

FRANK D. McCANN JR.

The Brazilian- American Alliance, 1937–1945



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Frank D. McCann, Jr.

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1937-1945

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With Love and Affection for

Diane Marie

Teresa Bernadette

Katherine Diane and

Our Brazil

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Preface

MY INTEREST in Brazil and the study of Brazilian-American relations began rather suddenly in the late spring of 1962 during supper in the Graduate Residence Center at Indiana University. I was about to take a seminar in American diplomatic history with Robert Ferrell and was explaining to my friend George Fodor and three Brazilians from Minas Gerais, to whom he had recently introduced me, what I intended to write about. They let out cries of disbelief that I could consider a subject not dealing with their country. They insisted that Brazil was the most dynamic and important nation in Latin America and that I had to write about it. When I asked what topic they would suggest, they replied without hesitation relations between Brazil and the United States during the time of Getúlio Vargas and the Estado Novo. Over coffee they talked of Vargas' Brazil, and afterward Constancia Xavier de Lima, Iêda Dias da Silva, and Teresinha Souto Ward took me to the library to show me the Brazilian items. They were so earnest and determined that I could not say no. While the paper took shape (as a study of Brazil's entry into World War II) my four friends pursued me hawkishly discussing, arguing, and explaining. After that summer the direction of my academic career was set and now, four trips to Brazil later, this book is finished.

Its beginnings are important to me because they were not in the many dusty and dim archives that I would haunt in

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the next years but in the love of Brazilians for their land. I hope that this book repays in part the many kindnesses that they and their countrymen have shown to me and my family.

So many people have played a part in the research and writing of this book that I am certain I cannot assign each his proper due. But some feeble effort is necessary. Daniel McGuire, Bernard Williams, and Maury Baker gave great encouragement throughout the early years. Robert E. Quirk provided a scholastic standard that has served as a constant beacon, as did the energy and attention to detail of Robert Ferrell. With only a small research grant and a large NDEA loan to see us through what turned out to be an eight-month period of research in New York and Washington in 1964–1965, we would surely have gone broke if Richard Schroeder had not asked Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Virdone of Roslyn Heights, New York, to help us. They generously provided us with their friendship and a cottage on their property.

For the research in official United States files the help of the following people was indispensable: the late E. Taylor Parks and Arthur G. Kogan of the State Department's Historical Office; Wilbur J. Nigh and Thomas Hohmann of the National Archives' World War II Records Section and Patricia Dowling of the diplomatic files section; the staffs of the Office of the Chief of Military History, the Navy Library and Records, the Library of Congress, and the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, especially Joseph Marshall and Robert Parkes. Judith A. Schiff at the Yale University Library granted access to the Henry L. Stimson Papers. And John C. Pirie, then Vice-President and Associate General Counsel of Pan-Amernican Airways, expedited research on the Airport Development Program. Special thanks are due Alberta Sankis for her assistance during my weeks in the Pan-Am Building.

The four trips to Brazil in 1965–1966, 1969, and 1970 were made possible by a Fulbright grant, my father's assistance, the cooperation of Colonels Amos Jordan and

Roger Nye of West Point, and a grant from the Penrose Fund of the American Philosophical Society. The hospitality and orientation of George Fodor, John and Marilou Schulz, Derek and Maria Lovell-Parker, William and Carmita Vance, Constanca Xavier de Lima, Iêda Dias da Silva, Rosa Marcôndes de Souza, and the Valladares, Flôres da Cunha, and Souto families was always delightful, and contributed greatly to my appreciation of Brazilian culture. Particular thanks for assistance are due Martha Maria Gonçalves, chief of the *Arquivo Histórico* of the Itamaraty; Seraphim José de Oliveira, charge officer of the *Arquivo da Fôrça Expedicionária Brasileira*; Charles Matthews of Natal; Antônio Flôres da Cunha; Cauby C. Araújo; Hélio Silva; João dos Santos Vaz and the *Clube dos Veteranos da Campanha na Itália*; Colonel Newton C. de Andrade Mello; General Willis D. Crittenberger; and General Vernon A. Walters. My debts to Marshals Estevão Leitão de Carvalho and João Baptista Mascarenhas de Moraes are indicated in the Note on Sources. If at times I have been critical of either, my presentation was motivated by a need for historical accuracy rather than by a lack of respect and admiration. Mascarenhas faced and overcame obstacles that would have destroyed a lesser man. He was, to use General Crittenberger's words: "the toughest little guy who ever wore boots!"

This book obviously would not be what it is without the graciousness of Alzira Vargas do Amaral Peixoto and Euclides Aranha Neto, who in addition to the free use of the Vargas and Aranha papers gave liberally of their time to reminisce and to clarify areas of uncertainty.

Participation in the Rio Research Group during 1965-1966, and in the Interdisciplinary Seminar on Brazil at Columbia University from 1968 to 1971 greatly influenced my thinking. My colleagues and good friends Robert M. Levine and Neill W. Macaulay have given encouragement and advice from our days in Rio on. The manuscript owes much to Eugene Trani, David M. Pletcher, Judy R. Collins, Donn

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Olvey, Stanley Stein, Jordan Young, Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, John Culver and Thomas Skidmore, who read various chapters and drafts with pencil in hand. I gratefully acknowledge the forbearance and good advice of Arthur S. Link, and the never-failing sense of perspective of David Hirst, while I prepared the final draft during my year with them at Princeton as a National Historical Publications Commission Fellow. Teresinha Souto Ward read through this and an earlier draft, trying to bring order to my chaotic accenting and Portuguese spelling. Kate Nicol typed several chapters with a very careful eye to spelling and style. Nancy Baldwin Smith deftly handled the copyediting. James Flagg, Robert Costa, and Marcia Walters read aloud each word, comma, and semi-colon of the galley proofs; and Marjorie Sherwood of the Princeton University Press oversaw the details of publication. Of course I am the only one responsible for any errors the book may contain.

I wish to thank my father, Francis D. McCann, Sr., for his steadfast confidence that somehow it was all worthwhile. But above all I thank my wife, Diane Marie Sankis, and daughters, Teresa Bernadette and Katherine Diane. In many ways this book is as much theirs as mine. Literally it determined the girls' birthplaces and has certainly shaped their world view. Diane has helped with the research, has thought and debated over ideas and approaches, read and reread every chapter and note, and throughout our travels preserved her sense of balance and good humor. A thousand thanks to all.

St. Patrick's Day, 1972

F.D.M.

Abbreviations

ADP	Airport Development Program
AFEB	Arquivo da Fôrça Expedicionária Brasileira (Ministério de Guerra, Rio de Janeiro)
AG	Adjutant General
AGV	Archive of Getúlio Vargas (Rio de Janeiro)
AHMRE	Arquivo Histórico de MRE (Itamaraty Palace, Rio de Janeiro)
BEF	Brazilian Expeditionary Force
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
DA	Department of the Army
DAR	Division of American Republics (Department of State)
DBA	Division of Brazilian Affairs (Department of State)
DGFP-D	<i>Documents on German Foreign Policy</i> , U.S. Department of State, Series D
DSF	Department of State Files (Department of State Building, Washington)
EXP.	<i>Expedido</i> —outgoing MRE dispatch
EW	European War
FEA	Federal Economic Administration
FEB	Fôrça Expedicionária Brasileira
FDRL	Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (Hyde Park, New York)
	<i>Foreign Relations</i> <i>Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers</i> (Department of State)

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JBUSDC	Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission
MRE	Ministério das Relações Exteriores
NA	National Archives (Washington)
OAA	Oswaldo Aranha Archive (Rio de Janeiro)
OCIAA	Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs
OCMH	Office of the Chief of Military History (Department of the Army, Washington)
OF	Official File (FDRL, Hyde Park)
OPD	Operations Plans Division (War Department)
PAA	Pan-American Airways
PPF	President's Personal File (FDRL, Hyde Park)
PSD	Partido Social Democrático
PSF	President's Secretary File (FDRL, Hyde Park)
PTB	Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro
SADATC	South Atlantic Division Air Transport Command
SLC	Standing Liaison Committee (State, War, Navy Departments)
UDN	União Democrática Nacional
USN	United States Navy
WPB	War Production Board
WPD	War Plans Division (War Department)
WWII RS	World War II Records Section (National Archives, Washington)

The Brazilian-American Alliance



Introduction

VISIBILITY was zero. The cold, steady rain of the 10th and 11th continued to pour from the densely clouded sky on the morning of December 12, 1944. Two battalions of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force sloshed through the mud toward the German positions at Monte Castello. The war against Hitler's Third Reich was in its final six months. Arriving at Naples in August, the Brazilians had missed the early victories of the Italian campaign and were determined to make up the lost opportunities for glory. Their troops were stalled before Monte Castello—they had failed to carry the heights in three previous attempts, and they needed this victory to preserve the honor of Brazil. But without air and artillery cover because of the thick fog, and with supporting tanks immobilized in the mud, the Germans drove them back. Accepting the impossibility of fighting nature and German infantry at the same time, the Brazilians and the rest of the Fifth Army dug in for the winter. Under more suitable conditions on February 21 the Brazilians took Monte Castello, and neither the elements nor the Germans deterred their onward march thereafter.

The history of the Italian campaign is studded with many famous names and events. Although Brazil's combat participation was little noticed in the United States because of the more widespread activities of American troops, it was of considerable importance in the history of Brazil and of inter-American relations. It was the first time that Latin American soldiers had fought in Europe, and Brazil was the only Latin American nation to send ground troops into com-

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bat in World War II. The results were immediate and far-reaching. Brazil became the preeminent military power in Latin America and the Brazilian military gradually came to dominate national politics.

But Brazilian entry into the war had a greater importance in the outcome of that global conflict. Without Brazilian cooperation much that happened might have been different. Getúlio Dornelles Vargas' establishment of a dictatorship in late 1937 had cast an uncertain shadow on the future of democracy in the Western Hemisphere. From 1938 through 1940 official Washington was preoccupied with the specter of Brazil allying itself to, or at least cooperating with, Nazi Germany. Especially during the dreary days of 1940 when it seemed that Great Britain might collapse, American diplomats and military planners worked feverishly to secure Brazil. Even though the United States was still neutral, it was evident to the State and War Departments that the Americas had to be united. If Brazil joined the Axis fortress America would be vulnerable and the South Atlantic would be closed to allied shipping; it would be impossible to supply the beleaguered British in Egypt, and would give the Germans domination of North Africa and increased influence in the Middle East. From there to dividing South Asia with the Japanese would have been a logical step.

Fortunately Brazil eventually joined the allies, and the South Atlantic not only remained open but became the principal supply route to Africa and the Far East. American engineers turned Natal in Northeast Brazil into a trampoline that bounced supplies from American factories to the war fronts—"a trampoline to victory."

While Brazilian bases facilitated supply and Brazilian troops scored victories in Italy, Brazilian workmen, advised by American technicians, were installing the giant blast furnaces at Volta Redonda which were to provide the basis for Brazilian heavy industry. Wartime development efforts produced lasting changes in the Brazilian economy, not the

least of which was to make São Paulo the greatest industrial park in Latin America and the fastest growing urban area in the southern hemisphere.

While the war undoubtedly increased Brazil's chances to realize its tremendous potential it also made it subservient, very nearly a dependency, to the United States. The growth of that dependency is an undercurrent that runs throughout the events discussed in this book. The war years brought to a peak the tendency in Brazilian foreign policy toward steadily closer approximation with the United States, which had begun during the foreign ministry of the Baron of Rio Branco (1902-1912). At that time Brazil made an unwritten alliance with the United States, as a step toward freeing itself from British domination and toward insuring its own hegemony in South America. In the 1930's and early 1940's, under the leadership of Foreign Minister Oswaldo Euclides de Souza Aranha (1938-1944), Brazil cut its financial ties with the British Rothschilds in favor of Wall Street, and renewed and strengthened Rio Branco's alliance with the United States. This was done in the face of a German campaign to link Brazil with the Third Reich.

The drive toward closer union with the United States occurred largely on Brazilian initiative, with the northern republic taking a passive role until 1940. While it was true that Brazilian and American leaders could speak of a long friendship, that friendship was more verbal than substantive. Some five thousand miles of ocean and jungle separated the principal cities of the two nations, and the distance and slow transportation hindered contact. American interest in Brazil became greater when improvements in aviation began to reduce travel time.

Throughout the nineteenth century the United States was preoccupied with the trans-Appalachian west and, once the Panamanian route to the Pacific was firmly established, Americans showed little interest in the South Atlantic. They ignored the Argentine-Brazilian struggle over what is now Uruguay and the long war of the Triple Alliance against

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Paraguay. At the same time, however, during the nineteenth century the two largest and most powerful nations in the hemisphere were a republic and a monarchy, and they neither fought wars against each other nor engaged in important controversies.

Brazilians and Americans did not know each other except at second hand. With the collapse of the monarchy in 1889 the Brazilians entered the Western Hemisphere family of republics, but found that they had more to gain from ties with the United States than from alliances with their South American neighbors. The United States provided markets which the Spanish Americans did not, as well as a political and economic alternative to Britain.

Of the twenty-two independent countries in the Western Hemisphere eighteen were Spanish-speaking and their cultures were either Iberian or Indian. Language and culture separated Brazil and the United States from these countries. Africa had influenced Brazil's culture more than it did the culture of the rest of South America, and Brazil's Portuguese was only superficially similar to Spanish. Nor did the language and culture of the United States provide a common ground on which to meet Spanish-speaking peoples. In size and power, Brazil and the United States were the giants of the hemisphere, and as such were attracted to one another. So while it was true that their peoples had little direct contact or understanding, it was also true that their governments sought to maintain cordial relations.

The Brazilians were more aggressive in seeking ties. They pursued a policy of approximation with the United States which fell just short of formal alliance, as a means of offsetting the shifting alliances of the Spanish-speaking countries and Argentina's dream of rebuilding the colonial Viceroyalty of the Rio de La Plata. American support, real or imagined, was useful to Brazil in thwarting Argentina. Economically the United States provided an escape from British domination. The formula was Brazilian support of United States policies in the Caribbean, Europe, and Asia

in return for American support of Brazilian preeminence in South America. Brazil often acted as intermediary between the other American nations and the United States, and provided a stable base for Washington's constantly changing Latin American policies.

American interest in Brazil increased during the 1930's for two reasons, the Good Neighbor Policy and the rise of Nazi Germany. Franklin Roosevelt's desire to create a Good Neighborhood in the hemisphere meant that the United States would renounce direct intervention in favor of more subtle forms of domination. In its post-Depression pursuit of markets the United States turned to Latin America as the logical area in which to recoup its losses in foreign trade elsewhere—indeed, the first reciprocal trade agreements were signed with Latin American republics. American officials talked in terms of equal opportunities for all in the Latin American market, but what they meant was equal opportunity based on American rules. Because United States businessmen could deal in hard currency while their German competitors could not, American insistence that the Germans use such currencies was tantamount to demanding that they withdraw from the market. The United States was seeking more than neighborliness, it was seeking economic and political hegemony. Brazilian leaders did not seriously oppose this hegemony, because they became convinced that they had more to gain than to lose by acquiescence. They were confident that Brazil could maintain its position in South America, and that they could maintain their positions in Brazil.

The Argentine government, on the contrary, was not at all pleased with Washington's desire for leadership of the Western Hemisphere. Active North American participation in hemisphere affairs would endanger Argentine plans to become the leader of Latin America. The Argentines did not trust American motives and did not believe that the new nonintervention policy would endure. They did not wish to depend on what they considered to be a fickle

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United States and they suspected that the United States would favor Brazil. They complained bitterly that the United States was discriminatory in excluding Argentina's principle export—beef—while providing Brazil with the chief market for its coffee. If Argentina could not sell to the United States how could it buy from it? Argentine opposition to American proposals at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace at Buenos Aires in 1936 led the Roosevelt administration to see Brazil as a balance to Argentina. As American leaders became steadily more concerned over the growing strength of Nazism and Fascism in Europe and as they came to fear the spreading of these ideologies to South America, Washington sought closer relations with Brazil to offset Argentina's equivocal attitude toward the Axis powers.

The Roosevelt administration gave political, economic, and military aid to the government of Getúlio Vargas, even though after November 1937 that government was a dictatorship. Roosevelt followed the traditional United States policy of recognizing a *de facto* government regardless of its political composition or the way in which it came to power, but he added to the policy by supporting an undemocratic regime in Brazil. Because Brazilian stability was essential to the hemisphere defense plans of the United States and to American trade, Washington had no choice but to support Vargas. To weaken him would have aided the fascist-style Integralista party, the Nazi fifth-columnists, or militarists like Army Chief of Staff Pedro Aurélio de Góes Monteiro who favored a Bonapartist dictatorship. It was wiser to support the nonideological Estado Nôvo (New State) as long as it was cooperative and useful to United States interests. Vargas was deeply committed to developing his country, convinced of his ability to lead it to greatness, and secondarily concerned with the constitutions that supported his rule (those of 1934 and 1937). He was not interested in ideology but in moving Brazil in a conservative, steady fashion beyond the grasp of communists or Inte-

gralistas. In supporting Vargas the Roosevelt administration was pragmatic; Vargas was preferable to chaos—he held Brazil together and gave Brazilians a strong sense of national consciousness.

Brazilian policy was based on the premise that the nation's security must take precedence over other considerations. But there was a difference of opinion among Brazilian leaders as to the best means of obtaining security, and Nazi Germany's efforts to capture markets in Brazil provided another alternative to economic dependence on Britain, and also a means of preventing American trade domination. Some military leaders, such as Minister of War Eurico Gaspar Dutra and General Góes Monteiro, for a time favored Germany because they believed that the Reich would conquer Europe and the United States would accept the new European order. Others under Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha worked to eliminate the totalitarian façade of the Estado Nôvo and to ally Brazil with the United States because they feared Germany and the antidemocratic tendencies of the Brazilian military. The Aranha group believed that they could walk the tightrope between cooperation with the United States and American domination. Once Vargas realized that the American fear that Brazil would join or, at least, cooperate with the Axis equalled Germany's desire to detach Brazil from the Americas, he endeavored to obtain concessions from both sides. By late 1940 he was convinced that the United States could and would defend Brazil and that his position would be more secure if he cooperated with the Americans. Even so, he moved slowly, careful not to outdistance civilian or military opinion.

The role of the United States in Brazil's going to war was decisive—the nature of the relationship between the two nations made a choice imperative. Simple neutrality was impossible. Brazil had to choose between the Axis and the United States. Analysis of that decision affords a view of the diplomatic uses of economic and military aid which became features of diplomacy in the postwar years. It also provides

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insights on the influence of the military on foreign policy and into the functioning of Vargas' Estado Nôvo.

Throughout the prewar and war years Brazilian leaders sought to pursue policies based on national self-interest. They attempted to be pragmatic in securing the best possible position for their nation. It was not entirely their fault that approximation with the United States did not bring all the hoped-for benefits, and instead turned into economic, political, and military dependence. The uncertain fortunes of war limited their ability to perceive the long-range effects of their policies just as the fog and rain at Monte Castello made it difficult for the Brazilian troops to see victory ahead. For both politician and soldier visibility was zero.

*"We will restore the nation . . . allowing it to
construct freely its own history and destiny."¹*

1

Vargas' Brazil

AFTER A RAIN during the night and with a cloudy sky still threatening showers, Wednesday, November 10, 1937, dawned cool and breezy in Rio de Janeiro. The morning newspapers carried no mention of the manifesto read the previous day in the Congress, only a feature story on the new Minister of Justice, Francisco Campos. All appeared normal, and the city was outwardly calm despite the sudden closure of the Congress that morning. The old cog-railway carried its loads of tourists to the top of Corcovado to see the view and to pose for photographs before the statue of Christ, while the tiny streetcars rattled their way from one end of town to the other. The ferryboats scurried back and forth across the bay between Praça Quinze and Niteroi, where the Fluminense soccer club was preparing for its match with Vasco da Gama, scheduled for the evening. The marquees in *Cinelandia* advertised the latest Hollywood films, starring the Marx brothers, Edward G. Robinson, Robert Young, and Claudette Colbert, and the Municipal Theater featured the opera "Rigoletto." The usual crowds bustled along the mosaic sidewalks of Avenida Rio Branco in the business district. At the General Staff School the director of instruction unveiled portraits of illustrious former professors before a gathering of generals. In the Guanabara Palace the presidential family enjoyed lobster at the mid-

¹ Getúlio Vargas, *A Nova Política do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1938-47), v, 32.

day meal; and in the courtyard of the Itamaraty the swans glided over the reflecting pool.²

But ferment underlay the placid surface. Rumors of an impending coup had been gaining currency every day. As the president's daughter, Alzira Vargas, recalled: "No one knew for certain how, when, or who would effect it. The tension, the anguish, the expectation was perceptible in the very air one breathed."³

The politics of Brazil between 1930 and 1937 was fraught with tension, anguish, and expectation, but the republic presented to the world a calm façade, masking its political squabbles, social problems, and economic change. Always Brazil seems to have appeared outwardly tranquil while seething underneath. Perhaps this is what led Gilberto Freyre to call his country a tropical China—its great size allowed it to absorb shocks that would have crumbled a lesser state. It can appear as unshakable as the ancient crystalline rock that underlies the Brazilian highlands, even when its society is being shaken to its foundations. November 10, 1937, marked the culmination of seven years of political jockeying and the beginning of eight years of dictatorship. Because of the influence of domestic events on foreign policy a look at the Brazil of the 1930's will aid in understanding the processes of policy formation and implementation.

Since coming to power through an armed movement in 1930, Getúlio Dornelles Vargas had sought to construct a regime capable of supporting the changes that he saw as necessary to modernize Brazil; basically this came to mean a strong central government. While the initial provisional

² Based on *Jornal do Brasil* (Rio), Nov. 9 and 10, 1937; Estevão Leitão de Carvalho, *Memórias de um Soldado Legalista* (Rio de Janeiro, 1964), III, 305–306; Lourival Coutinho, *O General Góes Depõe* (Rio de Janeiro, 1956), p. 318. The Itamaraty Palace housed the Brazilian Foreign Ministry in Rio de Janeiro.

³ Alzira Vargas do Amaral Peixoto, *Getúlio Vargas, Meu Pai* (Pôrto Alegre, 1960), p. 212.

regime allowed him to decree some progressive legislation, the factionalism of Vargas' Liberal Alliance, composed of old-time politicians and radical young military officers called *tenentes*, prevented strong unified effort. The various states balked at surrendering prerogatives that they had exercised since the fall of the monarchy in 1889. Federalism versus centralism, common to the histories of the American republics, produced in Brazil, as elsewhere, discord, violence, and civil war. In 1932 the rich and powerful state of São Paulo attempted to form a coalition with Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul, to defend state autonomy and to resolve myriad local issues. Federal forces neutralized rebels in the two latter states and threw a cordon around São Paulo. The futile civil war had begun with a flourish of popularity among Paulistas on July 9, 1932. Women gave their golden wedding rings to finance the cause, but generosity could not put experience into the raw recruits who manned Paulista positions. By the end of the first week in October the dismal affair ended with São Paulo's surrender.

Vargas shrewdly adopted a policy of conciliation for the sake of Brazilian unity. There were no firing squads, though some two hundred of the rebellion's leaders sailed to exile in Portugal, and there were no harsh indemnities; on the contrary, the national government agreed to redeem the Paulista war bonds. But the problems that had sparked the revolt remained.

The coup d'état of 1930 had ended the "old republic" in a governmental sense, but it was no social revolution. Rather than destroying rural-based oligarchies and their urban business allies, it merely removed their representatives from political control. In the following years Vargas expended much effort absorbing the rural and commercial elites into his power base. He turned these former enemies into supporters—or at least neutrals. Vargas succeeded because he checked the radical *tenentes* and the authoritarian rightists within his regime, and eventually destroyed the

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communists and the fascistic Integralistas that threatened it. He showed the elites that they had more to gain from co-operation than from opposition.

Vargas wanted to modernize Brazil but to avoid the sweeping violence that characterized the Mexican and Russian revolutions. He adroitly escaped the embraces of both the extreme left and the extreme right. He proceeded like a Disraeli or a Bismarck, freely borrowing ideas and measures from the extremes in order to blur their authorship and to weaken their potency as rallying-points for radical action. His revolution, though conservative, painfully gradual, and lacking "even the embryo of a precise ideology,"⁴ nevertheless merited the name revolution, because after 1930 it became obvious that "something profound had been changed in Brazil."⁵ The country was at a crossroads in 1930 but, unfortunately, the route which Getúlio Vargas chose, while freeing Brazil from rigidly liberal orthodoxy, produced a situation which eventually resulted in an authoritarian military government.⁶

Getúlio, as he was called by everyone, was one of the most curious figures in Brazilian history. He was a short man with a determined and fatherly face which customarily wore a large and sympathetic smile. He dominated public opinion to a degree previously unknown, he achieved popularity without appearing to cultivate it, and he carefully avoided ostentation. He was a reserved and complex man whose daughter said that he hid his thoughts even from

⁴ Nelson Werneck Sodré, *Orientações do Pensamento Brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro, 1942), p. 13, as quoted in João Cruz Costa, *Contribuição a História das Idéias no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1967), p. 410.

⁵ João Cruz Costa, *ibid.*

⁶ For internal politics in the 1930's see Robert M. Levine, *The Vargas Regime, The Critical Years, 1934-1938* (New York, 1970); and for results of the era Thomas Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964, An Experiment in Democracy* (New York, 1967) and Ronald M. Schneider, *The Political System of Brazil, Emergence of a "Modernizing" Authoritarian Regime, 1964-1970* (New York, 1971).

himself. His slow action in resolving controversies suggested discipline and nonpartisanship, as if his movements had mathematical precision. In crises he seemed serene, tranquil, even insensitive, always giving the impression that he had himself and the situation under control. He avoided displays of power, preferring to give at least the appearance of operating according to law. With self-discipline he allowed events to run their course before intervening. While usually attempting to rally a consensus before acting, he did not shrink from removing opponents or taking frank, decisive, even violent action. Whether he did this from temperament, intelligence, or cunning is difficult to say; he puzzled his family, friends, and contemporaries as well as the historian.

Vargas was a master of maneuver. His power rested on the armed forces, yet he was his own man, not subservient to the military; somehow he managed to be the final recourse in military as well as civil disputes. He did not hold grudges; if he needed a man, he used him, even if that man had fought against him in the past. But discard awaited those whose usefulness was spent. He balanced the power of one politician by that of another, one state with a second, one general with his rival. He was careful to see that no member of his administration achieved too much power, position, or popularity.

It might be useful to make some comparisons between Vargas and his contemporary in the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Both were sons of traditional families, both squires of small rural towns—São Borja, Rio Grande do Sul, and Hyde Park, New York. The people of their native states are energetic and accustomed to assuming leadership in the affairs of their respective nations. Politics permeated the atmospheres in which Vargas and Roosevelt grew up: to them political office was as much a duty as a reward. Both men served apprenticeships in subcabinet or cabinet posts; both rose slowly through the ranks of their state political ma-

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chines and took control after overcoming the party leadership. Vargas used the governorship of Rio Grande do Sul as a road to the presidency, Roosevelt used the governorship of New York State. Each headed a reform ticket—a violent revolution carried Vargas into power in 1930, and a peaceful one served Roosevelt just as effectively in 1932. In his own fashion each managed to put a reform program into effect. Indeed, in 1936 Roosevelt declared Vargas the co-author of the New Deal.

In governing they showed a remarkable similiarity. A 1937 cartoon depicted Vargas smiling while juggling all the major figures in Brazilian political life. Both Vargas and Roosevelt encouraged, even relished, rivalry among their subordinates. Each man enjoyed politics and the exercise of power, and within limits, each preferred to let problems resolve themselves rather than force a decision. Neither wanted to become involved in foreign affairs and turned attention abroad only when forced by events. They both were effective speakers who understood the value of an artful word or a graceful turn of phrase. Their concern was for their countries' welfare, and each felt that he was the man to solve his nation's problems. Each incurred the contempt of the rich and received the devotion of the common man. Each affected his nation's history, and gave his name to an era.

Vargas' Brazil was a rural nation, in spirit and in reality, that was only beginning to populate its vast 3,287,195 square miles of territory. Over 90 percent of its 41 to 42 million inhabitants clustered within two hundred miles of its 3,517-mile Atlantic coast, from French Guiana to Uruguay. Nearly 70 percent of its population lived in rural areas and only Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo could claim more than a million citizens. Poverty, malnutrition, and disease afflicted an interior dominated by one-crop agriculture—usually coffee, cotton, or cacao. Subsistence agriculture was a way of life for millions. These people and their neighbors on the great fazendas lived under the paternalistic exploita-

tion of the traditional latifundia system. *Fazendeiros*, like medieval lords, controlled huge areas with hired gunmen.

Rapid population increase, roughly 2.5 percent annually by 1940, caused a rural overflow that spilled into the cities. In addition, 4,190,837 immigrants streamed into Brazil between 1884 and 1943, most of whom settled in urban areas, particularly São Paulo, or in the southern states. Portuguese and Japanese predominated among the immigrants from 1914 to 1943, although German immigration reached its peak between 1924 and World War II; Italian and Spanish migration was heaviest before 1923.⁷

The combined currents of rural and foreign migrants placed severe strains on unprepared urban areas. This was especially true in the states of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul, which accounted for more than half of the national agricultural and industrial production and possessed 50 percent of Brazil's railroads.⁸ The rural poor became urban poor squeezed into the stinking *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, untended by government or church organizations.

In Rio de Janeiro of the mid-1930's, the altimeter was "an unflinching index of social position; the higher you lived, the less important you were. Poverty perched on the hill-tops, where the black population lived in rags. . . ."⁹ The rich landowner, now an urbanite, was just as impervious to human suffering in the city as he had been in the country. The Catholic Church can best be described as ultraconservative, with its leading cleric, Dom Sebastião Cardinal Leme (1882-1942), more preoccupied with such projects as erecting the famous statue of Christ on Corcovado mountain

⁷ Preston James, *Latin America* (New York, 1959), pp. 558-559.

⁸ Joseph L. Love, "Rio Grande do Sul as a Source of Potential Instability in Brazil's Old Republic, 1909-1932" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1967), pp. 10-12.

⁹ Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Tristes Tropiques, An Anthropological Study of Primitive Societies in Brazil* (New York, 1968), p. 92. In addition to its anthropological importance this book contains a valuable record of rural Brazil in the 1930's.

than in alleviating the poverty below "The Redeemer's" outstretched arms.¹⁰

The Catholic Church, devoting itself to the spiritual needs of the rising urban middle class, left the poor blacks and *caboclos* to ease their lot in the ceremonies of the African cult and the fantasies of the Carnival Samba Schools.¹¹ The Church did not need to explain its existence; it simply was. Unlike the Church in North America it did not suffer the necessity of changing in order to survive.

Education barely existed in the Brazil of the 1930's. In his lengthy "state of the nation" message to the National Constituent Assembly in November 1933, Getúlio Vargas declared the hard truth that Brazil had never squarely faced the problem of education. He called the mass of illiterates "a dead weight" on national progress, a "disgrace of which we should be ashamed." Out of every 1,000 Brazilians, 513 never entered school. Of the 487 who matriculated, 110 soon dropped out, 178 attended first grade but did not learn to read well, 85 completed two years attaining superficial

¹⁰ (Sister) Maria Regina do Santo Rosário, *O Cardeal Leme* (Rio de Janeiro, 1962), pp. 244-255. The statue of "Christ the Redeemer" was financed by contributions from the faithful in Rio de Janeiro and was dedicated on October 12, 1931. The people of Rio, the Cariocas, invented the story that when Getúlio rose to speak at the ceremonies he spread his arms like the statue as if to embrace the city below and declared: "The Gaúchos have arrived." See Alzira Vargas, *Getúlio*, p. 261.

¹¹ Only at Carnival would the blacks come swarming down from the *favelas* en masse, filling Rio with numbing rhythm and sweeping "all before them with the tunes they had picked out, on high, on their guitars." Lévi-Strauss, *Tristes Tropiques*, p. 92. The philosophy of carnival was expressed quite well in Vinicius de Moraes' lyrics to Antônio Carlos Jobim's *Felicidade* (Happiness): "Sadness has no end, Happiness does; . . . The happiness of the poor appears with the morning of carnival. The people work the whole year for a moment of dreaming. . . ." The pathos of the celebration was captured beautifully in Marcel Camus' film *Orfeu Negro* (*Black Orpheus*, 1959). For a detailed study of the African cult see Roger Bastide, *O Candomblé da Bahia (Rito Nagô)* (São Paulo, 1961).

literacy, 84 went a bit further but failed to complete their studies, and only thirty finished the three years that comprised the elementary course.¹² Of those thirty, only those from relatively affluent families would be able to continue their education. The secondary schools were private in all but a few cases, acting as a sieve that kept the poor from reaching the universities. The universities themselves were new, formed from the government-sponsored, tuition-free *faculdades* after the Revolution of 1930. At the recently-founded University of São Paulo, the professors were "wretchedly paid" and forced to work at extra odd jobs to exist. The students, admitted after rigorous entrance examinations, were "hungry for the jobs" which their diplomas would bring. It seemed to Claude Lévi-Strauss, a member of the educational mission which France sent to assist the new university, that the students valued "the novelties of the day" more than serious learning—"for which they had neither the taste nor the methods." Obsessed with the need to prove that they were no longer country bumpkins, they disparaged the image of the Brazilian rustic, the *caipira* (hick) who made up the majority of Brazil's population. In part this was the normal reaction of the aspiring urbanite, but among the sons of thrifty, hard-working immigrants, especially Italians and Jews, who crowded the university it represented alienation from traditional Brazil. More determined and with more resources than native Brazilians, the immigrants had founded their own secondary schools or sacrificed to send their children to existing ones. Having gotten through the secondary school sieve they saw the University of São Paulo as a means of obtaining status and security. Its graduates entered Vargas' new civil service and in time would form a new elite.¹³

¹² Vargas, *A Nova Política*, III, 129.

¹³ Lévi-Strauss, *Tristes Tropiques*, pp. 21, 106-107. Curiously the trend toward a predominance of immigrant offspring in the University of São Paulo student body continues; see Seymour M. Lipset, "Values, Education, and Entrepreneurship," in Seymour M. Lipset and Aldo

Perhaps the most striking feature of Brazil in the 1930's and 1940's was the tremendous gap between living standards in cities like Rio de Janeiro and in the rural interior. The Northeast (Maranhão, Piauí, Ceará, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Sergipe, and Bahia) long had staggered under periodic droughts; those of 1930 to 1933 were especially severe. In Ceará, where the situation was the worst, seven refugee camps received some 105,000 persons.¹⁴ Some of these took ship for the Amazonian rubber zone, while others crowded into slums from Fortaleza to São Paulo. Whether they stayed in the dusty, barren towns on the edge of the *sertão*, or joined the crab hunters in the mud at Recife, or reached the cacao groves of Ilheus exhausted and starving, or gathered boards and tiles to throw up a shack on a Rio de Janeiro hillside, they were disease-ridden, scrawny, dark-skinned reminders that Brazil was not predominantly white, urban, or comfortable. Ragged, barefoot, pot-bellied, dirty children with hacking bronchial coughs and ulcerated sores on their limbs, playing and fighting in the narrow feces-strewn alleys among the *favela* shacks, were like inhabitants of another world compared to the poised, immaculate, laughing children of the elite singing the traditional playsongs (*cantigas de roda*) as they whirled in dancing circles, one pink hand holding another under the watchful eyes of the white-uniformed, dark-skinned nursemaids (*babás*). While Cariocas spoke disdainfully of the rest of Brazil as the interior, the truth was that the interior could be seen on the hillsides and along the low swampy areas of Guanabara Bay.

The elite, and the middle class who aped their ways, lost itself in a continuous social whirl, insulated from annoying realities by servants and a basic belief in a society of classes.

Solari, eds., *Elites in Latin America* (New York, 1967), pp. 25–26. Only 22 percent of the students were of “purely Brazilian descent” at the end of the 1950's.

¹⁴ Vargas, *A Nova Política*, III, 101–102.

In Rio de Janeiro they built comfortable, even luxurious, homes in Botafogo, Urca, or Laranjeiras, sailed at the yacht club, joined friends for a set of tennis at the Country Club or a round of golf at Itanhangá. At night it was a candle-lit dinner party for a few friends, or a reception modeled on a Paris salon, highlighted by sparkling, witty conversation sprinkled with French or English phrases. The old imperial nobility preserved its social standing and a Bragança (the royal family) in attendance was a major coup for the hostess. The most striking feature for anthropologist Lévi-Strauss was the flippancy of it all; Rio seemed to him like "one huge drawing-room."¹⁵

Change was slow, but Brazil was changing in spite of all the obstacles that time-encrusted conservatism threw in its path. In 1922 came two symbolic blows at the established order: São Paulo's Modern Art Week, which sent shock waves through the Old Republic's cultural foundations, and the quixotic sacrifice of the Fort Copacabana rebels, which exposed the weakness of its political structure. Together they provided the spirit of change and the example of revolution. From 1923 to 1927 there were revolts of reform-minded young officers in Rio Grande do Sul, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and in some northeastern cities, that culminated in the famous march of the Prestes Column.¹⁶ The 1920's

¹⁵ Lévi-Strauss, *Tristes Tropiques*, p. 89. The following will give some idea of the sharp contrasts: Jorge Amado, *Gabriela, Clove and Cinnamon* (New York, 1962) and *The Violent Land* (New York, 1945); Jacques Lambert, *Os Dois Brasis* (Rio de Janeiro, 1959); Roger Bastide, *Brasil, Terra de Contrastes* (São Paulo, 1964); Josué de Castro, *Geografia da Fome* (São Paulo, 1965) and his *Death in the Northeast* (New York, 1969), see especially "The Crab Cycle," pp. 128-130.

¹⁶ Richard M. Morse, "São Paulo Since Independence: A Cultural Interpretation," *Hispanic-American Historical Review*, xxxiv (1954), 419-444; Glauco Carneiro and Osvaldo Tôrres Galvão, *História das Revoluções Brasileiras* (Rio de Janeiro, 1965), I, 223-309; Hélio Silva, 1922, *Sangue na Areia de Copacabana* (Rio de Janeiro, 1964) and 1926, *A Grande Marcha* (Rio de Janeiro, 1965); Adguar Bastos, *Prestes e a Revolução Social* (Rio de Janeiro, 1946).

In 1924 rebels from Rio Grande do Sul, under the command of Luís

and 1930's also saw the backlanders of the *sertão* from northern Minas Gerais to Ceará seeking their own solutions to ignorance, poverty, landlord oppression, and a government that usually meant police oppression rather than drought relief. If the average *caboclo* did not join Lampião's rampaging *cangaço* that attacked towns such as Água Branca in Alagoas (1922) and Mossoró in Rio Grande do Norte (1927) to the tune of "Mulher Rendeira," he sang about him and perhaps took quiet pleasure in seeing fear spread across a *fazendeiro's* face at the mention of the *cangaceiro's* name. Other northeasterners knelt under Padre Cícero's window in Juazeiro, Ceará, to receive strength from his daily blessing. Still others gathered at Caldeirão, Ceará (1933-1935) for a religiously-oriented communal life under the *beato* José Lourenço, where they did for themselves what no government had been able to do, namely to elevate their existence from survival to life. Not surprisingly their houses, their cattle, their religious activities, their unity aroused suspicion, jealousy, fear, greed. Local police forced them to disperse, destroyed their settlement and turned their goods over to the municipality.¹⁷ In 1928 Paulo

Carlos Prestes, linked up with another force retreating from São Paulo to form a column of nearly a thousand men who marched through the Brazilian interior as far north as Maranhão before heading west into asylum in Bolivia. They covered some 6,000 miles, fighting numerous engagements against the regular army, local police, and *fazendeiros'* gunmen. Their two-and-a-half year effort to keep the revolutionary spirit alive and to arouse the countryside failed, but their actions provided a symbol of the *tenentes'* revolutionary commitment. Prestes later became head of the Brazilian communist party.

¹⁷ Luís da Câmara Casudo, *Dicionário do Folclore Brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro, 1962), pp. 416-417; Maria Isaura Pereira de Queiroz, *O Messianismo, no Brasil e no Mundo* (São Paulo, 1965), pp. 264-267. *Cangaço* is a band of outlaws called *cangaceiros*. Of the many bands that terrorized the *sertão* during the period, Virgolino Ferreira da Silva or Lampião (lantern or light) headed the most famous and feared. His 23-year career ended in a fight in July 1938 in Sergipe. As used here a *beato* is a type of holyman without religious orders peculiar to the

Prado presented a melancholy portrait of Brazil as a "radiant land" with "sad people"—even so he sketched it with the confidence that the future "could not be worse than the past."¹⁸

But for the future to be better the economic underpinnings of the social order would have to change. Ironically Brazil's very underdevelopment may have lessened the direct impact of the Depression on most of its people; living by subsistence farming they were only marginally affected.¹⁹ To millions of Brazilians the scorching sun and lack of rain were more to be feared than falling coffee or cacao prices. The difference between utter deprivation and mere poverty is hard to measure. Still, while Brazilian leaders could speculate that having millions beyond the reach of the world economy gave them time to modernize the country, they could hardly be proud of the fact.

Seventy percent of Brazil's exports consisted of coffee, two-thirds of which came from São Paulo. Nearly half of the beans which earned foreign exchange went to the United States, and two or three American firms dominated the Brazilian coffee export trade. As the principal importer of Brazil's principal crop, North America's ability to buy coffee affected the Brazilian economy, notwithstanding the "security" of the poverty-stricken *campesino*. A United States sunk in depression made itself felt in the coffee *municípios* of São Paulo, the cacao zone in Bahia, and in the various seaports. With no heavy industry and with the shaky light industry cowering behind foreign exchange regulations that tended to eliminate imported consumer products, Vargas needed to proceed so as to harness both the

Brazilian sertão. For the "saint" of Juazeiro see Edmar Morel, *Padre Cícero* (Rio de Janeiro, 1966); and the excellent study by Ralph della Cava, *Miracle at Joazeiro* (New York, 1970).

¹⁸ Paulo Prado, *Retrato do Brasil, Ensaio sobre a Tristeza Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro, 1928; 6th ed., 1962), pp. 3 and 183.

¹⁹ Vargas, *A Nova Política*, III, 30.

one-crop landlords and the budding industrialists. Strong government allied to the traditional latifundia and forward-looking industry seemed the only way to achieve development without adopting the Soviet model. Unfortunately Brazilian businessmen—cotton cloth manufacturers for example—tended to operate with unimaginative marketing policies that ignored the domestic market and the need to expand it by paying wages that would make the workers consumers as well as producers.²⁰

Vargas kept the coffee plantations from the auctioneer's block by committing himself to a valorization scheme whereby the government purchased the entire national production, destroying whatever amount was necessary to keep the supply in line with market demand. The National Coffee Institute burned or dumped into the sea nearly eighty million sacks between 1931 and 1941, when the world market was never able to absorb more than fifteen million sacks annually.²¹ These Brazilian efforts to support the world price had long-range benefits and disadvantages. To subsidize the chief agricultural sector of the economy via valorization the government was forced to borrow heavily abroad, consequently tying up foreign exchange in debt servicing and leaving little for purchases of finished goods. Whatever foreign exchange remained was needed for spare parts to keep the railroads, motor vehicles, and electrical equipment running. This unconscious pump-priming, to-

²⁰ Stanley J. Stein, *The Brazilian Cotton Manufacture: Textile Enterprise in an Underdeveloped Area, 1850-1950* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), pp. 135-164. Stein describes the alliance between the Vargas regime and the cotton cloth producers, while pointing up the short-sightedness of the latter. For a contemporary discussion of the economy in the 1930's see Horace B. Davis, "Brazil's Political and Economic Problems," *Foreign Policy Reports*, XI, No. 1 (March 13, 1935), 2-12, *passim*.

²¹ Caio Prado, Jr., *História Econômica do Brasil* (São Paulo, 1963), p. 297. From 1925 onward coffee production exceeded demand. The 80 million sacks destroyed in the 1930's totaled 4,800,000 tons, enough to supply the world for two years at the 1962 level of consumption.

gether with the Tariff of 1934 and the Reciprocal Trade Agreement with the United States (effective January 1, 1936) made Vargas the unexpected benefactor of the manufacturing interests in the Rio de Janeiro–Minas Gerais–São Paulo triangle.²² Unfortunately it also made the world coffee market attractive to Colombian, Central American, and East Asian producers who grabbed much of Brazil's share of the market without making its sacrifices.

The obvious vulnerability of Brazil's agricultural export economy prompted demands for government action to achieve economic diversity and independence. This would mean creating a stronger executive authority than had existed during the Old Republic (1891–1930) and sacrificing the dual watchwords of the old order—state autonomy and economic orthodoxy. The latter held that Brazil was permanently cast in the role of raw-material supplier, and the former was the political mechanism that insured the position of those few Brazilians who benefited from this arrangement. Brazil's was a "penetrated political system" whose leaders cooperated with foreign interests, knowingly or unknowingly, to exploit the country's natural resources.²³ This

²² For a discussion of these trends in addition to Stanley Stein's work cited above see Celso Furtado, *The Economic Growth of Brazil* (Berkeley, 1963), p. 212; Donald W. Giffin, "The Normal Years: Brazilian-American Relations, 1930–1939" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1962), pp. 68–70. Vargas explained the complicated funding arrangements in his message to the Constituent Assembly, Nov. 15, 1933; see *A Nova Política*, III, 43–59. He was able to claim reduction of the national deficit from its 1929 level of 423,951:000\$ to its 1932 mark of 178,279:000\$. In 1929, 1,000\$ (a Conto) equaled U.S. \$118. and \$71. in 1932. For currency equivalents 1920–44, see Levine, *Vargas Regime*, p. 193.

²³ A penetrated political system is one in which "non-members of a national society participate directly and authoritatively through actions taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals"; James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, Ill., 1966), p. 65. Carlos A. Astiz applies Rosenau's definition

foreign penetration helps to explain why the Brazilian elite tended to disparage the interior and look for guidance to Paris, London, New York, Rome, or Berlin.

Between 1930 and 1933 Vargas concentrated on consolidating his coalition and forming a popular following. This he could best do by appealing "to the urban sector's natural hostility to the traditional predominance of the rural oligarchy" and reiterating "promises made during his electoral campaign for social legislation to aid the working classes."²⁴ He established new ministries of labor and public works, government institutes that supervised social security and pension programs, and he reformed the civil service by creating the Administrative Department of Public Service (DASP). Though he did not seek public acclaim during these early years, he won the support of the urban working classes. The *tenente* elements who had joined his cause in 1930 in the hope of using him to revolutionize Brazil became embroiled within their own camp in factional disputes as to means and goals. Vargas used *tenentes*, such as Juracy Magalhães (Bahia), Joaquim Magalhães Barata (Pará), and João Alberto Lins de Barros (São Paulo) as federal *interventors* to replace ousted state governors. They tended to get enmeshed in state politics, dissipating their energies and turning their attention away from the national scene.

After the defeat of São Paulo in 1932 the federal army steadily grew stronger in relation to the military forces of the individual states. Because the Paulista crisis had in part been brought on by *tenente* ineptness in governing, Vargas was able to rely less on their political support and more on that of the federal forces, which were increasingly under the control of officers who owed their rise to him, especially General Pedro Aurélio de Góes Monteiro. This northeast-

to Latin American societies in his *Latin American International Politics: Ambitions, Capabilities, and the National Interests of Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina* (Notre Dame, 1969), pp. 10-12.

²⁴ Levine, *Vargas Regime*, MS, p. A-10.

erner from the small state of Alagoas had supported the federal government against the *tenente* upheavals of the 1920's, switched in 1930 to serve as chief of staff of Vargas' revolutionary forces, and went on to defeat the Paulistas in 1932. His influence on Vargas was great, and his Bonpartist view of the role of the military in society left a lasting impression on the Brazilian officer corps.

As *tenente* influence ebbed, Vargas "became increasingly identified with conservative business and industrial spokesmen who welcomed the growing trend to federal authority, even at the expense of state independence." At the same time agricultural groups "welcomed the new federal institutes for the development of such products as sugar, coffee, vegetable oils, alkalis, and salt, and Vargas' commitment to protectionism."²⁵

The political atmosphere was extremely agitated from the time of the calling of the Constituent Assembly in 1933 to the declaring of the Estado Nôvo in 1937. In May 1933, the first popularly elected constitutional convention in Brazilian history convened in Rio de Janeiro. The delegates were to consider and revise a proposed constitution developed by an eight-man commission representing a variety of ideological positions. The draft was subjected to intense debate that produced more than five thousand suggested amendments. The hybrid result pleased no one. Vargas lamented the constraints placed on presidential authority and, taking advantage of a constitutional provision which approved acts of the provisional government and exempted them from judicial review, issued more than fifty executive decrees before the constitution took effect. The document contained ample social guarantees (including an eight-hour work day, vacations with pay, pensions, minimum wages, female suffrage, and prohibition of child labor); enumerated cases in which the government could nationalize businesses; sanctioned establishment of political parties; limited

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. A-17.

the senate's authority; provided for federal supervision of state elections; made possible ownership of productive land after five years of uncontested occupation and expropriation of large estates; restricted inheritance; and permitted organization of labor unions under the guidance of the Ministry of Labor. In a feature reminiscent of the social encyclicals of Popes Leo XIII and Pius XI, and of Mussolini's Fascism, the Congress included fifty deputies representing classes and interest groups. Although this measure gave lobbyists seats in the legislature alongside the 350 state deputies, it tended to aid the president, since for the most part class deputies shared economic interests furthered by government programs. After transforming itself into the constitutional congress the assembly elected Vargas president by a vote of 175 to 63.²⁶

Instead of giving Brazilians a period of calm, however, the coming of constitutional government unleashed a season of storms. The assembly had granted amnesty to political exiles, including the Paulista leaders, who returned determined to send Vargas and his Gaúchos home to Rio Grande. It was to be a struggle between the proponents of strong federal government and those of state autonomy, and by mid-1934 when state elections were held Brazil was caught up in a whirlwind of political activity. Some opposition parties won victories over Vargas forces. Uncertainty settled over the land as bitterness and acts of violence spread during 1935. The architects of the Revolution of 1930 began to fear that their victory would be undone. Oswaldo Aranha, close friend of Vargas and coordinator of the October 1930 Revolution, wrote from his ambassadorial post in Washington that Brazil's weaknesses resulted from its people's "ignorance, sickness, and lack of personal capacity," and that Brazil's destiny should not be left to its masochistic and sadistic politicians. He warned that Brazil's

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Chap. I; Hélio Silva, 1934, *A Constituinte* (Rio de Janeiro, 1969).

disorganization would lead it down the trail blazed by Germany, Italy, and Russia.²⁷ Góes Monteiro was more afraid of anarchy; he worried that the Brazilians' seeming inability to govern themselves would lead to national decomposition, and saw an authoritarian regime as the solution.²⁸

This pessimism was justified. The politics of extremism seized control of Brazil's destiny. The conservative opposition, desiring a return to the pre-1930 order, became less important in the course of events than the far left and the far right. The Brazilian Communist Party, under the leadership of the near-legendary *tenente* Luís Carlos Prestes, posed what recent scholarship has shown to be an almost Quixotic threat.²⁹ But exaggerated threats are often not seen as such by contemporaries, and gun fights between communists and rightists were real enough to frighten many Brazilians into preferring security to democratic niceties. After their national front organization (National Liberation Alliance) was outlawed, the communists decided on a test of strength with the government in late November 1935. Uncoordinated risings in Natal, Recife, and Rio de Janeiro failed to gain popular support and government forces easily suppressed them, eventually capturing and jailing the leaders. The party went underground until the last days of Vargas' rule in 1945.

The government used the abortive revolt to silence or harass opponents. Vargas requested from the Congress, and received, a declaration of a "state of war," suspending constitutional guarantees that could directly or indirectly prejudice national security. This useful device was continu-

²⁷ Aranha to Pedro de Góes Monteiro, Washington, Mar. 9, 1935, Oswaldo Aranha Archive, Rio (OAA); and Oswaldo Aranha to João Mangabeira, Washington, June 11, 1935, *ibid.* The Oswaldo Aranha Archive is in the possession of the Aranha family and is currently housed on their property in Cosme Velho, Rio de Janeiro.

²⁸ Pedro de Góes Monteiro to Aranha, Caxambu, June 5, 1935, OAA.

²⁹ Levine, *Vargas Regime*, ms, Chap. vi. This is by far the best study of the events of 1935.

ally renewed during the next two years to combat a communist threat that existed only in official propaganda.³⁰ With increased authority, Vargas' aides imposed stricter censorship, removed suspected elements in the military establishment, and restricted interstate travel. Intellectuals came under presidential fire for "poisoning the atmosphere, muddying the waters" by encouraging "evolutionary modification of universal values."³¹ The trend of events became clearer. The Rio de Janeiro daily *O Imparcial* predicted ominously that Brazil was "on the road to military dictatorship."³² Francisco de Assis Chateaubriand put the matter more pointedly in his *Diários Associados* column: "The recipient of all that Luís Carlos Prestes has lost is Getúlio Vargas."³³

Among the most ardent supporters of Vargas' efforts to increase federal power and to fight communism were the Integralistas. Founded in 1932 by Plínio Salgado, a Paulista journalist, their organization was a Brazilian adaptation of European fascism. Claiming more than a million members, the extremely nationalistic greenshirts assisted Vargas by stressing the importance of being Brazilian. They condemned foreign penetration of Brazilian life and culture and urged their countrymen to study the works of national authors and poets. They sought an integrated nation, a unified Brazil capable of escaping foreign domination and international communism.

³⁰ For explanation of state of war see Pedro Calmon, *História do Brasil*, VI (Rio de Janeiro, 1959), 2238-39. During the 1930's a "state of war" usually applied to all Brazil, while states of siege or emergency applied to particular regions. A state of war allowed the national government to federalize state militias and to use federal troops to maintain order in the states.

³¹ Vargas, *A Nova Política*, IV, 141.

³² *O Imparcial* (Rio), Dec. 18, 1935; as quoted in Levine, *Vargas Regime*, MS, p. F-39.

³³ Francisco de Assis Chateaubriand, "A revolução hiperbólica," *Diário de Pernambuco* (Recife), Dec. 8, 1935; as quoted in Levine, *Vargas Regime*, MS, p. F-10.

The Integralista view of government was Authority with a capital A, to prevent, as their literature claimed, the powerful, foreigners, and selfish political groups from endangering Brazil's interests. Although their uniformed storm troopers took to the streets to fight communists, the Integralistas attracted members from all levels of society. Respectable Brazilians considered it a respectable organization.

The *Ação Integralista Brasileira* (AIB) was the only truly national party—certainly the only one, other than the defunct Communist party, which had a coherent body of doctrine and definite political aims. A major beneficiary and perpetrator of the red scare, the AIB increased its membership and by the election of 1937 seemed a force to be taken seriously.³⁴

On September 7, 1936, the 114th anniversary of Brazilian independence, Getúlio set the tone for the fateful year ahead with an appeal to Brazilian patriotism. Warning that "the agents of subversion and disorder" were persisting in their "diabolical plans" to utterly destroy the Brazilian "fatherland, family, and religion," and to transform Brazil into a "colony of Moscow," the president asserted that it was "vital to maintain constant vigilance" against a "treacherous coup." Was he attempting dissimulation and falsehood, the very tactics he ascribed to the communists? Did his audience in Rio de Janeiro's Esplanada do Castelo detect some hidden meaning or did they accept Getúlio's words at face value? Historical experience had demonstrated, he declared, that "democracy is the form of government most suited to our people's nature and to their moral and material progress." But what did he mean by democracy? Brazilian democracy, he went on, could not be

³⁴ Plínio Salgado, *O Integralismo Brasileiro Perante a Nação* (Lisbon, 1946), pp. 17–26; Alzira Vargas, *Getúlio*, p. 214; Robert M. Scotten, Rio, Aug. 25, 1937, 832.00/1045, U.S. Department of State Files, NA; Frederico del Villar, "Life and Death of Brazilian Fascism," *The Inter-American Monthly*, 11, No. 5 (June 1943), 16–19.

"structured in rigid and unchangeable formulas, shut off from the renovating action of time and existing realities; rather, it ought to vest itself in a plasticity capable of reflecting social progress, perfecting itself and . . . defending itself when threatened. . . ." Then, employing terminology remarkably similar to that of the 1964-1970 military dictatorship, he hinted at his concept of democracy by declaring: "Brazil is a country of order. Order and democracy mean discipline and liberty, conscious obedience and respect for the law. We will repel demagogic outbreaks just as we would not tolerate tyranny."³⁵

Certainly Getúlio did not think of himself as a tyrant. Nevertheless, events and his view of the kind of government Brazil needed would lead him to establish a dictatorship. Of course, in the agitated atmosphere of the 1930's the appeal of strong central government was not limited to Brazil. Just before Franklin Roosevelt's inauguration in 1933, the American business journal *Barron's* thought that perhaps "a mild species of dictatorship will help us over the roughest spots in the road ahead."³⁶ The day after Roosevelt took office the German Reichstag gave Adolf Hitler absolute power, while in Italy Benito Mussolini's regime appeared quite successful. Obviously Roosevelt had been able to obtain reform and to increase presidential power without dictatorship, but it must be noted that the restraining tradition of constitutional government was immeasurably greater on Roosevelt than on Vargas. Although Roosevelt, during his 1936 visit to Rio, proclaimed Vargas the co-author of the New Deal, the milieus in which they operated were quite different. During the period in which the United States had lived under the constitution of 1789, Brazil had been a colonial viceroyalty, a kingdom equal with Portugal, an independent empire that experienced many governmental modifications, a republican dictatorship, a constitutional presidency based on a formula of big-state domination, and

³⁵ Vargas, *A Nova Política*, IV, 181-187.

³⁶ *Barron's*, XIII (Feb. 13, 1933), 12.

finally it had undergone the continuous changes between 1930 and 1937. Brazilian and American democracy were hardly the same.

Vargas had to perform a smooth juggling and balancing act to maintain control, not only of the country but of his own regime. Between October 1930 and November 1937, 42 men had held the nine cabinet posts, and 103 had been either appointed interventors or elected governors in the twenty-two states and the federal district and territory of Acre.³⁷ The states had militia and state police forces that often outnumbered the federal forces stationed within their borders. Political questions could all too easily find solution in tests of arms or acts of violence and terrorism—as happened in São Paulo in 1932, in Rio Grande do Norte, Pará, and Alagoas in 1935. Political conflicts between pro-Vargas and opposition groups occurred in almost every Brazilian state between the state elections in October 1935 and proclamation of the Estado Novo in November 1937.

By early 1936 Vargas apparently began seriously to contemplate staying in power even though the constitution contained a no reelection provision. But it is difficult to say exactly when contemplation turned into resolve. Those close to the president were either pessimistic about continuing electoral government or determinedly opposed to it. Oswaldo Aranha, Vargas' close friend and fellow Gaúcho, sounded the keynote from Washington—declaring that he no longer believed in elections and predicted that Brazil would have a dictatorship first.³⁸ Minister of Labor Agamemnon Sérgio Godoy de Magalhães had severely attacked old-fashioned presidential government at the 1934 Constituent Assembly. General Góes Monteiro had masterminded an unsuccessful plot during 1935 to discredit the Congress and to increase military influence. Francisco Campos, former Minister of Education and author of both the 1937

³⁷ Alzira Vargas, *Getúlio*, pp. 267–285. She lists their names, posts, and dates.

³⁸ Aranha to Ricardo Xavier, Washington, Apr. 21, 1936, OAA.

Estado Novo constitution and the Institutional Act of April 1964, steadfastly championed authoritarian corporatism as a barrier to the "Moscovite inundation." He believed that where power was diffused, instead of being concentrated in "one single Power," government did not exist because government was "one thought and one action."³⁹ Filinto von Strubling Müller, head of the regime's repressive police, maintained close ties with the Third Reich's embassy, while Minister of War Eurico Gaspar Dutra, also a Germanophile, disliked representative government and believed that Brazil needed a dose of discipline.

Even with such strong support for continuation, Getúlio proceeded indirectly, perhaps having decided to let events determine his course. The question of succession came to the fore when Armando de Sales Oliveira resigned the governorship of São Paulo to become a candidate for the presidency. Vargas did not welcome Armando Sales' action and attempted unsuccessfully to persuade him to reconsider. In his New Year's address to the nation in the first hour of 1937, Getúlio promised that the coming presidential campaign would be conducted "within the bounds of vibrant democracy, in a free and healthy atmosphere," and that he would collaborate to insure "that the name chosen effectively represented the will of the majority of the Brazilian people."⁴⁰ There would be no court favorite and, not unexpectedly, Getúlio's impartiality created an atmosphere of doubt.

Armando Sales, Paulista industrialist and son-in-law of Júlio de Mesquita Filho, publisher of the anti-Vargas *O Estado de São Paulo*, naturally attracted support among opposition elements throughout Brazil. His victory would bring to power the Paulista rebels of 1932, which could hardly be acceptable to the revolutionaries of 1930. Other politicians quickly followed Armando Sales' lead. Minister of Foreign Affairs José Carlos de Macedo Soares resigned

³⁹ Francisco Campos, *O Estado Nacional, Sua Estrutura, Seu Conteúdo Ideológico* (Rio de Janeiro, 1941), pp. 62, 67.

⁴⁰ Vargas, *A Nova Política*, IV, 216; Alzira Vargas, *Getúlio*, p. 160.

so that he too might be eligible for the candidacy. José Antônio Flôres da Cunha, the spirited governor of Rio Grande do Sul, had been meddling in the politics of other states and mustering congressional opposition to the regime in a series of puzzling maneuvers, perhaps aimed at increasing his ability to play political broker or at securing the presidency for himself. What he secured was Vargas' distrust and the army's suspicion and opposition. To confuse the political scene even further, Oswaldo Aranha looked and acted like a candidate. A smooth-talking, popular figure, an old friend of both Vargas and Flôres da Cunha, Aranha could neither bring them together nor obtain their support for himself.⁴¹

After successfully testing his legislative support by unseating Antônio Carlos de Andrada of Minas Gerais as president of the Chamber of Deputies in April, Vargas turned his attention to the south and gave more authority to the federal commander of the Rio Grande do Sul military district, increased his troop strength, and ordered more coastal patrols to stop arms smugglers. Gôes Monteiro visited the south in May to survey the situation, as the general staff prepared contingency plans.⁴² The Gaúcho governor purchased modern weapons in Europe, which reportedly included field-pieces and tanks, to improve the armament of his 26,000-man state Military Brigade and militia-like provisional units. The army, already anxious because of Argentina's military buildup, grew increasingly nervous over the possibility of an uprising in the border state. Clearly Flôres da Cunha had to go. But Vargas could not simply remove the governor, because this was not a Pará or Sergipe where the federal government could impose its will with a handful of troops. Rio Grande do Sul had a tradition of auton-

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 173-175.

⁴² Benedicto Valladares to Vargas, Rio, May 17, 1937; Gen. Emílio Esteves to Vargas, n.p., Apr. 25, 1937; Benjamim Vargas to Vargas, n.p., Mar. 5, 1937; all in Getúlio Vargas Archive, Rio de Janeiro. This valuable archive (AGV) is in the possession of Dona Alzira Vargas do Amaral Peixoto and is housed in her Flamengo (Rio) apartment.

omy. In the nineteenth century it had seceded from the empire and declared itself the "Rio Grande Republic." Ten years (1835–1845) and many lives were necessary to return it to imperial control. In the early 1890's and again in the 1920's civil war erupted in Rio Grande. Even a Gaúcho president had to proceed with caution.⁴³

Vargas was an extremely cautious man. He knew that he was the key to the situation and that he could afford to wait—until he bestowed his support upon someone, there would be uncertainty. He continued to smile amicably at everyone and to make public statements complimentary to this one or that, always refraining from clarifying his position. Also, according to Getúlio's daughter Alzira—his longtime "confidante of political secrets"—he thought that it was a mistake for a president to impose an official candidate, preferring that the country's leaders make the choice.⁴⁴

The governors and political chieftains met in Rio de Janeiro in late May 1937, under the chairmanship of Governor Benedito Valladares of Minas Gerais, to choose the official candidate. Vargas unsuccessfully and inexplicably attempted to postpone the selection, but the convention chose José Américo de Almeida of Paraíba, a man closely associated with the 1930 revolution. Vargas then began a series of curious political maneuvers. He told an Integralista delegation, which came on June 14 to inform him officially of Plínio Salgado's candidacy, that he had no candidate and that he guaranteed the honesty of the coming elections. Four days later he wrote Aranha in Washington that José Américo's choice was a "truly happy" one and everything indicated that he would be victorious. In fact, he preferred to leave an American invitation to visit the United

⁴³ Scotten, Rio, Jan. 3, 1937, 832.00/1009, NA; Scotten, Rio, Jan. 6, 1937, 832.00/1010, NA; Alzira Vargas, *Getúlio*, pp. 175, 185–186. For a history of the state see Arthur Ferreira Filho, *História Geral do Rio Grande do Sul, 1503–1964* (Porto Alegre, 1965).

⁴⁴ Vargas to Aranha, Rio, Oct. 28, 1937, OAA; Alzira Vargas, *Getúlio*, p. 170.

States for his successor to accept. Early in July, he appointed a strong backer of José Américo as mayor of the federal district, thereby assuring him a majority of Rio's votes. But he refused to donate any money to the campaign fund or to make public statements favoring the candidate. And José Américo was not making it easy for him to do so; instead of taking issue with Armando Sales or Salgado, he was attacking the president and the policies of his regime. The official candidate was apparently more opposed to the government than was the opposition candidate. José Américo quickly made his continued candidacy unacceptable.⁴⁵

The opposition was in no better condition, and Vargas was the cause of its difficulties. Lack of a strong party structure, like that of England or the United States, made election difficult for a man out of office. By fulfilling the constitutional requirement of being a private citizen for a year before the election, Armando Sales lost his chief political asset, the governorship of São Paulo: after the election of his successor, he gradually lost control of the state's political machinery. His position weakened when fellow-Paulista Macedo Soares, disappointed in his bid for the candidacy, returned to the Vargas cabinet as minister of justice.⁴⁶

The situation in Rio Grande do Sul was crucial to the presidential campaign. Flôres da Cunha had given his backing to Armando Sales after discovering that his own chances were nonexistent. The army was nervous about Flôres da Cunha's open preparations for a showdown. The provisional units, which had been the basis of the independence of Rio Grande do Sul's caudillos, including Vargas in his provincial phase, had to be disarmed to bring the state under federal control. It was a difficult task requiring delicate handling; the provisionals were Gaúchos proud of their

⁴⁵ Benedicto Valladares, *Tempos Idos e Vividos, Memórias* (Rio de Janeiro, 1966), pp. 134-145, 153-154; Scotten, Rio, May 22, 1937, 832.00/1032, NA; Vargas to Aranha, Rio, June 17, 1937, OAA; Scotten, Rio, June 19, 1937, 832.00/1038, NA; Scotten, Rio, July 10, 1937, 832.00/1040, NA.

⁴⁶ Vargas to Aranha, Rio, June 17, 1937, OAA.

state's autonomy. Even a man like Oswaldo Aranha considered it the duty of every Gaúcho to defend the state's honor, the inheritance of 1835.⁴⁷ To demand their disarming could bring civil war; subtler methods were necessary. The "state of war" originally declared after the 1935 revolt had inconveniently expired, making it difficult for the federal government to act.⁴⁸

At this juncture the army's general staff discovered a document, known as the "Cohen Plan," that supposedly outlined a communist plot to seize the government on October 30. The exact authorship of the plan was, and is, a subject of debate. It seems likely that Integralistas, possibly officers on the general staff, drew up the plan, probably with the knowledge if not at the order of the chief of staff, General Góes Monteiro. Whether the Cohen Plan was the work of communists, Integralistas, or General Góes Monteiro, it provided the basis for a new "state of war." The congress approved the suspension of constitutional guarantees for ninety days on October 2, thus giving the government the atmosphere it needed to remove Flôres da Cunha.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Aranha to Vargas, Washington, Oct. 27, 1937, OAA. The "inheritance of 1835" is Aranha's phrase and refers to the rebellion of Rio Grande do Sul against the Brazilian Empire from 1835 to 1845; it is sometimes called the Ragamuffins' War.

⁴⁸ See above, note 30.

⁴⁹ Góes Monteiro later claimed that he considered the Cohen document false from the start and that such items frequently were sent to the general staff, see Coutinho, *General Góes*, pp. 298-299. The subchief of the general staff, General Leitão de Carvalho and other high officers did not know of the Cohen Plan until later and they resented the name of the general staff being used to give weight to the document (Leitão de Carvalho, *Memórias*, III, 294-295, 302; Alzira Vargas, *Getúlio*, pp. 205-206). A recent account names the author as Captain Olímpio Mourão Filho, a member of the Integralista "historical department," who claims that he was drawing up a theoretical communist attack to be used by Integralista planners. According to him his document was altered before being published as the Cohen Plan. See John W. F. Dulles, *Vargas of Brazil, A Political Biography* (Austin, 1967), pp. 162-163.

General Manoel de Cerqueira Daltro Filho, the right arm of General Góes Monteiro, had gone to Rio Grande in August to take command of the military region. His orders were to disarm the provisional units at the first opportunity. Lacking sufficient troops, he had used the annual Independence Day parade on September 7 as a pretext to call in more army units. The "state of war" now authorized the general to place the state forces under his command. Faced with fighting or being humiliated before the nation, Flôres da Cunha hesitated and others seized the power of decision. Dissident elements in the state assembly worked feverishly to obtain a majority to impeach the governor. Rio Grande was splitting into factions. The commander of the state's Military Brigade voluntarily placed his troops under Daltro Filho, destroying any hopes Flôres da Cunha may have had. Finding himself alone, he resigned and flew to exile in Montevideo; with him went the presidential election. To avoid an inconvenient struggle for power within the state, Vargas appointed General Daltro Filho as federal interventor.⁵⁰ Aranha, while conceding that Flôres da Cunha had been "a promoter of conflicts, difficulties, and crises," and that his flight had ended the "comedy of miseries," was distressed at the intervention, which he termed a "brutal act." He realized that Getúlio had to maintain public order, but he could not understand why he had intervened instead of allowing Rio Grande to elect a new governor. Getúlio defended himself, claiming that after intervening the authorities had seized large supplies of arms located at strategic points throughout the state for use in the "sedition" that Flôres da Cunha had been preparing for months with military and Paulista elements. The president assured his ambassador that the danger had passed, and that there was such relief in Brazil that on the day after the intervention the interna-

⁵⁰ Alzira Vargas, *Getúlio*, p. 186; Coutinho, *General Góes*, pp. 296-300; Calmon, *História do Brasil*, vi, 2304; Leitão de Carvalho, *Memórias*, III, 302-304; Scotten, Rio, Oct. 2, 1937, 832.00/1053, NA; Vargas to Aranha, Rio, Oct. 28, 1937, OAA.

tional currency exchange reacted favorably. "Work now," he advised soothingly, "in a more confident and serene atmosphere."⁵¹ Another of Aranha's correspondents, however, had described the situation more accurately when he wrote some weeks earlier that "Getúlio's strength merits a coup to end this foolishness. The navy is firm and dictatorial-minded; the army is the same. There will be no more constitutional solutions for Brazil."⁵²

It is uncertain exactly when Vargas decided to stay in office. In his letters to Aranha during June 1937 he spoke of projects that should be left to his successor, such as the visit to the United States. In May he had ordered construction of an addition to his house on the *estância* Itú in São Borja; he even had books and other items sent there, presumably in preparation for his retirement from Guanabara Palace (the presidential residence). However, there must have been signs for close observers to read because Aranha's brother, Adalberto, had been writing him for more than a year of Getúlio's "imperious and deliberate intention" to continue in power.⁵³

On October 1, Vargas wrote Aranha that the atmosphere was agitated, but that the horses were at the post and the race would be run unless some dogs crossed the track.⁵⁴ Perhaps he was trying to tell his old friend something, but if so Aranha did not understand. On October 18, he con-

⁵¹ Aranha to Vargas, Washington, Oct. 27, 1937; and Vargas to Aranha, Rio, Oct. 28, 1937, both OAA.

⁵² José Soares Maciel Filho to Aranha, Rio, mid-Sept., 1937, Maciel Filho Archive, as quoted in Levine, *Vargas Regime*, MS, pp. H-11-12.

⁵³ Vargas to Aranha, Rio, June 17, 1937, OAA; Alzira Vargas, *Getúlio*, p. 180. Adalberto Aranha to O. Aranha, Rio, Nov. 17, 1937, OAA.

⁵⁴ Vargas to Aranha, Rio, Oct. 1, 1937, OAA. In Portuguese the sentence read: "Os parceiros estão em compostura e a carreira será corrida, a menos que os cachorros se atravessem na cancha." Aranha apparently said something like this to Vargas in 1930 and reportedly Vargas said the same thing to José Américo about the same time as his letter to Aranha. See Affonso Henriques, *Vargas, O Maquiavélico* (São Paulo, 1961), p. 401.