ROBERT J. KAISER

The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR

Ethno-National Communities of the USSR

Barents Sea

Kara Sea

Black Sea

Caspian Sea

L. Ladoga

L. Onega

Aral Sea

Interstate Borders
and Union Republics

Autonomous Republics

Autonomous Oblasts

Autonomous Okrugs

* Only the largest national communities listed here. See the map key for complete information.

Laptev
Sea

Sea of
Okhotsk

L. Baykal

Ethno-National Communities by Ethno-Linguistic Group*

ARMENIAN	FINNO-UGRIAN	ROMANCE	SLAVIC
Armenian (A)	Estonian (E) Other	Moldovan (Mo)	Belorussian (B)

BALTIC	IRANIAN	TURKIC	
Latvian (La) Lithuanian (Li)	Ossetian (O) Tadzhik (Ta)	Azerbaydzhani (Az) Kazakh (Kz) Kyrgyz (Ky) Turkmen (Tu) Uzbek (Uz) Other	Russian (R)

CAUCASIAN	MONGOLIAN		
Georgian (Ge) Other	Buryat (Bu) Kalmyk (Ka)		Ukranian (Uk)

Uninhabited or
sparsely populated

The Geography of Nationalism
in Russia and the USSR

The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR

Robert J. Kaiser

To Anne Marie

Contents

Key to Map "Ethnonational Communities of the USSR"

ETHNOLINGUISTIC GROUP	NATIONAL COMMUNITY
ARMENIAN	Armenian (A)[a]
BALTIC	Latvian (La)
	Lithuanian (Li)
CAUCASIAN	Georgian (Ge)
	Abkhazian (Ab)
	Adygey (Ad)
	Avar (Aa)
	Chechen (Cc)
	Cherkess (Ce)
	Dargin (Da)
	Ingush (In)
	Kabardin (Kb)
	Lak (La)
	Lezgin (Le)
FINNO-UGRIAN	Estonian (E)
	Hungarian (H)
	Karelian (Ka)
	Khanty (Kh)
	Komi (Ko)
	Komi-Permyak (KP)
	Mansi (Mn)
	Mari (Ma)
	Mordvin (Mr)
	Udmurt (Ud)
IRANIAN	Tadzhik (Ta)
	Ossetian (O)
MONGOLIAN	Buryat (Bu)
	Kalmyk (Kl)
ROMANCE	Moldovan (Romanian) (Mo)
SLAVIC	Russian (R)
	Ukrainian (Uk)
	Belarusian (B)
	Bulgarian (Bl)
	Polish (P)

TURKIC	Uzbek (Uz)
	Kazakh (Kz)
	Azerbaydzhani (Az)
	Kyrgyz (Ky)
	Turkmen (Tu)
	Altay (Al)
	Balkar (Bk)
	Bashkir (Ba)
	Chuvash (Ch)
	Dolgan (Do)
	Gagauz (Ga)
	Karachay (Kc)
	Karakalpak (Kr)
	Khakass (Ks)
	Kumyk (Ku)
	Tatar (Tr)
	Tuvin (Tv)
	Uygur (Uy)
	Yakut (Ya)
OTHER	German (G)
	Jewish (J)
	Korean (Ke)
	Chukchi (Ck)
	Evenk (Ev)
	Koryak (Ky)
	Nenets (Ne)
	Other peoples of the North (On)

[a]Initials are used to identify concentrated settlements of members of national communities outside their home republics (e.g., Armenians outside Armenia), and also to identify concentrations of indigenes whose homelands are located in sparsely populated regions of the country (e.g., Evenks in the Evenk Autonomous Okrug, Turkmen in sparsely settled regions of Turkmenistan). Colors for ethnolinguistic groupings are used to identify the regions of the homeland populated primarily by the indigenous national community (e.g., the color for the Baltic ethnolinguistic group represents Latvians in Latvia, and Lithuanians in Lithuania).

Maps

Tables

Preface

THE RESEARCH for this book began as an investigation into the reasons why nations formed such strong emotional attachments to specific land areas, and how this sense of homeland influenced international relations in multinational, multihomeland states. The absence of such a geographic focus in the study of nations and nationalism has been especially pronounced in the United States, where the immigrant roots of the population has biased research into the nature of ethnonational group formation and international interaction. As an example of this bias, when I began giving lectures on the importance of homelands in the study of nations and nationalism, the term *homeland* itself was nearly incomprehensible to the general audience. It conjured up images of aboriginal peoples isolated from the forces of "modernization" or the artificial political geographic contrivances of Grand Apartheid in South Africa. It was only after 1989, when nationalists in the USSR increasingly began to speak of their emotional attachment to the homeland and to demand control over it, that this geographic aspect of nations and nationalism became a more frequently discussed (if no better understood) concept.

The limited appreciation of the geography of nationalism in general has also been apparent in studies of the so-called national problem in Russia and the USSR. The focus of much of this research was on nationality policy initiatives developed in Moscow by the Communist party elites and the impact of these policies on the national communities in the state. At best, these studies acknowledged the variable impact of nationality policies on different nations in the USSR, but few if any noted the geographic variability of these policies' effectiveness within the same national community. Furthermore, nations themselves were frequently equated with cultural communities (i.e., communities of language, religion, etc.), and the focus of empirical investigations often simply traced the changing strength of linguistic or religious affiliation over time. A national sense of homeland and the implications that this has had on national formation and international relations in the USSR was almost completely missing from this body of literature.

A final source of bias in the study of nationalism comes from nationalist historians, political scientists, sociologists, and so forth, who begin with the assumption that their nations are primordial organisms that have suffered from the "denationalization" policies emanating from Moscow, and that have only now reawakened to reclaim their glorious heritage and to fulfill their destiny as masters of their primordial homelands. These treatments of the "national question" in Russia and the USSR do not accord with the historical record, which indicates that the making of nations and homelands in Russia and the USSR,

and indeed in the rest of the world, are relatively recent social processes. Far from a seventy-five-year period of denationalization, the Soviet period was the time during which most of the nations in the state became mass-based, and the national challenge to Soviet legitimacy was much more formidable in the post-World War II era than it had been at the time of the bolshevik revolution.

This book is a preliminary attempt to explore the dynamic societal processes that restructured human communities as nations, and geographic places as homelands. The focus here is not on political structures and institutions per se; as I noted above, policy and political elites have been overemphasized, if anything, in studies of the national question in the USSR. In particular, the book is an exploration into the nature of national territoriality and the degree to which national homelands, once created in the imaginations of the indigenous masses, have influenced their attitudes about themselves, their futures, and about ethnic "outsiders."

I say preliminary here because as I researched this topic, it became increasingly obvious that each chapter could easily form the basis of a volume in its own right. This is truly only a beginning point in the elaboration of the geography of nationalism in Russia and the USSR, and in multinational, multihomeland states more generally. It is hoped that this research will stimulate others working in the field of nationality studies to add a geographic dimension to their work, in order that the meaning of homeland in the study of nations and international relations may be explored from a multidisciplinary perspective.

The results of this research clearly have relevance that reaches far beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union. The increasing frequency of demands by nationalists for self-determination in regions proclaimed to be the ancestral homelands of their ethnonational communities in the First and Third Worlds indicates that a better understanding of the geography of nationalism is more critical than ever. The experience of the Soviet Union is certainly not unique in this regard. The very fact that successful independence drives by nations in the USSR struck a responsive chord leading to renewed calls for independence by nations in multinational, multihomeland states around the world provides convincing evidence of that. The development of a sense of homeland along with the formation of a national self-consciousness appears to be a nearly ubiquitous phenomenon of the twentieth-century world, and a deeper understanding of this general interrelationship is clearly warranted.

Acknowledgments

Theoretical and Historical Framework

The Meaning of Homeland in the
Study of Nationalism

THE AGE OF NATIONALISM, long thought to have reached its apex in the romanticism of the nineteenth century, has resurfaced to take ideological pride of place in the late twentieth century. Indeed, in many ways nationalism as a mass-based ideology is a new and more potent force for change today than it was in the past. The legitimacy of multinational states new and old has been increasingly challenged by smaller and smaller ethnic groups whose members proclaim their communities nations deserving of their own independent states. This centrifugal force is behind much of the ethnic and territorial conflict in the underdeveloped South following formal decolonization (e.g., India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, Uganda, Iraq, Sudan, Zaire, Zambia). It has clearly been the principal cause of disintegration of the multinational states in the socialist world (e.g., USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia). Multinational states in the developed "core" have also faced national separatist challenges (Spain, Great Britain, Belgium, France, Canada), despite the European Community states forming a more confederal relationship with one another.

While it is true that the threat posed to multinational states by national separatism has varied over time and political geographic space, the nationalistic demand that nations be masters of their own homelands has strained to the breaking point the ties that supposedly bind nations together in these states. Political elites in multinational states have been successful in managing the separatist challenges confronting them for a time through the use of both accommodative (provision of cultural or territorial autonomy) and coercive (repression, ethnocide or forced acculturation/assimilation, genocide) policies. However, they have ultimately been unsuccessful in solving their national separatist problems, and policies designed to defuse the nationalist challenge have often proved counterproductive. In addition, although few national separatist movements have been successful in accomplishing their ultimate objective—secession and the establishment of an independent and ethnically homogeneous nation-state—they have been more successful in the political mobilization of the indigenous masses and in winning a degree of territorial autonomy over their homelands.

Nationalism has been defined as loyalty to the nation and its continued survival, and as "politicized ethnicity." Both these definitions highlight the political dimension of nationalism, but each begs the question: What is a

nation? Or what is ethnicity? A more complete definition of nationalism is offered by Breuilly (1982, 3):

> The term 'nationalism' is used to refer to political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments.
>
> A nationalist argument is a political doctrine built upon three basic assertions:
> a) There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character.
> b) The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values.
> c) The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty.

Ideally, most nationalist movements envision the construction of ethnically homogeneous nation-states within which the national membership will be able to determine its own future. This nation-state ideal is also often depicted as economically and politically independent of all other states, and as a place where the indigenous nation's cultural attributes (i.e., language, religion, way of life, etc.) are predominant. This idealized objective means that nationalism is not only a political movement for national independence but also has a demographic, sociocultural and economic agenda for change. This nationalistic ideal is clearly at odds with the multinational character of most states in the world today. It also runs counter to the economic and sociocultural trends toward globalization during the twentieth century, but this has not apparently dampened the nationalistic appeal of autarchy and absolute sovereignty, particularly for subordinate national communities in multinational states.

Nationalism is at heart a political geographic doctrine, since it has as its objective the congruence between political and ethnonational borders (Gellner 1983, 1; Williams 1986). The geographic centrality of nationalism is also identified in the work of Anthony Smith (1986, 163): "the need for a 'homeland', a national space of one's own, is a central tenet of nationalism. Indeed, nationalism is always, whatever other aims it may have, about the possession and retention of land." Geography is clearly a critical dimension of nationalism, although it has often been ignored in political and sociological studies on the subject. The purpose of the present work is to bring geography back into the study of nations and nationalism.

The definition of nationalism offered above still raises two crucial questions that this chapter seeks to address in a general way, and that the remainder of this book is devoted to in a case study of Russia and the USSR. The first of these two questions is: What is a nation? The second is: What is homeland, and what is the meaning of homeland in the study of nations and nationalism?

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PLACE

With a few notable exceptions (e.g., Connor 1986; Smith 1981, 1986; Williams and Smith 1983), political and sociological studies of nations and nationalism,

as with political sociology more generally, have tended to treat *place* as an insignificant explanatory variable (Agnew 1987).[1] If not ignored altogether, it is often seen as an empty container—meaningless in and of itself—within which individuals and groups live out their lives. During the 1980s, political geographers have increasingly been engaged in the study of nationalism, and as a consequence questions about the importance of place have been raised, if not definitively answered (e.g., Knight 1982; Johnston et al. 1988; Williams 1982, 1986; Williams and Kofman 1989; Agnew 1984, 1987). Nevertheless, even political geographic studies of nationalism have tended to treat "regions as little more than locational referents for particular peoples or groups," and have not looked into the creation of national places and their impact on national and international processes (Murphy 1991, 24). Specifically, the importance of *homeland*, both in the formation of national self-consciousness and as the place where international relations are played out, has rarely served as a focus of research in political geography.

A strong argument may be made for such a focus: the national homeland is a powerful geographic mediator of sociopolitical behavior and serves as a strong case in support of the place-based theory of political sociology recently elaborated by Agnew (1987). According to this thesis, the study of place has three dimensions (ibid., 28, 230–231): *locale*, *location*, and *sense of place*. Each dimension may be related to a place-based theory of nationalism. Locale, defined as "the setting in which social relations are constituted," may be equated with the objective or tangible land serving as the resource or political power base of the nation. Location, defined as "the geographical area encompassing the settings for social interaction as defined by social and economic processes operating at a wider scale," may be thought of as the external (i.e., international and interhomeland) geopolitical and socioeconomic environment within which national communities interact. Sense of place, defined as "the local 'structure of feeling,' " may be viewed as the subjective dimension through which a given national community identifies with a certain area as its ancestral homeland. The presence of an emotional attachment to the ethnonational homeland has been noted by several analysts (e.g., Connor 1986; Smith 1981; Tuan 1977; Anderson 1988; Williams and Smith 1983). The development of a "sense of homeland" along with a national self-consciousness, and its impact on international relations in the USSR, are central themes of this study.

DEFINING THE NATION

The question "What is a nation?" is by no means simple, and this issue alone has been the subject of numerous publications both in the West (e.g., White 1985;

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[1] As used in this book, nation is not synonymous with state. The meaning of nation and its derivatives (i.e., international, nationalism, etc.) are explored in this chapter.

1985; Symmons-Symonolewicz 1985; Connor 1978; Smith 1986; Armstrong 1982; Gellner 1983; Tiryakian and Rogowski 1985; Blaut 1987), and also in the former USSR (e.g., Stalin 1913; Hodnett 1967a; Shanin 1989; Zeymal' 1988; Bromley 1981, 1983a; Drobizheva 1985; Kryukov 1986).[2] Terminological confusion over the use of nation, state, nationality, and ethnic group is a serious problem which has contributed to the failure of social scientists to explain and predict the occurrence of nationalism (Connor 1978). As used in this study, nation refers to a self-defining community of belonging and interest whose members share a sense of common origins and a belief in a common destiny or future together. It is a primary form of group identity which includes both a "modern" or "instrumentalist" dimension (i.e., a community of interest), and also a "primordial" dimension (i.e., a shared perception of common origins), though the nation itself is decidedly modern.[3] This distinguishes the nation both from the state and also from ethnic groups or *ethnie*, the latter of which are defined by Smith (1986, 32) as "named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity." In this study, the term *ethnie* is used to refer to protonations, that is, ethnic communities of belonging that have not yet developed into future-oriented politicized communities of interest.

Nations are normally defined as having two dimensions—a set of objective characteristics that members of the nation share in common, and a more subjective sense of belonging, a national self-consciousness (Shafer 1972). Each of these dimensions is discussed in greater detail below. The importance of place as both a tangible attribute of national communities and also a critical element in the development of a national self-consciousness is highlighted in the following sections.

The Objective Dimension

Members of a nation normally share a number of tangible or objective characteristics, including a common language, land, religion, customs, rituals, dress,

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[2] Hodnett 1967a and Shanin 1989 provide surveys of Soviet writing on the subject. Hodnett's in particular is worthwhile, since it details a debate on the meaning of nation conducted during the 1960s. Two decades later, Kryukov's 1986 article set off a new round of debate on the definition of "ethnic communities" conducted on the pages of *Sovetskaya Etnografiya* (1986, nos. 3–5: section "Diskussii i Obsuzhdeniya"). The definition of nation in Russia and the USSR changed over time, and is in some sense the main subject of the remaining chapters in the book. For this reason, the Soviet view of national identity is not elaborated in this chapter, which is meant to provide a more general, comparative context within which to assess the evolving "national question" in the USSR.

[3] Smith (1986, 6–13) provides a good discussion of these two approaches to the study of nations and their limitations, along with his own "perennial" approach. This approach is further elaborated in Smith (1988), and is rebutted in Zubaida (1989). See also Hobsbawm (1990) and Connor (1990), the latter of which asks the related question: "When is a nation?"

diet, and so on. These objective features are important in that they provide individuals with more or less readily identifiable "markers" of ethnonational belonging. These markers serve as one of the ways in which the sociocultural boundaries of ethnonational communities may be delimited and maintained (van den Berghe 1981).

The tangible characteristics of the nation are often treated as essentially timeless and unchanging elements around which the national community is structured, and this is particularly true of the nationalist literature on the subject. However, an assessment of social history in Europe and the Russian Empire as late as the mid-nineteenth century indicates that most of these objective criteria varied from locality to locality within the proclaimed nations that had been created (e.g., Weber 1976; Hobsbawm 1990; Hroch 1985; Connor 1990; Brooks 1985; Raun 1987). Standardized "national" languages were being created only during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Anderson 1983), at a time when mass-based nations themselves were actively being constructed (Hroch 1985). Homeland itself most often meant the local village or region in which one was born, and only changed with the broadening of the conceptualization of "nation" beyond locality to encompass much larger "imagined communities" (Hobsbawm 1990, 15–16; Anderson 1983; Weber 1976). Even though objective characteristics were given a primordial appearance by nationalists, they were for the most part new creations that coincided with the growing interaction among localities; with increasing communication and transportation; and frequently with the creation of states themselves which fostered linguistic standardization and a geographically more expansive perception of homeland.

The national land in its objective dimension (i.e., locale) may be viewed as the physical resource base of the nation. Land in this regard is, along with capital and labor, one of the three inputs into the nation's economic life. As a second dimension to the objective geographic base of the nation, land also serves as the place where the nation exercises political control (Blaut 1987, 62). From this objective perspective, the nation need not be sited in any particular place, and as a community of interest should favor land that is well endowed with natural resources, geostrategic location, and so forth. However, while it is true that nationalists normally lay claim to the most expansive homelands possible, nations have clearly not been as footloose as this objective depiction would suggest. The development of a sense of homeland, along with a sense of national belonging has served to attach nations to specific places during the last century or so.

A tendency both in the West and in the former USSR has been to equate the nation with the tangible attributes that its members share in common. For example, the international conflict in Northern Ireland between the Irish and Orange nations is often portrayed as a religious conflict between Catholics and Protestants, just as the conflict between the Flemish and Walloonian nations in

Belgium or between the Quebecois and British Canadians is said to be a linguistic dispute. Nationalists themselves often promote the idea that the nation is strictly bounded by its objective characteristics, and that the loss of the national religion, language, and so on, are harbingers of the nation's demise (e.g., Dzyuba 1970).

This tendency to equate the nation with a community of shared characteristics has resulted not only in an overly simplistic view of the nation, but also in an overly optimistic assessment of the prospects for resolving the "national problem" through international integration, i.e., the assimilation of nations into one statewide community (e.g., a Soviet People). The loss of ethnocultural characteristics by members of one nation and their replacement by those of another through a process of acculturation has been viewed as a preliminary stage which necessarily results in the eventual assimilation of members from one nation to that of another (e.g., Gans 1979). For Stalin (1913, 8), who defined the nation as "a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture," it was deemed "sufficient for a single one of these characteristics to be absent and the nation ceases to be a nation."

While acculturation does normally precede assimilation, the former is not a sufficient condition for the occurrence of the latter. In a comparative study of the relationship between these two "stages of assimilation," Connor (1972, 341–342) found that "an individual (or an entire national group) can shed all of the overt cultural manifestations customarily attributed to his ethnic group and yet maintain his fundamental identity as a member of that nation. Cultural assimilation need not mean psychological assimilation." Of course, this statement also applies to land as a tangible attribute of the nation. A nation can exist without possessing land or dictating the economic uses to which that land is put, as the Basques and Catalans under Franco, the Jews prior to the creation of Israel, and indeed most nations living in a multihomeland setting demonstrate. However, it does appear that for a nation to exist, it must have some place that it can claim as its own, whether or not it has political or economic control of that geographic space at a given time.

The lack of coincidence between the tangible attributes and the essence of national identity has presented a dilemma not only for empiricists studying nations and nationalism but also for policymakers seeking to integrate a state's disparate national communities into a more unified whole. For example, centralizing authorities in multinational states have often promoted the adoption of statewide, ethnocultural traits (e.g., an official state language or *lingua franca*) in part as an attempt to create the conditions for the erasure of national identity and its replacement by a closer affiliation with a statewide identity.[4] However,

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[4] A multinational state's attempts to integrate its population is rarely without bias in favor of a "dominant" nation within the state. For example, "Sovietization" in the USSR had a strong element

even when these policies are successful, they rarely have the desired assimila-
tive effect. On the contrary, state attempts to force the pace of acculturation and
assimilation have generally proven counterproductive (Connor 1972). This had
been recognized by Soviet ethnographers and policymakers for much of the
state's history, although actual policies often failed to live up to the voluntaristic
tenets of a Marxist-Leninist approach to solving the "national problem" (Connor
1984a). Consequently, national self-consciousness may actually rise with the
loss of the nation's objective characteristics, particularly when this acculturation
is viewed as an attack on the nation by "foreigners." For example, state-
sponsored "Russification" during the late nineteenth century was at least partially
responsible for rising national self-consciousness in the non-Russian periphery.
More recently, the main purpose of national front organizations formed in the
USSR since 1985 is said to be to ensure the rebirth of the nation after a long period
of forced "denationalization" (e.g., RUKH 1989, 9–11).

To conclude that the nation is not merely the sum of its objective parts is not
to argue that these tangible features are unimportant. Objective characteristics
become part of a subjective "myth-symbol complex" which is central to the
evolving national sense of self (Smith 1986). For example, language was seen
by Herder, the father of German cultural nationalism, as "a gift from God" that
distinguished the German nation from all others, rather than "an artificial
instrument" (Kohn 1945, 431), and the same can of course be said for the
national religion and the belief that the nation itself is favored as the "chosen
people." In addition, land often devoid of economic or geopolitical value is
perceived by nationalists as priceless, sacred soil (Connor 1986; Anderson
1988; Williams and Smith 1983). Objective characteristics often become part
of the nation's iconography, and along with a flag, anthem, monuments, and so
on, function as symbols of the nation's uniqueness.[5]

Beyond this symbolic function, the objective national characteristics have an
instrumental value. Language in particular can and has been used as an instru-
ment by nationalists seeking to gain an edge in international competition for
scarce resources, including high-status occupations. Having one's native lan-
guage declared the lingua franca of the entire state or a region therein clearly
provides strategic advantages to the "native" speakers, and this is undoubtedly
one reason why the status of the indigenous language was one of the first items
on the nationalists' political agenda in the USSR during the late 1980s.

Nevertheless, the retention of a distinct national language, religion, and so
forth, is not necessary for a nation's continued existence. First, as is becoming
increasingly clear with the growing number of historical studies on the making
of nations, the idea that objective characteristics have existed "from time imme-

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of "Russification" inherent in it, which was particularly apparent in the adoption of Russian as the
state's lingua franca (Aspaturian 1968).
    [5] See Gottmann (1973) on the importance of the use of iconography to state- or nation-building.

morial" essentially unchanged (except for the attacks launched against them by "foreigners") is a self-serving nationalistic concept that has little basis in reality.[6] The national idea did not depend on or derive from a preexistent primordial language; rather, national languages were created only after nations were conceived. In general, the same is true of the process of constructing a national homeland. Second, the loss of one's native language, religion, customs, and so forth, does not necessarily signify the loss of one's sense of national belonging. For example, the Irish nation is undoubtedly a viable entity, even though the Irish have for all intents and purposes acculturated to the English language. More generally, ethnospecific religious affiliation, rites, rituals, customs, dress, diet, and so on, are often undermined during the course of sociocultural and economic development, even while national self-consciousness has tended to grow stronger and to become mass-based over time with "modernization." In defining the nation, we need to go beyond the objective characteristics that may or may not be shared by its members, and examine the more subjective sense of belonging that binds the membership together.[7]

National Self-Consciousness

The more subjective dimension of national self-consciousness derives its strength from both a backward-looking sense of common origins and a forward-looking sense of common destiny (Emerson 1960, 95). The former promotes the perception that the nation is a "primordial organism," while the latter lends the nation a more "instrumentalist" appearance. Both of these temporal aspects of national self-consciousness are fused together in the nationalist's imagination by a "myth-symbol complex," which tells the nation where it has been and indicates a "trajectory" along which the nation will travel (Smith 1986). Each of these two temporal dimensions is discussed below.

As with the definition of nation in general, the importance of place cannot be understood without a consideration of a subjective sense of homeland which develops along with national self-consciousness. In essence, the subjective sense of homeland is founded on the perception held by members that a given place is both the geographic cradle of the nation and also the "natural" place where the nation is to fulfill its destiny. The national homeland itself is a "social construct" created during the past century or two along with the emerging national idea. Once created, the sense of homeland has in turn exerted a powerful influence on the nationalization process.[8]

[6] The invention of traditions was an integral part of the construction of a "myth-symbol complex." For a fascinating study of this topic, see Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983).

[7] The USSR made a clear distinction between sense of national belonging and objective attributes. For example, a question on language and a question on national identity were asked in each of the Soviet censuses. See Silver (1986).

[8] Alexander Murphy (1991) provides an excellent discussion of the importance of understanding

A SENSE OF COMMON ORIGINS—SHARED ANCESTRY

A sense of common origins normally involves a belief in shared ancestry, which is for the most part mythical. While certain authors have taken the view that nations *are* biological entities (e.g., Ardrey 1966; van den Berghe 1981; Gumilev 1990), the belief in a common ancestry cannot (and need not) be objectively verified. Contemporary nations most often consist of several subnational ethnographic groups whose members have undergone a process of horizontal (i.e., interethnic) consolidation in the recent past. Even in the USSR under "developed socialism," when the process of national consolidation was said to have been essentially complete (Bromley 1983b, 9), the nationalization process was still underway in the North Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia, and the Far East.

In addition to horizontal consolidation, vertical incorporation into the national community is also something essentially new. Indeed, throughout feudal Europe before the nineteenth century, there was little sense among elites that the peasantry was part of the same species, let alone part of the same nation (Weber 1976; Pearson 1983; Breuilly 1982; Hobsbawm 1990). As discussed in chapter 2, the Russian peasants before the mid-nineteenth century were similarly viewed by the gentry and government as at best children needing strict guidance (Eklof 1986), and at worst subhumans in need of evolution (Riasanovsky 1968). Active attempts to integrate the masses into the emerging nations, and thus provide these collectivities with a mass base, occurred only during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Europe and Russia (Hroch 1985).

While the processes of horizontal and vertical consolidation were to some extent unique historical processes for each nation, a number of common elements can be identified. In a discussion of national consolidation in Western Europe, Smith (1986, 130–134) cites as critical the "triple Western revolution" of (1) capitalism, resulting in a much higher degree of economic integration; (2) the "rise of the bureaucratic state" and the increasing centralization of political power; and (3) a "cultural and educational revolution" and the increasing standardization of each. The critical importance of all three of these "revolutions" is that they had the effect of lowering the geographic, socioeconomic, cultural, and political barriers to integration. Specifically, the three revolutions meant improvements in transportation and communication; the development of a capitalist market economy linking urban center with rural hinterland and elites with masses; and the promotion of mass literacy, the standardization of languages, and innovations that allowed for communication with the masses. These "revolutions" were of great importance in that they created the preconditions within which members of the nation who had never met one another could

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"regions as social constructs." The subsequent impact of these "social constructs" may be seen as a feedback effect which, in turn, helps to reconstruct social relations in the future.

imagine themselves as belonging to the same extended family (Anderson 1983).

Although the processes outlined above are referred to as revolutions, their impact on the masses was neither immediate nor universal. Change penetrated into the countryside only slowly. For example, it was not until the period from 1870 to 1920 that localized peasants in France were consolidated into a French nation (Weber 1976). And, as the contemporary rise in national self-consciousness among Bretons, Corsicans, Basques, and other ethnonational communities in France reveals, all regions and ethnic groups have still not been successfully nationalized (e.g., Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985, 76–77). While the "three revolutions" played a crucial role in dramatically increasing the potential for national consolidation, they were in and of themselves insufficient for the formation of national self-consciousness. This may be seen as one of the critical flaws in the so-called diffusionist theory, which posits that national consolidation is solely a response to the spread of "modernization" (e.g., Deutsch 1966).

It was not only the diffusion of socioeconomic development that was important but also the message of shared ancestry that was being diffused. On the surface the myth of common descent appears to be at odds with the process of modernization and nationalization and yet, paradoxically perhaps, the shared ancestry myth provided an essential glue binding the more expansive national community together. The most important function of the common origins myth is that it creates an image of the nation as a "primordial organism," as something both " 'natural' and 'eternal' " (Portugali 1988, 155). The nation becomes an extended family in the perception of its members, and this in itself is a strong argument for internal cohesion, particularly in an era of relatively dramatic change.

Nationalist intellectuals began promoting the idea of a "primordial" nation in earnest during the nineteenth century, a period during which the spread of education, communication networks, and particularly innovations such as the printing press greatly facilitated the diffusion of this mythology to an increasingly literate population (Hobsbawm 1983; Anderson 1983). Thus, the nineteenth century throughout Europe was proclaimed as a period of national "rebirth" or "reawakening," even though this was in reality the first time the lower strata of society were considered by the elite, or indeed considered themselves, to be part of such a large, internally cohesive community (Weber 1976; Pearson 1983; Hobsbawm 1990).

There is a question as to the motivations of the nationalist intelligentsia in reconstructing "history" in such a way. A Marxist approach argues that the bourgeoisie created its own nation in order to secure for itself a loyal work force and market (Connor 1984a, 7; Salikov et al. 1987, 24). However, such a direct economic argument does not appear valid, since the most active promoters of the nation's ancient lineage and glorious past were educators, historians, soci-

ologists, archeologists, and so forth, and not "captains of industry" (Hroch 1985). And, while these constructors and purveyors of the national myth-symbol complex may have benefited in the long run from this activity, there was little immediate economic incentive, and often a number of strong disincentives to becoming proselytizers of the national idea, ranging from loss of work to loss of life. This was particularly true for members of subordinate ethnic groups. The nationalist intelligentsias appear to have been motivated more by a romantic desire to end their own sense of alienation and to merge with the masses than they were by material interests alone. Insecurity among the indigenous lower middle class ("the lesser examination-passing classes") was also apparently instrumental in the rise of xenophobic, often anti-Semitic nationalism during the period from 1870 to 1918 (Hobsbawm 1990, 118).

Whatever the motivations of the nationalist elites, in order to understand how nations became mass-based entities, one needs to consider why the masses themselves took part in the process. For Connor (1984b, 357), nationalism is at heart a "mass sentiment to which elites appeal" rather than a creation of the intelligentsia. At minimum, nationalization has been an interactive process through which elites and masses came to see each other as part of the same extended family.

National consolidation was most successful within a region of places sharing ethnocultural attributes; for this process the objective characteristics of the communities involved in the nationalization process did serve to facilitate or inhibit the spread of the national idea (Nielsen 1985). The ancestry myth was clearly easier to construct and promote among ethnoculturally similar communities that shared in the legends and mythical histories of the region. Thus, the masses "went along" with the myth because it was grounded in the local "legends and landscapes" (Smith 1986, 200–208) that were familiar to them, or were a part of their own folklore. This grounding of the myth-symbol complex in the rural folkways of the region also upgraded the status of the peasantry and other low socioeconomic strata in the process, relocating them in ideological terms from the sociocultural "periphery" of society to its sociocultural—if not its socioeconomic—"core."

Beyond this, the nation promised a brighter socioeconomic and political future for its members. A new golden age was said to be just over the horizon, that is, after the nation took charge of its own destiny (Smith 1988, 2). And, in Europe at least, modernization provided vast improvements over the local conditions of life that had previously existed (e.g., Weber 1976). In sum, the nation offered "status superiority" over "outsiders" for the lower strata of society, and promised "economic as well as psychological rewards" (Anderson 1988, 36). At the same time, the masses were made to feel both a part of something eternal and a part of the noble quest for future greatness. The nationalist message of a primordial organism reawakening to fulfill its destiny (the reconstruction of a national golden age) clearly struck a responsive chord

among the masses, or at least those who could identify closely with the nation that was being "reborn."[9]

The grounding of the nation's mythical past in the local "legends and land-scapes" limited the geographic and ethnographic range of the nationalization process. The localized myth of common ancestry, with its legendary heroes and glorious past, was unlikely to find a receptive audience outside the locality around which the myth-symbol complex was constructed. In each of the European states that had expanded through the conquest of ethnically distinct peripheral regions (i.e., Great Britain, France, Spain, and Russia/USSR), the outlying ethnic communities were not successfully consolidated into the dominant nations of each state. This is not surprising, since the past glories for the core nation were likely to be the past defeats for those in the periphery. In addition, conquest normally meant continued subordination of the peripheral *ethnies*. For example, "an English national idea had implicit implications of subordination for those who were not defined or did not wish to define themselves as English within the British Isles" (Breuilly 1982, 57). During the twentieth century we have witnessed the growth of a national self-consciousness within each of these unconsolidated communities, rather than their integration into the dominant nations of each state. Indigenous elites from these "peripheral" nations have elaborated their own myth-symbol complexes of localized common origins and a glorious past (e.g., Linz 1985, 204). Thus, although nationalization did occur with modernization and the political socialization of the masses by a nationalistic intelligentsia, the majority of states in Europe—where this process has had the longest time to work itself out—have not become nation-states.[10]

A Territorial versus an Ethnic Nationalism?   The comparability of the "national problem" in Western Europe on the one hand and the USSR and Eastern Europe on the other has been the subject of serious debate. According to Hans Kohn, who made perhaps the most well known statement in this regard (1945, 329–351), essentially two types of nationalism—a "Western territorialism" based on political nation-states and an "Eastern ethnicism" founded on a folk

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[9] This same message of rebirth has reemerged as a central theme of the national front organizations created in the USSR after 1985. For Belorussia's *Adradzhen'ne* ("Revival"), the very name of the organization is borrowed from the earlier period of Belorussian national "reawakening" (Vakar 1956, 91–92).

[10] According to nationality data provided in Bruk (1986), only in Denmark is more than 90 percent of the population Danish and more than 90 percent of all Danes live in the state. Austria, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Malta, Norway, Portugal, Finland, and Sweden are states with more than 90 percent of the population comprised of one nation, but with a larger proportion of that nation living outside the state. Even since reunification, Germany does not qualify as a nation-state using these criteria, though that event brought the state much closer to nation-state status (85 percent of all Germans now live in Germany).

community or ethnonation—have emerged since the eighteenth century.[11] While undoubtedly some degree of variation existed between the nation idea as it emerged in Western Europe and the way in which peoples outside Western Europe adapted this idea to the local setting, the above depiction of political nation-states in the West as opposed to folk nations in the East is clearly overdrawn.[12] Nations in Western states, such as the English, Scottish, Welsh, Irish, French, Castilian, Basque, Catalan, Flemish, and Walloonian, also claim to have an ancient ethnographic basis. According to Smith (1986, 148), "most nationalisms after 1789 became increasingly influenced by an 'ethnic model' of the nation. . . . To achieve integration and legitimate a set of borders and a 'homeland,' myths of descent were needed, not only for external consumption, but for internal mobilization and co-ordination."

Also, while a sense of British, Spanish, or Belgian identity certainly exists at some level, it has clearly not overcome the "ethnonational" identities that continue to command primary loyalty from the vast majority of the population of these states (e.g., English, Scottish, Welsh, Irish, Orange; Castilian, Basque, Catalan, Galician; Flemish, Waloonian). Indeed, a resurgent nationalism has occurred among these "ethnic" communities during the postwar period. On the other hand, few of the Eastern "ethnic" nations emerged as mass-based entities before the establishment of some form of territorial autonomy, whether in the form of independent national states or "sovereign" republics in multinational, multihomeland states. Furthermore, as discussed in chapters 2 and 3, a territorial "sense of homeland" arose with national self-consciousness in Russia during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In both East and West, the territorial dimension of the national idea coincided not with the boundaries of the state but rather with the imagined borders of an ancestral homeland.

A SENSE OF COMMON ORIGINS—SHARED BIRTHPLACE

The backward-looking aspect of national self-consciousness refers not only to a mythical common ancestry but also to a common geographic birthplace— the national homeland. The terms for the national land themselves tend to denote a strong perceptual bond between ancestry and place (Connor 1986, 16): "As evidenced by the near universal use of such emotionally charged terms as the motherland, the fatherland, the native land, the ancestral land, land where

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[11] As discussed in chapter 6, a new east-west national dichotomy supposedly emerged after the October Revolution: that of brotherly, nonantagonistic socialist nations in the East and hostile, conflictual capitalist nations in the West.

[12] The overdichotomization into eastern and western national types may be more a reflection of a sense of superiority among those doing the defining than it is a reflection of actual differences in the way national members perceive themselves and their communities. For a discussion of this problem in the defining of nations, see Seton-Watson (1977, 3–5).

my fathers died and, not least, the homeland, the territory so identified becomes imbued with an emotional, almost reverential dimension."

According to Murphy (1990, 532), the concept "territory cannot be understood as a collection of objective attributes." This echoes the work of Knight (1982, 517), who asserted that "territory is not; it becomes, for territory itself is passive, and it is human beliefs and actions that give territory meaning." National "territory" clearly fits within this more subjective conceptual framework. It is perceived by members of the nation as much more than a tangible or objective geographical region (i.e., locale) for "history has nationalized a strip of land, and endowed its most ordinary features with mythical content and hallowed sentiments." (Williams and Smith 1983, 509). Anderson (1988, 24) views the importance of territory in similar subjective terms: "Associations with the past are central to nationalism's territoriality, for territory is the receptacle of the past in the present. The nation's unique history is embodied in the nation's unique piece of territory—its 'homeland,' the primeval land of its ancestors, older than any state, the same land which saw its greatest moments, perhaps its mythical origins."

As with the nation's genealogical bond, much about the ancestral homeland is mythical. In much of Europe prior to the nineteenth century, the "sense of place" was spatially limited to the local village, where a relatively isolated population lived out the majority of its existence (e.g., Hobsbawm 1990, 15–16; Weber 1976). Even by the turn of the nineteenth century in Germany, the use of the term *fatherland* by intellectuals referred more often than not to the local state (e.g., Bavaria) than to a larger German homeland (Kohn 1945, 388), indicating that the nationalization of the elite itself had barely begun by this time. This localism was also clearly apparent in rural France throughout much of the nineteenth century (Weber 1976, 45–47):

> "The least of our villages," wrote a local historian of the Var, "considers itself a *pays* in its language, legends, customs, ways." The awkward and untranslatable term *pays* has the fundamental significance of "native land" and applies more properly to local than to national territory.
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> "Every valley," wrote an economist in 1837 about the central Pyrenees, "is still a little world that differs from the neighboring world as Mercury does from Uranus. Every village is a clan, a sort of state with its own patriotism."

As discussed in chapter 2, life in rural Russia, at least to the time of World War I, was similarly localized (e.g., Kingston-Mann 1991, 15–16).

At least some evidence suggests that the local place continues to exert a great deal of influence over sociopolitical behavior (Agnew 1987). In the former Soviet Union, favoritism was often shown not only to members of the indigenous nation but also to members of one's own local village or extended family. Localism continues to be relatively strong not only in the less developed non-Russian periphery (i.e., Central Asia, North Caucasus, and Transcaucasia

(e.g., Atkin 1992; 1993; Carlisle 1991; Nissman 1993) but also in Russia it-self. Nevertheless, it is also apparent that where places are similar, a region of places may emerge (Agnew 1987, 28): "In this situation the sense of place can be projected onto the region or a 'nation' and give rise to regionalism or nationalism."

With nationalization there emerged a broader geographic perception of home. The homeland myth developed along with the ancestry myth as part of an attempt to foster "internal solidarity and a sense of territorial 'rootedness' " (Smith 1986, 148). However, this expansive view of national belonging and territorial homeland occurred only slowly, and in the main only among lo-calities whose populations could identify with the genealogical and geographi-cal myths around which national consolidation was occurring. Attempts to expand the borders of the perceptual homeland were not always and everywhere successful. For example, as discussed in chapter 2, during the nineteenth cen-tury Siberia was perceived by many Russians migrating east as a Russian Utopia, but this myth was soon dispelled, at least for those who had "gone east" and suffered the hardships of a Siberian winter. This resulted in a large return migration stream westward.[13] Today the question "What is Russia?" remains a lively topic of debate.

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and in conjunction with the promotion of the idea of a primordial nation, nationalists have laid claim to an ancestral homeland.[14] During this period, the literary imagery of blood and soil mixing through the ages to produce a unique nation in its special place has been a common theme certain to evoke strong emotions. This theme of the special historic role played by the homeland in creating the nation has apparently not lost its potency over the years. Even in the Soviet Union at the height of "developed socialism," it was not difficult to find evidence of this. For example, Russian nationalists such as Yuri Bondarev spoke out against the scheme to divert water from Russian rivers for use in Central Asia using just such emotive terms (as quoted in Petro 1987, 248): "From the first hour of our birth to the last second [of our lives] we are beholden to the earth which gave birth to us, and to the national culture that transmitted to us all that is good, solid, [and] moral— that which is called the warmth of patriotism. This priceless quality can be measured only in terms of returning this spiritual debt to our ancestral home."

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[13] Judging by the difficulty that the USSR/Russia has had in holding the eastern migrants in place, it remains questionable whether Siberia has yet been adopted as part of Russia's perceptual homeland.

[14] According to Kozlov (1971, 94), the development of claims to an ancestral land occurred as human communities became less nomadic and more sedentary, at which time "territorial ties" replaced "blood ties." However, in Tuan's study of peoples' "attachment to homeland" (1977, 156–157), nomadic groups also exhibit a strong "sentiment for the nurturing earth." In addition, as a broader national self-consciousness develops, "blood ties" are not so much replaced as they are made mythical, as are territorial ties themselves.

Similar sentiments have been espoused by non-Russians in the state as well. For example, the Kirgiz poet Kozhomberdiyev exhorted his fellow Kirgiz in 1971 to "Remember, even before your mother's milk / You drank the milk of the homeland" (as quoted in Allworth 1973, 16).

The belief in an ancestral homeland reinforces the perception that the nation is a primordial organism, and one that is rooted to a particular place. For members of the indigenous nation, this is reflected in a strong emotional attachment to the homeland, in a belief among members that they belong only there and nowhere else. In its role as a crucial element of the common origins mythology, the homeland-as-birthplace myth may also be seen as an underlying ingredient of national territoriality. This accords with Soja (1971, 34), who identified a "sense of spatial identity" as the first of three major elements of human group territoriality.[15]

Since this dimension of territoriality serves to enhance the perception of the nation as a primordial organism, it has been mistaken for an innate response to the need for "survival, stimulation, and identity" found in other species (e.g., Ardrey 1966; Gumilev 1990). However, motivations for behavior in this regard appear to derive more from nationalistic perceptions of reality than from reality itself. Nationally self-conscious individuals behave (in part) according to perceptions of the nation as an extended family and of the homeland as the geographic birthplace, and not according to a "territorial imperative" dictated by the survival instincts of a "biological nation."

Since the nation (as perceived by members) is not only an extended family but also an organism that needs its ancestral soil in order to thrive, the sense of spatial identity felt by members of the nation toward their homeland provides a foundation for legitimizing nationalist claims to territory. For example, RUKH's program (1989) repeatedly bases the Ukrainian nation's claim to Ukraine on the "fact" that this territory has belonged to the Ukrainian people "from time immemorial." This claim to primordial connectivity between nation and homeland was made with increasing frequency and intensity in the USSR after 1985. However, since in reality nations and before them ethnic communities have not remained stationary and geographically isolated throughout the history of their formation, each nation's claim to an ancestral homeland is not incontrovertible. Nationalist historians, of course, choose the historic period most beneficial to their own nations. Pearson (1983, 17) certainly found this to be the case in Eastern Europe: "What does the 'historic' claim mean? The *longest* chronological span of ownership? The *earliest* significant period of ownership? The *latest* or the most *beneficial* period of ownership? In practice, claimants select the criteria favouring their own case, transforming past history into present politics in the process."

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[15] The other two elements are "a sense of exclusiveness" and "the compartmentalization or channeling of human interaction in space" (Soja 1971, 34). These are discussed below.

There were and continue to be serious conflicts between neighboring nations as to the geographic extent of "ancestral" homelands. On both the interstate and intrastate scales, international conflicts over the delimitation of homelands are a nearly ubiquitous feature of the geopolitical landscape. National self-determination through the use of plebiscites in the disputed regions has often been proposed as a potential solution to these conflicts. However, self-determination based on contemporary ethnodemographic settlement patterns is not likely to satisfy the nationalist whose claim to a region as part of the homeland is grounded in the "primordial" past. Indeed, the emphasis on contemporary ethnic demography enhances the likelihood that indigenous nationalists in a demographically tenuous position will pursue a strategy of ethnoterritorial purification in order to solidify their claim to their "ancestral" homeland (e.g., the ethnic "cleansing" programs conducted by Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina, as well as the removal of Armenians and Azeris from border regions between the two republics). The changing demography of nations may have diminished the relative weight of the primordial nation in certain parts of the perceived homeland (e.g., Serbs versus Albanians in Kosovo), but this has not necessarily diminished the resolve of indigenous nationalists to regain or maintain control of these regions. For example, Estonians now comprise only 61.5 percent of Estonia's population (Goskomstat SSSR 1991a, 140) due to the in-migration of Russians and other nonindigenes during the past fifty years. Estonian nationalists seeking to gain independence from the USSR called for national self-determination by the population of "pre-Occupation" Estonia, that is, the population (and its descendants) of Estonia prior to 1940, at which time Estonians were demographically (and otherwise) dominant.[16] Latvians, who comprised only 52 percent of Latvia's population in 1989 (Goskomstat SSSR 1991a, 124), have called for similarly restrictive definitions of citizenship in independent Latvia.

Of course, in addition to the lack of coincidence between ethnic demography and ethnic geography, it is also true that the principle of national self-determination itself has rarely been used as the primary basis for intra- or interstate border delimitation. In his survey of the ethnopolitical landscape, Connor (1986, 20) found that "political borders of states have been superimposed upon the ethnic map with cavalier disregard for ethnic homelands." Since members view their nations and homelands as more ancient than any state, their claim to the homeland is perceived as more legitimate than any claim a state may make.

To conclude, a backward-looking sense of common origins is a crucial dimension of national self-consciousness, in that it provides a deep-seated

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[16] T. Kelam, a leader of the Estonian National Independence Party, discussed these issues during a meeting at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Washington, D.C., 1 December 1989.

emotional rationale for national consolidation. Basing nationalization on a common ancestry myth helped promote the image of the nation as a primordial organism, but was only successful within a limited ethnocultural and geographic range. As part of the sense of common origins, a sense of spatial identity formed around the idea that the nation had a common geographic birthplace, the national homeland. This ancestral homeland myth has served to enhance the perception of primordialism surrounding the nation, helping to make the nation appear both eternal and natural. Given this intimate connection between nation and homeland, it should not be surprising that the nation's future well-being, indeed its very survival, is frequently said to be tied to its obtaining or retaining control over the ancestral homeland.

A SENSE OF COMMON DESTINY

The forward-looking nation, whose members share a sense of destiny, has been viewed as a goal-oriented community of interest (e.g., Nielsen 1985; Hechter et al. 1982; Breuilly 1982). Here the nation is seen as the community most capable of articulating and satisfying the needs of its members. This is a more instrumentalist answer to the question "What is a nation?" and it is often presented as an alternative to primordialism. The instrumentalist nation is also often defined as a modern nation without a past, created by the "three revolutions" briefly described above.

This view of the "modern" nation is a reasonably accurate depiction, so far as it goes. However, the nation must be viewed as a distinctly different sort of interest group. The reason for this has to do with the perceptual linkage between the primordial and instrumental aspects of national self-consciousness. Even if national elites are unsuccessful in attaining benefits for their members, the masses are unlikely to abandon the nation. Indeed, the very idea of voluntary "denationalization" probably would not occur to most members, who perceive their membership as being conferred by birth. This is a distinct advantage that the nation enjoys over other communities of interest (e.g., class).

The national destiny is often perceived as the reconstruction of a modern golden age. To accomplish this objective, the nation must at minimum survive. Any loss of membership through international integration or assimilation is often viewed as a direct threat to the nation's future viability. Horowitz (1985, 263) found that this loss was a recurrent theme underlying separatist movements in the Third World. Even "natural" population decline resulting from a decreasing rate of birth has been perceived as a threat to the nation (e.g., the Baltic nations, France, Rumania), while rapid population growth has been interpreted as a sign of national vitality (e.g., Soviet Central Asia) (Carrere d'Encausse 1978, 70).

Of course, national survival means more than demographic growth or stability, for the nation in reality is not a natural and eternal organism. Each succeeding generation must become nationally self-conscious, and this in turn means

that national consciousness itself is a dynamic process. The nation's history is reinterpreted and rewritten by each successive generation, incorporating new events and selecting from among alternative myths and symbols. This may be seen as one of the major reasons why the perceived relative importance of the nation's objective attributes (i.e., language, religion, etc.) waxes and wanes over time. This will have an impact on the nation's perceived destiny, since the future "trajectory" is at least partially set in the past (Smith 1986). Conversely, a reassessment of the national destiny may serve as an impetus for reconstructing the nation's history. In this way, national self-consciousness becomes a dialogue between past and future conducted in the present, and with the nationalization of the masses it is a dialogue engaged in not only by an elite few, but by the national membership generally. The nation should thus be viewed as a flexibly delimited community of interest. This flexibility is clearly a strength, for the nation is easily able to incorporate recent events into its myth-symbol complex. For example, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian nationalists justify their present claim to an independent political existence not only on the claim to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as their ancestral homelands but also on the fact that they were independent during the interwar period. In the same way, Georgian nationalists point to their independence during the period from 1918 to 1921 as historic justification for the reestablishment of a new independent "Republic of Georgia," and have adopted the flag, anthem, name, and other state symbols from the period of independence. Even more recently the April 19, 1989, demonstrations in Tbilisi and the harsh reaction by Soviet troops quickly became part of the historic dialogue reorienting Georgians toward a future outside the Soviet Union.

As a means of establishing the conditions for the future prosperity of the national community (i.e., a new golden age), national self-determination, however defined, becomes a dominant objective among nations large and small (Knight 1988; Connor 1967). A central belief is that the nation must control its own destiny, and cannot leave its future in the hands of "outsiders" who have their own parochial national interests at heart. If a sense of common origins serves to enhance intranational cohesion, a sense of common destiny tends to encourage if not demand international separation. In this way the multinational, multihomeland state is perceived (at least by subordinate nationalists) as anachronistic.

Just as a sense of common destiny is intimately connected across time with a myth of common descent, the claim to homeland as a place for the nation exclusively to control its destiny is founded on the belief that this area is the geographic birthplace of the nation, or at least the place where the historic community experienced a glorious past. In other words, the nation's sense of spatial identity provides the historic justification for the development of a nationalistic "sense of exclusiveness" regarding the indigenous nation's standing in its own homeland. This sense of exclusiveness may thus be seen as the

present-future aspect of a nation's sense of homeland and is also the second major ingredient of human group territoriality identified by Soja (1971, 34). The homeland is not only the place where indigenes feel most "at home." It is also the place that indigenes believe they alone should control (Connor 1986; Shibutani and Kwan 1972). Fundamentally, nationalists demand that they be "masters of their own land."[17]

The two temporal dimensions of a developing sense of homeland, as noted above, may be identified as key ingredients of national territoriality. However, this territoriality may be latent (Soja 1971), in that members of the nation may feel a sense of spatial identity and exclusiveness regarding their status in the perceived homeland without necessarily acting on these feelings. National territoriality as an active strategy, and the sociocultural, economic, and political factors serving as catalysts in its activation, are examined below.

NATIONAL TERRITORIALITY AND ITS ACTIVATION

Territoriality at both the individual and group levels has been a topic of serious debate between those who view human territorial behavior as little more than animal instinct (e.g., Ardrey 1966), and those who argue "that territoriality represents a culturally derived and transmitted answer to particular human problems, not the blind operation of instinct" (Gold 1982, 48). This disagreement is as fundamental and nearly as old as the "nature versus nurture" debate. The definition of national territoriality as a latent sense of homeland that becomes activated whenever the nation-homeland bond is seriously threatened may appear to correspond more closely with an innate reaction comparable to that found in other (though not in all) species. However, as we have already discussed above, the motivation for territorial behavior among indigenes derives not so much from instinctual need as from a desire to control their own lives in order to fulfill their national destiny (i.e., to create a new golden age for members of the nation). This desire to satisfy "higher needs" clearly accords more with the second depiction of human territoriality as a problem-solving strategy.

According to Sack (1986, 19), human territoriality represents "the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area." An activated national territoriality may be viewed as a special case of this, as a strategy used by members of the nation to control their own destiny (according to the dictates of the nation's historic mission) by gaining control over their perceived homeland. Viewed in this way, activated national territoriality becomes the essential equivalent of nationalism. This is certainly implied by

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[17] This phrase has been heard and seen with increasing regularity in the former USSR since 1989.

Gellner (1983, 1), who defines nationalism as "a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent," and as "a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones."[18]

According to Sack (1983, 1986), territoriality is always a means to an end, though it may appear as an end in itself. The appearance of national territoriality as an end rather than as a means to an end is closely linked to the backward-looking sense of homeland, to the perception that the nation-homeland bond is something both organic and primordial, and that the nation cannot exist without the homeland. The nation's sovereignty over its perceived homeland is often portrayed as the fulfillment of the national destiny itself; the new golden age becomes synonymous with indigenous territorial control. The "Magyar Creed," a Hungarian lament to the loss of territory following World War I, provides an excellent example of this (Pearson 1983, 176):

> I believe in one God,
> I believe in one Fatherland,
> I believe in one divine, eternal Truth,
> I believe in the resurrection of Hungary.
> Hungary dismembered is no country,
> Hungary united is Heaven. Amen.

This subjective rationalization for the use of national territoriality provides a potent additional dimension to the more objective reasons for using territoriality identified by Sack (1986, 32–34), including the ease of "classification, communication and enforcement of control."

Under what conditions does national territoriality become an activated strategy to gain control of the perceived homeland? Primarily, this conversion takes place whenever the indigenes' sense of homeland is challenged by nonindigenes. This perceived threat to the nation-homeland bond may arise in a number of ways in a multihomeland state. The factors serving to activate national territoriality should be viewed as catalysts rather than causes, since the reason for a territorial response by nationalists lies in the sense of homeland that has evolved along with national self-consciousness.[19] An understanding of these catalytic agents likely to activate national territoriality is essential to the study of contemporary national problems in multihomeland states such as the USSR. Part 2 of this book examines four of the most commonly cited catalysts and the way they have affected international relations in the postwar USSR: the geographic mobility of national members across homeland borders; the social

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[18] See also Colin Williams (1986).

[19] The confusion of catalysts with causes has led to mistaken nationality policies, as well as overly optimistic assessments of the potential for recasting the population in a new national or "anational" mold (Connor 1972, 1984b).

mobilization of indigenes and their increasing contact and competition with nonindigenes for the resources of the homeland; state-sponsored international integration (i.e., Sovietization) and the perceived threat of "denationalization;" and the centralized nature of economic and political decision making in the former USSR. These catalysts are certainly not unique to the former Soviet Union. A generalized discussion of each of these catalysts is presented below.

Geographic Mobilization and Demographic Indigenization

There is abundant evidence that the immigration of nonindigenes to another nation's homeland has served to heighten the perception among indigenes that the nation and its primordial claim to homeland is under attack (i.e., that interhomeland migration functions as a catalyst activating national territoriality). In his general discussion of societal territoriality, Soja (1971, 34) states that the "sense of exclusiveness" remains latent until it is activated by some sort of "invasion" by "aliens." Shibutani and Kwan (1972, 445) also found that "the national land is often regarded as a group possession on which foreigners are interlopers." Similarly, Weiner (1978) described the rise of "nativism" among the "sons of the soil" that occurred with the in-migration of nonindigenes in India. The rise of Le Pen's National Front party in France was primarily a response to the perceived threat to the French nation represented by an increased immigration of non-French into the country. Fear of massive immigration from the East has resulted in a similar rise in popularity of ultranationalist parties in Germany and Austria, as well as a rise in antiforeigner acts of violence. Even the *Gastarbeiter* (guestworkers) invited into West European states have caused a nationalistic reaction among indigenous nations, who perceive this foreign presence as a threat to the nation's status in its homeland and to national "purity" (e.g., Kramer 1972). Indeed, Connor (1986) appears correct in regarding all nonindigenes as essentially living in diaspora. Even if welcomed by indigenes at one time, nonindigenes are likely to serve as a catalyst for rising indigenous nationalism eventually—particularly during times of economic recession or uncertainty. They are unlikely ever to be made to feel "at home."

Chapter 4 examines interhomeland migration, the more general changes in ethnodemographic status of indigenes in their home republics, and the role of these demographic trends in activating national territoriality among members of the indigenous nations during the postwar period. While greater interhomeland migration has been encouraged by policymakers and ethnographers as a way to break national territorial ties and facilitate international integration, it has tended to result in the opposite effect (i.e., rising national selfconsciousness and a more assertive territoriality among members of the indigenous nations). A rising *nativism*—the growth of anti-outsider sentiments that often results in a violent reaction among indigenes—has been an increasingly

disturbing feature of the national problem in the USSR and its successor states since 1985. As a result of this much more active national territoriality, a trend toward the demographic indigenization of each homeland is in evidence, as nonindigenes leave for "home."

Social Mobilization and Sociocultural Indigenization

The social mobilization of indigenes is one of the most potent catalysts serving to activate national territoriality, since this process of "modernization" not only brings indigenes into closer contact with nonindigenes but also intensifies the competition between them for the resources of the homeland. This response is certainly implicit in the theoretical works elaborating a "competition theory" of nationalism in modernized and modernizing states (e.g., Nielsen 1980, 1985; Nagel and Olzak 1982, 1986), and helps to explain the failure of the "diffusion-ist thesis" which predicted the demise of national identity with modernization (e.g., Deutsch 1966).

Most models designed to examine the relationship between socioeconomic development and national identity treat social mobilization as an independent variable causing changes in national self-consciousness. However, a growing number of studies in the past decade have raised serious questions regarding the validity of this causal model (e.g., Connor 1984b; Orridge and Williams 1982; Smith 1988). In line with the competition theory, in several multihomeland states, including Spain, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and India, the most developed or socially mobilized nations are also among the most nationalistic. On the other hand, Horowitz in his study of ethnic separatism in the Third World (1981, 173) found that "by far the largest number of secessionists can be characterized as backward groups living in backward regions." Furthermore, the development of "relative deprivation" among indigenes, that is, a condition in which the rate of social mobility experienced does not meet or exceed expectations (Gurr 1970), is also an important factor in the determination of whether social mobilization or the lack thereof will serve as a catalyst in the activation of national territoriality in multihomeland states.

Chapter 5 examines the relationship between social mobilization and na-tional territoriality in the postwar Soviet Union. The research in this study indicates that social mobility alone is not a sufficient condition either for the creation of national self-consciousness or for its erasure from the collective memory. In addition to knowing whether or not social mobility is occurring, we need to know the geographic context in which modernization is taking place. The homeland and indigenous status are particularly important in mediating the effect of social mobilization on national self-consciousness. In general, in-creasing social mobility has served as a catalyst activating national territoriality among indigenes even while it has tended to erode a sense of national self-consciousness and facilitate international integration among nonindigenes.

International Integration and Ethnocultural Indigenization

In multinational states such as the former USSR, a desire often exists on the part of central authorities to internationalize or denationalize the population of the state. In Soviet terms, a goal of creating a "new Soviet people" from the numerous ethnonational communities has existed for much of the state's history (e.g., Konstantinov 1985). This objective was to be attained by the voluntary drawing together (*sblizheniye*) and merging (*sliyaniye*) of the nations in the state into an anational community of "Soviet people." However, a degree of coercion has been involved in the drawing together or acculturation process (Connor 1984a), which placed the Russian nation and its cultural attributes (particularly language) in a preferential position. The favored status of Russians as "first among equals" raises questions concerning the equality of peoples and the anational character of the Soviet people supposedly being created (Aspaturian 1968; Dzyuba 1970; Clem 1980; Connor 1984a; Silver 1974b, 1978). This officially endorsed process of international integration, and the consequent state support for Russification, have also served as catalysts in the activation of national territoriality among non-Russians. This "forced denationalization" was one of the major complaints lodged against central authorities by national front organizations (e.g., RUKH 1989). This was not so different from nationalist reactions against programs of "Bulgarization," "Magyarization," "Czechization" or even "re-Slovakization" in Eastern Europe, or against the cultural dominance of the French, English, or Castilian nations in France, Great Britain, or Spain.

On the other hand, the non-Russian languages and cultures were also officially supported, as part of a dialectical approach to solving the national problem in the state. The state-sponsored "flowering" (*rastsvet*) of national cultures was geographically limited for the most part to the home republic of each national community. As the state progressed toward communism, the flowering of national communities was to give way to their drawing together and eventual merger. This desired outcome obviously did not occur. The support for indigenes and their cultural attributes in their own homelands but not outside converged with the indigenes' sense of homeland to ensure both the continued survival of the nations and their cultural attributes, and even to raise them to a level that challenged the dominant status of Russians.

Chapter 6 explores the processes of acculturation and assimilation as they occurred during the postwar period in the USSR. While the Russian nation and culture retained a position of dominance throughout the state (at least up to the late 1980s), a second tier in the national stratification system emerged that favored the indigenous nation in its own homeland. This ethnocultural indigenization was one more element in the developing national separatism within the country during the past thirty years, and it accelerated greatly after 1985.

The Centralization of Decision-making Authority and Political Indigenization

Each of the catalysts discussed above has a political dimension, since the external forces perceived as threatening to the viability of the nation and its sense of homeland often emanate from policies made at the center, as well as from neighboring nations or global trends. For example, few multihomeland states allow each indigenous nation to control migration into and out of its homeland, and central policies that encourage the interhomeland movement of peoples, in addition to the migration streams themselves, may help to activate national territoriality (e.g., Weiner 1978). Similarly, the adoption of a lingua franca by the state and its attempts to acculturate all national communities to this language are likely to increase the perception among indigenes that the nation itself is under siege. As a final example, social and economic policies rarely have a geographically even effect, and the "lumpiness" or uneven development that occurs as a result provides proof to nationalists that their nations are not well served by the center (Nielsen 1985; Nairn 1977; Hechter 1975). Policies that result in uneven development are likely to activate national territoriality among those nations adversely affected, and this holds not only for less developed nations but also for relatively more developed nations (e.g., Slovenes, Estonians, Catalans) whose members feel that they contribute more than their fair share to statewide development. Such policies encourage the development of an indigenous perception of relative deprivation, which was cited above as a catalyst activating national territoriality. For example, during the 1960s Slovaks charged that investment decisions made in Prague did not allow for adequate development in Slovakia. As a consequence, Slovaks were "forced" to migrate to the Czech Socialist Republic in search of work, where they were said to be subjected to acculturation and assimilation (i.e., Czechization) pressures. This was one of the issues that Slovak nationalists cited in their demand for federalization of the state (Steiner 1973). In general, political subordination is likely to be viewed by indigenes as inherently undesirable, since the destiny of the nation and homeland is in the hands of outsiders who are likely to act in ways that promote their own national interests over those of the indigenous nation.

The political system in the USSR also reflected a dialectical approach to solving the "national problem." The federal structure of the Soviet government itself encouraged indigenes to think of themselves as the rightful owners of the republics named after them, since it was based for the most part on the geographic extent of national homelands. Attempts to do away with this special relationship, which was based not only on the Soviet constitution but on each nation's own sense of homeland, have resulted in sharp reactions by the indigenous communities who feel their own status is likely to be negatively affected.

Chapter 7, examines the political dimension of national territoriality in the