

PETER H. SMITH

Labyrinths of Power

*Political Recruitment in
Twentieth-Century Mexico*



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Political Recruitment
in Twentieth-Century Mexico

Peter H. Smith

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IN MEMORY OF
don Daniel Cosío Villegas
AND
IN ADMIRATION OF
THE GENERATIONS HE INSPIRED

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASA	Aeropuertos y Servicios Auxiliares
CANACINTRA	Cámara Nacional de Industrias de Transformación
CNC	Confederación Nacional Campesina
CNOP	Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares
CONCAMIN	Confederación de Cámaras de Industria
CONASUPO	Compañía Nacional de Subsistencias Populares
COPARMEX	Confederación Patronal de la República de México
CTM	Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos
FSTSE	Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores en el Servicio del Estado
IEPES	Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Económicos y Sociales
IMSS	Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social
ISSSTE	Instituto de Servicios y Seguros Sociales de Trabajadores del Estado
PAN	Partido de Acción Nacional
PARM	Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana
PEMEX	Petróleos Mexicanos
PIPSA	Productora e Importadora de Papel, Sociedad Anónima
PNR	Partido Nacional Revolucionario
PPS	Partido Popular Socialista
PRI	<i>Partido Revolucionario Institucional</i>
PRM	Partido de la Revolución Mexicana
SOMEX	Sociedad Mexicana de Crédito Industrial
SRH	Secretaría de Recursos Hidráulicos
UNAM	Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

PART I

INTRODUCTION

. 1 .

THE LINES OF INQUIRY

One of the most critical sets of questions about any political system concerns the composition of its leadership: Who governs? Who has access to power, and what are the social conditions of rule? Such issues have direct bearing on the representativeness of political leadership, a continuing concern of democratic theorists, and on the extent to which those in power emerge from the ranks of "the people"—or from an exclusive oligarchy. These themes also relate to the role of the political system within society at large, and to the ways in which careers in public life offer meaningful opportunities for vertical (usually upward) social mobility. In addition, these questions focus attention upon the patterns of political careers—that is, the timing, sequence, and duration of tenure in public offices—patterns which can in turn provide important clues about the operative codes that guide and affect the behavior of the leaders of the system.

Consideration of these problems is highly relevant to an understanding of political change in twentieth-century Mexico, and Mexico offers an exceptionally promising laboratory for a study of them. In the first place, Mexico underwent an extended, violent, and ultimately mass-based revolution in the decade from 1910 to 1920. It is therefore possible to examine, with substantial historical perspective, the long-run impact that the Mexican Revolution may (or may not) have exerted upon the composition of the country's political elite. Did it really alter the social background of the ruling groups, or did it merely reallocate power to differing segments of the same class? Any thorough assessment of the meaning of the Mexican Revolution, and its significance for Mexican society, obviously demands an answer to this question.

In the second place, Mexico has created and maintained an unquestionably "authoritarian" regime—a system that is characterized by "limited pluralism," in Juan Linz's phrase, and one that is identifiably and analytically distinct from democratic or totalitarian types of rule.¹ Authoritarianism is a widespread phenomenon, especially in countries

¹ See Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," most easily consulted in *Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology*, ed. Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan (New York: The Free Press, 1970), pp. 251-283 and 374-381.

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throughout the Third World,² and an appreciation of its variety and complexity calls for the study of elites. For if authoritarianism consists of limited pluralism, it becomes necessary to determine who falls on which side of the limits—who does (and does not) have the functional right to organize and compete for power. There is an equally urgent need to gain some understanding of the behavior of authoritarian elites and the “rules” of their political game. Ironically enough, the qualities that set off the Mexican regime from so many of its authoritarian counterparts—its apparent stability, and its domination by civilians—also make it an extraordinarily useful case study, since the recruitment and selection processes have endured for many years without a military coup or any other major interruption. To put the question in its simplest form: If you don’t attain high office by amassing a popular vote (as in a democratic system), or by ascending the military hierarchy (as in countless places), then how do you do it?

Third, Mexico has undergone rapid and profound socioeconomic change during the course of this century. Industries have flourished, cities have grown, literacy has spread, the population has boomed—and the gap between the rich and poor has steadily increased. The situation thus affords an opportunity to analyze the relationship, if any, between alterations in society at large and in the composition of the ruling groups. For it is at least conceivable that socioeconomic trends, rather than political events or processes, have exercised primary influence upon the patterns of leadership recruitment.

In an effort to confront these issues I focus, in this study, upon the changing characteristics of the national political elite in twentieth-century Mexico. Specifically, as explained in some detail below, I explore the personal biographies of more than 6,000 individuals who held national office in Mexico at any time between 1900 and 1976—before, during, and since the Mexican Revolution. My intent is to analyze the structure and, more important, the transformation of elites over a substantial stretch of time. Straightforward as this purpose seems, it raises a series of complex conceptual problems, not the least of which concerns the very notion of a political elite.

THE CONCEPT OF ELITES

A study of this kind draws heavily upon the intellectual legacy of the classical elite theorists: Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, and Robert

² According to Jean Blondel, who does not follow Linz’s definitions, about 30 percent of the world’s political systems were “authoritarian” as of 1972—and another 30 percent were “populist” (including Mexico). Blondel, *Comparing Political Systems* (New York: Praeger, 1972), Appendix.

Michels. Writing in the late nineteenth century, when Europe's hereditary aristocracies were waning and burgeoning labor movements were promoting Marxist visions of stateless utopias, these thinkers argued forcefully that in all societies, no matter what the political system, power would always be controlled by a small minority.³ "Among the constant facts and tendencies that are to be found in all political organisms," declared Mosca in his famous treatise,

one is so obvious that it is apparent to the most casual eye. In all societies—from societies that are very meagerly developed and have barely attained the dawns of civilization, down to the most advanced and powerful societies—two classes of people appear—a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first, in a manner that is now more or less legal, now more or less arbitrary and violent, and supplies the first, in appearance at least, with material means of subsistence and with the instrumentalities that are essential to the vitality of the political organism.⁴

The distribution of power was highly skewed and bimodal, and the minority which possessed it comprised a "ruling class." To this dominant stratum Pareto gave the label that has since remained in common use: the governing, or political, elite.⁵

This emphasis upon a ruling elite seems, at face value, unexceptionable. Political power is unequally (if not bimodally) distributed in all societies; those who have the greatest shares can properly be regarded as an elite, and it is in that sense only that I employ the term throughout this book. Whether power *must* be so concentrated, as Michels gloomily concluded ("Who says organization, says oligarchy"),⁶ is a separate question. The fact is that it *has* been so, at least in all societies observed to date, and it applies to twentieth-century Mexico as well as to other situations.

The difficulty with classical elite theory lies in its extension of this

³ For an excellent analysis of the political context giving rise to elite theory see James H. Meisel, *The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and the Elite* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962).

⁴ Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, trans. Hannah D. Kahn, ed. Arthur Livingston (New York and London: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. 50.

⁵ *Vilfredo Pareto: Sociological Writings*, trans. Derek Mirfin, ed. S. E. Finer (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966), pp. 248-249.

⁶ Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 365.

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basic insight. Beginning with its stark, unnecessarily simplistic dichotomy between the rulers and the ruled, the theory went on to posit that the ruling group comprised a unified, organized, self-conscious, purposeful class "obeying," in Mosca's words, "a single impulse."⁷ One problem with this formulation stems from the implicit concept of class, which includes the question of consciousness but ignores the question of socioeconomic influence or status. Another and perhaps more basic problem comes from the assumption of shared consciousness. It may be, in some cases, that the dominant elite pursues a common purpose; it may also be, in other cases, that those possessing power do not have a sense of unity. That is a matter for empirical research, not for a priori definition.

In addition, proponents of the theory tended to argue that members of the elite were somehow superior—"select," as the word itself implies—and that, in an almost Darwinian sense, they held a monopoly of power because they were the fittest for it. As Mosca put it, "ruling minorities are usually so constituted that the individuals who make them up are distinguished from the mass of the governed by qualities that give them a certain material, intellectual or even moral superiority; or else they are the heirs of individuals who possessed such qualities."⁸ Pareto, for his part, laid the emphasis on psychological attributes: political leaders had to know how to use appropriate combinations of persuasion and force, and this task called for special kinds of personalities. In either case, the assumption was that individuals acquired power largely because of their own qualities, rather than because of structural inequities or patterns of oppression.⁹

A concomitant part of this view was an idea that political elites, or ruling groups, were essentially autonomous. They could be pressured by the masses, and they needed the support (or acquiescence) of the nonelites, but they were mainly beholden to themselves. Even Harold Lasswell, writing in the early 1950s, defined the political elite as the social stratum from which leadership originates "and to which accountability is maintained."¹⁰ Again, this might be true and it might not be true: there is no inherent reason why it must be so.

Ironically enough, some theorists have constructed interpretations

⁷ Mosca, *Ruling Class*, p. 53.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ For Michels, it should be noted, individuals attained power because of the imperatives of large-scale organization. Mosca, too, was careful to stress that virtue (or superiority) was in the eye of the beholder, though he did not offer much of an explanation about how or why cultural values change over time.

¹⁰ Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and C. Easton Rothwell, *The Comparative Study of Elites: An Introduction and Bibliography* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 13.

of political democracy by accepting much or most of elite theory and rejecting just this one assumption. In a democratic system, as Joseph Schumpeter (among others) has maintained, positions of power are in principle open to everyone, but they are in fact sought by members of a tiny minority—that is, by competing factions of a political elite which, in contrast to the classical model, owes accountability to its electorate. Democracy, then, consists of the “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”¹¹ In this conception, democracy is merely a method for the selection of elites.¹²

At any rate, the emphasis on elite autonomy led the classical theorists to find the sources of political change within the ruling group itself. In Mosca’s terms, “the varying structure of ruling classes has a preponderant importance in determining the political type, and also the level of civilization, of the different peoples,” and a change within the ruling class necessarily meant a change within society at large. (Mosca also conceded that dislocations in the ruling class could result from the emergence of new social forces, as when “a new source of wealth develops in a society”¹³—a position that, as James Meisel observed, brought him “uncomfortably close to Marx,”¹⁴ and one that Mosca himself did not thoroughly develop.)

It was Pareto, of course, who crystallized the idea of the circulation of elites. Leadership demanded a requisite combination of psychological attributes, according to Pareto, and the elite must constantly replenish its supply. “Aristocracies decay not only in number but also in quality, in the sense that energy diminishes and there is a debilitating alteration in the proportion of the residues [sympathies] which originally favored the capture and retention of power. . . .” Therefore the elite should draw upon the nonelite, improving (and protecting) itself by renewing itself. Social mobility would thus maintain high standards of leadership and assure political stability as well. But if circulation stopped, danger then arose: “the accumulation of superior elements in the lower classes and, conversely, of inferior elements in the upper classes, is a potent cause of disturbance in the social equilibrium.” In time, most ruling groups lost sight of this fact and eventually

¹¹ Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 3rd edition (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 269.

¹² For trenchant criticisms of this view see T. B. Bottomore, *Elites and Society* (London: Penguin Books, 1964), ch. vii; and Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).

¹³ Mosca, *Ruling Class*, pp. 51 and 65.

¹⁴ Meisel, *Myth*, p. 303.

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succumbed to challenges from below. Hence revolutions, and hence Pareto's well-known aphorism: "History is a graveyard of aristocracies."¹⁵

What Pareto envisioned was a cyclical exchange of political dominance between two psychological types, the foxes and the lions. Foxes, in this scheme, tended to be cunning, shrewd, manipulative, artists of corruption and deception. Lions relied on force instead of persuasion: they were primitive, forceful, and strong. Interestingly enough, Pareto identified these leadership types with differing economic activities—foxes with industrial and commercial interests, lions with agriculture—but he did not pursue this connection at any length. Essentially, he saw elite transformation as the interplay of psychological forces, with excesses of one kind counterbalanced by excesses of another.¹⁶

At face value, this thesis has a certain plausibility. In the case of Mexico, for instance, there appears to be a fox-lion-fox cycle in the transition from the aging Porfirio Díaz (and his elegant collaborator, José Yves Limantour) to rough-and-tumble types like Pancho Villa to smooth operators like Miguel Alemán. But the scheme is as superficial as it is suggestive. In the first place, political leaders, especially in Mexico, have displayed conspicuous abilities for combining foxlike agility with lionlike power, summoning each trait according to the requirements of the situation, not just because of psychic predilection.¹⁷ Second, the cyclical theory does not easily accommodate patterns of linear, secular change (as will be sometimes encountered below). Besides, I do not have any data on the psychological predisposition of Mexican political leaders and could not classify them even if I wanted to. On the other hand, this book is supposed to be a study of elite transformation: if not psychological forces, what might have been the sources of change?

One set of possibilities deals with political factors. In some societies electoral reform, to take one kind of political event, has contributed to major alterations in the social origin of leadership. In England, the Second Reform Bill of 1867 helped precipitate a sharp decline in the proportion of landowners sitting in the House of Commons.¹⁸ In Argentina, as I have elsewhere shown, the enfranchisement of all adult

¹⁵ Pareto, *Writings*, pp. 249-250.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 256-258. See also Bottomore, *Elites*, pp. 48-68.

¹⁷ I am presenting, in effect, a crude proposition: that political leaders seek power and, once smitten by this ambition, they will take whatever steps are necessary to fulfill it. For a classification of ambitions that is suggestive, but not particularly applicable to this study, see James L. Payne and Oliver H. Woshinsky, "Incentives for Political Participation," *World Politics* 24, no. 4 (July 1972): 518-546.

¹⁸ Robert D. Putnam, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), pp. 173-175.

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male citizens in 1912 prompted a similar decline in the percentage of upper-class "aristocrats" in the Chamber of Deputies, and the rise of the Peronist movement led to their near-complete eclipse in the 1940s.¹⁹ Being a process of violent upheaval, a revolution such as occurred in Mexico could—almost by definition—be expected to bring about profound and sudden changes in the composition of elites. Did it?

A lot of people seem to think it did. An ex-president of Mexico, Emilio Portes Gil, writing in a government-sponsored volume, has expressed what practically amounts to an official view on the subject. In contrast to the aristocratic pretensions of the prerevolutionary elite, said Portes Gil,

The founders and leaders of the Mexican Revolution were men of humble origin who were always in contact with working-class people in the city and the countryside. Many were farmers and had personally suffered the despotism of the landowners . . . ridiculed, reviled, and persecuted, they belonged to a class which possessed no privilege of any kind, and they viewed the *latifundistas* and representatives of the Porfirian dictatorship with contempt. From these men, the spokesmen and commanders of the Revolution, came the laws for the protection of the worker and the peasant, rural education, the conservation of the culture and traditions of the indigenous race, the assertion of national dominion over the subsoil and natural resources, and the many other and important social and political reforms that have made Mexico into a respected country.²⁰

In short, the Revolution meant a change from an urban, urbane, exclusive oligarchy to the political preeminence of poor and rural elements.²¹ Thus the Revolution opened the doors to political and social opportunity, drew its leaders from the masses, and created a system that would remain truly representative. Sometimes the argument is cast in racial terms, stipulating that the Revolution passed effective power from white *blancos* to mixed-blood *mestizos* and even to some pure-blood *indios*.²² Hence a streetcorner slogan, used by regime supporters to demonstrate the system's flexibility and by opponents to indicate its mediocrity: "Anyone can become president."

¹⁹ Peter H. Smith, *Argentina and the Failure of Democracy: Conflict among Political Elites, 1904-1955* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), pp. 26-27.

²⁰ Emilio Portes Gil, "Sentido y destino de la Revolución Mexicana," in *México: Cincuenta años de Revolución*, vol. III, *La política* (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1961), p. 480.

²¹ See also Frank Tannenbaum, *Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), pp. 54 and 69-71.

²² See, for example, Roger D. Hansen, *The Politics of Mexican Development* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), pp. 8-9 and ch. 6.

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Whatever the validity of this assertion, it would be excessively simple-minded to assume that all elite transformations are due to political factors. As Karl Marx argued so powerfully, and others have since maintained, alterations in leadership can also result from the changing balance of socioeconomic forces. For Marx, the ruling class consisted of those who controlled the means of production and who consolidated their hegemony through political means. A change in the modes of production necessarily entailed a change in social structure and the conditions of class struggle, and this, in turn, necessarily entailed a change in elite role or composition.²³ Donald Matthews and Robert Putnam have observed that, for a variety of reasons, there might be substantial lags in time between economic change and transformation in the social background of elites,²⁴ and Nicos Poulantzas has pointed out that the changing *role* of elites might not require a change in social origins of membership.²⁵ But even then, the similarities and differences in social background and position of the economic and political elites provide important indications about the character and operation of the system, and it is abundantly clear that these relationships can hinge upon the processes of economic change.

Despite its logic and clarity, this view has not found easy application in the Mexican context. As a reflection of the problem, Juan Felipe Leal has offered a richly provocative interpretation of the Mexican state. The original leadership of the Revolution came, he says, not so much from peasants as from a lower-middle rural class ("small farmers [*rancheros*], small businessmen, country school teachers, and others from the middle strata") and from a provincial intelligentsia. These two groupings came together in an uneasy coalition that yielded, in time, a new political force, a military and political bureaucracy "whose plan of action pointed towards the implementation of reforms within the framework of capitalism, and not outside of it. As a result," Leal continues,

the Revolution established itself as a great social upheaval, capable of carrying out important changes in the then-prevailing relationships, institutions, and structures, but never suggesting or implying

²³ On Marx see Bottomore, *Elites*, pp. 24-32.

²⁴ Donald R. Matthews, *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers* (New York: Random House, 1954), pp. 42-45; Putnam, *Comparative Study*, pp. 179-183.

²⁵ Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, trans. Timothy O'Hagan (London: NLB and Sheed and Ward, 1973), esp. pp. 332 and 335. See also Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," *New Left Review* 58 (November-December 1969): 67-78, esp. 72-74; and Ralph Miliband, "Poulantzas and the Capitalist State," *New Left Review* 82 (November-December 1973): 83-92.

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the dominance of proletariat over the bourgeoisie. More precisely, the change amounted to the establishment of a new form of capitalistic state, with the reorganization of the bloc in power, under the hegemony of the bureaucracy which emerged from the Revolution, and with the redefinition of the existing relationships between the bloc in power and the mass of the oppressed classes.²⁶

Thus the Revolution has never been "betrayed," as critics of the contemporary regime have frequently charged.²⁷ The slowness and incompleteness of social reform are, instead, entirely compatible with the bourgeois thrust of the movement itself.

One difficulty with this view, especially in relation to Mexico, is that it lacks an empirical foundation. Leal, through no fault of his own, is unable to provide much solid information on the social origin or the functional role of revolutionary leadership or the governmental bureaucracy. Have political leaders come from the same background as the economic elites? Is the state in any way separate from the bourgeoisie, though perhaps in alliance with it? Is there, as some scholars have recently maintained, an identifiable and autonomous "state interest"?²⁸ Or is the political apparatus run directly by the bourgeoisie?

Observed in a somewhat different light, economic development can also affect the composition of elites by creating demands for special skills. As these needs gain recognition, those who can perform these functions move into ascendancy.²⁹ In reference to Mexico, this argument is commonly invoked to explain the rise of *técnicos*, or economic technicians, as distinct from *políticos*. Raymond Vernon has spelled out the proposition in detail:

In the development of nations, the economic technician is rapidly coming to be thought of as the indispensable man. By general agree-

²⁶ Juan Felipe Leal, "The Mexican State: 1915-1973, A Historical Interpretation," *Latin American Perspectives* 2, no. 2 (Summer 1975): 48-63, with quotations on 49-50, though I have altered the translation in places. For the Spanish original see Leal, "El Estado mexicano: 1915-1973 (Una interpretación histórica)," paper presented at the Primer Encuentro Latinoamericano de Historiadores (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos, 1973).

²⁷ Stanley R. Ross, ed., *Is the Mexican Revolution Dead?* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967).

²⁸ See, particularly, John F. H. Purcell and Susan Kaufman Purcell, "Mexican Business and Public Policy," in *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*, ed. James Malloy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), pp. 191-226; and Douglas Bennett and Kenneth Sharpe, "The State in Late Dependent Industrialization: The Control of Multinational Corporations in Mexico," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1976.

²⁹ Suzanne I. Keller, *Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society* (New York: Random House, 1963); and Putnam, *Comparative Study*, pp. 169-170.

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ment, such subjects as exchange-rate policy, fiscal and monetary policy, investment and saving policy, and similar esoteric matters can no longer be left entirely to the rough-and-ready ministrations of the politician. For one thing, the economic techniques have grown so complex that they are beyond the easy understanding of the amateurs; for another, the increasing flow of communications between nations and with international agencies on these subjects has demanded that every country develop a class of responsible officials which is capable of holding up its end in the interchange. In Mexico the economic technician has become an integral element in the decision-making process on issues affecting Mexico's development.³⁰

Empirically, it is not always easy to know a *técnico* when you see one,³¹ but the causal proposition stands: the influx of technocrats has resulted from the functional requirements of economic change, not from the course of political events.

In sum, classical elite theory has multitudinous weaknesses. Quite unnecessarily, it imbues elites with a self-conscious cohesiveness that might or might not exist. Either benignly or maliciously, it endows elites with allegedly superior qualities, a position that now seems at best naive. Somewhat shortsightedly, it gives elites an autonomy that appears to ignore the roles of common people. Partly for this reason, it offers relatively little insight into the causes and dynamics of elite transformation. Aside from these conceptual and methodological issues, elite theory also has an ideological burden to bear. Anti-Marxist in inception, it came to furnish the intellectual cornerstone of conservative, not to say reactionary, European political thought. Construing minority rule as inevitable, no matter what the system, elite theorists came to evaluate concentrations of power with admixtures of approval, resignation, and despair. Michels was not the only one who followed Mussolini.

What I take from elite theory is not its unnecessary trappings, and certainly not its ideological propensities, but simply its most elementary insight: that power is distributed unequally, that those who possess it can be identified as an elite, and that the characteristics of the elite offer considerable insight into the operation of society. Specifi-

³⁰ Raymond Vernon, *The Dilemma of Mexico's Development: The Roles of the Private and Public Sectors* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 136.

³¹ Presumably, *técnicos* are defined by their education, expertise, attitudes, and behavior. In one effort to analyze individuals, Roderic Ai Camp has had to include career patterns as one of the identifying criteria, thus running a risk of circularity. Camp, "The Cabinet and the *Técnico* in Mexico and the United States," *Journal of Comparative Administration* 3, no. 2 (August 1971): 190.

cally, I intend to concentrate my efforts on the transformation of political elites in Mexico, and to this end I shall borrow, in part, from Pareto's notion of elite circulation, but without his stress on cycles or on personality types. I shall attempt to go beyond such internal explanations and examine the external relationships between elite changes, political factors, and economic factors. On a conceptual level, elite composition will here be taken as the dependent variable, and political and economic factors will be considered as different clusters of independent variables. It will not be possible to measure these relationships with any precision, given the paucity of longitudinal data, and I will base most inferences of this kind upon patterns of chronological sequence. Even so, this methodological problem does not diminish the intrinsic value of the enterprise.³²

Moving beyond the limits of classical theory, I also attempt to speculate, at least in a tentative way, about the possible connections between elite composition and attitudes and behavior. As has been frequently observed, most traditional elite analysis stops short of this question, perhaps because of the premise about elite autonomy: the emphasis has been on who the leaders *are*, not on what they *do*. After all, the essence of politics is action; it lies in decisionmaking, in the formulation and execution of policy, and not in social origin. Who cares who governs?

There are good reasons to care. In the first place, it seems to me that social background is bound to shape, in some important way, the general outlooks of elites (and others)—that is, their fundamental cognitive and normative orientations, as distinct from their preferences on particular policy issues.³³ People from an identifiable social class, for instance, are conditioned by that common experience, and they are inclined to share a set of common assumptions. Other things being equal

³² For an empirical, cross-national study of some of the determinants of elite composition see William B. Quandt, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites*, Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics 01-004 (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1970).

³³ See Putnam, *Comparative Study*, pp. 93-94. Empirical studies which have found relatively weak or inconsistent associations between social origins and policy preferences include Lewis J. Edinger and Donald D. Searing, "Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry," *American Political Science Review* 61, no. 2 (June 1967): 428-445; Allen H. Barton, "Determinants of Leadership Attitudes in a Socialist Society," in *Opinion-Making Elites in Yugoslavia*, ed. Allen H. Barton, Bogdan Denitch, and Charles Kadushin (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 220-262; R. Wayne Parsons and Allen H. Barton, "Social Background and Policy Attitudes of American Leaders," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1974; and Uwe Schleth, "Once Again: Does It Pay to Study Social Background in Elite Analysis?" in *Sozialwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch für Politik*, ed. Rudolf Wildenmann (Munich: Gunter Olzog Verlag, 1971), pp. 99-118.

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(as they rarely are), these assumptions would in turn determine attitudes and hence affect behavior. There are numerous exceptions to this rule—Fidel Castro comes quickly to mind—but that is beside the point. I am merely arguing that, in the most general way, people are more likely to think and act in accordance with class-derived perspectives than against them, and that, *ceteris paribus*, they are unlikely to destroy the class from which they come.

But people also undergo a constant learning process, a never-ending experience of what has come to be known as "socialization." Obviously enough, men and women *acquire* ideas and beliefs, rather than transport them intact from cradle to grave. This explains the focus, in much political analysis, on the socializing roles of institutions and activities, particularly schools and occupations. And I, for one, choose to place strong emphasis on the political system itself. In systems that are highly institutionalized, with rigorous prescriptions for behavior, politicians tend to comply with the rules, regardless of their social background, and more often than not they internalize them too. In systems that are less institutionalized, without such clear-cut norms, leaders may continue to hold their own predispositions and even act upon them. In the contemporary world, indeed, there is some empirical evidence for the notion that social background has more bearing on elite attitudes in the less developed countries than in the more developed ones.³⁴ In reference to Mexico, I would phrase the hypothesis in longitudinal terms: in periods of greater institutionalization, social background may have less impact on attitudes or behavior than in periods of lesser institutionalization.

Finally, the selection of political leadership is a decisionmaking process, and, in principle, a study of this procedure can capture just as much of the essence of politics as can the study of a bill, decree, or constitutional amendment. To be sure, I do not concentrate in any detail on the socioeconomic policies of Mexican leaders; I merely speculate, and intermittently at that, about the relationship between broad policy outlines and elite composition. Notwithstanding this limitation, and for reasons that should become clear, I believe that the mechanisms of elite recruitment and selection provide especially good material for the analysis and understanding of the Mexican system.³⁵

³⁴ The proposition is from Quandt, *Comparative Study*, pp. 197-198. For supporting evidence see Donald D. Searing, "The Comparative Study of Elite Socialization," *Comparative Political Studies* 1, no. 4 (January 1969): 471-500; and Stanley A. Kochanek, "The Relation between Social Background and Attitudes of Indian Legislators," *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies* 6, no. 1 (March 1968): 34-53.

³⁵ Recruitment and selection are usually viewed as distinct phenomena; note that, in the subtitle of this book, I have used the word "recruitment" in the broadest possible sense of the term.

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APPROACHING THE DATA

In the effort to uncover trends and regularities in elite recruitment, I have adopted a relentlessly empirical approach. After considering various alternatives, and consulting extensively with colleagues in Mexico, I decided to define the twentieth-century political elite operationally for the bulk of this study as those people who held major national office at any time between 1900 and 1971 (when the first phase of data-gathering came to an end): presidents, vice-presidents (when relevant), cabinet ministers, subcabinet officials, heads of large decentralized agencies and state-supported companies, leaders of the government party, governors, senators, deputies, ambassadors, and delegates at two special congresses—the Sovereign Revolutionary Convention of 1914-15 and the Constitutional Congress of 1916-17—for a grand total of 6,302 individuals. A second phase of research concentrated on the period from 1971 through 1976, and these results are reported separately, in Chapter 10. By taking such a large number of people into account I have sought to move beyond the facile generalities and incidental anecdotes that surround the subject and, through the use of quantitative methods (plus the aid of a computer), to uncover recurrent patterns and regularities. Moreover I have attempted to indicate not only *whether* particular phenomena have existed, but also to pinpoint matters of *degree*: how many, how much, how often, how long. It has thus been my goal to introduce a new level of precision into the discussions of elite formation in twentieth-century Mexico.³⁶

³⁶ The most extensive studies to date have come from Roderic Ai Camp, who has compiled an impressive compendium, *Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-1975* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976), and written a monograph, *The Education of Mexico's Revolutionary Family* (forthcoming), that analyzes the relationship between educational background and political attainment in the post-1935 period. He has also produced a series of articles on selected specific topics, such as "The Cabinet and the *Técnico* in Mexico and the United States," *Journal of Comparative Administration* 3, no. 2, pp. 188-214; "Education and Political Recruitment in Mexico: The Alemán Generation," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 18, no. 3 (August 1976): 295-321; "Losers in Mexican Politics: A Comparative Study of Official Party Precandidates for Gubernatorial Elections, 1970-75," in *Quantitative Latin American Studies: Methods and Findings*, ed. James W. Wilkie and Kenneth Ruddle, Supplement 6 (1977) of *Statistical Abstract of Latin America* (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center, 1977), pp. 23-34; "Mexican Governors since Cárdenas: Education and Career Contacts," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 16, no. 4 (November 1974): 454-481; "The Middle-Level Technocrat in Mexico," *Journal of Developing Areas* 6, no. 4 (July 1972): 571-581; "The National School of Economics and Public Life in Mexico," *Latin American Research Review* 10, no. 3 (Fall 1975): 137-151; "A Re-examination of Political Leadership and the Allocation of Federal Revenues in Mexico," *Journal of Developing Areas* 10, no. 2 (January 1976): 193-212; "El sistema mexicano y las decisiones sobre el personal político," *Foro Internacional* 27, no. 1 (July-September

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As a result of the definitional criteria, the research has provided virtually complete information on continuity, turnover, and career patterns among the offices at the national level. To identify people for inclusion in the elite, I have taken down the names of all individuals who, according to official records and newspaper reports, have occupied any of the specified offices at all discernible points in time between 1900 and 1971—and, eventually, on up through 1976. Collating the materials in alphabetical order and matching the records have, in effect, made it possible to reconstruct every individual's career within this pool of offices. The technique is naturally subject to human error, and also demands a bit of guesswork (is R. Gómez at one time and place the same as Ramón Gómez at another time or place?), but because of consistent corroboration from other sources I believe that the record-linkage reached a very high degree of accuracy, in the range of 95 percent or more.

Having selected the members of the elite, I then set out in search of biographical information. My assistants and I consulted several kinds of sources:

- a. biographical dictionaries, of varied type and quality, a total of 60 in all;

1976): 51-83; and "Women and Political Leadership in Mexico: A Comparative Study of Female and Male Political Elites" (unpublished).

Additional works on Mexican elites include two theses presented at UNAM: a remarkable, ambitious, but incomplete and partly flawed analysis by Gustavo Abel Hernández Enriquez, "La movilidad política en México, 1876-1970" (Ciencias Políticas y Administración Pública, UNAM, 1968), and the more narrow study by Eduardo Guerrero del Castillo, "El reclutamiento y la selección del personal en la administración pública mexicana" (Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, UNAM, 1963). Another UNAM researcher, Armando Rendón Corona, has recently produced a monograph, "Los profesionales de la política en México 1940-1970" (mimeo, Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, UNAM, 1976[?]), concentrating mainly on patterns of continuity and turnover. Other studies include the following: James D. Cochrane, "Mexico's New *Científicos*: The Díaz Ordaz Cabinet," *Inter-American Economic Affairs* 21, no. 1 (Summer 1967): 61-72; Merilee Grindle, "Patrons and Clients in the Bureaucracy: Career Networks in Mexico," *Latin American Research Review* 12, no. 1 (1977): 37-66; Wilfred Gruber, "Career Patterns of Mexico's Political Elites," *Western Political Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (September 1971): 467-482; William P. Tucker, "Las élites mexicanas," *Aportes*, no. 13 (July 1969): 103-106; and William S. Tuohy, "Centralism and Political Elite Behavior in Mexico," in *Development Administration in Latin America*, ed. Clarence E. Thurber and Lawrence S. Graham (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1973), pp. 260-280.

Most of these works tend to concentrate on relatively recent phenomena, and—with the conspicuous example of the Hernández thesis, plus some of Camp's writings—they tend to concentrate on single points in time (or, as Camp usually does, they collapse their data to form a single chronological unit). Consequently, despite their many virtues, these studies can offer little or no insight into processes of historical change or elite transformation.

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- b. newspaper and magazine articles, reports, and obituaries;
- c. official documents and registers;
- d. books, autobiographical and otherwise;
- e. official and semiofficial archives;
- f. a mail survey, sent out to approximately 300 officeholders in mid-1970 (about 80 answers were received).

(For a full discussion see Bibliography and Sources, particularly Section A.) As a result of these efforts, the dataset contains personal biographical information—such as date or place of birth, education, primary occupation—on approximately 3,000 individuals, depending upon the variable concerned. Obviously, and sadly, the data are far from complete.

Despite these limitations the material can yield some rather precise quantitative statements about the composition of political leadership in twentieth-century Mexico: that X percent came from urban communities, that Y percent attended a university, that Z percent were lawyers. But assertions of this kind, in and of themselves, have absolutely no meaning at all. They are purely descriptive. In order to acquire analytical significance, they must be placed within some kind of comparative context. Only then will it be possible to determine whether a given number is high or low—that is, in relation to some kind of standard—and to interpret the results accordingly. During the course of this study I shall employ five different kinds of comparative techniques.

First, and perhaps foremost, I shall make *longitudinal* comparisons, in search of trends and changes within the Mexican elite over time. One obvious strategy here is to categorize officeholders according to presidential regime and look for differences between regimes. The presidency itself has been a constant driving force in Mexican politics, each president has impressed something of his own personality upon his administration, and the presidential regime clearly emerges as an appropriate unit for chronological analysis. As classified for this study, regimes have varied in duration (from several months to six years) and in size of membership (from 56 to 731, usually ranging from 300 to 600), and these differences can affect the comparability of results. Partly for this reason, and also because of my understanding of prevailing political realities, I have grouped some presidential administrations together—as in the era of the ill-fated Convention (1914-15) and the period when Plutarco Elías Calles exercised *de facto* power as the *Jefe Máximo de la Revolución*, the so-called *Maximato* (1928-34). Incumbents have been identified with the regime *during* which they took of-

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fice, even if their tenure stretched beyond the end of the regime itself, as has often been the case for state governors. Those with temporary, provisional, or interim status have also been included, no matter how long or short their stay in office.³⁷

To complement the regime-by-regime approach I have also created, for analytical purposes, three separate officeholding cohorts. Individuals in the late Díaz regimes, from 1900 to 1911, have been grouped together in a so-called "prerevolutionary" cohort ($N = 610$); those who held office between 1917 and 1940 constitute a "revolutionary" cohort ($N = 2,289$); and those who made any appearance between 1946 and 1971 comprise a "postrevolutionary" cohort ($N = 2,008$). The cohort analysis is of course less sensitive to short-run changes, and to the timing of such changes, than is the regime-by-regime approach. On the other hand, it cuts the elite into fairly sizable populations and yields correspondingly firm and reliable results. Because of its special characteristics, and because of its importance to this study, I shall give an extended explanation of the cohorts in a later section of this chapter.

A second set of comparisons focuses upon elites in varying *levels of office*. In both the cohort analysis and the regime-by-regime approach, I shall concentrate on men in "upper-level" positions—presidents, vice-presidents, cabinet ministers, heads of the government party, and directors of major state-supported companies and agencies.³⁸ As officeholders on the topmost level, these were people designated directly by the president (or by the functional leadership of the ruling coalition), and they provide a relatively clear indication of the special attributes and underlying tendencies of each presidential regime. Upper-level offices are exclusively appointive, not subject to quotas for regional representation (as is the legislature), so the composition of the group is virtually unaffected by constitutional requirement.³⁹ Finally, data on top elites have proved to be much more available than for the total elites.⁴⁰ Admittedly the number of upper-level individuals in any single presidential regime tends to be rather small, ranging from 15 to 66, and the computation of proportions and percentages becomes a risky enterprise. Partly for this reason I shall also deal with top elites by cohort as well as by regime: between 1900 and 1911 there were 30

³⁷ Alternate deputies and senators (*suplentes*) have been included only if they actually took seats in the legislature.

³⁸ As explained in Appendix A, these are positions with scale values of 7 or 8 for the HIGHEST OFFICE variable (see especially Table A-3).

³⁹ With the exception of the office of Attorney General, which must be held by a qualified lawyer.

⁴⁰ See Figure A-1 and the surrounding discussion in Appendix A.

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upper-level officeholders, between 1917 and 1940 there were 185, and from 1946 to 1871 there were 159.

Contrasts and similarities between the total elites and the upper-level elites yield some provocative suggestions, and in Chapter 4 I make a systematic search for differences in elite composition according to level of office attained (as measured on an eight-point scale), by cohort.⁴¹ The question underlying this part of the analysis is: have individuals possessing certain social characteristics (such as a university education) tended to get higher on the political ladder than other individuals, and if so, to what extent?

Third, I shall draw comparisons between elites with differing *spheres of influence*. My own research has concentrated largely on those people who are believed to have exercised power, in one way or another, within the political domain. But what about those who have economic power? Are they the same individuals? If not, are they at least from the same social origin? Such questions receive explicit treatment in Chapter 7.

Fourth, I shall make comparisons between the characteristics of Mexican political elites and the *national population at large*. The purpose here is to identify the social attributes which give individuals advantages (and disadvantages) in the quest for political office. Since the incidence of characteristics in the general populace can be interpreted as the distribution that would be statistically "expected" among political elites, were leaders drawn *at random* from the constituent public, this method furnishes a means of assessing the degree—as well as the direction—of social bias in the recruitment processes.⁴² Ideally, I would prefer to compare elite characteristics with those of the literate adult male (LAM) population, rather than the entire population, since it is the LAM stratum that has historically contained most serious aspirants to power: illiterates have been marginal to the system, children have been too young, and women—unfortunately—have held very few political offices. Because of vagaries in Mexican census reports, though, I have been able to isolate the LAM population with consistency only for 1960; for other periods I have made estimates where necessary.⁴³

⁴¹ See Table A-3 in Appendix A.

⁴² I am *not* assuming that, in order to be democratic or genuinely representative, the social characteristics of political elites should mirror the population at large. I am seeking, instead, to determine the form and extent of social bias.

⁴³ Note that the purpose of isolating the LAM population is analogous to Robert E. Scott's reason for estimating the proportional size of the "participant" culture in Mexican society, which he gives as 1 to 2 percent of the national total in 1910 and around 10 percent in 1960. The "subject" culture might also be included in the pool of possible aspirants to office; by Scott's guess, it amounted to 8 or 9 percent of the 1910 population and 65 percent of the 1960 population. Scott, "Mex-

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Fifth, and finally, I attempt to make some *cross-national* comparisons. Insofar as possible, I have selected other countries according to type of political system, in order to ascertain concomitant patterns of variation. The United States, for instance, provides a (woefully imperfect) example of a democratic polity, at least in a Schumpeterian sense; the Soviet Union furnishes an (equally imperfect) case of totalitarianism; Franco's Spain and Ataturk's Turkey, among other polities, offer additional illustrations of authoritarianism. Needless to say, it is extremely difficult to draw these comparisons in a rigorous way: the roles of institutions vary so much across both time and space that one wonders what (or who) should be compared to what (or whom).⁴⁴ Moreover I have had no choice but to rely on secondary literature for the comparative data. Consequently the cross-national findings are more suggestive than definitive, and I have by no means exhausted the possibilities in this regard. Even so, I hope to have accomplished my basic objective: establishing, where plausible, some sort of international benchmark for evaluating tendencies in Mexico's political elite.

DEFINING POLITICAL COHORTS

As stated above, much of the longitudinal analysis of change over time relies on comparisons between three political cohorts. In contrast to the most common procedure, which identifies cohorts according to dates of birth, I have defined these cohorts according to *time of holding office on the national level*.⁴⁵ To repeat, the first cohort consists of people holding office between 1900 and 1911 ($N = 610$); the second includes officeholders between 1917 and 1940 ($N = 2,289$); and the third contains those in national office at any time between 1946 and 1971 ($N = 2,008$). Time constraints prevented me from including officeholders between 1971 and 1976 in the computerized dataset; otherwise, they would have belonged to the third cohort. Also, to minimize overlap between the cohorts, I have purposely deleted two other his-

ico: The Established Revolution," in *Political Culture and Political Development*, ed. Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 335 and 345.

⁴⁴ On these points see Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Study of Elites: Who's Who, When, and How," *World Politics* 18, no. 4 (July 1966): 690-717; and John A. Armstrong, *The European Administrative Elite* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), ch. 2.

⁴⁵ Norman Ryder, "The Cohort as a Concept in the Study of Social Change," *American Sociological Review* 30, no. 6 (December 1965): 843-861; and Alan B. Spitzer, "The Historical Problem of Generations," *American Historical Review* 78, no. 5 (December 1973): 1353-1385.

THE LINES OF INQUIRY

torical periods: (a) the years of violence and disorder, from 1911 to 1917, when multitudinous factions were competing for supremacy, moving in and out of power; and (b) 1940-46, when Manuel Avila Camacho presided over an era of transition, with many holdovers from the 1917-40 group still clinging to some office and future leaders of the 1946-71 cohort already on the way up.⁴⁶

There are three sets of criteria behind this categorization. *First*, the political tasks confronting these cohorts were fundamentally different. The 1900-1911 group witnessed, and took part in, the decline of Porfirio Díaz's decades-long dictatorship. The 1917-40 elite assumed responsibility for creating a viable political system in the wake of violent revolution. The third group, from 1946 onward, had to manage and consolidate the system. *Second*, the cohorts governed during different phases of Mexico's economic development. The Díaz group presided over the last years of extensive, outward growth; the 1917-40 group held sway during an era of slow growth; and the 1946-71 elite presided, proudly, over a period of unprecedented industrial and economic development.


One assumption underlying my scheme is that each set of political and economic tasks bound members of these officeholding cohorts together, at least more so than the accident of birth. The question is whether these tasks brought different types of leaders to the fore. In this connection John Kautsky has offered a suggestive distinction between "revolutionary" and "managerial" elites, hypothesizing a transition from the former to the latter over time. I am more inclined to think of revolutionary and managerial *roles* than of elites, given the near-impossibility of classifying individuals with precision, but the analytical point still holds.⁴⁷

The *third* criterion, an accompanying characteristic rather than a defining one, but nonetheless of great importance, refers to historical experience. To a substantial extent these differing political cohorts represent distinct biological cohorts as well. Figure 1-1 illustrates the point by plotting the proportional distribution of known birthdates, by decade, for the three groups. (The relatively small numbers of ob-

⁴⁶ As a consequence of these deletions, there is very little overlap between the cohorts. Only 13 of the 610 members of the 1900-1911 group found their way into the 1917-40 elite; as expected, none showed up in 1946-71. A fairly large absolute number (157) of the 2,289 individuals in the 1917-40 group turned up among the 2,008 officeholders in the post-1946 years, but this figure still amounts to less than 8 percent of the total membership in either cohort.

⁴⁷ John H. Kautsky, "Revolutionary and Modernizing Elites in Modernizing Regimes," *Comparative Politics* 1, no. 4 (July 1969): 441-467; and Kautsky, "Patterns of Elite Succession in the Process of Development," *Journal of Politics* 31, no. 2 (May 1969): 359-396.

Figure 1-1: Distribution of Dates of Birth for Officeholding Cohorts, by Decade



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servations, or Ns, aptly illustrate the frequency of missing data.) Members of the 1900-1911 cohort were children of the mid-nineteenth century. Over 80 percent were born in the years between 1830 and 1860, and practically 50 percent were born in the 1840s and 1850s—which means that they reached their majority (and probably developed their political interests) in the 1860s and 1870s, the turbulent era of French intervention, socioeconomic reform, and Díaz's own rise to power. The 1917-40 cohort was an end-of-century group, 70 percent being born in the twenty-year span between 1880 and 1899, thus suggesting that the revolutionary movement had some generational overtones, a possibility to be explored in more detail below. Significantly, members of this elite would have reached adulthood during the revolution itself; to understate the point, this was their decisive common experience. The 1946-71 cohort, by contrast, consists mainly of twentieth-century children. About 70 percent were born between 1900 and 1929, and they and their younger colleagues therefore came into their majority after the conclusion of the Revolution, just around the time that the contemporary authoritarian regime was establishing control of Mexico.

These generational patterns clearly imply variations in political experience, and, specifically, varying relationships to the Revolution. This assumption finds strong support in the data, imperfect though they are, in Table 1-1. Only a handful of the Díaz group, about 3.8 percent in all, is believed to have actively supported any of the revolutionary movements.⁴⁸ An overwhelming proportion of the 1917-40 cohort is thought to have participated in the Revolution, more often than not as soldiers (315 are known to have performed military roles; 55 are known to have performed exclusively civilian functions). The third cohort, on the other hand, contains a much smaller share of revolutionary activists, perhaps 11 percent or so. Most of the rest were too young to take part.

Thus, the officeholding cohorts used for analytical purposes in parts of this study reveal sharp differences in composition, birthdates, and political experience. It is in these senses that the 1900-1911 group constitutes what I consider to be a "prerevolutionary" elite. The second cohort, officeholders between 1917 and 1940, will be referred to as the "revolutionary" elite. And the latest group, ascendant from 1946 to 1971, comprises a "postrevolutionary" group. The labels are partly mnemonic devices, a literary shorthand for referring to the separate cohorts; but as I have tried to show, the labels also have a factual and substantive foundation.

⁴⁸ Apart from the counterrevolutionary Huerta regime of 1913-14.

PART I: INTRODUCTION

TABLE 1-1
Activity during the Revolution, by Cohort

Activity	% among Cohort 1 (N = 610)	% among Cohort 2 (N = 2,289)	% among Cohort 3 (N = 2,008)
Bore arms on side of a revolutionary faction	1.5	13.8	3.6
Performed civilian role on side of a revolutionary faction	0.5	2.4	0.5
Revolutionary activity presumed, but nature unknown	1.8	25.2	7.4
Held office before 1911, presumed to have opposed the Revolution	91.0	0.0	0.0
Born after 1905, presumed to have been too young	0.0	0.7	42.7
Unknown	5.2	58.0	45.7
Totals ^a	100.0	100.1	99.9

^a May not add up to 100 because of rounding.

It is important to realize that the "revolutionary" cohort (1917-40) does not come even close to providing a random sample of leading participants in the Mexican Revolution as a whole. Because of its stress on officeholding after 1917, it by definition tends to overemphasize the triumphant faction in the struggle for supremacy—that is, the *carrancista* movement. Among the cohort members whose participation in the Revolution is fairly well known, only a handful—less than 10 percent—had ever joined forces with Carranza's major rivals, Pancho Villa or Emiliano Zapata. Hardly any had followed the Flores Magón brothers or Pascual Orozco. Not unexpectedly, quite a few (at least half) claimed to have supported the initial uprising under Madero. But by far the largest share, about 66 percent in all, could be classified as members of the *carrancista* wing. As befits a study of political elites, perhaps, the 1917-40 cohort consists primarily of those who won the Revolution. The subsequent elite inherited that legacy.

In summary, at different points in this study I attempt to locate changes and trends within Mexico's political elite by tracing differences between individual presidential regimes, by drawing comparisons