ROGER CHICKERING

Imperial Germany and a World Without War

The Peace Movement and German Society, 1892-1914

PRINCETON LEGACY LIBRARY

Imperial Germany
and a
World Without War

Imperial Germany and a World Without War

The Peace Movement and German Society, 1892-1914

Roger Chickering

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

Published by Princeton University Press, Princeton and London

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data will
be found on the last printed page of this book

This book has been composed in Linotype Janson

Printed in the United States of America
by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

For Wendy

Contents

List of Figures and Maps

Preface

THIS study belongs to the genre of peace research. The principal characters in it are pacifists; its principal theme is their campaign to eliminate violent conflict from international politics. However, the study is ultimately more concerned with the society and political system within which this campaign took place.

I was originally drawn to study the German peace movement by my curiosity about attitudes toward war in Europe prior to the First World War. For an era that did not know of the public opinion poll, the peace movement seemed to be one possible vehicle to get at this problem. It was particularly attractive to me because of the presence, at the Hoover Institution, of the library of Alfred Fried, one of the leaders of the peace movement in Germany. Largely on the basis of the material in this collection, I wrote my dissertation. I concluded that the peace movement had, with remarkable accuracy, foreseen the disastrous impact of general war, but that its predictions and the reforms it proposed for making war unnecessary were overwhelmingly rejected in Germany.

Partially because of the limitations of the available documentary evidence, my dissertation did not adequately explain why the opposition to the peace movement was so widespread in Germany, nor was I able to determine conclusively whether it was any less widespread elsewhere. In 1970–71 I continued my research into the problem in Europe, using the private papers of many of those who had been active in the German movement, as well as the archives of the secretariat of the international peace movement, which enabled me to investigate the campaign of the movement in other countries. I also rethought the problem. I began to recognize that attitudes about war cannot be analyzed in isolation, that they are intimately bound up in perceptions of the whole complex of international relations,

and that these perceptions in turn play an important role in the functioning of political systems. As a result, I began to view the pacifists' campaign in a somewhat different light, in the context of the attitudes that composed the political culture of imperial Germany. This analytical framework drew my attention to features in the German political system that accounted for the fact, which I could now demonstrate, that the peace movement was significantly weaker in Germany than elsewhere.

While preparing this study I have had a great deal of help, both financial and intellectual. I wish at this point to thank the individuals and agencies that have come to my aid. My benefactors include the National Endowment for the Humanities, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Office of Scientific and Scholarly Research of the Graduate School of the University of Oregon. Numerous people have offered bibliographical suggestions or made comments about the manuscript at various stages of its growth. They include Gordon Craig, who directed my dissertation and subsequently made valuable suggestions, Gordon Wright, Ivo Lederer, Walter Sokel, Karl Holl, Adolf Wild, Dorothee Stiewe, Friedrich-Karl Scheer, Val Lorwin, Stanley Pierson, Robert Berdahl, Thomas Brady, John Perrin, Lloyd Sorenson, James Shand, Dieter Buse, and John Conway. I would like as well to thank the staffs of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, especially Agnes Peterson, the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek in Munich, and the United Nations Library in Geneva for their kind help.

Eugene, Oregon
September 1974

Abbreviations

AA	Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bonn. ACP and UC numbers refer to microfilm designations: see American Historical Association, Committee for the Study of War Documents, *A Catalogue of Files and Microfilms of the German Foreign Ministry Archives, 1867–1920* ([Washington, D.C.], 1959).
AStA	Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Munich: Allgemeines Staatsarchiv
BA	Bundesarchiv, Coblenz
BIP	Archives of the Bureau international permanent de la paix, United Nations Library, Geneva
CBM	*Correspondance bi-mensuelle*
CW	*Christliche Welt*
DDF	*Documents diplomatiques français (1871–1914).* First and Second Series. Paris, 1929–55
DWN	*Die Waffen nieder!*
ER	*Ethische Rundschau*
FB	*Die Friedens-Blätter*
FW	*Die Friedens-Warte*
GP	Johannes Lepsius, *et al.*, eds., *Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette 1871–1914.* Berlin, 1926–27.
GStA	Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Munich: Geheimes Staatsarchiv
HB (1)	Alfred H. Fried, *Handbuch der Friedensbewegung.* Vienna and Leipzig, 1905
HB (2)	Alfred H. Fried, *Handbuch der Friedensbewegung.* 2d ed. Berlin and Leipzig, 1911–13

HStASt	Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart
JPC	David Starr Jordan Collection, Peace Correspondence, Hoover Institution, Stanford University
KA	Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Munich: Kriegsarchiv
KVfiV	*Korrespondenz des Verbandes für internationale Verständigung*
MFK	*Monatliche Friedenskorrespondenz*
MVfiV	*Mitteilungen des Verbandes für internationale Verständigung*
NL	Nachlass
NZ	*Neue Zeit*
PD	*La paix par le droit*
PM	*The Peace Movement*
SFC	Suttner-Fried Correspondence, United Nations Library, Geneva
StAH	Staatsarchiv Hamburg
StBR	*Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstages.* Berlin, 1871–1933
StOb	Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Munich: Staatsarchiv für Oberbayern
VF	*Der Völker-Friede*

Imperial Germany
and a
World Without War

"Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?"
"To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time."
"The dog did nothing in the night-time."
"That was the curious incident," remarked Sherlock Holmes.

1

Introduction: The Peace Movement, Pacifism, and Political Culture

AMONG the documents of that tangle of events in 1914 known to historians as the July crisis, one of the least controversial has been the Serbian reply to the Austrian ultimatum. Convinced that the Austrians were determined to go to war regardless of how the Serbs answered the ultimatum, and convinced that the Serbs knew this, historians have not ascribed much importance to the substance of the Serbian reply, except to note that it was a clever piece of dissimulation designed to win for Serbia the support of world opinion. No doubt this interpretation is correct, and one ought to regard with skepticism any concessions the Serbs made in the document. This skepticism ought certainly to extend to the remarkable offer contained in the second paragraph of Article X of their reply: "In the event the Austrian government is not satisfied with this response, the Serbian government . . . is prepared, as always, to accept a peaceful agreement, by submitting the question . . . to the decision of the International Tribunal at The Hague."[1]

However disingenuous, the Serbian offer was not altogether implausible. There was in fact a tribunal at The Hague, which had on several occasions successfully arbitrated international disputes submitted to it. In the years prior to 1914 numerous international agreements had been negotiated, binding signatory states to arbitrate certain kinds of disputes either at The Hague or before some other suitable agency. There was, moreover, a considerable body of world opinion which believed that arbitration repre-

[1] G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War* (11 vols., London, 1926–38), XI, 367–71 (Appendix B).

sented a realistic alternative to war and that the competence of bodies like the Hague tribunal ought to be enlarged.

Historians who have studied the origins of the First World War have shown little more interest in the development and popularization of arbitration than the diplomats in Vienna showed in the Serbian offer to resolve the July crisis at The Hague. Only recently have general studies of the prewar years begun to acknowledge that arbitration appeared to many Europeans as a feasible solution to the problem of international violence.[2] The historical questions that remain unanswered about this possible alternative are legion. Given the political and social tensions in Europe at the turn of the twentieth century, was arbitration in fact a feasible alternative to war? Did the men who formulated government policy regard arbitration as feasible or desirable? What was the nature of popular support for arbitration? Did it influence political decisions? What resistance did the concept of arbitration encounter?

No single volume can deal adequately with this complex of questions, at least not at the present stage of historical research into the problem. Obviously, the concept of arbitration was international in scope; this meant that discussion of the concept took place in all countries in Europe, in different circumstances and with significantly different results. Nonetheless, an analysis of this discussion in any single country must begin with a brief consideration of a movement in which there had by the turn of the century developed a strong sense of international solidarity.

The Development of the International Peace Movement

There has been no dearth in western history of thinkers who have envisaged the definitive elimination of violence

[2] Two examples: Fritz Klein, *et al.*, *Deutschland im ersten Weltkrieg* (3 vols., Berlin, 1968–70), 1: *Vorbereitung, Entfesselung und Verlauf des Krieges bis Ende 1914*; Oron J. Hale, *The Great Illusion, 1900–1914* (New York, 1971), esp. pp. 16–21.

from international affairs and have made specific proposals to this end.[3] As a rule, however, these thinkers—men such as Crucé, Sully, St. Pierre, and Kant—were isolated intellectuals, officials, or clerics, who spoke for no articulate group but relied on the benevolence and insight of the sovereign heads of state for the realization of their projects. Only in the nineteenth century did proposals to do away with war begin to attract a politically active popular following.

The immediate stimulus for the creation of peace societies in the early nineteenth century was revulsion over the Napoleonic wars.[4] The first such society was established in New York in August 1814, while the first in Europe, the Society for the Promotion of Permanent and Universal Peace, was founded in London in June 1815. Most of the societies that appeared subsequently in the first half of the nineteenth century were located in England, but one was established in Paris in 1821 and another in Geneva in 1830. Tied together by little more than personal acquaintances and a common commitment to working against war, this early peace movement represented the outgrowth of three dif-

[3] For general surveys see: Roland H. Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Reevaluation* (New York and Nashville, Tenn., 1960); Adda B. Bozeman, *Politics and Culture in International History* (Princeton, 1960), esp. pp. 238–97; F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States* (Cambridge, 1963), pp. 13–149; Elizabeth V. Souleyman, *The Vision of World Peace in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century France* (New York, 1941); Kurt von Raumer, *Ewiger Friede: Friedensrufe und Friedenspläne seit der Renaissance* (Freiburg and Munich, 1953); Sylvester John Hemleben, *Plans for World Peace through Six Centuries* (Chicago, 1943).

[4] On the international peace movement in the nineteenth century see especially August Schou, *Histoire de l'internationalisme*, III: *Du Congrès de Vienne jusqu'à la première guerre mondiale (1914)* (Oslo, 1963); A. C. F. Beales, *The History of Peace: A Short Account of the Organised Movements for International Peace* (London, 1931), pp. 45–277; F. S. L. Lyons, *Internationalism in Europe, 1815–1914* (Leyden, 1963), pp. 309–61.

ferent, though not unrelated traditions.[5] The most important of these was Quakerism, a denomination whose unique blend of doctrinal precepts would make it the most active of all Christian groups in organized efforts to secure peace. Like many Christian sects, Quakers repudiated all forms of warfare, whether aggressive or defensive, as unbefitting a Christian life, and refused to participate in military service. In the case of most sectarian groups this repudiation was part of a general rejection of secular concerns; in Quakerism it was coupled with constructive political activism, a commitment to achieving the reforms that would eliminate the need for war. In this connection it was significant that the authors of two of the most important peace projects of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, William Penn and John Bellers, were Quakers. In the early nineteenth century Quakers were the leading element in most English and American peace societies.

The second major tradition underlying the early peace movement was free-trade liberalism. Secular and utilitarian in its assumptions, this school of thought condemned warfare, to use the words of one of its principal figures, James Mill, as "the pestilential wind which blasts the property of nations" and "the devouring fiend which eats up the precious treasure of national economy."[6] As the most effective guarantee of a durable peace, these liberals prescribed unimpeded international trade, which would tie the peoples of the world together in a network of commercial interdependence. The most renowned champions of this liberal case against war were Richard Cobden and John Bright, whose stature and influence made the peace movement an important factor in English politics.[7]

[5] See Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *Introduction to the History of International Relations* (New York, 1967), p. 219.

[6] Quoted in Edmund Silberner, *The Problem of War in Nineteenth Century Economic Thought* (Princeton, 1946), p. 41; cf. Helen Bosanquet, *Free Trade and Peace in the Nineteenth Century* (Kristiania, 1924), esp. pp. 71–79.

[7] Gavin B. Henderson, "The Pacifists of the Fifties," *Journal of Modern History* IX (1937), 314–41.

Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century the peace movement remained much stronger in England than on the European continent, where neither Quakerism nor free-trade liberalism was as deeply rooted. The continental peace societies managed to attract primarily liberals, such as the Frenchmen Frédéric Bastiat and Joseph Garnier. Toward the middle of the century, however, an alliance began to form between the peace movement and a tradition indigenous to the continent. One of the articles of faith of nationalists inspired by Mazzini was that warfare would persist only as long as reactionary statesmen frustrated the national aspirations of the peoples of Europe. Lasting peace, they argued, would be the natural product of the division of mankind into harmonious, responsibly governed, national groups.

Largely a middle-class phenomenon, the early peace movement was more homogeneous socially than doctrinally. Although all elements in it agreed that war was reprehensible, they were severely at odds about conditions in which war might be permissible. Quakers argued that war was legitimate in no circumstances, while liberals approved of wars of self-defense, and Mazzinian nationalists even condoned revolutionary wars of national unification. There was, however, one point on which all could agree. Arbitration appealed to Quakers as a means to remove the need for wars of any kind; liberals regarded it as the appropriate device for resolving misunderstandings in the community of trading partners, and nationalists endorsed it as a useful tool for settling disputes that might occasionally arise in the great sisterhood of nations they envisaged. A principal activity of peace societies everywhere was, accordingly, the popularization of the concept of arbitration and the elaboration of plans for some kind of international arbitral agency.

The first phase of the peace movement's history culminated in a series of international peace congresses in the middle of the century. In 1843 delegates from the existing peace societies gathered in London for the first General

Peace Convention. Then, amidst the euphoria of the mid-century revolutions on the continent, peace congresses convened in Brussels in 1848, in Paris in 1849, in Frankfurt in 1850, and in London in 1851. Although they created the impression of international solidarity, these congresses, like the peace movement itself, were overwhelmingly dominated by the English; 292 of the 324 delegates to the convention in 1843, and 670 of the 850 delegates to the congress in Paris were from Great Britain.[8]

Even as this series of congresses was drawing to a close, the peace movement began to enter an eclipse that extended almost until the 1870s. The onset of reaction on the continent made it impossible for peace societies to work in public. The Crimean War and then the wars of national unification on the continent badly discouraged the Quakers, who made up much of the English movement. The American Civil War likewise created serious difficulties for the peace movement in the United States.

Measured by the numbers of people associated with it, the range of its activities, and the influence it enjoyed, the peace movement experienced its golden age in the period between the Franco-Prussian War and the outbreak of the First World War. This was both a result and a symptom of the significant developments that were changing the face of European society and politics. The most important of these was the accelerated internationalization of western life at the end of the century. The development of an international economy, unprecedented in its degree of interdependence, seemed to confirm the expectations of liberals that the nations of the world would tie themselves together in a vast commercial and financial network. To make this economic internationalization possible, an international communications and transportation network developed, overseen in part by international agencies such as the Universal Postal Union and the Telegraphic Union. In the wake of economic developments numerous cultural, humani-

[8] Beales, *History of Peace*, pp. 67, 78.

tarian, professional, and religious organizations appeared. Between 1870 and 1914 over four hundred such nongovernmental organizations were created, and in 1910 representatives of 137 of them met in Brussels to found the Union of International Associations, which was designed to serve as a coordinating agency for what was becoming known as the "international movement."[9]

The late nineteenth century also saw a marked increase in the international coordination of political activity. The Second International provided the most conspicuous example; less dramatic, but no less political in implication, was the response of governments to the internationalization of communications, transportation, and the economy. Through a network of treaties, conventions, and agencies, governments regularized their relations in such important areas as the navigation of international waterways, consular jurisdiction, extradition, and some categories of commercial legislation. The product was a growing body of international law, which in turn stimulated scholarly and professional interest in its continued development. In 1873 two private organizations were founded to study and promote the expansion of international law. The *Institut de droit international*, with headquarters in Ghent, was an elite group of statesmen and scholars, while the more widely based International Law Association in London appealed to lawyers, politicians, and professional people with a more practical interest in the development of international law.

From one perspective the expansion of the peace movement after 1870 represented an aspect of this internationalization. Peace societies sought to capitalize on the growth of international interdependence and to push it through to what they believed was its logical conclusion—the regulation by law of all critical aspects of international affairs, including the kinds of disputes that had routinely led in the past to war.

[9] See *Annuaire de la vie internationale* (Brussels and Monaco, 1905–11). The best general survey of late nineteenth century internationalization is Lyons, *Internationalism in Europe*.

The growth of the peace movement at the end of the century was also a response to a paradoxical development: the same period in which international ties multiplied so rapidly also witnessed the transformation of Europe into an armed camp.[10] The adoption of universal military service in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War and the development and deployment of efficient new weaponry, such as the small-caliber rifle, the machine gun, and siege artillery, portended war of unprecedented scale. The revolution in military equipment and organization also provoked popular alarm over the likely consequences of such a war and over the cost, both fiscal and moral, of maintaining vast armies and navies in peace time. From another perspective, then, the expansion of the peace movement represented an attempt to articulate this concern and make it politically effective.[11]

One final factor contributed to the growth of the peace movement at this time. This was the very fact of a long period of peace in Europe—a phenomenon the peace movement tended to ascribe to internationalization rather than to the deterrent effect of large armies. Despite sporadic colonial wars and a series of increasingly ominous international crises after the turn of the century, peace societies could point to more than three decades of peace in Europe as evidence that war had become an anachronism.

The recovery of the peace movement from its mid-century decline can be dated from 1867, when two of the most durable peace societies on the continent were founded.[12] Created in Paris by Frédéric Passy, the *Ligue*

[10] The best short survey of these developments is Michael Howard, "The Armed Forces," *The New Cambridge Modern History*, XI: *Material Progress and World-Wide Problems, 1870–1898* (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 204–42.

[11] William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890–1902* (2d ed., New York, 1965), p. 581.

[12] For an extensive account of the peace movement in the late nineteenth century see Irwin Martin Abrams, "A History of European

internationale et permanente de la paix represented a continuation of the liberal tradition in calling for international political cooperation on the basis of free trade. The other new organization, the *Ligue internationale de la paix et de la liberté*, emphasized the more radical Mazzinian vision of a peaceful community of democratic nations, and after its creation in Geneva by Charles Lemonnier, it became a haven for disaffected republicans throughout Europe. Both new organizations stressed secular considerations in opposing war and were more successful in finding support on the continent than English Quakers had been earlier in the century.

After a brief relapse occasioned by the Franco-Prussian War, the peace movement's expansion began in earnest. By the middle of the 1870s new peace societies had been founded in Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. In 1878 an international peace congress convened in Paris, attended by delegates from thirteen countries. In the 1880s peace societies underwent further expansion and reorganization. Plans began to take shape for some kind of international apparatus to coordinate activities among peace societies in different countries. In 1880 Hodgson Pratt established the International Arbitration and Peace Association of Great Britain and Ireland, an organization whose secular orientation appealed to those who were uncomfortable in the religious atmosphere that still prevailed in most English peace groups. Pratt was also a tireless agitator and set up several peace societies on the continent. At the same time a vigorous peace movement developed in Scandinavia.

In 1889 the development of the peace movement entered a new phase. In that year both of the institutions that would become the focal points of the prewar peace movement appeared. In June the first Universal Peace Congress met in Paris. There representatives from peace societies in western

---

Peace Societies, 1867–1899" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1938).

Europe and America decided to coordinate their campaign through a series of regular international congresses. They agreed as well that this campaign should emphasize the need for obligatory arbitration of international disputes. Immediately after this congress adjourned, the first Interparliamentary Conference convened, likewise in Paris. There, some one hundred parliamentarians, principally from France and England, also agreed to launch a series of regular international meetings and to exert pressure within their respective parliaments for negotiation of permanent treaties of arbitration.[13]

The third event in 1889 of major significance for the peace movement was the publication of Bertha von Suttner's antiwar novel, *Die Waffen nieder!* Although (or perhaps because) its polemical value exceeded its literary merit, it was an immense popular success. By 1905 the book, which was hailed as the "*Uncle Tom's Cabin* of the peace movement," had gone through thirty-seven editions and had been translated into more than a dozen languages.[14] Far more than the annual international congresses, *Die Waffen nieder!* mobilized popular support for the peace movement; many, if not most, of those who found their way into peace societies after 1889 probably did so after reading this book.

During the last decades before the First World War the peace movement continued to grow and enlarge the scale of its operations. While the parliamentarians sought to utilize the political channels open to them in order to promote arbitration and international conciliation, peace societies

[13] On the Interparliamentary Union see Chr. Lange, *et al.*, *The Interparliamentary Union from 1889 to 1939* (Lausanne, 1939); Richard Eickhoff, "Die Interparlamentarische Union (1889–1914)," *Zeitschrift für Politik* VIII (1915), 452–93.

[14] Beatrix Kempf, *Bertha von Suttner: Das Lebensbild einer grossen Frau* (Vienna, 1964), pp. 29–30; cf. Bertha von Suttner, *Memoirs of Bertha von Suttner: The Records of an Eventful Life* (2 vols., Boston and London, 1910), I, 294–311; Bertha von Suttner, *Aus der Werkstatt des Pazifismus* (Leipzig and Vienna, 1912), pp. 7–14.

attempted to mobilize public opinion to the same end. In the 1890s existing peace societies expanded and new ones appeared, notably in Austria-Hungary and Germany. To add more international direction to their efforts both facets of the peace movement, the Universal Peace Congresses and the Interparliamentary Conferences, established permanent secretariats in Berne in 1892. Thereupon the International Peace Bureau and the Interparliamentary Bureau began to serve as general supervisory agencies for their respective groups, publishing journals, protocols, and statistics. The convocation of the two Hague conferences, in 1899 and 1907, worked to the further advantage of the peace movement; with diplomats now debating projects for a court of international arbitration, apparently in earnest, it became more difficult to dismiss the peace movement as a group of dreamers who were not to be taken seriously. Although the actual results of the Hague conferences were minimal, peace societies benefitted from the popular interest they created in arbitration.

By the first years of the twentieth century the peace movement had become a prominent feature in political affairs. Universal Peace Congresses and Interparliamentary Conferences were noteworthy events, and leaders of the movement, such as William Stead, Frédéric Passy, Henri La Fontaine, Albert Gobat, and Bertha von Suttner, commanded wide respect. In 1910 the peace movement acquired a benefactor, which enabled it to expand its operations further. Through its European bureau in Paris, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace sent annual subsidies to selected peace groups, journals, and the International Peace Bureau.

The peace movement remained a middle-class phenomenon that harbored a diversity of outlooks, although by the turn of the century the secular, humanitarian, and liberal doctrines of the continental societies had begun to predominate over the religious antiwar thinking of most of the Anglo-American groups. And, in an era enchanted with sci-

ence, this liberal opposition to war took on the accents of positivism: the development of a community of nations, linked by economic, cultural, and ultimately by political ties, was now characterized as the natural product of social evolution. Although there remained severe philosophical tensions, which surfaced whenever the problem of defensive war was raised, all elements in the peace movement continued to agree on the need for arbitration and, particularly with the acceleration of the arms race at the turn of the century, on the urgency of some kind of comprehensive arms agreement. Interparliamentary Conferences and Universal Peace Congresses were devoted to studying ways to implement these measures, as well as to discussion of more long-range projects, notably the creation of a world federation with its own judicial, executive, and legislative agencies.[15]

Pacifism and Internationalism

Throughout most of the nineteenth century people who joined peace societies and attended international peace congresses referred to themselves simply as "peace workers," "peace advocates," or, most commonly, "friends of peace." With the expansion of the peace movement in the 1890s dissatisfaction grew over these conventional labels, which, it seemed, did not adequately distinguish members of peace societies from others who held that war was objectionable but were unwilling to do anything about it. Labels like "friends of peace" had the added disadvantage of sounding a little silly and seemed inappropriate for a movement that aspired to bring about major international reforms. After considerable discussion among leading personalities in the movement, a Frenchman, Émile Arnaud, contrived the term "pacifism" to describe the doctrine and program of the

[15] For an analysis of the proposals studied by these congresses see Sandi E. Cooper, "Peace and Internationalism: European Ideological Movements behind the Two Hague Conferences (1889 to 1907)" (Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1967).

peace movement. As an ism, the word suggested a well-developed and coherent body of thought, and it could be integrated with relative uniformity into different languages. In 1901 this designation was officially adopted at the Tenth Universal Peace Congress in Glasgow, whereupon those active in the peace movement began to refer to themselves, and were referred to by others, as pacifists.[16]

Almost immediately problems arose over the scope and application of the word. Debates raged over whether to use the label to describe a statesman who was pursuing peaceful policies, or whether someone deserved the label if he only advocated voluntary but not obligatory arbitration, or if socialists, who called for arbitration but generally avoided the peace societies, should be regarded as pacifists.[17] These problems seemed academic in retrospect, however, once the peace movement split in 1914 between those who supported the war efforts of their respective countries and those, principally in England, who did not. After the war, amidst considerable recrimination within the movement, it became common to reserve the label pacifist for those who unconditionally opposed all forms of international violence. Those who proposed to eliminate war through arbitration and international organization, but who countenanced defensive warfare or the use of collective sanctions, became known as "internationalists," "world federalists," or even, more recently, as "pacificists."[18] Since Pro-

[16] BIP (VIIIA1), Richard Grelling to Élie Ducommun, Berlin, 11 May 1896; BIP (1H), Commission du Bureau, Séance, 18 May 1896; "Die Geschichte eines Wortes," FW, XII (1920), 60–61; HB (2), II, 317.

[17] NL Alfred Fried, United Nations Library, Geneva (cited hereafter as NL Fried), Fried to Nippold, Vienna, 22 December 1913; Fried, "Neo-Pazifisten," FW, V (1903), 89; "Ich bin kein Pazifist," FW, XIV (1912), 347–48; VF, XV (1914), 81.

[18] Norman Angell, "Pacifism," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, 1933), XI, 527. For the unfortunate term "pacificist" we are indebted to A. J. P. Taylor, *The Trouble Makers: Dissent over Foreign Policy, 1792–1939* (London, 1957), p. 51. He has the support of Fowler.

fessor Beales adopted this distinction in his pioneering study of the peace movement in 1931, historians too have tended to use the term pacifist in a restricted sense, to refer to someone who repudiates all forms of international violence.[19]

This distinction is important, and it reflects significant differences between varieties of opposition to war. But it is also troublesome, since it excludes from the category of pacifist the very people who invented the term as a self-designation. For this reason, and because I shall be centrally concerned with these same people, my conceptualization of the pacifist will be broad enough to comprehend both unconditional repudiation of violence and advocacy of international political organization. I shall define the pacifist simply as one who holds war to be wrong and has made a personal commitment to pursuing the kinds of activity he believes will lead to its systematic elimination from international affairs. Pacifism, then, is a doctrine or body of thought that postulates the reprehensibility of war and prescribes a course of action designed to make it impossible or unnecessary. The concept includes two elements, an assertion and a precept. By itself, asserting that war is bad is not enough to distinguish the pacifist from anyone who, like the apologist for the balance of power, prefers peace to war but accepts conflict as a normal feature of international relations. Pacifism holds not only that war is an evil, but that it is, to quote R. C. Stevenson, "an evil sufficiently serious under present conditions to warrant effort and a reasonable sacrifice of group interests to establish a stable international order."[20] It entails, that is, a relatively high degree of en-

[19] Beales, *History of Peace*, pp. 5–8, 332–34; cf. Mulford Q. Sibley, "Pacifism," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, 1968), XI, 353; Sibley, *The Political Theories of Modern Pacifism* (Philadelphia, 1944).

[20] R. C. Stevenson, "The Evolution of Pacifism," *International Journal of Ethics* XLIV (1934), 444. Max Scheler's definition of pacifism is basically the same: "not just the sentiment of peaceableness, love of peace, but rather the belief in . . . systematic methods of directing

gagement in activity that will presumably contribute to the definitive removal of violence from international relations.

This general definition comprehends a rich variety of assumptions, analyses of international conflict, and prescriptions for action, which pacifists have historically brought to bear in trying to do away with warfare. Their condemnation of war has derived from a wide range of considerations, including the incompatibility of war with the Christian ethic, the material waste it causes, or the outrage it does to humanitarian values. Pacifists have located the basic causes of war on different levels of analysis. Some have found them in human nature, others have put the blame on the social or political structure of states, still others have cited factors at the level of international relations.[21] Finally, depending upon their assumptions and analyses of the causes of war, pacifists have prescribed numerous different methods to deal with the problem. Some have called for nonresistance to all forms of violence, others have advocated the democratization of the world, still others international organization.

In an attempt to lend some coherence to this complexity, historians have undertaken to classify the varieties of pacifism, usually according to the methods by which pacifists propose to eliminate war or according to the considerations for which they condemn it.[22] Among the more common types cited are "religious pacifism," "humanitarian pacifism," "political pacifism," "economic pacifism," "revolutionary pacifism," and "juridical pacifism." There are two basic

---

wills, techniques, [or] arrangements, with which immediately to approach the problem of bringing about 'perpetual peace' in some way or the other." *Die Idee des Friedens und der Pazifismus* (Berlin, 1931), p. 11.

[21] On this "level of analysis" problem see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York, 1959).

[22] See Marcel Merle, ed., *Pacifisme et internationalisme XVIIe–XXe siècles* (Paris, 1966), esp. pp. 12–41; Scheler, *Die Idee des Friedens und der Pazifismus*, pp. 31–61; Renouvin and Duroselle, *Introduction*, pp. 214–24.

drawbacks to these systems of classification, apart from the fact that there are as many systems as there are systematizers. In the first place, by classifying varieties of pacifism according to methods advocated for securing peace, or according to considerations that lead to the condemnation of war, these systems focus upon a single component of pacifist thought, overlooking the integrated complex of assumptions, analyses, and prescriptions that composes each pacifist doctrine. Analysis of the entire complex reveals that many of the common distinctions are peripheral or, conversely, that some of these common categories obscure more basic distinctions. For example, the doctrines commonly called "economic pacifism" and "juridical pacifism" are basically alike, in that they locate the roots of war in the insufficient development of bonds among naturally peaceful nations; one doctrine merely emphasizes the need for economic ties while the other stresses legal ties, and in fact, each also endorses the work of the other. On the other hand, "religious pacifism," in the sense of opposition to war out of considerations of Christian morality, comprehends both constructive activism and withdrawal, two fundamentally dissimilar approaches to the problem of war.

The most serious drawback of these systems of classification is not that they present an incomplete intellectual picture of the varieties of pacifism; it is that they present only an intellectual picture. They neglect the sociological dimension of pacifism, the fact that every pacifist doctrine is rooted in a social and political context, which in turn vitally affects its character, development, and its relative success.

In an effort to isolate the central distinction among varieties of pacifism, a distinction based upon their socio-political context as well as their integrated intellectual content, I shall suggest two basic categories, for which I am indebted to Karl Mannheim for more than just the terminology.[23] Us-

[23] See Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York, 1936), esp. pp. 33–108.

ing the orientation of a pacifist doctrine toward politics and society as the basic criterion of differentiation, it is useful to distinguish between pacifism as utopia and pacifism as ideology. Utopian pacifism conceives of war as an inseparable aspect of a social and political order that is utterly corrupt and beyond rehabilitation. Ideological pacifism rejects war because of the threat it poses to a social and political order that is basically sound and praiseworthy. Differences in nuance and emphasis among varieties of pacifism are subordinate to this central distinction.

Basic to utopian pacifism is an analysis of war and violence that regards these as intrinsic features of a social and political order whose perversity is fundamental and incorrigible. Whether this perversity derives from human nature or the corruptive effects of political society, and whether it is conceived in religious or secular terms, it creates an absolute antagonism between the pacifist, struggling to maintain his own purity, and the society which he regards as the source of perdition. This antagonism in turn severely restricts the range of action available to the pacifist in coping with the problem of warfare. He may, on the one hand, withdraw from society in order to preserve his own virtue in uncorrupted and transcendent isolation, adopting a posture of nonresistance to those agencies of society that would have him commit acts of violence in their name. Since society does not, in the eyes of the pacifist, admit of reform, his only alternative to continued withdrawal is a revolutionary assault on society in order to reconstruct it on a totally new and virtuous foundation.[24]

Utopian pacifism has been a sectarian and chiliastic phenomenon.[25] It has typically appealed to lower-class or mar-

[24] On this pacifist tradition see especially the provocative essay by David A. Martin, *Pacifism: An Historical and Sociological Study* (New York, 1966).

[25] See Wilhelm Mühlmann, ed., *Chiliasmus und Nativismus: Studien zur Psychologie, Soziologie und historische Kasuistik der Umsturzbewegungen* (Berlin, 1961); Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millen-*

ginal sectors of society, whose disposition to repudiate the existing social and political order has been nurtured by their own minimal stake in it. Most prominent manifestations of utopian pacifism have been sectarian derivatives of early Christian pacifism; in the modern period, though, these have been largely supplanted by the secular religions, anarchism and revolutionary socialism.[26] All hold war to be an integral and necessary aspect of political society as they find it; the Christian pacifist regards war as a symptom of the corruption of temporal existence, the revolutionary socialist views it as a product of the ineluctable antagonisms in capitalism, and the anarchist sees it as the necessary result of the very fact of political society. All are profoundly disturbed by the phenomenon of warfare, and all assume a radically negative posture toward existing society, either by withdrawing from it and maintaining this isolation, or by undertaking an assault on it in order to establish a fundamentally new order devoid of factors that give rise to warfare.

Utopian pacifism seeks to solve the problem of war by transcending society or repudiating it. Ideological pacifism seeks to use factors immanent in society to do away with war. While utopian pacifism anticipates a radical personal or collective solution to the problem, ideological pacifism calls for moderate, constructive reform within the framework of political society. While one rejects existing society because of the violence it spawns, the other seeks to preserve society from the potentially destructive effects of that violence.

Ideological pacifism proceeds from a much more positive evaluation of political society than does utopian pacifism.

---

nium: Revolutionary Messianism in Medieval and Reformation Europe and Its Bearing on Modern Totalitarian Movements (New York, 1961).

[26] For a survey of these groups see Peter Brock, *Pacifism in Europe to 1914* (Princeton, 1972) and his earlier *Pacifism in the United States: From the Colonial Era to the First World War* (Princeton, 1968).

Ideological pacifism assumes that the features of society that give rise to warfare are, while admittedly significant, remediable. Ideological pacifism postulates the basic goodness and rationality of man and denies that political society is necessarily corrupt or corruptive. It assumes that men are by nature peace loving and that a society that conforms, as it should, to the needs and aspirations of men will likewise be peaceful. Accordingly, ideological pacifism holds peace to be the natural or normal condition in international relations; deviations from this norm it ascribes to popular ignorance and the conspiracies of a few selfish men. Imputing to states as well as to individuals the capacity for ethical behavior, ideological pacifism calls for the creation of conditions in which such behavior will be possible. Typically this entails the education and moral enlightenment of society and the establishment of agencies to facilitate the peaceful settlement of international misunderstandings.

The increasing secularization of European politics made ideological pacifism the dominant variety in Europe after the sixteenth century. Ideological pacifism informed the peace projects of Sully, Crucé, St. Pierre, Kant, and others in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it assumed the character of a middle class reform movement and constituted an important facet of the major bourgeois ideologies of the era. Liberalism and, in its classical formulations, nationalism both assumed that the infusion of society with their principles would bring the lasting reign of international peace.

It should be noted that neither utopian nor ideological pacifism entirely excludes the instrumental use of violence. Ideological pacifism contemplates both wars of national defense and the use of collective sanctions by international agencies. Utopian pacifism fluctuates between extreme passivity and extreme, often violent activism. Beyond this similarity, the two pacifist traditions are fundamentally divergent sociologically and philosophically, although, as the combination of nonresistance and reform-oriented activism

in Quakerism demonstrates, it is possible to bring the two traditions into a fairly stable synthesis. In addition, groups can undergo a transition from one to the other, a process that reflects either the growing integration of a group into the dominant social order or, conversely, its growing estrangement from that order. Such a transition was one of the issues in the revisionist controversy within the Second International.

Unless I specify otherwise, I shall henceforth use the terms "pacifism" and "pacifist" in the sense of the ideological tradition, for the program of the organized peace movement at the end of the nineteenth century was clearly informed by ideological pacifism. The people who gathered at peace congresses believed it was possible to exploit the forces at work in society to create international institutions to guarantee the peace. Moreover, they were confident that this could be done without fundamentally altering the existing social order; indeed, much of their aversion to war derived from their fear of what a general war might do to the fabric of European society.

These pacifists called specifically for the settlement of international disputes through legal channels, through arbitration. In itself deceptively simple, this demand rested upon a number of crucial assumptions about the nature of international relations. Most obviously, the call for arbitration presupposed the feasibility of regulating international affairs by law. This in turn presupposed the existence *in potentia* of a body of law, international in scope, analagous to public law in the domestic realm. But the assertion that such a body of law existed, needing only to be articulated for arbitral application, rested upon another assumption: that there existed a source for this law.

Political theorists today are generally agreed that there are two prerequisites for the successful functioning of a political system in which behavior is regulated by law. The more basic is the existence of a community of interest or purpose among the constituents of the system—"an uncon-

ditional consensus on cooperation, a belief in a common good (however vague) and in the precedence of this common good over particular interests."[27] The second prerequisite, an institutionalized source of power and law, then represents the formal expression and focus of this community. From the perspective of the mid-twentieth century it seems clear that the absence of both these prerequisites has prevented the emergence of a binding system of legal relationships among the nations of the world and that, barring imposition of an institutionalized source of law through conquest, the emergence of an effective international political system must await the development of a genuine sense of international community. To quote the words of Hans Morgenthau, "a world community must antedate a world state."[28]

Pacifists at the turn of the century were gifted—or plagued—by no such insight. They believed in an international community and predicted that out of it would emerge the institutions necessary for legal settlement of all international disputes. This international community, which was the central postulate of late nineteenth century pacifism, had two dimensions, one ethical, the other material. By virtue of their views on the nature of man, pacifists assumed the existence of an ethical and rational community among all men, a union in which all men partake because of their very humanity and their innate disposition to rational and ethical conduct.[29] By itself, however, belief in an ethical community only supported the assertion that war should be eliminated; it could not justify the expectation that the elimination of war was imminent or even possible. Yet nine-

[27] Stanley Hoffmann, "International Systems and International Law," *The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics* (New York, 1965), p. 89.

[28] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (4th ed., New York, 1967), pp. 499–500.

[29] See Walter Schiffer, *The Legal Community of Mankind: A Critical Analysis of the Modern Concept of World Organization* (New York, 1954), esp. pp. 142–54.

teenth century pacifism was confident that the problem of warfare could be resolved. This optimism derived from the belief that the international community was acquiring a material infrastructure; in the ongoing social and economic internationalization of European life pacifists perceived a process that would link men in a community of interests, as well as one of ethical disposition, and would make the elimination of warfare a question of economic utility, as well as one of moral precept. In one sense, then, the community the pacifists envisaged transcended politics; in it men were bound together by ethical and material ties irrespective of the political units into which they were organized. Yet in another sense the international community was profoundly political, since both its ethical and material dimensions implied norms or patterns of behavior binding upon the state as well as the individual. Specifically, pacifists believed that these norms prescribed harmony, cooperation, and peaceful competition and interchange for mutual benefit among the constituent political groups in the international community; conversely, they proscribed national prejudice, hostility, and violent conflict.

The pacifists' goal was to infuse politics with the spirit and ethics of international community—to elevate international politics into a realm governed by law and morality. To make this possible they called for the political institutionalization of the international community, a process that would entail both the translation of the community's ethical norms into a code of international justice and the establishment of an arbitral agency to adjudicate international disputes on the basis of this code.

Pacifists at the end of the nineteenth century were a fractious group of people. They disagreed with one another, for example, about whether to emphasize the ethical or material aspects of international community. They argued over the composition and prerogatives of the arbitral agency they hoped to create. And they were at odds over whether, in an era in which politics would be governed by ethics, an

executive agency would be necessary to enforce arbitral decisions.[30] Yet however great their differences, pacifists were at one in their belief in international community. Whether this belief derived from an *a priori* assumption of an ethical community of man, or from confidence in the progressive development of a community of material interests, or from both, pacifists urged the promotion and elaboration of this community and its translation into politics.

Emphasizing the centrality of international community in pacifist ideology raises another problem of definition, for it suggests that equating this variety of pacifism with "internationalism," as some authors have done, is justified. However, I prefer to view internationalism, as a credo, more broadly than pacifism and to define it as an attitude or doctrine that affirms the systematic growth of international ties. It includes revolutionary doctrines such as Marxism, in which internationalization is the prelude to fundamental social change, as well as liberal credos, like ideological pacifism, in which the development of international ties is interpreted as a healthy feature of the existing social order. Internationalism is as multifaceted as the internationalization process itself; it comprehends doctrines that call for no more than reduction of tariffs, as well as those that promote the extension of international law.

The ideological pacifism of the late nineteenth century might thus be called an extreme political variety of liberal (as opposed to revolutionary) internationalism.[31] Pacifism and internationalism are generically similar concepts, which lie, so to speak, on different concentric levels of generality, separated by an intermediate concept, which can be labeled liberal political internationalism (figure 1).

All three connote a positive orientation toward international interchange and cooperation. Internationalism is the

[30] On these disagreements see Cooper, "Peace and Internationalism."

[31] See Max Huber, *Die soziologischen Grundlagen des Völkerrechts* (Berlin, 1928), pp. 3, 85; Sandi E. Cooper, "Liberal Internationalists before World War I," *Peace and Change* 1 (1973), 11–19.



PACIFISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

FIGURE 1

most general concept and refers to the growth of international ties of all kinds. Liberal political internationalism is a doctrine or orientation that affirms that the growth of such ties will or ought to have political repercussions in the extension of international law and regular recourse to arbitration; however, it does not necessarily specify how far these developments should lead, though it expects international conciliation to result. Ideological pacifism, then, is an extended form of liberal political internationalism, a doctrine which, while it does not reject the nation-state as a political unit, calls for the subordination of the nation to the international community and the comprehensive legal regulation of international relations.

These conceptual distinctions might well appear to be arbitrary, overelaborate, or even pedantic. In fact they reflect the complexity of the doctrines and organizations spawned by internationalization at the end of the nineteenth century. They are also necessary for an understanding of the character of the peace movement.

The Peace Movement and Political Culture

I have used the term "peace movement" to refer collectively to peace societies that were established in Europe and America during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For most of this period this is a reasonably accurate

designation, but the problem of delimiting the peace movement after 1889 becomes more complicated. During this late period peace societies began to find allies in two different kinds of internationalist organizations. The first were those which, like societies to promote an international language or certain feminist groups, were not peace societies in the first instance, though their programs included working for arbitration and world peace. The second kind of allied organization included those like the American Association for International Conciliation or the Interparliamentary Union, which were founded to promote arbitration and international conciliation, but did so with more restraint and caution than the peace societies and, for this reason and in order not to compromise their respectability, generally disdained the term pacifist.

Contemporary descriptions of the peace movement frequently included all these groups. Moreover, although pacifists and peace societies were the most conspicuous proponents of peace and arbitration, some of the most effective work was undertaken by persons and organizations that refused to call themselves pacifist. For purposes of analytical clarity, and in order to remain as consistent as possible with contemporary descriptions, I shall define the peace movement by correlating it not with pacifism, but rather with the more general concept of liberal political internationalism. The peace movement, then, was the aggregate of all organizations and individuals that sought to promote the growth of international law and the practice of international arbitration.

The correlation with liberal political internationalism also helps clarify the relationship between the peace movement and two other kinds of organizations whose programs resembled that of the peace societies in some respects. The first included a number of friendship societies that were founded around the turn of the century in order to improve relations between two or more countries; in some instances, however, they did so for dubious reasons that had little to

do with world peace. Unless these organizations were internationalist, in the sense of favoring general international conciliation, I shall not include them in my definition of the peace movement. I shall also in general exclude the socialist movement from my definition of the peace movement, in keeping with the views of most socialists themselves. As a pacifist credo, orthodox Marxism was more in the utopian than the liberal, ideological tradition, and discussion of the problem of war and its elimination was conducted in quite different categories at socialist meetings than at peace congresses. As long as they held that the only effective way to prevent war was to overthrow capitalism, socialists remained suspicious of efforts to promote international arbitration and were deaf to pleas for their cooperation from bourgeois peace organizations.

The peace movement, as it was generally known at the turn of the century, and as I shall define it, was thus a bourgeois phenomenon which typically comprehended, in each country in which it operated, a number of elements. The most dedicated, visible, and articulate sector comprised the pacifists in the peace societies. Less outspoken, but often more influential, were the politicians and notables gathered in more prestigious organizations, such as the Interparliamentary Union, which usually maintained some distance from the peace societies. Finally, the peace movement included assorted reform organizations, many of which were led by pacifists or had international ties themselves, and which promoted arbitration as an aspect of the causes they championed.

With the exception of several groups that attempted to work directly through parliamentary channels, all sectors of the peace movement conceived of their mission in terms of the enlightenment and education of society. They did this because they believed that the most effective, as well as the most accessible means to influence political decisions was to work through public opinion. They reasoned that the mobilization of popular support for arbitration would com-

pel politicians and statesmen to negotiate international agreements setting up the institutions necessary for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

Mobilizing popular support for international arbitration seemed to the pacifists to be a multifaceted, though eminently feasible undertaking; it would entail convincing public opinion of the reality of a harmonious international community whose precepts ruled out resort to war. Pacifists proposed to do this through a concerted campaign designed to awaken the ethical sense of community that resided in all men, to educate the public about the internationalization process and its implications, and to acquaint people in different countries with one another. In addition, pacifists set out to eradicate all popular attitudes incompatible with the norms of international community, such as exclusive nationalism, hostility, and the willingness to accept war as a legitimate feature of international affairs.

The pacifists were students of the processes by which public opinion was created and influenced. They concluded early that some sectors of society were, by virtue of their prestige, visibility, or power, particularly important in shaping the attitudes of the masses about international relations. As early as 1850, when an international congress met in Frankfurt, one delegate called upon peace societies to "work for the eradication of popular hate and the political and commercial prejudices that have so often led to the most lamentable wars." The channels he identified for this work included "careful education of youth . . . instruction from the pulpit and the speakers platform, [and] . . . the public press."[32] As the peace movement underwent its major expansion at the end of the century, in an era marked by the growing intrusion of the masses into European politics, Universal Peace Congresses devoted numerous sessions to studying how best to mobilize this new political force. As principal targets for their agitation and propaganda, pacifists isolated schools, youth groups, the press, political par-

[32] Quoted in HB (2), II, 68–69.

ties, religious associations, and labor organizations.[33] They calculated that if they succeeded in convincing these articulate sectors of society that the international community was a reality, the masses would soon accept its validity.

The study of the formation of political attitudes has progressed a long way since the peace movement attempted to win popular support for arbitration; concepts developed by sociologists and political scientists have made possible a much better understanding of this complex process. These concepts can in turn be employed in an historical analysis of the peace movement's activities. For seen in this analytical perspective, the peace movement's campaign to educate public opinion represented an attempt to refashion political culture.

Political culture, as defined by the two foremost students of the concept, is "the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members" of a political system.[34] The key words in this definition are "orientation" and "political objects." "Orientation" connotes the knowledge, concepts, beliefs, feelings, and judgments which make up the political outlook of every member of a political system. Orientations suggest "deeply-rooted patterns of thought" rather than the more ephemeral attitudes implied by the word "opinion."[35] Orientations may be rationally or irrationally based; they involve cognitive perceptions, emotions, and evaluations. The "political objects" to

[33] *Proceedings of the Universal Peace Congress . . . London, 14–19 July, 1890* (London, 1890), pp. 82, 85, 98; *Troisième Congrès international de la paix, Rome, Novembre 1891* (Rome, 1892), p. 39; *Bulletin officiel du IVme Congrès universel de la paix tenu à Berne du 22 au 27 août 1892* (Berne, 1892), pp. 141–67.

[34] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Boston and Toronto, 1965), pp. 12–14; cf. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics* XVIII (1956), 391–409.

[35] Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton, 1965), p. 514.

which these orientations refer include the political system itself and all its component parts: attitudes about the legitimacy of the system as a whole, about the role of the individual within it, about the purposes or function of government, and about specific policies and political figures.

The existence of a political culture or, in the case of developing nations, the desire to create a new one raises the question of how political orientations are formed. The answer given by theorists of political culture is that these are learned, through the process known in modern parlance as political socialization.[36] Political socialization refers chiefly to the transmission of orientations from one generation to the next, both through direct teaching of political attitudes (political or civic education) and by more subtle and indirect means, such as exposure to authority patterns in the family. As such, the process is principally concerned with the learning of political concepts by young people; the most important institutions of political socialization are, accordingly, the family, peer groups, and schools. In a stable and established political culture, the process tends to have a conservative bias, perpetuating dominant orientations by passing them on to each succeeding generation of citizens.

However, in circumstances of rapid political change, and when this change involves the transformation of a political culture, socialization becomes an integral part of the process of political mobilization into new orientations and goals.[37] The process of creating political orientations is now generated more directly by conscious political decision, and it takes place on many different levels, actively affecting adults as well as children. A wide range of institutions, of

[36] Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston and Toronto, 1966), pp. 64–65; Herbert Hyman, *Political Socialization: A Study in the Psychology of Human Behavior* (New York, 1959); Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, *Political Socialization: An Analytic Study* (Boston, 1969); Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*, pp. 269–74.

[37] See J. P. Nettl, *Political Mobilization: A Sociological Analysis of Methods and Concepts* (New York, 1967).

secondary socializing importance in a stable culture, are recruited into the mobilizing process in order to resocialize citizens into new patterns of orientation.[38] Variously called "formative institutions," "communications channels," or "institutions for countersocialization," these agencies, whose importance stems from their power, visibility, and accessibility to political control, typically include the military, schools and universities, newspapers, political parties or movements, and religious organizations.[39]

I wish to emphasize two points in drawing the connection between the work of the peace movement and the processes that relate to the formation of political culture. The first has to do with international relations as "political object." Although the literature on political culture has not emphasized this aspect of the subject, orientations about the way political systems interact with one another are among the most important an individual acquires during socialization, and they directly color his attitudes toward his own political system. Prevailing attitudes about a system's legitimacy and identity, the proper role of authority and government, and the validity of specific policies reflect orientations about the world at large: ideas about the role of the country in the world, perceptions of foreign countries, and views about the nature of the international system itself—whether conflict or harmony is the norm and whether the outside world is hostile or benign.[40]

[38] Robert LeVine, "Political Socialization and Culture Change," in Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (New York, 1963), p. 301; cf. James S. Coleman, "Introduction: Education and Political Development," in James S. Coleman, ed., *Education and Political Development* (Princeton, 1965), pp. 3, 13.

[39] See Richard R. Fagen, *Politics and Communication* (Boston, 1966), p. 37; Sidney Verba, "Germany: The Remaking of Political Culture," in Pye and Verba, *Political Culture and Political Development*, p. 136.

[40] Lucian Pye, "Identity and the Political Culture," in Leonard Binder, *et al.*, *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Prince-

The second point I wish to emphasize concerns the peace movement's understanding of the concept of public opinion. Although pacifists did—increasingly after the turn of the century—attempt to influence popular beliefs about specific policies, issues, and disputes, they thought of public opinion in a more general sense, akin to what Leonard Doob has called "enduring public opinion."[41] To pacifists public opinion connoted basic views about the whole complex of international politics; it referred, in fact, to those orientations toward international affairs which are inculcated during socialization and constitute a fundamental part of any political culture. "Winning over public opinion" thus meant entering directly into the socialization process in order to promote popular attitudes and beliefs conducive to peace and arbitration. It meant creating positive orientations toward an international community and the corollary propositions that peace and cooperation were the normal conditions in international relations and that conflict was pathological, unethical, and detrimental to the interests of all. The pacifists' goal was tantamount to modifying national political cultures everywhere in order to create the cultural foundations of an international political system. This entailed promoting orientations within existing national cultures which were compatible with the concept of international community, and extirpating those which were not.

The peace movement was a paradoxical political phenomenon, difficult to categorize because the implications of its program were both revolutionary and basically conservative. The changes pacifists proposed would have revolutionized the system of international politics, substituting

---

ton, 1971), p. 102; Robert A. LeVine, "Socialization, Social Structure, and Intersocietal Images," in Herbert C. Kelman, ed., *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis* (New York, 1965), p. 47; cf. William Buchanan and Hadley Cantril, *How Nations See Each Other: A Study in Public Opinion* (Urbana, 1953), esp. pp. 60–67.

[41] Leonard W. Doob, *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (2d ed., Hamden, Conn., 1966), pp. 50, 54.

law for power as the regulatory principle of international political behavior. Yet pacifists insisted that these changes would not threaten the social or political foundations of existing nation states, whose validity all pacifists recognized; such changes would merely alter the mode in which these individual political systems interacted. Indeed, pacifists everywhere regarded themselves as patriots and believed that the implementation of their international reforms would make the social and political order in existing nation-states more secure. They thus tended to compartmentalize the international and national systems of politics, arguing that far-reaching changes in the one would require no substantial changes in the other. Without commenting at this point on the validity of this expectation, I would emphasize the social conservatism of the international peace movement, and the fact that pacifists affirmed the legitimacy of their respective national political systems, by eschewing the label "social movement" to refer to them.[42] As this term is generally used by sociologists, it refers to a movement that "aims at fundamental and comprehensive alterations in the total social order."[43] It would thus be a more accurate description of a movement inspired by utopian pacifism. For the late nineteenth century peace movement, however, a more suitable designation would be a "movement with limited goals," to use Rudolf Heberle's term, or a "norm-oriented"—as opposed to a "value-oriented"—movement, to use Neil Smelser's.[44]

One of the great advantages of using concepts drawn from political sociology to analyze the history of the peace movement is that it immediately throws into perspective the staggering dimensions of what the pacifists were trying to

[42] See Dorothee Stiewe, "Die bürgerliche deutsche Friedensbewegung als soziale Bewegung bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges" (Inaugural dissertation, Freiburg, 1972).

[43] Rudolf Heberle, *Hauptprobleme der politischen Soziologie* (Stuttgart, 1967), pp. 9–15.

[44] *Ibid.*; Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York, 1963), esp. pp. 270–312.

do. Studies of nation-building have documented the tenacity with which traditional cultural patterns have withstood the attempt to impose orientations and values of a new political culture, even when this attempt involves a systematic assault on the social foundations of that cultural tradition and is supported by all the political, economic, and military resources at the regime's disposal. These lessons certainly apply to orientations about international relations. As one study has concluded, "When one considers the variety of sources of resistance . . . deriving both from group norms and from personality motives—one is left with a rather bleak picture."[45] This is particularly true when one considers that the peace movement had only very limited political resources with which to work and that it had to contend with established systems of socialization which in every country counteracted its efforts to some extent. Indeed, even if one is able to suspend an acute sense of skepticism about the pacifists' view of international politics, the enormous incongruity between their aspirations and the resources they commanded casts an air of unreality about their whole campaign.

This air of unreality makes it difficult to treat the history of the peace movement without abandoning one's sense of political proportion. It also raises the question of whether the history of this movement, whose goals seemed nearly as extravagant then as they do now, is worth recounting at all. The answer is that the history of the peace movement can be justified on a number of compelling grounds. Like other movements that never witnessed the complete realization of their goals (and most never do), the peace movement left a mark in the form of some notable partial successes. The Hague tribunal, the League of Nations, and ultimately the United Nations can be traced back to the inspiration and persistent agitation of this movement. Moreover, the

[45] Irving L. Janis and M. Brewster Smith, "Effects of Education and Persuasion on National and International Images," in Kelman, *International Behavior*, p. 211.

pacifists did succeed in making some minor inroads into systems of political socialization in countries where they operated, and it is important to note the extent of both their success and failure.

Finally, and for this study most importantly, the history of the peace movement has heuristic value for the historical study of political culture. Pacifists in every country attempted to refashion indigenous political cultures by working through agencies of socialization to inculcate the view that the nations of the world formed a harmonious community. Their success in this campaign varied significantly from country to country. This variation reflected in the final analysis significant differences in the national political cultures the peace movement encountered—the fact that prevailing orientations toward international relations were more congenial in some countries than in others to the concept of international community and its implications. And even where the movement experienced almost no success, the history of its campaign provides a revealing glimpse into the processes by which orientations toward international relations were created and fostered in Europe before the First World War.

All this suggests the need for systematic comparative analysis of the peace movement in different countries on the eve of the war. As my own contribution to such a project, I have undertaken to study the history of the peace movement in imperial Germany and have added only enough of a comparative dimension to indicate roughly how the German example differed from others. I have three principal objectives in this study. The first is to survey the organizations and ideologies of the peace movement in Germany. The second is to describe the activities of the German peace movement, treating them as a more or less systematic attempt to modify an important facet of German political culture. Finally, I propose to analyze the significance of the peace movement's experience in imperial Germany, first by comparing it briefly with the experience of the peace move-