THE BLOOMSBURY COMPANION TO HEGEL

EDITED BY
ALLEGRA DE LAURENTIS AND
JEFFREY EDWARDS

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To the memory of Burkhard Tuschling, teacher, mentor and friend of many years.

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† Deceased contributor

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

HEGEL

Antrittsrede 1818	*Konzept der Rede beim Antritt des philosophischen Lehramtes an der Universität Berlin*
Briefe 1,2,3,4.1,4.2	*Briefe von und an Hegel* (*Bd.* 1 – 4.2)
Differenzschrift	*Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie*
Dissertatio	*Dissertatio philosophica de orbitis planetarum*
Enc	*Encyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften* (1830)
Enc 1817	*Encyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften* (1817)
Enc 1827	*Encyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften* (1827)
Gl&Wi	*Glauben und Wissen*
GW	*Hegel, Gesammelte Werke*
JS I, *II*, *III*	*Jenaer Systementwürfe* I, II, III
Kritisches Journal	*Kritisches Journal der Philosophie*
Nohl	*Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*
PhG	*System der Wissenschaft. Erster Theil, die Phänomenologie des Geistes*
RPh	*Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*
Scepticismus	*Verhältniß des Scepticismus zur Philosophie*
SS	*System der Sittlichkeit*
Systemprogramm	*Ältestestes Systemprogramm des Deutschen Idealismus*
TWA	*G. W. F. Hegel. Werke in zwanzig Bänden. Theorie Werkausgabe*
V	*Vorlesungen. Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*
VGeist	*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des Geistes* (1827/8) (*V* 13)
VGesch	*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte* (1822/3) (*V* 12)
$VGPh_{1–4}$	*Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* (*V* 6–9)
VKunst	*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst* (1823) (*V* 2)
VLog	*Vorlesungen über die Logik* (*V* 10)
$VNat_1$	*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Natur* (1819/20) (*V* 16)
$VNat_2$	*Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie* (1821/2)
$VNat_3$	*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Natur* (1825/6) (*V* 17)
VPhR	*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des Rechts* (1819/20) (*V* 14)

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VRel$_1$	*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion. Einleitung. Der Begriff der Religion* (1824, 1827, 1831) (*V* 3)
VRel$_2$	*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion. Die bestimmte Religion* (*V* 4)
VRel$_3$	*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion. Die vollendete Religion* (*V* 5)
VRPh	*Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie* (1818–31) (Ilting edition)
W	*Sämmtliche Werke*
WBN	*Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts*
WL	*Wissenschaft der Logik*
WVAesth	*Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik* (in *W*)
WVGPh	*Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* (in *W*)

DESCARTES

AT	*Descartes Oeuvres. Édition Adam et Tannery*

FICHTE

FGA	*J. G. Fichte. Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*
Naturrecht	*Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre*
Wissenschaftslehre	*Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre*

KANT

AA	*Kants gesammelte Schriften* (=*Akademieausgabe*)
Anth	*Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* (in *AA* 9)
GMS	*Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (in *AA* 4)
KpV	*Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (in *AA* 5)
KrV	*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*
KU	*Kritik der Urteilskraft* (in *AA* 5)
MAN	*Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaften* (in *AA* 4)
MS	*Metaphysik der Sitten* (in *AA* 6)
Prol	*Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als wissenschaftlich wird auftreten können* (in *AA* 4)
Rel	*Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft* (in *AA* 6)

MARX, ENGELS

Kap	*Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*
MEGA	*Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe*
MEW	*Marx-Engels Werke*

SCHELLING

STI	*System des Transcendentalen Idealismus* (1800)
SW	*Schelling Werke*
SsW	*Schellings Werke*

SPINOZA

Ethica	*Ethica more geometrico demonstrata*

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INTRODUCTION

Allegra de Laurentiis and Jeffrey Edwards

Our goal in this volume has been to provide Hegel scholars and Hegel readers with a handbook on Hegel's work that is true to his stated aim, which was to produce a philosophical account of natural and human reality in systemic form. The principles of Hegel's own arrangement of his subject matters have therefore furnished the natural criteria for structuring Part II, dedicated to 'The System of Philosophy' (Chapters 4–10). The same principles also form the guideposts for the contributions on 'Substantive and Interpretive Questions' in Part III (Chapters 11–24) as well as for those on 'Hegel's Forms of Argument' in Part IV (Chapters 25–27). Hegel's systematic account of reality was not conceived in a moment of intuitive insight. Nor was its influence exhausted upon its completion by Hegel. Thus, Part I, dedicated to 'Hegel's Path to the System' (Chapters 1–3) focuses on the laborious philosophical developments leading up to the mature shape of his thought, and Part V on 'Hegel's Philosophical Influence' (Chapters 28–31) treats some of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century movements that were deeply affected by Hegelian philosophy.

The unity and the relative simplicity of this volume's underlying plan are not meant to conceal the pronounced interpretive and methodological differences between the philosophical approaches exhibited in the various contributions. Apart from our wish to offer a historically defensible and intellectually sober overview of Hegel's mature philosophy, we have also sought to bring together diverse perspectives on Hegel's doctrines, contrasting assessments of his arguments, and distinct philosophical styles through which contemporary theoretical concerns can be addressed in connection with solutions put forward by Hegel. An additional objective of ours has been to offer first translations of some of the most advanced research in Hegel studies that has so far been unavailable in English. In our view, the result of this 3-year project demonstrates that an illuminating and productive dialogue is possible on the basis of quite disparate readings of Hegel's thought – as long as the participants share, as is the case in this Companion, a scholarly interest in Hegel's thesis that truth is systematic, hence also holistic, in nature.

Part I: 'Hegel's Path to the System', begins with two chapters by *Martin Bondeli*, who traces Hegel's intriguing – at times almost paradoxical – intellectual development from the Tübingen years to Frankfurt and then to Jena. Bondeli first focuses on Hegel's Kantian phase in Bern, his concerns with theology, his critique

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of 'positive' religion, his interest in moral reason, and eventually his engagement with those who, like Reinhold, Fichte and Schelling, took themselves to be completing Kant's philosophical project. Bondeli then contextualizes the Frankfurt writings in the framework of Hegel's increasingly revolutionary (and Fichtean) concern with dissolving what Marx would later call 'all fixed, fast frozen relations'. Bondeli's second chapter, recounting the Jena years, presents Hegel's repudiation of Fichteanism, his criticism of Kant, Jacobi and Reinhold, his involvement with Schelling's transcendental philosophy, and finally his divergence from the latter. Readers interested in researching any aspect of Hegel's progression from the criticism of contemporaneous 'philosophies of reflection' to the conceptualization of 'speculative' philosophy in Jena's multiple system drafts will find in Bondeli's contributions both a careful reconstruction of these decisive phases of Hegel's development and a helpful interpretation of Hegel's early epistemological concerns.

Kenneth R. Westphal's conspectus of the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit* centres on this work's role in providing the epistemic justification of the standpoint of pure thinking that is embodied in the *Science of Logic* – thus on the *Phenomenology*'s function as a proper, that is, non-external, introduction to Hegel's philosophy. Along with a detailed treatment of Hegel's original epistemology, Westphal follows each of the decisive steps in Hegel's analysis of mind as well as Hegel's portrayal of the spirit of human, historical communities while engaging with central concerns of contemporary philosophy of mind and epistemology in the analytic vein.

Part II: 'The System of Philosophy', opens with *Ardis Collins*'s investigation of Hegel's various introductions to – or inductions into – his philosophical system, beginning with the *Phenomenology*. Collins discusses contemporary interpretations of the status of Hegel's introductions as either propedeutic, or systematic, or both. Her response to these contemporary readings is based on the examination of three decisive factors: the *Encyclopaedia*'s explicit characterizations of thought's relation to experience; the *Encyclopaedia*'s account of the three fundamental ways in which thinking positions itself vis-à-vis objectivity; and Hegel's proof procedure in both the Lesser and Greater Logics. Collins's final sections consider the relation between logic and phenomenology in light of their shifting role as 'first part' of the system of philosophical sciences.

Hegel's conception of a science of logic is the subject matter of *Michael Wolff*'s chapter. Through detailed critical exegesis that is both historical and systematic in character, Wolff presents Hegel's conception of logical science as an originally Kantian project that, though revised and transformed, always remains in dialogue with Kant's conception of logic. Wolff traces Hegel's division of logic into its 'subjective' and 'objective' parts to his understanding of Kant's general and transcendental logics. He explains Hegel's idea of 'speculative logic' as stemming from his notion of the self-critique of reason, and shows how Hegel's characterization of logical categories as 'objective thoughts' denotes a subject matter that is necessarily intrinsic to pure, that is, logical, thinking. Wolff also relates Hegel's account of the formal, absolute and abstract character of logical determinations to a key aim of logical science, namely, to provide direct proof of absolute cognition (as opposed to the indirect proof provided by the *Realphilosophie*). Wolff then turns to Hegel's solution to the problem of a 'presuppositionless' beginning of science; to Hegel's theory of the necessarily dialectical

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pattern of thought's inquiry into the subject matter of logic; to Hegel's conception of 'immediacy' as resulting from 'mediation'; and to Hegel's account of 'concept', 'concept of concept' and 'idea' as the fundamental elements of logical cognition. Combined with George di Giovanni's new translation of the *Science of Logic*, Wolff's succinct but deeply probing reconstruction of the origin, context, method and results of logical science should prove indispensable for future research into this area of Hegel studies.

Dieter Wandschneider's chapter investigates the Philosophy of Nature in view of the strengths and contemporary relevance of early nineteenth-century theories of natural philosophy as well as in view of the neglect and 'interpretive prejudices' to which these theories have been subject over the past two centuries. In his first six sections, Wandschneider explains the logical roots of Hegel's concept of nature, the theoretical strengths of objective idealism and the meaning of the process of 'idealization' that Hegel attributes to natural systems. In the remainder of the chapter, Wandschneider reconstructs the architectonic intricacies of Hegel's natural philosophy. In this context, Wandschneider examines Hegel's criticisms of Kepler's and Newton's mechanical conceptions of the universe; his debt to Schelling's notions of gravity and light; his anticipations of later scientific theories of light's 'absolute' velocity; and his position that 'the chemical process' harbours organic life within itself. Finally, Wandschneider discusses the conceptual transition that Hegel provides from nature's prose to nature's poetry, that is, from mechanical and physical systems to living ones.

Cinzia Ferrini treats one of the most difficult conceptual-systematic transitions in Hegel's philosophy: the transition from the world of nature to the realm of spirit. She outlines the internal connections between logic, nature and spirit, as conceived by Hegel. She then determines the meaning of 'external nature' in the 1807 *Phenomenology*. Finally, by considering Hegel's various lectures on logic, nature and spirit, as well as the *Encyclopaedia* Philosophy of Nature, Ferrini elucidates Hegel's challenging account of the separation of self-external nature from nature as the externalization of spirit.

We thus arrive at the Philosophy of Spirit. *Willem deVries* takes on the task of reconstructing and assessing Hegel's theory of Subjective Spirit. After a comprehensive discussion of the paradigm shifts implied by Hegel's rejection of pneumatology and contemporaneous empirical psychology, deVries guides us through the various stages of subjective spirit: the so-called Anthropology of spirit as natural, feeling and 'actual' soul; the Phenomenology of spirit as consciousness, self-consciousness and reason; and the Psychology of spirit as theoretical, practical and free mind. Throughout his contribution deVries engages contemporary interpretations of Hegel's subjective spirit – rightfully regretting the paucity of studies on this subject – and relates Hegel's conception of human cognitive and emotional capacities to contemporary scientific accounts.

Kenneth R. Westphal's chapter on Objective Spirit consists of two parts. The first supplies the theoretical framework for understanding Hegel's moral and social theory in terms of what the author calls Natural Law Constructivism. In a tight series of steps, Westphal reconstructs fundamental historical debates that centred on the question of the objectivity of moral values and juridical principles – a question to which Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* is meant to respond. Westphal leads us from Plato's Euthyphro's dilemma to the Humean distinction between

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artificiality and arbitrariness; to Hobbes's arguments for the freedom-limiting and public nature of justice; to Rousseau's and Kant's conceptions of moral autonomy; to Hegel's distinction between the 'truly historical' view of right and the 'merely historical' view taken by the historical school of jurisprudence. Part two of Westphal's contribution offers a carefully reasoned outline of the *Philosophy of Right* and its explication as a work that integrates Montesquieu's and Kant's views on the objectivity of moral and political principles that are historical in nature.

Walter Jaeschke's chapter on 'Absolute Spirit' elucidates Hegel's contention that art, religion and philosophy are all forms of the same content: the objectifications of self-comprehending human spirit (in other words, the forms of 'absolute knowing') that we attain in relative independence from the external constraints of social existence. The first section, 'Art', offers a comprehensive examination and appraisal of the 'intuitive' form of self-comprehension embodied in all artworks. Starting from the analysis of the basic concept of the beautiful in art (*das Kunstschöne*), Jaeschke guides us through Hegel's historical and logical systematization of art forms (symbolic, classical and romantic) and the art types that run through them (from architecture to poetry). Jaeschke's exposition rectifies various misconceptions of Hegel's aesthetic theory – for example, the (in)famous thesis of the 'death of art'. Given the imposing character of Hegel's body of work on the fine arts, Jaeschke also points out that 'the range and depth' of Hegel's treatment of the arts is unmatched in art history and aesthetics. The following section on 'Religion' explicates this 'representational' form of human self-knowledge, its self-alienating character and thus its cognitive limitations. Jaeschke delineates Hegel's theory of the structure shared by the concept religion with all 'determinate' religions. Breaking with tradition, Hegel considers *all* religions as expressions of spirit's historically diverse forms of self-knowing. The reason why he singles out Christianity as the 'consummate' religion is not, as often alleged, that it is a superior actualization of the concept of religion, but rather that Christianity makes this very concept into its own object. The final section treats Hegel's understanding of philosophy as sublation of art and religion in conceptual self-comprehension, as well as Hegel's closely related thesis that the history of philosophy is the history of self-conscious reason itself.

Part III, on 'Substantive and Interpretive Questions', includes Chapters 11 to 24 that succinctly clarify key concepts of Hegel's philosophy in connection with their historical origins and systematic functions.

Michael Inwood contributes four essays. In 'Logic – Nature – Spirit' Inwood explains the tripartite division of Hegel's system as rooted, on the one side, in the philosophical tradition that begins with Greek Stoicism and, on the other side, in Hegel's dialectical understanding of what counts as a rational account of reality. The section on 'Determination, determinacy' offers an overview of Hegel's use of these key-concepts in the Logic and in the *Realphilosophie*. In 'Spirit, Consciousness, Self-Consciousness' Inwood clarifies Hegel's uses of *Geist* and *Bewußtsein* with reference to the ancient meanings of *pneuma*, *nous* and *spiritus* as well as with reference to the uses of 'spirit' and 'consciousness' in modern (including Kantian) philosophy and psychology. In his fourth contribution Inwood focuses on the distinction between 'Reason and Understanding' that pervades Hegel's mature philosophy. Highlighting Hegel's changing assessments of the relationship between

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reason and understanding in the course of his intellectual development, Inwood discusses Hegel's mature view of this relation in connection with corresponding views of Kant, Jacobi, Schelling, Schiller and Goethe.

Angelica Nuzzo's first contribution examines the relation of 'System and History' in Hegel's thought. Nuzzo scrutinizes the conceptual relations between spirit, world spirit, consciousness and the history of consciousness that characterize Hegel's thinking during his Jena period. She then moves on to the 1807 *Phenomenology*'s treatment of history as a pivotal (if at times only implicit) category for grasping the development of spirit; to Hegel's preoccupation with the systematic *locus* of history in the Nürnberg lectures; and, finally, to Hegel's distinction between 'historical history' and 'philosophical history' – the latter having world history proper as its subject-matter. Nuzzo's second contribution, 'The Finite and the Infinite', analyses the treatment of this conceptual pair as it is found in the Science of Logic. Nuzzo argues that the relation between the finite and the infinite, when rightly understood, is in Hegel's own view the key to grasping 'true' (and that means, non-dualistic) philosophy.

The logical and ontological relations that obtain between 'Concept, Object and Absolute Idea' in Hegel's system are examined by *Burkhard Tuschling* in three steps. First, he presents their function in key passages from the Lesser and the Greater Logic; second, he traces in outline the dialectical transformations of these three basic categories in Hegel's accounts of logic, nature and spirit; third, Tuschling reconstructs what Hegel calls 'the hardest of all transitions', namely, the transition from the concept of substance to the concept of subject.

Marina Bykova's first essay clarifies Hegel's criticism of the uses to which the concepts of 'Thinking and Knowing' were put by his predecessors, especially by Descartes, Spinoza and Kant. Bykova provides here a précis of Hegel's explicit treatment of 'thought' and 'cognition' in the Introduction and Preliminary Conception of the *Encyclopaedia*. She also examines the definition of the 'pure form' of thought at issue in the Logic, and the treatment of thought's relation to reality that Hegel gives in the *Phenomenology*. Bykova's second contribution explicates the pivotal methodological notions of 'Mediation and Immediacy'. She shows that, in Hegel's dialectic, mediation and immediacy are not related as a pair of opposites, but instead feature in a conceptual triad: simple immediacy, first mediation and mediated immediacy. Bykova's third piece centres on 'Will and Freedom' as the crucial and most basic notions for understanding Hegel's moral and political philosophy.

George di Giovanni contributes four essays. 'Truth' provides a historically informed response to standard discussions of this Hegelian concept that contrast coherence with conformity, as if these could be separated in Hegel's philosophy. 'Moment' analyses in detail Hegel's metaphorical use of this term (which originates in the language of the physics of motion) in connection with 'sublation' and 'idealization'. In 'Negativity, Negation' di Giovanni first presents the most relevant historical antecedents (in Parmenides and Fichte) of Hegel's peculiar use of these concepts. Di Giovanni then traces the role played by negativity and negation in pivotal transitions of the *Science of Logic* and in epistemological arguments from the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Finally, di Giovanni's 'Identity and Contradiction' gives readers a comprehensive map of Hegel's often misunderstood and misapplied theory of the relation between these two concepts, which

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are of equally fundamental significance for logic and *Realphilosophie*.

Part IV, 'Hegel's Forms of Argument', is dedicated to critical examinations of key aspects of Hegel's method. It opens with a chapter by *Italo Testa*, who, in a detailed discussion of Hegel's original and nuanced response to the challenges of modern epistemological scepticism, argues that Hegel's solution is found in the theoretical and practical dimensions of the process of recognition.

'Dialectic' is the theme of *Manfred Baum*'s chapter on Hegel's method. Relating Hegel's notions of 'dialectic' and 'the dialectical' to Kant's, Baum first introduces us to Hegel's close link to and simultaneous rejection of his predecessor's definition of dialectic as a logic of illusion. Baum's chapter then elucidates Hegel's opposing thesis that dialectic is the only adequate method of true cognition: the absolute method of absolute knowing. The section 'Dialectic in Greek philosophy' examines the reconstruction of the history of dialectics found in Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Analysing Hegel's portrayals of Parmenides, Zeno of Elea, Heraclitus, Gorgias, Plato and Proclus, Baum presents Hegel's account of how dialectic came to be understood both as a method of thought and as the essence of thought's object. The section 'Dialectic in the absolute idea' leads us through Hegel's determination of the subject matter of logic as the 'pure method' itself. According to Baum, Hegel's subjective logic, qua logic of the concept (*Begriffslogik*), provides a solution to the problem of the inverse relation between the logical extension and intension of concepts: Hegel's notion of *the* concept (i.e. the 'concrete universal') is the idea of '*pure personality* that . . . holds *everything within itself*'. It is, in other words, the notion of an absolutely self-determining subjectivity, whose nature can only be the 'absolute dialectic' or pure method that is the true subject matter of the logic.

In the third and final chapter of Part IV, *Kenneth R. Westphal* investigates what counts as 'Proof, Justification, Refutation' in Hegel's philosophy. The first section relates Hegel's notions of 'deduction' and 'science' to Hegel's appropriation of Kant's reply to Cartesianism as well as to his rejection of Kant's transcendentalism. The second and third sections expose the role played by the Pyrrhonian 'Dilemma of the Criterion' in Hegel's overall strategy for addressing modern scepticism's denial of the objectivity of cognitive criteria. The *Phenomenology*'s approach to assessing cognitive validity claims is examined in the fourth section, and Westphal devotes his final section to what he calls the 'transcendental logic' at work in the *Science of Logic* and the Philosophy of Nature.

Part V of this volume treats aspects of 'Hegel's Philosophical Influence'. *Tom Rockmore* contributes two chapters. The first gives us a meticulous outline of the intellectual and political movement of the Young Hegelians. L. Feuerbach, B. Bauer, K. Marx and F. Engels stand here as main representatives of this multifaceted group. Among other insights, Rockmore shows how the discrepancies between Marxian theory and historically emerging Marxisms are due largely to the philosophical stances of Marx's first editor (Engels) and to the publication history of Marx's work. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the contrast between Marx's theoretical roots in German Idealism and Engels's positivistically tainted scientism. Rockmore's second chapter, 'Hegel in France', demonstrates how the peculiarities of the reception of Hegel's thought in

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France would eventually produce an original 'French' reading of Hegel that is rather independent of Hegel's extant work. The chapter begins with the nineteenth-century initiator of French Hegel studies, V. Cousin, and traces his influence on a number of French philosophers (L. Herr and G. Noël among others), historians (e.g. H. Taine) and political thinkers (socialists like J. Jaurès). Rockmore then turns to twentieth-century scholars like J. Wahl, J.-P. Sartre, E. Levinas and A. Kojève, to whose powerful and controversial influence Rockmore dedicates two sections. The chapter concludes with a learned and helpful synopsis of 'Recent French Hegel scholarship' (much of which appears to originate in Kojéve's interpretation of Hegel) from J. Hyppolite, J. Vuillemin, R. Aron and G. Bataille, to more recent Hegel interpretations inspired by Catholicism and communism.

Paul Redding's 'Hegel and Analytic Philosophy' provides a thoughtful critical analysis of analytic receptions of Hegel that is grounded in his thorough familiarity with both the Anglophone tradition and 'continental' Hegel scholarship. Redding directs our attention to Russell's fateful conflation of 'idealism' with (Berkeleyan) 'immaterialism' and to Sellars's subsequent rectification of this conflation. Following in Sellars's footsteps, contemporary analytic philosophers like McDowell and Brandom now recognize Hegel's early critique of 'givenness', his idealist 'objectivism', conceptual 'holism', 'analytic' procedures and the social dimensions of his epistemology. They have thereby made productive and original efforts to overcome the alleged irreconcilability of analytic philosophy and absolute idealism.

In the final chapter of the volume, *Fred E. Schrader* opens up new avenues of research into 'Marx's Hegelian Project and World History'. After giving an overview of the main aspects of Hegel's general influence on Marx's thought, Schrader focuses on Marx's most explicit statements about his work's relation to Hegel's method, which are found above all in the *Grundrisse*. Scholarly appreciation of Marx's 'Hegelianism' in the *Grundrisse*, however, has seldom gone beyond the detection of strong analogies between systematic arrangements of concepts in Hegel's logic and the presentational organization of materials in Marx's critique of political economy. Any future attempt to understand Hegel's deeper influence on Marx, Schrader argues, will have to begin with Marx's critical appropriation of Hegel's philosophy of world history. Indispensable to this sort of investigative project will be a study of the unpublished manuscripts on world history that Marx composed at the very end of his life, between 1881 and 1883. According to Schrader, these manuscripts show Marx's commitment to a comprehensive account of world history that would repudiate Eurocentric provincialism in favour of genuinely global history, and offer a realistic alternative to Hegel's theory of the inevitable role of private property and civil society in world history.

NOTE ON CITATION

Apart from references to his *Encyclopaedia* (which is always designated by '*Enc*'), Hegel is generally cited according to volume and page numbers of the various German editions of collected works and lectures mentioned in the List of Abbreviations and specified in the Selected Bibliography. For example, '*WL GW* 12:244' refers to page 244 of the *Wissenschaft der Logik*

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(Science of Logic), as published in volume 12 of Hegel's *Gesammelte Werke* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1968–). Kant, Fichte, Schelling and (with minor variations) Marx are similarly cited. Wherever feasible, passages from 'classic' primary sources are located according to methods that have long been accepted in the scholarly literature. (Aristotle, for instance, is cited according to the page, column and line numbers of the Bekker edition of the relevant Greek text.)

For works other than those mentioned in the List of Abbreviations, we have used an 'author-title' system of citation as well as an 'author-date' system. Authors' names are keyed to the two lists of works (Primary Sources; Secondary Sources) comprising the Selected Bibliography. In keeping with the Companion's focus on original historical texts, works listed under Primary Sources are generally cited by authors' names and abbreviated titles (e.g. Hume, *Treatise*) in conjunction with either page numbers or another standard way of locating the passage(s) at issue. Works listed under Secondary Sources are cited by authors' names, publication dates and page numbers; for example, Horstmann, 2006, pp. 16–20.

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PART I:
HEGEL'S PATH TO THE SYSTEM

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1

TÜBINGEN, BERN AND FRANKFURT: 1788–1800

Martin Bondeli

The phase of Hegel's life and work stretching from his formative years in Tübingen (1788–93) to his private tutorship in Bern and Frankfurt (1793–1800) marks a peculiar contrast with the later image of the great and sovereign philosopher. Hegel's fragments, notes, excerpts and letters up to 1800 (*GW* 1, 2 and 3)[1] make it difficult to discern their connection with the thinker who will one day write the *Science of Logic* (*WL*) or the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (*Enc*) and who will lead post-Kantian systematic philosophy to a momentous culmination. For long stretches, the young Hegel is indecisive; he struggles to secure a professional and intellectual orientation. His literary output, devoted largely to theological and political matters, advances slowly and remains limited to wide-ranging collections of materials and unfinished reflections. Compared to his friend Schelling, five years his junior and in the philosophical limelight from the outset, Hegel's is a solitary intellectual path. His relationship to post-Kantian philosophy, centred in Jena for two decades, long remains ambivalent. As a sympathetic and willing observer, yet without genuine enthusiasm, Hegel witnesses the completion of Kant's philosophy begun in 1789 by Reinhold's *Elementary Philosophy* (*Elementarphilosophie*) and carried forward in Fichte's *Foundation of the Entire Doctrine of Science* (*Wissenschaftslehre*) and in Schelling's sketches for a transcendental and natural philosophy. Not until his *Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy* (*Differenzschrift*) of 1801 does Hegel garner some acclaim, thus becoming linked to Jena's intellectual movement, the royal road of German Idealism. This is not to say that Hegel's work and thought prior to 1800 should be regarded as insignificant. For they give us insight into substantive and conceptual continuities that stand to inform our understanding of his later thinking. Moreover, some peculiarities of his thought can only be grasped by appreciating that the young Hegel arrives at post-Kantian philosophy through a theological and political detour. It is especially noteworthy that his thinking is distinguished in all phases by pronounced political and pedagogical orientations. From the time of his tutorship in Bern, Hegel persists in taking a stand on the political events of the time.

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THE INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT IN TÜBINGEN (1788–93)

For an adequate understanding of Hegel's path it is helpful to consider some facts about the intellectual milieu at the Tübingen *Stift*, the university in the protestant duchy of Württemberg where Hegel studies as a fellow during his formative years (see Rosenkranz, 1844, pp. 25–41; Pinkard, 2000, pp. 19–44; for the philosophical and theological contexts of the Tübingen years, see Franz, 2005, 2007).

During this period he earns a Master of Philosophy and sits for his qualifying exam in theology. He belongs to a circle of friends that includes several later luminaries. Among these are Hölderlin and Schelling, influential companions during his philosophical development. A regular topic of conversation in this circle is the conservatism of official Tübingen theology. The more enlightened among Hegel's friends impugn the dogmatism of their teachers Storr and Flatt[2] with its combination of classical rationalist content and belief in miracles and revelation. The students regard this mixture as typical of the dominant positive religion – the antithesis of the natural, rational and tolerant religion endorsed by prominent thinkers like Rousseau, Herder, H. S. Reimarus, Lessing and Kant. Another topic of fervent conversation is the French Revolution of 1789. News of its developments lead to high expectations and to mounting sentiments of liberty and fraternity among students of the *Stift*. Indeed, many see themselves on the threshold of a new epoch. Hegel is an outspoken advocate of the revolution. Even afterwards, he would remain convinced that this event, despite its excesses, marked a crucial juncture of progress in mankind's history. The friends embrace and debate everything that prompts change and renewal. Each has his favourite writers – for Hegel, Rousseau above all (see Nicolin, 1970, p. 12). In the context of the circle, he reads with special fondness Jacobi's novels (see Rosenkranz, 1844, p. 40). These are clearly congenial to the perceived need for a religion of the heart and sentiment as opposed to traditional religious ritualism. Of enduring impact is the shared reading of Jacobi's *On the Doctrine of Spinoza* (*Über die Lehre des Spinoza*). This has a peculiar effect on Hegel, Hölderlin and Schelling. It directs their attention not just towards Jacobi's philosophy of being, enriched by elements of *docta ignorantia* and Humean scepticism, but also towards the pantheistic doctrines of Spinoza and Bruno, for which Jacobi has both sympathy and scorn. Spinoza's and Bruno's monism and their religion-critical aura make them attractive to the Tübingen friends. Undeterred by the fatalism attributed to Spinoza, they regard this as a reason for re-interpreting Spinozian substance as the unity of nature and free subjectivity.

Finally, there is the influence of Kant's philosophy. After 1789, his philosophy comes to be regarded at German universities as the spiritual and philosophical counterpart of the revolution. In his *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy* (*Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie*) Reinhold revered Kant as the new Messiah and provided a detailed account and generalized application of Kantian 'results', especially those of Kant's moral theology. From this 'gospel of pure reason' Reinhold hoped to usher in the 'reformation' of all the sciences as well as one of the 'most remarkable and beneficial revolutions' of the human spirit (see Reinhold, 2007, vol. 2/1, pp. 70–3). Also swept up in this fervour are those who debate Kant in the *Stift*. Flatt teaches Kant's first *Critique* as part of the Tübingen curriculum, although

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he himself is less than enthusiastic about the rise of moral-religious Kantianism.[3] The idea of the 'invisible church', re-interpreted in Kant's *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (*Religion*) as 'ethical state' (*AA* 6:94, 101), circulates among radical students of the *Stift* as a revolutionary formula.[4] In a sermon, Hegel appeals to the 'duties' imposed by Jesus on the disciples and refers to a 'kingdom of God' to be established not through a 'visible church' but through a living religious spirit (cf. *GW* 1:70; see Nicolin, 1996, pp. 42–69).

On the whole, there is scarcely anything to indicate that in Tübingen Hegel has his own philosophical programme. His philosophical activity consists primarily in the enthusiastic dissemination of religious ideas of freedom and community. The background and sources of these ideas play secondary roles. Yet the soil on which his later philosophy would thrive is now staked out. Kant, Jacobi and Spinoza have become crucial landmarks on Hegel's path towards post-Kantian systematic philosophy.

KANTIANISM IN BERN (1793–6)

Hegel's programmatic reflections on theology and philosophy first emerge in Bern and Tschugg (see Bondeli, 1990, pp. 17–83; Schneider and Waszek, 1997; Pinkard, 2000, pp. 45–69).

At the end of the Tübingen period, he had developed original thoughts on the relation between 'objective', or 'positive', and 'subjective religion.' He resumes these reflections at the beginning of his stay in Bern. The earliest fragments (*Studien 1792/3–1794*, *GW* 1:73–114) display a distinctive critique of objective or positive religion, understood as a religion that appeals to the understanding or demands blind faith in truths of revelation. Its fixation on exterior practices and rituals, Hegel writes, serves as ideological instrument of a particular class. Against this, he demands a return to a subjective religion that satisfies the understanding as much as the heart and conscience – a religion not geared towards private interests but one that serves as popular religion. In Bern, Hegel sharpens and concretizes this theoretical approach. Employing the keyword 'positivity', he launches a polemical attack against religious and political currents that he thinks are formalistic, legalistic, particularistic and hostile to sensibility. His polemics are primarily directed against Christian religion and theology. Seeking to seize Christianity by its roots, he combines a sober account of the life and teachings of Jesus (*Das Leben Jesu*, 1795, *GW* 1:205–78) with in-depth inquiry into how Jesus' moral lessons and religion of the heart could have mutated into a positive religion and contributed to the development of a theocratic state. He concludes that the spread of Christianity, shaped by the Judaic religion of laws and by Jesus' sacrifice, is nothing less than calamitous. In this scathing indictment, the history of Christianity figures as a series of schisms, falsifications and failed attempts at reconciliation (*Studien* 1795/6, *GW* 1:329–31). While gathering source materials for his novel religion, Hegel expands his account of the opposition between subjective and objective religion to include religious and cultural history, thus linking this opposition to a 'difference between the Greek religion of the imagination and the Christian positive religion' (*GW* 1:365). Bolstered by Herder's and Schiller's work, he maintains that subjective religion should seek its historical model neither in current nor in original Christianity but in ancient communal religion.

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Hegel's aim in Bern is to ground both the critique of positive religion and his ideal of subjective religion. In Tübingen, he did not align himself with Shaftesbury, Rousseau, Spinoza or Kant. He held them all to be equally exemplary. This now changes abruptly. The Bern fragments are distinctly oriented towards Kant's doctrine of morals and his philosophy of religion, and Hegel's affinity with Kantian ideas on the moral religion of reason becomes more prominent. Central to Hegel's discussion of the subjectivity of subjective religion are Kant's 'moral law' as well as the feelings of 'respect' and 'duty' necessary to its fulfilment. To Hegel, the higher ranking that Kant gives to moral reason in relation to sensible and empirical moral representation is self-evident. The Bernese fragments from 1795 and 1796 are characterized by a radical Kantian stance on moral reason (see Kondylis, 1979, pp. 235–56).

Hegel is at first reluctant to explain his strong Kantian leanings. One might say that his thoughts are framed by a basic idea from the Doctrine of Method of the *Critique of Practical Reason* (*KpV*) namely the idea that pure concepts of morality must be integrated with human nature so that 'objective practical reason' is also made '*subjectively* practical' (*AA* 5:151).

A thorough study of Kant and of subsequent philosophical developments furnishes Hegel in Bern with new insights into the prospects, aims and tendencies of his Kantian philosophizing. Of special interest to him is Kant's doctrine of the postulates (cf. *Hegel: The Letters [Briefe]* 1:16, 24) and the light it sheds on the relationship between moral theology and physico-theology (*GW* 1:195; *Briefe* 1:17). Paying close attention to Reinhold's concept of free will (*GW* 1:195–6), Hegel dedicates himself to a revolutionary and practice-oriented moral Kantianism. In April 1795 he writes to Schelling: 'From the Kantian system and its highest completion I expect a revolution in Germany, which will proceed from principles that are already at hand and need only to be applied to all hitherto given knowledge' (*Briefe* 1:23–4). Like Reinhold, Hegel has evidently become convinced that the employment of Kant's moral philosophy in religion, psychology, history, natural right, aesthetics, etc., provides the proper path to a contemporary philosophy of enlightenment and revolution accessible to a wider public. He stands here in intellectual proximity to Bernese Kantians and Fichteans who, having broken with the *ancien régime*, develop reforming ideas inspired by critical philosophy (see Bondeli, 2001).[5]

The post-Kantian philosophy inaugurated by Reinhold's *Essay on a New Theory of the Human Capacity for Representation* (*Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens*) and carried further by Fichte and Schelling still strikes Hegel as suspect. He is not impressed by Fichte's and Schelling's central conviction that philosophy must proceed from the unconditioned, thus making 'the idea of God as the absolute I' the necessary first principle of all philosophizing. He thinks that the sublimity and radicalism of this appropriation of Kant by Fichte's and Schelling's 'esoteric philosophy' (*Briefe* 1:24) is unparalleled. Yet he also holds that their philosophy fails to account for the needs of the age and for enlightened pedagogical requirements. He certainly does not wish to distance himself entirely from this esoteric Kantianism beyond Kant. After all, his friend Schelling had vigorously embraced this cause and Hölderlin had given an enthusiastic account of Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* as well as of the relation of Fichte's 'I' to Spinoza's substance (*Briefe* 1:19–20). Thus in Bern Hegel decides to study Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* and Schelling's most

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recent works (*Briefe* 1:25, 32). In this way, Hegel hopes to satisfy both his interest in the idea of God and the need to counter, with Schelling, uncritical interpretations of Kant's postulates of pure practical reason (*Briefe* 1:12–14, 16–17).

Hegel's engagement with the postulates – principally that of God's existence – continues to influence his theological and political thinking. The late Bern fragments feature an autonomy-centred interpretation of Kant's doctrine oriented towards the idea of the moral world's self-actualization. On this view, moral reason must be understood as 'absolute' (*GW* 1:358), that is, capable of realizing by itself moral ends or the highest good. The notion of God as judge of the moral world is replaced by the idea of God as absolute practical reason. Hegel's proximity to Fichte's interpretation of the postulates according to the idea of self-positing – a view that after 1796 would be subject to charges of atheism – is here undeniable.

Quite likely, Hegel's reading of Kant's postulates during the late Bern period prompts him to clarify his own Kantian position. But this can be neither proved nor disproved until it is determined whether the extant sketch for a forthcoming system of Kantian postulates and ideas is indeed Hegel's own product. This sketch, found in Hegel's *Nachlass*, has come to be known as *Oldest System Programme of German Idealism* (*Systemprogramm*). It dates from the end of 1796 or the beginning of 1797. Although written in Hegel's hand, its intellectual authorship has been vehemently disputed since its first publication by Rosenzweig (1917).

This double-sided document of roughly 70 lines combines the plan for a system that exhibits ideas linked to Kant, Fichte, Herder and Schiller, with a campaign program for aesthetic and religious reform. The author begins by stating that 'all future metaphysics will be subsumed under the *theory of morals* – for which Kant with his two [*sic*] practical postulates has provided only an *example* and brought nothing to its full conclusion.' Moreover, it is necessary to establish an 'ethics' that contains 'a complete system of all ideas' or 'of all practical postulates' (Jamme and Schneider, 1984, p. 11, lines 1–5). The first idea must be the representation of myself as 'absolutely free being' (l. 5–6). This must be understood as immediately connected with the idea of the creation of a world: 'there emerges at once a whole *world* – from nothing – the only thinkable creation from nothing' (l. 6–8). Then, starting with the question 'How must a world be constituted for a moral being?' (l. 9–10), the first programmatic step will be the project of a creative 'physics broadly construed' (*Physik im Großen*: l. 13). The second step, which proceeds from the '*work of man*' (l. 16), will involve ideas such as the '*history of mankind*', 'state, constitution, and government' and 'perpetual peace' (p. 12, l. 22–5). It must be shown that a state conceived as a mechanical 'wheelwork' contradicts the idea of human freedom and must therefore 'cease' (l. 21–2). The third step will involve the articulation of moral and religious ideas conducive to human autonomy, since free spirits will not want to seek the ideas of 'God' and 'immortality' outside themselves (l. 30–1). Finally, one must provide the all-unifying 'idea of *beauty*' (l. 32) and give voice to the conviction that '*truth and goodness* are sisters *only in beauty*' (l. 35–6). The reverse side of the document contains reflections on the preeminence of art, especially poetry, at early social and cultural stages of spirit. The task of philosophers and poets is to sensualize the religion of reason, to engender a 'new mythology' (p. 13, l. 17–18) and to establish a 'new religion' (p. 14, l. 31).

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Significant evidence suggests that this document is Hegel's transcription of Schelling's system programme. The conception of the 'I' as free being and the discussion of the practical postulates is characteristic of Schelling's Fichteanizing thought during 1796/7. This is when Schelling mentions plans for an 'Ethics', begins his transition to natural philosophy or speculative physics, and eventually focuses on a philosophy of art and mythology. Yet there is also evidence to suggest that Hegel himself might be sketching here his own Kantian programme as strengthened by his study of the postulates and by post-Kantian inquiries inspired by Schelling and Hölderlin. The conception of a complete system of ideas or postulates based on the theory of morals sits easily with Hegel's Bernese 'applied' Kantianism. While modifying Kant's conception of morals, Hegel has not yet abandoned the idea of a metaphysics derived from the theory of morals in favour of speculative metaphysics. The radical critique of the state, the conclusion concerning an all-encompassing aesthetic idea, and the claims pertaining to poetry, mythology, and a new religion are certainly consistent with Hegel's views. Consider for example that at this time he agrees with Herder's account of folk religion and mythology as well as with Schiller's idea of an aesthetically grounded theory of morals (*Briefe* 1:25). Also noteworthy is Hegel's intensifying affinity with Hölderlin, as is shown by his lyrical letter '*Eleusis*' (*GW* 1:399–402). It is of course possible that the *Systemprogramm*'s inspirer was Hölderlin or someone from Fichte's circle in Jena. The claim that Kant 'has brought nothing to its full conclusion' with his postulates, the talk of a creation *ex nihilo*, and the anarchistic demand that the state should cease, can be found almost literally in Fichte's 1796 lectures, which may suggest authorship by a student of Fichte. Finally, the *Systemprogramm* may originate not just in Tübingen and Jena but also in Bern. With it, Hegel may well be countering Bernese Kantianism – a movement that he considers neither radical nor revolutionary enough (see Bondeli and Linneweber, 1999, pp. 365–94; Bondeli, 2001, pp. 205–13). In any event, there currently exists an almost unmanageable variety of interpretations of the content and authorship of this document (for details, see Hansen, 1989; Bondeli and Linneweber, 1999, pp. 295–428). At present, there is no conclusive evidence that Hegel is its intellectual author.

FRANKFURT: TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHY OF UNIFICATION (1797–1800)

The Frankfurt fragments reveal a thinker still harshly critical of Christian religion and theology – a thinker vigorously confronting the 'tragedy' and 'destiny' of the Christian world. At times, Hegel seems to find some aspects of the Christian heritage to be congenial to his reflections on a new religion. His transcription of portions of the Johannine Prologue (cf. *Nohl*, pp. 305–8), for example, shows that Hegel takes St. John's discourse on divine *logos*, life, light and love to be a conceptual model for overcoming the schisms of objective religion. On the whole, however, he is still far from his later view according to which the spirit of Christianity is a prelude to the most progressive epoch in history: the realization of the principles of reason and freedom.

What markedly changes in Frankfurt is Hegel's conceptual-structural account of the religious ideal and its opposite, that is,

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objective or positive religion. Increasingly, he specifies his previous understanding of the opposition between subjective and objective religion in terms of a relation between whole and part, between unification and separation. He goes so far as to make this latter relation into the blueprint for developing the contrast between subjective and objective religion. He now pins all hopes on a new religion characterized primarily by the unity of 'subject' and 'object' (cf. *Nohl*, p. 376). Accordingly, it is not only the unrealized potential of subjective religion that Hegel conceives as an expression of dichotomizing positivity, but also a new kind of subjectivity incapable of integrating or sublating objective religion into itself. He also turns against the sort of positivity that he characterizes as subject's fatal 'flight' from the object, and hence as a 'fear of unification'. Successful unification must be understood as a relation of 'love' (ibid.). This cancels his plea for a moral religion of reason based on individual virtue and moral conviction. Hegel thinks that the religious moment of free community will have a firmer grounding in concrete ethical relations of love and friendship than it can have in a universalized principle of subjective morality.

What is required is not the replacement of objective conditions with subjective ones, but the universal dissolution of separations and calcifications. Henceforth, this becomes Hegel's new credo in matters of religion and a guiding theme of his political thought. In his draft *Über die neuesten inneren Zustände Württembergs* (*On the Internal Conditions of Württemberg in Recent Times*) and in *Die Verfassung Deutschlands* (*The Constitution of Germany*) composed in Frankfurt, Hegel appears eager to break up petrified relations. He yearns for life and change, and hopes that the 'power-wielding universality' of the state will end the people's lack of rights as well as the hegemony of particularistic powers (*Vorarbeiten und Entwürfe 1799–1801*, *GW* 5:18). To understand these changes one must realize that Hegel's thinking is now shaped not just by the new intellectual context in Frankfurt, but also by the perception in revolutionary circles that a certain subjectivist strain of radical enlightenment thought is bound to fail.[6]

In Frankfurt, Hegel's entire paradigm finally shifts in tandem with the development of the philosophical ideal of unification in religion and politics. This ideal can no longer be adequately articulated on the basis of a practical or even an aesthetic Kantianism. What is needed is a new philosophy of unification centred upon a principle of indivisibility and unity, a principle that is in turn connected to a primary structure of reflection. These are ideas familiar to Hegel from neo-Platonic sources (see Halfwassen, 1999). But Hegel may have rediscovered them through Jacobi and Hölderlin. His philosophical affinity to Hölderlin is most significant in this regard (see Henrich, 1975, pp. 9–40; Jamme, 1983). The order of the day in the *Bund der Geister*, a fraternity to which belong Hölderlin, Hegel, von Sinclair and Zwilling (see Jamme and Pöggeler, 1981, 1983; Brauer, 1993, pp. 140–64; Waibel, 2002, pp. 24–55) is a debate about the ideal of subject–object unity and about one singular whole subsisting independently of reflection. In April 1795 Hölderlin proposes to replace the philosophy of the unconditioned that begins with the absolute 'I' with a new philosophy of being. According to Hölderlin, the 'I!' signifies nothing but 'self-consciousness' or 'I am I'. Thus the 'separation' (*Ur-Theilung)* of the one into a 'subject-I' and an 'object-I' is always already given. The inseparable, indivisible and un-reflective principle of all philosophizing must therefore be called '*being as*

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such' (see Hölderlin, 2004, IV, p. 163). Like Schelling, Hölderlin has in mind a synthesis of Fichte and Spinoza. Yet he diverges from Schelling in that, instead of a modified philosophy of the 'I', he arrives at a philosophy of being inspired by Spinoza and Jacobi.

As Hegel achieves clarity about the philosophic conception of unification, he becomes increasingly convinced that he must part ways with Kant and criticize the results of Kant's moral philosophy as forms of positivity (see Bondeli, 1997, pp. 116–59). Hegel previously held that Kant's idea of a free 'morality' was clearly distinguishable from legalistic representations of the moral law and hence from coercion and punishment. He now claims that Kant's understanding of morality amounts to 'subjugating the individual to the yoke of the universal' (see *Nohl*, p. 387). While he formerly thought that respect for the moral law and the duty to follow it furnish uniquely valid moral incentives, Hegel now sees 'respect for duty', as opposed to 'inclinations', as a contradictory or barren feeling (see *Nohl*, p. 266). And while an idea of community derived from the moral law formerly appealed to Hegel, Kant's duty of love towards one's neighbour (cf. *KpV AA* 5:83) now strikes him as nonsensical, since 'in love, all thought of duty vanishes' (*Nohl*, p. 267). Hegel thus seems to regard Kant's understanding of morality as outmoded. Not only does he disapprove (like Schiller in his aesthetic reflections) of its rigoristic character, but he also has obviously come to hold the view that the very stage of morality is problematic and ought to be sublated into higher stages of spirit, namely the aesthetic, ethical and religious spheres. In accordance with this radicalization of his criticism, Hegel goes on to impugn Kant's concept of morality because it can only provide an ontology of the 'ought' and not of the 'is'. Moreover, the existence of moral objects derived from Kant's concept of morality can be postulated solely in form of a weak certainty of faith. Given Kant's postulate of God's existence and his moral philosophy in general, Hegel now extends his criticism of positive religion to any attempt at reducing the absolute to an 'ideal', that is, to what 'we ought to be', or to belief in an object of faith (see *Nohl*, p. 385).

Initially, Hegel's project in Frankfurt is still dominated by the idea of an absolute practical reason that has distinctly Fichtean traits (see *Nohl*, pp. 374–5). But he now develops an approach that does justice to the centrality of subject–object unity. He understands this unity not merely in religious and political terms but as a metaphysical category which he comes to regard as a principle of knowledge and volition and which he calls, like Hölderlin, 'being'. The result of his 1798 reflections on faith and being is: 'Unification and being are synonyms' (*Nohl*, p. 383).

Hegel's move towards a philosophy of unification and being will have systematic implications for the entirety of his thought. The term 'being' (emerging around 1798) characterizes for him a philosophy that responds to theories developed at 'lower' stages of reflection and judgement. Like Hölderlin, Hegel has reached the conclusion that every judgement is at its core an original dividing, that is, an original unity that divides itself into a subject and a predicate. He sets forth the thesis, reiterated in later years, that the copula of the judgement – 'the binding word *is*' – expresses a unification that opposes that subject–predicate division (see *Nohl*, p. 383). Moreover, wherever 'being' is meant to connote 'love' and 'life', it also stands as a cipher for overcoming all subject–object dualisms as well as the sort of monism which, when confined to practical reason, raises an absolute 'I' existing beyond nature to the status of supreme

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principle. 'Being' thus becomes the basic term in Hegel's forthcoming philosophy. This will be, first, a new post-Kantian metaphysics; second, a metaphysics that has overcome Fichte's monistic subjectivity. Finally, 'being' will come to signify Hegel's distantiation from a philosophy that privileges 'representation', the 'ought' or an 'ideal', that is, a philosophy of belief in the pejorative sense: a philosophy of positivity. I say 'in the pejorative sense' because the epistemic side of Hegel's philosophy of being is still anchored in a notion of belief. In his book on Spinoza Jacobi maintains that the philosopher's task is to 'uncover and reveal *being*' and that the strongest certainty attainable lies in 'belief' (Jacobi, *Schriften zum Spinozastreit*, pp. 29, 115). In a similar vein, Hegel claims that reflection gives us no access to 'being' and that 'being can only be believed' (*Nohl*, p. 383).[7] Hegel is here disavowing the type of philosophy that recognizes only belief in the object of faith or, in Kant's case, belief in a postulated absolute that defies the certainty of faith. All this shows that Hegel has not yet developed the concept of speculation as a higher form of reflection that makes it possible to speak of knowing, cognizing and comprehending being. Yet we already encounter several attempts on Hegel's part that lead in this direction: he characterizes the structure of reflection aimed at (extra-reflective) being as a dialectical 'antinomy' (*Nohl*, p. 383). Reflection on being perforce triggers reflection on both unification of and opposition between the *relata* at issue. In this sense, Hegel grasps each pole of an antinomy as an opposite per se that, in order to be recognized as such, must already be united with the other. Hegel is not alone in reflecting about these figures of thought. In Hölderlin's circle, Zwilling attracts attention on account of his discussions of a fundamental, *quasi*-antinomial relation between 'relatedness and non-relatedness' (see Henrich and Jamme, 1986, pp. 63–5).

We can only approximately reconstruct the final developments of this project of a philosophy of unification and being that eventually leads to Hegel becoming tied to post-Kantian philosophy in Jena. We must assume that, along with his closeness to Hölderlin, Hegel turns increasingly to Schelling, closely monitoring the latter's plans for a dual system of transcendental and natural philosophy. By integrating the philosophy of the 'I' with Spinoza's concept of substance, Schelling had come to develop a distinct subsystem of natural philosophy and science. Hegel presumably worked on this sort of project already in Frankfurt (see Rosenkranz, 1844, p. 100). For without a philosophical and scientific study of celestial mechanics, he would have hardly been in a position to submit his *Philosophical Dissertation on Planetary Orbits* (*Dissertatio*) (*GW* 5:221–53); and without prior study of the general elements of natural philosophy, Hegel's impending involvement with Schelling is scarcely conceivable. By the end of his stay in Frankfurt, he appears to begin drafting a systematic philosophy of being, as is indicated by the system fragment of 1800 (see *Nohl*, pp. 343–51). In this two-sheet text, probably a coda to what was originally a 45-sheet manuscript, the author sketches a system of 'life' or 'nature'. Life or nature, which constitutes a 'being outside reflection' or the indivisible, is supposed to mark the beginning and end of a system of reflection – a system of 'organizations' of the living. Hegel emphasizes nature here because his rejection of the absolute 'I' as first principle has turned into a more radical criticism of the hostility towards nature that this principle represents. What is fatal to freedom is not the dependency of the 'I'

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on nature but the human being's dependence on a being 'above all nature' (*Nohl*, p . 351). To account for the logical dynamics of his new system, Hegel again takes up the idea of unity-in-antinomy. He proposes an antinomial progression whose basic structure he now characterizes as a 'union of union and disunion' (*Nohl*, p. 348), thus prefiguring the Jena formula of the 'identity of identity and non-identity' (*Differenzschrift GW* 4:64). Clearly, he does not yet envisage his system of nature as one part (alongside logic and the philosophy of spirit) of an overarching system – this will become the signal feature of his Jena philosophy. Instead, he has in mind a system of nature that is also a system of spirit. It consists of a succession of spatial-temporal, physical (celestial) and spiritual-religious determinations. Religion, not philosophy, is the most complete activity of spirit, the most rigorous approximation to the infinite. In keeping with the dictum that being may only be believed, Hegel claims that philosophy must 'cease where religion begins' (*Nohl*, p. 348).

NOTES

1 See also Nohl (1907), Nicolin (1970) and Jamme and Schneider (1984). The Frankfurt fragments will be published in *GW* 2.

2 On the work of Storr and Flatt, see Henrich (2004, vol. 1, pp. 29–72) and Franz (2005, pp. 535–54).

3 On Flatt's exposition and criticism of Kant, see Franz (2005, pp. 540–54; 2007, pp. 189–223).

4 Cf. Hegel's farewell to Schelling in early 1795: 'Reason and freedom remain our parole, and our locus of unification is the invisible church' (*Briefe* 1:18).

5 Hegel's contribution to the *Cart-Schrift* (cf. *Hegels erste Druckschrift*, 1970) points to his collaboration with the Republican movement of Kantians and Fichte's followers in Bern.

6 Given this atmosphere, one can agree with Lukács (1973, vol. 1, p. 174) that Hegel in Frankfurt falls prey to a 'crisis-ridden groping for novelty'. This crisis, however, is not primarily a personal one. Actually, after his lonely years in Bern Hegel begins to flourish in Frankfurt in the circle of his friends.

7 On the view that Hegel again came to grips with Jacobi's book on Spinoza in connection with this thesis, see Baum, 1989, pp. 55–6.

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2

THE JENA YEARS: 1801–6

Martin Bondeli

Hegel's years in Jena are characterized both by his connection to post-Kantian systematic philosophy in its then most advanced form, namely Schelling's transcendental philosophy and philosophy of nature, and by his gradual elaboration of a system derived from Schellingian premises (see Henrich and Düsing, 1980; Pinkard, 2000, pp. 153–202). In 1801, after his father's death and the settling of his inheritance, Hegel secures a position as academic instructor at the University of Jena. He must prove his qualifications by the submission of his *Philosophical Dissertation on Planetary Orbits* (*Dissertatio*) and the defense of this habilitation thesis (*GW* 5:221–31). His acceptance at Jena is made easier by the fact that two alumni of the Tübingen *Stift*, Niethammer and Paulus, already hold office there as theology professors. In the following years, the three will form a close friendship. Above all, Hegel has Schelling to thank for his successful transition from private tutor in Frankfurt to philosophy lecturer in Jena. Schelling, the leading figure in Jena after Fichte's departure for Berlin (1799), encourages his former Tübingen colleague to join him once again in close collaboration, a fact that contributes to the smooth completion of Hegel's habilitation. Aside from collegial like-mindedness, there are also strategic reasons for their close cooperation. In 1800, the relationship between Schelling and Fichte had suffered a philosophical and personal rupture. On account of the atheism controversy, Fichte had to leave Jena. The break was caused by the shattering of Schelling's plans to start a journal with the author of the *Foundation of the Entire Doctrine of Science* (*Wissenschaftslehre*). Fichte had not been able to warm to his successor's suggestions to extend the principle of the active 'I' to the realm of nature, thus embracing the philosophy of nature as a systematic part equivalent to the philosophy of the 'I'. Hegel however, due to his work in Frankfurt, is now very much open to this undertaking. He lets this be known together with his views on Fichte's erroneous path, in the polemical work *The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy* (*Differenzschrift*, 1801), published prior to his dissertation. Schelling thus seizes the opportunity to establish the journal with a new partner. The *Critical Journal of Philosophy* (*Kritisches Journal*), co-edited by Schelling and Hegel, runs from 1801 to 1803. This publication, characterized by its repudiation of Fichteanism and driven by the endeavour to become the leading philosophical voice of the nascent century, is principally devoted to criticizing the editors' philosophical rivals.

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Kant and Jacobi, along with Reinhold and Fichte, pioneers of post-Kantian philosophy, land in the journal's polemical crossfire just as often as a slew of other allies and opponents. The collaboration grows less intense when Schelling is called to Würzburg in 1803 and Hegel's intellectual development becomes more self-sufficient. Towards the end of Hegel's Jena period, there emerge the first philosophical and personal rifts between the two thinkers.

Hegel's drafting of the system of philosophy is closely linked to his teaching activity, which begins in the winter semester 1801. The curriculum of his Jena lectureship, lasting until 1805, and of his subsequent adjunct professorship covers the following areas: introduction to philosophy, logic and metaphysics, natural right, philosophy of nature, philosophy of spirit, philosophy of history and arithmetic. The increasingly far-reaching and deeply penetrating lecture drafts from this period must be viewed as decisive advances on Hegel's path towards the encyclopaedic system and also as signposts of Hegel's first major project, the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit* (*PhG*). Fragmentary lecture manuscripts are extant (*Fragmente* 1801/2, *GW* 5:255–75; *Fragmente* 1803, *GW* 5:363–77; *Aus den Jenaer Vorlesungen*, *GW* 5:455–75) along with the body of extended drafts known as the *Jena System Sketches* (*JS GW* 6–8) and a transcript (by I. V. Troxler) of Hegel's first lectures on logic (see Düsing, 1988, pp. 63–77). An early fragment (*Die Idee des absoluten Wesens* 1801/2, *GW* 5:262–5) shows that Hegel, in terms of both content and structure, pursues his future encyclopaedic system right from the start. The 'extended science of the idea' must begin with 'logic', which in turn ascends to absolute determinations of metaphysical categories. Thus, the task is to attain the 'reality of the idea' and to work through various celestial and terrestrial systems. 'Natural philosophy' must then move to 'philosophy of spirit'. Spirit's structure of development includes 'representation and desire', 'right', 'absolute ethical life' (*absolute Sittlichkeit*) and, finally, the spheres of the 'philosophy of religion and art'. Hegel's intense concern to realize his plans for a system does not hinder him from continuing to work on the political issues of the day. Until 1803 he carries on with the studies that he had begun in Frankfurt on a German constitution. While he shows his competence in seemingly peripheral factual issues in politics, he is equally capable – as is attested by the 1802/3 *System of Ethical Life* (*SS*) – of elucidating social and political issues from the perspective of highly abstract distinctions and concept relations.

THE CRITIQUE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF REFLECTION

In the *Differenzschrift* and in the *Kritisches Journal* Hegel and Schelling attack various forms of the so-called philosophy of reflection. According to Hegel's *Faith and Knowledge* (*Gl&Wi*), the *Reflexionsphilosophie* represents a further chapter in the failed emancipation of enlightened reason from faith and mere understanding (*Gl&Wi GW* 4:315–24). From a systematic point of view, the philosophy of reflection is a stage of spirit where the understanding, along with cognition based on judgements about finite objects, is the measure of all things. Reason, understood as the higher stage of spirit whose object is the infinite, is only poorly comprehended (though not altogether ignored) by the philosophy of reflection. In this type of philosophy the infinite is not an

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object of cognition but merely a postulated one, an object of faith, of longing or of ironic speech. Moreover, in cognizing finite objects the philosophy of reflection either reduces these to mere products of the understanding or else locks them into a form–matter relation. Finite objects or nature itself therefore appear either as governed by subjective activity or as amorphous dead matter, that is, as a homogeneous stuff or a contingent content added to an empty form. The misapprehension of the infinite and the flawed treatment of finite nature must be taken as symptoms of a type of dualistic thinking that misunderstands the genuine identity or unity of subject and object. In other words, the basic defect and the real scandal of the philosophy of reflection is 'dualism', understood here as entailing division, ossification, particularism, incomplete wholeness or failed unification. In providing this diagnosis Hegel opposes a number of contemporaneous theories. His primary target is the predominance – initially established by Kant and fully instituted by Fichte – of the subject of mere understanding over nature and reason. Hegel also strongly opposes the reduction of philosophy to logic and formalism, which he considers to be the end of the trail leading from Kant to Reinhold and the newer Kantians.[1] His polemics against any empty or futile striving for the infinite are meant to put in their proper place Fichte and Jacobi as well as two leading figures of Jena Romanticism, namely, F. Schlegel and Schleiermacher (see Pöggeler, 1999, pp. 121–67). Finally, Hegel also rejects common-sense philosophy, especially G. E. Schulze's empiricism and scepticism, which he considers one of the low points of the philosophy of reflection.

Seen from a developmental perspective, the polemical characterization of *Reflexionsphilosophie* just described marks the prelude to a historical account of systematic philosophy, according to which the former systematic philosophies beginning with Kant are interpreted as developmental stages leading to Hegel's own. This interpretation is an essential feature of Hegel's subsequent philosophical development in the sense that the criticized theories come to be correlated with specific stages of his system.

Hegel's criticism of *Reflexionsphilosophie* in Bern and Frankfurt must ultimately be seen as self-criticism. It embodies the overcoming of convictions that he once shared with Kant and Jacobi. Having said this, of course, the critique of *Reflexionsphilosophie* must also be understood as a critique in its own right, since it clearly lays claim to a standpoint deemed superior to the standpoint at issue in Kant and Kantianism. And in this respect Hegel's arguments are anything but unassailable. For scholars thoroughly familiar with the Cartesian and Kantian tradition – and hence its essential distinctions between thought and extension and between concept and intuition – it is not easy to see why 'dualism' should designate an inferior mode of thought. Moreover, to those who (following Locke and Hume) are convinced that knowledge is limited to objects of experience and who (following Kant) understand and accept as meaningful the anti-dogmatic assumption that things in themselves are unknowable, it will hardly be obvious why we should assume that we can have knowledge of the unconditioned. Finally, adherents of the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition, who understand the 'form' of something as signifying its essence or its necessary medium of articulation, will not discern any immediate connection between the form-matter relation and the grip of 'formalism'.

The critique of Kant plays a key role in Hegel's discussion of the philosophy of reflection. At a basic level, Hegel holds that

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the 'spirit' of Kant's philosophy must be separated from its 'letter' (*Differenzschrift GW* 4:5). This demand is in keeping with his subsequent portrayal of a twofold Kant (*Gl&Wi GW* 4:325–46). On the one hand, there is the Kant whose treatments of the original synthetic unity of apperception, reflecting judgement, the transcendental power of imagination and intuitive understanding prepare the way to a genuine grasp of the absolute. On the other, there is the Kant of anti-speculative doctrines and principles such as the transcendental deduction of the categories, the limitation of knowledge to sensible intuition and experience and the non-cognizability of the thing in itself. With these, Hegel contends, Kant excludes himself from access to what he is most concerned with. While Hegel praises Kant's conception of moral autonomy, which he thinks heralds a new philosophical epoch, he also chides Kant for positing the moral law as a categorical imperative – thus giving autonomy a shape that destroys all efforts to improve moral conditions. From Hegel's perspective, Kant's conception of moral freedom either serves as an instrument of moral coercion or is reduced to a wholly ineffectual moralizing. Hegel thus advances in his criticism of the moral law already begun in Frankfurt. His main objection is that the intrinsic demand of the categorical imperative, namely that maxims be selected by means of a universality test, amounts to a 'formalism' leading to arbitrary choice (*Willkür*) (*On the Scientific Treatments of Natural Law* [*WBN*] *GW* 4:434–9). According to Hegel, Kant's categorical imperative is the 'law of non-contradiction' applied to the practical realm. The effect of this imperative must therefore be such that 'maxims' are to be chosen with complete indifference to their 'content' or 'matter' – the imperative leads, in other words, to an 'absolute abstraction from all matter of the will' (*WBN GW* 4:435). Thus, any given content may be added to the abstract, empty will and validated through universalization or with the aid of the law of non-contradiction.

Seen from a distance, of course, Hegel's account of a twofold Kant – the speculative and the anti-speculative – is by no means unproblematic (for discussion, see Bondeli, 2004). Hegel's criticism continually foists upon Kant implications contrary to the latter's aims. For example, Hegel interprets the famous question 'How are synthetic judgements a priori possible?' as if Kant wanted to show that the heterogeneous structure of subject and predicate, particular and universal, is 'at once a priori, that is, absolutely identical' (*Gl&Wi GW* 4:328). On this interpretation, Kant was unable to articulate sufficiently this absolute identity on account of his *Verstandesdenken*, that is, on account of the limitations intrinsic to the understanding mode of thought. For Kant himself, however, this question had nothing to do with identity. Instead, it concerned the substantiation and proof of a particular form of knowledge. Even the details of Hegel's critical analyses are problematic. For instance, his criticism of the formalism of the moral law ignores the fact that Kant was not concerned with abstractions from maxims or with contents of the will but rather with the testing of maxims – a testing that indeed involves criteria of content. Likewise, there is no such thing in Kant as the positing and universalizing of arbitrary contents. Kant's aim is rather the ascertainment of a universal content.[2] Of course, these shortcomings do not preclude that some of Hegel's objections may prove to be, to some extent, productive when they are specifically directed to the actual concerns of Kant.

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