Education Policy

Globalization, Citizenship & Democracy

- MARK OLSSEN - JOHN CODD
- ANNE-MARIE O'NEILL

Education Policy:
Globalization, Citizenship and Democracy

Education Policy: Globalization, Citizenship and Democracy

Mark Olssen, John Codd
and Anne-Marie O'Neill

Contents

Contents

About the Authors

Mark Olssen is Reader and Director of Doctoral Programmes, in the Department of Educational Studies, University of Surrey. He is editor of *Mental Testing in New Zealand: Critical and Oppositional Perspectives* (University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 1988), author (with Elaine Papps) of *The Doctoring of Childbirth* (Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, 1997) and editor (with Kay Morris Matthews) of *Education Policy in New Zealand: The 1990s and Beyond* (Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, 1997). More recently he is author of *Michel Foucault: Materialism and Education* (Bergin and Garvey, New York, 1999). He has published articles in Britain in the *Journal of Education Policy*, the *British Journal of Educational Studies*, *Educational Psychology* and *Educational Philosophy and Theory* and the *British Journal of the Sociology of Education*. Released in 2003 from Peter Lang, New York, he is a co-editor with Michael Peters and Colin Lankshear of *Critical Theory: Founders in Praxis,* and from Rowman and Littlefield, New York, also with Michael Peters and Colin Lankshear, *Critical Theory and the Human Condition: Dreams of Difference.*

John Codd is Professor of Policy Studies in Education in the Department of Social and Policy Studies in Education at Massey University, New Zealand. He has co-edited five books of essays on education policy in New Zealand and published monographs on the philosophy of educational administration (1984) and organizational evaluation (1988). He is General Editor of *Delta: Policy and Practice in Education*, a former co-editor of the *New Zealand Journal of Educational Studies* and has contributed regularly to international journals, including the *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, *Discourse,* the *Journal of Education Policy* and *Educational Philosophy and Theory.* More recently, he is a joint author of *Education and Society in Aotearoa New Zealand: An Introduction to the Social and Policy Contexts of Schooling and Education* (Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, 2000).

Anne-Marie O'Neill is a Senior Lecturer in Education in the Department of Social and Policy Studies in Education at Massey University, New Zealand. She teaches graduate and undergraduate courses on curriculum sociology, educational/policy sociology and the sociology of gender and education, in which she has published widely in New Zealand. She is a Joint Editor of the refereed journal *Delta: Policy and Practice in Education*. In 1996 she published *Readings in Education Feminism* through Massey University, and is a joint author of *Education and Society in Aotearoa New Zealand: An Introduction to the Social and Policy Contexts of Schooling and Education* (2000). She is also the primary editor (with John Clark and Roger Openshaw) of two large volumes, *Reshaping Culture, Knowledge and Learning? Policy and Content in The New Zealand Curriculum Framework Vol 1* (2004) and *Critically Examining The New Zealand Curriculum Framework: Contexts, Issues and Assessment Vol 2* (2004) to be published by Dunmore Press.

Acknowledgements

1

Reading Education Policy in the Global Era

The thesis at the centre of this book is that education policy in the twenty-first century is the key to global security, sustainability and survival. The events of 11 September 2001 (9/11) have shown that the era of global interdependence and interconnectivity is also an era in which human survival is threatened not only by the actions of states with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) but also by the actions of transnational networks of individuals perpetrating acts of terrorism (AOT). Thus, the era of globalization brings urgency to the need for a new world order in which nation-states can develop policies that will contribute to and sustain forms of international governance. We argue in this book that education policies are central to such a global mission.

Globalization, we contend, is not a new phenomenon but it is becoming more complex and more pervasive with the advent of new technologies and the expansion of global markets. Contrary to what some would argue, nation-states, in our view, are not disappearing. However, internally they are changing in their spheres of control, while externally they are radically unequal in the extent of their international influence. Global governance, we argue, is necessary for global survival, but such governance cannot be established and maintained without the support of strong democratic nation-states. This has been clearly evidenced in the Iraq crisis of 2002–03, where the authority of the United Nations has been challenged both by Iraq, as an undemocratic 'rogue state' and also, paradoxically, by the USA and Britain, ostensibly democratic states that have been unwilling to concede to the majority view of the United Nations Security Council. Thus, the disparities of power amongst states can undermine processes of global governance and prevent the attainment of solutions to major crises. Because inter-state democracy at the global level is not viable, it is necessary to build durable democratic institutions within nation-states. The problem is, however, that the neoliberalism of recent times has seriously eroded the process of democracy within most ostensibly 'liberal democratic' states.

Our argument is that a deep and robust democracy at a national level requires a strong civil society based on norms of trust and active responsible

citizenship and that education is central to such a goal. Thus, the strong education state is necessary to sustain democracy at the national level so that strong democratic nation-states can buttress forms of international governance and ensure that globalization becomes a force for global sustainability and survival.

Reading education policy

The book sets out a broad theoretical framework for a critical reading of state produced educational policy texts. To this end, it shows the inadequacy of earlier approaches to policy that have their origins in the hegemonic dominance of liberalism underlying traditional educational discourses. The development of the policy sciences, which sought to derive so called 'objective', value-free methods for the writing and reading of policy, represent an attempt to give technical and scientific sophistication to the policy process in order to buttress its intellectual legitimacy. Such approaches to policy-making and policy analysis, in our view, serve to legitimate forms of liberal and neoliberal state hegemony.

This study demonstrates the conceptual complexity of reading state-produced policy discourse. It argues that reading neoliberal educational policy is not just a matter of understanding its educational context or reading it as the 'pronouncements' of 'the policy-makers'. It requires an understanding of the dynamics of the various elements of the social structure and their intersections in the context of history. Policy documents are discursive embodiments of the balance of these dynamics as they underlie social relations at particular points in time. It is for this reason that the discursive formations they contain constitute a highly politicized form of public rhetoric; symbolic systems which await decoding. If official policy texts are political, cultural and economic as much as they are educational treatises, the meanings of the discourses embedded in these texts await decoding so as to reveal the real relations that this specifically cultural form of official discourse helps to construct, reconstruct and conceal. In the analysis of educational policy, this theoretical decoding has been done in different ways, depending upon the philosophical assumptions entailed within the theories used.

There was a time when educational policy *as policy* was taken for granted and policy-making was seen more as a democratic consensual process than a political one. Policy analysis, if it were even identified as such, was taken to be a somewhat sterile and invisible activity carried out by statisticians and officials in government departments. Clearly that is no longer the case. Today, educational policies are the focus of considerable controversy and overt public contestation. The analysis of such policies, moreover, is an activity undertaken both by officials within the system, who now call themselves policy analysts, and various commentators or critics outside the system who also presume that

what they do is policy analysis. Educational policy-making has become highly politicized.

In the past 25 years, critical educational scholarship has endeavoured to place the formulation, meanings and real effects of educational policy within the wider theoretical context of critical theory. Indeed, 20 years ago, Prunty (1984: 3), in articulating the importance of what he called the 'critical-perspective', spoke of venturing 'onto an intellectual landscape with few paths and signposts ... a new social terrain'. The ways that critical theorists have traversed this landscape have varied according to their intellectual concerns and political commitments. For example, in a paper addressing the construction of inequality in state produced reports on education, Apple (1986: 174) argued that such texts were important ideological constructions, not only as indicators of shifts in rationales but as 'part of the cultural production of such altered public discourse and as such (they) need(ed) to be seen as constitutive elements of a particular hegemonic project'. Likewise, in a discussion on the development of a political sociology of educational policy-making, Torres (1989: 83) reiterated the need to situate such production within the context of a theory of politics. Thus, he argued for the application to policy of a critical theory of power, one which interrogated the role of bureaucratic organizations, interlinked to a theory of the state.

Recognizing the political nature of educational policy, this book argues for the need to reject the dominant liberal/idealist inclination of education studies and the technicist theories of the policy sciences. In essence, our argument is that education policy must be contextualized both nationally and globally as a transformative discourse that can have real social effects in response to contemporary crises of survival and sustainability, such as those that follow the events of 9/11. Primarily, this implies a rejection of their pervasive reliance on positivist epistemologies and positivist methodologies as well as many of the dominant insights in the liberal conception of the political system. In opposition to both classical liberal and neoliberal conceptions of policy, this study advocates a critical orientation to educational policy deriving theoretical and methodological insights from critical social theory, and more specifically from the work of the French post-structuralist, Michele Foucault. Central to such foci is a conception of policy as a politically, socially and historically contextualized practice or set of practices. Rather than aiming to present a detailed account of the whole field of educational policy, what we aim to do in this study is elucidate an approach to the critical 'reading' of educational policy. In other words, what we aim to present the reader with is a way of understanding, conceptualizing and analysing educational policy: what it is, why it is important and what it means. The meanings of policy texts, we will argue, do not reside unproblematically in the text itself as something to be 'discovered' or rendered 'visible', but in the relationship between the text and the social structure. The meaning and significance of policy at any particular historical

juncture is something that must be rendered intelligible through a process of interrogation, by ascertaining the way that discursive contexts inherent within the social and historical process manifest themselves in and through textual production, formulation and articulation.

Although our analysis in this study is relevant to policy restructuring in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries such as the UK, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, our particular approach is dictated more by a concern with the supranational contexts of policy formulation and development than it is by particularized concerns with understanding policy development within specific national contexts. Notwithstanding certain tendencies within both recent postmodernist and 'older-styled' positivistic studies to emphasize the 'local' and the 'specific' as against the 'interrelatedness' of the 'political', 'economic', 'cultural' and 'social', our study seeks to illuminate how discursive practices and assumptions which operate supranationally come to effect specific national policy developments. Where we do focus on particular national contexts our examples seek to illuminate general processes at the level of nation-states and their interrelations. These include how discursive ideologies come to influence policy developments within a particular nation-state, and how the nation-state as a specific bounded region can no longer protect national community life from supranational influences, as the events of 9/11 have so dramatically shown. In this sense, the nation-state is 'too small' to be entirely effective and 'too large' to be entirely irrelevant. Yet a further issue concerns how the existence of dominant discursive contexts of policy development are, if not truly international, common to more than one country and how the patterns of this commonality must be understood historically, culturally, politically and economically.

Theories of globalization

Globalization theorists have emphasized the 'new' ways in which the individual nation-state is influenced by the international world order. Broadly these can be considered in relation to economic, cultural and political categories, each of which is interrelated. Moreover, the different forms of globalization have been shaped by technological progress. Thus the rapid development in the past 30 or so years of communication and transport technologies has reduced the possibility of individual nation-states maintaining separate economic policies. As a consequence of these new technologies, it is suggested that markets, governments and independent political groups within specific nation-states become 'more sensitively adjusted' to each other (Held, 1991: 145). As the patterns of interaction and communication typically cross-cut national boundaries, so the cultural identities traditionally defined within these boundaries are increasingly undercut (Wallerstein, 1974).

Economic globalization

Economic globalization is about processes that enable the free flow of goods, services, investments, labour and information across national borders in order to maximize capital accumulation. Thus, global capitalism involves the commodification of all kinds of human endeavour in order to produce surplus value and profit. The transnational corporation is the main vehicle through which this surplus value is appropriated and accumulated as profit. It also occurs through the medium of financial and share markets. Many transnational corporations have more power and are larger economic entities than a number of nation-states. In 1998, for example, there were 29 such corporations with larger economies than New Zealand (Rugman, 2001: 58). Moreover, as Kelsey (2002: 16) points out, 'the top 200 transnationals account for over one quarter of the world's economic activity, but employ less than one percent of its workforce'.

At an economic level, there is a major incongruence between the boundaries of the nation-state and the systematic interests of economic units within the international community. This relates centrally to the internationalization of production investment and exchange, and of financial transactions between international banks and investment houses which have little to do with, and which frequently are disjunctive with, the interests, goals and strategies of individual nation-states. Both multinational enterprises and financial institutions plan and execute their operations with a world economy in mind. As a consequence, the monetary and fiscal policies of individual nation-states are increasingly dominated by developments in international financial markets and by the decisions of the international financial and business community.

The well-known and controversial journalist, John Pilger (2002: 2) describes 'global economy' as a modern Orwellian term, such that:

> On the surface, it is instant financial trading, mobile phones, McDonald's, Starbucks, holidays booked on the net. Beneath this gloss, it is the globalization of poverty, a world where most human beings never make a phone call and live on less than two dollars a day, where 6,000 children die every day from diarrhoea because most have no access to clean water.

Predictably, economic globalization has strong opponents (Chomsky, 1999; Gray, 1998; Mander and Goldsmith, 1996) and equally strong advocates (Cable, 1999) as well as those who are cautiously sceptical (Soros, 2002; Stiglitz, 2002). Political parties that champion the so-called 'third way', such as New Labour in Britain and New Zealand's Labour-led government since 1999, consider economic globalization to be a reality that has to be accommodated with a mixture of enthusiasm and pragmatism.

Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist of the World Bank and winner of the 2001 Nobel prize for economics, has recently argued (2002: 214) that

although economic globalization has the potential to be a force for good, it has not worked for millions of people. He lays much of the blame for this squarely on the transnational economic institutions:

> Globalization has brought better health, as well as an active global civil society fighting for more democracy and greater social justice. The problem is not with globalization, but with how it has been managed. Part of the problem lies with the international economic institutions, with the IMF, World Bank, and WTO, which help set the rules of the game. They have done so in ways that, all too often, have served the interests of the more advanced industrialized countries – and particular interests within those countries – rather than those of the developing world.

Anthony Giddens, arguably the most influential theorist of third way politics, suggests that 'Economic globalization, by and large, has been a success. The problem is how to maximize its positive consequences while limiting its less fortunate effects' (Giddens, 2000: 124). In support of this claim, Giddens refers to improved global levels of employment and improved living conditions in some Asian countries. But Giddens (1999: 12) also acknowledges that globalization is 'a complex set of processes, not a single one'. Thus, globalization has cultural and political dimensions as well as economic dimensions (Burbules and Torres, 2000).

Cultural globalization

At a cultural level, globalization involves the expansion of Western (especially American and British) culture to all corners of the globe, promoting particular values that are supportive of consumerism and capital accumulation. Because culture is what makes life meaningful for people, global images and symbolic representations, such as those contained in marketing or advertising texts, popular music or films, can influence people's sense of identity and belonging, their values, beliefs and aspirations. While it is important not to conflate global culture and the communication technologies through which it is transmitted, there can be no doubt that such technologies have made possible the complex connectivity of cultural globalization (Tomlinson, 1999).

Cultural globalization is largely transmitted by the expansion of the transnational enterprises, such that, as the 1998 Nobel prize-winning economist, Amartya Sen (1999: 240), has commented:

> The contemporary world is dominated by the West, and even though the imperial authority of the erstwhile rulers of the world has declined, the dominance of the West remains as strong as ever – in some ways stronger than before, especially in cultural matters. The sun does not set on the empires of Coca-Cola or MTV.

This cultural hegemony that pushes the values of consumerism and standardization also invokes forces of resistance and movements for the assertion of

local interests. Many indigenous groups, therefore, view globalization as a renewed form of colonization, threatening to destroy their cultures and exploit their peoples. Jane Kelsey (2002: 10) gives a biting account of these effects, as follows:

> Global capitalism reduces the natural and spiritual world to tradeable commodities and rationalizes its (and their) exploitation. This destroys the enduring relationships and balance between economic, social, cultural and spiritual life and denies their responsibility as the guardians of that lifeworld. Exclusion from, or exploitation on the periphery of, this global economy compounds the powerlessness, poverty and dispossession of previous eras.

As with economic globalization, cultural globalization is closely linked to the development of new information technologies. The Internet, for instance, has enabled the growth of mass communications that can reach to all corners of the planet. But this does not mean that all people have access to these forms of communication. The 'digital divide', both within nations and globally, has given rise to a new kind of structural inequality. While there is increased cultural interconnectedness across nations as a result of the mass media, and also as the result of greater movements of people in migration, tourism and the growth of global economic and political institutions, there is also a heightened awareness, if not understanding, of cultural differences. Hence, there is no tendency towards a single integrated global culture. On the contrary, cultural globalization has contradictory or oppositional effects, providing an impetus for the revival of local cultural identities. As Giddens (1999: 13) points out:

> Most people think of globalization as simply 'pulling away' power or influence from local communities and nations into the global arena. And indeed this is one of its consequences. Nations do lose some of the economic power they once had. Yet it also has an opposite effect. Globalization not only pulls upwards, but also pushes downwards, creating new pressures for local autonomy.

What is very clear, in both of these effects, is that globalization is about power; it is fundamentally a political phenomenon, in which dominant ideologies are vigorously contested and resisted (Rupert, 2000).

Political globalization

At a political level, policy is increasingly in response to international developments, and increasingly involves international agreements and collaboration, as can be seen in the rise to prominence and power of quasi-regional or supranational organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Community (EEC), World Bank (WB), or International Monetary Fund (IMF) or, with relation to

New Zealand and Australia, Closer Economic Relations (CER). The effect of 'private' or quasi-public organizations, such as 'think tanks', research groups and so on, can, with the development of rapid communication and information processing capabilities (the 'superhighway', for instance), also exert an influence which systematically and continuously cross-cuts the boundaries of individual nation-states. Moreover, the new information and communication technologies, especially the Internet, have provided a means for the mobilization of public opinion on a global scale that has never been seen before. This could be seen dramatically on 16 February 2003 when, for the first time in history, millions of protesters in more than 50 countries expressed united opposition to war against Iraq. This globalization of mass resistance substantially reduces the power of nation-states to control the availability of information and to manufacture consent.

Political globalization, in some accounts (Ohmae, 1996; Reich, 1991), is the most powerful form of globalization because it is a process whereby the autonomy of the nation-state is being radically reduced and its sovereignty eroded. In some ways it is a consequential effect of other forms of globalization. Thus, economic globalization means that governments are required to manage monetary, fiscal and other economic processes, over which they have little or no control because they are no longer contained within national borders (Held, 1995). Likewise, cultural globalization means that satellite communication systems can disseminate information, images and ideas with increasing degrees of freedom, opening up an enormous array of influences on socialization and weakening the notion of 'citizen' as a unified and unifying concept (Capella, 2000). Thus, within the context of political globalization, the nation-state surrenders some of its capacity to ensure citizenship rights or entitlements and to maintain non-economic policies having such aims as environmental protection or social justice.

The nation-state in the new global order

That the relevant focus of analysis is constituted by the communities of a bounded territory or state becomes deeply problematic as soon as the issue of global interconnectedness is considered. Tracing the patterns and effects of such interconnectedness between nation-states and the international world order is referred to as 'world systems analysis' (Herz, 1976; Kedgley and Wittkopf, 1989; Wallerstein, 1974) or as 'globalization theory' (Held, 1991; 1995; 1996; Held and McGrew, 2000; Held et al. 1999; MacEwan, 1999; McGrew, 1992), although more accurately it could be referred to as the 'process of western globalization' (Held, 1991; 1995). Amongst the major arguments by globalization theorists is the claim that there is a process of global transformation which eventually will render the nation-state of substantially reduced power, although not totally ineffectual. Thus theorists such

as Castells (1996; 1997; 1999), Reich (1991) and Ohmae (1990; 1996) argue that new forces are witnessing the decline in influence of the nation-state. Ohmae (1990), for instance, argues for the development of what he calls the borderless state where national cultures are dissolved under the influence of global electronic communication, resulting in patterns of 'cultural hybridization'. Manuel Castells sees the rise of a 'powerless state' (1997: 121), where the 'instrumental capacity of the nation-state is decisively undermined by globalization of core economic activities, by globalization of media and electronic communication, and by globalization of crime' (ibid.: 244). In a similar way, the economist Robert Reich (1991) argues that with the growth of modern technologies, increases in the transfer of goods and services and information effectively undermines the autonomy and efficiency of the national economies. Reich sees the transnational corporations as being at the centre of this process, as they form the new 'global enterprise webs' which co-ordinate, transfer and exchange capital and information. Such forms, says Reich, are increasingly cosmopolitan, owing little allegiance to any particular national country, in relation to management operations, ownership, product manufacture and assemblage, as well as product sales and service. In Reich's extreme view, the process of global transformation will rearrange the politics and economics of the twenty-first century (ibid.: 1): 'There will be no more national products and technologies, no national corporations, no national industries. There will no longer be national economies at least as we have come to understand the term. All that will remain rooted within national borders are the people who comprise the nation.'

Adopting a more moderate position, David Held and his collaborators (Held, 1991; 1995; 1996; Held and McGrew, 2000; Held et al., 1999) hold that globalization implies at least two distinct phenomena. First, it suggests that political, economic and social activities are becoming worldwide in scope. Second, it suggests that there has been an intensification of levels of interaction and interconnectedness between states and societies, which make up the international world order. As Held (1991: 145) puts it:

> What is new about the modern global system is the chronic intensification of patterns of interconnectedness mediated by such phenomena as the modern communications industry and new information technology and the spread of globalization in and through new dimensions of interconnectedness: technological, organizational, administrative and legal, among others, each with their own logic and dynamic of change.

One important question that arises here is to what extent such global interconnections constitute a new phenomenon? It could be claimed that nation-states have always been 'interconnected' since the emergence of a world economy and the development of international trade over great distances have ancient origins. Whether we focus on the Mogul expansion throughout Asia,

or the expansion of the Roman empire throughout the regions of the Mediterranean, we can detect the development of commercial trade relations across national boundaries in many pre-modern societies. In the modern era we can detect the expansion of trade through the growth of commerce since the end of the fifteenth century with the opening of international sea routes by Europeans, and again in the nineteenth century with the expansion of trade, international investment and banking finance activity, as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution. While in this sense 'globalization' is not a new phenomenon, the point being made by globalization theorists today is that the extent and nature of the interconnections have changed, affecting the sovereignty of nation-states and undermining their autonomy. Moreover, nation-states are now required in the post-9/11 era to respond to new threats to their security brought about by AOT and WMD. In this sense, late twentieth-century globalization has some distinctive characteristics, as Held (1991: 145) points out:

> It is one thing to claim elements of continuity in the formation and structure of modern states and societies, quite another to claim that there is nothing new about aspects of their form and dynamics. For there is a fundamental difference between the development of a trade route which has an impact on particular towns and/or rural centres and an international order involving the emergence of a global economic system which outreaches the control of any single state … the expansion of vast networks of transnational relations and communications over which particular states have limited influence [and] the enormous growth in international organizations and regimes … . While trade routes may link distant populations together in long loops of cause and effect, modern developments in the international order link and integrate peoples through multiple networks of transaction and co-ordination, reordering the very notion of distance itself.

Characteristically, the implications of the new global order for nation-states has been to create new patterns of both institutional and consumer conduct, new structures, opportunities and problems, as well as new incentives and disincentives. In the current period, globalization has involved a progressive deregulation by individual nation-states of the international movement of capital and goods. As well as pressures for free trade other related developments have involved:

- the emergence of new financial constraints by the state in response to international pressures and increased competition;
- the increasing importance of technological developments and knowledge production to national economies in order to compete in the international marketplace;
- the tightening of the relationship between states and business, and closer relationships between states and multinational business corporations;
- an increase in the state's interest in expenditure and conduct in the public

sphere, resulting in new regimes of control and accountability;
- the increasing trend to marketization and deregulation by states over social services including education at its various levels; and
- a new institutional norm of competition as a strategy to effect the efficient utilization of resources.

Nevertheless, while there are common trends, globalization has not produced the same responses in all countries. As Esping-Andersen (1996) has shown, welfare states have adapted to the global economy in different ways. He argues (ibid.: 10) that:

> Since the 1970s, we can identify three distinct welfare state responses to economic and social change. Scandinavia followed until recently a strategy of welfare state employment expansion. The Anglo-Saxon countries, in particular North America, New Zealand and Britain have favoured a strategy of deregulating wages and the labour market, combined with a certain degree of welfare state erosion. And the continental European nations, like Germany, France and Italy, have included labour supply reduction while basically maintaining existing social security standards. All three strategies were intimately related to the nature of welfare states.

Thus, it is important not to assume that globalization is a homogeneous or universalizing process. Its various dimensions – economic, political and cultural – will have different manifestations in different national contexts. In this study, our primary focus is on the Anglo-Saxon countries, particularly Britain, the USA, Australia and New Zealand.

Globalization, liberalism and neoliberalism

This book is about policy in education, more specifically how to contextualize it in the contemporary global era. It is not about 'globalization' or 'world systems' as such, except in terms of how an understanding of these contributes to an understanding of national and global contexts. What is important in this respect is that in order to understand the production of education policy within individual nation-states, we will argue that it is necessary to understand the origins and determining influences of that policy in relation to social, cultural, political and economic forces that transcend the context of its national production. This is so, for example, in relation to the impact of theoretical systems such as Keynesianism, but also in relation to the disciplinary knowledge systems of neoliberalism as well. In fact, the rise of various theories of macroeconomic management which have come to affect the development of education in all advanced capitalist societies is, as Tomlinson (1991: 103) has put it, 'one of the most striking features of the middle decades of the twentieth century'. In the post-war decades this was seen in terms of the effects of the 'Keynesian Revolution'. Although it manifested itself differently in different countries,[1] it became a dominant and effective theoretical force funda-

mentally affecting the structure and development of state-produced social and educational policy. Since the 1970s, a similar claim can be made with regard to significant modification of welfare policies and the resurgence of neoliberal or 'new right' policies. While in Reagan's America and Thatcher's Britain, and post-1980s Australia and New Zealand, all had quite distinct approaches to restructuring education and social policy, there is enough similarity of basic orientation and theoretical commitment to warrant an examination of the extra-national factors at play in the formulation and implementation of specifically national approaches. These extra-national factors constitute both material and discursive elements of policy formation.

Although the consequences of this highly interconnected global order mean that traditional domains of state activity, as well as the forms of economic, political and social policy, must be considered within a context that transcends national boundaries, we are not arguing a thesis of the 'powerless state'. While we accept that international developments in culture, politics and economics have become increasingly interconnected, we argue in this book that a particular nation-state, or block of nation-states, has the capacity to act with relative autonomy in political affairs, and indeed must assert its autonomy against globalization forces if nations are to thrive and prosper. In this sense, we are not uncritical of globalization theories. While it is undoubtedly true that new technologies change the nature and speed of world politics and economics, and that globalization forces affect national identities at a cultural and ideological level, we would argue that technological changes do not in themselves prevent national or regional autonomy at the political and educational level.

In this we concur with Hirst and Thompson (1996) who present a critical assessment of the globalization hypothesis in their book, *Globalization in Question*. While they recognize, as we do, increasing internationalization at the economic, political, educational and cultural levels, they argue that many of the claims of the globalization theorists are overstated. One claim they make is that internationalization has had greater effects in some countries and regions than others. Another argument is that the claims of the globalization theorists are often poorly conceptualized and fail to distinguish between the different forms and elements, (for example, investment, trade, political alliances, cultural and so on). Whether in relation to population movements, or trade or investment, internationalization has been sporadic and uneven in its advance. Although multinational corporations have an enormous stake in the world economy, in opposition to Reich's claim, the vast majority are not 'trans-national', but 'home-based', and in the main, their operations are closely controlled by their home country (Hirst and Thompson, 1996: 159).

Thus, for Hirst and Thompson, multinationals are still essentially located in national contexts. For the most part they still trade on the national nature of their services or products. Across a variety of dimensions, the 'home-orien-

tated nature of MNC [multinational corporation] activity … seems overwhelming. Thus MNCs still rely on their "home base" as the centre for economic activities, despite all the speculation about globalization' (Hirst and Thompson, 1996: 160). Thus, full multilateral economic globalization is something of a myth. It has not been attained, and may not, in fact, be attainable. Multinational corporations, which are, according to Rugman (2001:1), 'the engines of international business', are organized regionally rather than globally, and 'operate from the "triad" home bases of the United States, the European Union, or Japan, at the hub of business networks in which clusters of value-added activities are organized'. Rugman (2001:18) provides convincing empirical evidence to show that:

> While there are some economic drivers of globalization there are extremely strong cultural and political barriers preventing the development of a single world market. Only in a few sectors, such as consumer electronics, is there a successful firm-level strategy of globalization, with homogeneous products being sold on price and quality. For most other manufacturing sectors, and all service sectors, regionalization is much more relevant than globalization.

Other economists, such as Hutton (1996), and Porter (1990) also argue for the importance of national context and 'local infrastructure' to business activity. While therefore, there are clearly important changes, and some strong 'globalizing trends', the precise extent and nature of economic globalization is a contested phenomenon. At the political level, moreover, we claim that the state has potential autonomy notwithstanding important globalizing trends. For the forseeable future, more than ever before, it is important that the state plays a major role in two crucial respects: first, in co-ordinating and providing social services, as these are important to the continuity and stability of welfare in a global economic order; and, secondly, in funding providing and regulating education, which is not effectively protected, or provided for, by the institutions of global capitalism. Education, we shall argue, becomes vital, economically, to the addition of value on goods and services, which enables nations to prosper, as well as for the basic growth and continuance of democracy. In this sense, education becomes a central function of the state in the global order. Our thesis concerns the rise of the education state, and the central functions that it fulfils in relation to the maintenance of democracy and welfare in the post-millennium era.

Central to our argument, then, is the claim that it is imposed policies of neoliberal governmentality, rather than globalization as such, that is the key force affecting (and undermining) nation-states today. Thus, while a great deal of recent educational policy can be explained in terms of the sociological concept of globalization, we argue in this book that it must be theoretically represented in relation to the political philosophy of neoliberalism. No change

in the technology of communication or transport can radically affect the sovereignty, unity or power of the state, except perhaps in the shaping and mobilization of public opinion, as the anti-war protests of 2003 have shown. What is crucial, and yet largely ignored, has been the discursive politically developed context in terms of which international exchange has been directed. As a consequence of this, policy development within specific states is represented as explainable in terms of its relations to more fundamental political discourses, which have undergirded policy formation in western nation-states for some two centuries. Much of our attention is thus devoted to identifying the central relations between policy and specific forms of governmental reason. In fundamental terms the thesis developed in this book entails an examination of the role of the various forms of state reason as a basis from which policy has been formulated and enacted, and in terms of which it is capable of guiding the policy programmes of western nation-states.

In our view, liberalism, while incorporating many progressive elements in its classical, or original, formulation, especially as regards its democratic and constitutional safeguards, constitutes overall, an unsatisfactory basis from which nation-states can make or defend policy. Not only does it inadequately account for the dimensions of power and control, but it underemphasizes the effects of private property and social class as determinants of the political and social character of community life. In spite of the worthiness of its lofty ideals regarding rights, freedom and democracy, which we will seek to retain, we will argue that liberalism has an impoverished conceptualization of the individual, of human nature, of power, of the state, as well as of the international economic order, especially with reference to *free trade*. It also provides no consistent set of principles which could establish standards or priorities for the state in terms of its relations to individuals or groups or institutional sectors, such as the economy or education. Although it is in relation to liberal precepts and reason that state officials and politicians have sought to justify policy, liberal reason fails to provide the impetus for growth that it claims. Ultimately, also, it provides an untenable explanation of education, of the sources of educational success and failure, of the nature of individual agency and of the processes of national economic planning. Further, we will argue that through the mutations of its classical formulation, resulting as it has in neoliberal theories of the economy and management, those principles that were initially progressive in the classical doctrine, have themselves become corrupted. Rather than offering choice or freedom, neoliberalism, we maintain, becomes a new system of political and economic control. We contend, moreover, that Foucault's insights into the discursive manifestations of state-authored modes of power and control, together with the nuanced historicity of his exploration of how government becomes inscribed in the subject, provide a useful antidote to liberal views of globalization which see it simply in terms of expanding transnational

interdependence and interconnectivity. His account prepares the ground for a more deeply theoretical account of globalization.

The context for education policy

The substantive argument of this book, as explained in detail in the final chapters, is to argue for a new model of the welfare community as the basis for social policy in OECD countries. Our conception, seeks to formulate a democratic model which, while it would seek to preserve and protect the important principles of liberal constitutionalism, locates these within a communitarian context, where they are allied to a concept of social inclusion and trust. Only such a model, we argue, can support a conception of education as a public good. In its turn, education, for us, as once for Dewey (1916), is seen as pivotal to the construction of a democratic society, and for the model of citizenship that such a conception of society implies. This book, then, is essentially about the role of education in the construction and maintenance of democratic states, constituted within a new global order. Even more, today, we will argue, than in the welfare states of the past, the state must be an *education* state. This book, then, is about the rise of the education state.

As well as advancing a substantive argument in defence of a return to the welfare community, albeit in a new global context, this book also has an explicitly pedagogical purpose. As we have already stated, it aims to present students of educational policy studies, and social policy analysts generally, with a theoretical framework, and with the philosophical concepts and principles necessary for the critical analysis of educational policy. It is for this purpose that we cast the net widely: traversing topics in the sociology of education, theories of discourse and texts, policy analysis methodology, theories of the state, liberalism, neoliberalism, community, citizenship, democracy and conceptions of the welfare state – all of which are necessary for students in the field to achieve a deeper understanding of educational policy and policy-making by the state.

The structure of the study is as follows. This chapter has sought to set the scene by briefly examining some of the recent debates around theories of globalization and exploring connections between the education policies of nation-states and the current global context. This involves outlining the main forms of globalization and showing how all these forms have been shaped by neoliberalism. Chapter 2 provides an overview of Michel Foucault's theoretical position, explicating his concepts of power, knowledge, discourse and governmentality, and differentiating him from other post-structuralists. For Foucault, neoliberalism defines a form of state reason based on a revival of classical liberalism in political theory and neoclassical theory in economics. Our utilization of Foucault's theories and concepts as a framework for analysing policy is timely given the major interest in his work within the social

sciences. Chapter 3 outlines a Foucauldian approach to critical policy analysis based upon his unique form of critique and his methods of archaeology and genealogy. Chapter 4 develops the approach further by elaborating a framework for the analysis of policy as discourse and as text based upon a materialist theory of language.

Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 all concern the themes of liberalism and the effects of liberal reason on models and conceptions of education. Chapter 5 outlines and critiques the political rationality of classical liberalism from John Locke in the seventeenth century to Adam Smith in the eighteenth century and through to Jeremy Bentham in the nineteenth century. Classical liberal axioms regarding the individual, freedom, the public and the private spheres, and the role of the state (laissez-faire) are outlined as constituting the necessary basis for an understanding emergence of neoliberalism in the twentieth century. Continuing the concern with the themes of liberal reason, Chapter 6 traces the rise of social democratic, or welfare state liberalism as it emerged in the nineteenth century with writers like Green and Hobhouse, and was finally realized in the economic formulations of John Maynard Keynes in the early twentieth century. Chapter 7 traces the ascendancy of neoliberalism. Twentieth-century neoliberalism centres around the increasing influence over state policy of the academic discourse of economics in writers such as Frederick A. Hayek, James Buchanan, Gary Becker, Milton Friedman, Oliver Williamson and Robert Nozick, and theories such as Austrian economics, Public Choice Theory, Human Capital Theory, monetarism, Transaction Cost Economics, Agency Theory, and the political philosophy of the minimal state and entitlement justice. These writers and their theories are central to any understanding of the resurgence of neoliberal restructuring of education and society that has occurred in the western world over the past 20 years. Chapter 8 continues with neoliberalism tracing the effects on institutional restructuring and educational management. Chapter 9 discusses the effects of neoliberalism on professionalism in education and higher education, as well as the effects of competition on the culture of trust.

In Chapter 10, neoliberal policies of choice are examined and in chapter 11 various educational policy issues are considered in the context of comparing liberal to communitarian forms of governmentality. Our endorsement of a communitarian position is based on the argument that communitarianism constitutes a more viable political philosophy than liberalism to understand the role of the state and education in relation to citizenship and democracy in a global order. Chapter 12 concludes by focusing on globalization and the importance of conceptions of citizenship and democracy for education. It theorizes a new conception of the political, moving beyond 'third-way' formulations, based on the relationship between democracy and education to advance a model of *the education state*.

Notes

1 Tomlinson (1991) maintains that, while Keynesianism strongly influenced Britain, Australia, New Zealand, America, Canada and most of Europe, in terms of macroeconomic policy it had very little influence on policies developed and implemented in France and Germany.

2
The Post-structuralism of Foucault

During the 1980s, educational policy sociology became much more directly concerned with the nature of policy discourse. This was due, in large part, to influences from the writings of the French post-structuralist, Michel Foucault. In this chapter, we attempt to unravel the key strands in Foucault's thought and to situate his work within the broad tradition of European critical social theory. We begin with his critique of Marxism which leads into his unique conceptions of knowledge and power. We then consider his views on the liberal state and the microprocesses of power that he sees as constituting forms of governmentality. We show how Foucault's thought engages with the central elements of liberal reason and, finally, we differentiate his form of post-structuralism from that of Derrida and the postmodernists. Thus we lay out the foundations for the Foucauldian approach that informs this study.

Foucault's critique of Marxism

Foucault's work was directed against the deep theoretical structure of Marxism at a level which rejected the functionalism of Althusserian Marxism. Essentially it criticized the holistic and deductivistic approach within which it located Marxism in general. His position not only rejected the primacy of the economy but also the approach which seeks to explain parts of culture as explicable and decodable parts of a whole totality or system. For Foucault, the explanatory quest is not to search for the organizing principle of a cultural formation – whether the 'economy' or the 'human subject' or the 'proletariat'. Rather, Foucault is interested in advancing a polymorphous conception of determination in order to reveal the 'play of dependencies' in the social and historical process. As he put it in 1968, he 'would like to substitute this whole play of dependencies for the uniform simple notion of assigning causality and by suspending the indefinitely extended privilege of the cause, in order to render apparent the polymorphous cluster of correlations' (Foucault, 1978a: 13).

There are three aspects to the play of dependencies. First, the *intradiscursive*, which concerns relations between objects, operations and concepts within the

discursive formation; secondly, the *interdiscursive*, which concerned relations between different discursive formations; and, thirdly, the *extradiscursive*, concerning the relations between a discourse and the whole play of economic, political and social practices. Rather than seeking to find the articulating principle of a cultural complex, Foucault was interested in discerning how cultural formations were made to appear 'rational' and 'unified', how particular discourses came to be formed and what rules lay behind the process of formation. In doing so he sought to produce accounts of how discursive formations like nineteenth-century psychopathology came to be formed, how it constituted its scientific legitimacy and shaped the thinking of a particular period. Thus in the case of nineteenth-century psychiatry and psychopathology Foucault shows how the term 'madness' came to be applied to certain types of behaviour, and how, in its very designation by what it was not, it helped establish our conceptions of 'the rational' and 'the sane'. What he resists, however, in all of these studies, is the temptation to explain the development of particular discursive formations as a result of any single cause or principle.

In opposing the Marxist conception of determination, Foucault explicitly opposes the conception of social structure present in Marxism and the determining effect of the economy on that structure. This reflected his Nietzschean heritage and his belief that Marxism was a mode of thought that had outlived its usefulness. Following Nietzsche, and the philosophy of difference, Foucault enunciates a theory of discursive formations and rejects Hegelian and Marxist conceptions of history. Although Foucault locates his work within a tradition beginning with Hegel, it is the rejection of the Hegelian dialectic with its implied beliefs in progress, enlightenment and optimism concerning the human ability to understand reality that characterizes Foucault's Nietzschean method. As a consequence of this, Foucault differs in fundamental respects from a theorist like Althusser. Whereas Althusser adopted the structuralist programme seeking to explain the whole by understanding the interrelations between its component parts, for Foucault the totality always eluded either analysis or understanding but, rather, was characterized by incompleteness, openness and chance ('alea') (Foucault, 1981: 69). Comparing Althusser and Foucault, Mark Poster (1984: 39–40) closes the balance sheet firmly in favour of Foucault:

> The theoretical choice offered by these two theorists is dramatic and urgent. In my view Foucault's position in the present context is more valuable as an interpretive strategy and ultimately, although this may strike a discordant note, more marxist. If by marxism one means not the specific theory of the mode of production, or the critique of political economy, and not even the supposed dialectical method, but instead a critical view of domination which as historical materialism takes all social practices as transitory and all intellectual formations as indissociably connected with power and social relations – then Foucault's position opens up critical theory more than Althusser's both to the changing social formation and to the social locations where contestation actually occurs.

Notwithstanding Poster's somewhat liberal use of 'marxism' as a concept, the passage highlights the important similarities and differences between the two systems of thought. While Marxism's focus upon labour and production was relevant to the rise of industrial capitalism in the nineteenth century, Poster identifies changes in the nature of the economy, an increase in the service and white-collar sectors, the increasing importance of information technology and communication together with the new possibilities this generates for a decentralization of political power that makes 'discourse/practices' the pertinent level of intelligibility for a critical social theory in the twentieth century (Poster, 1984).

In criticizing Marxism, Foucault also cautions 'circumspection' with regard to the use of the concept of ideology. Thus, in an interview conducted in 1977 (Foucault, 1980a: 118), he stated that:

> The notion of ideology appears to me to be difficult to make use of for three reasons. The first is that, like it or not, it always stands in virtual opposition to something else which is supposed to count as truth. Now I believe that the problem does not consist in drawing the line between that in a discourse which falls under the category of scientificity or truth, and that which comes under some other category, but in seeing historically how effects of truth are produced within discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false. The second drawback is that the concept of ideology refers I think, necessarily, to something of the order of a subject. Thirdly, ideology stands in a secondary position relative to something which functions as its infrastructure, as its material economic determinant, etc. For these reasons, I think that this is a notion that cannot be used without circumspection.

The third criticism Foucault lists expresses his rejection of the Marxist framework of base and superstructure and the problem of determination, already discussed, while the first and second express other issues central to his own approach. The first indicates Foucault's belief that marxism builds a conception of truth into its theoretical framework in advance. By representing a perspective as 'ideology', we not only imply that such a perspective is 'illusory' or 'false' or 'distorted', but we also imply that the perspective of the speaking subject is in fact true. This raises important questions about Foucault's own epistemology.

Foucault's epistemology: power–knowledge

Whether Foucault is arguing that truth is something that simply cannot be ever attained, the 'will to truth' simply being an expression, following Nietzsche, and the 'will of power', or whether he is suggesting, alternatively, that the issue of truth can be 'bracketed out', or, alternatively again, that he is simply not interested in the truth status of the discourses he examines, is not clear. While writers like Charles Taylor (1989) and Jürgen Habermas (1987a)

charge Foucault with the 'crime' of epistemological relativism, there are some who seem less put out by such relativist implications (Dreyfuss and Rabinow, 1982). While within the context of his own framework of power/knowledge it does not seem that Foucault can avoid the charge of relativism, he certainly did not consider himself a relativist, and there is no shortage of truth claims, or 'claims to know', in his own analysis. In his writings on the physical and human sciences, in comparing organic chemistry to medicine and to various social sciences, Foucault's whole line of analysis is based upon the epistemological adequacy of their theoretical systems. He claims, for instance, that medicine has a much more 'solid scientific armature' than psychiatry (Foucault, 1980a: 109). In addition, the very focus of genealogy is to undertake grounded historical analyses. To the extent that there is an issue with relativism, it is not in the sense, then, of a *judgemental* relativism whereby it is claimed that all interpretations, or knowledge, are equally valid, or that there are no practical grounds for preferring one truth to another. Rather, it is in the sense of an *epistemic relativism* which claims that all beliefs or knowledge are socially constructed, so that knowledge is contingent, neither the truth values nor criteria of rationality exist outside of historical time.

While this is a potentially serious issue for Foucault,[1] it should be noted that Foucault did not deny that universal truths existed. To the extent they did so, however, they were always historically and discursively mediated. As he stated in his essay 'What is enlightenment?' (Foucault, 1984a: 47–8) he sees universalizing tendencies in the 'acquisition of capabilities and the struggle for freedom' which he says 'have constituted permanent elements'. Again, in the 'Preface to the History of Sexuality, Vol. 2', Foucault (1984c: 335) says that:

> Singular forms of experience may perfectly well harbor universal structures; they may well not be independent from the concrete determinations of social existence. However, neither these determinations nor these structures can allow for experiences … except through thought … this thought has an historicity which is proper to it. That it should have this historicity does not mean it is deprived of all universal form, but instead that the putting into play of these universal forms is itself historical.

Central to the analysis of Foucault's epistemology is the concept of *power–knowledge*. This concept suggests that knowledge and power are always inextricably related and that there are always sociological implications to the production of knowledge. However, it is not necessary to situate all knowledge (and all science) as a mere product or expression of power in order to isolate the interconnections between power and knowledge. As Dreyfuss and Rabinow (1982) maintain, Foucault focuses on discourses that claim to be advancing under the banner of legitimate science but which in fact have remained intimately connected to the microphysics of power. Because the different discourses interact with social structures in different ways, Foucault seeks to examine each

specific discursive formation separately, to be able to evaluate its claims adequately to describe reality, as well as to assess the particular ways in which interactions with social structure and power take place. The problem with the concept of ideology then is not only that it predetermines discourses as overly coherent but that, by implication, it judges them as false.

The second issue Foucault raises in his statement on the concept of ideology relates to his view of the human subject. In what is a similar view to that of Althusser, Foucault attempts to advance a consistent social constructionist view of the constitution of the human subject. By social constructionism Foucault means that the subject is constituted discursively in history. It is by 'decentring' the subject in this way that he rejects essentialist views based on conceptions of 'human nature' or 'biology' or 'psychology'. Foucault's conception of subjectivity is central to his theoretical perspective. As he stated himself, his objective in the studies he conducted was to 'create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects' (Foucault, 1982a: 208). Foucault recognizes three main ways by which subjects are so constructed: first, via the human sciences, which developed after the start of the nineteenth century; secondly, through the 'dividing practices' which objectify the subject, providing classifications for subject positions ('male', 'normal' and so on); thirdly, by human individuals themselves who have agency to turn themselves into subjects and, through resistance, change history. For Foucault, individuals identify with particular subject positions within discourses. It is with reference to this third view that Foucault has been criticized by writers like Giddens (1987: 98) for failing to explain how human agency is possible.

Discourse

Foucault replaces the concept of ideology with that of *discourse*. He represents discourse as one of a variety of practices whose most significant units are 'serious speech acts', both written and spoken. A discourse is defined in terms of statements (*énoncés*), of 'things said'. Statements are events of certain kinds, which are both tied to historical context and capable of repetition. Further, as Foucault (1972: 49) describes them, 'Discourses are composed of signs but what they do is more than use these signs to designate things. It is this move that renders them irreducible to the language and to speech. It is this "move" that we must reveal and describe'.

Discourses, then, as Stephen Ball (1990a: 2) summarizes them, 'embody meaning and social relationships, they constitute both subjectivity and power relations'. Although they comprise signs and consist of complex ways of conceptualizing objects of concern analogous to the idea of a 'frame of reference', discourses cannot simply be equated with language analysis of the sort undertaken by Austin and Searle. As Foucault (1972: 27) puts it:

> The question posed by language analysis of some discursive fact or other is always: according to what rules has a particular statement been made, and consequently according to what rules could other similar statements be made? The description of the events of discourse poses a quite different question: how is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another?

For Foucault, it is the relationship between the discursive and the extra-discursive that is central. This was especially the case in his writings after 1968 when Foucault became concerned with the analysis of institutional power and in the relations between macro and micro structures of power and between power and subjectivity. What differentiated discursivity from language and from textuality, as Michelle Barrett (1988: 126) explains it, is that discursivity is related to context. This is particularly important in the analysis of policy discourse where the context of implementation is to be differentiated from the context of policy formation. In Chapter 4, we argue that this is a key distinguishing feature of a Foucauldian approach to policy analysis, making possible a deeper understanding of how policy texts can have real effects on social structures and practices.

Foucault's concept of power was developed in opposition to the marxist idea of power and class dominance. In Foucault's analysis, power is exercised rather than possessed, and incorporated into practices rather than in agents or in interests. As the themes Foucault was interested in – psychiatric institutions, madness, medicine, sexuality, discipline and punishment, the care of the self – had only a limited significance in relation to economic considerations, the Marxist conception of power as resulting from economic oppression was of limited relevance. Power, as Foucault conceptualized it, was dispensed rather than centralized, worked from the bottom up rather than from the top down, and was positive and enabling as well as being negative and repressive, liberating as well as coercive. The fact that Foucault recognized no core or institutional basis to power accounts for a major absence of theorization in relation to the state.

Foucault and the state

Foucault's work challenges received ways of thinking about the state and about government, and in our view can be rendered complementary to the work of Gramsci on the basis that his concepts and theoretical ideas supplement, while not being inconsistent with, Gramsci's views.[2] Unlike much work within the Marxist tradition, however, Foucault does not see the state as all-encompassing, in the sense of subsuming the sphere of civil society altogether (as could be claimed of Althusser, for instance). With this caveat, however, the issues of the state, of political power, and of government are all considered important. In responding to earlier misunderstandings of his views, Foucault (1980a: 122) states: