

WARREN F. KIMBALL

# Churchill and Roosevelt

*The Complete Correspondence:  
Volume 1, Alliance Emerging October  
1933-November 1942*



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**Churchill & Roosevelt**  
**The Complete Correspondence**



1. "A Righteous Comradeship"

# Churchill & Roosevelt

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## The Complete Correspondence

### I. Alliance Emerging

OCTOBER 1933 – NOVEMBER 1942

EDITED WITH  
COMMENTARY BY

Warren F. Kimball

Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey



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DEDICATED TO  
Winston Spencer Churchill,  
1874–1965  
AND  
Franklin Delano Roosevelt,  
1882–1945

Now that we are together, now that we are linked in  
a righteous comradeship of arms, now that our two  
considerable nations, each in perfect unity, have joined  
*all their life energies in a common resolve, a new scene*  
opens upon which a steady light will glow and brighten.

Winston S. Churchill  
before a joint session of the United States Congress  
December 26, 1941



# Contents

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## VOLUME I

List of Maps	ix
List of Photographs	x
Preface	xi
Acknowledgments	xiii
Editorial Procedures	xvii
Bibliographical Note	xxvii
Initials of Message Drafters	xxxii
Digest of Documents	xxxiii
Addenda	clxv
Introduction: Churchill and Roosevelt: Their Relationship, Their Correspondence	2
Correspondence: October 8, 1933 – November 14, 1942	23
Editorial Commentary:	
Lend-Lease	87
The Mediterranean Theater and the Balkans	144
ULTRA Intelligence	214
The Atlantic Conference (RIVIERA)	227
The United States and Japan	274
The First Washington Conference (ARCADIA)	292
India	373
Organizing the Pacific Theater	409
Early Plans for a Cross-Channel Invasion	458
The Second Washington Conference (ARGONAUT)	513
Strategic Bombing	596
Politics in French North Africa	635
Addenda and Errata to the Paperback Edition	675

## VOLUME II

Correspondence: November 15, 1942 – February 29, 1944	4
Editorial Commentary:	
The North African Invasion and the Darlan Deal	3
Postponing the Second Front in Europe	48
The Casablanca Conference (SYMBOL)	117
Poland and Russia	192

De Gaulle and the Free French	208
The Third Washington Conference (TRIDENT)	212
The First Quebec Conference (QUADRANT)	429
Italy	455
The Political-Military Relationship	479
Yugoslavia and Greece	548
The Cairo and Teheran Conferences (SEXTANT AND EUREKA)	605
Great Britain and Yugoslavia	660
The Polish Boundary Dispute	684

## VOLUME III

Correspondence: February 29, 1944 – April 13, 1945	3
Editorial Commentary:	
The Big Three Powers in Iran	139
De Gaulle versus the Allies	169
The Pacific Theater	191
Disputes over Strategy in Europe	197
De Gaulle's Visit to Washington	237
The Warsaw Uprising	259
British Policy in the Balkans	274
The Second Quebec Conference (OCTAGON)	315
Organizing the United Nations	330
The Moscow Conference (TOLSTOY)	348
Anglo-American Disagreements	436
Trouble in Greece	449
Confusion of Policy toward Poland	461
Roosevelt and Eastern Europe	481
Competition for Iranian Oil	511
The Malta and Yalta Conferences (CRICKET and ARGONAUT)	521
A British Reversal on Eastern Europe	545
Glossary of Codenames, Acronyms, and Common Abbreviations	639
List of Sources Cited	647
Index	655

## List of Maps

---

### VOLUME I

The North Atlantic	55
The Western Desert (North Africa) ( <i>Campaign Summaries</i> , USMA)	271
Initial Japanese Attacks 7–8 December 1941 and Limit of Advance ( <i>Campaign Summaries</i> , USMA)	288
The ABDACOM Area, January–February 1942 ( <i>United States Army in World War II</i> series; hereafter U.S. Army history)	311
The Pacific Areas, 1 August 1942 (U.S. Army history)	410
Persian Corridor Supply Routes (U.S. Army history)	573
Convoy Routes to Northern Russia	601
The Battle of El Alamein, 23 October – 4 November 1942 ( <i>Campaign Summaries</i> , USMA)	658
Landings in North Africa 8–11 November 1942, and Advance into Tunisia November–December 1942 ( <i>Campaign Summaries</i> , USMA)	668

### VOLUME II

Russian Winter Offensive 1942–43 ( <i>Campaign Summaries</i> , USMA)	16
Lines of Communication in China-India-Burma Theater, December 1942 (U.S. Army history)	111
Campaign in Italy, 1943–45	453
Polish Boundary Proposals	685
India-Burma Theater, 1944–1945 (U.S. Army history)	758

### VOLUME III

Campaign in Northern France	184
Situation in the Pacific, 12 March 1944 (U.S. Army history)	192
Campaign in Southern France, 15 August – 15 September 1944 (U.S. Army history)	277
Situation in Europe, 15 January 1945 (U.S. Army history)	525

# List of Photographs

---

## VOLUME I

1. ( <i>frontispiece</i> ) Roosevelt and Churchill at the Cairo Conference, November 25, 1943 (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library)	ii
2. Churchill and Roosevelt, Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, August 9, 1941 (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library)	2
3. Churchill, aboard HMS <i>Kelvin</i> (destroyer), June 12, 1944 (US Army, SC 435965)	132
4. Roosevelt, Quebec, August 1943 (US Army, SC 178036)	230
5. Churchill, aboard HMS <i>Kelvin</i> (destroyer), June 12, 1944 (US Army, SC 190284)	291
6. Churchill and Roosevelt, Casablanca, January 1943 (US Army, SC 152334)	337

*See individual volumes for other photographs*

## Preface

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When I first thought of editing and annotating the correspondence between Roosevelt and Churchill, an idea I came up with a few years before the opening of the British and American wartime archives, I planned to select the most important items, identify the key persons and events, add a few useful appendices, and then get on to other “real” research. Such a collection would have been a useful, standard “editing job.” But along that road I was waylaid by Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt! Early on I realized that their correspondence was a special, unique whole, not only because it occurred in the maelstrom of World War II, but because of the style, intellect, and personality of each man. Regardless of whether one approves of their plans and actions, both are endlessly fascinating and undeniably important as historical figures. For me to “select-out” some of their exchanges seemed wrong, for it would inevitably distort a major historical skein. And so I have gone in the other direction, trying to include every scrap that could conceivably be considered Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence.

But as I began to put it all together, I found myself trying to think like an historian—evaluating evidence, setting a broad context, drawing conclusions. The traditional approach would have been to edit the documents and then, afterward, write a monograph based on them. Instead, I have tried to combine the two in one set of volumes. Without question, the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence can be read and consulted independently of what I have done, and presenting that collection in a form usable by scholars was a primary goal. But I have also tried to use the headnotes as far more than just a vehicle for bare-bones identifications and facts. The headnotes are intended to be read along with the documents. If I have succeeded, the documents and headnotes, taken together as a whole, comprise an interpretive history of Anglo-American strategy and diplomacy that is based both on the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence and on the other sources that are available on the Second World War. Those who dip in and out of this collection to find specific items will likely miss its broader purpose. For those who read these volumes like a book instead of a documentary collection, my intention is for the headnotes to provide the broad context and interpretive scheme that distinguishes analytical history from mere story-telling.

Warren F. Kimball





## Acknowledgments

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In the course of completing such an extensive a project, an editor receives help from hundreds of people. I have tried to keep track of all those favors, but inevitably I have forgotten some. To those whose help I have failed to acknowledge, I offer an apology and a heartfelt thank-you.

An author's fullest and warmest acknowledgements traditionally come last. For once, however, the first shall be first. My wife, Jacqueline, has encouraged, praised, pushed, and supported me from the outset. Her help has been much more than just putting up with my preoccupation; she has assisted directly in countless ways, big and little, as have my children, Paula, Tom, and Donna.

Three friends—and colleagues—have performed far above and beyond the call of both professional courtesy and friendship. Charles C. Alexander of Ohio University and George C. Herring of the University of Kentucky have both read the entire manuscript, cover to cover, and have saved me from more errors of fact and style than I care to admit. Their willingness to provide a thorough, painstaking critique has contributed immeasurably to the final result. Lloyd C. Gardner, of Rutgers University, not only read and criticized large portions of the text, particularly the essays on the major conferences and controversies of the war, but also offered constant encouragement as well as responses to my endless stream of questions. Their help and enthusiasm were indispensable. Were they not my friends, I would owe them an enormous debt.

Two other scholars read much of the manuscript and shared with me their vast knowledge. Forrest C. Pogue, Director of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Institute, has already provided a series of guideposts for historians of the Second World War in his writings, particularly his biography of George C. Marshall. His help at various stages of this project was of great benefit. William M. Franklin, for years the Director of the Historical Office in the State Department, either worked on, edited, or supervised the editing of all the volumes in *Foreign Relations of the United States* dealing with the wartime years. That series, which is the best and most up-to-date collection of its kind (and which I hope will remain so), sets a benchmark for editors. I was indeed fortunate to have the benefit of Bill Franklin's advice, though I suspect he thought trying to correct my errors was a chore that had ended once I completed his courses in graduate school.

Since the most complete archival collection of the Churchill-Roosevelt exchanges is in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, the constant and cheerful cooperation of the staff there—particularly

William Emerson, William O'Neill, William Stewart, Frances Seeber, Joseph Marshall, and Robert Parks—was essential, and always forthcoming. Anyone who works there soon comes to understand the wisdom of the planners who created the presidential libraries, places where scholars can escape the impersonal bureaucracy of huge archives and get involved with dedicated experts who understand and care about individual projects.

At the Public Record Office in London, England (at what used to be the Portugal Street branch), an expert and cooperative staff made my research fruitful. I am particularly grateful to Alice Prochaska for her help in untying some red tape. Distance made it impossible for me to visit the Public Record Office whenever I needed to examine the documents, but I found I could depend upon another colleague, David Reynolds of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, who spent freely of his own time to dig through those files for me. His perceptiveness and diligence proved enormously helpful. He also graciously permitted me to consult the manuscript of his now published excellent monograph on Anglo-American relations, 1937–42. I must also thank Henry B. Ryan, then a student at Cambridge University, now with the USICA, for performing similar chores, as well as for sharing with me the results of some of his own research.

The day-in, day-out support provided by a researcher's home library is always critical. I am deeply grateful to a group of scholar-librarians at Rutgers University who invariably gave me the help I needed. People at both the New Brunswick and Newark campuses—particularly George Kanzler, Francis Johns, Gil Cohen, Myong Chung, Mary Fetzner, Natalie Borisovets—were unfailingly efficient, prompt, and courteous. I could not have made it through without their kindness and expertise. Rutgers University Library has developed an extensive microfilm collection of documents relating to British foreign policy, particularly for the twentieth century, and without those materials my work would have been much more difficult.

A number of other libraries and archives provided important support. The staff of the National Archives Diplomatic Branch in Washington, D.C., headed by Milton O. Gustafson, helped me locate a number of items and assisted me ably in my general research in those files. Dean Allard at the Navy Historical Center, John Taylor at the Modern Military Records Branch of NARS, and Maurice Matloff at the Office of Military History, all in Washington, D.C., Randall Rakers at the Military History Institute in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and the Directors of the Harry S Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower libraries answered specific inquiries as did the curator at Chartwell, Kent, Winston Churchill's country estate. Finally, I

managed to find all sorts of hard-to-get books at the Naval War College Library in Newport, Rhode Island, which has what may be the most complete collection of secondary studies on World War II available in the United States.

A number of people assisted me in large and small ways—Henry H. Adams, Rear Admiral Ernest Bell, John Costello, Robert Dallek, David Dilks, Taras Hunczak, David Kahn, Joseph P. Lash, Richard W. Leopold, James Leutze, William Loveland, Herbert P. Meritt, Fred Pollack, Brian Porter, Robert Price, Basil Rauch, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., Paul Rosenfeld, Louise Sieminski, Mark Stoler, Christopher Thorne, John Tolland, and Donald Cameron Watt. The willingness of people like these to share their experiences and research and to dig out answers to other people's questions is one of the most rewarding aspects of the historical profession.

In the summer of 1980, I was privileged to participate in a joint meeting of the American and United Kingdom Committees for the History of the Second World War, held at the Imperial War Museum in London. The papers presented and the full, frank discussions which followed provided detail and, more important, context which I have endeavored to write into my headnotes. Some of these scholars have been thanked above, but the others deserve recognition: Louis Allen, Ralph Bennett, Philip Bell, Martin Blumenson, William Casey, Harold Deutsch, John Gaddis, Margaret Gowing, Michael Howard, David Lance, Ronald Lewin, Maurice Matloff, Nigel Nicolson, and Samuel Proctor. Special acknowledgement goes to Arthur Funk and Sir William Deakin both for organizing the conference and for their own contributions.

I extend particular thanks to Martin Gilbert, Churchill's official biographer, for sharing the results of his exhaustive research in the Churchill papers; to Winston Churchill, M.P., who helped me to locate several elusive items; to Professor M. Medina, of the Universities of Madrid and La Laguna, and to Edward Elly, then the Cultural Attaché at the American Embassy in Madrid, for helping me to continue my research while I was a Fulbright Lecturer at the University of Madrid; to Aida Lahood, who constructed just the right maps from my crude sketches; and to Joan Bailey, who compiled the index with skill and patience.

Research requires money, an important supply of which was provided by the Rutgers Research Council. The American Philosophical Society and the American Council of Learned Societies granted the funds I needed for an extended visit to the Public Record Office in London, and the Eleanor Roosevelt Institute awarded me a grant which made possible repeated trips to the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

My editors at Princeton University Press, Sandy Thatcher and Bill Hively, operating with what seemed an inexhaustible supply of patience, gave excellent advice and firm support from start to finish. It is a pleasure to work with a publisher that puts scholarship at the top of its priorities.

The late J. Joseph Huthmacher—a true friend, teacher, and scholar—offered good counsel and encouragement from the first day I began as an apprentice historian. This is affectionately dedicated to his memory.

Of course, Winston S. Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt helped a little.

Warren F. Kimball  
Somerset, New Jersey  
March 17, 1983 (#24)

# Editorial Procedures

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## HEADNOTES

The headnotes serve three purposes. They provide identifications and facts needed to understand the document they precede. They also are intended to bridge the gaps between documents so that the entire collection can be read rather than just consulted. Finally, they offer an opportunity for interpretive comments. Although citations have been omitted except for quotations and hard-to-locate information, editorial comments are based upon research in archives and literally hundreds of secondary sources; still, they remain unabashedly subjective. Taken all together, the essays and headnotes are intended to offer a broad and comprehensive interpretation of the politics of strategy in World War II, particularly as viewed by Churchill and Roosevelt. Those who prefer the "unobtrusive editor" can rest easy, secure in the knowledge that the intrinsic identity and value of the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence can withstand any editor's assault.

## SOURCES

Whenever possible, the archival text of a document (whether an original or a carbon copy) has been used in this collection, though in a few cases only a printed version could be located. In all cases the source text is the first one cited following each document; the other citations indicate other manuscript or printed versions of that item.

The main source for this compilation has been the papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt located at the Presidential Library in Hyde Park, New York. The staff of that library has searched its files and put all of the Churchill-Roosevelt exchanges into one collection. That new file is based primarily on the Map Room papers but includes items from a number of other files at the Roosevelt Library as well as a few exchanges found in the State Department materials at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. In addition to examining the Map Room papers, the editor has systematically checked the other presidential files as well as additional collections at the Roosevelt Library, such as the Harry Hopkins papers and the diaries and papers of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., for Churchill-Roosevelt exchanges and/or supporting documentation.

The State Department's vast decimal files for 1939-45 are set up according to subject, making it impractical to conduct a document-by-document search for Churchill-Roosevelt exchanges. Nevertheless, a careful search of relevant subject files was conducted, and finding-aids, including

the card file, were consulted. National Archives personnel have also searched many of the State Department records and have placed copies of any messages exchanged by Churchill and Roosevelt in the Roosevelt Library files.

A valuable check on the completeness of the American materials, and a source for a number of documents not available elsewhere, was the Public Record Office in London, England. The Prime Minister's Operational File (PREMIER 3) and the Prime Minister's Confidential File (PREMIER 4) contain most of the Churchill-Roosevelt exchanges as well as unsent drafts and related correspondence. Filing is by subject, necessitating a systematic check of the files in order to locate the Churchill-Roosevelt messages, which dealt with a wide variety of unrelated subjects. The PREMIER 3 records contain a separate collection of the Churchill-Roosevelt telegrams (though that compilation is far from complete), does not contain letters or other non-telegraphic exchanges, and has little supporting documentation. The Foreign Office files, also at the Public Record Office in London, frequently provided important background material not available in the PREMIER 3 files.

According to Churchill's official biographer, Martin Gilbert, no additional Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence has yet been located in the private Churchill papers, although Mr. Gilbert's own detailed research into the Second World War period is not completed.

Portions of the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence appear in many printed sources, but only those collections which were primarily or significantly devoted to publishing such documents have been cited in the list of sources following each message. The printed sources regularly consulted, as well as the archives used, are given below in the Bibliographical Note. In a number of cases the printed version is incomplete, and that is indicated by the letter "p" preceding the citation.

The most valuable and reliable of those printed sources are the wartime volumes in *Foreign Relations of the United States*. Nevertheless, that series is not intended to be definitive, and the choice of selections was occasionally influenced by diplomatic considerations at the time of publication.

During the late 1940s and the 1950s, Winston Churchill's *The Second World War* served as the primary source of documents and interpretation for British strategy and diplomacy during the war years. Even after other memoirs and the official British *History of the Second World War* appeared, Churchill's documents remained the only extensive source of primary material on Britain's wartime policies, at least until the opening in 1972 of the British Foreign Office papers for the period through 1945. Churchill had apparently intended to publish a long series of documentary volumes plus a narrative, but his personal finances and his publisher's insistence on a limit of six volumes prompted him to change that plan.

Instead, he built a narrative around the collection of documents, which may account for some of the disorganization in those six books, published between 1948 and 1953. Scholars have learned to treat that narrative with caution, as is proper with any memoir. Now it is also possible to evaluate Churchill's selection and editing of the documents.

Some of the exchanges with Roosevelt which Churchill did not print are either repetitive or relatively unimportant, but he also chose to present British policy and his own role in the most favorable light. As befits a statesman concerned with contemporary foreign relations, certain abrasive issues were largely ignored. Anglo-French-American relations are one example, though there are others, particularly where the British government proposed actions which might later have been considered high-handed. According to the testimony of persons who assisted Churchill with his memoirs, some documents were omitted by accident, owing to the chaotic nature of the records. One of those associates, Sir William Deakin, relates the story of Churchill going up to various wartime public figures and asking them if they remembered this or that message and how the Prime Minister reacted to it. Omissions within the documents are not always indicated by ellipses in the Churchill volumes (or, for that matter, in some of the other collections of the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence), and on a few occasions the document printed by Churchill differs significantly from the actual message sent. Although that could reflect his conscious editing, it seems more likely that Churchill unwittingly selected an early draft of the message. Because he frequently wrote harshly worded drafts in full expectation that his assistants would tone them down, such documents present a misleading picture of Anglo-American relations (this is again the testimony of William Deakin), though not of the Prime Minister's personal feelings. (See, for example, the headnote to document C-50x, draft A, below.) Frequently the documents in *The Second World War* differ from the source text in the use of synonymous words and phrases or in word order. Such variations were usually due to paraphrasing, a common practice designed to prevent codes and ciphers from being broken by the enemy. Normally, copies of decoded messages exchanged directly between Churchill and Roosevelt were delivered as received, but paraphrased versions were often sent to other offices, particularly the State Department and various British ministries. Churchill also eliminated message numbers and the names of minor figures from the exchanges printed in his memoirs.

#### COMPLETENESS

All source texts have been printed in their entirety, including enclosures and appendices. This collection includes all letters, cables, telegrams,



memoranda, notes, and telephone transcripts found to have been exchanged between Churchill and Roosevelt. Internal evidence (references within one message to another message) plus an examination of those memoirs which frequently refer to Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence (particularly Churchill's memoirs and Robert Sherwood's *Roosevelt and Hopkins*) lead me to conclude that this compilation is complete, although a few stray messages or written exchanges may turn up (see, for example, the headnote to R-11x and C-294). At a less formal level, however, some gaps exist.

Churchill and Roosevelt spoke frequently with each other on the radio-telephone, but only a few transcripts of those conversations have been found. The significance of such telephone exchanges is diminished by the knowledge that (according to Robert Sherwood) trans-Atlantic telephone connections were frustratingly poor. Moreover, both British and American security experts constantly warned the two leaders that the telephone was the most insecure means of communication. "Scrambler" devices were installed in both the White House and 10 Downing Street, but that provided only privacy from eavesdropping, not protection against recording and "unscrambling" the conversation. In fact, two of the telephone messages in this collection come from German intercepts of presumably "scrambled" talks (C-R/tel.-4, July 28, 1943; C-R/tel.-5, Feb. 1944). For all these reasons, Churchill and Roosevelt apparently limited their use of the telephone largely to casual conversations, emergencies, and simple answers to questions raised previously in telegrams or letters (see, for example, C-353), at least until late 1943. At that time, the installation of new equipment made it possible for the two leaders to speak on trans-Atlantic telephone with complete security. The new system, developed by Bell Telephone Laboratories and called variously X-Ray, the X-System, SIGSALY, and the "Green Hornet," could not be broken by crypt-analysis (see Bennett, "Secret Telephony," Price, "Further Notes," and Fagan, ed., *History of Engineering*, pp. 296-317). Even with this technological advance, Churchill and Roosevelt used SIGSALY only occasionally to talk to each other, despite the fact that extensions were put into the White House and Churchill's War Rooms (see CAB 120/768). That was most likely due in part to their reluctance to discuss secret strategy on the telephone, even though communications experts assured them that the system was completely secure; and in part because such frequent direct contact could trivialize their relationship and result in hasty decisions, a particularly important consideration for Roosevelt, who regularly resorted to procrastination as a problem-solving technique. However, an early incident may also have contributed to Churchill's preference for cables and letters. Shortly after the SIGSALY system had been set up, he placed a call to the President. Upon hearing the Prime

Minister's voice, Roosevelt giggled. After the call, Churchill made inquiries and found that voice distortion caused by the equipment prompted Roosevelt to think that the Prime Minister sounded like Donald Duck. At that point Churchill muttered that he would never use "that damn thing" again, but the testimony of a handful of communications personnel who operated SIGSALY demonstrates that, by May 1944, the two men were using it to speak to each other. By that time, engineers had managed to make adjustments so that Churchill sounded more like Churchill. Despite those occasional Churchill-Roosevelt conversations, a search of the War Department Classified Message Center files (Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.) turned up no transcripts of such talks, although a number of conversations between the Prime Minister and other officials were transcribed. From the fragmentary evidence, it seems clear that little if anything was said over SIGSALY that did not appear in written and telegraphic correspondence. The one exception might be when, according to one witness, the President called Churchill "Winnie" and in return was addressed as "old pal." (Much of the information in the preceding paragraph is courtesy of Robert Price.)

Another gap in this collection concerns intelligence material, particularly that which fell under the broad classification of ULTRA and MAGIC. A few references to MAGIC (intelligence gleaned from the breaking of certain Japanese codes) occur in the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence (see C-190, C-545, C-550/1, and R-446/1), but there is no direct mention of ULTRA (intelligence obtained from the breaking of certain codes/ciphers used by the German High Command—see C-103x), although Churchill does refer to BONIFACE (for example, C-412/2, C-441, C-721, C-789), an earlier codename for the same intelligence, and one telegram, R-647, was stamped "Top Secret ULTRA" on the source text. In addition, intelligence materials released by 1981 demonstrate that Churchill occasionally ordered summaries of ULTRA-related material passed directly to the President, and presumably vice-versa (see C-737/1). Such material may technically fall under the rubric of Churchill-Roosevelt exchanges, but it is likely that any comments the two leaders made on the intelligence came in separate correspondence. ULTRA and other intelligence data were routinely passed to President Roosevelt in much the same manner as the daily British military summaries, without being considered as formal messages from Prime Minister Churchill. Nevertheless, the special handling given one intelligence-related paragraph in a Churchill-to-Roosevelt message raises nagging suspicions, for nothing in the basic telegram indicates that one paragraph had been sent separately (see C-545). These suspicions might be either confirmed or laid to rest if scholars could examine the relevant files now controlled by the National Security Agency in the United States and by the British gov-

ernment. Some ULTRA/MAGIC materials have been released, but intelligence files in both countries are exempt from the usual declassification schedules (see R-442 headnote).

A minor category of Churchill-Roosevelt exchanges which appears incomplete is formal letters of introduction. A few have been located and printed, but others seem to be missing. (For example, see C-283/1.) Since such letters were normally filed under the name of the visitor, finding them is frequently a matter of luck.

This collection does include a number of "indirect" exchanges. These are letters or telegrams which Roosevelt or Churchill sent to a third party, but which were clearly intended for delivery to the President or Prime Minister. In almost all such cases in this collection the intermediary was Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's special adviser, for both Churchill and Roosevelt routinely gave messages to Hopkins when he was visiting the Prime Minister. (For example, see R-111, R-132, and C-68/1.)

#### DOCUMENT NUMBERS

Churchill and Roosevelt did not begin to number their telegrams sequentially until February 7, 1942. At that time, Churchill arbitrarily began with number 25 and Roosevelt, following the Prime Minister's suggestion, started with number 101 (100 was drafted but never sent). In order to retain that original numbering as the basic reference system for all the documents in this collection (particularly important since Churchill and Roosevelt themselves used those numbers as references), the following procedures were used:

(a) The sender or intended sender of a piece of correspondence or a draft is indicated by a C (Churchill) or an R (Roosevelt) supplied by the editor and preceding the document number (for example, C-123).

(b) *Exchanges sent before February 7, 1942* (before the adoption of a formal system of sequential numbers). In all cases, numbers for these messages have been supplied by the editor, and are followed by a lowercase "x." For Roosevelt, the last of these editorially assigned numbers is R-82x; for Churchill it is C-165x. Occasional unsent messages drafted during this period have also been sequentially numbered by the editor.

(c) *Exchanges after February 7, 1942.*

1. Telegrams. All are printed with the sequential number assigned by communications personnel at the time the message was sent or received. Churchill arbitrarily chose to begin with 25, and suggested to Roosevelt that the presidential messages start with 100 (see C-25).

Roosevelt actually began with number 101. (This means that numbers C-1 through C-24 and R-1 through R-100 were not assigned.) Telegrams which were not assigned sequential numbers (usually messages which related to intelligence, the atomic bomb, or which were sent when the originator was away from regular communications facilities) are numbered according to the procedure outlined for letters, memoranda, and notes (see the next paragraph).

2. Letters, memoranda, notes, and unnumbered telegrams. Such exchanges are assigned the number of the immediately preceding document which was sent by the same person, followed by a slash and the number 1—for example, R-150/1. If a second originally unnumbered item follows immediately, it is numbered sequentially after the slash as in R-150/2, and so on. Note that R-150 and R-150/1 may be completely unrelated messages.

(d) *Unsent Messages*. Such items are numbered in accordance with the procedures outlined above in paragraphs (b) and (c). All are labeled “not sent.”

(e) *Message Drafts*. Early drafts of a message are normally included with the final version which was actually dispatched, and they have the same number plus a capital letter, “A” for the first draft, “B” for the second, and so on. For example, C-75/A is a draft of C-75. Occasionally, when the date of a draft precedes the dispatch date of the message by a few weeks or more, the unsent draft has been inserted in its own chronological place and assigned a number of its own in accordance with paragraphs (b) and (c) above. All are labeled “not sent.” The occasional use of letter designations by U.S. or British communicators is noted in the headnote preceding such cases.

(f) *Telephone Conversation Transcripts*. These are separately numbered by the editor and are preceded by the legend “C-R / telephone—” plus the assigned number—for example, C-R / telephone-5.

## MESSAGE FORMAT

The exchanges are arranged in chronological order, with the exception of a few unsent drafts. The wording of introductory data has not been changed, but all messages have been made to fit the standard format outlined below.

(a) *Message number*. This is centered at the top of the document, followed by the type of message (letter, memo) if not a telegram. The majority of Churchill-Roosevelt exchanges were telegrams, and the absence of notation after the document number indicates that it was sent by wireless.

(b) *Sending/receiving data.*

1. First line. The location of the sender plus the channel of communications, if known—for example, [via U.S. Embassy]. The location given is not necessarily the place the message was sent from, but rather the place where Churchill or Roosevelt was at the time he wrote or approved the message.

2. Second line. The date of the exchange: Occasionally a message was actually sent on a date different from that in the heading. If known, that date is included. Next come the time of dispatch and time of receipt, if known. The military frequently used Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), abbreviated as Z (Zulu). GMT messages used a twenty-four-hour clock. Otherwise, messages are assumed to bear the local time and are followed by either A.M. or P.M. The time of receipt (TOR) follows the time of dispatch.

3. A sample of the sending/receiving data follows:

London [via U.S. Army]

June 1, 1942, 1450Z / TOR 3:30 P.M.

This message was drafted or approved in London on June 1, 1942, and sent at 1450 Zulu time by way of U.S. Army communications channels, and received at 3:30 P.M. local (Washington) time.

(c) *Heading.* The exact language of the actual message heading is retained, minus any special forwarding instructions inserted by communicators. The actual word order within the headings was apparently shifted now and then by communications personnel in order to make cipher-breaking more difficult. In any case, the heading found on the source text has been printed. If the source text had no heading, the editor has supplied one in brackets.

(d) *Message.* The message appears in exactly the same language as in the source text, including transmission errors, misspellings, incorrect punctuation, and similar mistakes. Only obvious transpositions of letters have been routinely corrected. Since many of the errors occurred as a result of coding, decoding, and/or wireless transmission garbles, a few corrections have been inserted by the editor whenever the meaning of an exchange became obscured. Such insertions are indicated in either the text or the headnote preceding the document. Apostrophes indicating the possessive are almost always a casualty of radio-communications, and they have not been supplied. Bracketed words without a question mark indicate that an alternative source text (usually the version found in the British files) used the bracketed word in place of the word immediately preceding. If a question mark is included within the brackets, the word has been supplied by the editor. References supplied by the editor are also included within

brackets. Churchill and Roosevelt frequently included reports, quoted other messages, or added lengthy summaries of conversations with third parties in their messages to each other. Such items have been extracted (set off by extra space) for the convenience of the reader, regardless of whether they were set off in the source text. Fuller explanations are frequently found in the headnotes.

(e) *Sender/drafter*.

1. The name or initials of the sender follow the main text if included in the message as drafted. If the source text for a letter or memorandum was signed or initialed by hand, that is so indicated. Roosevelt's telegrams usually included the sign-off "Roosevelt" as part of the message. Churchill's messages frequently had "Prime" (for Prime Minister) at the end, but that was apparently added later by communications personnel and has not been included.

2. The initials (or name) of the drafter of the message, if known, follow the sender's name and are enclosed in brackets. (See the Initials of Message Drafters, below.) A message closing "Roosevelt [HLH]," for example, indicates that Roosevelt included his name as part of the message and that it was drafted by Harry L. Hopkins.

(f) *Sources*. Just below the message will be found the sources for that document. The first item cites the source text for the message as printed in this collection, followed by a period. Subsequent entries designate other manuscript or printed versions of that document and are also separated by periods. (See the Bibliographical Note and List of Sources Cited.) A sample follows:

[MR\*. *FRUS*, 1941, I, 12 pWSC, I, 123.]

The source text for this document would be in the Map Room papers of the Roosevelt Library (MR). Other versions could be found in the PREM 3 papers (\*), in *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* and in Churchill's memoirs (WSC). The lowercase "p" before the last citation indicates that only part of the message is printed there.

(g) *Use of brackets*. All material enclosed in brackets has been supplied by the editor. In the case of dates, channel of transmission, drafter's initials, and the like, the information was found in papers which accompanied the source document or was located along with other copies of the document. The use of question marks within the brackets indicates an assumption by the editor.

(h) *Editing of draft language*. Changes made by Churchill or Roosevelt to draft messages have frequently been included. The words deleted are indicated by a line through the words (for example, ~~Franklin D. Roosevelt~~); the new language is shown by underlining (for example,

Winston S. Churchill). In the event of extensive changes, the entire draft is printed separately. If the identity of the person who made the changes is known, it is given in brackets or in the headnote. Italics are used in a document only if they appeared in the source text, except for the names of ships and aircraft, which are italicized regardless of how they appeared in the source.

(i) *Codenames*. All codenames are printed in capital letters regardless of how they appeared in the source text. See the Glossary for abbreviations, acronyms, and codenames.

#### BRITISH AND AMERICAN SPELLING/PUNCTUATION/USAGE

Purists will quickly realize that British source texts do not consistently follow British spelling, punctuation, or usage (for example, “honour” vice the American “honor,” etc.), and vice-versa. The clerical staffs in both countries frequently but not consistently reverted to the spelling and punctuation with which they were familiar, probably without realizing that they were, ever so slightly, altering the messages they typed. Occasionally, both British and American spellings of the same word will appear in the same text. In all cases, the editor has tried to follow the source text as precisely as possible. Chinese-language transliterations have been made in the Wade-Giles system, which was used in Britain and the United States during World War II. Misspellings of proper names in documents are usually given correctly in the headnote.

#### ILLUSTRATIONS

Picasso may have dismissed portraits as mere photography, but that does not mean that photographs tell the truth. One has only to study the varied poses of Roosevelt photographed during the Yalta Conference—ranging from a look of slack-jawed imbecility to robust health—to know that the camera proves little beyond the physical presence of the subjects. Photographs may not reveal the genuine mood and feelings of those pictured, but they can be used to represent the genuine interpretation of the photographer or, in this case, the editor. The photographs have been selected and the captions added with that purpose in mind: to illustrate the editor’s judgment of the true mood and atmosphere during a given period of the Churchill-Roosevelt relationship. The only exceptions to this are four photographs of things specifically mentioned in the documents. For those who like their illustrations unadorned by comments, the List of Photographs provides the bare-bones identifying data.

## Bibliographical Note

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### LIST OF SOURCES AND SOURCE ABBREVIATIONS

The archives and printed sources given below provided source texts or additional versions of the source text. They are listed in the alphabetical order of their abbreviations, since that is the way they appear in the notations and headnotes.

CAB	United Kingdom; War Cabinet. Papers. Public Record Office, London. This is followed by file identification numbers.
DS	United States, Department of State. Decimal files. National Archives, Washington, D.C. This is followed by the file and document number (for example, DS 800.12/3).
<i>FDR LTRS</i>	<i>F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928–1945</i> . Elliott Roosevelt, editor. Vol. II. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950.
FO	United Kingdom, Foreign Office. Foreign Office files. Public Record Office, London. This will be followed by other reference numbers indicating the storage file, folder, and paper (for example, F.O. 371/222/12 paper AN2131).
<i>FRUS</i>	United States, Department of State. <i>Foreign Relations of the United States</i> . Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1865–. This will be followed by the year, volume number, and pages; or in the case of the Conference Series for World War II, the location of the conference and, if necessary, the year (for example, <i>FRUS</i> , 1941, I, 123–24, or <i>FRUS, Quebec Conf.</i> , 1944, pp. 112–13).
HLH	Harry L. Hopkins. Papers. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (FDRL), Hyde Park, New York. This is usually followed by a reference to the file or folder.
MD	Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Diary. FDRL. References to the so-called Presidential Diary are so designated.
MR	Map Room papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt papers. FDRL. Unless otherwise noted, references are to the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence files in that collection.
MR*	See PREM 3.
OF	Official File, Franklin D. Roosevelt papers. FDRL. This is followed by the file number.
p	Indicates that the immediately following citation is to a printed source which contains only a partial text of that document.
PPF	President's Personal File, Franklin D. Roosevelt papers. FDRL. This is followed by the name of the file.
PREM 3	United Kingdom, Prime Minister's Operational File (PREMIER 3). Public Record Office, London (also available on microfilm at the Rutgers University Library, New Brunswick,



- New Jersey). This is followed by the file/folder/and page numbers (if any), except as below:
- \* The asterisk indicates that the document is found in PREM 3/3/467 through 473, the Churchill-Roosevelt telegrams. Since documents in those files are arranged in chronological order, pages and precise file numbers are omitted.
  - PREM 4 United Kingdom, Prime Minister's Confidential File (PREMIER 4). Public Record Office, London. This is followed by the file/folder/and page numbers.
  - PSF President's Secretary's File, Franklin D. Roosevelt papers. FDRL. This is followed by the name of the file, except as noted below:
  - PSF:GB:WSC President's Secretary's File, Great Britain, Churchill folder. Occasionally the reference is just to the GB (Great Britain) folder.
  - R&C *Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence*. Manfred Jonas et al., editors. New York: Saturday Review Press, 1975. Since the selections are in chronological order, page numbers are omitted.
  - R&H Sherwood, Robert E. *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History*. Revised edition. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950.
  - Stalin/FDR U.S.S.R., Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945: Correspondence with Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman*. New York: Capricorn Books, 1965 (originally published by State Political Books Publishing House, 1957). This is followed by the document number.
  - Stalin/WSC ———. *Ibid.: Correspondence with Winston S. Churchill and Clement R. Attlee*. This is followed by the document number.
  - WSC Churchill, Winston S. *The Second World War*. 6 volumes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948–1953. Followed by the volume number and the pages (for example, WSC, II, 234).

## SECONDARY MATERIALS

The basic source for this collection has been the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence itself, found in archives in both Great Britain and the United States. I also made extensive use of the archival collections in writing the headnotes. Nevertheless, completing the headnotes still entailed research in literally hundreds of secondary works. In *The Last European War*, John Lukacs estimated that there are 60,000 books and articles written on various aspects of World War II. Even when that number is pared to only those dealing with the issues that concerned Churchill and Roosevelt, it remains intimidating—and grows larger every day. To attach a long list

of sources consulted in preparing this collection would serve no useful purpose; to compile a complete, fully annotated bibliography on the strategy and diplomacy of the Second World War is a project unto itself. The purpose of this collection is to present the complete correspondence between Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt within its historical context, not to provide a definitive bibliography.

Instead, at the risk of slighting all too many of my friends and colleagues, I have chosen to mention only those few works which I have found indispensable: that handful of books which have sat next to my typewriter for the past eight years. This is not to say that other studies were not important to my work, nor does it even suggest that these are somehow better than some other books. It is just that the works mentioned below were so broad in their coverage and/or so scholarly in their approach and documentation that I found myself constantly referring to them. I may not have always agreed with them, but I always used them. Some additional citations are given in the headnotes when the material discussed is unusual, difficult to find, or involves direct quotation (see List of Sources Cited), but the bulk of the hundreds of books and articles I consulted go without the recognition they deserve. Casual readers will not care, serious scholars will know where to find them, and individuals will recognize their own contributions and understand my gratitude.

Two official series are invaluable to anyone trying to understand the strategy and diplomacy that engaged Churchill and Roosevelt: the United Kingdom, *History of the Second World War*, and United States, Department of the Army, *The United States Army in World War II*.

The British *History of the Second World War* is divided into a number of sub-series, one of which, the *United Kingdom Military Series* (J.R.M. Butler, editor), in six volumes titled *Grand Strategy* (London: HMSO, 1956–76), offers a unique insight into the politics of strategy. All six volumes were most useful, but one deserves special recognition. Volume IV (August 1942–August 1943), by Michael Howard, is a model of scholarship, completeness, and candor. It is everything an official history should be. No other single book better explains the British view of the complicated relationship between military operations, grand strategy, and Anglo-American diplomacy during a most critical period of the war.

Another sub-series in the British *History of the Second World War* consists of the five volumes written by Sir Llewelyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War* (London: HMSO, 1970–76). Woodward is carefully uncritical of British policy, and his organization does not lend itself to research in Anglo-American relations, but he provides a wealth of detail as well as citations to the British archives.

The United States government did not sponsor a broad history of the

Second World War comparable to the British effort, but the individual services did commission studies of their wartime roles. Those written for the Navy and the Army Air Force are narrowly conceived and proved of little use. Not so in the case of the Army's history. The longer one works with this series, the more clear it becomes that these books are the product of remarkably extensive and perceptive research, frequently well beyond the confines of the military archives. Broad issues are often subordinated to detail, and the authors often avoid critical analysis, but almost every important question is touched on and usually explained. The entire series, *The United States Army in World War II* (Kent Roberts Greenfield, general editor), was useful, but certain sub-series were of particular value, specifically *The European Theater of Operations*, *The Mediterranean Theater of Operations*, and *The War Department*. Within those series, three volumes rate special mention: Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command* (Washington: OCMH, 1954), Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942* (Washington: OCMH, 1953), and Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944* (Washington: OCMH, 1959). The useful *Chronology, 1941–1945*, Mary H. Williams, compiler (Washington: OCMH, 1960), is part of the *Special Studies* sub-series.

Two secondary works fall into the same “indispensable” category as the official histories. Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945* (New York: The Viking Press, 1973) is in the same class as Michael Howard's *Grand Strategy*, although the focus on Marshall necessarily limits coverage of some issues. Nevertheless, it is a complete and persuasive presentation of grand strategy, making full use of both British and American sources. Unfortunately, the publisher limited the length and scope of Pogue's citations, where he originally discussed many issues peripheral to Marshall, but that does not detract from the value of the book as it stands. The second invaluable book is the combination memoir/narrative by Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History*, revised edition (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950). In spite of its age, the book continues to be one of the best surveys of Anglo-American wartime relations, and consistently provides detail and insights not available elsewhere.

Some other less comprehensive studies proved valuable. B. H. Liddell Hart, *The History of the Second World War* (London: Cassell, 1970), remains the best short history of the war, particularly for the European/Mediterranean/North African theaters from 1939 through 1943, although I regularly had to consult the more detailed and less opinionated military studies found in the British and American official histories. Two narratives by Roger Parkinson, *Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat* (New York: David McKay, 1973) and *A Day's March Nearer Home* (London: Hart-Davis,

MacGibbon, 1974), based largely on the British War Cabinet papers, provided a convenient source of information on British decision-making at the highest level. Although *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years*, Alfred D. Chandler, Stephen E. Ambrose et al., editors, 5 volumes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), are most valuable as a documentary collection, they also contain extensive and comprehensive footnotes, many of which deal with issues that concerned Churchill and Roosevelt. Christopher Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan, 1941–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978) proved a gold mine of information on the war in the Pacific, and Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), which Professor Dallek was kind enough to send me in manuscript, was a valuable guide to the broad outlines of Roosevelt's military-political strategy.

## Initials of Message Drafters

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The staff of the White House Map Room and the State Department frequently indicated the identity of the drafter of a message on accompanying papers. Churchill's messages, on the other hand, usually worked their way through a routine vetting process within the Prime Minister's office; hence no single individual was listed as the drafter. The initials of message drafters, listed below, have been used in the documents to avoid clutter.

AAB	Adolf A. Berle
CB	Charles Bohlen
CH	Cordell Hull
DA	Dean Acheson
EJK	Admiral Ernest J. King
ES	Edward Stettinius
FDR	Franklin D. Roosevelt
GCM	General George C. Marshall
GE	George Elsey
HHA	General Henry H. Arnold
HLH	Harry L. Hopkins
HLS	Henry L. Stimson
HM	Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.)
OWI	Office of War Information
SW	Sumner Welles
WDL	Admiral William D. Leahy
WEB	Admiral Wilson E. Brown

## Digest of Documents

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1933

Inscription, Oct. 8. An inscription to Roosevelt written by Churchill in volume I of Churchill's Marlborough biography.

1939

**R-1x**, Sept. 11. Proposes a personal correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt.

**C-R / tel.-1**, Oct. 5. Surmises that the Germans may have planted a bomb on board the merchant ship *Iroquois*; suggests public disclosure of the German warnings about such a bomb.

**C-1x**, Oct. 5. Asks that the non-belligerency zone around the Western Hemisphere be effectively enforced; expresses concern over the unknown location of the German warships *Scheer* and *Hipper*.

**C-2x**, Oct. 16. Provides a summary of British naval actions; offers ASDIC to the U.S. Navy; suggests that a lack of oil limits German options.

**C-3x**, Dec. 25. Defends the British violation of the Western Hemisphere security zone during the Battle of the River Plate; discusses magnetic mines.

1940

**C-4x**, Jan. 7. Forwards an Admiralty report on the Battle of the River Plate (the report is included as an enclosure).

**C-5x**, Jan. 29. States that American merchant vessels will not be diverted into the combat zones around the British Isles.

**C-6x**, Jan. 30. Partly retracts the assurances given in C-5x; claims such diversions can be avoided only if the United States guards against contraband shipments.

**R-2x**, Feb. 1. Acknowledges receipt of C-4x; warns against offending the American public by needless search and seizure at sea.

**C-7x**, Feb. 28. Acknowledges receipt of R-2x; complains of evasion of navicert procedures by American shippers.

**R-3x**, Mar. 5. Indicates that navicert procedures are under study.

**C-8x**, May 7. Forwards the recently published *Battle of the River Plate*.

- C-9x**, May 15. Mentions Churchill's new position as Prime Minister; expresses fear of an invasion of Britain and a declaration of war by Italy; requests forty or fifty old U.S. destroyers; mentions economic warfare, Irish neutrality, and the possibility of American presence in Singapore as a challenge to Japan.
- R-4x**, May 16. States that a loan of U.S. destroyers requires congressional approval; discusses British purchases of aircraft and arms; indicates that the U.S. fleet will remain at Hawaii.
- C-10x**, May 18. Expresses fear of a German attack, but promises to continue the fight; emphasizes the urgent need for aid from the United States.
- C-11x**, May 20. Asks for more airplanes; promises to continue the fight against Germany but cannot guarantee the policies of a new ministry should Churchill's government fall.
- R-5x**, May 30. Acknowledges receipt of C-8x.
- C-12x**, June 1. Requests permission to purchase more aircraft in the United States.
- C-13x**, June 11. Praises Roosevelt's Charlottesville speech; assumes France will not surrender; again asks for a loan of U.S. destroyers.
- C-14x**, June 12. Expresses fear that French resistance will collapse; asks that Roosevelt do what he can to bolster French morale.
- C-15x**, June 13. States Churchill is leaving for France; repeats a plea for a public statement by Roosevelt; expresses concern over Ireland.
- R-6x**, June 13. Forwards a copy of Roosevelt's message to Reynaud; states that the United States cannot send a naval squadron to Ireland; indicates the U.S. fleet will remain at Pearl Harbor.
- C-16x**, June 14. Reports a French request for permission to negotiate a separate peace with Germany; again requests permission to publish Roosevelt's message to Reynaud.
- R-7x**, June 14. Refuses to permit publication of the message to Reynaud; echoes Churchill's concern about the disposition of the French fleet.
- C-17x**, June 15. Warns that the United States has to take action; expresses fear that a different British government might negotiate with Germany; indicates a desperate need for U.S. destroyers.
- C-18x**, June 15. Echoes Reynaud's plea that the United States commit itself to an early entry into the war.
- C-19x**, July 9. Notifies Roosevelt that the Duke of Windsor will become Governor of the Bahamas.
- C-20x/A**, not sent; July 5. Requests additional aid, especially destroyers; asks for stronger American pressure on the Irish government.
- C-20x**, July 31. Describes British naval losses and asks for destroyers; claims the air war is going well.

- R-8x**, Aug. 13. Offers to send fifty old destroyers in return for a pledge that the British fleet will not be surrendered to Germany and permission to establish bases on certain British possessions in the Western Hemisphere.
- C-21x**, Aug. 15. Thanks Roosevelt for message R-8x; warns that public disclosure of promises not to surrender the British fleet could stimulate defeatism.
- R-9x**, Aug. 19. Forwards a copy of a letter to Roosevelt from the U.S. Chargé in Berlin (Alexander Kirk) in which Kirk opposes any concessions to Germany as a threat to civilization itself, and urges full American support of the British war effort.
- C-22x**, Aug. 22. Expresses Churchill's desire to avoid the appearance of a deal of destroyers for bases; reiterates British need for destroyers.
- C-23x**, Aug. 25. Offers a compromise designed to avoid the appearance of exchanging destroyers for bases.
- C-24x**, Aug. 27. Agrees to the American offer of destroyers and other matériel in return for bases; indicates concern over probable Italian invasion of Greece.
- C-25x**, Aug. 27. Formal offer to the United States of leases for British bases in the Western Hemisphere.
- R-10x**, Aug. 30. Formal inquiry by the President about the fate of the British fleet in the event of a German conquest of the British Isles.
- C-26x**, Aug. 31. Formal assurances from Churchill that the British fleet will continue to fight even if Germany occupies Great Britain.
- R-11x**, Sept. 22. Warning from Roosevelt about impending invasion of French Indo-China by Japan (taken from memoir sources).
- C-27x**, Sept. 22. Request for speedy transfer of small arms promised as part of the destroyers-for-bases deal.
- C-28x**, Sept. 22. Informs Roosevelt of planned invasion of Dakar.
- R-12x**, Sept. 24. Informs Churchill that small arms requested in C-27x are being shipped.
- C-29x**, Sept. 24. Thanks Roosevelt for supporting British/Free French invasion of Dakar; asks for American pressure to prevent a declaration of war by French government in Vichy.
- C-30x**, Sept. 25. Thanks Roosevelt for small arms; explains failure of Dakar invasion.
- C-31x**, Oct. 4. States Burma Road will be re-opened; expresses confidence regarding air defense, though the threat of a German invasion is not over; mentions the Dakar operation.
- C-32x**, Oct. 21. Expresses concern that the Vichy French will permit the Germans to use French ships and troops in an invasion of England; mentions heavy losses due to German submarines.



- R-13x**, Oct. 24. Passes the substance of an American warning to the Vichy government concerning German use of French warships; cautions that in such an event the United States will not help France retain its overseas territories.
- C-33x**, Oct. 25. Reports struggle for power between Pétain and Laval; asks Roosevelt to warn Vichy not to collaborate with Germany.
- R-14x**, Oct. 25. In answer to Churchill's request in C-33x, refers him to R-13x; states he will reiterate the warning.
- C-34x**, Oct. 25. Asks Roosevelt to warn Pétain that the American warning applies to German use of bases as well as ships; expresses cautious optimism about the threat of a German invasion; requests supplies.
- C-35x**, Oct. 26. Acknowledges receipt of R-14x.
- C-36x**, Oct. 27. Discusses overall British military commitments as an argument for speeding up deliveries of American supplies, particularly aircraft.
- C-37x**, Nov. 6. Congratulates Roosevelt on winning the election of 1940.
- C-38x**, Nov. 10. Expresses fear over rumors that two French battleships under construction will fall into German hands; asks Roosevelt to warn Vichy government against such an eventuality.
- R-15x**, Nov. 13. Tells Churchill that the United States has warned Vichy about the two French ships and has offered to purchase them.
- C-39x**, Nov. 16. Thanks Roosevelt for warning Vichy about the two French ships; briefly mentions British attack on the Italian Navy at Taranto.
- R-16x**, Nov. 18. Forwards the text of message from Vichy government assuring Roosevelt that none of the French fleet will fall into German hands.
- C-40x**, Nov. 21. Forwards a brief Admiralty report on the attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto.
- R-17x**, Nov. 23. Reports further assurances from Pétain that he will give prior notice to the United States of any movements of French naval units.
- C-41x**, Nov. 23. Suggests the United States offer to supply food for Spain as a means of keeping Spain neutral.
- C-42x**, Nov. ? Letter of introduction for Sir Walter Citrine.
- C-43x/A**, Nov. 12. An unsent draft of C-43x prepared by Lothian.
- C-43x/B**, Nov. ? An unsent draft of C-43x printed for circulation to the British War Cabinet.
- C-43x**, Dec. 7. A letter (sent by wireless) outlining Britain's extensive worldwide commitments; refers to the challenge posed by Japan and Germany, and the lack of cooperation from Ireland; argues

that Britain is fighting America's war, and closes with a strong plea for a solution to Britain's inability to continue to pay cash for war supplies; includes an enclosure with statistics on Allied shipping losses.

- C-43x**, Dec. 20. Minor corrections to the original version of C-43x.
- C-44x**, Dec. 13. Expresses grief at the death of Ambassador Lothian.
- C-45x**, Dec. 13. Mentions British military successes in Libya; expresses concern about German submarine activity; threatens to cut off food subsidies and special shipping to Ireland.
- C-46x**, Dec. 14. Proposes Lloyd George as Ambassador to the United States.
- R-18x**, Dec. 15. Agrees to accept Lloyd George as Ambassador.
- C-47x**, not sent; Dec. 17. Withdraws the nomination of Lloyd George as Ambassador; discusses Britain's inability to pay cash for war supplies; requests additional war matériel.
- C-48x**, Dec. 21. Announces the appointment of Lord Halifax as Ambassador to the United States, pending Roosevelt's approval.
- R-19x**, Dec. 31. Offers a plan for supplying food, clothing, and humanitarian supplies to children in Vichy France.
- C-53x/A**, Dec. 25. Forwards an Admiralty memorandum explaining why the U.S. destroyers loaned to Britain are not yet in service.

## 1941

- C-49x**, Jan. 1. Extends New Year's greetings; thanks Roosevelt for the "Arsenal of Democracy" speech.
- C-50x/A**, not sent; Dec. 28 (1940). Expresses strong opposition to the transfer of gold by ship from Cape Town, South Africa.
- C-50x/B**, not sent; Dec. 31 (1940). Opposes the gold-transfer scheme; asks about the problem of interim finance for war supplies.
- C-50x**, Jan. 2. Agrees to the transfer of South African gold to the United States; expresses concern over Britain's inability to pay cash for war supplies.
- C-51x**, Jan. 3. Agrees to permit humanitarian aid to children in Vichy France.
- C-52x**, Jan. 6. Reports a British victory over the Italians at Bardia.
- C-53x**, Jan. 9. Explains that the delay in utilizing U.S. destroyers is due to the need for extensive reconditioning.
- C-54x**, Jan. 11. Asks Roosevelt to repeat to Pétain a British offer of military assistance if Vichy government flees to North Africa and resumes the war against Germany.

- R-20x**, Jan. 13. Complies with request made in C-54x.
- C-55x**, Jan. 13. Expresses pleasure that Roosevelt sent Hopkins as a personal emissary.
- R-21x**, Jan. 16. Predicts passage of lend-lease bill; warns of rumors of pending invasion of England.
- R-22x**, Jan. 18. Responds to C-53x; indicates the United States has no destroyers to spare.
- C-56x**, Jan. 20. Informs Roosevelt of arrival of Lord Halifax aboard HMS *King George V* at Annapolis; invites Roosevelt to visit ship.
- R-23x**, Jan. 20. Forwards "Ship of State" verse to Churchill via Willkie (letter).
- C-57x**, Jan. 21. Uses U.S. diplomatic channels to forward message to Marshal Pétain indicating Britain will permit French naval units interned at Alexandria to depart if Vichy government moves to North Africa and resumes war against Germany.
- R-24x**, Jan. 22. Answers C-56x; Roosevelt will meet Halifax if possible.
- C-58x**, Jan. 28. Thanks Roosevelt for "Ship of State" verse and discusses strategic situation in eastern Europe.
- C-59x**, Jan. 29. Brief birthday greetings to Roosevelt.
- C-60x**, Feb. 15. Reports rumors of Japanese plans to go to war with Britain; asks Roosevelt to indicate that the United States will support Britain; expresses grave concern over such a war forcing Britain to over-extend her naval strength.
- C-61x**, Feb. 20. Reports that new intelligence indicates Japan will not attack Britain; refers to lend-lease bill and Roosevelt's need to avoid any public support of Britain in the Pacific.
- R-25x**, not sent; Feb. 25. Expresses concern over arguments and delays in arriving at formal agreements on base leases in the West Indies; proposes compromises.
- C-62x**, Mar. 1. Requests additional assistance in convoying ships along the northwest route in the Atlantic.
- C-63x**, not sent; Mar. 6. Sets forth the British position regarding the base leases and asks Roosevelt to compromise on certain issues.
- C-64x**, not sent; Mar. 8. Offers additional British arguments regarding the West Indian leases and proposes compromises.
- R-26x**, Mar. 8. Reports passage of lend-lease bill by Senate; expects to sign bill on March 11.
- C-65x**, Mar. 9. Brief message of appreciation for the Lend-Lease Act.
- C-66x**, Mar. 10. Tells of British decision to reinforce armies in Greece in hopes of getting Yugoslavs to hold out against Germany; mentions base-leasing problems again.

- C-67x**, Mar. 12. Suggests that Roosevelt warn Admiral Darlan against use of French warships against the British blockade; expresses worry over the leakage of U.S. supplies designated for France but getting into German hands; mentions that base-leasing agreements have been reached.
- C-68x**, Mar. 17. Praises Roosevelt's speech of March 14.
- R-27x**, Mar. 19. Acknowledges C-67x and informs Churchill that the United States has cautioned Vichy government about the seriousness of any drastic action.
- C-69x**, Mar. 19. Reports sighting German battle cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*; warns of heavy strain on British naval forces; requests U.S. aid in tracking German raiders.
- C-70x**, Mar. 23. Reports further sightings of *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*; requests permission for HMS *Malaya* to undergo repairs in U.S. shipyard.
- R-28x**, Mar. 25. Agrees to repair HMS *Malaya*.
- C-71x**, Mar. 27. Tells Roosevelt that Britain will recognize and assist the new Yugoslavian government, and asks the United States to do the same.
- R-29x**, Mar. 29. Informs Churchill of the transfer of ten Coast Guard cutters.
- R-30x**, Mar. 29. Lists war supplies being transferred to Britain, including a significant number of aircraft.
- C-72x**, Mar. 29. Notifies Roosevelt that in response to agreements between Germany and Vichy, Churchill has instructed the Admiralty to tighten the British blockade of unoccupied France.
- C-73x**, Mar. 30. Reports successful results of the Battle of Cape Matapan against the Italian fleet; responds to Roosevelt's messages about repairing the *Malaya*, the sending of ten Coast Guard cutters, and German surface raiders (R-28x, R-29x); protests leaks in blockade of Germany.
- R-31x**, Apr. 2. Announces expansion of U.S. ship-building program.
- C-74x**, Apr. 2. Reports intelligence that French plan to move *Dunkerque* to Toulon for repairs; Churchill fears the Germans will then take control of the ship; asks Roosevelt to warn Vichy that such actions will not be permitted.
- C-75x**, Apr. 2. Requests that any U.S. message to Vichy be worded to avoid disclosing source of British intelligence.
- R-32x**, Apr. 3. Acknowledges C-74x; says U.S. Ambassador will make appropriate protests.
- R-33x**, Apr. 4. Reports that *Dunkerque* will not leave Oran for ten days.

- R-34x**, Apr. 4. Recommends the British adopt a suggestion from Count Sforza calling for the British to return all Italian civilians taken in Ethiopia to their families; Sforza believes that could undermine Mussolini's authority in Italy.
- C-76x**, Apr. 4. Rejects Sforza's proposal because of the possibility of continued Italian resistance in East Africa and lack of shipping.
- C-77x**, Apr. 4. Thanks Roosevelt for R-31x; summarizes problems of protecting the northwestern Atlantic sea lanes.
- R-35x**, Apr. 6. Reports the substance of a conversation between Pétain, Darlan, and Matthews in which Darlan guaranteed that no French warships would fall into German hands.
- C-78x**, Apr. 6. Thanks Roosevelt for assistance regarding French warships; discusses U-boat attacks on Atlantic convoys; repeats message from Duke d'Aosta thanking British for humanitarian treatment of Italian prisoners in East Africa.
- R-36x**, Apr. 11. Reports extension of security zone in Atlantic to long. 25° W; U.S. sightings of aggressor ships or planes will be forwarded to British; removes the Red Sea from the list of combat zones.
- R-37x**, Apr. 11. Forwards a copy of a message from the U.S. Embassy in Vichy reporting a note from the French government stating that it will not move the *Dunkerque* to Toulon.
- C-79x**, Apr. 13. Expresses gratitude for the increase in American assistance in the Battle of the Atlantic; thanks Roosevelt for intervening with the Vichy government; discusses strategy in North Africa.
- C-80x**, Apr. 16. Discusses naval coordination in the Atlantic; mentions deteriorating situation in the Balkans; expresses optimism about holding Tobruk and Libya.
- C-81x**, Apr. 24. Summarizes the Anglo-American joint naval planning for the Battle of the Atlantic; expresses concern over possible Spanish and Portuguese cooperation with Germany; suggests possibility of need to occupy Azores and Cape Verde Islands; requests American naval force in the area as a warning.
- C-82x**, Apr. 24. Expresses pleasure at the Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 2 adopted by the United States; admits Greece is lost; is optimistic about Tobruk and North Africa; suggests disclosure of U.S. naval actions in the Atlantic as a means of influencing Turkey and Spain.
- C-83x**, Apr. 29. Summary of deteriorating situation in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean; asks Roosevelt to influence Vichy government to oppose German use of French colonies and bases in the Middle East.

- R-38x**, May 1. Explains that Portugal will not permit a visit of U.S. Navy ships to the Azores, but countenances a British occupation of the islands if necessary; calls British efforts in the eastern Mediterranean a "delaying action" and asserts that the war will be won by control of the Atlantic and Indian oceans; refuses to take strong action to prevent German use of Vichy colonies in the Middle East.
- C-84x**, May 3. Responds to R-38x; reserves right to intervene in Azores and Cape Verde Islands in advance of an actual German takeover; disagrees with Roosevelt's willingness to give up eastern Mediterranean as lost; agrees to follow U.S. lead regarding Vichy government.
- C-85x**, May 10. Hopes that plans to train British pilots in the United States will not be delayed by legal problems.
- R-39x**, May 10. Assures Churchill of American support for efforts in Middle East/eastern Mediterranean; mentions promises from Vichy government but discusses French inability to resist Germans; mentions Atlantic patrols.
- C-86x**, May 14. Brief reiteration of previous statements regarding Middle East, Vichy government and Darlan, and the problem of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands.
- R-40x**, May 14. Requests information concerning the interrogation of Rudolf Hess; mentions negotiations with Vichy government.
- C-87x**, May 17. Summary of the interviews of Rudolf Hess.
- C-88x**, May 19. Sends a copy of a message from Willkie to Churchill on the question of confusion over British needs in the Battle of the Atlantic; includes proposed reply from Churchill summarizing the naval situation.
- C-89x**, May 21. Complies with President's wishes regarding the Willkie message; mentions opening of the battle for Crete and other Middle Eastern problems; mentions seriousness of continued German submarine action in the Atlantic.
- R-41x**, May 21. No legal difficulties in the way of training British pilots in the United States; additional supplies forthcoming.
- C-90x**, May 23. Brief summary of the battle for Crete; reports sighting of German surface raider-force including the *Bismarck*; forwards two Admiralty papers concerning the Battle of the Atlantic.
- C-91x**, May 25. Thanks Roosevelt for R-41x.
- R-42x**, May 27. Mentions Pan-American Day speech; congratulates Churchill on the sinking of the *Bismarck*.
- R-43x**, May 28. A list of additional supplies being sent to the British in the Middle East.

- C-92x**, May 28. Thanks Roosevelt for Middle East supplies; discusses impact of the sinking of the *Bismarck*; hopes it will restrain the Japanese.
- R-44x**, May 29. Informs Churchill that U.S. military pilots will ferry new aircraft from the manufacturer to the point where British pilots can pick them up; requests that R.A.F. control activities of the ferry pilots.
- R-44x/A**, not sent; May 23. Requests that R.A.F. take over control of ferrying planes to England.
- C-93x**, May 29. Endorses U.S. intention to assume defense of Iceland; discusses probable policies in case of a German penetration of Spain and Portugal; welcomes U.S. occupation of Dakar.
- C-94x**, May 31. Accepts suggestion made in R-44x regarding ferrying service; mentions evacuation of Crete and effect of the defeat.
- C-95x**, June 3. Discusses the necessity of building a larger logistics organization in the Middle East; asks permission for Averell Harriman to join the planning mission traveling to the Middle East.
- C-96x**, June 7. Announces that British and Free French troops will occupy Syria and asks the United States to try to restrain Vichy.
- C-97x**, June 8. Proposes a meeting of the British dominions and allies and hopes that the United States will send a representative.
- C-98x**, June 8. Text of the formal resolution to be discussed at the meeting mentioned in C-97x.
- C-99x**, June 11. Supports suggestion of Elliott Roosevelt to use Bathurst as a staging point for the ferrying of planes.
- C-100x**, June 14. Expresses pleasure at U.S. takeover of British bases in Iceland; tells Roosevelt of impending offensive in Egypt; predicts German attack on Russia and states Great Britain will provide all possible aid to Russia in that event; mentions Roosevelt's health.
- R-45x**, June 17. Expresses willingness to build landing facilities in West Africa for ferrying planes to Middle East; is concerned over delays between Takoradi and lower Egypt.
- C-101x**, June 20. Discusses problems of ferrying aircraft from Takoradi to Egypt; reports failure of offensive in Egypt and hopes for an improvement in Syria.
- R-46x**, June 25. Announces accelerated merchant ship-building program.
- C-102x**, June 26. Suggests joint Anglo-American tank board to avoid unnecessary maintenance problems.
- C-103x**, July 1. Summarizes efforts in the Battle of the Atlantic.

- C-104x**, July 4. Explains reasons for the relief of General Wavell and the staff reorganization of the British Middle East Command.
- R-47x**, July 6. Acknowledges receipt of C-102x.
- C-105x**, July 7. Discusses the Battle of the Atlantic; expresses pleasure over impending implementation of U.S. Defense Plan No. 3.
- R-48x**, July 10. Disagrees with Churchill's proposal for an Anglo-American tank board.
- R-49x**, July 12. Announces expanded tank production goals.
- R-50x**, July 14. Cautions against promises by Britain regarding postwar political settlements; suggests plebescites to revive small states as in Versailles Treaty.
- R-51x**, July 19. Mentions effect of U.S. occupation of Iceland.
- C-106x**, July 25. Informs Roosevelt that Churchill will be able to meet with him (Atlantic Conference).
- C-107x**, July 25. Discusses tank-building program; suggests that heavy bombing of Germany be supplemented by plans for tank-landing ships.
- R-52x**, July 26. Relates substance of an offer to Japan to neutralize Indo-China.
- C-108x**, July 27. Names persons who will accompany Churchill to the Atlantic Conference (see p. clxv for R-51x/1 and R-52x/1).
- C-109x**, Aug. 5. Reports departure of Churchill and Hopkins for Atlantic Conference.
- C-110x**, Aug. 9-12. Informs Roosevelt of the sinking of a German submarine.
- C-111x**, Aug. 12. Farewell to Roosevelt after the Atlantic Conference.
- R-53x**, Aug. 18. Discusses recent Japanese-American negotiations.
- R-54x/A**, not sent; Aug. 20. Discussion of ways to control retransfers by Britain of articles obtained under lend-lease.
- R-54x/B**, not sent; Aug. 20. Another draft of a letter discussing the need to control retransfers of articles obtained under lend-lease.
- C-112x**, Aug. 29. Discusses plans for occupation of the Canary Islands.
- C-113x**, Sept. 1. Asks for shipping in order to send reinforcements to Persia and the Middle East.
- R-55x**, Sept. 5. Agrees to supply the transports requested in C-113x.
- C-114x**, Sept. 5. Forwards a message from Stalin requesting a second front; also forwards Churchill's negative reply to Stalin; expresses fears that the Soviets are considering a separate peace with Germany.



- C-115x**, Sept. 7. Thanks Roosevelt for supplying shipping to Middle East; mentions aid to Russia.
- R-56x/A**, not sent; Sept. 8. Outlines an extensive aid program to Russia; proposes an Anglo-American conference on aid to the Soviet Union (later sent as a Hopkins-to-Churchill message).
- R-56x**, Sept. 12. States that Lieutenant General S. D. Embick will represent the United States at the Anglo-American supply conference on aid to Russia.
- R-57x**, Sept. 17. Provides information about U.S. tank production.
- C-116x**, Sept. 22. Thanks Roosevelt for information about tank production.
- R-58x**, Sept. 25. Additional data regarding U.S. tank production.
- C-117x**, Sept. 30. Thanks Roosevelt for data on tank production; mentions losses in the Atlantic and upcoming talks with the Russians on supply matters.
- R-59x**, Sept. 30. Provides additional data on doubled U.S. tank production and the supply of combat planes to Russia.
- C-118x**, Sept. ? A note forwarding one of Churchill's books.
- C-119x**, Oct. 5. Informs Roosevelt that Attlee will be in Washington and will discuss Middle Eastern matters of importance with the President; mentions success of talks with the Russians.
- R-60x**, Oct. 7. Withdraws offer of U.S. transports for British reinforcements to the Middle East and suggests a different method which will not offend American public opinion or jeopardize plans to amend the Neutrality Act.
- R-61x**, Oct. 8. Expresses pleasure at the chance to talk to Attlee and at the outcome of the Moscow talks. Mentions proposal made in R-60x.
- C-120x**, Oct. 8. Protests U.S. policy regarding postwar regulation of European wheat production.
- C-121x**, Oct. 9. Accepts proposal made in R-60x to transport troops to Middle East via Halifax, Nova Scotia.
- R-62x**, Oct. 11. A letter proposing joint atomic research (MAYSON).
- R-63x**, Oct. 15. A letter expressing pleasure at the work of Admiral Mountbatten and informing Churchill that Mountbatten has information concerning possible operations in Africa; mentions possible Japanese move northward.
- R-64x**, Oct. 18. Explains U.S. position regarding postwar wheat controls; notes that the talks have only been exploratory.

- C-122x**, Oct. 20. A letter summarizing the military situation and strategic plans, particularly in the Middle East (with enclosures on artillery, air defense, and army strengths).
- R-65x**, Oct. 24. A letter informing Churchill of the appointment of William Donovan as Coordinator of Information, a new intelligence position.
- C-123x**, Oct. 27. Acknowledges receipt of R-64x.
- C-124x**, Oct. 28. Congratulates Roosevelt for his speech of October 27.
- C-125x**, Nov. 2. Informs Roosevelt of the transfer of the *Prince of Wales* to the Indian Ocean; mentions sinking of the USS *Reuben James*.
- C-126x**, Nov. 5. Supports a request from Chiang Kai-shek for aircraft and pilots; discusses ways to prevent further Japanese aggression.
- R-66x**, Nov. 7. Doubts that the Japanese are in a position to attack Yunnan and cut the Burma Road; generally agrees with Churchill's advice on a stern policy toward Japan; will expedite lend-lease aid to China.
- C-127x**, Nov. 9. Reports sinking of two Axis convoys in the Mediterranean and expresses optimism about the Russian front.
- R-67x**, Nov. 11. Tells Churchill of some critical U.S. Army reports regarding the condition of defenses on the British Isles.
- C-128x**, Nov. 18. Expresses pleasure at the proposed amendment to the U.S. Neutrality Act; operations mentioned in C-122x to start immediately.
- C-129x**, Nov. 20. Reports successful start of offensive in Libya, and concern over the possible replacement of Weygand by a more pro-German officer.
- R-68x**, Nov. 20. States the United States had protested to Vichy about any actions in North Africa which would aid Germany and is reviewing its policy toward France.
- C-130x**, Nov. 21. Report on the offensive in North Africa.
- C-131x**, Nov. 23. Forwards report of General Auchinleck on North African offensive.
- C-132x**, Nov. 24. Report on the offensive in North Africa.
- R-69x**, Nov. 24. Explains the Japanese offer to the United States of a *modus vivendi* and the American counter-offer.
- R-70x**, Nov. 25. Informs Churchill that William C. Bullitt is going as the President's personal representative on an inspection trip of the Middle East; mentions settlement of coal-miners' strike in the United States.

- C-133x**, Nov. 26. Indicates concern that the Chinese are not receiving enough aid.
- C-134x**, Nov. 27. Acknowledges R-70x.
- C-135x**, Nov. 30. Suggests the best way to restrain Japan would be an announcement that Roosevelt will ask for a declaration of war if their aggression continues.
- C-136x**, Dec. ? Indicates British willingness to cooperate on atomic research (MAYSON).
- C-137x**, Dec. 7. Asks for Roosevelt's comments on the proposed draft declaration from Britain and the British Commonwealth to Japan.
- C-R/tel.-2**, Dec. 7. Summary of a telephone call from Churchill to Roosevelt after the Pearl Harbor attack.
- R-71x**, Dec. 8. Asks Churchill to delay asking for a declaration of war against Japan until after Roosevelt speaks to Congress to make a similar request; approves of Churchill's message to the Irish government.
- R-72x**, Dec. 8. Reports U.S. declaration of war against Japan.
- C-138x**, Dec. 9. Suggests a conference between himself and Roosevelt (ARCADIA).
- C-139x**, Dec. 10. Dismisses question of personal danger and reiterates desire for a meeting with Roosevelt.
- R-73x**, Dec. 10. Agrees to a meeting with Churchill in Washington; assures that production and allocation problems can be worked out.
- R-73x/A**, not sent; Dec. 10. Asks for a delay of a few weeks before any meeting while an assessment is made of the new situation following the Japanese attack.
- R-73x/B**, not sent; Dec. 10. Suggests one week delay before any meeting.
- C-140x**, Dec. 11. Asks United States not to break its relations with Vichy France.
- C-141x**, Dec. 12. Asks Roosevelt to divert U.S. transports carrying British troops to Bombay instead of Middle East.
- R-74x**, Dec. 12. Informs Churchill that his request in C-141x has been followed.
- C-142x**, Dec. 18. Forwards a proposed agenda for their upcoming meeting.
- C-143x**, Dec. 18. Accepts Roosevelt's invitation to stay at the White House.
- C-144x**, Dec. 21? Gives estimated time of arrival in the United States and suggests additional transportation arrangements.
- C-145x**, Dec. 16-20. Four long reports from the Prime Minister assessing the strategic situation on all fronts.

- C-146x**, Dec. 30. Discusses Joint Declaration of the United Nations and Unity Plan formulated during the ARCADIA Conference.

## 1942

- C-147x**, Jan. 1. A personal inscription in a collection of Churchill's speeches.
- C-148x**, Jan. ? A personal inscription in Churchill's book *The River War*.
- C-149x**, Jan. 1? Requests that two Burmese nationalists be put on a plane going to West Africa.
- C-150x**, Jan. 3. Suggests timing of the press release regarding the unified command for the South West Pacific area (with proposed draft statement).
- C-151x**, Jan. 5. Requests supplies for Spain.
- C-152x**, Jan. 6. Memo enclosing a newspaper cartoon.
- C-153x**, Jan. 7? An extensive draft summary of the strategic situation for 1942 and 1943 in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.
- C-154x**, Jan. 14. Requests public assurances from Roosevelt that the destroyers-bases agreement does not involve any transfer of sovereignty over the West Indies colonies.
- C-155x**, Jan. 14. A suggested joint statement regarding the Free French occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon.
- R-75x**, Jan. 16. Informs Churchill that Roosevelt has approved General Wavell's proposal to take command of the South West Pacific area, excluding the Philippine Islands.
- C-156x**, Jan. 17. Supports Roosevelt's action regarding the South West Pacific Command; reports Churchill's return to London.
- C-157x**, Jan. 23. Reports de Gaulle's acceptance of Churchill's proposed statement on St. Pierre and Miquelon (C-155x) without insisting on secret conditions.
- C-158x**, Jan. 23. Reports the reaction of the British government to various supply arrangements and the establishment of two supply-coordinating boards; expresses doubts over treating China as an equal in supply matters.
- R-76x**, Jan. 26. Proposes a press release regarding the supply arrangements mentioned in C-158x, plus some minor changes in the documents.
- C-159x**, Jan. 27. Forwards protests from Australia and New Zealand over Great Britain's role as broker between them and the United States in formulating strategy in the Pacific.
- C-160x**, Jan. 29. Requests American intervention to prevent Chiang Kai-shek from withdrawing the Flying Tiger Squadron from Rangoon.

- R-77x**, Jan. 29. Forwards a copy of American promises to Pétain and Weygand aimed at bringing French North Africa to the Allied side; reports apparent failure of this move.
- C-161x**, Jan. 30. Birthday greetings to Roosevelt.
- R-78x**, Jan. 30. Discusses command problems in the ABDA area; agrees that Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch proposals should be coordinated in London (C-159x).
- R-79x**, Jan. 31. Requests that Churchill appoint Sir John Dill as the British representative on the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington.
- C-162x**, Feb. 1. Agrees to R-79x.
- C-163x**, Feb. 1. Forwards Wavell's proposals for restructuring the ABDA Command.
- C-164x**, Feb. 3. Forwards Wavell's response to R-76x, along with Churchill's own suggestions about the ABDACOM structure; agrees with Roosevelt's proposals regarding Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch participation in the Combined Chiefs of Staff committees; comments on China's role.
- R-80x**, Feb. 4. Asks Churchill to prevent further delay in British acceptance of the proposed Master Lend-Lease Agreement.
- C-165x**, not sent; Feb. 5. Asks Roosevelt not to press the "no discrimination" article of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement.
- R-81x**, not sent; Feb. 5-6. Disagrees with Churchill's draft of a joint statement regarding the Free French occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon (C-155x).
- R-82x**, Feb. 7. Suggests that Admiral Helfrich replace Admiral Hart as Acting Commander in Chief of ABDA naval forces; mentions German submarine activity in the Atlantic.
- C-25**, Feb. 7. A long discussion of the ABDA Command, coordination of Australian and New Zealand proposals, and the use of Chinese forces; expresses the hope that no guarantees will be given to the Vichy government about Madagascar since Britain plans to occupy the port of Diégo-Suarez; also discusses MAGNET and the Master Lend-Lease Agreement negotiations; suggests a numbering system for their telegrams.
- C-26**, Feb. 8. Forwards a query from Wavell concerning appointment of Helfrich as Acting Commander in Chief of ABDA naval forces.
- R-101**, Feb. 9. Informs Churchill that Helfrich has been designated Acting Commander in Chief of ABDA naval forces.
- R-102**, Feb. 11. Comments on various items raised in C-25.

- R-103**, Feb. 10. Forwards a copy of a message to Pétain strongly protesting the use of French ships to transport supplies to German forces in Africa.
- C-27**, Feb. 11. Suggests other command appointments in ABDA area; states that Singapore will be held to the bitter end.
- R-104**, Feb. 11. Asks Churchill to delay announcement of Peirse's appointment as commander of ABDA air forces.
- R-105/A**, not sent; Feb. 10. A strong defense of the American version of Article VII of the interim Master Lend-Lease Agreement.
- R-105**, Feb. 11. Defends the American position regarding Article VII but in more conciliatory language with a fuller explanation than in the draft.
- R-105/1**, Feb. 11. A letter teasing Churchill about his use of an assumed name (Charles Morin) when painting.
- C-28**, Feb. 12. Accepts the American position on the Master Lend-Lease Agreement; agrees with Roosevelt's protest to Vichy; mentions problems with Chiang Kai-shek, battle at Singapore, ABDA Command appointments, and the escape of the German ships *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*.
- C-29**, Feb. 16. Discusses command appointments in ABDA area; discusses the strategic implications of the fall of Singapore; expects a battle soon in North Africa; claims the shift of the German warships to Norway actually lessens pressure on the Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets.
- R-106**, Feb. 18. Discusses the effect of the loss of Singapore; promises increased American aid and efforts in the Pacific; agrees that the shift of German warships to Norway eases Anglo-American problems in the North Atlantic.
- C-30**, Feb. 20. Thanks Roosevelt for the support expressed in R-106; mentions resignation of Beaverbrook.
- C-31**, Feb. 20. Requests Roosevelt's assistance in persuading the Australian government to authorize the diversion of an Australian division to Burma.
- R-107**, Feb. 20. Supports the British request for a diversion of an Australian division and promises extra American troops for Australia.
- R-108**, Feb. 21. Forwards a copy of a message from Roosevelt to Australian Prime Minister Curtin asking that the Australian government permit the diversion of the leading Australian division to Burma; promises increased American aid for Australia.

- C-31/1**, Feb. 21. Repeats the gist of a Pacific War Council message to Wavell authorizing him to take the steps required to evacuate certain personnel from Java; also asks the United States to continue sending heavy bombers via India.
- R-109**, Feb. 22. Claims that Wavell now has sufficient instructions; doubts the possibility of getting naval reinforcements to the ABDA area.
- R-110**, Feb. 22. Repeats a message to Curtin asking that Australian forces returning from the Middle East be diverted to Burma; mentions forthcoming Washington's Birthday speech.
- R-111**, Feb. 23. (Sent by Hopkins.) Claims in answer to C-31/1 that U.S. bombers continue to be sent to Java.
- C-32**, Feb. 24. Congratulates Roosevelt on his Washington's Birthday speech.
- C-32/1**, Feb. 25. A letter calling for increased cooperation in the sharing of military ciphers.
- C-33**, Feb. 27. Suggests prior U.S.-British consultation before allowing any government to sign the United Nations Declaration.
- R-112**, Mar. 3. Agrees that French National Committee could sign the United Nations Declaration but no others without prior Anglo-American consultation; raises question of consulting the Soviet Union.
- C-34/A**, not sent; Mar. 2. A response to Roosevelt's inquiry about the possibility of granting independence to India.
- C-34**, Mar. 4. Asserts that the British government is considering a statement giving India dominion status with the right to secede after the war; expresses concern over the effect such a declaration could have on elements of the Indian Army, particularly Moslems.
- C-35**, Mar. 4. Forwards reports from authorities in India, one of which argues that a grant of independence would have adverse effects upon the morale of the Indian Army.
- C-36**, Mar. 4. Discusses the overall shortage of shipping; suggests postponement of GYMNAST; notes that increased needs in the Far East and Russia have depleted Britain's stock of supplies at home.
- C-37**, Mar. 5. Outlines Churchill's evaluation of the strategic situation, particularly in the Far East and the Indian Ocean. Expresses hope that the United States can keep Japan occupied in the Pacific and prevent any move by Japan into the Indian Ocean; surmises that the shortage of shipping is the major problem.
- C-38**, Mar. 6. Forwards a proposal from the Australian government for the establishment of a joint war council in Washington to direct the war in the ANZAC area.

- C-39**, Mar. 7. Forwards comments by British military authorities about the adverse effect of any promise of Indian independence upon the morale and effectiveness of the Indian Army.
- R-113**, Mar. 7. An extensive outline of U.S. troop and matériel allocations for the Pacific area during 1942; agrees on the cancellation of GYMNAST; supports invasion of Europe in 1942.
- C-40**, Mar. 7. Asks that the United States drop its objections to an Anglo-Russian treaty recognizing Russian territorial claims, particularly in the Baltic area; mentions India and hints at British support for some sort of second front in Europe.
- C-41**, Mar. 7. Forwards reports from the Viceroy of India and Governor of the Punjab, both recommending against any declaration giving India the right to secede from the British Empire.
- C-42**, Mar. 9. Acknowledges receipt of R-113 and promises an early response.
- R-114**, Mar. 9. Requests Churchill's concurrence in appointing Admiral Stark as the personal representative of the President in London; informs Churchill that Admiral King will become Chief of Naval Operations.
- R-115**, Mar. 9. Proposes a simplification of the military command structure by dividing the world into three theaters.
- C-43**, Mar. 10. Expresses pleasure over the appointment of Admiral Stark.
- R-116/A**, not sent; Feb. 25. Strongly suggests that Britain establish a temporary dominion-style government in India as a first step toward postwar independence; warns that the days of colonialism are over and draws an analogy between the United States after the American revolution and India.
- R-116**, Mar. 10. Suggests the same thing as the unsent draft of Feb. 25, but in less vigorous, critical language.
- C-44**, Mar. 14. Informs Roosevelt that Britain has decided to invade and occupy Diégo-Suarez on northern Madagascar (BONUS); asks for U.S. naval assistance to relieve the Gibraltar Squadron.
- R-117**, Mar. 15. Indicates desire that Stilwell continue to command Chinese forces operating in Burma, with British to retain command over forces in southern Burma.
- C-45**, Mar. 15. Indicates that BONUS, the codename for an invasion of Madagascar, has been changed to IRONCLAD.
- R-118**, Mar. 16. (Sent from Hopkins to Churchill.) Promises a quick answer to Churchill's query about heavy losses of tankers; asks for answers to R-115 and R-117.



- R-119**, Mar. 16. Agrees to support IRONCLAD by sending U.S. ships to reinforce the British Home Fleet.
- R-120**, Mar. 16. Gives number and type of ships being sent to reinforce the Home Fleet; discusses reasons for U.S. inability to provide adequate protection against submarine attacks in U.S./Gulf of Mexico waters; mentions departure of R. G. Casey.
- R-121**, Mar. 17. Informs Churchill of the appointment of General MacArthur as Supreme Commander in the Australian region.
- C-46**, Mar. 17. Agrees with the broad concept outlined in R-115 but offers some suggestions on specifics; aims at retaining a British voice in strategy in the Pacific.
- C-47**, Mar. 17. Indicates pleasure at General MacArthur's becoming Supreme Commander in the South West Pacific area.
- R-122**, Mar. 17. Reports a successful air attack on a Japanese task force in the Salamaua-Lae area of New Guinea.
- C-48**, Mar. 17. Suggests specific types of ships for reinforcement of British Home Fleet in connection with IRONCLAD.
- C-49**, Mar. 17. Indicates a preference for complete British command over all Allied forces fighting in Burma.
- C-50**, Mar. 17. Suggests that Roosevelt send the new battleships to the Pacific rather than to reinforce the Home Fleet.
- C-51**, Mar. 18. Expresses pleasure at American action in New Guinea (R-122); suggests establishing channels for the regular reporting of military actions.
- R-123**, Mar. 18. Informs Churchill of the specific numbers and types of ships being sent to reinforce the Home Fleet.
- R-123/1**, Mar. 18. A long letter in which Roosevelt discusses criticism from the press, the strategic situation in the Indian Ocean, his hopes of a second front in Europe, and the submarine war off the U.S. Atlantic Coast.
- R-124**, Mar. 19. Insists that Stilwell retain command of Chinese armies operating in northern Burma; claims Stilwell and Alexander are cooperating effectively.
- C-52**, Mar. 19. Thanks Roosevelt for the reinforcements being sent to the British Home Fleet.
- R-125**, Mar. 19. Suggests British air raids on German submarine bases.
- C-53**, Mar. 20. Agrees to Stilwell's maintaining independent command in northern Burma; states that the R.A.F. will take every opportunity to attack German submarine bases.

- C-54**, Mar. 20. Informs Roosevelt that New Zealand Prime Minister Fraser had agreed to the American proposal for a South West Pacific area with MacArthur as Supreme Commander.
- C-55**, Mar. 21. Responds to R-113; accepts U.S. proposals for allocation of shipping and air resources.
- R-126**, Mar. 22. Informs Churchill of plans to resume shipments of food to children in France and to send various forms of economic aid to French North Africa.
- R-127**, Mar. 22. Expresses annoyance over the publicity surrounding the Anglo-Australian argument about the appointment of R. G. Casey to the Middle East.
- C-56**, Mar. 23. Presents Churchill's view of the reasons for the dispute with the Australian government.
- C-57**, Mar. 24. Forwards the Australian government's comments on Roosevelt's proposals for theaters of operation (R-115).
- C-58**, Mar. 24. The text of the Australian government's comments on Roosevelt's theaters of operation; suggests changes designed to enhance Australian/New Zealand participation in strategic planning.
- R-128**, Mar. 26. Informs Churchill that the United States has told Australian Prime Minister Curtin that American reinforcements will be sent immediately to Australia; Curtin was asked to consider leaving the Australian division in the Middle East.
- C-59**, Mar. 27. Agrees to Roosevelt's proposal to resume shipments of supplies to French North Africa; asked for American permission to call the attack on Madagascar a joint Anglo-American expedition.
- C-60**, Mar. 29. In answer to Roosevelt's request (R-125), promises air attacks on various U-boat bases; asks Roosevelt for heavy bombers as soon as possible.
- C-61**, Mar. 31. Requests use of the USS *Wasp* to ferry fighter planes to Malta.
- R-129**, Apr. 1. Informs Churchill that Hopkins and Marshall will go to London to present the American long-term plan for military action; proposes asking Stalin to send two representatives to Washington.
- C-62**, Apr. 1. Answers R-123/1; mentions commando raid on St. Nazaire; discusses probable Japanese strategy; mentions IRONCLAD and convoys to Murmansk; reports increased British bombing of Germany and German-held cities.

- R-130**, Apr. 2. Answers C-61 in the affirmative but also proposes using HMS *Furious* for the job of ferrying planes to Malta, rather than a U.S. carrier.
- C-63**, Apr. 2. Expresses pleasure at the planned visit of Hopkins and Marshall; suggests Admiral King should also come.
- R-131**, Apr. 3. Refuses to label the invasion of Madagascar a joint Anglo-American expedition lest it cause a break with the Vichy government.
- R-131/1**, Apr. 3. Emphasizes the need of a second front to take pressure off the Russians.
- C-64**, Apr. 4. Acquiesces to Roosevelt's refusal to make IRONCLAD a joint venture.
- C-65**, Apr. 7. Reports the presence of a major Japanese fleet in the Indian Ocean and requests diversionary action by the U.S. fleet in the Pacific.
- C-66**, Apr. 7. Revises estimates of Japanese naval strength in the Indian Ocean; reports the loss of two British cruisers.
- C-67**, Apr. 11. Forwards a message from Stafford Cripps reporting the failure of his negotiations with the Congress Party in India; informs Roosevelt that Cripps has been called back to England.
- R-132**, Apr. 11. Requests Churchill to postpone the departure of Cripps from India; asserts that U.S. public opinion would strongly oppose any break in the negotiations.
- C-68/A**, not sent; Apr. 12. Rejects Roosevelt's arguments on Indian independence and offers to resign if that is best for Anglo-American relations.
- C-68**, Apr. 12. Informs Roosevelt that the British military and Churchill agree in principle on future operations in western Europe; defends the Cripps mission to India and says he will consider message R-132 private rather than official.
- R-133**, Apr. 14. Explains the ways in which the United States can reinforce British forces in India.
- C-68/1**, Apr. 14. A message from Hopkins reflecting British recommendations that the United States refrain from sending merchant ships into the Atlantic until a new convoying scheme becomes effective.
- C-69**, Apr. 15. Repeats request for American naval and air assistance in the Indian Ocean area; mentions lack of Anglo-American naval cooperation.
- R-134/A**, not sent; Apr. 16. Bluntly urges Churchill to accept the proposals set forth in message R-133.

- R-134**, Apr. 16. Recommends the measures set forth in R-133; indicates that the United States opposes any mixed fleet in the Indian Ocean and that Roosevelt does not expect any major battles there in the near future.
- R-135**, Apr. 16. Agrees to the suggestions in C-68/1 concerning keeping U.S. shipping in port until coastal convoys can be established.
- R-135/1**, Apr. 16. Forwards a report of negotiations between Japanese and Burmese leaders.
- R-136**, Apr. 17. Notifies Churchill that Roosevelt has agreed with a proposal by Mackenzie King for a conference at Ottawa regarding joint training of pilots.
- C-70**, Apr. 17. Reports a favorable British reaction to the American proposals for a cross-channel invasion; mentions problems in the Indian Ocean; agrees that Stalin be asked to send representatives to discuss the new plans (R-119).
- R-136/1**, Apr. 17. (Sent to Hopkins.) Instructs Hopkins to discuss Laval's return to power in Vichy; mentions apparent withdrawal of Japanese ships from the Indian Ocean; raises possibility of reconsidering GYMNAST.
- C-71**, Apr. 18. Discusses naval and air reinforcements for the Indian Ocean area; mentions complaints from Chiang Kai-shek.
- C-72**, Apr. 18. Forwards a note by Air Marshal Portal regarding U.S. plans for reinforcing the India theater.
- C-73**, Apr. 20. Proposes the establishment of a single combined agency to deal with supply matters.
- C-74**, Apr. 20. Suggests that the United States offer support to Pétain and Darlan if they will move the French fleet to North Africa.
- R-137**, Apr. 21. Provides additional information about the number and types of aircraft being sent to India.
- R-138**, Apr. 21. Suggests waiting before taking any action following Laval's return to power in Vichy France.
- R-139**, Apr. 21. Expresses pleasure at Anglo-American agreement over plans for a cross-channel attack; mentions air raid on Tokyo and the forthcoming visit of Molotov.
- C-75**, Apr. 24. Asks if Laval's return in France has changed Roosevelt's refusal publicly to associate the United States with Operation IRONCLAD.
- C-76**, Apr. 24. Asks for the use of the *Wasp* for another ferrying mission to Malta; mentions Atlantic fleet dispositions.

- C-77**, Apr. 24. Forwards a memo from the British Defence Committee regarding the use of the British fleet to support Malta, IRONCLAD, and Indian Ocean operations.
- R-140**, Apr. 24. Agrees to permit *Wasp* to ferry planes to Malta; acknowledges receipt of C-77.
- C-78**, Apr. 24. Informs Roosevelt that Molotov is scheduled to come to London before visiting the United States.
- C-79**, Apr. 25. Acknowledges receipt of R-140.
- R-140/1**, Apr. 24. From Hopkins to Churchill; expresses concern over the accumulation of supplies scheduled for transshipment to Russia.
- C-79/1**, Apr. 26. Answers Hopkins' questions (R-140/1); notes that Britain has asked Russia for increased protection of convoys.
- R-141**, Apr. 26. Expresses strong concern over the curtailment of large supply convoys to northern Russia; indicates worry over the Soviet reaction.
- C-80**, Apr. 28. Explains plans for future convoys to northern Russia.
- C-81**, Apr. 28. Requests that America publicly support and participate in the invasion of Madagascar (IRONCLAD).
- R-142**, Apr. 28. Forwards the text of a public statement regarding Allied occupation of any territory controlled by the Vichy French government; agrees to warn Vichy of American support for IRONCLAD.
- C-82**, Apr. 29. Mentions the escape of General Giraud; mentions attempts to sink *Tirpitz* and German retaliation; asks if a request from Curtin for additional forces and supplies, forwarded as a request from MacArthur, had been approved in Washington.
- R-143**, Apr. 29. Asks Churchill to accept American proposals designed to accelerate the size and number of convoys to northern Russia.
- R-144**, Apr. 30. Informs Churchill that Curtin's requests for reinforcement were made after conversations with MacArthur but were not approved by the chain of command; Roosevelt agrees with the British demurral and states MacArthur will make all requests via the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.
- C-83**, May 1. Acknowledges receipt of R-143.
- C-84**, May 1. Passes on the time schedule and substance of an appeal to the Governor of Madagascar relative to IRONCLAD.
- C-85**, May 1. Indicates that American proposals for convoys to northern Russia are unworkable because of a lack of escort vessels and warships.

- R-145**, May 2. Acquiesces to Churchill on the matter of convoys to Russia; states that the Russians will be told the reductions are needed in order to prepare for the invasion of France (BOLERO).
- C-86**, May 7. Expresses pleasure at news of the Battle of the Coral Sea.
- R-145/1**, May 7. A memo forwarding an envelope postmarked on the USS *Augusta* during the Atlantic Conference.
- C-87**, May 12. Asks for an increased allotment out of American aircraft production, particularly fighters and transports, the latter for airborne forces; suggests joint training of airborne forces in England.
- R-146**, May 16. States that U.S. requirements make it impossible to provide additional fighter aircraft; passes on the schedule for delivery of transport planes; agrees to joint training for airborne forces.
- R-147**, May 19. Abrogates the Arnold-Portal agreement regarding the allocation of American aircraft, indicating a desire to build up American air forces and have a greater use of American air crews on American planes; suggests discussions in London to work out new policy on aircraft allocation.
- C-88**, May 20. Expresses grave concern that American emphasis on using American air crews will limit the effectiveness of present air power.
- R-147/1**, not sent; May 22. Encourages the British to allot six of their aircraft to the Polish High Command in London.
- R-148**, May 26. Asks that Mountbatten visit Washington; mentions forthcoming luncheon with the Duke and Duchess of Windsor and the visit of Lyttelton.
- C-89**, May 27. Mentions the successful negotiations with Molotov regarding an Anglo-Russian alliance; comments on talks with Arnold and Towers concerning aircraft allocations; requests that the USS *Washington* remain in the Atlantic; thanks Roosevelt for allocating seventy tankers to Britain.
- C-90**, May 27. Forwards a collection of Churchill's books for Roosevelt's personal library.
- R-149**, May 27. Asks Churchill for a summary of his talks with Molotov as they related to BOLERO.
- R-150**, May 27. Proposes inviting Smuts and Curtin to Washington and asks Churchill for his reaction.
- R-151**, May 28. Adds to R-150 that Curtin would not be invited until after Evatt returns to Australia.
- C-91**, May 28. Expresses pleasure at the cordial talks with Molotov; mentions problems of any major invasion in 1942 and suggests an invasion in Norway; mentions convoy to Russia; expresses pleasure that the battle in Libya has begun.

- C-92**, May 28. Forwards a report on the Churchill-Molotov talks regarding the second front; indicates very strong British reservations about any cross-channel invasion in 1942.
- C-93**, May 28. Approves Roosevelt's suggestion of talks with Smuts and Curtin (R-150).
- C-94**, May 28. Agrees with R-151.
- C-95**, May 30. Comments on Evatt's visit to England.
- C-95/1**, May 31. (Sent to Hopkins.) Expresses concern over rumors that Pandit Nehru will be invited to the United States and that Louis Johnson will return to India.
- R-151/1**, June 1. (From Hopkins.) States that Nehru will not be invited to the United States and that Johnson is not returning to India.
- R-152**, May 31. Thanks Churchill for the books (C-90); mentions the invitation to Smuts and Curtin; claims that Molotov's visit was a real success; expresses concern over Russian morale and military strength; strongly pushes for an invasion of western Europe in 1942.
- C-96**, June 1. Doubts that the Allies can invade western Europe in 1942; mentions the beginning of a battle in Libya and a mass air attack on Cologne.
- C-97**, June 2. Thanks Roosevelt for leaving the USS *Washington* in the eastern Atlantic.
- C-98**, June 3. Thanks Roosevelt for the souvenir envelope (R-145/1).
- C-99**, June 4. Compliments Ambassador Winant for his role in helping negotiate the Anglo-Russian treaty of alliance.
- R-153**, June 5. Reports Molotov's departure from Washington.
- R-154**, June 6. Asks Churchill if he approves the concept of a Combined Production and Resources Board as worked out by Nelson and Lyttelton.
- R-155**, June 6. Reports minor changes in the joint protocol of supplies given to Molotov; expresses concern over the situation on the Russian front; mentions the Battle of Midway.
- C-100**, June 7. Approves the proposed Combined Production and Resources Board.
- R-156**, June 10. Agrees to a visit to Washington by Churchill.
- R-157**, June 12. Endorses the new Slessor-Arnold agreement regarding the allocation of American aircraft.
- C-101**, June 13. Provides information on Churchill's plans to visit the United States; congratulates Roosevelt on the victory at Midway Island.

- C-102**, June 13. Indicates concern regarding Slessor-Arnold agreement.
- R-158**, June 13. Suggests that Churchill come to Hyde Park; thanks him for the set of books.
- C-102/1**, June 14. A letter informing Roosevelt that the Bundles-for-Britain will have to be cut back because of a shortage of shipping.
- R-159**, June 16. Asks Churchill to bring Air Chief Marshal Portal with him to Washington.
- C-102/2**, June 17. Informs Roosevelt of expected arrival time in the United States; says Portal is unable to come.
- C-102/3**, June 20. Argues against any cross-channel invasion in 1942 and suggests an invasion of North Africa as an alternative.
- C-103**, June 27. Passes on General Auchinleck's thanks for additional American artillery and tanks.
- R-160**, July 2. Congratulates Churchill on the defeat of a motion of censure in Parliament.
- C-104**, July 2. Agrees to the American proposal to offer the French squadron interned at Alexandria the opportunity to accept transfer to the Western Hemisphere under U.S. custody.
- C-105**, July 4. Requests the diversion of forty light bombers enroute to Russia to British forces in Egypt.
- C-106**, July 6. Proposes more precise meanings for various codewords.
- R-161**, July 7. Passes on news of Stalin's agreement to the diversion of the forty A-20 bombers.
- C-107**, July 8. States that the British military cannot recommend SLEDGEHAMMER as practical in 1942 and claims the attempt would delay a major cross-channel invasion; recommends GYM-NAST as the best alternative for 1942.
- R-162**, July 8. Recommends they propose that the French warships interned at Alexandria be given safe passage to Martinique and re-interned there.
- R-163**, July 8. Agrees with Churchill's suggestions (C-106) for precise definitions of BOLERO, SLEDGEHAMMER, and ROUNDUP.
- C-108**, July 8. Proposes General Marshall as commander for BOLERO.
- C-109**, July 8. Expresses the hope that the appointment of a U.S. commander for BOLERO will not jeopardize more current operations such as GYMNAST.
- R-164**, July 9. Asks that various escort/anti-submarine ships built or building in Canada be temporarily assigned for use by the United States.
- C-110**, July 9. Thanks Roosevelt for arranging the transfer of Russia-bound planes to the Middle East.



- C-111**, July 9. Agrees with and offers minor additions to Roosevelt's proposal for interning French warships in Martinique.
- R-164/1**, July 9. Memo expressing Roosevelt's personal feelings about having to cut back on the Bundles-for-Britain program; offers to send Churchill a martini.
- R-164/2**, July 9. A formal letter thanking Churchill for his letter [C-102/1] concerning the Bundles-for-Britain program.
- R-165**, July 12. States that messages C-108 and C-109 have not been received.
- C-112**, July 13. Explains that C-108 and C-109 had been sent via the British Embassy.
- C-113**, July 14. Reports heavy losses suffered by convoy P.Q. 17 to northern Russia; suggests that convoys temporarily be discontinued and reports that a proposed message to Stalin will follow.
- C-114**, July 14. Strongly reiterates opposition to SLEDGEHAMMER and support for JUPITER and GYMNAST.
- C-115**, July 14. Forwards a proposed message to Stalin which explains why the convoys to northern Russia had to be suspended.
- R-166**, July 15. Agrees to the cancellation of the next scheduled convoy to Russia; suggests American railway personnel take over operation of the rail line in Persia.
- R-167**, July 15. Informs Churchill that Marshall, King, and Hopkins are leaving at once for London.
- R-167/1**, July ? A letter of introduction for William C. Bullitt.
- C-116**, July 15. Reports the impending departure of a heavily guarded convoy to Malta which, if successful, could indicate the best way to protect future convoys to Russia.
- C-117**, July 16. Suggests that Hopkins, Marshall, and King spend the weekend at Chequers.
- R-168**, July 16. Requests that Hopkins, Marshall, and King go directly to London.
- C-118**, July 16. Reports delay in sending an agreed-upon message to Stalin (C-115) in hopes of making it more optimistic.
- C-119**, July 16. Accepts suggestion to bring the American Mission directly to London.
- C-120**, July 17. Forwards changes made in the final version of the telegram about convoys to northern Russia sent to Stalin. The new version is more optimistic about resumption of convoys and proposes discussions between Russian and British military officials on how to do that.

- C-121**, July 21. Proposes a common pool of newly built escort vessels.
- R-169**, July 24. Agrees with Churchill's suggestion of a pool, providing that ships are in constant use and not held in reserve.
- R-169/1**, July 24. A letter forwarding photographs of Churchill taken in Washington in June 1942.
- R-169/2**, July 25. (Sent via Hopkins.) Reports rumors in Madrid of peace feelers between Britain and Germany and between the United States and Germany.
- C-122**, July 26. Agrees that any pool of escort vessels refers only to ships not yet ready for service.
- C-123**, July 27. Reports the agreement between British and American military conferees on questions of long-term grand strategy in Europe; an invasion of North Africa (TORCH) was agreed upon, although preparations for SLEDGEHAMMER-BOLERO-ROUNDUP were to continue.
- R-170**, July 27. Reports the return of Hopkins, King, and Marshall and indicates Roosevelt's pleasure with the results of the conferences.
- C-124**, July 29. Reports Stalin's angry response to the suspension of convoys as well as Britain's apparent unwillingness to open a second front in Europe in 1942; suggests a vague but non-argumentative reply to Stalin.
- R-171**, July 29. Proposes telling Stalin more details of Anglo-American plans for future grand strategy; strongly endorses the plan for sending Anglo-American air forces to fight on the southern Russian front.
- R-172**, July 29. Forwards a message from Chiang Kai-shek which asks that Roosevelt intercede with the British to obtain promises of independence for India; asks for Churchill's comments.
- C-125**, July 30. Disagrees with Chiang Kai-shek's interpretation of the problems in India and asks Roosevelt not to press Britain about Indian independence.
- C-125A**, July 31. Informs Roosevelt that Churchill has told Stalin of a resumption of convoys to northern Russia in September and has suggested a meeting with Stalin; tells Roosevelt he is leaving for Cairo.
- C-125A/1**, July 31. Suggests Marshall be appointed Supreme Commander of ROUNDUP with Eisenhower as his deputy.
- C-126**, Aug. 1. Endorses recommendations of the Combined Shipping Boards.
- C-126A**, Aug. 4. Asks Roosevelt to let Harriman accompany Churchill to Moscow.

- R-173**, Aug. 5. Agrees to send Harriman to Moscow.
- C-126A/1**, Aug. 6. Thanks Roosevelt for sending Harriman to Moscow.
- R-174**, Aug. 6. Agrees with the British proposal to appoint General Eisenhower as Commander in Chief for TORCH.
- C-127**, Aug. 8. Recommends advancing the date for TORCH; explains the reorganization of the Middle East Command.
- R-175/A**, not sent; Aug. 7. A draft message setting the date for TORCH as November 7, 1942.
- R-175**, Aug. 8. Suggests advancing the date for TORCH by three weeks.
- R-176**, Aug. 9. Informs Churchill that Chiang Kai-shek has been told that the United States will not do anything to undermine the authority of British officials in India.
- C-128**, Aug. 9. Asks to see any message Roosevelt might publish on the anniversary of the Atlantic Charter because of OWI forecasts that such a message would criticize colonialism.
- C-128/1**, Aug. 10. Thanks Roosevelt for not backing Chiang's protest regarding India.
- R-177**, Aug. 11. Passes the text of a protest from Chiang Kai-shek about the arrest of leading Indian nationalists by the British.
- R-178**, Aug. 13. Forwards the text of Roosevelt's press release on the anniversary of the Atlantic Charter.
- C-129**, Aug. 13. Reports on the talks between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow.
- C-130**, Aug. 14. Strongly protests Chiang Kai-shek's interference in the domestic situation within India.
- R-179**, Aug. 14. Expresses pleasure at Stalin's cordiality and understanding; indicates Roosevelt's desire to meet with Churchill and Stalin.
- C-131**, Aug. 15. Reports on the talks between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow; includes an *aide-mémoire* from Stalin protesting the failure to establish a second front in Europe during 1942 plus Churchill's formal reply to that protest.
- C-132**, Aug. 16. Indicates satisfaction with Roosevelt's Atlantic Charter statement (R-178); suggests that Roosevelt send a message to Stalin designed to console the Russians over the decision not to have a second front in 1942.
- C-133**, Aug. 17. Reports on the final formal dinner meeting between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow.
- C-134**, Aug. 18. Reports on an informal meeting with Stalin shortly before leaving Moscow; indicates strong optimism about Soviet relations with the Allies.

- R-179/1**, Aug. 21. A letter of introduction for Daniel Tobin.
- C-135**, Aug. 22. Agrees to Roosevelt's suggestion that U.S. personnel operate the Trans-Persian Railway (R-166).
- C-136**, Aug. 26. Suggests that a firm date for TORCH be set; discusses the likely political effects on Spain, Vichy France, and French North Africa.
- C-137**, Aug. 26. Thanks Roosevelt for sending pictures of Churchill in Washington (R-169/1).
- C-138**, Aug. 26. Acknowledges receipt of the revised American proposals for TORCH.
- C-139**, Aug. 27. Argues strongly against the American proposal to limit the scope of TORCH to assaults on the Atlantic coast of Morocco.
- C-140**, Aug. 30. Proposes a method of establishing an Anglo-American air force in the Caucasus (Operation VELVET).
- R-180/A**, not sent; Aug. 29. General Marshall's draft of a message objecting to any landing in North Africa east of Gibraltar.
- R-180**, Aug. 30. Proposes that TORCH consist of American landings at Oran and Casablanca followed a few days later by a British landing at Algiers; argues that there is a shortage of shipping and that the French would oppose the British but not the Americans.
- R-181**, Aug. 30. Acknowledges receipt of C-140 and promises quick response; supports Operation VELVET.
- C-141**, Aug. 31. Informs Roosevelt that Rommel has begun his expected attack in North Africa.
- C-142**, Sept. 1. Argues strongly for simultaneous landings at Oran, Casablanca, and Algiers as part of TORCH; agrees that the entire operation should be distinctly American.
- R-182**, Sept. 2. Agrees to a landing at Algiers as well as on the Atlantic coast of Morocco; emphasizes that the United States will control relations with French civil and military authorities in North Africa.
- C-143**, Sept. 3. Requests that assault troops be transferred from the Casablanca landing to strengthen the one at Algiers; expresses a desire for haste since the Free French suspect such an attack and might leak the information.
- R-183**, Sept. 4. Agrees to transfer some troops from the Casablanca assault to the one at Algiers.
- R-184**, Sept. 4. Forwards a list of U.S. naval vessels available for TORCH.
- C-144**, Sept. 5. Agrees to Roosevelt's proposals for the allocation of troops for TORCH; states that Admiral Ramsay will come to Washington to coordinate naval details.

- R-185**, Sept. 5. Congratulations on the agreement over TORCH.
- C-145**, Sept. 6. Returns the congratulations.
- C-146**, Sept. 6. Informs Roosevelt that the tanks and artillery promised in July have arrived in the Middle East.
- C-147**, Sept. 12. Additional information about the arrival and use of American tanks and artillery in Egypt.
- C-148**, Sept. 14. Requests final U.S. plan for the takeover of the Trans-Persian Railway; mentions VELVET and the problems of further recruitment in Russia of Polish officers and men for Polish divisions fighting with the British; discusses TORCH and the need to keep de Gaulle from getting involved; reports bad news about the P.Q. 18 convoy to northern Russia.
- C-149**, Sept. 15. Gives the projected date for TORCH.
- R-186**, Sept. 15. Promises delivery of plans for the U.S. takeover of the Trans-Persian Railway and Operation VELVET.
- C-150**, Sept. 16. Discusses the use of U.S. B-17 bombers and the effective bombing offensive by the British Bomber Command; requests that Roosevelt do whatever possible to increase U.S. production of bombers; mentions the U.S. campaign in the Solomon Islands.
- R-186/1**, not sent; Sept. 16. Discusses TORCH; agrees that de Gaulle should be kept out of the operation; proposes a radio statement by Roosevelt just prior to the landing in North Africa; passes on tentative proposal for an Allied air force in the Caucasus (VELVET).
- C-R/tel.-3**, Sept. 18/19. A telephone call from Churchill to Roosevelt on the occasion of Elliott Roosevelt's birthday.
- C-151**, Sept. 22. Discusses the overall problem of Allied relations with the Soviet Union following the cancellation of P.Q. 19 until January 1943; suggests an invasion of northern Norway (JUPITER); notes that, in discussions with Eisenhower, everyone assumed that a cross-channel invasion would not be possible until 1944 and feared effect of that announcement on Stalin.
- C-152**, Sept. 22. Gives the date for TORCH as November 8, 1942.
- C-153**, Sept. 22. Gives the codename for the British offensive in Egypt: Operation LIGHTFOOT.
- C-154**, Sept. 22. Forwards the suggested text of a message to Stalin explaining the reasons for cutting back convoys to northern Russia and suggesting JUPITER.
- R-186/2**, not sent; Sept. 24. A draft proposed by Hopkins suggesting that the air force to be established in the Caucasus (VELVET) be composed solely of British units with U.S. replacements going to the Middle East.

- R-186/3**, not sent; Sept. ? A draft answer to C-151 proposed by General Marshall and Admiral King; strongly opposes JUPITER and similar drains on BOLERO; asserts that sending small amounts of aid to Russia just to boost morale is unnecessary.
- R-187**, Sept. 26. Requests Churchill to delay cabling Stalin about the postponement of P.Q. 19 until that decision is final.
- C-155**, Sept. 28. Agrees to R-187; mentions VELVET and operations in Madagascar.
- R-188**, Oct. 2. Informs Churchill of his return to Washington.
- C-156**, Oct. 4. Expresses concern over the failure of the combined Production and Resources Board to solve certain planning problems. Indicates particular concern over production goals for tanks and ammunition which are too high and which would limit Anglo-American production of ships and aircraft.
- R-189**, Oct. 5. Opposes Churchill's suggestion to tell Stalin that the next convoy, P.Q. 19, will not sail; indicates deep concern about Russian morale; suggests specific changes to Churchill's proposed message to Stalin (C-154).
- C-157**, Oct. 6. Forwards a cable from Stalin and argues that they should meet Stalin's requests.
- C-158**, Oct. 6. The text of the Stalin-to-Churchill cable mentioned in C-157; Stalin requests additional supplies, particularly modern fighter planes, in view of the German advances toward Stalingrad.
- R-190**, Oct. 6. Requests that the *Chicago Tribune* be denied a license to publish a daily newspaper for American troops in England; proposes the printing of a daily newspaper published by the American government.
- R-191**, Oct. 6. Informs Churchill that the United States will send a heavy bomber group to the Caucasus for the joint air force (VELVET).
- C-159**, Oct. 7. Rejects the American proposal for a modified form of convoys to northern Russia and forwards a note from the Admiralty explaining his reasons; argues that VELVET has to await the outcome of the battle in Egypt; states that he doubts the Russians are threatening a separate peace.
- C-160**, Oct. 7. The text of Churchill's proposed message to Stalin: indicates that aid to the Soviet Union will have to await the outcome of the battle in Egypt and the invasion of North Africa; that Britain will send additional fighter aircraft as soon as possible; and that no more large convoys can sail to northern Russia until escort vessels become available early in 1943.

- R-192**, Oct. 7. Agrees to Churchill's proposal for a drastic curtailment of convoys to northern Russia; suggests minor changes to Churchill's message to Stalin.
- C-161**, Oct. 7. Agrees that the *Chicago Tribune* should not be granted a license to publish a paper for American troops in England; promises assistance in the establishment of a daily paper for American troops published by the Army.
- C-162**, Oct. 7. States that three telegrams about ASPIDISTRA will follow; asks if Roosevelt will prepare recordings as propaganda to be used with the North African invasion.
- C-163**, Oct. 7. Explains the capabilities and proposed use of the ASPIDISTRA radio transmitter in England.
- C-164**, Oct. 7. Gives the technical requirements for recordings to be used on ASPIDISTRA.
- C-165**, Oct. 8. Requests six radio tubes as spares for ASPIDISTRA.
- C-166**, Oct. 8. Informs Roosevelt that the message to Stalin included all of the President's suggested changes.
- C-167**, Oct. 8. Forwards the text of Churchill's message to Stalin regarding the postponement of the large convoys to northern Russia and additional British aid.
- R-193**, Oct. 8. Transmits a copy of Roosevelt's message to Stalin promising additional American aid to Russia.
- R-194**, Oct. 9. Agrees to Churchill's proposal that the President record a statement to be broadcast at the time of the invasion of North Africa.
- R-195**, Oct. 12. Replies to C-156 noting that production programs for tanks, ammunition, etc. will be periodically re-examined in the light of wartime developments; suggests that the Combined Production and Resources Board should simply respond to requirements set forth by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- C-168**, Oct. 18. Indicates concern over the supply of 100-octane fuel and asks Roosevelt to increase production capacity.
- R-196**, Oct. 19. Promises to monitor carefully the supply of 100-octane fuel.
- R-196/1**, Oct. 19. A letter sent via Eleanor Roosevelt; expresses concern over the Guadalcanal campaign; complains about newspaper owners.
- C-169**, Oct. 21. Suggests that four U.S. destroyers take part in TORCH operations inside the Mediterranean in hopes of guaranteeing neutrality on the part of the French fleet.

- R-197**, Oct. 23. Rejects as impractical Churchill's proposal to transfer U.S. destroyers to the Mediterranean for TORCH.
- C-170**, Oct. 24. Informs Roosevelt that the British attack in Egypt has begun.
- C-171**, Oct. 24. Reports the safe arrival in London of Mrs. Roosevelt; mentions the proposed visit of Smuts to the United States.
- C-172**, Oct. 24. Expresses concern over Stalin's failure to reply to earlier messages regarding the cutoff of convoys and the establishment of an Anglo-American air force in the Caucasus.
- R-198**, Oct. 24. Summarizes the new production goals set for escort ships, merchant vessels, and aircraft; mentions Guadalcanal.
- C-173**, Oct. 25. Recommends that Roosevelt meet with Swedish Secretary General Erik Boheman during the latter's visit to the United States.
- C-174**, Oct. 26. Disagrees with Roosevelt's suggestion that no mention be made of British participation in TORCH in the messages being sent to the Spanish and Portuguese governments.
- R-199**, Oct. 26. Forwards the draft of a press release to be given to American reporters immediately following the invasion of North Africa.
- R-200**, Oct. 26. Agrees with Churchill's argument that British participation in TORCH should be mentioned to the Spanish and Portuguese.
- R-201**, Oct. 26. Agrees to meet with Swedish diplomat Erik Boheman.
- C-175**, Oct. 27. Reports on Mrs. Roosevelt's activities in England.
- R-202**, Oct. 27. Discounts the significance of Stalin's failure to respond to recent cables; insists that Anglo-American commitments to the Soviet Union must be fulfilled.
- R-203**, Oct. 28. Forwards a copy of Roosevelt's response to a complaint by Australian Prime Minister Curtin about the lack of forces needed to defend Australia; Roosevelt promises additional U.S. forces will be dispatched to the southwestern Pacific and hopes the Ninth Australian Division will stay in the Middle East.
- C-176**, Oct. 29. Thanks Roosevelt for his message to Curtin (R-203).
- C-177**, Oct. 30. Informs Roosevelt that the planned winter operation behind German lines in Roumania and Norway and Italy (PLOUGH) is not possible in 1942-43, but suggests that the special vehicles be developed anyway.
- C-178**, Oct. 30. Agrees to the President's suggested press release to accompany TORCH; proposes two minor amendments.



- C-179**, Oct. 31. Forwards a report from General Montgomery about the high performance of American tanks and guns in the battle in Egypt.
- R-204**, Oct. 31. Agrees to the amendments suggested for the U.S. press release announcing TORCH.
- C-180**, Oct. 31. Agrees to emphasize the American nature of TORCH to the Spanish and Portuguese governments.
- C-180/1**, Oct. 31. A letter which outlines the crisis caused by U-boat sinkings of British merchant ships; requests a larger share of U.S. ship construction; forwards a memo about plans for the disposition of British Army forces during 1943 (printed as an attachment); mentions other supply and production questions.
- C-181**, Nov. 1. Reports on Eleanor Roosevelt's trip to the United Kingdom; indicates that General Smuts might be willing to visit the United States; mentions the battle in Egypt.
- R-205**, Nov. 2. Thanks Churchill for assisting Eleanor Roosevelt during her visit to the United Kingdom; reports that a quick decision regarding TORCH had been made without consulting Churchill.
- C-182**, Nov. 2. Mentions military successes in Egypt; requests Roosevelt to rewrite his proposed message to Pétain to avoid antagonizing de Gaulle and others; reports that General Giraud will be picked up and taken by submarine to Gibraltar.
- C-183**, Nov. 3. Reports a probably decisive victory in Egypt; congratulates Roosevelt on the good news from the southwestern Pacific.
- R-206**, Nov. 4. Agrees to tone down the message to Pétain to be sent at the time of the TORCH invasion.
- C-184**, Nov. 4. Passes a report from General Alexander about the victory against Rommel's forces in Egypt.
- C-185**, Nov. 5. Indicates that de Gaulle will be told about TORCH one day before the invasion; Churchill will, as a consolation, permit de Gaulle to announce the appointment of a Gaullist as Governor General of Madagascar.
- R-207**, Nov. 5. Requests that de Gaulle not be told of the TORCH operation until after it begins.
- C-186**, Nov. 6. Requests Roosevelt to reconsider and permit the use of a leaflet mentioning the employment of British troops in the invasion of North Africa; regretfully accepts Roosevelt's view that de Gaulle should not be brought into the TORCH operation.
- R-208**, Nov. 6. Opposes Churchill's request for the release of a leaflet mentioning the joint nature of the TORCH operation.
- C-187**, Nov. 6. Passes on a report from the Egypt/Libya front concerning the size of German losses.

- R-209**, Nov. 7. Forwards a report from the American Ambassador in Spain about a conversation with the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs during which the Spanish cautioned against any invasion of any portion of Morocco and the Americans warned Spain not to assist the Germans.
- C-188**, Nov. 11. Appeals for an Anglo-American policy designed to unify the various anti-German French forces.
- R-210**, Nov. 11. Indicates that the next step after TORCH should be toward Sicily, Sardinia, Italy, and Greece, and calls for a conference of military planners to work it out; agrees on the need to unify the French, but wants to know de Gaulle's intentions.
- C-189**, Nov. 13. Strongly endorses Roosevelt's suggestion about operations in the Mediterranean area; agrees that efforts should be made to bring Turkey into the war; mentions the victory in Libya and the U-boat problem in the Atlantic.
- C-189/1**, Nov. 13. Forwards the text of two "friendly messages" to Churchill from Stalin and the text of Churchill's reply; the messages indicate the Soviet need for immediate dispatch of Anglo-American air forces to the Caucasus.
- R-211**, Nov. 14. Suggests that once Anglo-American discussions about future operations in the Mediterranean are completed, an Anglo-American group should go to Moscow to talk to the Russians, since those operations will bring the Allies close to the Black Sea and the Soviet Union.
- C-190**, Nov. 15. Supports Eisenhower's decision to make a deal with Darlan in French North Africa, though he expresses serious doubts.
- R-211/1**, not sent; Nov. 16. A draft of an unsent message to Churchill which includes a copy of an unsent message to Eisenhower in which Roosevelt warns Eisenhower not to trust Darlan.
- C-191**, Nov. 15. Agrees with Roosevelt's proposal to consult the Russians about future operations in the eastern Mediterranean.
- C-192**, Nov. 17. Congratulates the Americans on the naval victory in the Battle of Guadalcanal.
- R-212**, Nov. 17. Informs Churchill of Mrs. Roosevelt's arrival in Washington and thanks the Prime Minister and his wife for their courtesies to her.
- C-193**, Nov. 17. Expresses concern over the public opposition to the Darlan deal; hopes that it is merely a temporary expedient.
- R-213**, Nov. 17. Agrees that severe opposition to Darlan exists; forwards a copy of a press release explaining the deal.
- R-214**, Nov. 17. A copy of a press release explaining why the Darlan deal was expedient and that the arrangement is only temporary.

- C-194**, Nov. 17. Forwards a copy of a note sent by Churchill to the British Chiefs of Staff regarding military strategy in the Mediterranean; thanks Roosevelt for the statement about Darlan.
- C-195**, Nov. 18. A lengthy summary of Churchill's plans for future Allied operations in the Mediterranean area—the "under-belly of the Axis"; places particular emphasis on bringing Turkey into the war.
- C-196**, Nov. 18. Suggests sending a convoy to northern Russia in late December provided the United States can supply twelve additional escort destroyers.
- C-197**, Nov. 18. Forwards the text of a message from Stalin which congratulates the Allies on actions in North Africa and reports that the Soviet Union will soon begin a winter offensive.
- C-198**, Nov. 18. Requests permission for Cadogan to attend a conference being held by Eisenhower at Gibraltar.
- R-215**, Nov. 18. Has no objections to Cadogan's attending the Gibraltar conference, but cautions that no political matters should be discussed.
- C-199**, Nov. 18. Agrees that no decisions should be taken on political matters at the Gibraltar talks.
- R-216**, Nov. 18. Notes the improved tone of Stalin's last message and hopes that will continue.
- C-200**, Nov. 18. Claims that Roosevelt's public statement about the Darlan deal has settled the matter; agrees that the military situation should take priority.
- R-217**, Nov. 19. Informs Churchill that the Combined Chiefs in Washington are studying his recommendations regarding future operations in the Mediterranean and lists the various assumptions being made in such discussions.
- R-218**, Nov. 19. Explains why it is impossible for the United States to provide additional escort vessels needed for the resumption of convoys to northern Russia.
- C-201**, Nov. 19. Informs Roosevelt that Cadogan will not go to Gibraltar.
- R-219**, Nov. 19. Suggests appointing a British and an American political representative to supervise civil affairs in French North Africa; notes that Eisenhower has been instructed to make sure all political prisoners in the area are released.
- R-220**, Nov. 19. Discusses a request from Australian Prime Minister Curtin for the immediate return to Australia of their Ninth Division.
- R-221**, Nov. 19. Forwards a copy of the actual request sent by Prime Minister Curtin of Australia.

- C-202**, Nov. 20. Requests thirty Liberator (B-24) aircraft with newly developed radar for use in anti-submarine warfare in the Atlantic.
- C-203**, Nov. 20. Forwards a summary by Field Marshal Smuts of the political/military situation in North Africa; Smuts suggests that additional anti-Darlan statements would be unwise.
- C-204**, Nov. 21. Concurs with Roosevelt's instructions to Eisenhower to avoid anything beyond a military agreement with Darlan.
- C-205**, Nov. 22. Reports that de Gaulle had not been permitted to broadcast an attack on Allied cooperation with the Vichy regime in North Africa.
- C-206**, Nov. 22. Forwards the text of the broadcast de Gaulle had asked to deliver.
- C-207**, Nov. 23. Asks Roosevelt to delay answering the Australian request for the withdrawal of Australian troops from the Middle East; expresses concern over shipping problems and the effect on New Zealand of the Australian request.
- R-221/1**, Nov. 23. A letter which reports that Lyttelton's visit has been successful.
- C-208**, Nov. 24. Indicates that, although Britain opposes the withdrawal of Australian and New Zealand troops from the Middle East, the requests cannot be refused; states that the United States should feel free to express an opinion.
- C-209**, Nov. 24. Contains the text of Churchill's messages to the Prime Ministers of New Zealand and Australia expressing the British government's regret at having to return Australian and New Zealand troops from the Middle East.
- C-210**, Nov. 24. Contains a copy of the New Zealand request for the return of its troops from the Middle East.
- C-211**, Nov. 24. Protests an apparent American decision to abandon ROUNDUP; emphasizes the bad effect such a move would have on the Soviet Union.
- C-212**, Nov. 24. Agrees to Roosevelt's proposal (R-219) to appoint political representatives to assist Eisenhower in North Africa; cautions that such representatives should not be accredited to Darlan's government.
- C-213**, Nov. 25. Informs Roosevelt that Major General Smith has explained that the United States has not abandoned ROUNDUP.
- R-222**, Nov. 25. Assures Churchill that the United States does not intend to abandon ROUNDUP; explains that delays in BOLERO are necessitated by TORCH and operations in the southwestern Pacific; mentions that Lyttelton will take letters for Churchill to England.

- C-214**, Nov. 26. Suggests that a tripartite staff meeting in Moscow would not be productive since the Russians would only ask about a second front in Europe for 1943; proposes instead a Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin meeting in Iceland in January.
- R-222/1**, Nov. 30. In a letter sent to England with Oliver Lyttelton, Roosevelt promises to provide most of the shipping requested by the Prime Minister (C-180/1); he also discusses providing additional bombers to England and the Soviet Union.
- R-223**, Dec. 1. Reports that the vehicles for Operation PLOUGH will be ready on schedule and that training for the project is underway.
- C-215**, Dec. 2. Notes that Australian Prime Minister Curtin has requested the return of supplies with the Australian Ninth Division, but those supplies had been intended for the Polish Corps.
- C-216**, Dec. 2. Forwards the text of an exchange between Churchill and Stalin in which convoys to northern Russia, a possible Big Three meeting, and the entry of Turkey into the war are explored; Stalin continues to insist on a second front in Europe and Churchill suggests to Roosevelt that ROUNDUP should be re-examined for implementation in 1943.
- C-217**, Dec. 2. Responds to an American request for carrier reinforcements in the Pacific by proposing to send two British carriers and to have the USS *Ranger* go to the British Home Fleet.
- R-224**, Dec. 2. Agrees to a Big Three conference but prefers meeting in Africa; indicates reluctance to meet Churchill beforehand; expresses a desire to concentrate on military questions.
- C-218**, Dec. 2. Acknowledges receipt of R-223.
- C-219**, Dec. 3. Agrees to a Big Three conference in Africa but prefers an Anglo-American meeting prior to any talks with Stalin.
- R-225**, Dec. 3. Asks Churchill to arrange for the Gaullists in French Equatorial Africa to release Vichy/Darlan supporters so that similar steps will be taken by the Governor General of French West Africa, Pierre Boisson; indicates particular concern about controlling the port of Dakar.
- C-220**, Dec. 3. Forwards portions of telegrams exchanged by British officials in London and Moscow which indicate that Stalin no longer favors Operation VELVET but prefers instead that the Allies simply give the planes to Soviet forces; Churchill is willing to carry out VELVET only as originally conceived and proposes that they delay making any response.
- R-226**, Dec. 5. Accepts the British offer to send the carrier *Illustrious* to the Pacific, but turns down the exchange of an American carrier to the Home Fleet and a second British carrier to the Pacific.

- C-221**, Dec. 6. Substitutes the carrier *Victorious* for the *Illustrious* as the carrier going to the Pacific.
- C-222**, Dec. 6. Asks Roosevelt to thank New Zealand's Prime Minister Fraser for the decision to leave the New Zealand division in the Middle East.
- R-227**, Dec. 6. Agrees to hold off any decision regarding Operation VELVET, but hopes that the project will be carried out primarily because of its political advantages.
- R-228**, Dec. 6. Forwards a copy of the thank-you message sent to Prime Minister Fraser.
- C-223**, Dec. 6. Agrees with Roosevelt's comments about VELVET.
- C-224**, Dec. 7. Forwards a copy of a message from Stalin indicating the Russian's unwillingness to meet in January because of intensive military activities; Stalin asks about the second front in Europe for 1943.
- C-224/1**, Dec. 7. A general statement, intended for public release, about joint efforts in the Pacific; sent on the first anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
- R-228/1**, Dec. 7. Acknowledges C-224/1 and promises the destruction of Japan's aggressive power.
- C-225**, Dec. 8. Suggests that Stalin be informed that VELVET will be carried out only as an Anglo-American operation as originally conceived.
- R-229**, Dec. 8. Agrees that VELVET must be a joint Anglo-American air force, not merely an increased supply of planes to Russian forces.
- R-230**, Dec. 8. Informs Churchill that a second message to Stalin will be sent in hopes of arranging a Big Three meeting; opposes any staff discussions in Moscow about the second front or other major operations for 1943; suggests military talks in Africa among lesser staffs of the three countries, with all decisions referred to the home governments.
- R-231**, Dec. 8. Forwards the text of the message to Stalin about a meeting between Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Russian leader.
- C-226**, Dec. 9. Requests permission to read R-214 (about Darlan) to a secret session of the House of Commons.
- R-232**, Dec. 9. Grants permission for R-214 to be read to the House of Commons and adds language which indicates that there was no agreement to let Darlan take charge in French North Africa.
- C-227**, Dec. 9. Indicates concern about the continued persecution of anti-Vichy elements by Darlan's administration in French North Africa; suggests that this shows the need for sending immediate political/administrative assistance to Eisenhower.

- C-228**, Dec. 10. Reports support from the House of Commons for the arrangement with Darlan; surmises that Stalin chose not to come to a meeting since a postponement of a second front in Europe seemed to be in the offing; suggests a meeting between British and American military leaders in London.
- R-233**, Dec. 11. Reports passing C-227 to Eisenhower for his comments.
- C-229**, Dec. 11. Indicates his intention to appoint Harold Macmillan as the British political representative in North Africa.
- C-230**, Dec. 12. Opposes Anglo-American talks with the Russians unless all three heads of government are there since the Russians are interested only in the second front.
- C-231**, Dec. 14. Thanks Roosevelt and Eisenhower for arranging the release of British internees in French West Africa.
- R-234**, Dec. 14. Reports that a courier is bringing a letter about future plans.
- R-234/1**, Dec. 14. A letter (delivered Dec. 23) which agrees to a Churchill-Roosevelt meeting in Northwest Africa and outlines a tentative schedule and itinerary; opposes bringing foreign-affairs personnel to that meeting; suggests early March if Stalin changes his mind and agrees to a meeting.
- R-235**, Dec. 16. States that Robert Murphy will be appointed Minister and the President's personal representative on Eisenhower's staff.
- R-236**, Dec. 16. Forwards Eisenhower's reply to accusations that Vichy sympathizers control the administration of North Africa; supports Eisenhower because of the military situation.
- C-232**, Dec. 17. Indicates eagerness to see Roosevelt's letter (R-234/1) so joint planning can begin; thanks Roosevelt for the letter about the Lyttelton mission (R-222/1).
- R-237**, Dec. 17. Forwards a copy of a message to Stalin which indicates that Roosevelt is still willing to implement project VELVET.
- C-233**, Dec. 17. Suggests procedures which would permit Britain to build up its dangerously low stocks of petroleum.
- C-234**, Dec. 17. Forwards full details on tanker utilization in reference to C-233.
- R-238**, Dec. 17. Forwards a message from Stalin explaining why the Russian cannot attend a tripartite meeting and again raising the question of a second front in Europe; also indicates Stalin's support for the deal with Darlan.
- C-235**, Dec. 18. Points out that Stalin's reference to the second front only emphasizes the need for a Churchill-Roosevelt meeting.

- R-239**, Dec. 18. Largely rejects Churchill's request for special procedures to build up United Kingdom petroleum stocks.
- R-240**, Dec. 18. Reports that the courier carrying a letter (R-234/1) will arrive on December 20.
- C-236**, Dec. 18. Proposes that Harold Macmillan be Agent General in North Africa and not be attached to Eisenhower's staff.
- C-237**, Dec. 19. Opposes making any new commitments to Darlan in order to get Admiral R. E. Godfroy to permit the French squadron at Alexandria to join the Allies.
- R-241**, Dec. 19. Prefers that Macmillan hold a title equivalent to that of Robert Murphy in North Africa, and be attached to Eisenhower's staff.
- R-242**, Dec. 21. Forwards a summary of the long-delayed letter (R-234/1) agreeing to a Churchill-Roosevelt meeting in or near Casablanca.
- C-238**, Dec. 21. Agrees to a Churchill-Roosevelt meeting as soon as possible; suggests SYMBOL as the codename.
- R-243**, Dec. 22. Proposes a program for the American and Swedish Red Cross to provide food and clothing for children in Norway.
- C-239**, Dec. 23. Argues that because of differences in the two systems of government, the titles for Murphy and Macmillan in North Africa cannot be precisely the same; argues that Eisenhower should be relieved of the burden of political problems.
- C-240**, Dec. 23. Acknowledges receipt of Roosevelt's letter (R-234/1) and endorses its suggestions regarding a conference at Casablanca.
- C-241**, Dec. 25. Christmas greetings.
- R-244**, Dec. 25. Christmas greetings.
- R-245**, Dec. 26. Suggests that Macmillan's departure for North Africa be delayed until the confusion caused by the assassination of Darlan is cleared up; asks that de Gaulle's visit to the United States be delayed.
- R-246**, Dec. 26. Forwards a copy of a message from Roosevelt to Eisenhower authorizing the provisional appointment of General Giraud to take charge of French civil and military authorities in North Africa.
- C-242**, Dec. 27. Informs Roosevelt that de Gaulle's visit is being delayed for forty-eight hours; asserts that a unified French leadership is needed; asks that Macmillan's appointment be approved.
- C-243**, Dec. 27. Forwards a copy of a message from de Gaulle to Giraud which proposes a meeting to discuss unification of French forces.



- C-244**, Dec. 28. Reports a meeting with de Gaulle and d'Astier at which de Gaulle argued that Giraud is better suited to lead troops than to be a political leader.
- C-245**, Dec. 29. Acknowledges receipt of a book from Roosevelt, a Christmas gift.
- C-246**, Dec. 29. Proposes calling Macmillan Minister Resident at Allied headquarters instead of British representative or H.M. Government's representative; mentions that French Somaliland has formally joined the United Nations.
- R-247**, Dec. 29. Agrees to the newly suggested title for Macmillan; emphasizes Eisenhower's authority.
- C-247**, Dec. 30. Thanks Roosevelt for the agreements negotiated during the Lyttelton visit to Washington but warns that the shipping crisis is far from over; outlines the way in which British civilians will be utilized; comments on the need for more naval aircraft and transport planes.
- C-248**, Dec. 30. Discusses arrangements for the Casablanca Conference (SYMBOL); agrees that Eisenhower has the ultimate authority in North Africa.
- R-248**, Dec. 31. Agrees to Churchill's suggestions for SYMBOL and suggests dates.
- C-249**, Dec. 31. A lengthy discussion of the political situation in North Africa in which Churchill suggests that, although the Allies are clearly in charge until the end of the war, local French authorities should shoulder the political burden, leaving Eisenhower to concentrate on the dangerous military situation in Tunisia; predicts that the British will take Tripoli by early February.
- C-249/1**, Dec. 31. Forwards a copy of the instructions given to Macmillan before he left for North Africa.

## 1943

- C-249/2**, Jan. 1. Denies the accuracy of a reported conversation between Churchill and a foreign Ambassador.
- R-249**, Jan. 1. Forwards a copy of a release U.S. censors will give the press just prior to Roosevelt's departure for Casablanca asking for a blackout on such news; asks Churchill to take similar measures to ensure secrecy.
- R-250**, Jan. 1. Argues that French politics in North Africa are subordinate to winning the war; criticizes de Gaulle but agrees that Giraud should handle only military affairs.

- C-250**, Jan. 1. Refuses a request that the Red Cross be allowed to send supplies to Norwegian children, but informs Roosevelt that a secret means of getting such supplies to children has been worked out.
- R-251**, Jan. 2. Discusses more effective utilization of tankers in the North Atlantic so as to meet Britain's oil-supply needs.
- C-251**, Jan. 2. Agrees on the need for secrecy regarding SYMBOL (Casablanca Conference) and proposes codenames and press restrictions; asks if de Gaulle should come to Washington before SYMBOL.
- C-252**, Jan. 2. Gives Churchill's codename regarding SYMBOL.
- R-252**, Jan. 2. Proposes codenames for Roosevelt and Hopkins and agrees to Churchill's suggestion to exclude the press; states that de Gaulle should not visit Washington until after SYMBOL.
- C-253**, Jan. 3. Suggests different codenames for Roosevelt and Hopkins and proposes a code for Willkie if he should also come to Casablanca; agrees the time is not right for de Gaulle to visit Washington.
- R-253**, Jan. 4. Asks Churchill to bring Averell Harriman to SYMBOL.
- C-254**, Jan. 5. Agrees to bring Harriman to SYMBOL.
- R-254**, Jan. 7. Forwards the substance of a message from Chiang Kai-shek in which the Chinese leader complained of inadequate support for a planned offensive in Burma (Operation ANAKIM).
- C-255**, Jan. 7. Proposes setting up Marrakesh as an alternative site for SYMBOL.
- R-255**, Jan. 7. States that Churchill's suggestion about Marrakesh (C-255) has been referred to Eisenhower.
- C-256**, Jan. 8. Congratulates Roosevelt on his State of the Union speech.
- R-255/1**, Jan. 8. A letter asking Churchill to consider allocating from British supplies the aircraft requested by Polish General Sikorski.
- C-257**, Jan. 10. Agrees to the tanker-utilization proposals in R-251; notes that the shortage of escort vessels continues.
- C-258**, Jan. 10. Explains why the British Eastern Fleet cannot support any amphibious operations in southern Burma during 1943; mentions that Operations CANNIBAL and RAVENOUS are all Britain can support.
- C-258/1**, Jan. 16. A copy of a message from Churchill to the British War Cabinet summarizing military developments in Tunisia and emphasizing the need to exploit that victory with further operations in the Mediterranean area.

- C-258-A**, Jan. 27. Informs Roosevelt that Churchill will leave Egypt shortly for talks with the Turks.
- C-259**, Jan. 30. Birthday greetings to Roosevelt.
- C-259-A**, Feb. 2. An optimistic report of Churchill's conversations with President İnönü of Turkey.
- C-259-A/1**, Feb. 2. Churchill's "Morning Thoughts" regarding the structure of the postwar world; mentions the formation of some sort of United Nations world organization; admits that Russia will get its June 1941 boundary with Poland; discusses the benefits of Turkish intervention on the side of the Allies.
- C-260**, Feb. 3. Forwards an outline of a proposed joint message to Stalin which would provide more information about future Anglo-American operations, especially in the Mediterranean, and about the cross-channel invasion.
- R-256**, Feb. 5. Revises Churchill's message to Stalin (C-260); eliminates mention of an attack on Italy and further limits the conditions for a second front.
- R-256/1**, Feb. 6. Requests that the exchange rate of francs to dollars be raised in the areas controlled by the Gaullists.
- C-261**, Feb. 8. Informs Roosevelt that the British Eighth Army, with the conquest of all of Libya, should now come under Eisenhower's command; suggests they should also announce the appointments of Alexander and Tedder to Eisenhower's staff.
- C-262**, Feb. 8. Forwards a copy of General Alexander's report of victory in Egypt and Libya.
- R-257**, Feb. 8. Agrees to the announcement of command changes in North Africa; asks that the American role in North Africa be emphasized in order to gain cooperation from French forces.
- C-263**, Feb. 10. Forwards exchanges of cables between Stalin and Churchill regarding the discussions at Casablanca and Churchill's suggestion that there be Soviet-Turkish talks; warns that continued emphasis on the American role in North Africa is bound to bring criticism in the British press.
- R-258**, Feb. 10. Forwards a copy of public remarks Roosevelt will make which emphasize the need for the French to concentrate on military unity against Germany rather than political problems in North Africa; indicates to Churchill his dislike of de Gaulle's call for elections in North Africa.
- R-259**, Feb. 10. Agrees to Churchill's proposed announcements of command changes in North Africa.
- C-264**, Feb. 11. Forwards the text of those portions of a Churchill speech which would deal with command changes in North Africa.

- C-265**, Feb. 11. Forwards minor amendments to C-264.
- C-266**, Feb. 11. Suggests that Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden visit the United States for talks with Roosevelt and the State Department.
- R-260**, Feb. 11. Agrees to Eden's visit; congratulates Churchill on his speech to the House of Commons.
- C-267**, Feb. 11. Discusses a broad range of problems relating to the French in North Africa, Martinique, and Alexandria; agrees that parliamentary elections in North Africa are not needed.
- C-268**, Feb. 17. Suggests that the invasion of Sicily (HUSKY) should be moved up to the "June Moon."
- R-261**, Feb. 19. Proposes discussions in Washington which would lead to a third lend-lease protocol with the Soviet Union.
- C-269**, Feb. 27. Reports Churchill's improved health and hopes that Roosevelt is over his fever.
- C-270**, Mar. 2. Designates Colonel J. J. Llewellyn as the British representative for discussions about the third lend-lease protocol with the Soviet Union.
- R-261/1**, Mar. 2. Forwards a photograph of a portrait of General Sylvester Churchill.
- C-271**, Mar. 4. Forwards a proposed cable to be sent jointly to Stalin which fully explains the Allied offensive in North Africa and mentions other future operations; also discusses the conditions for a cross-channel invasion in the summer of 1943.
- R-262**, Mar. 5. Passes on the text of a message to Stalin sent by Roosevelt on February 22 regretting the delay in taking Tunisia and promising a second front as soon as possible.
- C-272**, Mar. 5. Congratulates Roosevelt on the American victory in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea.
- C-272/1**, Mar. 5. Forwards a copy of the film *Desert Victory* and expresses concern about Roosevelt's health.
- R-262/1**, Mar. 17. Thanks Churchill for the film *Desert Victory*; expresses pleasure with the visit of Anthony Eden and cautions Churchill to take care of his health.
- C-272-A**, Mar. 18. Indicates that the preparations for HUSKY and the large concentration of German warships in northern Norway make further convoys to Murmansk impossible; includes two attachments: (1) a proposed message to Stalin explaining why no convoys can be sent until after HUSKY, and (2) a British Admiralty minute which provides a full discussion of the naval situation as it relates to convoys to Russia.

- C-272-A/1**, Mar. 19. A letter which acknowledges receipt of R-261/1 and the photograph.
- R-262/2**, Mar. 19. A letter forwarding a story about Churchill having visited Amenias, New York, as a baby (with enclosure).
- R-263**, Mar. 20. Agrees to hold up the convoy to northern Russia scheduled for March; recommends a delay in telling Stalin that HUSKY could interrupt further convoys.
- R-264**, Mar. 20. Mentions reports of German troop movements toward the Spanish border; recommends establishing a committee to study Wellington's Iberian Peninsula campaign.
- C-273**, Mar. 24. Advises that reports of German troop movements toward Spanish border are rumors put out by the enemy; notes that German troops and materials have been shifted to the Russian front.
- C-273/1**, Mar. 24. Outlines Churchill's concern about the unforeseen effects of the shortage of shipping; includes a memo on Britain's domestic shipping requirements.
- C-274**, Mar. 25. Reports talks with Archbishop Francis Spellman; suggests informing Stalin of the delay in northern convoys as soon as events in Tunisia turn in favor of the Allies.
- C-274-A**, Mar. 25. Indicates it is impossible to follow the suggestions made in R-263 that a convoy be run either as a blind or as bait; argues strongly in favor of telling Stalin about the delay in convoys to Russia; includes a draft cable to Stalin for Roosevelt's approval.
- R-265**, Mar. 28. Approves Churchill's draft telegram to Stalin after deleting references to any convoys before September; also adds promise of additional supplies to Vladivostok.
- R-266**, Mar. 29. Promises to examine the question of a shortage of ships; surmises that some military operations will have to be curtailed.
- C-275**, Mar. 30. Reports sending the cable to Stalin as amended by Roosevelt. (See R-265.)
- C-276**, Mar. 30. Notes that Churchill first visited the United States in 1895, when he was too big for a baby carriage.
- R-267**, Mar. 30. "SOME BABY!" (full text).
- R-268**, Apr. 1. Indicates how the shipping shortage could affect future military operations planned for 1943.
- C-277**, Apr. 2. Forwards Stalin's response to the news that convoys to northern Russia will be postponed until September; interprets Stalin's response as honest and not a veiled threat.
- C-278**, Apr. 2. Reports the Soviet rejection of a German offer of reciprocal prisoner repatriation; interprets that as a Soviet reassurance that they will fight on against Germany.

- R-269**, Apr. 3. Places a favorable interpretation on Stalin's message (C-277); indicates that Roosevelt is preparing a message to Stalin.
- C-278/1**, Apr. 3. Forwards the gist of a report from Stalin about an American offer to mediate between the Russians and the Finns; summarizes the British reply which encouraged the Soviets to pursue the offer.
- C-279**, Apr. 5. Suggests that Hopkins and Marshall come to London to discuss strategy to follow HUSKY; includes a copy of a minute to the British Chiefs of Staff advocating a speedy follow-up in Italy, Yugoslavia, or the Aegean Sea.
- R-270**, Apr. 11. Suggests postponing any Anglo-American conferences about post-Sicily operations until respective staff planning is complete; recommends continuing the buildup for HUSKY; mentions the possibility of a small-scale invasion of Burma; expresses pleasure at the successful bombing raids against Germany.
- C-280**, Apr. 11. Asks if American public opinion would still oppose conscription in Northern Ireland.
- C-281**, Apr. 12. Reports the capture of Sousse in Tunisia.
- C-282**, Apr. 13. Proposes that the administration of occupied Sicily should be set up with the British as the "senior partner."
- R-271**, Apr. 14. Rejects Churchill's suggestion for a British-led occupation government in Sicily and instead asks for joint Allied control and a predominance of Americans in the lower echelons.
- R-272**, Apr. 14. Reports his departure from Washington on an inspection tour of U.S. defense facilities; expresses pleasure at the capture of Sousse.
- C-283**, Apr. 15. Agrees that any occupation of Sicily should be joint but wants equality, unlike North Africa; suggests formulating a joint outline of occupation policy; mentions hopes of ferrying aircraft to the Soviet Union to offset the postponement of convoys.
- C-283/1**, Apr. 16. Reports that George McCullagh's visit to England is completed.
- R-273**, Apr. 19. Agrees that American public opinion would no longer oppose conscription in Northern Ireland.
- C-284**, Apr. 25. Forwards copies of cables sent by Churchill to Stalin concerning Polish accusations against the Soviet Union regarding the Katyn Forest massacre.
- C-285**, Apr. 25. Forwards a copy of a Stalin-to-Churchill message in which the Soviet Premier insists on breaking relations with the Polish government in exile.

- C-286**, Apr. 25. Summarizes British attempts to get the Turks to cooperate in the war; defends the shipment of supplies to Turkey as worth the gamble.
- C-287**, Apr. 26. Identifies Operation HANDCUFF as an attack against the Italian-held Dodecanese Islands.
- R-274**, Apr. 26. Forwards a copy of a Roosevelt-to-Stalin message asking the Soviet Union not to break relations with the Polish government led by Sikorski.
- C-288**, Apr. 27. Expresses approval of Roosevelt's message to Stalin (R-274); indicates annoyance that the Katyn Forest matter has aided German propaganda.
- C-289**, Apr. 28. Forwards a copy of another plea to Stalin asking the Soviets not to cut off relations with the London Poles; promises to restrain anti-Soviet propaganda coming from Polish exiles.
- C-290**, Apr. 28. Forwards a copy of the Polish government's statement concerning Soviet-Polish relations.
- C-291**, Apr. 29. Requests a meeting with Roosevelt and their respective military staffs beginning in Washington on May 11; expresses a desire to discuss the operations to follow the Sicily invasion.
- R-274/1**, not sent; Apr. 30. Praises Churchill's response to the Polish-Soviet crisis over the Katyn Forest massacre; emphasizes the need for wartime unity.
- R-274/2**, not sent; Apr. 30. Proposes delaying any Anglo-American conference about future European operations until early June; agrees that a British military mission should come to Washington immediately to discuss operations in Burma.
- R-275**, May 2. Indicates pleasure at Churchill's forthcoming visit.
- C-292**, May 3. Requests Roosevelt to cable New Zealand's Prime Minister Fraser expressing appreciation for the decision to keep the New Zealand Army division in North Africa during the Tunisian campaign.
- C-293**, May 4. Expresses pleasure at the forthcoming conference in Washington; congratulates U.S. troops on a victory in Tunisia.
- R-275/1**, May 8. (Possibly not delivered.) A memorandum summarizing the American position regarding political control in the liberated French territories and expressing extreme annoyance with de Gaulle.
- C-293A**, May 10. Warns of a slight delay in arrival at New York and suggests traveling by train to Washington.
- C-294**, May 10. Thanks Roosevelt for the naval escort; indicates pleasure at the prospect of spending the weekend at Hyde Park.

- R-275/2**, May 20. A memorandum discussing a report from London that various non-Gaullist French officials are disturbed about de Gaulle's attempts to gain complete control over the entire French government in exile as well as in the liberated sections of the French Empire.
- R-275/3**, May 21. A brief memo stating that a report on Libya and Tripoli is coming in and will be ready by May 23.
- C-295**, May 27. Reports Churchill's safe arrival at Gibraltar.
- C-296**, May 26. Forwards a draft of the proposed joint statement to Stalin on the results of the TRIDENT Conference.
- R-276**, May 27. Expresses pleasure at Churchill's safe arrival in Algiers; states that the agreed-upon one-sentence announcement about the TRIDENT Conference has been given to the press.
- C-297**, May 28. Reports Churchill's safe arrival in Algiers.
- R-276/1**, May 28. A letter informing Churchill that the United States has decided to transfer additional merchant ships to Britain for war-time use.
- C-297/1**, May 28. A memorandum summarizing a luncheon discussion during which Churchill outlined his views on the best structure for peace and security in the postwar world; includes suggestions for close Anglo-American cooperation, the creation of a number of European confederations, and a rough alignment of the world into three major spheres of influence.
- C-298**, May 31. Informs Roosevelt that Eden will come to Algiers to assist in arranging an agreement between de Gaulle and Giraud; assures Roosevelt that Britain wants any French council to have the power to restrain the ambitions of any single individual.
- R-277**, June 3. Suggests that public information about anti-submarine warfare be limited to a monthly joint Anglo-American statement; this to avoid helping the Japanese effort against American submarines.
- R-278**, June 4. Expresses pessimism about the value of any de Gaulle-Giraud agreement; emphasizes the need to keep Dakar under the control of Boisson and the need for de Gaulle to cooperate with the war effort.
- C-299**, June 4. Agrees to a monthly statement on anti-submarine warfare; reports that discussions between Marshall and the British had been useful; mentions an agreement between de Gaulle and Giraud.



- C-300**, June 6. Reports the creation of the French Committee; states that this ends the British connection with de Gaulle as leader of the Fighting French; promises to try to keep Boisson as Governor of West Africa and to cut down on Gaullist propaganda in the press; expresses pleasure over the meetings with Marshall.
- C-301**, June 6. Thanks Roosevelt for deciding to transfer additional merchant ships to Britain; asks permission to publish Roosevelt's letter (R-276/1).
- R-279**, June 7. Turns down Churchill's request to publish R-276/1.
- R-280**, June 9. Reports the return of Joseph Davies from Moscow; promises to forward Stalin's response to the report of the TRIDENT Conference.
- C-302**, June 10. Requests American concurrence in a request from Tedder and Eisenhower for permission to conduct air attacks on the railroad marshaling yards at Rome.
- R-281**, June 10. Repeats a message from Murphy describing the political struggle between de Gaulle and Giraud plus a message from Roosevelt's instructions to General Eisenhower indicating strong American opposition to the removal of Boisson as Governor General of West Africa; indicates Roosevelt's fear of de Gaulle's gaining full control over French military forces in North Africa.
- C-303**, June 10. Outlines British proposals for occupation and administrative policies in liberated Sicily; requests that Macmillan continue as a British political representative at Eisenhower's headquarters.
- C-304**, June 10. Forwards a British memorandum, apparently written by Eden, establishing Macmillan's position at Eisenhower's headquarters and outlining the channels of communication for Eisenhower and Macmillan.
- C-305**, June 11. Proposes that the British Ambassador in Lisbon open discussions with the Portuguese government in order to obtain bases in the Azores; indicates that planning for a military operation against the Azores is continuing, should discussions fail.
- R-282**, June 11. Agrees with Churchill's proposal to conduct talks with the Portuguese about the Azores.
- C-306**, June 11. Concurs in Roosevelt's support for Boisson and the general assessment of the situation in North Africa contained in R-281.
- C-307**, June 11. Reports the surrender of the Italian island of Pantelleria.
- R-283**, June 11. Expresses pleasure at the capture of Pantelleria.