. Gotteri makes a helpful start when he defines systemic linguistics as follows:

The term "systemic linguistics" can be used of any variant of system-structure theory in which language is interpreted as essentially a vast network of interrelated sets of options. The structure of a language (wordings or other syntagmatic realisations) is regarded as

⁹Systemic linguistics is the child of Firthian linguistics: see Firth, *Selected Papers*, esp. 1-11. For a critical assessment see Lyons, "Theory"; Butler, *Linguistics*, 4-13; Kress, *Halliday*, x-xv. It is possible to appreciate the work of Firth while recognizing the limitations of his programmatic, provocative and undeveloped statements.

manifesting choices made from interdependent paradigmatic options, which between them constitute the language's potential for conveying meaning. ("Comparison," 31)¹⁰

This definition contains several ideas that require comment.



a. Although from its inception systemic linguistics has shunned several of the principles of structuralist linguistics as defined by de Saussure (*Course*, esp. 65ff.; see Culler, *Saussure, passim*; cf. Fawcett, "Semantics," 132), several fundamental principles held in common are worth defining briefly (others that are assumed include the priority of synchronic over diachronic analysis and linguistics as a descriptive science). The first is the concept of system, although systemic linguistics has adapted this terminology. Within a given language, any meaningful component is part of a system of similar available choices, and these systems of choices are arranged into a network. As Halliday ("Sketch," 3, in Halliday, *Halliday*) says, "The system network is the grammar."¹¹ This work treats the verbal aspectual system as one of two major systems (the other being finiteness) of the Greek verbal network. Thus the verbal network in Greek, though it may have developed in any number of ways, developed within it an aspectual system with three individual aspect systems--perfective (>>Aorist); imperfective (>>>Present/Imperfect); stative (>>>Perfect/Pluperfect)--which must be considered in relation to each other, not independently and certainly not primarily in relation to Sanskrit or Latin, both languages often alluded to in discussion of ancient Greek (see e.g. Holt, *Etudes*, 5; Robertson, 46-48; McKay, "Syntax," 44-45, who recognize this problem). Although with an epigraphic language the corpus is limited, and analysis must be done from the interpreter's standpoint, the use of the concepts of system and network bind evaluation to actual instances in opposition to other possible selections within the language, primarily in terms of the language itself before formulation of translational equivalents.

b. Systemic linguistics sees language as a network which specifies the choices available in a given system and displays them graphically. Fawcett calls this "the expression of knowledge as procedures," in which "the availability of such a choice is always dependent on the selection of a logically prior feature" (*Linguistics*, 19; cf. Halliday, "Chain," 84-87; "Sketch," 3-6, in

¹⁰Morley, *Introduction*, v-vi: systemic linguistics accounts "for the nature of the linguistic system available to the native speaker of a language and for the selection of options which a person makes when using the language. . . . The meaning options are then realised as component elements of the language structure. . . ." Cf. Berry, *Introduction*, 1.21-32.

¹¹See Halliday, "Categories," 67-70; "Features," 58-73; "Structure," 122-31, all in Halliday, *Halliday*; Berry, *Introduction*, 1.141-76; Fawcett, *Linguistics*, 19-25 ("System networks are not merely a notation: they are a conceptual model" [20]); Butler, *Linguistics*, 40-45; J. Martin, "Meaning," 17; Hasan, "Dream," 185.

Halliday, *Halliday*). (1) To display a network is not to say that a speaker or writer actually makes a conscious choice at every juncture, since use of language by a native speaker lies beyond the scope of what this model strives to delineate. For example, it is implausible that a Greek speaker consciously determined--if he were to use an Imperative--that he would select the features [+aspectual / +finite: -assertion: +direction] to arrive at the realization »»Imperative, yet this is the set of semantic choices that he seems to make in Greek, nonetheless. (2) Movement through a network system does not imply temporal progression, but it does display a set of selected semantic features. Despite various conceivable ways of drawing the same network, each network ideally is elegant, i.e. it captures the generalizations of the language and breaks them down into their constituents in the most economical and symmetrical fashion (cf. Fawcett, "What," 8). To use a given language a speaker or writer makes certain increasingly specific semantic choices, i.e. the progression is from broader to more delicate, and these constitute the necessary conditions for subsequent choices, until a specific realization is arrived at. A realization statement for the verbal network consists of a selection expression of semantic features and a specific verb form, and the convention in this thesis for labelling this is »», e.g. »»Imperative (see below. Hierarchy is very important in systemic linguistics [Gotteri, "Comparison," 34]; see Berry, *Introduction*, 1.104-40; Martin, "Meaning," 16-26). For example, the entry condition for making a verbal statement as opposed to a verbless statement must be satisfied before selecting the semantic features of the verbal component itself, such as aspect and attitude. (3) In any given system not all choices are always available. Certain choices either are not possible or have never been felt necessary by the speakers of a given language (cf. Fawcett, *Linguistics*, 65-66, on "facilitation," in which certain combinations of choices are repeatedly made). Displaying the choices in a network graphically allows the implications to be grasped more firmly. For example, in classical Greek speakers grammaticalize three numerical designations for the verb: singular, dual, and plural. These might be arranged in a network display in two ways, since networks/systems may be drawn in various ways, according to their purposes. The one on the left makes no further distinction in delicacy but displays all three formal choices at the same level of specification. The one on the right sees an opposition between singular/non-singular, and treats the latter at a further level of delicacy as a second of two choices (see Fawcett, "What," 10-14). Capital letters are used for system names, and small letters for the terms within a system:




This system differs from the one in hellenistic Greek where it is no longer utilized by speakers (a number of earlier authors do not use it as well):




A speaker of classical Greek has three choices (or two sets of choices) available, whereas the speaker of hellenistic Greek has two choices, as the network display makes clear.


c. In systemic linguistics, there are two types of networks: non-semantic and semantic taxonomies (Gotteri ["When"] refers to "bogus networks" for non-semantic taxonomies; cf. Fawcett, "What"; Halliday, "Structure"; Martin, "Meaning," 30-37). Semantic taxonomies or networks have been treated above when speaking of choice within the verbal aspectual system. Non-semantic taxonomies are employed for displaying networks of formal choices. Their uses are four: "explaining the use of various forms," "checking the consistency of your terminology," checking "the completeness of your coverage," and determining "the applicability of your generalisations. . ." (Gotteri, "When," 7). The convention adopted here (suggested by Fawcett) is to utilize slanted-line diagrams in non-semantic taxonomies. For example, the formal choice of VOICE in Greek might be displayed thus:



The networks for semantic choices, i.e. semantic choices realized by formal means, use straight-line diagrams. Thus the diagram for VOICE might be as follows:


¹²So Zwicky, "Markedness," 133; cf. Fawcett, *Linguistics*, 19. Or should this be displayed as follows?





Semantic networks are at the heart of this thesis (Fawcett ["What," 6] gives the following criteria for a semantic network to be considered usable: realization rules, holistic, and generative/analytic).

Several other conventions for diagramming should be noted.



d. Whereas there is a dispute among systemic linguists whether formal categories convey meaning (Huddleston, "Features"; Fawcett, *Linguistics*, 5-6, 39-45; cf. idem, "What," 1-4), previous work in analysing verbal networks has shown that systemic linguistics benefits greatly when it makes an overt and conscious distinction between the form and function of a given linguistic item, especially with reference to verbal choices (see esp. Gotteri, "When," in response to idem, "Note"; Fawcett, *Linguistics*, 43; idem, "Generating," 157. Bolinger [*Meaning*, 1-21] cites Firthian linguistics as carrying discussion forward in this area; cf. Dahl, *Tense*, 21). For Greek this may not seem an important point to make, since it has long been recognized that Greek is a language with a relatively stable morphological basis, especially in the verb. In fact, it is all the more important to stress the relationship between the two.¹⁵ For example, Participle is a form, and in Greek it may be an element of the subject, predicate, adjunct (e.g. temporal or causal Participle), or complement

¹³Joseph, "Greek," 338.

¹⁴See Barber, "Voice," 16-24; cf. Rijksbaron, 126ff. Barber argues convincingly that the Middle and Passive should be linked, rather than the Active and Middle, which might be posited if the history of the language were being considered. The identical formal realization for Middle and Passive in the Present prompts thought that lack of formal differentiation may result in vagueness rather than ambiguity in VOICE, although the Middle itself seems vague (see Carson, *Fallacies*, 77-79). See my chapt. 10 on ambiguity and vagueness.

¹⁵See Panhuis, "Endings," 106-07, 110-11, who notes the form/functional relation of Person in Greek. Functionally 1st and 2d Person are shifters, and 3d Person is a non-shifter. These two are also related to the speaker, person spoken to, and something outside of these two (Jespersen, *Philosophy*, 54). These correspond to the sound symbolism of the endings: μ , σ , τ , moving from the least obstruent (μ) to a fricative (σ) to a complete stop (τ). Thus the "cline of person" is "underscored by a phonological hierarchy . . ." (110).


(object of a verb) in clause structure. To identify the form is not to delimit its function. For tense names, as will be seen below, it is especially crucial that formal and functional categories be distinguished, since the names Aorist, Present, Imperfect, Perfect, Pluperfect, Future, are all formal titles, formulated around at least three concepts: time, kind of action, and lack of specification (Lyons [*Semantics*, 704] relabels the tenses: Present imperfect [»»Present]; present Perfect [»»Perfect]; past Imperfect [»»Imperfect]; past Perfect [»»Pluperfect], calling the Pluperfect "misleading"). But these do not describe the use or function of any of these forms, e.g. the Present used in past-time contexts ('historic' Present). There is in grammar no necessary correlation between a formal name and the function(s) of the form(s), although a strong case can be made for this correlation clearly existing in Greek (see chapt. 2).¹⁶ I follow the convention of capitalizing all formal terms--Subjunctive, Participle, Aorist Indicative--and retaining lower case spelling for functional categories--e.g. perfective, attitude, stative, etc. Quotations retain their original spellings. There is a temptation to alter quotations, but since many fall victim to vagueness in their tense terminology, a vagueness which has repercussions for their tense analyses, it is better to be faithful to the original (for further discussion of why capitalization is adopted to separate formal and functional titles see Porter, "Terminology").

e. "*Meaning implies choice*" (Bazell, *Form*, 51; see also Lyons, *Structural Semantics*, 25-30; idem, *Introduction*, 413-14, 415-19; Dahl, *Tense*, 12; cf. Collinge, "Reflexions," 88, esp. 99-100; Jakobson, "Struktur"). Since systemic linguistics deals with language as it is actually evidenced in usage, systemic linguistics takes seriously the dictum of structural semantics that an element is only meaningful if it is defined wholly in terms of other elements. A given linguistic phenomenon that is wholly predetermined, i.e. there is no choice between this and some other grammatical unit, offers little for a discussion of meaning. For example, certain verbs in Greek offer no formal choice of tense systems, like εἰμί. Thus it is meaningless to classify the forms εἰμί, etc., ἤμην, etc., as part of the Present/Imperfect conjugation, since there is no Aorist conjugation, etc. (see chapt. 10). Systemic linguistics--with its use of systems in networks that are constructed around choice--is well suited to exploit this concept by displaying all possible and conceivable oppositions within a given network. For example, at the level of the semantic category

¹⁶As Gildersleeve ("Evolution," 206) says: "Where form survives anywhere, function survives everywhere." Cf. Gotteri, "Speaker's Right," 77, who notes that "the alternative to delimiting one's data in this way seems to be to embark on a global and frankly unmanageable investigation of how Polish [or Greek] talks about processes, situations, the world, the universe and everything."

realized by the word (and any structure of which it is an element) it is impossible to find principled grounds for distinguishing among ingressive, constative, and effective Aorists. The verb form is, simply, the Aorist. And there is no further choice that makes discussion of such concepts as ingressive, constative, and effective meaningful. The meaningful choice of the Aorist occurs in relation to the Present/Imperfect and Perfect/Pluperfect tenses. Thus semantic choices may be defined in terms of what is not chosen, in contrast with the items that are chosen, emphasizing that a distinction is made, rather than striving to find an appropriate metalanguage to define every semantic category fully. The concept of meaning as choice also serves to bridge the gap between form and function, since it must be admitted that to differentiate semantic categories without formal realizations undermines not only the principle of form/functional relation but principled means for differentiation (Halliday ["Grammar," 88-98, in Halliday, *Halliday*] showed early that form and function are integral in semantic analysis; Zwicky ["Markedness," 137] uses the term "iconicity").

f. All networks must contain a series of realization statements that show how selection of particular features (selection expressions) are translated into the data of the language itself (realization) (Fawcett, *Linguistics*, 50-53, 115-24; cf. Fawcett, "What," 4-6 [he calls them "realization rules"]; Butler, *Linguistics*, 59-62; Berry, *Introduction*, 2.18-50; Huddleston, "Features," esp. 67, 69; Halliday/Martin, "Notational Conventions," 10-12, in Halliday/Martin, *Readings*. There is some discussion about whether selection expressions may result in semantic or formal realizations). In this work componential analysis is often utilized to make realization statements more precise (a major treatment of this approach is Nida, *Analysis*). There has been much justified criticism of componential analysis of late (e.g. Kempson, *Theory*, 86-102), especially when it is utilized in defence of making specific ontological statements about the qualities of certain linguistic items (this occurs mostly in lexical studies). In a systemic semantic network componential analysis need not assert anything about ontological qualities, but may convey as a "simple calculus" (Kay/Samuels, "Analysis," 49) the semantic component of a given choice within a system and provide a more complete translation into the metalanguage of the particular qualities realized by a given form (cf. Lyons, *Structural Semantics*, 80: "'Componential analysis' is as valid as the relations upon which it is based and which it may conveniently summarize"). A formal taxonomy might have the following realization statement:



<u>Realization statement</u>	
Selection expression	Realization
a:b	=
a:c	=
a:d:e	=
a:d:f	=

The semantic network of VOICE (see above) might appear as follows:

<u>Realization statement</u>		
Selection expression		Realization
-restrictive	=	»»Active
+restrictive: +benefit	=	»»Middle
+restrictive: -benefit	=	»»Passive

Often reference will only be made to the most delicate semantic choice in a system, but selection of, for example, [+benefit] implies inheritance of the bundle or accumulation of all previous semantic choices (Hasan ["Dream," 187] calls this "systematic path inheritance").

g. Systemic linguistics distinguishes between (syntagmatic) chain and (paradigmatic) choice. Paradigmatic choice--the choice of a single linguistic item as distinct from other linguistic items of the same class that might fulfil the same function--is fundamental to systemic linguistics, since the choices that are made in any network are at any given point selections along the paradigmatic axis (Gotteri, "Comparison," 32; cf. Berry, *Introduction*, 1.52-56; Lyons, *Structural Semantics*, 59: "I consider that the theory of meaning will be more solidly based if the meaning of a given linguistic unit is defined to be the set of [paradigmatic] relations that the unit in question contracts with other units of the language [in the context or contexts in which it occurs]"; idem, *Introduction*, 70-81). Syntagmatic choice emphasizes the linear relation of given linguistic items (structure) (see e.g. Halliday, "Structure"). While many systemic linguists are concerned with syntagmatic choice, especially at the larger ranks, this work places its emphasis on paradigmatic choice as crucial for syntagmatic meaning. The semantic choice of verbal aspect, realized in a particular verbal form and placed in the predicate slot (see Berry, *Introduction*, esp. 1.63-65) at the rank of clause, determines the verbal aspect for the entire clause in which the particular verbal item occurs. The individual item with its semantic meaning as a verbal category is influential upon the entire semantics of the greater context of situation.

h. Although many systemic linguists do not make this distinction, and it is a point of contention among a number of linguists outside this model (e.g. Lyons, *Semantics*), it is useful to distinguish semantics from pragmatics, or "what the forms mean" (semantics) from "what speakers mean when they use the forms" (pragmatics) (Gotteri, "Note," 49; cf. "When," 13).¹⁷ In the case of Greek verbal structure, semantics can be defined as analysis of the essential meanings of the individual verbal aspects which allows their usage in a variety of contexts. These contexts may differ, for example, in relation to temporal reference. (Grammarians have various ways of defining this difference: e.g. Dahl, *Tense*, 3-19; Bache, *Aspect*, 54-60; Comrie, *Aspect*, 41-51.)¹⁸ Another useful way of making this distinction is in terms of code and text (see Gregory/Carroll, *Language*, 75-98). Code refers to the shared meaning-system encoded in grammatical, syntactical and lexical items, such that the utterances speakers produce, despite individual variations, are "describable in terms of a particular system of [linguistic] rules and relations" (Lyons, *Introduction*, 52, cf. 140-41, on idealization of linguistic data at this level; Butler, *Linguistics*, 40-57). Grammar determines the verbal range of an individual, i.e. the "range of meanings which that person can express," and the ways in which these meanings are realized in the specific formal features of the language. Texts then exist as the "operational instances" of language as code (Gregory/Carroll, 75, 84). The code is the network of verbal choice that speakers draw upon when creating their individual instances of text (Fawcett insists upon the close connection between semantics and formal realization in generating text). A valuable point of connection between the two is the concept of implicature. Comrie recognizes that there is a profitable "distinction between the meaning of a linguistic item, in terms of its conventionalised semantic representation, and the implicatures that can be drawn from the use of a linguistic item in a particular context" (Comrie, *Tense*, 23; cf. Lyons, *Semantics*, 592-96). Thus implicature applies to what is implied by the use of the particular verbal aspect within a given set context.

The separation of meaning from implicature thus enables us first to give a more accurate characterisation of the meaning of a linguistic form, and secondly, given a theory of implicatures, to account for the implicatures that are assigned to linguistic forms in the absence of any cancellation of those implicatures. (Comrie, *Tense*, 25)

¹⁷Within systemic linguistics, the semantics/pragmatics distinction is often not made, though Gotteri ("When," 9) finds it a "useful fiction." Levinson (*Pragmatics*, 5-47) attempts to define pragmatics.

¹⁸At this point discussion could turn to discourse analysis. While this work concentrates upon semantics, it recognizes the importance of the issue of text analysis, without being able to discuss it in detail. For a useful treatment see Brown/Yule, *Analysis*, esp. 27-67, 190-222.

For example, the essential semantic feature of the Future is [+expectation]. One of the common implicatures of such semantic meaning (though not the only one) is future reference (see chapt. 9).

i. Producing translations is not to be seen as the sole purpose of studying a language. Exploiting the translational value of ancient texts has long been an item of high priority for scholars. In systemic linguistics, with its emphasis upon meaning as choice within a given system network, the ability or lack of ability to translate a given linguistic item into another language, or even into a concise description in a metalanguage, must be viewed with appropriate scepticism. For example, in translating Hebrew tenses, since the Imperfect and Perfect often occur in identical temporal contexts (e.g. Psalm 23, where the Imperfect verbs in vv 1b-3 are often rendered identically with the Perfect verbs in vv 4ff.), many scholars neglect the formal difference in arriving at identical translational equivalents, thus neglecting the important distinction in verbal aspect. Most examples within this work are translated, but the purposes of the translations vary from being literalistic renderings to interpretative glosses, depending upon the particular point being made, and they are not to be used to evaluate the particular concept being discussed. As Gleason says, "Translation is a very inadequate means of expressing meanings and must always be used with great caution" (*Introduction*, 77; "Linguistics," 15-16; "Contribution," 54-55; cf. Robertson, *Minister*, 90-91; Lyons, *Structural Semantics*, 97-99: translations [of terms for skills, etc.] "cannot claim to be adequate statements of meaning in any scientific sense" [98]).

CHAPTER 1: RESEARCH INTO TENSE, *AKTIONSART* AND ASPECT

0. INTRODUCTION. As late as 1974, Rydbeck, commenting on the state of research into NT grammar, said, "today research into post-classical Greek in general and NT Greek in particular has come almost to a standstill." One of the reasons he gives for this is that "there is a prevalent but false assumption that everything in NT Greek scholarship has been done already" ("What Happened," 427; announced earlier by Moule, *Language*, 1ff.). This assumption is rightly open to question. The state of discussion of aspect¹ in NT Greek--in its terminology, assumptions, and conceptual framework--is still only the tentative result of a history of previous debate. Though this debate began with the Greeks themselves, from a linguistics standpoint it is relatively recent. This chapter summarizes the major work that has treated the question² offering a critique along primarily two lines: difficulties evidenced (i) within individual treatments and (ii) in opposition to systemic linguistics as a theoretical model. The discussion divides into six sections: hellenistic Greek grammars, 19th-cent. and traditional grammars, comparative philology and *Aktionsart*, transitional approaches, structural linguistics and aspect, and

¹"Aspect" is apparently a translation by Ch. Ph. Reiff in 1828-29 of the Russian word *vid*, a loantranslation from Greek, εἶδος (see Pollak, *Studien*, 32; Bache, *Aspect*, 5), whose history has little if any bearing on its semantic definition and current linguistic use.

²For histories of discussion see Herbig, "Aktionsart," 171-86 (the first to apply *Aktionsart* to modern European languages); Wackernagel, *Vorlesungen*, 13-39, 149-57; Holt, *Etudes*, 1-13; Schwyzler, 2.248-56; Schlachter, "Verbalaspekt," 22-34; Pollak, *Studien*, 30-47; Wilkinson, "Aspect," 22-30. For a summary of major 19th-cent. disputants see Meltzer, "Lehre." Gonda (*Rgvedic*, 18) says: "what . . . will strike the reader of the books and articles devoted to this chapter of Greek syntax considered as a whole is their almost chaotic character"; Verkuyl, *Nature*, 6, 7.

grammars of hellenistic Greek from Winer to the present, with appendixes on 'perfectivizing' prefixes (1A) and dissenting theories (1B).

It would be wise, however, to express a caveat regarding tense terminology. In major linguistics books a common complaint is voiced about categories used to describe verbal action (e.g. Lyons, *Introduction*, 304ff.). *Inter alia* the problems include the desire to relate all verbal action to past, present, and future time; the tendency to believe that temporal reference is "necessarily an inflexional category of the verb"; and the neglect of other categorial uses of tense forms, such as aspect, deixis and various temporal and modal functions (Lyons, *Semantics*, 677ff. [quotation 678]).

Grammarians have traditionally been concerned with the range of linguistic entities in one language (and often many more languages), and they feel obliged to say something meaningful about tense, without taking sufficient time to consider fully such a problematic area. Thus they often speak along traditional lines and further obscure an issue of central importance (see the large number of attempts at grammars of English and Slavonic languages, besides general linguistics books). Some of the difficulty is caused by the abstruse nature of the categories of tense and aspect themselves, since they are related to each other and to other verbal categories, such as Mood. One of the most basic facts about the names for tense categories is that they are based on typical functions, but this is potentially very misleading. In English, it is commonly said that there are two forms of the Present tense: the simple Present and the progressive Present, so called because they are often used with present meaning. But it is significant how few times English speakers actually use the simple Present. The progressive Present seems much more common not only in present but also future contexts. The progressive Present seems to have a range of legitimate temporal functional uses, unified around an aspectual quality, the progressive kind of action. This illustrates the crucial problem of maintaining the difference between a tense category's formal name and its functional uses, in which a formal name is often mistakenly understood to represent the range of functional uses available (Lyons, *Semantics*, 683: "Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that there is probably no tense, mood or aspect in any language whose sole semantic function is the one that is implied by the name that is conventionally given to it in grammars of the language. Furthermore, it is undoubtedly the case that the terms conventionally used to describe the functions of the tenses, moods and aspects in certain languages are very misleading. This point must be borne constantly in mind"). In the following discussion, therefore, these general problems in tense terminology must be remembered. Whereas they do not excuse errors or minimize the necessity of formulating clearer and more accurate definitions, they do allow a certain generosity and the acknowledgment that to venture an opinion on tense terminology is to invite almost certain criticism.

1. HELLENISTIC GREEK GRAMMARS. Whereas the earliest Greek writers had a fundamental understanding of time, they took much longer to formulate a theory of temporality.³ They were slower yet in their formulations of grammatical theory.⁴

a. Dionysius Thrax. The first (extant) Greek grammar is attributed to the Alexandrian scholar Dionysius Thrax (c. 120 B.C.) (the Greek text is in

³See Hom. Il. 1.70, speaking of Calchas the diviner, ὅς ῥδῃ τὰ τ' ἐόντα τὰ τ' ἐσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα (who [knew] already all things that are and that are expected and the things previous); Pl. Rep. 392D; E. Daught. Troy 468; Rev 1:8; see my chapt. 2. Plato and Aristotle are usually credited with making the distinction between a verb and a noun, with Aristotle stating that the verb (ῥῆμα) is "the thing that indicates time" (τὸ προσημαίνον χρόνον; Int. 16B6; cf. 16B6-25).

⁴For details of the history of linguistic discovery in the ancient world see esp. Robins, *History*, 9-44; *Theory*, 1-47. Treatments of ancient Greek grammatical scholarship can be found in Steinthal, *Geschichte*, esp. 1.307-17; Sandys, *History*, esp. 103-64; Pfeiffer, *History*, esp. 234ff.; Pinborg, "Antiquity"; Hoffmann, "Paratasis," 1-8; Hovdhaugen, *Foundations*, chapt. 3.

Bekker, *Anecdota Graeca*, 2.638; scholastic scholia on various points in Dionysius's treatment of the verb can be found on 2.887-91)⁵ His short, structured γραμματική devotes sect. 15 to the verb (ῥήμα), which he divides into eight categories. Concerning the tenses or times (χρόνοι), he says there are three: ἐνεστώς, παρεληλυθώς, μέλλων (present, past and future [it is noteworthy that this definition uses two Perfect Participles and a Present Participle]), and four different kinds of past tense: παρατατικόν, παρακειμένον, ὑπερσυντέλικον, ἄοριστον⁶ (the Imperfect, Perfect, Pluperfect, and Aorist), with three relationships among the tenses: ἐνεστώτος πρὸς παρατατικόν, παρακειμένου πρὸς ὑπερσυντέλικον, ἄοριστου πρὸς μέλλοντα (Present to Imperfect, Perfect to Pluperfect, Aorist to Future) (note ambiguity whether formal or functional categories are being specified for the Present and Future). This can be represented diagrammatically:

Past	Present	Future
παρεληλυθώς	ἐνεστώς	μέλλων
παρατατικός		
παρακειμένος		
ὑπερσυντέλικος		
ἄοριστος		

And the oppositions thus:

ἐνεστώς	-	παρατατικός
παρακειμένος	-	ὑπερσυντέλικος
ἄοριστος	-	μέλλων

This brief description illustrates several points.

(1) Dionysius does not make clear whether his temporal categories correspond to particular verbal forms, though the forms he selects as labels seem to argue against this (Pulgram, "Functions," 251-52). Since he differentiates four past forms, the temporal terms appear to be a mixed grouping--present or future may correspond exactly to a single verb form (though Dionysius does not state this) but past is a type with four sub-types. Dionysius does not clarify how the four past forms are related, since his work does not contain a syntax of the verb (Dinneen ["Linguistics," 62] notes that Dionysius never got beyond individual words in his analysis).

(2) Dionysius recognizes that binary relationships exist between the tense names, though his reasoning is unclear. The relation of Present to Imperfect in Dionysius seems to be that of temporality, but this cannot be the basis for Perfect to Pluperfect, since they are both listed as past forms (the categorization of the Perfect as a past tense is surprising, and open to serious question even as a general pattern of usage). And the relation of Aorist to Future is obscure. Robins notes that the proportions may have been constructed on morphological grounds (the word and paradigm method) with the Imperfect built upon the Present stem, the Pluperfect built upon the Perfect stem, and the Aorist and Future evidencing the sigmatic stem though not being etymologically related (Robins, *History*, 36. The presence of the sigma in the Aorist and Future may have 'fooled' the ancient Greeks, as it has many modern scholars). This may be correct, since one of the scholia

⁵Some doubts have been cast on the authenticity of Dionysius's authorship: Pfeiffer (*History*, 271-72) endorses the traditional view of authorship while questioning arrangement of the manuscript as original; against Pinborg ("Antiquity," 103-06), who, referring to the work of di Benedetto, argues for a 3d cent. A.D. composition. For a summary and critical discussion of the entire treatise see Robins, "Dionysius Thrax."

⁶Herbig ("Aktionsart," 175) claims that in Dionysius the term "aorist" is found for the first time. For elucidation of these terms see the scholia in Bekker, *Anecdota Graeca*, 2.889-90.

makes such a correlation in expanding upon Dionysius's theory (Bekker, *Anecdota Graeca*, 2.890-91.), unless Dionysius had a scheme similar to that of the Stoics' in mind (see below).

(3) Dionysius's scheme is clearly temporally oriented. On the basis of his recognition of three temporal categories he attempts to subsume all other verbal uses, creating very forced results, including failure to treat verb forms that may be non-past referring, but especially regarding what he calls past tenses. Perhaps this is why Dionysius's outline does little more than provide a list of categories. As Robins says, Dionysius's "failure to give proper recognition to the aspectual dimension in the semantic structure of the Greek tenses must be considered a definite loss of insight" (*History*, 36; Gonda, *Rgvedic*, 17. Schwyzer [2.249] disagrees, claiming that though both Dionysius and the Stoics made time "den Oberbegriff . . . , so erscheinen doch als Unterbegriffe die Begriffe des *Verlaufes* oder der 'Erstreckung' . . . oder der *Nicht-Vollendung*, der *Vollendung* und der zeitlichen *Unbestimmtheit*. . . ." But nowhere does Dionysius state this).

b. Stoic grammars. By comparison the Stoic grammarians present a much more sophisticated picture of the Greek verb, found primarily in a scholia by Stephanos on Dionysius's grammar (selections are from Bekker, *Anecdota Graeca*, 2.891-92; see Haberland, "Note," 173-76, who notes the difficulties in interpreting the Stoic comments; and Collinge, "Greek," 17-19, who doubts their existence). Working with essentially the same terminology as the Alexandrians, the Stoics do not set out a purely temporal paradigm but work from tense-form oppositions,⁷ defining tenses according to both temporal distinctions and kind of action. Thus the Stoics define the Present as the present incomplete (ἐνεστώς παρατατικός), ὅτι παρατείνεται καὶ εἰς μέλλοντα (because it stretches even into the future). In other words, ὁ . . . λέγων ποῶ καὶ ὅτι ἐποίησέ τι ἐμφαίνει καὶ ὅτι ποιήσει (the one who says "I am doing" shows both that he did/does something and that he will do something). By analogy the Imperfect is the past incomplete (παρωχημένος παρατατικός), which means that ὁ . . . λέγων ἐποίουν, ὅτι τὸ πλέον ἐποίησεν, ἐμφαίνει, οὕτω δὲ πεπλήρωκεν, ἀλλὰ ποιήσει μὲν, ἐν ὀλίγῳ δὲ χρόνῳ (the one who says "I was doing" shows that he did/does more, and he is not yet finished, but that he will do more, but in a little while⁸). "Therefore the Present and the Imperfect are related because both are without completion and they possess the same sounds," e.g. τύπτω and ἐτυπτον (an earlier scholia on Dionysius remarks that the Present-Imperfect, the Perfect-Pluperfect and even the Aorist-Future oppositions are joined according to sound [κατὰ τὴν φωνήν] and what they signify [κατὰ τὸ σημαίνόμενον] [Bekker, 2.890-91]).

If the event is complete, however, the verb used is the ἐνεστώς συντελικός because it represents τὴν συντέλειαν τῆς ἐνεργείας (the accomplishment of the action), and is divided into the Perfect (παρακείμενος) and the Pluperfect (ὑπερσυντελικός). Since they both represent past accomplishment (τελείως παρώχεται) and possess the same representative elements (χαρακτηριστικὰ στοιχεῖα), the Stoics elucidated a strange relationship between the Perfect and Pluperfect on the basis of the Aorist (ἀόριστος . . . ἐκλήθη πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολὴν τοῦ παρακειμένου καὶ ὑπερσυντελικού [the Aorist is chosen to distinguish between the Perfect and the Pluperfect]. The Attic Future, so called by the Stoics, is also listed as a future manifestation of

⁷On the Stoic view of time see e.g. D L. 7.141, who, believing time is ἀσώματος (incorporeal), says τὸν μὲν παρωχηκότα καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ἀπείρους, τὸν δ' ἐνεστώτα πεπερασμένον (that which is past and that which is future are infinite, but that which is present is finite). Cf. scholia on present time as the meeting point of past and future (Bekker, *Anecdota Graeca*, 2.889-90); Arist. Int. 5A7-8. Steinthal (*Geschichte*, 1.300-08) thinks philosophical interests govern the Stoics' grammatical analysis; cf. Frede, "Principles," esp. 32-35.

⁸ἐν ὀλίγῳ . . . χρόνῳ may be rendered "in short, briefly," possibly referring to the explanation itself, but this is discounted by the μὲν . . . δέ construction and its placement.

the Perfect form, though recognized as rare). Having determined that the Aorist is used for the past, τοῦ ἄρτι τοίνυν τῷ ἀορίστῳ διδομένου γίνεται παρακείμενος, οἷον ἐποίησα ἄρτι--ἐπεποίηκα, τοῦ δὲ πάλαι προσενομένου ὁ ὑπερσυντέλικος γίνεται, οἷον ἐποίησα πάλαι--ἐπεποίηκειν (therefore the act being represented by the Aorist as just occurring becomes the Perfect, as in "I just did"--"I have done." And the act assigned to the distant past becomes the Pluperfect, as in "I did formerly"--"I had done"). Regarding the nature of the Aorist itself, the Stoics only say, ὁ . . . ἀόριστος κατὰ τὴν ἀοριστίαν τῷ μέλλοντι συγγενής (the Aorist according to its indefiniteness is related to the Future). (The Stoics debate why the Future is not called the Aorist Future, but conclude that the Aorist is named according to its boundaries, while the Future is not [is this a recognition of the problem of tense terminology?].)

The Stoic scheme, therefore, is as follows:⁹

Time	Past (παρωχούμενος)	Present (ἐνεστώς)	Future (μέλλων)
<u>Action</u>			
Incomplete (παρατατικός)	παρατατικός	ἐνεστώς	
Complete (συντελικός)	ὑπερσυντέλικος	παρακείμενος	
Undefined (ἀόριστος)	ἀόριστος		μέλλων

This scheme is presented less systematically by Apollonius Dyscolus (A.D. 2d cent.).¹⁰

Though the Stoics are to be commended for their attention to both temporal content and kind of action conveyed by verbs, and for their attempt to elucidate tense categories through apparent formal oppositions (they cite several examples of the appropriate form with each definition), the exact nature of the system has apparently eluded them.¹¹

(1) Most obviously, the Stoics have failed to develop a complete system that elucidates all the verbal forms and functions (especially such an important form as the Aorist, where it is defined in terms of ἄρτι and πάλαι [see Pinborg, "Antiquity," 92; Haberland, "Note," 175-76]), since they are bound within a temporal framework similar to Dionysius's. For example, the Aorist like the Future is left undefined, and it is not compared to the Present and Imperfect, but only the Perfect and Pluperfect. And their categories make no reference to past-referring Presents or Perfects, present-referring Imperfects and Pluperfects, as well as non-Indicative usage.

(2) The Stoics have failed to define terms clearly. Besides failing either to define or to make explicit the relation between the Aorist and Future (apart from seeing their non-participation in the incomplete/complete opposition), the Stoics evidence terminological difficulty in defining the other tense forms, as seen in the repetition of terms within their conceptual framework, sometimes according to temporal reference, sometimes according to kind of action.

(3) Although reference to "incompleteness" is made, the definitions of the Present and Imperfect, through use of the concept of futurity to define incompleteness, are temporally bound

⁹See Robins, *History*, 29; cf. Steinthal, *Geschichte*, 1.309. Pinborg ("Antiquity," 93-94) presents and criticizes schemes by other scholars; Hiersche ("Aspect") disputes an aspectual analysis (he uses the categories of *Aktionsart*). Their common features preclude analysis individually, although several are noticeably more complex than the evidence warrants.

¹⁰Bekker, *Anecdota Graeca*, vol. 2, trans. in Householder, *Syntax*. Holt (*Etudes*, 3; followed by Wilkinson, "Aspect," 22ff.) attributes the Stoic position directly to Apollonius Dyscolus, while Steinthal (*Geschichte*, 1.310-11) differentiates Apollonius from the Stoics proper, though recognizing their common terminology.

¹¹Holt (*Etudes*, 3) calls their theory "ingénieuse." Steinthal (*Geschichte*, 1.315) is more to the point: "So blieb die Theorie der Temporal in der Stoa durchaus inconsequent, teils weil man theoretisch alle Bestimmtheit der Zeit von dem Verhältnisse zur Gegenwart abhängig machte, teils weil man sich durch die tatsächlich vorliegenden Formen irre führen liess."

(many modern grammarians fall victim to this same fault), as are the definitions of the Perfect forms (see Hiersche, "Aspect," esp. 280-281, 283). The distinction between Perfect and Imperfect is also muddled, since the Perfect is called ἐνεστώως συντελικός but is said to represent past accomplishment and is defined in terms of ἐποίησα ἄρτι. The statement that the υπερσυντελικός is best represented by ἐποίησα πάλαι is not much clearer. But it is these definitions that have been adopted by many modern grammarians. To use ἀόριστος at all can only confuse the matter, however, since the term is left undefined. The problem appears to stem from the Stoics' over-dependence upon temporally-based definitional categories even for kind of action, so that since they could not conceive of the Future or Aorist in terms of specific 'aspectual' relations they were compelled to leave them outside the system proper (see Arist. Nic. Eth. 1173A34-B4; Pl. Thaeat. 155B-C [see chapt. 2]). As Pollak says, their system was based "allerdings also Attribute des χρόνος, der den Überbegriff bildet" (*Studien*, 31; Robins [*Theory*, 35-36] suggests the Stoics' problem stemmed from dependence upon meaning rather than form. This is only part of the problem). The Greeks cannot be faulted only for an insufficient metalanguage; the definitions and understandings themselves are not comprehensive or fully satisfactory.

As Robins rightly says, whereas "an author's work is important as part of the intellectual and literary life of the times and civilization in which he lived and wrote," more importantly it "represents a stage in the history and development of the subject he is concerned with" ("Dionysius Thrax," 68). Dionysius Thrax and the Stoics performed groundbreaking work in Greek grammar, and the former especially has had a formative influence on subsequent work (Robins, 67-68; cf. Robertson, 824, who laments Dionysius's influence even into the 20th cent.). As Friedrich says, "The traditional theories of Dionysius Thrax and the Stoics partly recognized the aspectual character of Ancient Greek, but erred seriously by overemphasizing tense, by defining aspect in terms of completion, and by inadequately characterizing the relation between the aorist and the future" ("Theory," S9). This should not discourage later grammarians, however, from striving for a better understanding of the subject, believing that the Greeks spoke the final word on Greek grammar. Certainly their abilities to use the language far exceeded those of modern scholars, yet their efforts at describing their own language were, unfortunately, rudimentary and even in places misleading.

2. 19TH-CENTURY AND TRADITIONAL GRAMMARS.

Between the hellenistic age and the 19th cent., many significant scholars made important contributions to discussion of verbal usage, such as the Latin grammarians, J. C. Scalinger, Samuel Clarke and Jacob Harris (see e.g. Herbig, "Aktionsart," 180-83; Holt, *Etudes*, 5-6; Wilkinson, "Aspect," 23ff. For an overview see Robins, *History*, 45-163.). A thorough discussion cannot be attempted here. The thread of the history resumes with the 19th cent., when there was a significant increase in work not only in Greek grammar but in linguistic study in general (Jankowsky, *Neogrammarians*, 12, 39; cf. Fries, *Linguistics*, 37ff.; Danker, *Century*, 57ff.). Even as recently as the 19th cent.,

the grammarians comprise roughly two groups: those resembling a. Dionysius Thrax and b. the Stoics.

a. Of those resembling Dionysius, Madvig (87-97) and Krüger (162-75) both treat tense forms as absolutely temporally based, and apparently formulate their descriptions on the basis of representative pragmatic usage. Consequently many ambiguities and peculiarities in verbal usage do not find ready explanation. For example, Madvig claims there is little difference between the Aorist and Imperfect (Th. 2.6.1), labels present-referring and customary usage of the Aorist as peculiar (Isoc. 1.1; Pl. Rep. 566), and claims that the historic Present is used for lively connected narrative (X. Anab. 1.1.3). Krüger posits a completely synonymous use of the tenses in contexts where, for example, the Aorist and Imperfect are mixed, since he invokes no other semantic feature than temporality.

Jelf's standard English classical Greek grammar (2.51-73) also establishes temporal relations as the primary criterion for the predicate. He divides the three temporal categories into absolute and relative tenses, the former expressing action "without reference to any other action" and the latter having "reference to some other action expressed by some other predicate" (51). Arguing logically, Jelf claims there are three absolute and nine relative tenses, including periphrastics. This elegant--though formally repetitious--scheme attempts to understand verbal action in the relative tenses on the basis of their relations, but since the entire scheme is formulated around temporal criteria (e.g. coincidence, antecedence, consequence), the plan is unhelpful. (In treating pragmatic usage he speaks in terms of incomplete, complete, and momentary action, but this is clearly secondary to his major formulation and often related to lexical conception of an event; see below on *Aktionsart*.) And Jelf's failure to define functional categories adequately (he explains the names of the tenses with English examples [54]) leads to confusion, as illustrated in his detailed discussion, where, though he admits to kinds of action, he treats such instances as the Present used for the Future, the Imperfect for the Present, and the Aorist instead of the Present, Imperfect, Perfect, and Pluperfect. In many places Jelf's pragmatic descriptions are correct, but in others he has obvious difficulties. Regarding the historic Present Jelf takes refuge in its use as an absolute tense to bring an event "more vividly before the mind" (55), although use in relative clauses would seem to argue against this (Hdt. 5.91; cf. X. Anab. 1.7.16); concerning Present verbs with Perfect meaning he dismisses this as arising from the "sense of the verb" rather than the "force of the tense" (56; X. Cyr. 6.1.45 with οἵχεται; Hom. Od. 15.403 with ἀκούεις); to the Aorist in non-momentary or non-past contexts (Hom. Il. 13.300; S. Ant. 303) he devotes a section on "peculiar usages" (63-66); and with reference to the Moods he notes that they are not strictly temporal, although if this is true, his scheme has little basis for describing how the Moods function. (His treatment does actually define the non-Indicative Moods in terms of temporal pragmatic usage [74ff.].)

As late as 1924 Meillet and Vendryes (*Traité*, 294-97) continue in this mould, mentioning only the temporal function of the primary (present) and secondary (past) endings.

b. The Stoic-influenced grammarians are more plentiful. P. Buttmann, at the turn of the 19th cent. ([1st ed. c. 1800] 125-26, on verb forms [he treats three temporal divisions and a manifold number of past tenses], and 407-15, on verbal functions), recognized that "die Bedeutungen können gründlich erst in der Syntax entwickelt werden" (125). Consequently, he defined tense usage

relationally: the Aorist is a narrative tense and the Perfect is not; the Perfect represents "vollendete und abgeschlossene" action while the Present "unvollendete und geschehende" (407); the Aorist is momentary past while the Imperfect is durative past (408). Despite his temporal dependence for the Indicative, Buttmann identifies incomplete, momentary and resultive characters of the Present, Aorist and Perfect. A recognizable difficulty, however, is when Buttmann notes that, though incomplete and momentary events are expressed in present and future times through single forms, the non-Indicative Moods have double forms throughout (409). Like the Stoics, however, Buttmann apparently misconstrues the nature of the kind of action by defining the tenses in temporal terms (complete, incomplete and momentary) and by apparently trying to use them as objective descriptions of the action itself. As a result Buttmann, for example, describes the empiric Aorist as "einen besondern Gräcismus häufig der Aorist" (411); recognizes the unmarked nature of the Aorist, though he says it can replace the Imperfect or Pluperfect if temporal indicators are sufficient (408; X. Mem. 1.6.14); claims the Present and Future are durative and momentary, although there are no double forms in the Indicative; recognizes present value of the Aorist in τί οὐ questions; and defends the historic Present (X. Anab. 1.7.16) as possible because of great freedom in choice of tense forms in Greek (412).

As late as 1897, Jannaris continues virtually the same Stoic scheme (esp. 433-45; see also Sandford, 167-68, 172-73; F. Thompson, esp. 138-41). After distinguishing nine categories (three temporal categories by three kinds of action) he includes a note that the effective and durative Presents (e.g. ποιῶ, "I do" and "am doing") have no separate single form (180, cf. 433, 435). This initially follows from a temporal view of verbal action. He applies this model to all the non-Indicative Moods as well (433). In his treatment of individual tenses, Jannaris states that, for example, the historic Present represents the past transferred to the present (Th. 1.91), in animated speech the Present is used for future reference (although both of the classical examples he cites--Th. 6.91; D. 19.32--are conditional statements), the Present stands for the Perfect, the gnomic Aorist transfers general truths to the past (again his only classical example--D. 2.9--is a conditional statement), the Perfect stands for the Aorist, and the Future is the present transferred to the future.

A similar system is promoted by Goodwin in his grammar and special treatment of the verb (*Grammar*, 268ff.; *Syntax*). In his *Syntax*, Goodwin formally distinguishes seven tense forms, gives temporally-dependent estimations of kind of action (going on, finished, or simply taking place), and then relates them to absolute (Indicative) or relative time (normally non-Indicative Moods). Since the Present "represents an action as *going on* at the time of speaking or writing" (8), and "as the limits of such an action on either side of the present moment are not defined, the present may express a customary or repeated action [Pl. Phaed. 58A] or a general truth [A. Ag. 857]" (9). This definition presents further problems for the historic Present (X. Anab. 1.1.1; Hdt. 1.63), use of the Present with πάλαι (Pl. Gorg. 489C), Presents with so-called perfect sense (Hom. Il. 15.223), and Presents of complete action (Th. 6.20). His definition of the Perfect as an action already finished at present time, besides being temporally oriented, must admit exceptions, as Goodwin himself recognizes (Pl. Thaeat. 114B; Men. Fr. 598 where no continuance of result is seen; Isoc. 1.2 with no past action). His definition of the Aorist as a "simple *occurrence* in past time" (16) is controverted by: examples speaking of a state or condition (D. 30.33), though he admits that the difference between the Aorist and Imperfect is related to the perspective of the speaker (16-17); verbs of speaking where he sees no semantic difference

between Aorist and Imperfect forms (Th. 1.72, 79), and Aorists used of present (S. Aj. 536; Ar. Knights 696) or future (E. Alc. 386) reference. His inclusion of a special discussion of gnomic and iterative tenses (53-56) shows that his temporally-based system finds it difficult to treat these uses except as something noteworthy.

In his *Grammar*, Goodwin proposes again an essentially temporally-based system, but with a concretizing of the categories regarding kind of action. A difficulty in formal and functional terminology is evidenced when he asserts that the gnomic Aorist is a primary tense, since it refers to present time and the historic Present is a secondary tense, since it refers to past time (271), forgetting that primary and secondary tenses are determined on formal criteria.

Kühner, in the German original from which Jelf is a translated adaptation (Kühner/Gerth, 1.129-200 [1955 reprint of the 3d ed., 1897]; see Lejnick, *Morphosyntax*, 45-58, who follows Kühner/Gerth), adheres to the same 19th-cent. neo-Stoic scheme. Thus, though he includes a knowledgeable discussion of kind of action (he uses the term *Aktionsart*--see below), his model of the Indicative is based upon absolute temporal categories (131). He defines the Aorist as referring both to a simple fact (*Faktum schlechthin*), thus as an event complete in itself; and to a fully represented event, thus momentary (cf. his chart that includes no present-referring momentary form [131]). His definition of the Present as delineating an event in its development or movement, thus without limitation and hence durative, is temporally bound, as is his definition of the Perfect as a state resulting from a completed event (130). Kühner makes disclaimers regarding the terminology of *Aktionsart* (e.g. momentary does not mean occurring in a moment), but these reveal an attempt to unite what might be called subjective and objective views of the action (131). Several further difficulties emerge. Kühner defines the historic Present in terms of the speaker transferring himself to the time of the event to maintain his definition of absolute present reference, though it is questionable whether this definition handles instances where Aorist and Imperfect verbs also occur (Hdt. 3.129ff.); admits that the Present is often used where the event belongs to the past but is in present view by the speaker, though several examples are troublesome (X. Mem. 3.5.26; Anab. 4.6.17; Pl. Gorg. 503C; Kühner admits that several are used like the Imperfect); and recognizes the future-referring Present as one of the original uses of the tense, though this also occurs with verbs of going. Though Kühner defines the Imperfect as the Present in the past, this presents difficulties in examples that do not show development (Th. 4.28; he maintains that the Aorist and Imperfect are not mixed though he is at pains to explain why [143-44, cf. 154, 157]). And he recognizes the difficulty of Perfects without reference to a past event (Th. 1.144.1) and instances where an event not yet begun is treated as completed (X. Cyr. 4.2.26). Kühner claims that Aorist verbs from durative roots are inceptive (Hdt. 2.137; this example is debatable), but Hdt. 1.16.1 calls this formulation--lacking formal criteria--into question ("Ἀρδουος δὲ βασιλεὺς ἀντος ἐνός δέοντα πεντήκοντα ἔτια ἐξεδέξατο Σαδυσάττης ὁ Ἀρδουος, καὶ ἐβασίλευσε ἔτια δωῶδεκα [and after A. reigned for forty nine years, S., the son of A., succeeded him, and he reigned twelve years]). His treatment of the gnomic Aorist as a single concrete case is unsatisfying (Isoc. 1.6), as is his treatment of present and future-referring usage (D. 23.206) and questions with τί οὐ (X. Cyr. 2.1.4).

In as recent a grammar (revised) as Smyth's (esp. 412-76; see also Bizos, 118-26), still widely used, this system continues. Though he recognizes that the tenses represent the "time of an action" and the "stage of an action" (412),

he lists time of action first, describes its relative and absolute uses (when he notes that the actual time may be different from that denoted by the tense, he seems to have confused tense terminology regarding name and function), and constructs a diagram in which he lists only the seven tense forms. Regarding kind of action, he creates a tense-system listing continued, completed, and simple attainment (in which he, like the Greeks, places the Aorist and Future), though he notes that the Present stem may denote aoristic action and the Future continued or aoristic action. Smyth reveals further confusion over formal and functional criteria when he lists the gnomic Aorist, perfect Aorist and present Imperfect as primary tenses, and makes the apparently contradictory remarks that "the tenses of the moods except the indicative do not express time in independent sentences" (415) and that the Subjunctive, Optative and Imperative always refer to future time. He explains the use of the tenses in temporal terms alone, causing difficulties. After defining the Present as representing a present state or action, Smyth lists the Present of customary action (D. 19.46); the Present of general truth (Men. Sent. 11); and Present for the future (Pl. Gorg. 505C), though he qualifies it as referring to "what is immediate, likely, certain, or threatening" (421); historic and annalistic Presents (X. Cyr. 2.1.19; Anab. 1.1.1); and Present for the Perfect (X. Anab. 1.4.8). He recognizes the Imperfect appearing in contexts where present reference would be expected (X. Anab. 4.8.1). Although Smyth says the Future denotes future action, he also notes gnomic (Pl. Rep. 603E) and jussive (D. 24.39) uses. His definition of the Aorist as expressing "the mere occurrence of an action in the past" (429) is apparently incompatible with the gnomic Aorist (Hes. Works 218), even though he invokes reference to a typical case; present or dramatic Aorist (S. El. 668); and future Aorist (E. Alc. 386 [in the apodosis of a conditional statement]). He admits as well that ingressive Aorist verbs need not be ingressive (430).

3. COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY AND AKTIONSART.

During the 19th cent., a few grammarians grew uncomfortable with traditional tense definitions. As early as 1836, Rost, though ascribing temporal categories to the verb, realized, "um die eigenthümliche Bedeutung eines jeden Tempus genau zu bestimmen und sicher aufzufassen, ist nothwendig, dass man ausser dem Begriffe der Zeit auch den Stand der Handlung welche in dem Verbum ausgedrückt ist, berücksichtigt. . ." (559; 559-72 on the tenses in general). Though he reconciles the two systems--action and time--by the same scheme as proposed by many mentioned above, Rost is able to move further in his understanding by paying particular attention to the verbal action of the individual tenses. (He also opposes the Aorist to the Imperfect rather than the Future.)

a. Most credit for making grammarians aware of the issue of verbal kind of action goes to Curtius, who was the first to attempt a reconciliation of comparative linguistics and Greek philology (see Pedersen, *Discovery*, 89, cf. 89-90; Jankowsky, *Neogrammarians*, 200-12). He recognized the need for "considerable revision" of the "doctrine of the use of the tenses." (His works include *Die Bildung der Tempora und Modi im Griechischen und Lateinischen sprachvergleichend dargestellt* [1846; Eng. trans. *Verbs*], *Griechische Schulgrammatik* [1852] and *Erläuterungen zu meiner griechischen*

Schulgrammatik [1863]. I cite the authorized translation of the last, *Elucidations*, 207-18, on the verb, a theory first presented in *Verbs*, 2ff.) Curtius asserted that ἐγένετο, ἐγίγνετο and ἐγεγόνει (become) are distinguished from each other along quite different lines than distinguish ἐγίγνετο and γίγνομαι, or ἐγεγόνει and γέγονα. This difference requires a new term--*Zeitart* or "kind of time." Whereas *Zeitstufe* (lit. time-step, left untranslated by Curtius's translator) refers to external time or the relation of "the action to the speaker" (208), *Zeitart* refers to internal distinctions: continuous (Present stem), completed (Perfect stem) and *eintretende* (Aorist stem).¹² Discussing the Aorist, Curtius discounts use of the term "momentary" (though later grammarians reinstated it) since it creates the temptation to measure the difference in lapse of time, e.g. νικᾶν and νικήσαι (conquer), ἔβαλλε and ἔβαλε (throw), whereas when an artist affixed ΕΠΟΙΗΣΕ or ΕΠΟΙΕΙ (make) to his work his choice did not depend on the actual length of time in creating the work but "on his intention to lay stress either on the simple fact that he was the artist, or on the labour spent upon it" (209). He also distinguishes the Aorist's *Zeitart* from a beginning or impending act, from a continuing act, and from an incomplete act (while recognizing the term's ambiguity). In describing *Zeitarten*, Curtius compares the Aorist to a point, which has no size, as the Aorist does not take "extension in time" (212) into account. But then Curtius expands his definition by noting that since an aoristic action is opposed to a continuing one, it may be ingressive--e.g. ἐρασθῆναι (to fall in love), the "starting-point of a line"; or effective--e.g. ἀγαγεῖν (to carry away), "the culmination of an act" (213). The Present by contrast is equated with a line, having indefinite extension, and the Perfect with "a surface bounded by lines, since it is completely limited in every direction" (213).

b. The importance of Curtius's groundbreaking work cannot be overestimated; however, only one major grammarian adopted his terminology: Stahl (74-87, on theory of tense; 87-220, on tense usage; he rejects the term *Aktionsart*, since, he argues, not every verb refers to an action or event [74]):

Das Tempus bezeichnet einen zeitlichen Bereich des Verbalbegriffs. Der Bereich einer Erscheinung wird ebenso nach der Zeit bemessen wie der Bereich einer Substanz nach ihren räumlichen oder begrifflichen Umfange. Wir unterscheiden nun den Bereich einer Erscheinung an sich und den Bereich einer Erscheinung in Verhältnisse zur Zeit der Aussage, und nennen jenen Zeitart, diesen Zeitstufe. (74)

Stahl differentiates an action as "durative" (*dauernde*), "complete" (*vollendete*) and "in and for itself" (*an und für sich*), corresponding to the Present, Perfect and Aorist stems as the three *Zeitarten* in Greek (74). (Note that he departs from Curtius in his definition of the Aorist.) Stahl rigorously follows this regime, finding that a *Zeitart* corresponds to its verbal stem, with choice of

¹²Curtius (*Elucidations*, 209) acknowledges adopting this term from Rost and Krüger; see the note, 210-12, where he discusses the French grammarian Thurnot's objections to his new terminology, since Thurnot posits only simultaneous, anterior and posterior action as expressed by the verb.

tense dependent on the individual author's conception of the action and temporal reference secondary. Stahl's helpful theory adumbrates the later work of Jacobsohn, Hermann, and McKay (see below), though Stahl also creates unnecessary difficulties. For example, although Stahl reasonably entertains general, past, present, and future uses of the Present, he poses the difficulty of the Perfect Present (X. Anab. 2.1.4; 5.7.29; Pl. Euth. 3E; he finds the same problem with the Imperfect: Hom. Il. 1.188; D. 20.48). Regarding the Perfect, Stahl depends upon a temporal definition which posits a past event, though this causes difficulties with the intensive Perfect (Hes. Works 207; Hom. Od. 5.400) and the extensive Perfect (Hom. Od. 8.134). Although Stahl reasonably argues that the Imperfect and Aorist differ not in temporal reference but in *Zeitart*, and since he argues that the augment bestows past reference, he must explain the empiric Aorist (Pl. Ol. 12.10), as well as the Perfect Aorist (S. Trach. 500).

Problems of a more general nature are also present. (1) The term *Zeitart* itself is questioned, since it does not appear to some to describe the nature of the concept being defined. Terms like *duration*, *momentary*, *punctual* are seen not as descriptions of kinds of time but as kinds of action. As Herbig ("Aktionsart," 185-86) says, "Zeit in den Zusammenhängen Zeitart und Zeitstufe etwas Verschiedenes bedeutet." (2) Criticism is found with Stahl's almost iron-clad (Gildersleeve would say overly-repetitious) description of verbal usage according to tense form (Gildersleeve, "I.--Stahl's Syntax . . . Tenses," 389-409). For example, Gildersleeve questions: whether the Future ought not be considered a Mood only (391); the conception of the Present as purely durative (here Gildersleeve follows most 19th-cent. grammars) (392); Stahl's formulation of the Imperfect as interrupted and uninterrupted (393), since duration is subjective; his multiplication of categories (394); and what Gildersleeve calls Stahl's "tiresome defense" of the right of the author to choose the verbal *Zeitart* he wishes (394). He concludes by declaring that little of Stahl's work is new and acceptable (409). Gildersleeve's reaction is surprising, since in many respects Stahl went beyond Curtius or his contemporaries.

An interesting contrast can be made to Gildersleeve's own grammar (esp. 79-122; see "Problems," 241-60, where he endorses a morphologically-based aspectual system along the lines of Curtius, disputing the terminology of the comparative philologists, e.g. regarding punctual or momentary Aorists; cf. "Brief Mention," 23 [1902] 106). Gildersleeve displays (80) a chart of verbal usage which apparently confuses form and function, in particular regarding the Present (cf. 82-83), and treats the "stage of action" (continuance, completion, attainment) with the "period of the action" (79). Thus he links temporal and kind-of-action meanings to tense stems, with his individual expositions of tenses temporally based. His terminology is tempered compared to many grammars (e.g. he refers to the "Present anticipating the Future" [83]), though he does not explain tenses using "kind of action" (cf. "Present for Perfect" [87]). Consequently, several apparent difficulties may be mentioned. Gildersleeve justifies the specific and universal presents as what occurs in English (81), though this fails to account for the historic Present (Pl. Phaed. 84D [cf. his 86 on annalistic Present]), which he must call "especially strange" (85); and the Present for the Perfect (X. Anab. 2.1.4), whose particularity may be increased by the problem of English translation. Since he emphasizes the Perfect of maintenance of result, Gildersleeve treats the intensive Perfect as an old form (Ar. Birds 944) and the emotional Perfect (S. Aj. 139) as unusual. He also distinguishes the ingressive Aorist as an item particularly favourable to the 1 Aorist, though he admits 2 Aorist uses as well (X. Cyr. 1.5.2; this distinction cannot be maintained on any principled linguistic grounds); and argues for the Aorist for the Perfect (Isoc. 5.19-21) on the basis of the Aorist being next of kin for verbs that form no Perfect (but cf. D. 9.26).

Since Curtius, major thought about Greek verbal usage has concentrated upon reassessing the importance of the kind of action represented by the verb. But this does not mean that all were in agreement, only that the struggle for definition had begun in earnest.

c. Delbrück shows in his Greek syntax (*Grundlagen*, 80-114, on the tenses) the transition to the purely comparative philology which dominated classical linguistics well into the 20th cent. Giving credit to Curtius, he realizes that the stems of the Present, Aorist and Perfect show different *Aktionen* (duration, event, complete event), in all Moods, with time only indicated by the augment (80). He then posits, however, that individual lexical items offer choices for stem meanings, which should form the basis of a grammar of the Greek tenses, rather than working from the tenses to the individual verbs (81-91). Delbrück's dependence on Indo-European (IE) languages is also evident. He argues for example: the Perfect stem is the oldest of IE verbs; the Future is not necessarily punctual since it probably did not originate from the Aorist Subjunctive; the Aorist as in Vedic originally had two senses based on the sigmatic and non-sigmatic forms; and the many Present stems reflect the IE verb's ability to build many verbs out of a common root (94, 97, 100, 111-12). But he readily acknowledges that his conclusions were only tentative and that much research was needed in the area of Greek tenses.

d. Perhaps the most important name in late 19th-cent. discussion of the Greek verb was Brugmann. In 1885 in his Greek grammar, he coined the term *Aktionsart* to describe the kind of action indicated objectively by a verb (538-41, on *Zeitstufe* and *Aktionsart* in general; 541-70, on tense usage). He begins his section on tenses boldly:

Das System der sog. Tempora des idg. Verbums diene von Haus aus nicht dazu, die subjectiven, ausserhalb der Verhandlung selbst liegenden Zeitstufen der Gegenwart, Vergangenheit und Zukunft auszudrücken. Vielmehr dienten sie zur Charakterisierung der Aktionsart, d.h. der Art und Weise, wie die Handlung vor sich geht. (538)

Claiming to find this concept in Apollonius Dyscolus he says further that all forms of the IE verb were originally timeless, and in Greek all non-Indicative tense forms remain timeless, "aber keine ohne Aktionsart" (538).

For Brugmann, *Aktionsart* is determined by verbal stem (root plus affix) so that a different stem offers a different conception of the action. He offers the following scheme:

1. Punctual *Aktionsart*--an event is complete, gathered up in a moment. One can speak of momentary, perfective and aoristic action, shown mainly through the Aorist: e.g. βα (go).¹³

¹³The origin of this terminology actually lies with Mutzbauer, *Grundlagen*, 1.11: "Die Bedeutungen des Praesens- und Aoriststammes scheiden sich scharf nach dem Prinzip der Anschaulichkeit. Und zwar lässt sich die Bedeutung des Praesensstammes einer Linie, die des Aoriststammes einem Punkte vergleichen." He then divides the point action into momentary (*Moment*), inceptive (*Anfangspunkt*) and terminative (*Schlusspunkt*).

2. Cursive *Aktionsart*--an event develops without limits as a single act inside itself, so that beginning and ending are not in view. The Present stem usually has this meaning, which can be referred to as linear (he only gives German examples).

3. Terminative *Aktionsart*--exit or endpoint is displayed, regardless of whether the action in itself is cursive or punctual, e.g. ἀγνύναι (smash).

4. Iterative *Aktionsart*--repeated action is represented, e.g. -σκον suffix.

5. Perfective *Aktionsart*--action of the Perfect stem, in which a state of the subject results from a previous event, e.g. βέβηκα, "I have come and now am here."

6. A prefix can perfectivize a verb.

Brugmann then characterizes the various stems according to their *Aktionsarten*, asserting with Delbrück that to understand the contrast of the tense stems one must not proceed from a general concept but from each single verb (cf. Brugmann, *Kurze . . . Grammatik*, 2.493-94, for an outline of the same scheme of *Aktionsart* for all IE languages; 494-551, for discussion of the verbal stems; see also Delbrück, *Syntax*, 2.13ff.). Under the Present stem he lists ἵστημι (stand) and γίγνομαι (become) as iterative; δάμνημι (subdue), δάκνω (bite), ὀρνυμι (rouse) and τίνω (pay) as linear-terminative; -σκω verbs such as φάσκω (say) as terminative; ιο suffixed verbs and κλαίω (weep) as cursive. Originally these verbs supposedly had no Aorist form because of the nature of the action, though later sigmatic Aorist forms developed by analogy. Other forms had both Present and Aorist roots to start, others just Aorist. According to Brugmann, the original classes of verbs were then assigned tense classifications on the basis of their *Aktionsart*, the punctual being claimed as Aorists, the non-punctual as Presents. This led to organizing different roots opposite each other even though the forms did not correspond (i.e. suppletive verbs), like λέγω/εἶπον.

In his exposition of the various tense forms, Brugmann shows how *Aktionsart* is exemplified. For example, the Aorist can represent ingressive (ἐδάκρυσα--I began to cry), effective (ἔπεσον--I fell down; ἤγαγον--I led), or constative (ἐποίησα--I did) action, depending not on the Aorist but on the perspective of its particular verbal root. Therefore, durative roots that later formed Aorists are described as complexive (Hdt. 2.133; Th. 5.5). Likewise the difference between an intensive (τέθλη--I am blooming) and accomplished (μémνημαι--I have remembered; cf. Pl. Crito 46A) Perfect is the meaning of the root. He also notes an intensive use (Ar. Peace 335), though he dismisses it as a late phase; and a transitive use in which an Aorist or Imperfect could be used (Hom. Il. 5.66). The Future, being a mixed tense from the IE Future and the sigmatic Subjunctive Aorist, may be punctual (βήσομαι--I will come), non-punctual (ἔσομαι--I will be) or both (ὄψομαι--I will see/observe) depending on the root. Also the Present may be punctiliar (e.g. εἶμι--I come, véομαι--I come) as well as durative.

e. The number of works fostered by this method is large. One obvious descendant of the comparative school of thought is the comparative grammar. For example, Wright finds five essential *Aktionsarten*--momentary, cursive, perfect, iterative and terminative (252-55), while Buck traces Greek back to its parent language with three essential "aspects" (*Grammar*, 238-40, who recognizes the terminology of "aspect" as having a broader sense than in Slavonic to cover disparate, non-technical distinctions that differ from language to language [240]).

The most significant work, however, is by Wackernagel (*Vorlesungen*, 149-86; see also Romano, "Significato," who applies his findings to Xenophon). On the basis of Slavonic, he claims that the differentiation of *Aktionsarten* (153) reflects the conception of the action by the speaker not the factual state of the event. When applied to Greek, however, Wackernagel accepts uncritically (154-56) the kinds of action (*Aktionsarten*) posited by the other comparative philologists: punctual, terminative, cursive, and the role of perfectivizing

prefixes, as objective descriptions of action. In applying these categories to Greek tenses, Wackernagel argues for both a characterization of each tense and distinctions based upon the roots of individual words. For the Present tense, he states that since a form like $\varphi\eta\mu\iota$ only shows a root ($\varphi\eta$) and an ending ($\mu\iota$) and no augment for past tense or sigma for futurity, it must only be used for present reference, though there is no present element per se (157-58), and it does not exclude uses like the gnomic. He depends upon the IE Present to explain that certain verbs ($\epsilon\lambda\mu\iota$, $\epsilon\rho\chi\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$ [come]) have future meaning (Hom. Il. 1.169; John 14:3) since they are punctual Presents, as in Slavonic usage; and that the historic Present is based upon an original timeless use of the Present (157-66). In comparison of the Imperfect and Aorist, he differentiates the meanings of the 1 (sigmatic) and 2 Aorists, claiming that the 2 Aorists were closer in meaning to the Imperfect, since the Aorist forms probably were not synonymous originally, though now no difference can be detected (171). He also cites examples where the Aorist is near to the Present ($\epsilon\kappa\lambda\alpha\upsilon\sigma\alpha$ [break]; $\epsilon\delta\acute{\alpha}\kappa\rho\upsilon\sigma\alpha$ [cry]; S. Aj. 270 [175-76]), and after prolonged discussion sees the gnomic Aorist as reflecting the original timelessness of the Aorist, as in Slavonic (Hes. Works 218; Jas 1:24 [178-81]). The Future divides its *Aktionsart* between punctual and non-punctual roots on the basis of point of view (197), though some scholars cite different forms, e.g. $\epsilon\tilde{\xi}\omega/\sigma\chi\eta\sigma\omega$ (203). The above discussion samples some of Wackernagel's disparate statements regarding Greek, intermixed with discussions of other languages. Though he recognizes *Aktionsarten* as subjective he constructs a model along the lines of the comparative philologists. Though his practice of interpretation, especially in the non-Indicative Moods, is often morphologically determined, it is virtually always violable on the basis of diachronic study or apparent, translational meaning.

The second type of work fostered by this approach is the historical Greek grammar, especially by Kieckers (13-29). His first distinction is between time and kind of action, noting that time only applies to the Indicative. After briefly defining the four most important *Aktionsarten* or *Aspekts* (imperfective, perfective, perfectual, iterative) and perfectivizing prepositions, and claiming a correlation between tense stem and *Aktionsart*, such that the Present is imperfective and the Aorist perfective (this explains the difference between $\chi\alpha\rho\iota\zeta\alpha\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ and $\chi\alpha\rho\iota\sigma\alpha\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ [show kindness]), and the Perfect perfectual, all with a mixture of examples from Greek and other languages (13-15), Kieckers extends his categories. He claims there are also perfective Present verbs, thus explaining the future-referring Present ($\epsilon\lambda\mu\iota$ [I go]); and perfective *Aktionsart* with punctual and terminative meaning (15-16). When he discusses usage of the forms, Kieckers almost completely disregards his previous discussion, listing a number of uses of each verb. Present: general or timeless, actual, timeless with $\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\omicron\varsigma$ (earlier) or $\pi\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha\iota$ (for a long time), historic Present, resultive, conative, future, and prophetic; Imperfect; historic Aorist, in which "Die dauer des Vorgangs spielt dabei keine Rolle" (23); the ingressive Aorist; gnomic Aorist, in which "der Aorist ist . . . zeitlos gebraucht" (25); Perfect, intensive and iterative; Pluperfect; Future, in which one form can be imperfective or perfective, as well as modal (volitive); and the Future Perfect. Kieckers's treatment is included more for its exemplary value than its explanatory powers, illustrating the persistence of this model. Its limitations are noteworthy. (1) The categories of *Aktionsart* are derivative. While Kieckers recognizes a correlation with stem forms, he lacks a theoretical basis for clarifying the relationship. (2) The treatment of *Aktionsart* has little influence on formulation of categories of usage, which are uncoordinated. He does not clarify how he arrives at the sub-categories of Present usage or why they are sub-categories. Treatment of the Aorist lists several major categories, also uncoordinated. (3) The Greek examples given are generally few and often made up, and they are often overshadowed by examples from German and Slavonic languages. Overall the treatment is

disappointingly uninformative, not only because it does not advance treatment of Greek itself but because it leaves fundamental assumptions unexamined.

f. A survey of a number of important publications in response to Brugmann *et al.* is worth making. The amount of material is overwhelming, since it includes articles in comparative philology, Slavonic and other IE languages, as well as purely theoretical discussions (see Schwyzler, 2.246-48, for bibliography; for a summary of the comparative philological approach represented by Brugmann and Delbrück [known as the Neogrammarians] see Jankowsky, *Neogrammarians*, 124-43; Ivic, *Trends*, 58-64; cf. also Robins, *History*, 164-97).

(1) There is a noteworthy range of disagreement regarding the internal structure of the Greek verbal edifice. For example, Brugmann lists 32 different stem classes arranged under twelve headings in IE (*Flexionslehre*, 86-390, with some duplication) and 16 of these (not counting sub-classifications) are applied to Greek (*Grammatik*, 312-62). Brugmann does not believe that each class represents a particular function, since he conveniently divides them into various *Aktionsarten* (see above). But even these categories are questionable. For example, δάμνημι (bring under the yoke) and ὀρυσμι (rouse), both characterized as linear-terminative, seem to be terminative in opposite ways. And how linear-terminative differs from strict terminative, e.g. εὕρισκω (find), or even iterative, e.g. γίγνομαι (become), is unclear. Brugmann himself notes that terminative can be used with a cursive or punctiliar root. The categories of *Aktionsart*, therefore, are more than root-based categories alone.

(2) An even more fundamental difficulty is to arrive at proper categories of *Aktionsart* (see e.g. Streitberg, "Benennung," 72-74, who is acutely aware of the terminological difficulties, though he endorses the terms imperfective/perfective, since the grammarian can give his particular meaning to them, he contends; cf. Review, 57-67. For very thorough listings of the secondary literature regarding verbal categories see footnotes to Brugmann, 538-70; Schwyzler, 1.247-301; see also Brunel, "L'aspect.")

Sarauw ("Syntaktisches," 145-49) argues against the terms punctual and punctual-perfective, noting that every action lasts some moment in time, so the beginning and ending cannot be linked directly, as the punctual event must be if characterized as a mathematical 'point.' He likens the point instead to one on a piece of paper with a certain extension. Therefore every verb represents a certain duration, and there is no such category as the punctual verb as an objective description of an event (cf. Brugmann's [540 n. 2, 541 n. 1] response to such criticism, and my chapt. 2).

Streitberg ("Perfektiv," 311-13) objects to any conception of a perfective verb other than one of completion. Since every verb of whichever *Aktionsart* expresses an event that has duration, he claims, when this common element is removed all that is left for a perfective verb is the moment of completion (he objects to Delbrück's use of the term "punctual" [313-14]). Streitberg also criticizes the use of *punctual* and *terminative* as conceptions of the same verbal root (Aorist in Greek, though he refers to the Slavonic Perfect), since the two are contradictory notions, referring to unlimited and limited action (313-14; Herbig ["Aktionsart," 209] finds a "durative-perfective Aktionsart" of the Aorist in ἐβασίλευσε τριάκοντα ἔτη [he reigned thirty years]).

Pedersen ("Vorschlag," 152-53; cf. "Lehre," 220-24) throws the debate into further terminological confusion when he argues on the basis of Slavonic and Gothic that the category of terminative verbs is misleading, since examples in fact can be punctual, iterative, and even durative. Instead, since every verb called punctual has a fixed termination it is better to refer to single-time and iterative-terminative, and possibly durative-terminative action. Regarding the category of iterative verbs, however, Herbig believes such a category is only psychological and not morphological, and dependent on adverbial modifiers ("Aktionsart," 214-16; he believes the Ionic σκον-suffix is already devoid of iterative significance).

This brief treatment is not designed to discredit the quest for verbal *Aktionsart* in itself, but to illustrate that these categories are neither strictly morphologically based, in the sense that a morphological pattern automatically conveys a particular *Aktionsart*, nor descriptively objective. They are convenient logical constructs grounded not in description of usage in an individual language but in argument from logical conceptions (see Streitberg, "Perfektiv," 313, who recognizes this) and the interpretative framework of comparative philology, thus providing a convenient and perhaps useful fiction in the guise of linguistic objectivity.

This method is potentially misleading when trying to gain insight into the nature of a particular language, especially one as morphologically based as Greek. For example, Brugmann in disputing Stahl's view that the Aorist is used to represent the event in and of itself states, "Aber ebensogut kann das Präsens in diesem Sinn gebraucht werden in Fällen wie *der Vogel fliegt*" (541; cf. Kieckers, 14). This German example says nothing about Greek usage. Hartmann's monumental study of the difference between the Aorist and the Imperfect falls victim to the same criticism. On the basis of a hypothesis about the original similarity in form between the two verbal categories and comparisons with various other languages, he concludes that certain categories of Aorists are not differentiated functionally from Imperfects ("Aorist und Imperfektum," 48 [1919]; 49 [1920]). On the basis of these previous studies, Hartmann can find no semantic differentiation between use of the Aorist and Imperfect in, for example, Luke 1-4 ("Aorist und Imperfektum im Griechischen," 327), only stylistic differences (contra Sarauw, "Syntaktisches," 151, who cites Hdt. 2.175.3, noting that ἐκόμισεν is not punctual but "concentrated," since it refers to the three year period during which the monolithic shrine was brought [ἐκόμιζον] from Elephantine). Also troublesome is Herbig ("Aktionsart"), whose argument constantly alternates between the theoretical and linguistically eclectic.

(3) Stahl (75) argues that, rather than suffixes of the Present stem containing meanings found in IE, (a) a special *Aktionsart* has not been indicated for every suffix, (b) with each single suffix the assumed sense is not employed with all constructed verbs, and (c) it must remain doubtful if the assured sense does not lie already in the tense itself. Taking -σκω as an example, Stahl argues it does not have a single fundamental meaning since it may be construed as inchoative with γηράσκω (I grow old), γινώσκω (I know) or μεθύσκω (I get drunk), iterative in Imperfect forms, e.g., ἐμέθυσκον (I was getting drunk), and neither in πάσχω (I suffer), εὕρισκω (I find), βόσκω (I nourish), or θνήσκω (I die). For the NT, as Moulton, a follower of the comparative-philological school, notes, "In prehistoric Indo-Germanic these stems may have carried some functional distinctions, but it is difficult to prove these distinctions in all cases, and most of them were obsolete before Hellenistic Greek arose, even if they could be claimed for earlier periods" (Moulton/Howard, 183).

g. Regarding *Aktionsart* several points may be clarified.

1. Determining *Aktionsart* is an attempt to define *objectively* the kind of action conveyed by a verb. Therefore such terms as punctual, iterative, terminative, cursive, perfective, linear are used.

2. Such conceptions are *not* based strictly upon morphological criteria since similar forms are often subordinated beneath varying descriptive categories. As Schlachter says, in the quest for *Aktionsart* the morphological point of view has been "nahezu vergessen," with the only formal element of large interest being the prefix ("Verbalaspekt," 24).

3. The categories themselves are subjective constructs of highly questionable pertinence. As Klein states, "grundsätzlich könnte man von der Annahme ausgehen, dass es so viele Aktionsarten gibt, wie es denkbare Beschreibungskategorien eines verbalen Vorgangs gibt" (*Tempus*, 104. He continues: "Als relevant dürfen jedoch nur solche aktionsartigen Kategorien gelten, die Auswirkungen auf eine mögliche Selektionsbeschränkung der Aspektsetzung oder auf weitere Syntaktische Kompatibilitäten besitzen"; see also Bache, *Aspect*, 10). Perhaps this is the most important point to make regarding *Aktionsarten*.

4. Whereas verbal roots may have conveyed *Aktionsart* at an earlier stage (e.g. in proto IE) these categories are not applicable to Greek from at least Homer onwards.¹⁴ Resorting to terms such as "ingressive," "effective," "constative" Aorist is an appeal to non-formally based grammatical categories, lacking any objective grammatical standard for deciding their character. As Klein once more states, "die besondere Schwierigkeit aktionsartlicher Untersuchungen besteht darin, dass die Aktionsarten 'nicht zur Ausbildung fester grammatikalischen Kategorien gelangt' sind" (*Tempus*, 104, quoting W. Hanckel, *Die Aktionsarten im Französischen* [Diss., Berlin, 1930] 7).

5. Attempts to equate *Aktionsart* with tense categories have no basis of support in discussion of *Aktionsart*, since tenses are treated as merely convenient ways to describe general tendencies. Appeal is made to the verbal root (see above), lexis or time. An appeal to lexis is seen when it is argued that a certain verb is perfective (e.g. ἀκούω) since in one's lexical understanding one hears a noise and its importance remains. An appeal to temporal distinctions is seen in such headings as "Present used for/as a Future" (this terminology also neglects formal/functional differences) or when an Imperfect is treated as an Aorist since both refer to an event in past time and are found in parallel constructions (a classic example using translational value of individual lexical items is Riemann, "La question," 585-99).

6. These criticisms can be summarized in this way (see Schlachter, "Verbalaspekt," 25). (a) Proponents of *Aktionsart* claim it to be an objective method of characterizing action when in fact it is arbitrary and subjective, since the hearer must construe the meaning apart from any principled grammatical means of determination, such as morphology (Schlachter, 36. That determining *Aktionsart* is subjective, in that it attempts to summarize or characterize an event as punctual, etc., was recognized by B. Faddegon in *Donum natalicium Schrijnen* [1929] 119ff., 127, as stated by Debrunner, Review of Koschmieder, 89 n. 1). (b) Without formal (morphological) criteria, comparative philologists lack an objective basis upon which to treat systematically all the variables present in Greek (kind of action, temporal distinction), without creating strained categories. (c) The terminology is temporally based; and the *Aktionsarten* are contradictory, mutually exclusive and (ironically) highly subjective appraisals of verbal action. (d) The problem can be laid at the feet of several causes, one being the comparative-diachronic method, since comparative philologists lack sensitivity to any one language as object of analysis. Since they function under the dictum that "what is not historical in linguistics is not scientific" (Ivic, *Trends*, 61), they tend to lose sight of the conception of any one language as a whole and to focus instead upon particular features found in many languages as evidence of the original IE. Also to blame are the failure to conceive of each language as a system in its own right, overreliance on temporal distinctions to establish suitable parallel contexts as well as to formulate tense labels, and failure to distinguish the value of tense categories. (e) One of the enduring features of the work of comparative philology, however, is to re-establish (from the hellenistic grammarians) that formal verbal tense categories, such as Aorist, Present, Perfect, as well as the forms of the various Moods, have a history that predates the hellenistic grammarians and even Homer, reaching back to the formative stages of Greek. And although the comparative philologists went far beyond the tense categories in formulating conceptions of Greek verbal usage, their recognition of and dependence upon these categories as comprising the starting point of any discussion of tenses are notable. These tense categories, at the heart of the Greek language, are to be treated as linguistic constructs (i.e. various forms are recognized as belonging to the same tense category), which are susceptible to principled

¹⁴Crisafulli (*Aspect*, esp. 1-33) attempts to demonstrate that lexical meaning is determinative for what he calls "aspect" (durative and punctiliar; actually this is a theory of *Aktionsart*), but he is forced to examine only primary verbs (i.e. those that have been in the language from earliest times) and exclude secondary verbs (i.e. those formed later from non-verbal stems or other verbal stems). Besides the evident problems of determining root meaning (translational values are crucial for him), the circularity of his logic is evident. It comes as no surprise that what he determines are durative roots appear most frequently in Present/Imperfect forms, and punctiliar roots in Aorist forms, though even here such a rule is far from absolute.

evaluation, unlike *Aktionsart*. Therefore, though Greek may appear to have many *Aktionsarten*, these are better viewed as contextual abstractions on the basis of lexis (i.e. attempts to describe each action objectively) and their verbal use must be subsumed under tense forms though *not* temporal categories.¹⁵ Subsequent evaluation of Greek grammatical discussion endorses the results presented above.

4. TRANSITIONAL APPROACHES. **a.** As early as 1919 Harrison (*Aspects*), in a romanticized treatment of Russian and Greek, posited a direct correlation between Russian aspects and Greek tense forms.¹⁶ The next significant development in study of aspect and *Aktionsart* was an incisive review by Jacobsohn of Wackernagel's *Vorlesungen* (369-95, esp. 378-86). After noting several difficulties Wackernagel and his school have in using IE to define *Aktionsarten*, and utilizing Semitic languages as a starting point, Jacobsohn concludes that there are two ways of conceiving of action: subjective aspect, "wie der Sprecher Verlauf der Handlung ansieht" (379; Jacobsohn is much more inclusive in his definition of aspect, listing such items as Moods as well as tenses [379, 381]), and objective *Aktionsart*, "als Bezeichnungen eines besonderen, ausserhalb des Subjekts gegebenen objektiven Tatbestandes" (381),¹⁷ though he affirms that the border between the two is flexible (386). Jacobsohn also argues that the verbal prefix is used in Greek to transform a durative tense into perfective action, treating this at the level of *Aktionsart*, though he says that this construction is to be considered at the level of grammar and not lexis (381-82). (Porzig ["Aktionsart," 152-53] takes up Jacobsohn's terminology, attempting to show that aspect is strongly morphologically based; contra Schlachter ["Verbalaspekt," 27-28], who criticizes Jacobsohn's definitions of the aspects, notes the lack of boundaries for what constitutes an *Aktionsart*, and points out Jacobsohn's failure in practice to fulfil his morphological differentiation.)

Soon after Jacobsohn, Hermann published an article which posits a solution for understanding the Greek Aorist ("Aktionsart," 207-28, similar to

¹⁵See Miller, *Tense*, 203-04. I follow his definition of lexis as a feature that is best handled by an "appropriate entry in a dictionary" of Greek, since the feature is "peculiar to one verb or to a group of verbs rather than being a general characteristic of the verb system" (204). See Pollak, *Studien*, 35-39, for others who argue for this position regarding Greek, including Leroy, "L'aspect"; Kravar, "Approche," 963, besides Jacobsohn and Hermann (see next section); cf. Klein, *Tempus*, who contrasts the morphological/grammatical concept of aspect with the lexical/semantic category of *Aktionsart* (77). The latter depends upon a single verb's meaning and the influences of context (103).

¹⁶Comparative philologists would have little to do with Harrison's explanation of the origin of aspect: "Some rather profound spiritual need must surely have prompted this distinction of aspect which is at once the dominant characteristic and the crowning glory of the Russian language" (*Aspects*, 11).

¹⁷The first to differentiate aspect and *Aktionsart* is reputed to be S. Agrell, who applied them to Slavonic languages in his *Aspektänderung und Aktionsartbildung beim polnischen Zeitworte: ein Beitrag zum Studium der indogermanischen Präverbia und ihrer Bedeutungsfunktionen*, Lunds Universitets Arsskrift NS 1, IV.2 (Lund, 1908). He distinguished aspect as the main category of Slavonic tenses (imperfective and perfective) and *Aktionsart* as functions of verbal composites which mark the kind or way the event is completed (see Pollak, *Studien*, 34, for summary).

K.W.L. Heyse in 1856 when he differentiated subjective and objective time; see Herbig, "Aktionsart," 185). He claims, "man hat bisher nur übersehen, dass zweierlei durcheinandergeworfen wird, was scharf zu trennen ist, weil es auf zwei verschiedenen Ebenen liegt" (207). The difference between ἐβασίλευον and ἐβασίλευσα "liegt lediglich in der Auffassung des Sprechenden" (207-08). Hermann devises a scheme of subjective *Aktionsart* (Hdt. 1.16.1)--complexive and cursive--and objective *Aktionsart*--durative and non-durative, with ἐβασίλευον/ἐβασίλευσα as complexive and durative, and ἐβασίλευσα as cursive and non-durative. All "Geschehene usw. dauern oder nichtdauern und alle Prädikate entweder durativ oder nichtdurativ sind" (211).¹⁸ Despite the fact that Hermann has defined two subjective systems, has not sufficiently differentiated their relationship, confuses form and function in defining their uses (since he treats them on the same level), and maintains the same reductionistic terminology for *Aktionsarten* (e.g. ingressive, effective, and momentary non-durative *Aktionsarten* [213, 224-25]), he distinguishes the major issues involved. (Schlachter ["Verbalaspekt," 29-30] criticizes Hermann for blurring his subjective and objective categories, failing to maintain morphological distinctions, and psychologizing when differentiating categories.) It is unfortunate that his so-called structural analysis of the Greek language falls far short of the expectations he created.¹⁹

Jacobsohn, in clarifying his position ("Aspektfragen," 293-318, esp. 305-18), disputed Hermann's limitation of *Aktionsart* to durative and non-durative, rightly recognizing that action "objectively" speaking is manifest, but that a speaker may view an event in different ways, *Aspekte*, which he characterizes as forming the pair durative/perfective (Hom. Il. 16.175 vs. 180; cf. Od. 16.118-19). Although the definition of terms may differ from language to language, he claims they are best expressed around formal verbal oppositions. This distinction between lexis as *Aktionsart* and subjective perspective as aspect is significant, but Jacobsohn is hesitant to exploit its implications, arguing that *Aktionsart* is "stärker empfunden als beim Aspekt" (316), on the basis of his reconstructed history of the Greek language (308-10). If he had examined modern Greek, however, he would have seen that aspect has grown in

¹⁸Hermann traces a somewhat different history of IE verb development than does Jacobsohn, equating different *Aktionsarten* with different stems, which may not have been associated phonetically (ὄρώ and εἶδον) or which developed different forms from the same stem (ἔχω and ἔσχω) (222). Hermann implies that aspectual categories were already present when *Aktionsarten* began to develop, whereas Jacobsohn claims aspect developed slightly later.

¹⁹Cf. Hermann, "Altgriechischen Tempora," 583-649, where he defines conceptually the major categories of *Zeitdauerarten* (durative, terminative, circuitous, punctual, momentary and coincidental [591-95]) solely on the basis of his conception of how events should occur. His application to Greek (611-19, cf. 607-10) is an imposition of these categories, not a structural analysis of the language itself. Rather than utilizing the insights of structural linguistics (whose accomplishments he realizes [esp. 585ff.]), his treatment lacks formal criteria for evaluation, conflates categories such as the Imperfect and Aorist, disregards contextual factors, and is much more like Brugmann's treatment than any other.

importance (especially in its equation with morphological categories),²⁰ while *Aktionsart* is still a matter of lexis. In any case, on the basis of the work of Jacobsohn and Hermann the major categories were distinguished upon which subsequent structural linguists might draw in their formulations of aspect in Greek verbal systems. (Svensson [*Gebrauch*, 1-9] recognizes the difference between aspect as a subjective category [perfective/imperfective] and *Aktionsart* as an objective category [iterative, intensive, inchoative, etc.] but chooses to treat verbs of saying from the standpoint of *Aktionsart* [10ff.].)

b. The major grammatical work to display sensitivity to this approach was written as late as 1950: Schwyzer's Greek grammar, begun as a revision of Brugmann's grammar and completed (vol. 2) by Debrunner (2.248-301, on tense and aspect; Lohmann [Review, 353] labels Schwyzer's grammar "als eines der grossen, repräsentativen Werke am Abschluss einer Epoche der europäischen Sprachwissenschaft," apparently referring to comparative philology; cf. 357-59 on aspect). Schwyzer distinguishes aspect and *Aktionsart* at the outset, using Hermann's work as a basis. He defines *Aktionsart* as pertaining to the difference between complete and incomplete action, and formulates two "Hauptaspekte"--the confective which "sieht einen Vorgang oder eine Handlung als Ereignis, als schlechthin geschehen, vollendet," and the infective which "betrachtet den Verbalinhalt ohne das Moment der Vollendung, einen Zustand als lediglich zuständlich, einen Vorgang oder eine Handlung als noch unabgeschlossen, noch geschehend, verlaufend" (252). Schwyzer (252-53) also rejects the terms *perfective* and *imperfective* because he believes they are too similar to traditional tense designations; he rejects visual depictions (linear, punctual, etc.) as well. He claims that all three tense categories in Greek are essentially aspectual (254, 257). Despite his formulation of an aspectual system, and although his discussion of pragmatic usage of individual tenses is in many ways exemplary since he primarily categorizes according to temporal reference, Schwyzer adopts a specific application quite similar to that of earlier comparative philologists. (1) Since he posits only two major aspects, he must place the Perfect in one of the categories--the infective (τέθνηκε, βέβηκε), though he also introduces the term "stative" (252, 257, 263, where he reserves it for the intransitive active Perfect), and suggests the two aspects are combinable in confective-infective and vice versa Presents (e.g. παίθω, Ar. Wasps 784; D. 24.6). (The Future is modal [265].) Aspect, therefore, is based upon analytic and not morphological or synthetic criteria, with apparently no principled means for distinguishing them. (2) He asserts that the Indicative has absolute temporal meaning (254, 256, 269), an assertion which causes unnecessary problems, since he acknowledges that the non-Indicative Moods are solely aspectual (304).

Thus though the Present stem, which he posits as an abstracted category (256 n. 2), is usually aspectually infective, Schwyzer finds confective Presents in verbs of future meaning (εἶμι, νέομαι) and the historic Present (X. Anab. 1.8.26) (his distinction between the expressive and inexpressive historic Present is grammatically unfounded [271-73]). And he includes Presents with the temporal scheme of a past event with present status (D. 20.141). As he says, "die häufige Beschränkung eines Verbs auf das Präsenssystem verbürgt keinen bestimmten Aspekt" (259). His

²⁰Thumb (*Handbook*, 151-78) shows the same facts from a comparative philologist's standpoint.

temporal rigidity for the Indicative fails to explain the future Present and the timeless Present (S. Phil. 121), which he attributes to an early timeless Present (Schwyzer believes the aspects preceded time-based tenses [253]). His claim that the augment is a past-time indicator presents problems with the non-past Imperfect (X. Hell. 2.1.21; Pl. Phaedr. 230A), as well as the completed Imperfect in contradistinction to its aspect (Hom. Il. 7.471ff.). Regarding the Aorist and Imperfect, though he acknowledges most Aorists are built on confective roots (contra ἐφόρησε, among several other infective Aorists [257]) and Imperfects on infective, Schwyzer recognizes a weakening of the confective sense to one of factiveness or non-infectiveness (e.g. Anacr. 8D: ἔτεα πεντήκοντά τε κάκατον Τάρτηρσσοῦ βασιλεύσαι [to rule as king of T. 150 years; 261]), although he argues that "das Gefühl für die Verschiedenheit der beiden Systeme vom Altertum bis zum heutigen Tag lebendig geblieben ist" (262). While claiming that the Aorist Indicative is past-referring (he says this use is "geläufigen"), he distinguishes a category for "immediate" (*unmittelbare*) past, though a distinction from present-referring is not convincing in several examples (S. Phil. 1314: ἡσθὼν πατέρα τὸν ἄνδρ' εὐλογοῦντά σε [I enjoy your praising my father]; cf. also E. Supp. 1161; S. El. 668; Aj. 536); and tries to avoid the implications of a future-referring Aorist Indicative (Th. 6.80.2). Four categories of usage for typical situations or events, including the gnomic Aorist (Isoc. 1.6), are recognized as well. Since he posits a present use of the Perfect, Schwyzer encounters the same problems as in discussion of the Present, in which past (X. Hell. 7.1.41), future (X. Anab. 1.8.12) and even nontemporal (Hdt. 7.130.1) uses do not seem to conform to rigid absolute temporal conceptions. A further problem is Schwyzer's major emphasis on the difference between the intensive and resultative Perfect, for which the Aorist is "gleichwertig" (287; Rev 5:7), though no criteria are given upon which to make such a determination.

c. A recent syntax of the verb by Rijksbaron, written in light of linguistic theory (esp. 126ff. on Voice), has made use of Schwyzer's terminology. Much of his treatment is sensitive to issues of Greek language, particularly his distinction of lexical from grammatical meaning (3-4), and dismissal of the resultative Perfect (36). Surely because of the constraints of space, much of his theoretical discussion remains perplexing. Rather than seven, Rijksbaron distinguishes five tense stems (Present, Aorist, Perfect, Future, Future Perfect), each of which has a semantic value: not-completed (imperfective), completed (confective), stative (stative-confective), future, future state (1-2), although not only is it questionable whether all tense stems should be treated on the same plane but the criteria for determining each semantic feature are mixed. This is reflected in a chart (6), similar to those of earlier grammarians. Though he includes "verbal action" as one axis of his grid, he categorically rejects as "untenable" the view that the tense forms are "aspect stems" (he entertains *Aktionsart* [4]), claiming that the difference, for example, between the Aorist and the Imperfect is "point of orientation" or order of events, although he freely admits that "substitution of one form for another usually changes the information and thus influences the way in which a speaker may proceed with, for instance, a narrative" (3, cf. 12-15). Rijksbaron wishes to invoke relative temporal reference for the tenses on the basis of simultaneity, anteriority and posteriority, except in the Indicative where absolute tense is present, i.e. with relation to the moment of utterance, distinguishing the tenses according to primary and secondary endings. He says there is no primary Aorist Indicative since the Aorist stem is complete. Although he claims not to countenance "aspect," Rijksbaron's formulation of tense as synthetically based is closer to the traditional formulation of aspect than *Aktionsart*. This is further seen in his treatment of tense usage in non-Indicative Moods, where temporal distinctions do not obtain, except possibly in the Imperative (5), although he reintroduces temporal differences with the Infinitive and Participle. In discussion of individual tense usage, though Rijksbaron is obviously sensitive to issues of absolute and relative tense, he gives no justification of, for example, generic (either habitual or universal/timeless--are these the same?) use of the Present (Pl. Lach. 179B; Hdt. 2.68.1), completed use of the Imperfect (Hdt. 5.24.1; Lys. 12.6-7), or historic Present. Rijksbaron admits that "Strictly speaking this historic use conflicts with the fundamental value(s)

of the primary present indicative" (22), claiming instead that this gives it a special status for highlighting decisive actions (E. Med. 1156-69) or making enumerations (X. Anab. 1.1.10). Justifying the first usage, Rijksbaron makes the possibly contradictory remarks that the historic Present creates an "eyewitness-effect" (24), while it also highlights significant moments in a person's life. Rijksbaron also notes use of the Aorist Indicative (1st Person) of verbs of emotion, arguing that "the speaker had begun to feel the emotion concerned before his interlocutor finished speaking" (28-29), though Ar. Wasps 983 appears to contradict this, as does the gnomic Aorist, where Rijksbaron states it does not have past value (Hdt. 1.194.4).

There is much to be learned from these grammars, but their dependence upon older, well-criticized schools of thought leaves them lacking in theory and explanatory power.

5. STRUCTURAL LINGUISTICS AND ASPECT. a. The first structural linguistic approach to aspect²¹ was published in 1943 by Holt (*Etudes*, 14-47, on ancient Greek). After an historical survey (2-12), Holt makes the important observation that previous attempts to adjudge aspectual values of the Greek verb suffered from lack of a systematic structural approach, i.e. failing to note that iterative/non-iterative is a different kind of opposition than Imperfect/Aorist (13; cf. 14-15, where he claims failure to formulate an appropriate metalanguage for the Aorist/Imperfect opposition has hindered study). He instead argues for a differentiation between a language's expression (form) and content (function). After noting that on the basis of the distribution of verbal forms alone (he charts the seven forms [16]) the Greek tenses cannot be temporally based, he explores the verbal stems, believing rightly, "dans la langue il ne peut pas exister plus d'unités dans le plan du contenu qu'il ne ce trouve d'unités dans le plan de l'expression," e.g. ποιώ/ποιήσω (17, cf. 1, 15).

Using Hjelmslev's view of language-structure with aspect as morphematic,²² Holt argues for a system of inflectional aspectual oppositions which includes the Perfect as positive (devolutive), the Present as its negative (evolutive), as in οὐδὲ βουλευέσθαι ἔτι ὥρα ἀλλὰ βεβουλευέσθαι ("ce n'est plus le moment de délibérer mais d'avoir délibéré," Pl. Crito 46A [28]), and the Aorist as neutral (zero) (Holt draws here on Brondal ["Structure"], who provides a complex and purely theoretical scheme of oppositions), with the Future non-aspectual. Citing X. Anab. 2.3.22, 23 (ἐπεὶ μέντοι ἤδη αὐτὸν ἐωρῶμεν ἐν δεινῷ ὄντα, ἡσχύνθημεν . . . προδοῦναι αὐτόν . . . ἐπεὶ δὲ Κύρος τέθηκεν, οὔτε βασιλεῖ ἀντιπιοῦμεθα τῆς ἀρχῆς

²¹There have been many structural approaches to aspect in languages other than Greek. See bibliography, esp. in Comrie, *Aspect*. Many of these treatments do not clearly distinguish aspect, *Aktionsart*, and lexis (as treated here). This section does not treat approaches to or those based upon modern Greek, e.g. Seiler, *L'aspect* (cf. idem, "Problematic"); Bakker, *Imperative* (see my chapt. 7), and Paraskevas-Shepard, "Choosing." See Wilkinson, "Aspect," 16-17, 206-17, who shows how Russian aspectual categories are not informative for study of ancient Greek, as does MacLennan, *Problema*, 33-54, who in analysing Holt and Ruipérez shows the difficulties of formulating a convincing aspectual theory of Greek in light of dependence upon Slavonic studies.

²²See Hjelmslev, "La structure," 122-47; "Essai d'une théorie," 160-73, in *Essais* (1971), whose method is ruggedly structuralist, formulating a language-system wholly apart from categories of meaning. Cf. "Analysis," 27-35, in *Essais* (1959).

["mais quand nous avons compris qu'il était en danger, nous avons eu honte de le trahir . . . mais après la mort de Kyros, nous ne disputons pas au roi la possession de son trône"] 21), he determines that aspectual selection is homonexual (internal), whereas temporal determination is heteronexual (external).²³ The positive term is the most delimited since it represents "l'état obtenu par un procès antérieur" (28), whereas the negative term is the process without its termination. The Aorist is allowed to remain undefined, as in the Greek writers, adopting Meiller's definition that the Aorist represents "the process pure and simple without consideration of duration" (32). This explains, Holt claims, terminative, ingressive and complexive action (Th. 1.1). (Holt also distinguishes a group of derivative aspects, equivalent to Hermann's objective *Aktionsarten*, consisting of *σκ* endings and reduplicated Presents, though he claims most of the distinctions have disappeared in classical Greek [34-39].)

Holt correlates the flexional forms with tense forms, positing the future as positive, the present as negative, and the past as neutral. Since he recognizes that the tense labels represent frequent uses (40), he explains the use of past and present tenses for future time on the basis of their negative or neutral characters. His conception of time as a realization of prospective, improspective and neutrospective categories (43), as differentiated from logical categories (e.g. the present as a point where past and future meet) allows him flexibility. When reconciling tense to aspect, however, he posits that, "c'est le morphème de temps qui détermine le morphème d'aspect," as illustrated by the following chart (44):

	+	0	-
+	Perfect Future		Future
0	Perfect	Aorist	Present
-	Pluperfect		Imperfect

He then explains such uses of the Aorist as gnomic (or present) (44) by the fact that the Aorist is temporally and aspectually neutral.

Holt is to be commended for composing the first structural analysis of aspect, especially in realizing the importance of inflexional aspect (35; cf. 45-46, where he makes inflexional aspect subordinate to derivative aspect, i.e. aspect subordinate to *Aktionsart*), and in attempting to relate time to aspect (esp. 39ff.). Though he set the tone for subsequent discussion among structural linguists, there appear to be several shortcomings to his method.

(1) Despite his protestations he does not depart significantly from a strictly logical analysis (23, 26ff.). His constructs are not apparently based upon an investigation of the Greek language so much as the Hjelmslevian model imposed on Greek. And if it is posited that the tenses function to convey meaning (as seems true from analysis of the language and so most grammarians and linguists), then Holt has dissociated his theory from this factor (even Schlachter, though he states that "im Altgriechischen bilden die Aspekte eben kein 'System'" ["Verbalaspekt," 67], believes that differences of aspect are realized by temporal morphemes [68]). For example, Holt recognizes that the Aorist is basically a past tense according to usage but claims this is of no importance since the form is really non-temporal and non-aspectual in his system, though he also says it is solely aspectual (44). And though vague temporal reference of the Present allows for past reference (42), he also claims that the historic Present is independent of the value of its temporal direction (21 n. 1) and has the same sense as the Aorist aspect (?) (33).

(2) His desire to put all choices on the same level (aspectual as well as temporal) fails to differentiate terms clearly. For example, he claims that the tense forms in Greek are both temporal and aspectual morphemes, but never says what it means that the Perfect and Present are 0 temporally, and how this relates to the Pluperfect and Imperfect being -. His description of the Aorist as neutral in both spheres does not fit his treatment of the Aorist as a past tense and as

²³This distinction between internal and external time is taken up by later linguists such as Lyons and Comrie (see below), by which two different aspects may enter into the same function simultaneously, but whereby two tenses may not do so.

parallel with the Present in various contexts, such as the gnomic. And despite his rejection of binary choices (24-25), the supposition of a 0 term apart from the meaningful opposition of + and - appears to be the same. It is questionable whether his formulation is helpful: on the one hand he argues that the temporal morpheme is predominant yet he also argues for a wide range of temporal usage especially for the Aorist and Present.

(3) Despite his recognition that it is impossible to define a term solely by its diverse uses (23), Holt's definition of the individual aspects is apparently confused. The semantic feature that differentiates Perfect (συντελικός) from Present (ἀτέλη) does not appear to be termination, as if the Present had no quality of itself (would it not be 0 then?). It does not follow that the Perfect must indicate the state attained by an anterior process (τέθηκε, ἐλόγησα, ἐλόγησα [28]), simply because it occupies a unique "zone" and is the least frequent and thus most specific, unless Holt is following the ancient Greek grammarians, a dubious aid to his scheme. He dismisses intensive Perfects (βέβηκε, κέκρηκε, etc.) as simply lexis and translation (29), though he includes perfective Presents (ἀκούω). He never specifies what it means for the Future to be an aspect. And it is not clear why the Aorist as the unmarked term would entail ingressive, etc., action or have the sense of the Perfect (33).

(4) Holt says time is predominant in determining aspect (44), showing a theory of aspect which is undermined by such things as the past-referring Aorist and the present-referring Present, since these are predominant uses that a theory must explain. The Future as delimited appears to be a logical rather than Greek-specific formulation. And his theory provides little help for understanding use of non-Indicative tense forms, where aspect alone is in effect, since the Aorist and Present are the predominant opposition. (Holt treats none of the non-Indicative uses of the Greek verb, though he acknowledges their relative temporal reference [40].)

(5) Holt must rely upon meaning, though he attempts to develop a system with reference only to structure. His movement between the two (form and function) is unclear. (Lyons [Structural Semantics, 111-17] essentially adopts Holt's system, followed by Erickson ["OIDA," from *Semantics*, esp. 297-303], whose construction of models based upon English lexical meaning and whose illogical shifting of formal/functional categories show up the weaknesses of Holt's analysis. See my chapt. 5.)

b. Ruipérez has eliminated many of the problems of Holt's work in perhaps the most thorough structural analysis of the Greek verb (*Estructura*, 1-44, for theoretical formulation; see also "Neutralization"; "Quelques vues"; he is followed by Louw, "Aspect"). Ruipérez bases his analysis on a Jakobsonian/Prague model from phonetics, though he departs slightly by positing that the unmarked member of an opposition may either be neutral or form a privative opposition (negative) (17-19). Not equipollent, the marked member always has an unmistakable value. The basic structure of the Greek verbal system, according to Ruipérez, is built upon two sets of oppositions, one for aspect the other for temporal reference.

The basic opposition is between the Perfect (expressing the state resulting from an action, τέθηκε, ἔστηκα, πεποίηκα, κέκτημαι) and the Present/Aorist, in which the Perfect is marked for its termination, not cessation or duration (45-65). Thus Present (Hom. Il. 5.472) or Aorist (Th. 5.5.1) verbs can be used where it is fitting to find a Perfect. In the Perfect, verbs with transformational semantemes (verbs illustrating a modification of the subject) emphasize the subsequent state (θυήσκειν [die], χαίρειν [be happy]), while verbs with non-transformational semantemes (excluding any modification) are known as intensive Perfects (εἶναι [to be], κείσθαι

[lay]).²⁴ The same verb, e.g. βέβηκα (go), may fit both categories of *semanteme*, since the category is based upon meaning, not phonetic form. Through this division, Ruipérez claims to be able to eliminate the exceptions pointed out by previous scholars (e.g. δέδορκα, γέγηθα).

The secondary opposition is between the Present and Aorist, with the Present marked for durativity and the Aorist unmarked for aspectual value (67-89), i.e. not emphasizing termination, punctuality, etc. After criticizing various theories designed to differentiate the Present and Aorist, Ruipérez claims that the Present/Aorist opposition is neutralized in the Indicative since there is no Aorist Indicative with present value (see 72), and attempts to find aspectual ideas in present time are the result of explorations of *parole*. Partial neutralization occurs also in the Aorist Subjunctive and Optative Moods (Ruipe´rez claims they are predominant over the Present), where the Aorist is unmarked and the Present marked. Regarding traditionally applied verbal concepts of ingressive, perfective, etc., Ruipérez sees arbitrariness in trying to judge externally objective fact through subjective use of verbs (e.g. θανεῖν may not be ingressive but perfective in relation to νοσεῖν [to be ill]), but instead he divides along the lines of transformational and non-transformational *semantemes*: the former is either momentary (ἀστράψαι [flash lightning]) or durative (νοσεῖν [be ill]), while the latter is either momentary (βῆναι [take a step]) or indifferent. He attributes certain other of these conceptions of action, such as iterative and inchoative, to realizations of *parole*. The only values the Aorist actually has are punctuality (Hdt. 1.1 [negative value]), and indifference to any aspectual distinction (Hdt. 5.28.1). In the Present tense only the opposition μῖννω/μένω (remain) maintains an aspectual distinction of its own (cf. 119-24). The Aorist is the unmarked member because it both expresses action without aspectual qualifications and displays complex values (e.g. ingressive, complexive, iterative, factive, inchoative, etc.). The Present on the other hand has a clear, unified durative value (but not necessarily lasting a long time [Hom. Il. 2.785]), and its possibility of selection for purely subjective reasons in place of the Aorist when the writer wants to contemplate the development of an action (not necessarily temporal duration) are known (Lys. 12.4: οὐμός πατήρ Κέφαλος . . . ἔτη δὲ τριάκοντα ὥκησε [neutral Aorist], καὶ οὐδενὶ πώποτε οὔτε ἡμεῖς οὔτε ἐκεῖνος δίκην οὔτε ἐδικασάμεθα οὔτε ἐφύγομεν [neutral Aorist], ἀλλ' οὕτως ὥκοῦμεν [descriptive Imperfect] δημοκρατούμενοι ὥστε μήτε εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους ἐξαμαρτάνειν μήτε ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀδικεῖσθαι [descriptive Present] [my father C. lived for thirty years and for no one ever did we nor he ever prosecute nor defend, but thus we were living in a democracy in order neither to offend others nor to be treated unjustly by others] [85]).

In temporal relations, Ruipérez opposes future with present/past, the basic notion being futurity. Ruipérez notes that futurity is different from present and past. In the future the verbal content has not been verified but comes from an act of the will. Thus the Future, without being exactly the same as the Subjunctive and Optative, has a certain modal character, including desiderative (E. And. 1076), imperative (Pl. Prot. 338A), prospective (Hom. Od. 14.512), purely temporal (Lys. 24.6), but also past (Ael. Nat. Anim. 16.11), present (Hdt. 1.173), and gnomic (Arist. Nic. Eth. 1123A27) uses, the last three manifestations of *parole*, as are Present with future reference (Th. 6.91.3) and Aorist with future reference (Hdt. 8.102.2) (91-94). In the opposition of present/past, the determination is complicated by *parole* in which the forms can be used for various temporal references (habitual Present, Simon. 7.65), but the fundamental idea seems to be present-ness (Theoc. 1.135; Th. 1.144.1), considered from a psychological standpoint as the natural position of the speaker facing events without taking into account his situation in the line of time (96). This psychological factor allows for the general Present (Hom. Il. 16.384), rhetorical Present (Th. 6.91.3), or historic Present (see 147-57). The past is the unmarked member and thus able to express past time (negation of the present) or be indifferent (neutral), in such cases as the

²⁴The terms *transformational* and *non-transformational* *semantemes* are difficult not only to translate but to grasp conceptually, since the terminology is reminiscent of transformational grammar. In some ways the terms harken back to the division between stative and dynamic verbs, but I have decided to stay with Ruipérez's terminology rather than increase the risk of misconstruing him. See criticism five below.

general Aorist (Hes. Works 240), or Aorist in similes or maxims (Hdt. 2.47.1) (91-100). Thus the psychological system of the Present and the indifference of the preterite work together.

Ruipérez has devised an appealing scheme depicting the relationships among the aspects. In particular the differentiation of the Perfect from the Aorist/Present is convincing. But his scheme presents problems at several points as well.

(1) He does not devise a model which shows a relationship between aspect and tense, leaving each system to function independently. Thus how to determine the pertinent neutralizations is not explained. Neither does he explain why the Present works according to psychological principles, especially with reference to tense, while the Aorist subsumes categories of usage according to *langue* and *parole*.

(2) Ruipérez fails to define the nature of the aspects in the most widely used Mood, the Indicative. To say that the opposition of Present and Aorist is neutralized in the Indicative (72) not only leaves too much outside the system but neglects much evidence that the Present Indicative has aspectual meaning (cf. Jones, Review, 127). Ruipérez's analysis begins by positing no meaningful opposition between the Present and Aorist Indicatives, but this reflects a formulation of aspect along time-based categories and apparently makes the temporal axis predominant. When Ruipérez extends this model to posit neutralization in the Subjunctive and Optative Moods as well, his theory seems to have failed to account for a fundamental opposition throughout the Greek verbal edifice.

(3) More specifically, his definition of the Perfect contradicts the evidence he cites. He claims the Perfect represents verbal action after its termination yet includes examples of what he labels intensive Perfects emphasizing initial action (πέφευγα [flee]). His appeal to transformational and non-transformational *semanemes* does not solve this. (Adrados ["El metodo," 26] argues that Ruipérez's concept is actually more unified than even he posits.)

(4) The distinction between *langue* and *parole* is important, but Ruipérez treats *parole* as if it were synonymous with 'aberrations.' He must show how the aberrations are connected and not really aberrant at all. For many of them he intimates that a misconstruction of lexical choice is at the heart but he must show more convincingly that the gap between *langue* and *parole* is bridgeable. When analysing any language--especially an ancient one--the outwardly evidenced phenomena must be adequately explained. To posit that much falls outside the norm and thus cannot be accounted for creates an unverifiable system.

(5) Perhaps most seriously, Ruipérez's differentiation between transformational and non-transformational verbs is problematic. It is difficult to see why φεύγειν (flee) is transformational and τρέχειν (run) or πέτεσθαι (fly) is non-transformational, or χαίρειν (be happy) and νόσειν (be ill). Rather it seems that Ruipérez's aspectual categories contain not only what has been termed aspect as a morphological category, but lexical choice, which compels him to formulate distinctions of *Aktionsarten*, e.g. ἀστράψαι (flash lightning) or βῆναι (take a step) as momentary. He provides only a rough model for differentiating these.


(6) Kahane (Review, 326) points out Ruipérez's difficulty regarding differentiation of the unmarked term in the opposition Present and Aorist in the non-Indicative Moods on the basis of duration. What if the basic notion is punctuality? Then the marked term is the Aorist and the unmarked is the Present. Besides Ruipérez's use of *Aktionsart*, this suggests the necessity of firmer criteria for determining the marked and unmarked terms (Collinge [Review of Ruipérez, 61] argues rightly that a phonetically-based opposition cannot be applied directly to syntax. This is a shortcoming in Ruipérez's formulation).

c. Friedrich likewise improves on his predecessors ("Theory"). After defining aspect (following Roman Jakobson) as a category dealing with temporal values inherent in a verbal process without view to the participants and the language event, he differentiates three devices for coding aspect: the inherent radical, the derivational-thematic, and adverbial-compositional (S5), choosing to concentrate on the derivational-thematic. In Homeric Greek, Friedrich contends, aspect "involves several subcategories related to one

another through a hierarchy of markedness and differential latency" (S9), with the primary opposition being durativity. Thus he first discusses the durative tenses (Present and Imperfect) versus the Aorist, neither of which is inherently marked for time. Under the Present, Friedrich easily subsumes such uses as iterative (ἵκημι [speak]), future, past (Hom. Il. 18.386), etc., on the basis of the primary durative aspect. He does similarly with the Aorist, subsuming traditional grammatical notions such as momentary (ingressive, resultative) and limited. Comparison of forms as well as "semosyntactic criteria" (S13) leads him to conclude that the Aorist is the unmarked member in the equipollent opposition.

Under verbal themes not marked for duration, Friedrich groups the categories of realized/nonrealized, defining the Perfect (or consequent) as the marked category. This not only includes an inherent temporal element derived from the concept of past completion and general condition, it also intersects with the category of intransitivity, which points to self-realization. Most Perfects are intransitive, Friedrich asserts, though the transitive tends to past meaning [and is hence more often found in aoristic contexts?]. Friedrich supports these verbal categories not only with reference to recent literature in linguistics but also with extended treatment of a select set of examples, concluding that the thematic categories are evidenced textually. He also provides a "categorical cube" (S25) to illustrate the relation of tense and aspect to mood.²⁵

Friedrich's scheme is tidy, well-exemplified, succinct in explanation, but problematic as an overall framework. (I) He gives the following diagram of the Greek verbal edifice:



This system is formulated upon the standard of durativity. But according to Friedrich's definition of the Perfect as combining various aspectual and temporal criteria, and being the most clearly marked tense form, as well as his specific address of the issue of Aorist versus Imperfect (and by implication the Present), his fundamental opposition should be Aorist:Present, and the Perfect differentiated separately (as per Ruipérez). Friedrich's distinctive feature notation (which he uses well to illustrate his theoretical conceptions) displays this:

²⁵Less to the point is Friedrich's comparison of Greek aspect with aspect in other languages (S28-S34) and an attempt at an axiomatic theory of aspect (S34-S37). This appears to be the correct procedure for establishing linguistic universals and departs fundamentally from the technique employed by many traditional approaches. Rather than imposing models of related languages upon Greek to flatten out its linguistic contours, Friedrich explores aspect among various languages and uses the findings to make generalizations and comparisons.

Present-Imperfect	[+Duration]
Aorist	[-Duration]
	[>Past]
Perfect	[-Duration]
	[+Real]
	[+State]
	[>Intransitive]

The Perfect is the tense form with the most features (the most marked) and, therefore, should not be linked directly with the Aorist in opposition to [+Duration] (cf. Dahl, *Tense*, 72-73).

(2) Friedrich's [>Past] feature under Aorist does not apply to the non-Indicative Moods and is only a tendency in the Indicative, as he himself notes: "The aorist also lacks obligatory past reference in the oblique moods and certain other, less important cases. The aorist participle, although it usually refers to an antecedent act, is obligatorily marked only for aspect. . . . In other words, past tense is an implication of the aorist forms [he attributes this to the augment and the endings, an assertion questioned in chaps. 2 and 4], but it ranges from a limited probability to a weak connotation to zero. The one exception is the fact that the aorist necessarily refers to the past in contrary-to-fact constructions" (S11). He does not pursue suggestive comments about the difference between semantics and pragmatics.

(3) While Friedrich is too temporally oriented in his argument for the Present and certainly for the Perfect (Friedrich is clearly dependent upon Chantraine regarding the Perfect; see my chap. 5), his definition of the Aorist fails on other grounds. His definition is not equipollent as he claims but is rather a privative opposition which neutralizes a too-temporally based feature, i.e. duration. His definition cannot account for such well-noted uses as τριάκοντα ἔτη ἐβασίλευσε (he ruled for thirty years), thus indicating that durativity is probably not the essential semantic feature. And his criteria for determining markedness, especially including analysis and comparison of pragmatic usage, do not clarify the use of the tense forms.

(4) Friedrich is right in differentiating the three means for encoding aspect, but his terms are misleading. His "inherent-radical" is tantamount to *Aktionsart*, and "adverbial-compositional" (see below) is solely dependent upon context. Greek aspect, it is argued below (and Friedrich shares this in emphasizing derivational-thematic aspect), is fundamentally morphologically determined. The other "influences" (not to be called aspects) must be posited in terms of pragmatic interpretation of morphologically-based aspect. Thus Friedrich's diagram nowhere shows where he passes from aspect proper to *Aktionsart*. If he wishes to include *Aktionsart* he has only gone partway, neglecting categories for the Perfect and Present, for which instead he substitutes temporal categories. The result is a potentially useful scheme misled by its desire to be too inclusive.

d. Comrie, in the first full-length English treatment of aspect (*Aspect*), goes far to correct Friedrich in his evaluation of Greek aspect²⁶ Comrie's text focuses primarily on the Slavonic languages but he includes able discussions of other languages, including ancient and modern Greek. Comrie differentiates aspect from tense as a way "of viewing the internal temporal constituency of a situation" (3), although he considers both to be time categories, with aspect concerned with "situation-internal time" and tense with "situation-external time" (5). He devotes an entire chapter to the important distinction between aspect and tense, including a further differentiation between aspect and voice (66-86). Comrie as well differentiates aspect as a grammatical category from

²⁶Unfortunately, Dahl (*Tense*), who follows Comrie (see e.g. 24), delivers much less than he promises, and is not systematically reviewed here.

Aktionsart as a lexical or lexical/derivational category (see 6 n. 4; cf. 41-51 where he treats *Aktionsarten* as inherent meanings in various lexical items). In defining the exact nature of the major aspectual categories--perfective, imperfective (16-40), and Perfect (52-65)--Comrie draws upon a variety of languages, attempting to devise particular definitions for each language, although he uses terms prominent in Slavonic study. He supplements his references to aspect as a grammatical category with discussion of other formal and syntactical 'aspectual' oppositions (though not all are relevant to Greek). In a worthwhile chapter on markedness Comrie distinguishes the kinds and degrees of markedness available not only among languages but within languages themselves (111-22). Regarding ancient Greek in particular (see his language guide [127]), Comrie posits two oppositions--between the Perfect and non-Perfect forms and between the Aorist and non-Aorist, contending that the Future is an aspectless temporal form (see his helpful section on the benefits of feature analysis to display sets of oppositions [130-32]). Although Comrie has single diagrams of the tense forms of ancient and modern Greek (96), he does not construct any further diagrams to illustrate the relations of temporal and aspectual reference.

Comrie would no doubt expect to be criticized in general for the lack of space devoted to each language and the fact that his knowledge of Greek appears limited. Bache has offered a damaging critique of the fundamental structure of Comrie's theory (*Aspect*, 6ff., esp. 18-20; "Aspect," 58ff. His criticism extends to Lyons, *Semantics*, 714ff.; and Moushikiou, *Morphology*, 265ff., as well). (1) "If the definition of aspect as a matter of 'viewing' situations is correct [as Bache and Comrie argue] then aspect has little to do with 'event-time' as such" (Bache, *Aspect*, 18). Not only is it misleading, but it is probably wrong to call both aspect and tense time categories. (2) Comrie's definition of aspect as a view of internal temporal constituency appears to be an attempt to define the objective nature of an event, and thus is a theory of *Aktionsart*. This is seen as well in the particular universal "aspectual" categories he defines, which focus upon the nature of the action itself and "are not grammaticalized in a specific language" (Bache, "Aspect," 62). (Comrie lists typical aspectual oppositions as Perfective/Imperfective, and under Imperfective, Habitual/Continuous, and under Continuous, Nonprogressive/Progressive [25]. He clearly has crossed from aspect to *Aktionsart*. As Vet [Review, 383] points out, lexis is the cause of such notions, rather than sentential semantics.) (3) When Comrie establishes his aspectual hierarchy (see [2] on their dependence upon *Aktionsart*), "it appears that there are no uniform criteria for the subdivisions of 'imperfectivity' to justify the setting up of six related aspects . . ." (Bache, "Aspect," 60). Many of these categories appear to be "inherent meanings rather than members of generic aspectual oppositions" (62).

Further criticism of Comrie may be made. (1) He retains the terms Perfect and perfective (though he differentiates the two by capitalization) as functional terms but he needs to be more precise to avoid confusion. The mixing of formal and functional definitions is troublesome in formulating proper tense terminology for Greek. Even more troublesome is Comrie's definition of the Perfect as indicating the "continuing present relevance of a past situation" (*Aspect*, 52). As Bache points out, the specific temporal reference of this definition to past and present times renders this a definition according to *Aktionsart*, not aspect (*Aspect*, 20). (2) Comrie's examples are not numerous enough to provide a clear illustration of the point he is making. He thus selects the well-known ἐβασίλευσε to support ingressive meaning of the Aorist. Besides the fact that his formulation contradicts his definition of perfective aspect as a view from outside the action (Vet, Review, 383), an exploration of further examples would have shown the lack of regularity in such