# AFTER THE WAR WAS OVER

RECONSTRUCTING THE FAMILY, NATION, AND STATE IN GREECE, 1943–1960

MARK MAZOWER

EDITOR

After the War Was Over

PRINCETON MODERN GREEK STUDIES

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RECONSTRUCTING THE
FAMILY, NATION, AND STATE
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Mark Mazower, Editor

This book has been composed in Sabon

This book is dedicated to the memory of

Nancy Crawshaw
and
Mando Dalianis

Contents

Abbreviations and Glossary of Terms

ABBREVIATIONS

AGDNG   *Archeio Genikis Doiikisis Voreio Ellada*
         Historical Archive of Macedonia, Archives of the General
           Directorate of Northern Greece
AGDWM   *Archeio Genikis Doiikisis Dytikis Makedonias*
         Archive of the General Directorate of Western Macedonia
AJDC   American Joint Distribution Committee
ASKI   *Archeia Synchronis Koinonikis Istoria*
         Archive of Contemporary Social History, Athens
BA   *Bundesarchiv Koblenz*
         Federal Archives
BA/ZWA   *Bundesarchiv-Zwischenarchiv Hengelar*
         Federal Archives, Hengelar Archive
BLO   British Liaison Officer
CJMCAG   The Conference for Jewish Material Claims against
           Germany
DSE   *Dimokratikos Stratos Ellados*
         Democratic Army of Greece
EA   *Ethniki Allilengyi*
         National Solidarity
EAM   *Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo*
         National Liberation Front
EASAD   *Ethnikos Agrotikos Syndesmos Antikommounistikis
         Draseos*
         National Agrarian Federation of Anticommunist Action
EDA   *Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera*
         United Democratic Left
EDES   *Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos*
         National Republican Greek league
ELAS   *Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos*
         National People's Liberation Army
EP   *Ehniki Politofylaki*
         Civil Guard (EAM)
EPON   *Eniaia Panelladiki Organosi Neon*
         United Panhellenic Organization of Youth

ESAG	*Eidiki Scholi Anamorfosi Gynaikon*
	Special School for the Reeduction of Women
FO	Public Record Office, London, Foreign Office Files
"Joint"	*see AJDC*
KEPP	*Kentriki Epitropi Peloponnisiakis Periferias*
	Central Committee for the Peloponnese Region
KKE	*Kommounistiko Kommo Ellados*
	Communist Party of Greece
OPLA	*Organosi Perifrourisi tou Laikou Agona*
	Organization for the Protection of the People's Struggle
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PAAA	*Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes,* Bonn
	Foreign Ministry, Political Archive
PASOK	*Panellinio Sosialistiko Komma*
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement
PEEA	*Politiki Epitropi Ethnikis Apeleftherosis*
	Political Committee for National Liberation
PEOPEF	*Panelliniki Enosi Oikogeneion Politikon Exoriston kai Fylakismenon*
	Panhellenic Union of Families of Political Exiles and Prisoners
PRO	Public Records Office, London
SB	Security Battalions
SNOF	*Slovenomakedonski Narodno Osloboditelen Front*
	Slav Macedonian Liberation Front
SOE	Special Operations Executive
USNA	United States National Archives, Washington, D.C.
WO	Public Record Office, London, War Office files

Glossary of Terms

andarte	resistance fighter
archigos	political or military leader
Dekemvriana	December events (December 1944)
dilosi	declaration of repentance
dilosies	those who signed declarations of repentance
ethniki syneidisi	national consciousness
ethnikofrosini	national-mindedness
ipefthinos	village leader
kapetan	leader of a guerrilla band
laokratia	People's rule (EAM/ELAS slogan)

The Territorial Development of the Greek Kingdom 1832-1947

-Key-

■ Original Greek Kingdom

▤ Ionian Islands ceded by Great Britain, 1864

▨ Thessaly, added 1881

▧ Macedonia, Crete and Islands added after the Balkan Wars, 1913

▥ Ceded by Treaty of Sèvres (not ratified) 1920

▦ Ceded by Treaty of Lausanne, 1923

▨ Dodecanese ceded by Italy, 1947

Miles
0   50   100   150   200

Historical

GREECE

English Miles

0 10 20 40 60 80 100

Railways ....

Geographical

After the War Was Over

Introduction

Mark Mazower

IN APRIL 1941, the German army swept into Greece, ushering in nearly a decade of social disintegration, political collapse, and mass violence unprecedented in degree and scale. The country's governmental system had been unstable before the war, but despite a volatile history of coups, military interventions, purges, and countercoups, it had never generated the intense hostility and bloodshed that were to follow. The interwar years had been a period of chronic crisis, as Greece's parliamentary democracy split apart in the "national schism" between republican Venizelists and royalist anti-Venizelists. A frail economy burdened by foreign indebtedness and the cost of fighting a decade of wars between 1912 and 1922 had also struggled to cope with the aftermath of that earlier era of conflict—the huge influx of refugees who fled the lands of the Ottoman empire and the Black Sea shoreline. Perhaps more than one and a half million newcomers entered a nation-state yet to absorb into the governmental machinery the large new territories it had won in the north—in Macedonia and Thrace—with their Slavic, Jewish, and Muslim minorities. Not surprisingly, the resultant strains— between Venizelists and royalists, between refugee newcomers and so-called autochthones, between the Greek majority and non-Greek minorities—presented obstacles that the country's political elite found it hard to overcome. The interwar economic depression brought about the downfall of the only politician of any stature: Venizelos himself. In 1936, parliamentary democracy was suspended and replaced by the right-wing dictatorship of General Ioannis Metaxas, a loyal royalist. Metaxas immediately set about destroying the Left, making lavish use of the anticommunist legislation passed by his predecessors. Communists real and suspected, as well as union organizers, were exiled or jailed by special tribunals. All this was repression on a scale not seen before in Greece; but it paled into insignificance compared with what was to follow.

In the spring of 1941, the country was split between three occupiers: the Italians held central Greece, Epiros, the Peloponnese, and the Cyclades; the Germans held most of the remaining points of strategic importance, including central Macedonia (with its capital, Salonika) and

Crete; the Bulgarians took over eastern Macedonia and western Thrace. Although a quisling government was set up in Athens under General Tsolakoglou, its rule over these three occupation zones was generally indirect and its hold precarious. Just how precarious was revealed almost immediately, as the food supply dwindled and starvation threatened the major cities and the islands. Soon it became clear that the Tsolakoglou regime was not powerful enough to collect the harvest from the farmers and deliver it to the towns. The tens of thousands of victims who died of hunger in the first winter of occupation testified to the political and administrative impotence of the Greek state machine in Athens. In effect, Greece barely existed as a political entity.

In this political vacuum, the efforts of most ordinary people to keep themselves alive and to secure access to food and security — basic citizenship rights that the Greek state could no longer guarantee — slowly assumed a political coloration. What one might call social resistance emerged alongside the pro-Allied intelligence and sabotage work in which some small groups had engaged almost from the moment the occupation began. In the summer and autumn of 1941 there were even sporadic attacks upon Axis troops: some were the acts of bands of Greek ex-servicemen, some represented the political initiative of Leftists. But when local communists organized an uprising against Bulgarian rule in the area of Drama, they unleashed a Bulgarian massacre of Greek civilians in retaliation, and thousands of frightened refugees fled the Bulgarian zone for Salonika. In October 1941, an attack on German soldiers in the Strymon valley was followed by Wehrmacht reprisals that led to the mass execution of more than two hundred villagers in Ano and Kato Kerzilion.

Hence in the winter of 1941, shocked by the vehemence of the Axis response, armed resistance died away. When opposition began again to emerge in a more sustained fashion, it was through urban mobilization. *Ethniki Allilengyi* (EA: National Solidarity) emerged as an underground movement to control access to food, prevent profiteering, and guarantee distribution; it was linked to another organization, the *Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo* (EAM: National Liberation Front), which quickly became the leading resistance movement in Athens and beyond. Many of its growing number of members failed to realize that behind EAM lay the Greek Communist Party (KKE), which was turning out to be far more successful than any of its prewar political rivals in exploiting the massive resentment at Axis rule to its own ends. From the late spring of 1942, armed resistance organizations began to operate again on a small scale, chiefly in remote mountain areas. But in the course of that year, the KKE established its own military resistance wing, *Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos* (ELAS: Greek People's Liberation

Army), and this began to disband rival resistance bands, often by force. Unlike in France, for instance, communist policy in Greece was to monopolize the armed resistance and to insist upon enrollment in a single Popular Front movement dominated by the Party and its cadres.

Even before Stalingrad turned the tide of the war early in 1943, the outlines of Greece's longer-term political problem were clear. Metaxas had swept away the old political elite of the interwar parliamentary system, and there had been few who mourned its passing. But the Germans had swept away the dictatorship in its turn, and even fewer wished for a return of the prewar authoritarian Right. The monarchy had been discredited by these events, and the bulk of popular opinion in occupied Greece was unmistakably opposed to the king's return. Hence the course of events, combined with the Communist Party's adroit domination of the resistance movement and the general Leftward shift across wartime Europe, seemed to point to a new democratic postwar order in which the organized Left (and in Greece that meant nothing else but communism) would take the lead. But what, then, of Britain's traditional strategic interest in Greece, and in particular Churchill's highly emotional commitment to ensuring King George's return to Athens? When a British unit of SOE (Special Operations Executive) was parachuted into Greece in the autumn of 1942, its members found themselves, much to their own initial bewilderment, in the middle of a political minefield.

British military and political interests tugged different ways. The war effort dictated supporting EAM/ELAS as it was providing the most effective guerilla opposition to the Axis; but longer-range political concerns required some kind of anticommunist counterweight. Hence, while continuing to work with and supply EAM/ELAS, the British also financed another resistance group, EDES (*Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos*, National Republican Greek League), led by the notorious Napoleon Zervas. Zervas was forced by British officers to take to the hills and build up an armed organization, and then was persuaded to drop his initial republicanism and come out in favor of the monarchy. Efforts to get the two resistance organizations to cooperate were largely a failure, and fighting broke out between them from 1943 onward. At Liberation, in the late autumn of 1944, EAM/ELAS turned on EDES and drove it from its stronghold in Epiros to the island of Corfu. At the same time as they were shoring up EDES, the British also retained more informal links with officers in the Greek gendarmerie and other nationalist units, and were prepared to overlook the fact that they were collaborating with the Germans.

When the Germans withdrew from Greece in October 1944, there was little to prevent EAM/ELAS seizing power. It dominated the coun-

tryside and the towns. EDES was driven off the mainland. Collaborators were rounded up, besieged, and in some cases massacred before the British could intervene. The paltry British forces then in Greece were no match for the thousands of armed men under ELAS's control. But EAM/ELAS did not make a move against, and indeed welcomed the arrival of, the incoming prime minister, George Papandreou, in whose government it held several ministries. One reason for its stance was undoubtedly that Russia had made it clear to the Greek communist leadership that it did not support an armed seizure of power: Churchill's negotiations with Stalin had resulted in an agreement, unknown in Greece at the time, that consigned the country unambiguously to the British sphere of influence. The Soviet Union had bigger fish to fry elsewhere in eastern Europe.

Nevertheless, many members of EAM/ELAS, while not opposed to the British, could not understand why the leadership hesitated to take power. Behind the scenes, the mistrust and suspicion between the resistance and those ushered into power by British support reached almost unbearable levels. At the beginning of December 1944, barely two months after the Wehrmacht pulled out, the resistance ministers in the Papandreou government resigned over a critical issue: the composition of the new police force. Unable to agree upon who should control the means of armed force in the postwar state, the two sides broke apart; two days later, on 4 December, following a demonstration in central Athens in which police fired on and killed several demonstrators, fighting broke out throughout the capital. These were the Dekemvriana—the December Events—which ended up with ELAS units pinning down British soldiers round the Grande Bretagne Hotel, and British jets strafing resistance positions in the leftist suburbs of Athens.

To this day there is enormous disagreement over the origins and meaning of the Dekemvriana: were they the onset of a communist seizure of power, or a spontaneous response by the Left to right-wing violence and provocation? Were they the first, or indeed perhaps the second, stage in the civil war between Left and Right that would explode into full-scale war again between 1946 and 1949? These questions remain unresolved. What is not in dispute is that when the fighting ended, in January 1945, and peace terms were agreed upon at the seaside resort of Varkiza the following month, the balance of power in Greece as a whole swung suddenly and decisively against the Left for the first time since 1942. Purges now took place in the civil service, and later in the new gendarmerie, but these purges were not, as elsewhere in Europe, of suspected collaborators but rather of suspected leftists and *resistants*.

It is against this background of right-wing terror, in which many scores were settled with the Left and new crimes were committed, that

Greece's returning political elite, clinging desperately to British support, tried to consolidate its position. 1945 stands out, in retrospect, as a year when moderate centrist politics, combined with a serious effort to tackle the problems of economic stabilization and reconstruction, were tried and failed. When elections were held in March 1946, the Left abstained—against Soviet advice—and the royalist Right triumphed. Despite the fact that the new government was led by a liberal, power chiefly lay in the hands of anticommunists at the regional and village level: right-wing violence intensified to the point where the government itself scarcely controlled what was happening in the provinces. That autumn, a rigged plebiscite secured the return of the king. British counsels of moderation were ignored, and the political center ground vanished.

As leftists fled their homes and villages for self-protection, armed bands began re-forming in the mountain areas of the Peloponnese and central Greece. By late 1946 it was evident that the country was once again facing civil war. The Democratic Army of Greece (DSE: *Dimokratikos Stratos Ellados*) was, in effect, the postwar successor to ELAS, except that communist control was much tighter and the ideological stakes were less ambiguous. Initially it was highly successful against the newly reformed National Army. But British and later American materiel and assistance, combined with a policy of forcibly relocating tens of thousands of villages to starve out the guerillas and increasing Greek military sophistication, turned the tide. As the guerrilla struggle became something much closer to a conventional military conflict, the advantages enjoyed by the official army proved decisive. The Tito-Stalin split in 1948 was the last straw. Tito had been the main backer of the DSE; when the leadership of the latter opted for Stalin and loyalty to the Soviet Union, Tito's backing was withdrawn. The following year, the DSE was finally defeated. Thousands of refugees streamed home; others sought refuge across Greece's northern borders; thousands more were interned in island camps or imprisoned on the mainland. From 1950 onward, Greece was at peace, but it was a strange, strained peace, guarded by what was formally a democratic order but held in place by repression, persecution of the Left, and armed violence on the fringes of society. It was, arguably, not until the anticommunist Right was itself discredited with the fall of the junta in 1974 that the country could return to some semblance of tranquility.

The Greek civil war was Europe's bloodiest conflict between 1945 and the breakup of Yugoslavia, and a turning point in the Cold War. Even before 1945, as internecine fighting developed within the resistance, bitterly polarized interpretations of Greek domestic politics were circulat-

ing inside British wartime agencies. After the Truman Doctrine in 1947—a dramatic shift in American foreign policy directly brought about by events in Greece—historians of the Right and the Left began to battle in print, attempting to settle the issue of who was responsible for the civil war. This was a debate that largely took place outside Greece (scholarly discussion of the subject inside the country was virtually impossible before the mid-1970s), and its contours followed those of the broader Cold War historiography.[1]

In the 1980s, at about the time that a kind of political reconciliation took place in Greece itself, a scholarly postrevisionist synthesis was also reached, exemplified by the series of volumes edited by John Iatrides. Around this synthesis—critical of both the Allies and the Left—quite substantial differences of emphasis were possible. While Iatrides underlined the KKE's commitment to revolution, David Close stressed the responsibility of the Right, and the emergence of an apparatus of terror and repression. Those who insisted upon the basic continuity of events between 1943 and 1947—the "Three Rounds"—faced those who insisted upon the real possibility of other outcomes, for instance, after Liberation. Yet so long as the Soviet Union existed, the main debate was conducted essentially on Cold War terms: historians focused either on the Greek Communist Party or on British and American policy-makers, and sought to pin blame on one or the other group. The dominant vein was politics, the mode diplomatic history. Civil-war scholars tended to see the war as a question of political strategies and policy-making, determined chiefly by discussion in cabinets or central committees; issues of gender, of culture, of *Alltagsgeschichte*, or indeed of social history broadly conceived, scarcely made an appearance. Athens, London, and Washington provided the focus, not villages, valleys, or the provinces.[2]

With the ending of the Cold War, the bounds within which this entire debate took place have become more obvious. Underlying intellectual and political concerns have changed, and slowly the civil war is moving from the realm of politics into that of history, thereby acquiring a new significance as part of the longer-run story of the formation of the Greek nation-state. In this and other ways, it starts to look more and more like a part of a common European experience of those years.

Claudio Pavone's *Una guerra civile: Saggio sulla moralità nella Resistenza* (Turin, 1991), with its radical reassessment of the Italian resistance and its frank recognition of the internecine nature of the fighting in northern Italy in 1943–1945, has sparked off a growing tendency among historians to view the European crisis of the 1940s generally as a profound shock to nations and states, weakened by the humiliation of defeat and foreign occupation, riven by deep ideological and ethnic divisions over the shape of the political and social order. Pavone's work,

alongside comparable work in French history, has led to a new interest in the social character of wartime resistance movements, but it has also focused attention on the *dopoliberazione*, the moment in which the violence of the resistance itself and the impotence of the traditional state, tainted by accusations of collaboration, became manifest. If the war years are seen as part of a broader continuum of conflict, it follows that the war cannot be seen as coming to an abrupt end with the German defeat. The immediate postwar years must also be brought into the picture: the whole issue of what Italians call the *dopoguerra* now forms a central concern of contemporary European historians, and the fighting in Greece can be seen as an extreme instance of a more general tension across Europe. It offers analogies with the violent resistance to Communist rule found in Poland, the Ukraine, and the Baltic states; it also acted as a warning and a deterrent in Italy.

Pavone's work stimulated a shift of geographical as well as temporal perspectives. If the mid-1940s constituted an unprecedented legitimacy crisis for the nation-state, then the depths of that crisis can be charted in the way power over territory slips from the control of the central state machine and, for greater or shorter periods, falls into the hand of occupying forces, partisans, or local elites. Much of the most interesting recent work on Italy and France in the 1940s has highlighted the limits to central power through an array of village and regional micro-histories. Of course, serious academic research into local history has long assumed an importance in French and Italian intellectual life that it lacks still in Greece. This volume represents an effort to apply these approaches to Greece as well.

One further factor behind the shift of scholarly concerns was Yugoslavia's experience in the 1990s, which cast a different light on civil wars generally. On the one hand, events there unquestionably accelerated the post–Cold War interest in nationalism and ethnicity, highlighting the whole ethnic dimension of the 1940s anew; on the other, they raised questions concerning the longer-term social and psychological repercussions of civil war. Civil wars come to an end: the question of how a society returns to some form of peace is no less intractable than that of why it was torn apart by conflict in the first place.

For all the above reasons, therefore, we are drawn back to the observations made by Nikos Svoronos on the need to search for the causes of the conflict of the 1940s in "the very structures of Greek society." Greece in the late 1940s unquestionably became a focus for global rivalries, yet a civil war by definition raises the problem of what happens when differing groups *within* the polity come to blows. Here our attention is very much on the domestic arena, and on the various ways in which internal conflict manifested itself and permeated society. In par-

Orphan children, a settlement outside Thessaloniki, October 1946. Reproduced by kind permission of the estate of Nancy Crawshaw.

ticular, the volume as a whole explores three crucial structural elements of the social order: the law, the family, and the nation.[3]

Across Europe, the ending of the Second World War and the defeat of fascism raised the question of the basis on which the postwar order would legitimize itself. Who would control the means of violence, and in the name of which political principles? The state apparatus had in most cases continued to function under foreign occupation, and thus itself faced an acute legitimacy crisis when the Germans pulled out; in Greece, the gendarmerie, for instance, had reportedly "lost the confidence of the people" at Liberation. This compromised state machine faced rival contenders—the resistance and returning exile govern-

ments—whose mutual relations were often laden with suspicion and mistrust.[4]

One way to look at the post-Liberation period, then, is in terms of a power vacuum in which different armed groups contested the right to impose their judicial and political norms upon all or part of the country while the state struggled to recover its monopoly of armed force. In Chapter One, I attempt to delineate what seem to have been the three most powerful and clearly defined rival versions of political justice: EAM/ELAS and its conception of "People's Justice," the nationalist conception of ethnic justice, and the liberal norms of the returning Greek political elite. This picture is of course simplified, because it takes little account of more local and less ambitious struggles. But it may help convey the enormity of the task that faced the returning Papandreou government and its successors, and the limits of their real power over much of Greece.[5]

Perhaps the chief reason for this outcome was that postwar governments lacked a loyal and disciplined police force and found themselves reliant upon a disparate conglomeration of anticommunist forces in their struggle with EAM/ELAS. In many ways, this new alignment came together under the pressure of the Dekemvriana and evolved uneasily in the following months. The new National Guard was dominated by right-wing officers, while British efforts to reconstruct the gendarmerie on professional lines failed. In reality it was neither the British nor the Greek political elite who called the tune, but rather officers in the security services and army. Between June 1945 and September 1946 the gendarmerie grew from 9,000 to 28,569 men and became increasingly militarized. Yet far from establishing itself with the Greek public, it was losing popularity. In mid-1946, its ineffectiveness led the government to empower the army to take over the task of restoring law and order.[6]

These developments underline the very limited extent to which politicians in postwar Athens managed to assert any greater control over the countryside than their occupation predecessors had done. In April 1945, it was reported from Volos that "purely local affairs still absorb the public mind and there is an apparent lack of knowledge [of] and even interest in events occurring elsewhere in Greece," while from rural Crete came reports that "law and order are absent . . . and a state bordering on anarchy is said to prevail." The prefect responsible for Karpenisi complained at the lack of government support, and said it was "impossible to get anything accomplished." The following month, Captain Pat Evans reported from Florina on "a general lack of confidence . . . a number of people have been remarking in cafes and other public places: 'There is no State.' 'The Communists did at any rate make

things run, whatever else they may have done.' 'The present Government is useless!' "[7]

As 1945 wore on, this situation did not change very much, and the only significant alteration in Greek politics was that whereas formerly it had been the Left that ignored Athens with impunity in the provinces, now it was the Right. In March 1945 it was reported from the small Evia spa resort of Aidipsos that "the Mayor is reported to be a member of KKE and when asked by the Prefect to hand over to his predecessor, he simply ignored the order since there was no one to compel him." A few months later such an episode would have been unthinkable. That summer Woodhouse reported on the right-wing grip on the Peloponnese and recorded with astonishment that "in the village of Eva near Kalamata, the X organization have established a private government under a man called Stavreas, which controls several neighbouring villages and runs an armed civilian police force. . . . Eva lies on the main road from Kalamata to Meligala."[8]

The new government's weakness was not solely geographical. It also manifested itself in its inability to come to terms with the war through the kind of purging of the civil service and punishment of collaborators that public opinion desired, and that took place in most of Europe at this time. Eleni Haidia's study of the collaborators' courts in northern Greece (Chapter Two) makes it clear that despite a strong popular desire for collaborators to be punished, little happened in many cases. Greece's poor record in this respect was not only a consequence of the Dekemvriana; it was also a product of the extraordinary weakness of an unpopular political elite, which was unable to organize itself and was challenged by the proven and successful rival EAM/ELAS, which had become in terms of Greek politics the organization par excellence.[9]

As often in Greek affairs, national political weakness allowed intermediate groups and institutions to block state action and policy. The popular desire for purges of war criminals, collaborators, and even individuals closely associated with the Metaxas regime ran up against institutional resistance, as Procopis Papastratis shows in his study of higher education (Chapter Three). Here we have a striking illustration of what Pavone calls "the continuity of the state" in the face of sporadic but seriously intentioned political attempts, backed, it can be said, by the British, to intervene in its workings to dismiss collaborators. The highly conservative and politically compromised leadership of the University of Athens successfully appealed to the notion of academic freedom to ward off the Ministry of Education, while at the same time taking advantage of the new mood to rid the faculty of leftists *and* gain greater influence over its rival university in Thessaloniki.

The acute legitimacy crisis of the Greek state was reflected not only in

its inability to assert new democratic institutional norms inside the judiciary, higher education, or the organs of public security, but also in the array of laws it passed to consolidate its position. As Nikos Alivizatos has pointed out, though the civil war never led to the collapse of Greek democracy, it did lead to the enactment of a body of legislation with obvious authoritarian consequences. This legislation built upon and extended the reach of various prewar laws, and forces us to compare the political uses of the law in Greek society before and after the Second World War.[10]

From the summer of 1945 onward, the Greek state attempted to control the Left with the aid of public security committees, originally set up in 1924, which allowed the government to outlaw persons considered dangerous to public security. Together with special military tribunals, these committees contributed to the mushrooming of special courts that lay outside the regular judicial system; as in Ireland during the war of 1919–1921, such a proliferation of judicial fora indicated the precariousness of the government's hold on power. In addition, the 1871 brigandage law was also restored, initially for a six-month term, and later extended. Political opposition was thus criminalized, and families as well as individuals became subject to punishment: article 2 of the 1871 law detailed which family members could be sent into internal exile. This was followed in September 1946 by another law punishing the families of army deserters, part of the right-wing fear of communist infiltration of the state itself that lay behind the purges of the Left and the vetting of bureaucracies that were a common feature of the early Cold War everywhere in the West.[11]

The extent of the increase in the scale and ambition of the state's use of the law can be gauged quantitively, and not just through the increased surveillance of its own servants that the fight against communism required. The gendarmerie alone more than doubled in size compared with the Metaxas period. Imprisonment for political crimes was also much more common. As the camps of the Metaxas era were being closed down, regular prisons were becoming dangerously overcrowded, and a new system of detention centers, islands of deportation, and camps was coming into existence, culminating in the creation of the Makronisos "re-education" center. Although we lack an overall study of this system as seen in the context of the longer run of Greek penal policy, the studies contained in this volume help gauge its internal dynamics and social impact.

It is true that the idea of incarcerating a large number of communists, "male and female of all ages," dated back to before the war—indeed, even to before the Metaxas dictatorship.[12] The ideological foundations of state anticommunism, involving the punishment of people for their

ideas, were in place already by the 1930s. But the sheer number of those incarcerated was far larger than at any time in the past, and easily dwarfed even the thousands jailed or detained under Metaxas. The greater severity of the law was reflected in particular in the unprecedented number of women and even children who were officially detained, necessitating the founding of special women's camps. In 1934, for instance, there had been roughly 130 female inmates housed in the Averoff Women's Prison in Athens; a little more than a decade later, it housed nearly ten times as many. The strains upon the primitive infrastructure required to support such an expansion of the system of incarceration can be judged in the remarkable collection of photos taken by women inmates and recently published under the heading *Gynaikes exoristes sta stratopeda tou emfyliou*.[13]

The amount of violence used by the state was also greater than in the past. We lack a reliable study of the use of the death penalty in Greek history, but it is fairly clear that its use against the Left between 1945 and 1950 overshadowed that in all previous and subsequent periods. It is also striking that while governments in the immediate postwar period were reluctant to carry out death sentences against convicted collaborators and war criminals, such inhibitions were much less in evidence against the Left, especially after the 1946 elections. In general, it is possible to say that for Greece, as for most other European countries, society in the 1940s became familiar as never before or since with violent death.

The implications of this closeness to death are explored in Polymeris Voglis's research into political prisoners on death row (Chapter Four). The threat of death was part of the pressure exerted by the state upon the minds of its opponents to persuade them to recant and publicly rejoin the national community. In this respect, it was the expression of a bitterly polarized ideological struggle and the logical culmination of a series of laws aimed explicitly at punishing thoughts and beliefs rather than acts—most notably the 1929 *Idionymon*, but also those laws which punished ethnic minorities for their supposed lack of an *ethniki syneidisi* ("national consciousness").

The phenomenon of public recantation that Voglis scrutinizes is only now beginning to attract the attention it deserves. A source of shame and embarassment both to the Party and to those who succumbed, it is the great unspoken of postwar Leftist historiography, despite the fact that a majority of political detainees probably did sign repentances, which were widely and deliberately disseminated in magazines, newspapers, and radio broadcasts by the authorities in order to discredit communism. But as Voglis argues, those who repented found themselves trapped not only between the competing forces of Right and Left, but

also between the competing realms of political and domestic respon-sibility.[14]

The KKE stigmatized those who repented as sinners and traitors, just as the government stigmatized those who refused to repent. Those on death row who held out saw themselves as heroes dying honorably for the sake of their beliefs; the letters they sent before execution expressed such views and transmitted them to their relatives. On the other hand, the families of prisoners often saw matters differently and urged in-mates to repent so that they could be released and could care for their children. Mando Dalianis's research (Chapter Five), a fascinating com-plement to the piece by Voglis, shows that the children of political pris-oners carried very mixed feelings about their parents for generations afterward. Interviewed in the 1980s, many of these children both ad-mired their parents and criticized them for putting politics above their domestic responsibilities. Such criticisms did not reflect any indoctrina-tion by the Right: one of the many fascinating aspects of Dalianis's research is that it shows how little influence the official anticommunist line peddled in schools and orphanages had upon the children educated there. None of them swallowed for very long the line that the king and queen were now their real parents. What many of these children really felt was that the ideological politics of the 1940s had demanded too much of their parents, and had ended up forcing them to choose be-tween the Party and the family.

Two other contributors also explore facets of this dilemma. Tassoula Vervenioti traces how in Greece, as across Europe in the 1940s, women experienced the transition from war to peace as a more or less unwilling move from public action back into the domestic sphere (Chapter Six). In the Second World War, adherence to the left-wing resistance meant participation in social revolution at a time when the war had eroded the bonds of the traditional family; after 1945 it meant persecution and imprisonment at a time when older domestic and patriarchal values were reasserting themselves. Some women squared the circle: they reen-tered the world of politics as mothers of prisoners protesting to publi-cize their childrens' plight and secure their release. But many others found themselves up against the choice of Party or family: they fell in love, and resented the way the Party claimed the right to decide for them whether or not they could marry; they became aware of the male-dominated structure of authority in the Party itself, present even in the prisons and camps where many were held; or they simply found them-selves dreaming of home.

Riki van Boeschoten's study of the "impossible return" to the moun-tain village of Ziakas (Chapter Seven) also analyzes the impact of the war on attitudes toward politics and community. Ziakas was a predom-

inantly left-wing village, 90 percent of whose inhabitants fled during the civil war. As with the Jewish community of Salonika, if for different reasons, there could be no reestablishment of the prewar community, no return home. Yet a strong sense of community helped villagers through decades of separation and exile. Indeed, van Boeschoten argues that this sense of community was an important aid in helping villagers survive and cope with the catastrophe of the 1940s. This coincided with their growing alienation from the Party, increasingly seen not merely as complicit in their tragedy but as incapable of more than a bureaucratic and authoritarian response to the problems of exile itself. Party meetings turned into crude mechanisms of social control, and villagers resented the Party's intervention in matters of private life.[15]

The fate of the villagers of Ziakas should also prompt us to consider the impact of the 1940s on what we might call the political geography of Greece. The war itself saw mountain villages like Ziakas first cut off from the capital and the national government, and then briefly moving closer to the center of politics in the mountains of Free Greece. In the case of this village, the reestablishment of control from Athens resulted in the almost total destruction of its traditional society. Only a few villagers lived on there, awaiting the infrequent letters from abroad whose arrival signified the continuation of village life abroad and which they experienced as a kind of "resurrection." But the end of village life can be seen differently — as part of the urbanization and modernization of Greek life that took place from the 1950s on. According to van Boeschoten, the children who left Ziakas to go into exile behind the Iron Curtain, forming part of the highly debated *paidomazoma* (lit., "gathering of the children"), combined regret at having had to leave their homes with a sense of having escaped the world of limited opportunities for the educational chances offered by cities like Prague and Bucharest.

Perhaps, then, the 1940s were the last time Greece's political destiny would be played out in the countryside as much as in the cities. Yet this makes it all the more extraordinary that there have been virtually no scholarly historical analyses of that critical decade from the perspective of particular villages or regions. Rural Greece has remained until very recently fixed in the image of an unchanging, traditional, ahistorical world established by postwar social anthropology and reflected in the photographs that Meletzis, Papaioannou, and others took for the country's growing tourism industry. These studies and photographs make no reference to the catastrophic events that swept the face of the land. But in this volume, Stathis Kalyvas, John Sakkas and Lee Sarafis all offer accounts of the violence of the 1940s as seen from the countryside. Kalyvas's pioneering study of left-wing violence focuses upon the little-

studied Argolid (Chapter Eight). Sakkas explores a group of villages near Karpenisi in central Greece, one of the most isolated parts of the mainland (Chapter Nine). Sarafis discusses the village of Deskati in Thessaly (Chapter Ten). This was perhaps less isolated, but not by much: after all, the main Athens-Larissa road was not fully reopened until 1949. Local perspectives serve to underscore the decisive importance of local politics and show how national political loyalties and struggles were filtered through a dense layer of village and regional concerns and interests.[16]

In all three chapters, the civil war stands out as a far more catastrophic experience than the Axis occupation. From 1943 onward, national political groupings needed to draw on unprecedented reserves of force and violence to compel or induce support and obedience. This went for EAM/ELAS as well as for a series of Athens-based regimes. It was the Left, according to Kalyvas's meticulously researched analysis of the spiral into violence around Argos, whose systematic assassination of political opponents triggered reprisals from Germans and Security Battalionists. The Argolid had shown almost no support for the Left before the war; preservation of EAM's swiftly acquired wartime power, especially when filtered through communist ideology, required high levels of killing, especially in that topographically intermediate zone between the mountains, where resistance control was easier, and in the plains, where it was almost impossible.

EAM may have been rather more popular in Deskati, as Sarafis describes (though her own family links to the village should be borne in mind), but around Karpenisi repression was vital in showing the peasants EAM's power. Aris Velouchiotis's brutality was one instance of the extreme violence the Left was capable of unleashing. Yet as Sakkas shows, the Right's power after Liberation was, if anything, more precariously based and more reliant upon an unsavory network of mercenaries and paramilitaries, who patrolled the outlying areas where the National Guard was afraid to go, targeting whole families when they could not find the suspects they wanted. When the civil war broke out in earnest, different villages responded very differently, some managing to contain the level of killing, others suffering massacre and terror. Once again, one returns to the possibility that the mass violence and political polarization of the civil war played an important part in destroying the older, more flexible forms of political allegiance that had been found in the villages before the war, and thus hastened the outflow of people from rural areas into the towns.[17]

North of Kastoria, in the region of the Prespa Lakes, lies a series of deserted villages. In this border zone, villages have multiple names:

Women and children homeless refugees in the ruins of Naoussa, after a rebel raid, 1949. Reproduced by kind permission of the estate of Nancy Crawshaw.

Gavdos, whose houses are collapsing into the overgrown fields, appears on the pre-1914 Austrian military maps as Gabres; Milionas, whose empty buildings now shelter passing Albanians on their way south, is shown as Metovo. These are the valleys where the civil war reached its climax in 1949, before the remnants of the Democratic Army fled

across the border into nearby Albania. Many Slavic-speaking villagers fled at the same time, when they had not already left to escape the raids of the Greek air force. A few years later, the Greek government became worried at the depopulation of its vital border regions and resettled the villages with Vlachs from Thessaly and Epiros. But with time, most of these left, too.

Today the whole region bears testimony to the tangled and complex ethnic dimension of the civil war years. With the collapse of communism and the emergence of an independent Macedonia across Greece's northern border, scholars have become newly attentive to the ways the stresses of the 1940s revealed the faultlines in the Greek nation, and underlined the limitations of the nation-building project of the previous century. In northern Greece — the New Lands of the post-1912 conquests — the war decade massively altered the ethnic balance of rural and urban areas alike. The Greek nation was built up anew on the basis of a narrative of selected historical memories in which the experience of Jews, Slavs, and others found no place.

Anastasia Karakasidou's study of nation-building and patriotic celebrations in postwar Macedonia (Chapter Eleven) charts the careful way the Greek state constructed a cult of national pride through decrees and administrative regulations. One is tempted to see this intensive bureaucratic effort as a response to the sense of anxiety that both occupation and civil war provoked. The same anxiety expressed itself in the patriotic ceremonials surrounding the royal family, which was desperate to promote its place in Greek society after fleeing the country in 1941 and then being prevented from returning until the 1946 plebiscite allowed it back in.

Thessaloniki, which is the city at the heart of Karakasidou's analysis, also features prominently in Bea Lewkowicz's contribution (Chapter Twelve). The city's largest religious group at the turn of the century had been the Jews, a flourishing community almost totally destroyed by the Final Solution. Almost, but not entirely, and Lewkowicz discusses how the survivors slowly rebuilt both their own lives and their much-reduced community in the following decades. The contrast with Voglis's proud leftists is striking: for the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust, the heroization of suffering was rarely a compelling possibility; they seem to have turned inward far more decisively, to the family, children, and domesticity. Shaken by their experiences, they and their children avoided entry into a public realm that forced upon them unwelcome issues of national and ethnic self-definition. Only in the 1990s, with the rise of a new kind of identity politics more globally as well as the emergence of an international acceptance of Jewish wartime suffering, did it become possible to acknowledge more publicly the presence of Jews in Greek life. Even then, as the 1997 unveiling of the Holocaust memorial in Thessaloniki

demonstrated, that acknowledgment remained highly conditional, above all in the erstwhile "mother of Israel" itself.

The burden of memory in the case of Greek suffering forms the subject of Xanthippi Kotzageorgi-Zymari and Tassos Hadjianastassiou's fascinating analysis of three generations of memory of the wartime Bulgarian occupation of northeastern Greece (Chapter Thirteen). Lands that were ruled by Bulgaria in both World Wars now form part of Greece. The members of the youngest generation have no personal memory of war, and a gulf seems to separate them from parents and grandparents who survived some of the harshest experiences of the entire occupation period. Teenagers who live today in the area investigated by Zymari appear scarcely interested in what happened half a century earlier. They also seem not to share the relatively harsh attitudes toward the Bulgarians that are more commonly and perhaps unsurprisingly found among their elders. Whether this shows the greater political maturity of the young or the benefits to be derived from historical amnesia is hard to say. But it is striking that the heroization of wartime suffering, the appeal of patriotic narratives of martyrs and sacrifices for the nation, appears more and more to leave Greek teenagers cold. Perhaps Greece is entering an era in which history and its public uses have less attraction than they once did. Or is it that public myth-making was never very attractive, and only imposed itself upon people's lives when the state devoted its resources to this end? In the mid-twentieth century, history was an essential weapon for the protagonists of the struggle of ideologies; at the century's end, it may no longer serve any obvious public function. A waning interest in the heroes and struggles of the past thus goes hand in hand with the more modest place of politics in daily life.

Finally, Susanne-Sophia Spiliotis's study of the politics of the Merten affair opens up the subject of the deliberate silence that enveloped discussion of wartime collaboration during the 1950s and 1960s. The nature of Greek wartime collaboration has in fact never been seriously researched. That it existed on a wide scale, in a variety of forms and for various motives, is unquestioned. The Merten scandal of the late 1950s, which erupted when a German war criminal was arrested in Greece, was not just the moment when it became clear how deeply the postwar Greek elite was implicated in unsavory wartime dealings. Thanks to Spiliotis's exploitation of recently released German archives, we can now see how the scandal itself affected Greco-German postwar diplomacy, and how the question of war crimes became enmeshed with issues of economic assistance and even the construction of the Common Market.

On the one hand, silence, denial, repudiation; on the other, the elaboration of ceremonies, parades, and myths. Destroyed, abandoned, or lost