Ethnicity and Globalization

Stephen Castles


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From Migrant Worker to Transnational Citizen

Stephen Castles

SAGE Publications
London • Thousand Oaks • New Delhi

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First published 2000

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SAGE Publications Ltd
6 Bonhill Street
London EC2A 4PU

SAGE Publications Inc.
2455 Teller Road
Thousand Oaks, California 91320

SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd
32, M-Block Market
Greater Kailash - I
New Delhi 110 048

British Library Cataloguing in Publication data

A catalogue record for this book is
available from the British Library

ISBN 0 7619 5611 5
ISBN 0 7619 5612 3 (pbk)

Library of Congress catalog card number 00 132725

Typeset by SIVA Math Setters, Chennai, India

For Freyja and Jenny

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PREFACE

This book sums up over thirty years of research on international migration and how it has changed the world. The essays collected in this volume provide a running commentary on the ways in which migration – first to the older industrial countries and then as a more general phenomenon linked to globalization – has created multicultural societies and changed ideas on citizenship and identity. At the beginning of the new millennium, transnational communities and increasingly complex forms of identification are part of the growing challenge to the nation-state.

Chapter 2 was first published in 1972, while Chapters 3 and 4 sum up European developments of the 1970s and 1980s. However, most of the collection is much more recent, reflecting the global trends of the 1990s and looking beyond to perspectives for the next thirty years. Three of the essays – Chapters 1, 7 and 13 – have been especially written for this book. This edition keeps very closely to the original texts, with only minor editorial changes. A few cuts have been made to avoid repetition; these are marked by an ellipsis in square brackets [...].

It is very hard to acknowledge all the people who have influenced and supported my work over so many years. One testimony is to be found in the references to the many important publications that have helped shape my own work, but it has always been the personal conversations, debates and arguments that have done most to advance my ideas. A few friends and colleagues should be mentioned specifically. The first is Godula Kosack, my collaborator in the late 1960s and 1970s, who is co-author of Chapter 2 of the present volume. As librarian and then director of the Institute of Race Relations (London), A. Sivanandan showed me and many other scholars how to combine the academic and the political. Wiebke Wüstenberg gave a great deal of encouragement and support in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Mark J. Miller persuaded me to take a global view. Carl-Ulrik Schierup, Aleksandra Ålund, Robin Cohen, Annie Phizacklea, John Solomos, Russell King, Klaus Bade, Catherine Wihtol de Wenden and Michael Bommes have helped me maintain my European involvement since coming to Australia in 1986. Many Australian colleagues have shared their ideas with me, among them Jock Collins, James Jupp, Alan Matheson, Robyn Iredale and Michael Morrissey. Rainer Bauböck and Alastair Davidson facilitated my access to the new area of citizenship studies. Supang Chantavanich, Diana Wong, Wong Siu-lun, Ron Skeldon, Ben Cariño, Paul Spoonley, Dick Bedford, Vijay Naidu and other colleagues in the Asia Pacific Migration Research Network have helped me to begin studying this huge and complex region. The support of the UNESCO-MOST (Management of Social

Transformations) programme, and particularly of Ali Kazancigil and Nadia Auriat, has been vital to developing my research in Asia and the Pacific. Ellie Vasta has been my close collaborator and strongest critic for many years.

I thank all the many publishers with whom I have worked over the years. Good publishers play a vital role in commissioning work, encouraging authors, helping to make complex ideas accessible and stimulating, and in choosing good titles for books. This is one reason why quick-fix electronic media will never replace the book. The idea for this book came from Chris Rojek of Sage Publications, who was highly encouraging (and patient) throughout the process of putting it together.

I also thank my colleagues at the University of Wollongong, especially within the Centre for Multicultural Studies and then the Migration and Multicultural Studies Program, for their great support. Kim Oborn helped make texts of diverse formats into a coherent manuscript. Colleen Mitchell did a wonderful job of editing and formatting the final text, despite persistent attacks by computer viruses.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author and publishers wish to thank the following for permission to use copyright material:

Allen and Unwin for S. Castles, 'The racisms of globalisation', in E. Vasta and S. Castles (eds), *The Teeth are Smiling: the Persistence of Racism in Multicultural Australia* (Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1996), pp. 17–45.

Berg for S. Castles, 'Migration and minorities in Europe: perspectives for the 1990s – eleven hypotheses', in J. Wrench and J. Solomos (eds), *Racism and Migration in Western Europe* (Oxford, Berg, 1993), pp. 17–34.

Blackwell Publishers and UNESCO (Paris) for S. Castles, 'Globalisation and migration: some pressing contradictions', *International Social Science Journal*, 156 (1998), pp. 179–86.

Cambridge University Press for S. Castles, 'Contract labour migration', in R. Cohen (ed.), *The Cambridge Survey of World Migration* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 510–14.

The Center for Migration Studies (New York) for S. Castles, 'The guestworker in Western Europe: an obituary', *International Migration Review*, 20 (4) (1986), pp. 761–78.

The Guardian for S. Castles, 'Bidonville – a French word for Hell' (14 January 1970).

The Institute of Race Relations (London) for S. Castles, 'The social time-bomb: education of an underclass in West Germany', *Race and Class*, 21 (4) (1980), pp. 369–87.

Macmillan Press for S. Castles, 'Multicultural citizenship: the Australian experience', in V. Bader (ed.), *Citizenship and Exclusion* (London, Macmillan, and St. Martin's Press Inc., 1997), pp. 113–38, and for S. Castles, 'Citizenship and the Other in the age of migration', in A. Davidson and K. Weekley (eds), *Globalization and Citizenship in the Asia-Pacific* (London, Macmillan, 1999), pp. 27–48.

New Left Review for S. Castles and G. Kosack, 'The function of labour immigration in Western European capitalism', *New Left Review*, 73 (May/June 1972), pp. 3–21.

The University of Queensland and the Editors of *Social Alternatives* for S. Castles, 'Explaining racism in the new Germany', *Social Alternatives*, 12 (1993), pp. 9–12.

PART I

INTRODUCTION

1

THIRTY YEARS OF RESEARCH ON MIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES

I began researching international migration in 1968. As part of a masters course in contemporary European studies at the University of Sussex, I wrote a 35,000 word dissertation entitled 'Social aspects of the mobility of labour: foreign workers in the German Federal Republic' (Castles 1968). Gathering data in Frankfurt am Main and West Berlin was pretty exciting for this was the height of the May 1968 student movement, with daily demonstrations, sit-ins and mass meetings. I spent my days interviewing trade-union officials, employers and social workers, and my evenings attending teach-ins (and some very good parties) at Frankfurt University, which was occupied by the socialist students and surrounded by helmeted pickets to keep out possible right-wing intruders. These were heady days, marked by an innocence which was soon to be lost in the increasingly violent confrontations of the 1970s. Everything still seemed possible; one had only to blow away the 'mould of a thousand years' (as one famous poster put it) and a new society could emerge, bringing sexual emancipation, education and fulfilling employment for all.

It was typical of the time that southern European and Turkish foreign workers were seen by many on the left as a potential new working-class vanguard. Their militancy and spontaneity were a breath of fresh air, especially in West Germany, with its huge, centralized trade unions and ritualized annual industrial disputes. In the early 1970s, young intellectuals like Joschka Fischer (who was to become Germany's first Green Foreign Minister in 1998) went to work at the Opel-Rüsselsheim car factory to learn from the Italian militants of *Lotta Continua* and *Potere Operaio*. As important as the migrants' political culture was their colourful and gregarious lifestyle, as expressed in the street festivals they started in the 1970s. These were first viewed with suspicion by Germans, but by the 1980s they would be run by neighbourhood groups all over the country, as part of a rejuvenated urban culture. The roots of multiculturalism lie in such experiences.

Before going to Sussex University, I had studied sociology from 1963 to 1966 at the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research, then still run by the grand old men of the Frankfurt School, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, and their successor, Jürgen Habermas. In accordance with the Frankfurt School principle of analysing society as a totality, it seemed evident that labour migration to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was a result of the dramatic economic and social changes brought about by the German economic miracle, and that it would in turn become a major factor of social and cultural change in itself. This was not a popular view in Germany, where policy-makers, employers and unions all saw the recruitment of 'guest-workers' as a temporary expedient – an economic buffer of labour which could be brought in as needed and sent away to 'export unemployment' if growth ever flagged. However, coming back to Sussex to write up my research, I soon came up against another conceptual issue. It seemed clear that foreign workers in Germany were doing the same unskilled and unpopular jobs as black workers in Britain. Yet British social scientists studying new Commonwealth immigration seemed totally uninterested in what was happening 'on the Continent' (of course, the British were notoriously insular and bad at foreign languages in those pre-European Union days). Comparative researchers took their evidence from South Africa or the southern states of the USA, rather than looking across the Channel. They therefore emphasized skin colour and used social-psychological concepts such as the 'dark stranger', prejudice or race relations, rather than looking at the socio-economic position of migrant workers within contemporary societies.

I and my then partner and collaborator Godula Kosack observed that immigrant workers were doing the same type of work and taking on similar societal positions throughout Western Europe. This led us to argue that immigration had structural causes inherent in the political economy of post-war capitalism, and was likely to have effects which transcended national differences. From this arose our interlinked Doctor of Philosophy (D Phil) projects, which involved a comparative study of immigrant workers and their effects on society in Britain, the German Federal Republic, France and Switzerland – the four main immigrant-receiving countries of Europe. This (in retrospect absurdly ambitious) project was a great deal of fun. We drove around Europe in an old van for months at a time, spending our mornings writing hundreds of index cards (this was before cheap photocopying) in the specialized libraries of ministries, research institutes, welfare organizations, trade unions and international organizations. The afternoons we spent visiting building sites, factories, workers' hostels or shanty-towns, in order to talk to migrant workers and their families. The long conversations over tea in Moroccan workers' shacks in the Parisian suburbs, or over a beer in a cheap bar near the depressing huts in which Spanish workers were housed in Geneva, gave human meaning to all the dry statistics and endless bureaucratic reports we had to work through. (A flavour of our experiences is given in the article 'Bidonville – a French word for Hell' published by the *Guardian* in January 1970, and reproduced on pp. 4–6). John Berger and Jean Mohr's famous portrayal of the migrant worker's condition through stories, photographs and poetry, *A Seventh Man* (Berger and Mohr 1975), is still worth reading today.

We also drove south to visit the countries of origin: a Spain still marked by grinding rural poverty, repression of urban workers and the constant terror of the Franco dictatorship; Algeria with its veiled women, unemployed youth and a pervading feeling of tension and aggression remaining from the recent war of liberation (reading Frantz Fanon helped us understand it, but did not make us feel any safer); southern Italy, with its railway stations crowded with departing men with cardboard suitcases, but also where the half-finished shells of migrant workers' houses built bit by bit during their holidays were beginning to sprout from the ground.

One result of all this was the book *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe* (Castles and Kosack 1973, 2nd edn 1985), which was to help change the way in which social scientists conceptualized migration. Another result was a strong and abiding interest on my part in international migration, as well as a passionate concern to expose the injustices brought about by exploitation of immigrants and racism against minorities. Since then, international migration and its consequences – the emergence of multicultural societies and transnational identities – has been the main theme of my work as a social scientist, whether in Britain, Germany, Australia or South-east Asia. Another continuity has been my use of an interdisciplinary comparative approach to understanding migration.

This book sums up my work on international migration, multicultural societies, racism and citizenship through a selection of essays written and published over three decades. The three chapters of Part II deal with the early period of migration and settlement after the Second World War, while the rest of the book is concerned with more recent developments, especially since the 1980s. The collection reflects the phases of development of global population mobility, as well as shifts in the social-scientific frameworks used to analyse these phenomena. Obviously, the essays also reflect my own intellectual development and the way in which this has been linked both to social change and paradigm shifts. The purpose of this Introduction is to trace these linkages. The next three sections contextualize the essays, roughly following the three main parts of the book, while the final section discusses some of the conceptual barriers which have bedevilled social-scientific research on migration and multicultural societies.

BIDONVILLE: A FRENCH WORD FOR HELL (1970)

The Ministry of the Interior has estimated that there are 75,346 people living in *bidonvilles* throughout France. A *bidonville* (the name comes from *bidons* – petrol cans – hammered flat to provide building material) is a 'group of light constructions erected on unprepared land, whether closed off or not, with materials found by chance'. The official figures probably underestimate the problem considerably because *bidonville* residents often do not give accurate answers to the census-takers as they are afraid of any form of officialdom and their papers are frequently not in order. *Bidonvilles* tend to spring up wherever there is a big building project, usually on the outskirts of cities. Thirty-five per cent of building workers in France are foreigners and normal housing is often unobtainable for them. This explains the paradox that *bidonvilles* are usually near modern housing developments.

When a homeless family or group of male immigrants moves into a *bidonville* their first dwelling is often an old truck or bus which has been dumped. At La Courneuve, in the northern suburbs of Paris, whole Yugoslav families with three or four children live in small delivery vans. These are the most recent arrivals. Once established, they collect building materials – corrugated iron, discarded planks, hardboard – and build a shack. Those who have been there longest (up to 15 years in some cases) even have some brick walls. From a high vantage point, the *bidonville* looks like a rubbish dump, for the inhabitants pile any available material round their walls and on their roofs in a vain attempt to keep out wet and cold. There are no sanitary amenities of any kind. The open sewers which develop are a constant danger to health. In some areas the local authorities have been persuaded to collect refuse from time to time; in others there is simply an ever-growing heap. At Nanterre one *bidonville* of more than 1,000 North Africans shares a single water tap with a nearby Portuguese 'village'.

Once a family has been reduced to living in a *bidonville*, a vicious circle tends to keep it there. Frequent illness caused by the bad housing conditions, and bad time-keeping caused by lack of transport, make it difficult for a man to keep a good job. Soon, employers come to know the addresses of *bidonvilles* and will not employ men giving them (which leads to a profitable trade in phoney domicile certificates issued by unscrupulous hoteliers).

Bidonvilles tend to develop their own forms of communal existence, which makes life somewhat less unbearable, but which, on the other hand, causes difficulties with regard to re-housing and integration into French society. To some extent, immigrants living in *bidonvilles* are able to maintain the patterns of life of their own countries. The men have to adapt to urban-industrial conditions at work, but the *bidonville* is a ghetto in which they and their families are completely isolated from other aspects of French society.

In an entirely North African *bidonville* it is possible to maintain the extended family structure with three generations (and sometimes animals) living under one roof. The high birth rate also persists – a child a year up to a total of six or eight children. So does the complete subordination of women, who are often not allowed to leave the *bidonville* even to go shopping, let alone to take a job. Many of them do not speak the language after several years in France.

At Champigny, about 10,000 Portuguese have a completely independent community. Here the shacks are fairly well built. Many have their own water taps outside and most have electricity. But even where communal solidarity has somewhat improved matters, nobody lives in a *bidonville* from choice. In the country with the worst housing shortage in Western Europe, the 2.5 million immigrants are at the end of the queue for every type of accommodation. Since the war, French government policy has encouraged large families and immigration, but has done little to provide housing for the resulting population growth. Today it is estimated that it would be necessary to build 600,000 dwellings (half of them with public money) a year for twenty years to make up the deficiency.

For several years the French government has carried out a programme for clearing away the *bidonvilles* through a special fund (*Le fonds d'action sociale pour les travailleurs migrants* – FAS). About two-thirds of the money for this fund comes from the immigrants themselves in the form of deductions from family allowances when the children remain in the country of origin. For example, in 1967 a French worker with five children got 531 francs a month in family allowances. His Portuguese colleague with five children at home got 89 francs, i.e. the amount he would have been entitled to if working in Portugal. The difference went to the FAS.

Since 1959, the FAS has helped to finance about 60,000 hostel beds for workers whose families are not in France. This is only a fraction of the number needed, but even if they do have the opportunity many immigrants are unwilling to move into such hostels. Apart from restrictions in some hostels (no visitors, lights out at a fixed time), the rent of between 60 and 120 francs a month is too high for men who have to support families at home. Some hostels are built much too far away from the places of work. Organizations representing immigrants have demanded a say in the running of the FAS, and protest at having to pay twice for the accommodation – once through their compulsory contributions to the FAS and again in the form of rent. The FAS housing programme for single men also creates racial segregation as there are separate hostels for black Africans.

> The FAS also gives subsidies to provide family housing for immigrants. But the proportion of foreigners in a housing development is not allowed to exceed 15 per cent to avoid conflict and the growth of separate communities. Often, foreigners from *bidonvilles* are not immediately re-housed in normal flats, but are sent first to *cités de transit* (transit centres). The idea is that they are unused to modern urban housing, having come straight from a backward rural area to the *bidonville*. In the *cité de transit* they are supposed to get used to modern sanitary facilities and housekeeping methods under the guidance of social workers, before moving on to normal flats after a year or two. In fact, immigrant families tend to stay much longer in the *cités*. New flats are just not available for them and there are not enough social workers. The *cités* – usually wooden huts – become forgotten ghettos, finally to form nuclei for new *bidonvilles*.
>
> *Guardian* (14 January 1970)

Western Europe: the guests who stayed

The period from 1945 to the mid-1970s (known in France by the evocative term of *les trente glorieuses* – the thirty glorious years) was a time of rapid growth and widespread prosperity for the old industrial nations. This was possible due to their financial and technological dominance and the lack of serious competition from the rest of the world. The need to maintain legitimacy in the face of the alternative political model provided by the Soviet bloc led to Keynesian anti-cyclical policies, full employment and the construction of welfare states. After the trauma of the Great Depression, fascism and the war, everything had to be done to maintain economic growth and reduce class conflict. Under these conditions, employers faced serious difficulty in securing additional labour for expansion, while at the same time preventing wage inflation which might bring about recession. An important study in the mid-1960s showed the approaches used in various countries to obtain adequate labour supplies (Kindleberger 1967), such as the transfer of labour from agriculture to industry and increasing female labour force participation. The most successful economies were those with abundant labour supplies: the German economic miracle could partly be explained by the presence of some 9 million expellees from former eastern parts of Germany annexed by the Soviet Union and Poland. But Germany's labour surplus was soon absorbed into industry, and most Western European countries lacked such reserves.

The same solution was adopted everywhere: the import of labour from the less-developed European periphery (Mediterranean countries, Ireland and Finland), or from more distant Third World countries, became a crucial factor in economic growth in all the core industrial economies. However, the form taken by labour import varied according to historical circumstances. Britain, France and The Netherlands could make use of labour from their colonies or former colonies. The political and cultural linkages created by colonialism made it possible readily to obtain low-skilled labour, usually without the need for specific recruiting systems. Information on the work opportunities in the 'mother-country', together with the availability of transport and the right to free movement, were sufficient to start and sustain migratory flows. By contrast, such countries as Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and Sweden had no access to colonial labour. Instead they set up labour recruitment systems to bring in temporary foreign workers, who were given permission to stay only as long as their labour was needed. The most developed of all these arrangements was the German 'guest-worker' system. Even the post-colonial powers used Mediterranean workers when colonial workers were insufficient in number. By the 1960s, migrant labour had become a structural feature of Western European labour markets. Abundant labour with low social costs was a vital factor in the long boom. This paved the way for subsequent family reunion and permanent settlement that was to lead to the multicultural Europe we know today.

In retrospect the most surprising feature of all this was the fact that neither policy-makers nor social scientists showed much foresight or concern about possible long-term consequences. Foreign workers were not expected to settle, and it was assumed that they could easily be sent home in the event of a recession. The only exception was Britain, where economic stagnation, anti-immigrant movements and growing unrest (notably the Notting Hill Riots of 1958) led to the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, which severely curtailed labour migration from the West Indies, India and Pakistan. Chapter 2, 'The Function of Labour Migration in Western European Capitalism' (co-authored with Godula Kosack and originally published in *New Left Review* in 1972) can be seen as an overview of this period, and a summary of *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe* (Castles and Kosack 1973). Reflecting its time, the chapter uses the terminology of Marxist political economy and class analysis in a way that neither I nor most of my contemporaries would subscribe to today. None the less, the analysis makes some important points on the economic and societal functions of migrant labour, which are beginning to seem relevant again in the light of the current Asian crisis.

These early works focused on Western Europe. The USA, Canada and Australia also experienced considerable immigration in this period, though in rather different forms. Australia initiated a mass immigration programme after 1945 because policy-makers believed that the population of 7.5 million needed to be increased for both economic and strategic reasons. The initial target was 70,000 migrants per year and a ratio of ten British migrants to every 'foreigner'. However, it proved impossible to attract enough British migrants, and recruitment was extended first to northern and Eastern Europe, and then to southern Europe. Non-Europeans were not admitted at all: the White Australia policy was still in force, and Asian immigration was seen as a potential threat to Australia's survival as a 'European nation'. The policy was one of permanent immigration: newcomers were expected to bring in their families, settle and be assimilated into society as 'new Australians'. None the less, the aim of the immigration programme was primarily to recruit labour for Australia's new factories and infrastructure projects. By the 1970s, manufacturing industry relied heavily on migrant labour and factory jobs were popularly known as 'migrant work' (Collins 1991). Canada followed similar policies of mass immigration. At first only Europeans were admitted. Most entrants were British, but Eastern and southern Europeans soon played an increasing role. Family entry was encouraged, and immigrants were seen as settlers and future citizens.

Large-scale migration to the USA developed rather later, owing to the restrictive immigration laws enacted in the 1920s. Intakes averaged 250,000 persons annually in the period 1951–60, and 330,000 annually from 1961 to 1970 – far less than in the great immigration waves of the period 1870–1914. However, agricultural employers recruited temporary migrant workers from Mexico and the Caribbean. Government policies varied: at times, systems of temporary labour recruitment, such as the Mexican *bracero* programme of the 1940s, were introduced; in other periods, recruitment was formally prohibited, but tacitly tolerated, leading to the presence of a large number of illegal workers. The short-term perspective was very like that which governed European 'guest-worker' recruitment: the Mexican workers were seen as temporary flexible labour, and were not expected to settle. The big change in US immigration came with the 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act. These were seen as part of the civil rights legislation of the period, designed to remove the discriminatory national-origins quota system. They were not expected or intended to lead to large-scale non-European immigration. In fact, the amendments created a system of worldwide immigration, in which the most important criterion for admission was kinship with US citizens or residents (Borjas 1990; Portes and Rumbaut 1990). The result was to be a dramatic upsurge in migration from Asia and Latin America.

The overwhelming impression of the period 1945–73 is thus of a short-term economic approach: migrants were seen simply as workers whose labour was needed, while their social needs and their potential impact on receiving societies were largely ignored. There was little understanding that migration was a social process that could develop its own dynamics, which might confound the expectations of even the most efficient states. The 'guest-worker' recruiting countries wanted labour, not people, but were to end up with new ethnic minorities. By contrast, both Europe's former colonial powers and the New World countries did see immigrants as settlers, but they did not expect migration to go on proliferating and diversifying. Australia, for instance, regarded immigration as a way of strengthening the population and economy, to keep the country white and British. As subsequent events were to show, the result was to be the opposite – one of the most ethnically diverse societies in the world.

Changes in migratory patterns were precipitated by the oil crisis of 1973, which marked the end of *les trente glorieuses* and the acceleration of major shifts in the global political economy. In the subsequent period, major corporations became transnational and moved their investments away from the high-wage economies of the old industrial heartland to low-wage export zones in the Third World. New industrial economies emerged in Asia and Latin America, while employment stagnated in the 'rustbelt' industries of the West. The electronic revolution and new modes of business organization changed the nature of work, eroding old skills and wiping out the security of the unionized blue-collar working class. The new casualized labour market pitted women and migrant workers against deskilled male workers, eroding wages and conditions for all. The victorious neo-classical ideology of monetarism preached deregulation, a small state and the demolition of welfare systems.

I spent most of the period from 1971 to 1986 teaching political economy at the *Fachhochschule* (polytechnic) of Frankfurt am Main. Migration remained my main interest, apart from a foray into the sociology of education which led to a book (Castles and Wüstenberg 1979), two years working in community education in Bristol and a year working for the Foundation for Education with Production in Botswana and Zimbabwe. Frankfurt was a good vantage point for observing changes in migratory patterns. Training social workers to work with immigrant youth quickly brought home the realities of settlement and minority formation. Much of my work at this time was concerned with Germany, although always in comparison with other European countries.

In November 1973, the German federal government abruptly stopped labour recruitment – an action to be followed by most Western European governments within the next twelve months. It was expected that large numbers of migrant workers would go home, allowing the export of unemployment – always seen as a potential benefit of the 'guest-worker' system. Although many did leave, the majority stayed. Family reunion gathered momentum and trends towards long-term settlement became obvious. Now attention shifted to the growing number of immigrant children entering European schools which were poorly prepared for this challenge. The media began to portray immigrant youth as a potential threat to public order. Chapter 3, 'The Social Time Bomb: Education of an Underclass in West Germany' (first published in *Race and Class* in 1980) uses the example of Germany to analyse trends in settlement, demographic normalization and intergenerational change among immigrant populations throughout Europe. The argument is that discriminatory educational policies were tending to reproduce the disadvantaged class position of immigrant workers for the next generation, providing European societies both with low-skilled labour and with scapegoats for the likely social problems of the future – an analysis which was to be confirmed by the events of the 1990s.

The final contribution in Part II is a retrospective analysis of the post-war labour recruitment system: 'The Guest-worker in Western Europe: an Obituary' (Chapter 4, first published in *International Migration Review* in 1986). This can be read as a summary of my book on the transition from labour migration to minority formation, *Here for Good: Western Europe's New Ethnic Minorities* (Castles et al. 1984). The chapter gives a country-by-country account of labour recruitment systems, showing how each one failed in its aim of preventing permanent settlement, paving the way for the multi-ethnic societies which were to prove so challenging for Western Europe. These developments are put in the context of a changing global political economy, already beginning to give rise to quite new forms of mobility.

The globalization of migration

In 1986 I moved to Australia to take up the post of director of the Centre for Multicultural Studies at the University of Wollongong. In a sense, I was a returning migrant myself, since I was born in Australia in 1944, but my parents had moved back to England in 1946, and I had grown up there. One reason for the move was my interest in the multicultural policies then being developed as a response to the failure of assimilationism and the emergence of a culturally diverse society in Australia. But the move also broadened my perspectives on migration, allowing me to compare the effects of permanent settler movements to Australia with European labour recruitment, and then to contrast both with the new forms of population mobility emerging in Asia and elsewhere. Like many observers at the time, I became increasingly aware that economic globalization also meant the globalization of population mobility. The four contributions in Part III describe and analyse various facets of the new migrations of the 1980s and 1990s.

'Migrations and Minorities in Europe: Perspectives for the 1990s – Eleven Hypotheses' (Chapter 5, originally published in Wrench and Solomos 1993) was written for a conference in 1991, and may be seen as a first draft for some of the ideas later developed by Mark Miller and myself in *The Age of Migration* (Castles and Miller 1993). The mid-1970s to the mid-1980s had been a time of stabilization of immigrant populations in Western Europe. Low levels of labour migration and trends to settlement and community formation had led to improvements in legal and social status, opening the way for debates on cultural pluralism and multicultural education. But events of the late 1980s and early 1990s were to change all this. The disintegration of the Soviet bloc and the end of the Cold War combined with rapid economic and social change in many Third World countries to produce vast new population flows. Some took the form of organized labour recruitment, but far more significant were the large flows of asylum-seekers and undocumented workers to

Western Europe and North America. The world's media showed dramatic scenes – such as the desperate attempts of Albanians to reach Italy in a flotilla of decrepit ships, or the interception by the US coastguard of Haitians trying to sail to Florida – which caused widespread fears of a mass influx of impoverished people who might undermine the prosperity of the West. This led to the emergence of anti-immigrant movements, tighter border controls and intergovernmental agreements to reduce the number of asylum-seekers and illegal entrants. Chapter 5 seeks to put all these developments into a global perspective, using the form of hypotheses to raise a wide range of questions in a speculative way.

Chapter 6 on 'Contract Labour Migration' (originally published in Cohen 1995) is a global overview of migrant labour recruitment systems. Such systems generally impose restrictions on the rights of migrants compared with other workers, and thus create a new form of 'unfree labour'. Historical antecedents include slavery, indentured labour and systems for control of foreign labour pioneered in Germany before the First World War. Western Europe's 'guest-workers' were contract labour – just like the Mexican *braceros* recruited for US agribusiness. The latter case shows the closeness between contract labour systems and undocumented flows: when the *bracero* programme was stopped in 1964, illegal migration quickly replaced it. Contract labour is a good example of the globalization of migration. This type of recruitment grew rapidly after 1973 as oil-rich countries hired ex-patriate experts and low-skilled manual workers to carry out their ambitious programmes of infrastructure development, construction and industrialization. Contract labour systems meant a very high degree of control over workers, designed to maintain a docile labour force and prevent settlement. Soon such contract labour systems spread to Asia's 'tiger economies', which were rapidly running into labour shortages as their economies soared. An important trend of the 1990s was the feminization of migrant labour: more and more women were recruited as domestic workers, entertainers and factory employees. The lack of rights typical of contract labour arrangements increased women's vulnerability to exploitation and sexual abuse, while conditions for undocumented women migrants were often even worse.

The growth of migration up to 1997 was a major factor in the 'Asian miracle'. Millions of Asians moved to North America, Australia, New Zealand and Europe, but even more migrated within Asia. Fast economic growth in certain countries was accompanied by declines in fertility and population growth. As opportunities for educational and occupational mobility for the populations of the 'tiger economies' grew, there was a lack of labour for the '3-D jobs' (dirty, difficult and dangerous). These were filled by migrant workers, both legal and illegal. Countries with slower economic growth but greater demographic growth became labour reserves. I became more deeply involved in the study of Asian migration through the establishment in 1995 of the Asia Pacific Migration Research Network (APMRN). This academic network, which covered eleven countries by 1998, is part of the UNESCO-MOST (Management of Social Transformations) programme, and is coordinated by myself and my colleagues at the University of Wollongong.

The rapid growth in Asian migration was inextricably linked to the rapid economic and social changes in the region connected with decolonization and globalization. When the 'Asian miracle' was suddenly interrupted in 1997 by a deep financial and economic crisis, this inevitably had serious repercussions for migrant workers and their families. However, the complete stop in labour migration and the mass repatriation of migrant workers expected by many did not take place. As in Western Europe a generation earlier, the results of the crisis look likely to be far more complex and ambiguous. Chapter 7, 'Migration in the Asian Pacific Region: Before and After the Crisis' (especially written for this volume, though partly based on an article published in UNESCO's *International Social Science Journal* in 1998) examines the development of Asian migration up to 1997 and discusses new trends in migration and settlement which may emerge from the crisis.

The brief essay which concludes Part III (Chapter 8, 'Globalization and Migration: Some Pressing Contradictions', first published in 1998 in the *International Social Science Journal*) is an attempt to link trends in international migration to some of the fundamental problems inherent in globalization. The argument is that migration plays a key part in most contemporary social transformations. It is both a result of economic, social, cultural and political change, and a powerful factor precipitating further change. The often disadvantaged position of migrant workers and their families reveals much about the dialectic of inclusion and exclusion, which is so typical of the new global (dis)order. Millions of people work and live in countries where they cannot become citizens. Often they have multiple identities and feel that they belong both in the country of origin and the country of residence. Such developments undermine the nation-state principle of singular and exclusive membership. These considerations form a bridge to the theme of Part IV of this book.

Multicultural societies as a challenge to the nation-state

When I arrived in Australia in 1986, I was fascinated by the way in which culture and identity were being reshaped in the highly diverse society that had resulted from post-war migration: 23 per cent of the population were immigrants from well over a hundred countries, while a further 20 per cent of the population were children of immigrants. My first attempt to analyse this, together with my colleagues at the Centre for Multicultural Studies, was the book *Mistaken Identity* (Castles et al. 1992), published as a critical contribution to the 1988 bicentenary of white settlement (see also Castles et al. 1988). At this time, Australia appeared to be not only one of the most ethnically diverse countries, but also one which