

JOHN BRESNAN

Crisis in the Philippines

*The Marcos Era and Beyond. Preface by
David D. Newsom*



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CRISIS IN
THE PHILIPPINES
The Marcos Era
and Beyond

EDITED BY

JOHN BRESNAN

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FOREWORD

DAVID D. NEWSOM

This volume by the Asia Society takes a close look at the Philippines today through both Philippine and American eyes. It explores the status and the importance of the relationship between these two nations, and in the process, examines the disturbing political and economic issues confronting the Philippines and its friends. The essays of this volume were written in large part before the dramatic events in the Philippines of February 1986. It is the more remarkable that they presaged so accurately the circumstances that precipitated those events, and required so little change in the light of them.

The signs of impending trouble were apparent even at the time of my own short term as ambassador in Manila, from November 1977 to April 1978. I went with a mixture of emotions and impressions. Coming from another post in Asia, as I did, an American diplomat is already impressed with the talent, the dynamism, and the identity with the United States of the many Filipinos living in other parts of that continent. They are managers, technicians, musicians, teachers—each one testifying to a special national heritage and to the advantages of one of the more advanced educational systems in Asia.

To an American who has spent many years in the former colonies of other powers, it is a rare experience to sense in the Philippines the same complex of post-colonial feelings that one has observed elsewhere—except that this time it is your country that has been the colonist. It is the diplomat of the United States who must deal with the pressure for immigration, the residual problems of veterans, pensions, and family reunification, the inevitable question of the nationalization of property, and the more basic challenge of maintaining a fruitful relationship.

No U.S. diplomat who has served in a country bordering on the Indian Ocean or who has faced the problems of global

strategy and fleet deployments can come to Manila without a consciousness of the worldwide significance for the United States of the bases in the Philippines and, in particular, Subic Bay.

But I came to the Philippines with two other sets of experiences.

An uncle of mine, John W. Dunlop, had gone to Cebu as a missionary in 1919. With a fondness for the people and the hills of Cebu that he never lost, he retired to the Philippines and died there in 1977. I had the opportunity to visit with him from my post in Jakarta shortly before he died. We visited farmers he had helped in the interior of Cebu. We visited his parishioners in the city, the poor and the lower middle-class. When I subsequently was appointed to Manila and lived in the ostentatious surroundings of Forbes Park, I could never forget that other Philippines that I had seen in the barrios and farms of Cebu. I could never quit myself of the feeling that the gap was too great—dangerously great—between those people in Cebu and those isolated wealthy who lived in a different world in Manila.

Five times in my foreign service career, I had responsibilities relating to countries where violent revolutions occurred, revolutions detrimental to the interests of the United States: in Iraq, Libya, Ethiopia, Iran, and Nicaragua. In each case, in varying degrees, the elements were present that I detected upon coming to the Philippines in 1977: the gap between the poor and the rich, the corruption in high places, the ruler protecting his family and friends and unwilling to face the realities of an ultimate transition of authority to someone else. In each case, the United States had been unable to influence events or protect its interests.

Fortunately for us, the situation turned out differently in the Philippines. The strength and courage of the Filipino people, their faith in democracy, and the vital roles of the middle class and the Church turned the tide against Marcos and his rule. The United States, even though there were moments of uncertain signals, was seen to be on the right side.

It is to be hoped that there was another result from these

events: that the people of the United States have seen the relationship with the Philippines in broader terms than before.

Until now, the importance of the Philippines to the United States has been seen almost totally in terms of the continued use of the two bases at Clark Field and Subic Bay. Debates in Washington on how to deal with the Philippines in both the executive and legislative branches have tended to revolve around this issue.

Filipinos have both resented and regretted this. They have seen other advantages to the United States in the relationship. They have believed that the United States should be proud of much that it did in the development of the Philippines and of the Filipino people. They have looked for a greater recognition of the sacrifices of the Filipinos in the common cause with Americans during World War II. In no other Asian country has there been such a deep feeling of friendship toward the United States, solidified by the countless family ties with relatives in America; not too many years ago, six million Filipinos signed a petition for statehood within the United States. Instead of a recognition of these ties, the Filipinos have seen what they regard as a neglect of the basic needs of the island republic and a concentration solely on the issue of the bases.

Undoubtedly, the Filipinos now hope that the reports of their country and its people on television, the extensive visits by prominent Americans, and the identity with the success of Mrs. Aquino will lead the people of the United States and the U.S. government to a deeper appreciation of the full measure of this relationship.

The political changes in the Philippines have not resolved its deep problems, many of which are discussed in this volume. One hopes that they have given the people and the government opportunities to deal with the problems, free of the burdens of a corrupt and authoritarian regime. The Filipinos will hope that the United States will continue to be interested and involved.

With their national pride and sensitivity over sovereignty, the Filipinos wish the Americans to be interested and concerned in their affairs, but not to interfere. The distinction, never very clear, is spelled out only in reaction to individual

acts of the United States or, occasionally, in opportunistic political rhetoric. Much of that will, in the years immediately to come, revolve around the issue of the bases.

In 1991, the agreement between the United States and the Philippines over the use of the two major bases will expire. There are those who, ignoring the realities of Philippine politics and trends, insist that the Filipinos will always want the bases because of their security implications and economic benefits. Others feel this is a dangerous assumption and that a prudent view of both U.S. interests and the possible future course of events in the Philippines should lead us to examine alternative arrangements. President Aquino has insisted that the issue be left open until 1991.

Our long-term relationship with the Philippines will depend on how we deal not only with the bases issue but with the other problems facing the islands. The concern over how much the United States is interested in Philippine affairs may, in the longer term, be a passing issue. A new generation growing in the islands, where 50 percent of the population is under twenty, may be less interested in the historic American tie. These years ahead will be times of difficult choices for both Filipinos and Americans. Those who have tasted, even briefly, the uniqueness of this relationship hope for wisdom and the maintenance of mutual respect and interests on both sides. The foundation of such a relationship is a knowledge of the issues. We hope this book will help to contribute some of that knowledge.

PREFACE

JOHN BRESNAN

At nine o'clock in the evening of February 27, 1986, Ferdinand Marcos fled the presidential palace of Malacañang in Manila, crossed the Pasig River at its rear, and from the opposite shore took a United States air force helicopter to Clark Field. His long domination of his nation was over. Corazon Aquino, the widow of his assassinated rival, Benigno Aquino, acceded to power as the new president of the Philippines.

This book describes the rise and fall of Ferdinand Marcos. It assesses the impact of his regime on the political, economic, and social life of the Philippine people. And it considers the implications of this experience for the United States. The book does so in the light of history and from the perspectives of ten Philippine and American scholars.

The book had its origin in the assassination of Benigno Aquino on August 21, 1983. The event triggered an immediate reaction of shock and dismay, not only in the Philippines, but also in the United States. In Manila, millions watched his funeral cortege pass, and the central bank reported massive capital flight from the country. In Washington, the House of Representatives passed a resolution by a vote of 413 to 3, deploring the killing, calling for "a thorough, independent, and impartial" investigation, and giving its support to "genuine, free and fair" elections in the Philippines. It was evident that the Philippines and Philippine-American relations had entered a period of trial and testing.

The officers of The Asia Society invited me in the fall of 1983 to advise them as to how the Society should respond to these developments. The Society is a private, nonprofit, nonpartisan educational institution that has its principal offices in New York. For more than a quarter century the Society had acted to increase American understanding of Asia through programs of education focused on Asian history, culture, and art. The So-

ciety was in 1983 beginning to give equal attention to the political and economic life of contemporary Asia and to issues in the current relations of Asian countries with the United States. But it was not immediately clear what the Society could usefully do in the widening Philippine crisis.

The Society made it possible for me to consult widely in the Philippines and in the United States. I heard a good deal of opinion in both countries that a serious problem existed in the level of American knowledge and understanding of the Philippines. The situation was in some respects predictable: the United States tended to have a considerable impact on the Philippines, much of it unintended, while the Philippines had great difficulty even gaining American attention. But this could be said of many countries. The Philippines, I was told by many I consulted, was different in two respects.

First, the impact of the United States on the Philippines has been unlike that on any other. It has been much greater than the impact of the United States on Mexico, for example, where the United States has been much more proximate but where it has never been a colonial power. The impact of the United States on the Philippines has been truly enormous, extending not only to political and economic values and institutions, but also to language, literature, the graphic and performing arts, even religion. There has thus been a tendency for Americans to see Filipinos as being rather like themselves, and to fail to appreciate the great differences that continue to exist within the familiar outer forms of Filipino life.

Second, the number of Americans who have a continuing interest in and familiarity with the Philippines is very small. Except for a few scholars, government officials, bankers, and investors, Americans did not follow the affairs of the Philippines at all closely until the dramatic events of February 1986. The community of Filipino-Americans, although growing rapidly, was still too new to be a significant factor in American opinion. There is thus nothing like the wider constituency of interested and informed citizens who thicken the American relationship with some other societies and who provide a balance to the rise and fall of official relations.

In these circumstances, The Asia Society was urged to try to do two things: to broaden the unofficial community of Americans with an interest in the Philippines, and to help those who did know the country well to communicate their views to a wider American public.

The Society accepted this advice. Under its auspices, a group of ten leading Americans from a variety of walks of life visited the Philippines in January 1986; their findings have since been published by the Society under the title *The Philippines: Facing the Future*. A similar group of Filipinos was scheduled to visit the United States in June 1986.

To serve the wider public, the Society commissioned me to plan and edit for publication a book on the crisis precipitated by the Aquino death and its aftermath. It was agreed that the book should be relevant to the issues of the moment, and several chapters have been revised just prior to publication in order to take into account the further crisis occasioned by the fraudulent election of February 7, 1986, and the swift fall of Mr. Marcos thereafter. But it also was agreed that the opportunity should be taken to explore, for the benefit of readers coming new to a book about the Philippines, the deeper origins of these crises in the social, economic, and political history of the country.

Beyond that, the Society left me free to proceed. In an early communication to prospective contributors to the book, I explained that it was my aim to produce a book for the serious general reader, someone who had an interest in foreign affairs, but who probably had no special knowledge of the Philippines. I also outlined the scope of each chapter. Subsequently, with the help of outside readers, I also exercised a fairly strong hand in the revision of some, though not all, of the chapters. Any shortcomings with respect to the scope, balance, and coherence of the book are therefore fairly laid at my feet, as are any failings in regard to the text's accessibility to the general reader.

The book is, however, chiefly what the chapter writers have made it. All are established authorities on the subjects about which they write; the reader is invited to consult the section

“About the Authors” in the rear of the book for further information about them. Because of the emotionally charged nature of some of the subject matter, the chapter writers also were selected with an eye to their ability to maintain some emotional distance between themselves and their subject.

The Asia Society is grateful to a number of individuals and foundations whose support for the Philippines project made this book possible. Mr. David Rockefeller and Mr. and Mrs. George O'Neill provided generous and timely support that enabled the Society to undertake the project. Grants from the Ford, Henry Luce, Andrew W. Mellon, and Rockefeller foundations and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund have supported the development of the Society's contemporary affairs programs, including the Philippines project. The Society is grateful for their early and continuing support.

The editor of such a book as this has many people to thank. The contributors have been generous and patient in meeting the demands we have placed upon them. My colleagues on the staff of The Asia Society, including Robert Oxnam, David Timberman, Emily Collins, and particularly Marshall Bouton, Eileen D. Chang, and Sara Robertson, were unfailing in their assistance and support during the two years in which the book has been in preparation. James W. Morley and my other colleagues in the East Asian Institute of Columbia University have been especially generous and supportive in making my time free over the same period. Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Barbara, and my son, Mark, for the personal sacrifices they have made in order to make work on the book possible.

March 1986

Crisis in the Philippines



The Philippines

CHAPTER I

PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN
TENSIONS IN HISTORY

THEODORE FRIEND

For many Filipinos the United States continues to have almost magical power as benefactor and exploiter. In popular mentality many Filipinos ascribe to America a nearly limitless capacity to *shape and resolve, for good or for evil, Philippine destiny*.

In fact, the United States that once enjoyed nearly half the world's gross national product now accounts for about one-fifth. And whereas a series of victories in wars, 1846 to 1945, tempted Americans to think of themselves as invincible, Vietnam changed that. We have learned caution about the tactical applicability of power in distant situations. The rise of the Soviet Union to strategic parity in military power has intensified this new realism.

Although the United States is a presumably chastened and ordinarily cautious world power, with limits to its capabilities and intentions regarding the Philippines, Filipinos correctly note that massive differences in scale have indeed determined much of the history between the two nations. But America's raw military and economic power are not sufficient to explain the fond dependence and acute resentment that mark the Philippine side of the relationship. These conflicted feelings derive from the cumulative impact of American social models, cultural standards, and political perspectives, all of which are remarkably deep—and extraordinary for being largely unconscious and unintended by policy.

When other Southeast Asians look at the Philippines, they tend to feel that their own historical permeability to colonial influence was much less; and that they operate now out of

stronger traditions and more genuine autonomy than the Philippines. That may be objectively true. Close inspection of the Philippine-American relationship, however, will not make objectivity easy for the key parties involved. Filipinos have tended to mirror American styles even while resisting American presences. And Americans have tended to look at the Philippines through a one-way glass so darkened with their own preoccupations that they can hardly see through it.

Conquest and Response

The United States did not plan the conquest of the Philippines. Neither did it sidestep the opportunity. In the century after the Northwest Ordinance, the young republic had raced across the continent, absorbing sparsely settled land into its constitutional framework as states. Still filling its land with diverse peoples, mainly European, America began to realize its capacity to express itself as an extra-continental power. Like other nation-states, it found an occasion where will joined capacity.

The last outposts of the Spanish empire, Cuba and the Philippines, had erupted in simultaneous turmoil in 1896-1898. Each threw its own revolutionary dynamic against the arthritic rule of Spain. The events that drew the United States into Cuba—most notably the destruction of the battleship *Maine*—drew it also into the Philippines. Why the far Pacific in addition to the near Caribbean? Chance favors the prepared mind. One of the best prepared, Theodore Roosevelt, saw the opportunity to realize the strategic imperialism theorized by Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt sent Commodore Dewey steaming to Manila. There American forces overpowered the Spanish. Roosevelt himself resigned his office to lead volunteers into Cuba.

Roosevelt's triumphant gallop up San Juan Hill was euphoric for him, and John Hay called the whole thing a "splendid little war." In the Philippine theater, however, easy defeat of the Spanish was followed by a terrible struggle against Filipinos. The nationalist army led by Aguinaldo and diffusely

captained guerrilla forces held out staunchly. American-declared martial law was not lifted until 1901.

The United States had stepped into the last Latin American revolution against Spain and simultaneously the first Asian revolution against Western power. In the Philippines, America prevailed in savage fighting; then had to take responsibility for the squalid deprivation that followed.

An imperial sense of triumph among some was countered by anti-imperial dismay among others. William Graham Sumner, who wrote of "the conquest of the United States by Spain," foresaw the dangers of becoming a surrogate imperial power. Those errors and terrors the United States would later repeat on a larger, more anachronistic scale: by trying to stand in for the French in Vietnam.

What tilted the United States against its anti-imperial instincts in the Philippine case? The American nation was moved by the logic of expansion that drives most political entities to grow until checked. The United States grasped a strategic opportunity in the Philippines to equip itself as a world military power with a major Asian base; as an economic power, with a tutorial ward to fulfill its democratic-religious mission. Power, profit, and prophecy here converged.

The treaty to annex the Philippines almost failed of passage, nonetheless, in the Senate. New imperial responsibilities never moved the American public to a rage of pride comparable to European cases. The summons in Kipling's exhortation to "take up the White Man's Burden" went against much in the American grain. American energies for Philippine annexation were neither conspiratorial nor inevitable; once provoked, to be sure, they were powerfully confluent with the forces of the age. But after the initial convulsion, basic policies for the Filipinos were defined by Elihu Root (secretary of war, 1899-1904) "to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices." Practices of rapid Filipinization of all branches and levels of government followed, especially under Francis Burton Harrison (governor-general, 1913-1921).

Hostilities subsided, sympathies arose. Filipinos over time settled into a nationwide pattern of assimilation to the con-

queror's style, in harmony with the imperial ruler's accommodations of local interests and aspirations. But that took time. The fact of superior American power was hard to swallow; the realization that Americans were there to stay was hard to digest. Six men summarized the range of responses:

Felipe Salvador, who had fought against the Spanish and the Americans as a guerrilla officer, came forth in 1903 as the "pope" of the Santa Iglesia, a mystical and militant conspiracy that contended for some years against the new regime. He was hanged for murder and sedition in 1911. Having drawn upon a legacy of peasant rebellion, he left it further enriched.

General Artemio Ricarte, though captured in 1900, refused to take an oath of allegiance to the new regime; was deported; returned illegally and was jailed; was deported again in 1910; took root in Japan; returned to the Philippines with Japanese forces in 1942, and died with them in 1945.

General Emilio Aguinaldo, after capture, took the oath of allegiance; ran for President of the Commonwealth in 1935 with weak results; cooperated fully with the Japanese; survived to advanced old age, archaic in his views.

Manuel Quezon, a young guerrilla captain, surrendered only after he saw Aguinaldo in comfortable detention; rose to the presidency of the Senate in 1916; was elected president of the Commonwealth in 1935; died in Washington in 1944, head of the Commonwealth government-in-exile, after two decades at the top of the Philippine political scramble.

Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera, a Hispanic Filipino, a Europeanized nineteenth-century liberal, supported the Revolution; was appointed by Governor-General Taft to the Philippine Commission, an early colonial governing council; moved on to become a pamphleteer for public secular education, and against church and superstition.

Sergio Osmeña, a young Chinese mestizo from Cebu, rose as a lawyer to become the majority leader among Filipino legislators from 1907 to 1922; after that, second in command to Quezon until 1944, when he succeeded to the presidency of the Commonwealth until just short of independence, 1944 to 1946.

These six men may be arrayed in a continuum of declining

hostility and ascending plasticity to the American imperial presence: Salvador, the irreconcilable guerrilla-pope; Ricarte, the unreconstructable exile; Aguinaldo, the domesticated rebel; Quezon, the conservative dissident; Pardo, the cooperating aristocrat; Osmeña, the constitutional technician. The first three were resisters. The last three represent cooperation in high degree with the new regime. Quezon was the most effective of all, because he projected to the Philippine electorate his guerrilla sense of affronted national pride, even as he learned the English language and American manners to charm American investors and officials.

Although these six can be said collectively to characterize the Filipino responses to American rule in the first part of the twentieth century, none of them epitomizes Philippine character as well as another, who died in 1896, before the Americans arrived. The Spanish executed Jose Rizal as a revolutionary, and thereby made him a national hero and martyr. Even had they not, he would have earned an elevated place in his people's memory as searcher for the lost Filipino past, loving analyst of the national character, and sublime propagandist. He continues still to endear himself to his people as novelist and physician, adventurer and healer, romantic secular saint.

The American-dominated Philippine Commission chose Rizal to honor with statues and celebrations rather than Andres Bonifacio, a more radical revolutionary, or Apolinario Mabini, a pre-Marxian theorist of class struggle. But imperial sponsorship did not besmirch Rizal in the eyes of his people. Even now, with nearly forty years of sovereignty behind them, Filipinos still look to Rizal as their prime exemplar, and their supreme educator. For some, devotion becomes worship. Numerous cults and sects among peasants and urban laborers elevate Rizal to divine status: the word become flesh in the Philippines; one man standing for liberated nation, autonomous culture, and free individual spirit.

The Philippine-American Amalgam, 1901-1941

The United States remained in the Philippines despite three major frustrations. First, the colony did not prove valuable as

a jumping-off place to the China trade, and that trade itself, in relation to the visions of vast wealth in 1898-1900, proved to be a mirage. Second, the colony itself could not be deemed a significant economic asset. Private investment returns were small. The United States bought more protected agricultural products from the Philippines than it sold manufactured goods there. The costs of administration were not fully covered by insular taxes, and were enlarged by defense costs met by the United States Treasury. In sum, the Philippines could be considered a significant net economic liability. Third, United States military and naval installations in the Philippines were not developed adequately to meet the potential threat of Japan. Instead of becoming part of the globe-circling power desired by Theodore Roosevelt, they constituted what he feared would be an American "Achilles' heel."

Although Spain had also clung to the Philippines despite its financial losses, it did so because of its territorial imperatives, Christianizing mission, and imperial nostalgia. The United States held on far less tenaciously. The liabilities were analogous, but the motivations to cut loose were much stronger. As early as 1916, a bill for Philippine independence almost passed the American Congress. The act that did pass contained a promise of eventual independence, the first such to arise amid the neomercantilist wave of imperialism that had swept over Asia and Africa from 1870 to 1900.

By 1933 the American forces for independence were strong enough to prevail. These included American beet and sugar lobbies opposed to Philippine sugar, dairy lobbies opposed to coconut oil, and labor lobbies opposed to Filipino immigrant labor. Such economic factions could not have prevailed without the isolationists and the power realists (the latter concerned about exposure vis-à-vis Japan), a new generation of anti-imperialists by party or by principle, and others who might be called emancipatory gradualists, disinterested persons who simply believed that "the time had come" for an independent Philippines.

The time was scheduled for 1946. During this period, a semi-autonomous Commonwealth was headed by a nationally

elected Filipino president. Quezon won more than two-thirds of the vote. But nearly one-third of the vote was split between General Aguinaldo and Bishop Gregorio Aglipay of the Philippine Independent Church. Together, the two minority candidates might be said to represent the nativist, provincial, traditional side of nationalism. Judge Juan Sumulong continued as a critic of Quezon, and precursor of the socially conscious, programmatic nationalism of Claro Recto in the 1950s, Jose Diokno in the 1970s and 1980s, and Lorenzo Tañada spanning both periods.

The Commonwealth period was the peaceful apex of Philippine-American cooperation. A constitutional representative system was functioning effectively with a native chief executive. The style that went with this structure was one of shifting, personally based coalitions, with strong familial and provincial ties determining allegiances. Concepts of the debt of honor and of in-group togetherness and trustworthiness were pronouncedly important in a bilaterally extended family system. They produced angles of discourse and axes of alliance too fluid to be called feudal, but certainly regional and factional, bound by personal, authoritarian, and charismatic values.

Two quotations by Manuel Quezon suggest the dynamics and dilemmas of the system in which he flourished: "Better a government run like hell by Filipinos than one run like heaven by Americans" and "Damn the Americans! Why don't they tyrannize us more?" The first, a classic anti-colonial slogan, might have been invented anywhere; but it was earliest said in the Philippines, and easier to say there than anywhere else in Southeast Asia. The second was the frustrated statement of a leader in need of a foreign antagonist and issues of imperial injustice, but not finding them.

Politically conscious Filipinos looked about them and realized, with gratitude toward the Americans, that they had the highest literacy rate in Southeast Asia, even though that was partly owed to a foundation in Spanish times. They saw expenditures on health unrivaled as a proportion of government budget throughout the region. The infrastructure of roads,

bridges, and communications lagged behind the Netherlands East Indies, and in agricultural development the Japanese were doing far better in Formosa. What came through to the average Filipino, however—often more forcibly to the minimally educated peasant than to the analytical urban dweller—was that the aim of the United States was to help the Philippines evolve to a scheduled independence, and that its policies with regard to education, health, and welfare were in accord with that aim.

Some other realities clouded the picture. Part of American motivation was negative self-interest, to get rid of the Philippines as a responsibility. The absolute expenditures of the insular government per capita were dramatically small, even if relatively great compared to other imperial powers. American racial attitudes tended to cluster in the range from condescension to bigotry. Even so, the Fil-American colonial skies were fundamentally sunny, whereas stormy overcasts were gathering in Indochina and Indonesia.

With political development toward independence, however, there also proceeded economic development toward dependency. The United States avoided some errors of European empires, such as the plantation systems in Sumatra, Malaya, and Indochina, and the government opium monopolies operated by the Dutch, the French, and the British. The American Congress in the Progressive Era passed landholding and corporation laws that made it extremely difficult for American investors to wrest away “the patrimony” (as Filipino politicians called the land) or to control industrial growth. Meantime the trade patterns fostered by American legislation pushed the external economy into further dependence upon sugar and coconut exports, while allowing preference for American manufactured goods.

What alternative vision of an independently vigorous Philippine economy was there? None was forthcoming from Filipino political leaders, preoccupied as they were with husbanding power or reaching for it. None had yet arisen from the nascent entrepreneurial class—men like Vicente Madrigal, Leopoldo Aguinaldo, and Toribio Teodoro. Their companies

borrowed American techniques of organization and styles of marketing, but persisted in spirit as Philippine-style family enterprises.

Central to the Philippine-American bond was the cultural affinity that had arisen. Whereas some of the mandarinates in Vietnam became genuinely enamored of things French, and some of the *pangreh pradja* (native civil service) in Indonesia felt devoted to things Dutch, such influences went little further. In contrast, the Philippine population in general was swayed, even captivated, by American culture. Rotarian civics and optimism in business, Madison Avenue slickness in advertising, Hollywood B (or C) heroes and heroines in the theaters, and Hit Parade stars in wave after wave of music swept into Philippine urban life to enthusiastic response. These may not constitute a worthy complex; but to take a highbrow stance on the question would make understanding the Philippines impossible.

Carmen Guerrero-Nakpil has often reflected since the 1950s on the Philippine experience of "falling in love with" American culture. Her tone, when not bitter, is rueful and amused: what a strange thing to do; what commonplaces and mischances it leads to; are we not deserving of a better fate? N.V.M. Gonzalez goes further, and explores the rootlessness that results from America having become for many Filipinos their promised land, their dream of heaven.

How could it have been otherwise? The indigenous "high tradition" of the Philippines was Hispano-Catholic as distinct from, say, Burma's Buddhist national identity, or Java's proud syncretism of several Asian elements. To the degree that the Philippines was already partly "Western," American concepts of individual freedom grafted easily upon Catholic notions of the value of the individual soul. And to the degree that the Spanish had been anti-developmental, and an ecclesiastical bureaucracy had helped provoke the Revolution of 1896, an American secular religion of democracy and progress found it easy to slip in sideways and steal over the whole country. Further, to the extent that the Philippines (in contrast to Thailand and Indonesia) lacked an elaborate indigenous tradition in the

arts, there were few bulwarks of resistance and canons of criticism by which foreign elements could be held at bay and local imitations effectually derided.

The Philippines of the late 1930s had some painting—superficially Spanish in character—and a good symphony orchestra in Manila, vaguely Germanic. Of its cultural phenomena, however, the most notable was the florescence of writing in English. An early generation, already schooled in Spanish, reeducated themselves to eloquence in English. Only a few, like Don Claro Recto, scathingly noted concurrent losses in Spanish-Filipino culture. A next group, converted early, produced in Carlos P. Romulo a Pulitzer prize-winning journalist. Now another generation was rising, educated from the beginning in English. They wrote short stories, poems, novels, essays, political journalism, business and legal journalism, with a conscientious sense of craft. They thought and felt in English. Some of them saw injustice and told of it; saw revolt simmering in Central Luzon and sympathized with it; participated in the women's movement and youth movement of the late 1930s and helped articulate both. They felt independence coming and yearned for it. So completely and so comfortably were they Americanized that they did all this without questioning English—rather than Tagalog or Visayan or Ilocano—as their most intimate language. Then came the war.

The Second World War as Revelation

The World War of 1939-1945 was on one front the Second War of European Suicide; on the other, the First Pacific War of Identity. For the first time, modern technology, economics, and politics embraced in war everything from the eastern borders of India through the innards of China to the fringe of Alaska; it seared the islands of the South Pacific and all the countries of insular and marshland Southeast Asia, until it concluded with nuclear bombing and occupation of Japan, both unique in history.

The Japanese, whose initiative created these vast theaters, saw the region as Greater East Asia, and the battle as the Holy

War for Asian Liberation. But freeing Asian peoples from the yoke of the Europeans and Americans had as its immediate sequel imposing the yoke of the Japanese. The “Co-Prosperity Sphere” that the Japanese established was focused upon Japan as its industrial hub, and the rest of Asia as supplier of raw goods and markets. A bitter Filipino joke had it as “Ako-Prosperity”: or “me-first-prosperity.”

What Theodore Roosevelt had foreseen had come true: American armaments were far from equal to the American commitment to defend the Philippines. American air power was destroyed on the ground at Clark Field hours after the disaster at Pearl Harbor. The American naval detachment withdrew before Christmas to fight another time. MacArthur, as the local American commander and Field Marshal of the Philippine Army, had been preparing against Japanese attack for six years. Immediate loss of control of air and sea now put his greatly superior numbers on the defensive. Philippine-American land forces yielded to the much smaller Japanese expeditionary force and were rapidly driven back to Bataan and Corregidor. There they managed to hold out for six months.

The truly remarkable factor was not generalship. Any luster that attaches to the name of Bataan belongs to the ordinary soldiers, American and Filipino, who stuck it out. They did not delay the Japanese from any other immediately scheduled strategic target, but they were the only force that stood up effectively to them in Southeast Asia. The Dutch surrendered Java within ten days; the British, Singapore, within weeks; and the French, under Vichyite orders, puppeteered themselves to Japanese power in Vietnam. Fil-American forces, however, resisted the Japanese for half a year, the only significant instance in Asia of a colonized people siding clearly with their white colonizer, and making mortal sacrifices in the name of a shared history.

During the Japanese occupation, guerrilla resistance sprang up. At first it did little but harass local Japanese patrols or gather information, if connected to the rudimentary intelligence network left behind by MacArthur's forces. By September 1943, when an occupation republic was proclaimed by the

Japanese, one of Jose Laurel's early acts as president was a declaration of amnesty to resisters. The gesture netted few who repented or feared enough of their activity to give it up. As American forces approached the Philippines, the intelligence network elaborated, and guerrilla action accelerated. Following the invasion of Leyte in October 1944, recruitment of auxiliaries by the Japanese grew extremely difficult; enlistment of guerrillas against them was easy. After the war, over a quarter of a million Filipinos were awarded back pay for fighting on the American side. Even if that number contained a certain proportion of opportunists and frauds, there were a great number who fought from conviction and valiantly. At the end of the war in 1945, 118,000 Filipinos were officially under arms fighting with Americans—perhaps double the number that MacArthur had effectively ready by 1941. The Makapili and other Filipino auxiliary forces drummed up and supplied by the Japanese probably never equaled one-tenth of that strength, and stood ground in no significant conflict.

Some of those fighting on the side of America were professionals, former members of MacArthur's forces. At the other extreme were Hukbalahaps fighting for revolution, in parallel with the Americans but separate from them, against the greater evil, Japan. In between, and by far the greatest number, were those guerrillas whose sense of the future was colored by a desire for independence under American auspices. They were moved to fight for reasons similar to those Dwight Eisenhower ascribed to ordinary American and British soldiers, each "to preserve his freedom of worship, his equality before law, his liberty to speak and act as he sees fit." There was also an impulsive, trusting quality to many Filipino commitments, such as the band called Hunter's ROTC Guerrillas, many of them collegians from the University of the Philippines, who fought out of a sense of shared destiny with America. Within twenty years of the war, three former guerrillas were elected president. Magsaysay, Garcia, and Marcos each found their wartime activity helpful to their political careers. Marcos made the most of it, including some decorations bestowed an unusually long number of years after events difficult to document.

To have fought with the Americans was clearly the popular thing to have done. In 1949, nonetheless, Jose Laurel, the president under Japanese occupation, was almost elected president of the postwar republic. Many voters perceived him as having done his best to defend their interests against the Japanese, and even his critics conceded that his courage was real. Among Laurel's many acts of clearly nationalistic impact during the war was encouragement of Tagalog/Pilipino as the national language. He very likely would have done so even without the Japanese insistence upon replacing Western languages wherever they went.

Encouraging native culture, particularly in its analogues to values held by the Japanese, was part of the "Holy War for the Liberation of Asia." In Java, the *jiwa ksatriya*, or warrior spirit, could be encouraged in line with samurai values and *bushido* spirit as a spiritual resource against the return of the Allies. In the Philippines it was much harder to strike such harmonies. The Japanese nevertheless laid open new layers of nationalist consciousness, not as much by the dexterity of their propaganda as by the sheer aggravating, provocative fact of their presence. Essayists for the wartime *Philippine Review*, such as S. P. Lopez, reached beyond the accommodation to Americanism that had been the prevailing norm of the 1930s to conceive of Philippine culture as developing strength through synthesis. In such a manner one could recognize the vitality of Japan's own adaptive culture as being of inspiring value to Filipinos, without any demeaning concession to Japanese presence. An Asian counterweight could be poised against the tremendous pull—or drag?—of American culture without betrayal of past associations or future hopes.

The Binational Restoration

Other regions of Southeast Asia were freed suddenly and bloodlessly by Japanese surrender in August 1945, except for Burma, where light fighting had occurred earlier in the year. Throughout the Philippine archipelago, however, beginning in October 1944, the Japanese were beaten island by island,