

Lisa Blackman



Immaterial Bodies

Affect, Embodiment, Mediation



Immaterial Bodies

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About the Author



Lisa Blackman is a Reader in the Department of Media and Communications at Goldsmiths, University of London. She works at the intersection of body studies and media and cultural studies. She is the editor of the journal *Body & Society* and a co-editor of *Subjectivity*. Her previous books include: *Mass Hysteria: Critical Psychology and Media Studies* (Palgrave, 2001, with Valerie Walkerdine); *Hearing Voices: Embodiment and Experience* (Free Association Books, 2001); *The Body: The Key Concepts* (Berg, 2008). *Immaterial*

Bodies: Affect, Embodiment, Mediation is her fourth book. She teaches courses which span critical media psychology, affect studies, embodiment and body studies, and experimentation in the context of art/science. She is particularly interested in phenomena which have puzzled scientists, artists, literary writers and the popular imagination for centuries, including automatic writing, voice hearing, suggestion, telepathy and automatism.

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The idea for this book started to take form in 2005 when I began reading the work of two key sociological figures of the twentieth century, Edward Ross and William McDougall, both considered foundational to the shaping of the discipline of social psychology. What preoccupied them and was part of the discursive field which circulated across the fields of psychology, sociology, philosophy, law, economics and literature was a focus on hypnotic suggestion and the potentialities and corresponding fears that accompanied this. This starting point reflects the exchanges that have been central to this book and without which it would never have been conceived. The inter-disciplinarity that was characteristic of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is one that I carry through today such that my own disciplinary location is far from settled. However, I have found an intellectual home at Goldsmiths, University of London in the Department of Media and Communications since 1994 and I thank all of my friends and colleagues at Goldsmiths for accepting my quiriness and allowing me to pursue my interest in phenomena such as voice hearing, suggestion, affect, embodiment and subjectivity. I particularly want to thank Sara Ahmed, Sarah Kember, Joanna Zylinska and Julian Henriques for sharing ideas. To Julian I might add that you are a great support, have a remarkable generosity of spirit and are one of the very best interlocutors I could possibly ask for. I would like to thank all of my colleagues in the Department for making academic life more bearable especially Natalie Fenton, Angela McRobbie, Pasi Valiaho, Damian Owen-Board, Jacob Love and Rachel Moore. A big thanks to all those on the Q Corridor that were left behind when the Department relocated to NAB, including Gavin Butt, Nicole Wolf, Lyn Turner and Irit Roggof. I also want to thank Janet Harbord, a former Goldsmiths colleague for stimulating conversations in the early part of the book and friendship thereafter. My conversations and on-going collaborations with Couze Venn and Mike Featherstone have enriched my intellectual life. Thank you for inviting me into the fold and for trusting me with the editing of *Body & Society*. Thanks also to all those in the academy I have met and

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Preface

Body and Affect Studies

Speed, movement, mobility, immateriality, fluidity, multiplicity and flows are all concepts that are profoundly reorganizing how the ontology of both subjectivity and corporeality are examined, understood and analysed within contemporary cultural theory. The solidity of the subject has dissolved into a concern with those processes, practices, sensations and affects that move through bodies in ways that are difficult to see, understand and investigate. The emphasis on immateriality over ideological and discursive processes is a call by some for an emancipatory politics of change. For others, this call for a paradigm shift across the humanities is undermining the capacity for ideological critique important for challenging inequities and oppressions. Cultural theory seems caught at a crossroads that is mirrored by the demands of advanced capitalism for rational subjects who are not swayed by social influences, at the same time as a suggestive realm is mobilized, created and orchestrated.

This set of circumstances is profoundly different from the concerns which inaugurated the 'sociology of the body' which took form during the 1980s and 1990s. The sociology of the body was characterized by a call for bodily matters to take up a central place within sociological theorizing. Since this 'turn to corporeality', there have been many revisions across the humanities of what the important elements of this orientation might be; this includes the foregrounding of difference, discipline, performativity, embodiment, movement, desire, kinaesthesia, the senses, and, increasingly within contemporary formulations, the posthuman, process, multiplicity, enactment, affect, life and immateriality. The latter concepts have played an important part in radically refiguring the body such that the idea that the body can be considered singular, natural or even distinctly human has been questioned in different ways. As I have argued in previous work, bodies are seen to always extend and connect to other bodies, human and non-human, to practices, techniques,

technologies and objects which produce different kinds of bodies and different ways, arguably, of enacting what it means to be human (see Blackman, 2008a).

The body is not therefore a 'thing' to retreat to, a material basis to explain how social processes take hold. The body has been extended to include *species bodies*, *psychic bodies*, *machinic bodies*, *vitalist bodies* and *other-worldly bodies*. These bodies do not conform to our expectations of clearly defined boundaries between the psychological, social, biological, ideological, economic, and technical, for example. If there is one guiding principle towards which work on the body and embodiment has moved, it is the assumption that what defines bodies is their capacity to affect and be affected. The focus upon the affective capacities of bodies, human and non-human, is extending the terrain of body studies in new and exciting directions. Although it is arguable whether such a focus will achieve the paradigm shift associated with the turn to discourse and the subsequent turn to the body within the humanities, some are proclaiming the 'turn to affect' as extending some of the trends that we find within body studies, directly and indirectly, in innovative ways (see Blackman, 2008a, for further discussion).

The field of body studies has proliferated since the 1980s and 1990s, now existing as a transdisciplinary locus of inquiry. Non-dichotomous concepts for theorizing the body and embodiment have become central to theories and practices of art, architecture, science and technology, performance, medicine and so forth. Work on the body and embodiment has been recognized as increasingly important for the study of areas and practices which now recognize that sense-making cannot be confined to meaning, cognition or signification. Screen studies is an area where the analysis of embodied perception and sense-making is seen to be crucial to understanding how films 'work' (see Stacey and Suchman, 2012). Increasingly within television studies, the body's potential for mediation is foregrounded as an important aspect of understanding televisual consumption. This can be situated alongside the importance of embodiment for understanding our relationship to architecture, technology, performance, art and dance. When we add to this the importance of understanding issues perhaps seen as being more closely connected to corporeality, including our experience of medical technologies and practices such as transplantation or cosmetic surgery, and issues such as obesity and eating disorders which disclose the mediated nature of processes such as eating, studies of the body and embodiment provide an important link and focus across art, cultural and science studies.

The 'turn to affect' has become a focus for these debates to take form, particularly as they intersect with the question of how to understand the role of the body and embodiment within processes of subjectification. One focus of these debates, as many scholars have argued, is the limits of reason and rationality in understanding how power and ideological processes work. The view for some that power works 'autonomically', bypassing reason and criticality and seizing the body at the level of neural circuits, the nervous system, the endocrine system or other systems assumed to work independently of cognition, is an assumption that is already subject to critique. As I write this preface the historian of science Ruth Leys (2011a) has written a cogent account of some of the problems within affect studies and particularly with the view that affect is non-intentional. Affect relates to all those processes that are separate from meaning, belief or cognition and that occur at the level of autonomic, pre-conscious bodily reactions, responses and resonances. This separation is one that she argues produces a 'materialist theory' of the body and emotions and ignores the crucial question of how to theorize the body and embodiment in ways that do not set up a 'false dichotomy between mind and matter' (p. 457). This question is of course not new. The intersections and productive tensions that affect introduces to body studies and that already existing theories of the body and embodiment introduce to affect studies is one key focus of this book and will be examined in Chapter 1.

Leys (2011a) argues that what is needed to avoid the materialism of much of contemporary affect theory is what she terms a genealogy of anti-intentionalism. As we will see in Chapter 1, scholars within affect studies often link the emergence of humanities scholars' interest in affect to the publication of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank's (1995) collection on the work of the American psychologist Silvan Tomkins. Tomkins was writing mainly in the 1960s, in the context of debates within psychology on the nature of emotions and whether emotions should be considered cognitive or primarily physiological in nature. Tomkins argued against cognitive appraisal theory, found in the work of the American psychologists Schacter and Singer for example, and argued that emotions were primarily inbuilt, hard-wired neurological responses that were separate and prior to cognition. Leys writes that the success of the anti-intentionalist paradigm within psychology at the time, represented by the work of Tomkins and later by the evolutionary psychologist, Paul Ekman, has become one of the accepted views of emotion that has become imported into affect studies. Leys (2011a) focuses particularly on the

seminal work of Brian Massumi (2002a), and argues that Tomkins and Massumi share a commitment, implicitly or explicitly to what she terms the 'Basic Emotions paradigm' (p. 439). Leys laments the lack of attention paid by affect scholars to the conditions of possibility which led this paradigm to become authorized within psychology, and is one which she argues has been taken up within affect studies uncritically as a model for thinking affective processes. She argues that the importance of genealogy to understanding affect is important as the success of the anti-intentionalist paradigm is one that is both subject to critique and also has a relatively recent history, within and outside the psychological sciences.

A Genealogy of Anti-Intentionalism

This book will intervene within these debates by taking seriously this genealogical call to respond to the supposed anti-intentionalism of affect. As Leys (2011a) argues, affect theorists have turned to the work of contemporary psychologists and neuroscientists to validate this view, as well as to a different archive of psychologists and philosophers writing at the turn of the last century, including William James, Henri Bergson and Gabriel Tarde, for example. The genealogy of anti-intentionalism that this book will write will be located within this archive, one that I primarily characterize as a 'subliminal archive'. It is shaped by a diverse set of scientific and literary preoccupations with invisible animating forces. From the writings of James, Bergson and Tarde, the experiments in divided attention which took place at James's psychological laboratory at Harvard between a psychologist and the avant-garde literary writer Gertrude Stein, through to an interest in a seminal book written by the subliminal psychologist Frederic Myers (1903), *Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death*, there is a fascination with the concept of prosopopoeia; that is, how the inanimate can be animated, and how, rather than talk about singular entities, the human, for example, we might instead talk about aggregates of human and non-human actors and agencies.

The book will return to these nineteenth- and early twentieth-century debates which primarily concerned the nature of perception, selfhood and embodiment. These debates, which involved the emergent disciplines of psychology, sociology and physiology, as well as debates within the medical sciences and those made by lawyers and economists, often focused and centred upon experiences such as voice hearing, hypnotic suggestion, telepathy and related experiences. These phenomena were all seen to breach the boundaries between

the self and other, inside and outside, material and immaterial, human and non-human, and even dead and alive. These phenomena in the present are often viewed as irrational perceptions, or, in the case of hypnotic suggestion, as evidence that the person has lost their will and succumbed to the will of another. What all these experiences were seen to share was an ontology where the borders and boundaries between bodies, human and non-human, were considered porous and permeable, although this belief was often overlaid by a set of cultural fears and fantasies about being governed and controlled by imperceptible forces and agencies, which distribute agency between the self and other in asymmetrical ways (see Andriopoulos, 2008, for a discussion of this in relation to hypnotic suggestion).

Another interesting factor of the debates was their transdisciplinarity, with concepts, ideas and exchanges circulating across art, literature, medicine and science. One example of such exchange is found in the writings of the American psychologist and pragmatist philosopher, William James. The brother of the novelist Henry James, and son of Henry James Senior, William James originally trained as a medical doctor, before developing his interests in philosophy whilst being employed as a psychologist at Harvard University. James's interest in the humanities and sciences was not unusual; indeed, as we will see throughout the book, most influential scholars of the nineteenth century wrote on a range of eclectic subjects.

To take two examples pertinent to the book, Gabriel Tarde (1902, 1962), the French sociologist/psychologist, and Gustave Le Bon, the French loyalist and crowd psychologist, both wrote about a diverse range of subjects. This included treatises on areas as diverse as 'tobacco, Arabian civilization, photography, socialism, education, and military psychology..., geography, archaeology, futurology and poetry' (see Apfelbaum and McGuire, 1986: 33). This was partly because disciplinary boundaries were still very much in their infancy, but also, as I will argue throughout the book, because medical scientists, philosophers, novelists, physiologists, economists, artists and so on were all united in their interest in matters spiritual, psychic and psychopathological. That is, their understandings of embodiment, corporeality, perception, sensation, criminal responsibility, and allopathic medicine, to name some of the interests, were developed through terms and concepts that connected up studies of hypnotic trance, psychotic delusions and hallucinations with studies of mediumship, telepathy and related psychic phenomena. One of the key paradoxes of these debates that William James focused his attention on was what he termed 'the problem of personality'. I will spend

some time in the next section outlining this problem as it will form a central genealogical focus of *Immaterial Bodies*.

The Problem of Personality

William James is probably better known to contemporary readers for his poetic descriptions of consciousness as being akin to a stream – a flow of ideas, images, sensations and affects which are characterized primarily by movement. Hence the metaphor of the stream captures the fluidity and permeability of consciousness, which ripples, flows and ebbs rather than being housed by a singular unified bounded subject. The topology of subjectivity that James presents is one which views the human subject as being akin to a channel or conductor of thought, open and permeable to the other, invoking a sense of a shared collective consciousness, rather than one closed and located within atomized subjects. The ‘problem of personality’ in the nineteenth century was articulated as a particular problem of suggestive or affective communication. Interests in affective or suggestive communication were framed through a concern with how ideas, affects, beliefs, traditions and emotion could spread throughout populations with a rapidity that seemed to defy the action of logic or rationality. Philosophers such as Henri Bergson, the sociologist Gabriel Tarde, and William James all attempted to provide answers to this problem by arguing in different ways that what defined human sociality and subjectivity was the capacity of ‘ordinary suggestion’. The human subject was not self-contained, individualized, clearly bounded and separate from others, but rather the borders and boundaries between self and other were considered porous and permeable.

The invocation of a version of ‘immateriality’ to understand human subjectivity was primarily drawn from the aforementioned scholars’ interest in matters spiritual, psychic and psychopathological. They were all members of the Institute for Psychical Research and framed their understandings through terms and concepts that connected up studies of hypnotic trance, psychotic delusions and hallucinations with studies of mediumship, telepathy and related psychic phenomena. This trinity of scholars have also been resurrected by many contemporary cultural theorists who have refigured bodies as processes, defined by their capacity to affect and be affected (Despret, Massumi, Latour). As we have seen, the ‘turn to affect’ has been framed as a response to the problems of cultural inscription and discourse determinism which have been argued to show up the limits of work on text, language and discourse across the humanities. Discursive approaches are seen to have sidelined the

body, emotion, affect and sensation in understanding communication processes. However, one key argument of *Immaterial Bodies* is that the paradox of personality that James identified is not resolved simply by moving to affect, unless we also engage with the parameters of the debates which concerned nineteenth- and early twentieth-century scholars. James, like many of his contemporaries, was also influenced by debates concerning the nature of will – how one could theorize and understand agency and self-determinism in the context of permeability and porousness between self and other. This paradox, which was captured by James's 'problem of personality', was far from resolved and entered into his musings on the nature of various concepts, such as habit and personality, and is one that I will argue resurfaces in an unacknowledged way in contemporary debates on affect and embodiment.

One way in which this paradox returns is in the thorny question of how to theorize the nature of the subject, or the complex ontologies of subjectivity that are being suggested by the renewed engagement across the humanities and social and natural sciences with affect, the non-representational and the immaterial. All of these concepts have been offered as terms which refer to registers of experience which are primarily trans-subjective (that is, they are not contained by bounded singularly human subjects), which introduce the non-cognitive into our theorizing of perception, knowing and sense-making, and which demand collaborations across disciplinary boundaries in order to reinvent new ways of being human, and develop new concepts for exploring embodiment and experience. The concept of embodiment is one central to body studies which is, as we have seen, a transdisciplinary area of study which grew from the sociology of the body, and now involves work across a diverse range of arts, humanities and science-based disciplines (see Chapter 1).

Art, Science and Humanities Research

The potential links and collaborations across cultural and science studies have of course not had an entirely amicable relationship. Once the subject of the infamous 'science wars' (Sokal and Bricmont, 1998), it is often forgotten that transdisciplinary collaborations are more common than such divisions might imagine or suggest. In a recent book written by the Australian psychologist Philip Bell (2010), which harks back to these wars, body studies and cultural studies become the subject of vehement attack. That a psychologist might be threatened by scholars from the humanities offering a revision of psychological concepts such as perception, habit and affect is perhaps

understandable, given the investment by psychology in retaining a truth value for the theories it produces. However, what is more surprising is the lack of attention given to the histories of transdisciplinary engagement across the humanities and sciences, which have become part of psychology's forgotten history of emergence. Indeed, this attack on the humanities becomes even more insidious in the context of the UK coalition government's attacks on and devaluation of arts and humanities research as having little economic impact or value. Indeed, the decision to remove or reduce funding for arts, humanities and social science research and teaching within the university sector assumes that there have always been clear divisions between the humanities and sciences. That through an act of 'cleansing' one can remove humanities research, reduced at best to the 'social aspects' of science, technology and medicine, and retain a purified notion of science as one that does not need the arts and humanities for its own development, innovation, creativity and success.

As many have argued, this rigid demarcation and division is one ideologically driven by marketization and privatization and shows an ignorance of how science and humanities research are informed and influence each other. Innovation and creativity do not come from the demands of the market; rather histories of scientific progress and creativity come as much from 'paradigm shifts' identified by Thomas Kuhn in the 1960s as the impact of cultural beliefs, ideas and concepts on the framing of scientific concerns and experimentation. One example of this in the context of the exchange between the psychological sciences and media cultures has been identified by Anna McCarthy (2009) in her examination of the exchanges which took place between the famous American experimental social psychologist, Stanley Milgram, and Allen Funt, the creator and producer of *Candid Camera*, one of the first reality TV programmes in the 1970s. *Candid Camera* employed hidden cameras and used simulation and deception in the form of 'staged pranks' for comedic value. The deception enacted on the unwitting participant would be revealed at the end of the prank by the invitation to 'Smile, you're on *Candid Camera*'. McCarthy shows how Stanley Milgram turned to Funt's work as a model for his own forms of social psychological experimentation into the nature of conformity and obedience.

What is important to signal in this preface is that histories of exchange and collaboration are integral to scientific forms of experimentality, not simply an adjunct that can be removed and isolated without damaging the very innovation, creativity and critical thinking that enable scientific thinking to develop. The subject of transdisciplinary exchange is one that is at the heart of this book, and I hope

will act as a cautionary reminder to those who might think and act otherwise. Indeed, as Michel Foucault cogently taught us, histories of progress are never simply histories of the unfolding of some purist notion of scientific truth. Histories of the present are histories of how what we might be tempted to isolate as the 'internal' and external' conditions which allow understanding to emerge can never be demarcated in this way. There is no 'internal' that can be isolated from the 'external' and in that respect the distribution and circulation of concepts, ideas, beliefs, understandings and forms of action within and across science, art and culture are integral to the emergence of knowledge practices such as science, medicine and those that might be more easily dismissed by some as of lesser value, namely culture and the arts. An understanding of past collaborations across such demarcations is crucial to understanding where and how we might invent new concepts for understanding who and what we are and, indeed, might be allowed to become.

One context of transdisciplinary engagement important for this book is one that coalesced around the 'problem of affective transfer' and the importance of spiritualist and psychic research for understanding problems common to emerging humanities-based and scientific disciplines during the late nineteenth to mid twentieth centuries. That is, from discussions of media technologies, such as early cinema, the radio and the printing press, through to discussions of crime, perception, hypnotic suggestion, psychopathology, instinct, habit, electricity, and communication systems such as the wireless and telegraphy, what was shared across knowledge practices, such as philosophy, science and medicine, was an understanding that sense-making, whether conducted by animals, spirits, machines or humans, occurred in registers which extended across time and space. This sense-making was considered difficult to see and articulate, and as thoroughly collapsing the boundaries between self and other, animate and inanimate, inside and outside, and human and non-human.

This observation is of course not new; many arguments have already been made regarding the importance of nineteenth-century spiritualist research for understandings of cinema as a hypnotic medium (Andriopoulos, 2008; Crary, 1990), or television as an 'occult domestic phenomenon' (Andriopoulos, 2005: 622; Sconce, 2000). Possibly less well known are the centrality of spiritualist arguments for understandings of habit, instinct and perception as they were shaped and formed as concepts during the emergence of the psychological sciences at the turn of the last century. Charles Bingham Newland, a biologist by training who exerted a profound influence on Edward McDougall, considered one of the founding figures of

American social psychology, published a book in 1916, *What is Instinct? Some Thoughts on Telepathy and Subconsciousness in Animals* (Bingham Newland, 1916). He used the analogy of the Marconi wireless system to understand the basis of instinctual behaviour amongst non-human species. The Marconi wireless system was 'a material apparatus tuned to transmit and receive the intangible through space' (p. 1). The focus on immaterial processes of communication, which he argued had been reduced to instinctual forces within physiology (located within different species nervous systems), obscured the way that the 'seen and unseen are closely connected' (p. 6).

The unseen or immaterial equated for Bingham Newland to an instinctive subconscious mind which was shared by a group and provided the conditions for the rapid, automatic, group behaviour which could be observed in nesting, migration, herding activity, stampedes, homing instincts, swarming and so forth. Thus, the kinds of foresight and sensing that might be found amongst insects, moths, flies, birds and fish (all the subject of Bingham Newland's book) were all evidence of the basis of instinctual behaviour within telepathic processes such as teleaesthesia. Teleaesthesia was defined as 'perception at a distance or power of vision transcending time and space' (Bingham Newland, 1916: 189). In other words, instincts were not simply hard-wired biological drives, to be understood by physiology, but represented complex systems of communication or affective transfer, which were shared, transmitted and co-constituted between members of species. Thus, the idea of telepathic rapport, or action at a distance, was a common way to understand communication processes, whether the discussion was focused on machines, animals, insects, humans or technologies. The idea of telepathic transfer largely became discredited, overtaken by an increasing focus on what were billed as more rational communication processes. These were represented in the psychological sciences by concepts such as the attitude (see Rose, 1985). However, arguably the cultural fantasies conveyed by telepathic transfer have refused to go away.

Affect

Within the contemporary context of cultural theory, the 'turn to affect' is one arena within which such fantasies have arguably resurfaced. The primacy of affect as an important yet under-researched process and mechanism of subject formation is one that has provided the kind of common ontology linking the human with the natural sciences, that links affect back to both spiritualist research in the nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries, and to cybernetics research from

the 1940s through to the 1970s (see Blackman, 2010a). Both spiritualist research and cybernetics provided occasions for the kind of interdisciplinarity that is forming around the subject of affect within the present. The Macy conferences held between 1946 and 1953 brought together physicists, mathematicians, electrical engineers, physiologists, neurologists, experimental psychologists, psychiatrists, sociologists and anthropologists to discuss a range of topics which were made intelligible through the development of the concept of information enshrined within information theory (Weiner, 1989).

Some hundred years previously, the subject of spiritualist research had also provided opportunities for cross-pollination and transdisciplinary collaboration in relation to the 'problem of communication'. This context brought together scientists, engineers, anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, medical doctors, physicists, spiritualists and psychiatrists to discuss telepathy and its relevance for understanding communication processes. The problem of communication as it was presented by studies of telepathy was articulated through a concern with forms of communication that crossed borders and boundaries between the human and the non-human, the material and the ephemeral, the self and the not-self, and the living and the dead. The concept of telepathic rapport travelled across emergent disciplines, and also appeared within medical, legal and literary contexts which invoked communication as a largely intangible, immaterial process. These three contexts (spiritualism, cybernetics and contemporary media cultures) all provide important surfaces of emergence for examining corporeality in the present. Attending to this will extend our understandings of the subject of affect and embodiment, common to both contemporary research in the neurosciences and the humanities. This must do justice to what Stefan Andriopoulos (2005: 637) has termed the 'half-hidden borrowings' from spiritualist and psychic research that have largely been forgotten.

Haunting(s)

Avery Gordon (2008) has invoked the concept of haunting as of important methodological significance for sociological theorizing. In the foreword to Gordon's book, *Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination*, Janice Radway concurs with Gordon's calls for a renewed attention in humanities research to how certain things, entities, processes or ideas have become 'marginalised, excluded or repressed' (Gordon, 2008: 4). Gordon shifts the focus on the 'visible and the concrete' characteristic of empiricist methodologies to those aspects of our 'complex personhood' (p. viii) that have been lost. In a

reconfiguration of genealogical research shared by other feminist sociologists such as Vikki Bell (2007), Gordon makes an argument that disrupts the usual focus in Foucauldian genealogical study on historical discontinuities, arguing that what is missed in such methodological framings are those aspects of historical continuity that are passed and transmitted through silences, gaps, omissions, echoes and murmurs.

Vikki Bell uses the concept of lineage or intergenerationality to point towards what tends to be left out by genealogical analysis. She suggests that although we might uncover historical discontinuities between different epistemes, this approach wilfully denies, through its historical method, the way in which affects, trauma, forms of shame and so forth are communicated intergenerationally. Turning to critical race studies and Gilroy's illuminating work on diaspora, she re-establishes the importance in this context of exploring how this background of felt dispositions is commemorated and routed (Gilroy, 1993). She describes these as 'those relations that are neither simply of identification nor of alterity, that is, those of genealogical connection' (Bell, 2007: 33). This is about 'generational carnal connection' (Bell, 2007: 37), relationships and dispositions which are transmitted by mediums and practices other than the speaking subject: this might include film, television, photographs, fiction and less inscribed, more embodied practices of remembering (Connerton, 1989).

This focus on 'hauntings' and the concept of intergenerational transmission is important in two ways for this book. In a focus on the hauntings which pervade the shaping and emergence of the psychological sciences, I am interested in how specific concepts and phenomena such as habit, suggestion, voice hearing, instinct, will and affect became shaped and formed in specific ways. This shaping, as we will see throughout the book, took place in a context where spiritualist and psychic research was prominent, and although psychology was largely to reject such immaterial matters, it is haunted by the disavowals and refusals that have characterized its project. The genealogy at the heart of this book then shares with other genealogies of subjects that attempt to revise and offer what we might term a post-psychological reinvention of what psychology claims as its subject matter. This includes the important genealogical work of the Belgian anthropologist Vincianne Despret (2004a, 2004b) on affect and emotion, and of Ruth Leys (2000, 2007, 2010a, 2011a), the historian of science who has taken psychological matters such as trauma and, in a more contemporary context, affect and emotion as her focus.

This work is set alongside genealogical studies and cultural histories that take perception (Crary, 1990), will and inhibition (Smith, 1992),

distraction (Swanson, 2007), autonomy (Rose, 1999), the double brain (Harrington, 1987), the bicameral mind (Jaynes, 1976; McGilchrist, 2009), habit (Camic, 1986), and suggestion (Chertok and Stengers, 1992; Orr, 2006) as their focus. This transdisciplinary work, coming from disciplines as diverse as art history, anthropology, sociology, the neurosciences, philosophy and cultural studies, has also offered humanities scholars productive and inventive ways of theorizing and analysing embodiment. This work has contributed to an exchange and circulation of ideas that I hope my own work can extend, specifically in the context of contemporary debates in relation to affect and embodiment.

Voices

In previous work, I undertook a genealogy of voice hearing (Blackman, 2001, 2007a), taking a phenomenon that has largely been specified, understood and acted upon within the psychological and psychiatric disciplines and approached largely as a sign of irrational perception. My own work in this area, in collaboration with the Hearing Voices Network, has helped problematize the view that voice hearing is merely a meaningless epiphenomenon of a disease process. The Hearing Voices Network, in conjunction with service users, professionals who are willing to listen, as well as scientists willing to concede that there is more to voice hearing than mapping the brain through imaging technologies and brain scans, have impacted upon the practice of psychiatry itself. It is now more common to find voice-hearing groups as part of outpatient psychiatric services, encouraging voice hearers to focus on their voices, listen to them and share them with other group members.

When I started my research on the phenomenon of voice hearing in the early 1990s in the UK, the view held by psychiatric professionals, which seemed absolutely intractable at the time, was that voices were simply signs of disease and that if you talk to the voice hearer about their voices you will simply be reinforcing their diseased and troubled reality (see Blackman, 2001, 2007a). I am glad to say that this view is no longer the predominant view of many psychiatric professionals, some of whom, led by the pioneering work of the Dutch psychiatrists Marius Romme and Sandra Escher, are now more open to exploring voices as communications. This has been consolidated in a co-edited book, *Living with Voices: 50 Stories of Recovery* (Romme et al., 2009), which brings together the views and practice of Romme and Escher with the accounts of service users, including Jacqui Dillon (the current Chair of the Hearing Voices

Network), and other psychological practitioners willing to listen to voice hearers. The arguments made in the book will be the subject of Chapter 6 – set alongside contemporary neuropsychological work, and that coming from more marginal areas of the psychological sciences. These are areas which are all challenging some of the dominant paradigms of brain research, which still approach voice hearing as a brain deficit to be mapped by brain-imaging techniques and scans (see Chapter 7).

The work I will explore reconfigures voice hearing as a different way of knowing; a form of communication that perhaps connects the voice hearer to alterity. This presumption has been inspirational for projects such as Grace Cho's (2008) beautiful and aptly haunting account of her own experience of the intergenerational transmission of memory. This project was undertaken within the discipline of cultural studies, and is situated within contemporary debates on affect that are taking form across the neurosciences and humanities. Cho takes the concept of voice hearing as a modality of knowing that cannot be reduced to irrationality or disease. Rather, such a modality of communication, she suggests, discloses our fundamental connectedness to each other; to our pasts, and even to past histories that cannot be known. These might be histories that are never or barely articulated, but importantly are communicated, albeit non-representationally, through silence and secrecy.

Cho's study is a way of linking up what Davoine and Guadilliere (2004) term histories beyond trauma. That is, connecting up those histories that have never be told, authorized or documented within official histories, such as the forgotten Korean War, with micro-histories of trauma and shame. Davoine and Guadilliere are analysts who have worked for over three decades with psychosis. Many analysts are reluctant to work with hallucinatory phenomena, preferring instead to work within the confines of language and ideation. Davoine and Guadilliere have pioneered work within studies of the intergenerational transmission of trauma, particularly approaching psychosis as an attempt to bring into existence a social trauma that has been foreclosed. This is an attempt to explore precisely those carnal generational connections that exist genealogically but which cannot be articulated. For Davoine and Guadilliere the subject is always a subject of history, even though those histories may have been cut out of what they call 'the sanctioned social narrative' (p. xii).

Cho's study will also form one of the bases of Chapter 6, and is an example of the second way in which the concept of 'haunting' is integral to the approach developed within this book. Haunting is

both a methodological and analytic tool, as evidenced in the preceding discussion, but also refers in this book more explicitly to the phenomena which will form the subject of the book: suggestion, voice hearing and telepathy, as well as other experiences, such as the bicameral mind (Jaynes, 1976) which suggest some kind of transport, under particular conditions, between the self and other, inside and outside, and material and immaterial. The self is literally haunted by another; indeed, if the phenomena I examine are examples of haunting, this may be the normative ontology of the subject. These phenomena and the scientific and humanities-based research I will examine suggest a very different paradigm for understanding some of the ontologies of subjectivity being introduced by affect studies; this might include Karan Barad's relational ontology and Patricia Clough's quantum ontology, for example.

The Double

In the afterword to the relaunch special issue of the journal *Body & Society* on affect, Clough (2010a) says that relational ontologies are problematic, and argues instead that quantum ontologies are more useful for imagining affective processes. Quantum ontologies are seen to 'enact intra-actions that are not in the world, but are of the world' (Parisi, 2004). This statement by Parisi is intended to show the focus of quantum ontologies on novelty based on singular events that can never be repeated again. What we have here is a reification of movement as the defining feature of becoming, whereas relational ontologies are seen to be too fixated on individuation – on the one rather than the many. This is akin to William James's focus on consciousness as a stream; what Parisi terms the 'specious present' acknowledging James's work. However, as I have argued throughout this preface, this focus on one aspect of James's theorizing obscures his simultaneous focus on the 'problem of personality'; on how individuals live singularity in the face of multiplicity, or what I am also going to term, throughout the book, the problem of being 'one yet many' (see also Blackman, 2008b). This question has been framed in the present as the question of how we can be 'more than one and less than many', or how we can 'hang together' in light of the multiple possibilities of becoming that exist. The paradoxes and puzzles that this creates in offering a relational and processual account of corporeality and subjectivity are one of the focuses of this book.

This problem moves critique in a different direction to that which has perhaps become instantiated by Deleuzian perspectives – that is,

particularly as they have been taken up by corporeal feminists such as Elizabeth Grosz and Rosi Braidotti in their calls for developing non-dualistic language and thought. The paradigm that will form the subject of this book is one that is very influenced by neuroscientific work on the double brain and bicameral mind. These are concepts linking work on the phenomena of suggestion, voice hearing and telepathy in the present (see Chapter 7). This work suggests that rather than reify either movement or individuation, we need to attend to that fact that we can be both one yet many, depending upon the different milieux that produce the possibility of experience. This more ecological approach to subjectivity recognizes the brain's capacity for both individuation and multiplicity, and is starting to challenge many of the assumptions that are entrenched across psychology, biology and the neurosciences. Work on the double brain has not been given much attention by humanities scholars, despite calls for more collaboration across the humanities and neurosciences.

This book will explore the importance of the paradigm of the double, rather than neuroscientific work on the double brain *per se*, for extending contemporary understandings of embodiment and affect. The paradigm of the double will take as its focus a number of key sites and surfaces of emergence for discussion. These are sites which are all marked by a transport or traffic between the self and other, material and immaterial, science and culture, and inside and outside. These sites include the crowd (Chapter 2), the séance and telepathy, particularly in the context of debates about emerging media technologies (Chapter 3), the clinical and therapeutic encounter (Chapters 4 and 5) and live performance and theatre (Chapter 5). What is important, the book will argue, is a re-engagement with what has been obscured, silenced and occluded in conceptions of immateriality that reduce the psychic to the body through understandings that privilege the brain or neurobiological body (see Cromby et al., 2011). This is a developing orthodoxy across cultural theory where the neurosciences and biological sciences have become authorized knowledge practices for validating the shift to affective bodies. The problems with this will be engaged through a genealogical analysis that will take this shift to affect as the subject of its inquiry (see Chapter 1).

There are many articles and a growing number of books engaging with this shift. These include a focus on the emancipatory potential and possible limits of affect, and calls for transdisciplinary work that creates a dialogue or conversation between the humanities and the sciences (particularly the life, neurological and psychological sciences).