


EDWARD C. THADEN

Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914



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**RUSSIFICATION IN
THE BALTIC PROVINCES
AND FINLAND,
1855-1914**



The Western Borderlands of the Empire.

RUSSIFICATION IN THE BALTIC PROVINCES AND FINLAND, 1855-1914

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PREFACE

THIS BOOK is a byproduct of the sessions on elites, modernization, and Russification in which we participated between 1972 and 1974 at the Third and Fourth Conferences on Baltic Studies in Toronto and Chicago and at the International Conference on Slavic Studies in Banff, Canada. In 1975 I drafted a proposal on the behalf of our group in response to the Ford Foundation's International Research Competition in Soviet/Russian and East European Studies. It has been largely because of the generous support we received from the Ford Foundation that we have been able to complete our project.

In our proposal to the Ford Foundation we listed the following questions among those with which we were attempting to deal. To what extent was Russification the result of the rationalization of the basic legal-administrative order that emerged in Russia during the era of Great Reforms? Was there ever a real possibility of political cooperation between the Baltic Germans and Estonians and Latvians? What were the effects of Russificatory changes in elementary education for Estonians and Latvians? How rapidly, for example, and to what extent was Russian really used as the language of instruction? What effects did administrative changes have, especially those in municipal government and the administration of justice? And how was the manner in which Estonians and Latvians responded to Russification affected by the level of cultural, social, and economic development they had already reached before 1880? With regard to Finland, what circumstances and conditions enabled her to grow into a modern country with a high degree of self-consciousness and a set of institutions and values that differed markedly from those of Russia? What effect did various internal conflicts have on the response of the Finns to Russification between 1899 and 1914?

In attempting to answer these and other questions we have viewed Russification in the context of what was happening both in the interior of the Russian Empire and in its borderlands. We have been particularly interested in determining the effects this policy had on the lives of the inhabitants of the Baltic Provinces and Finland. We have, therefore, undertaken to write as much an ethnic, social, economic, and intellectual history of this area between the Crimean War and World War I as a history of Russian nationality policy.

We have tried to base this study of Russification in the Baltic

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Provinces and Finland on the best sources available in the United States, Finland, western Europe, and the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, none of us has been able to work in the archives of the Soviet Baltic republics, although several of us have visited these republics and discussed our research with Soviet Estonian and Latvian scholars. A good part of the memoirs, letters, fiction, newspapers, journals, and historical materials published in the Baltic Provinces and in independent Latvia and Estonia before 1940 is available outside the Soviet Union. Such Baltic and, of course, Finnish materials are to be found especially in the libraries of Helsinki and Turku universities and the Åbo Akademi in Finland. The valuable papers of the minister state secretaries for Finnish affairs and of the Russian governors-general (as well as other pertinent papers) can be consulted in the Suomen Valtionarkisto (Finnish State Archives) in Helsinki. Additional pertinent manuscript materials are deposited in the Bremen Universitätsbibliothek and in the Hessisches Staatsarchiv in Marburg, Germany.

A problem all scholars working on Russification have encountered is the difficulty of gaining access to the principal Soviet archives and manuscript collections located in Leningrad and Moscow. The subject is one that Soviet archival and other authorities obviously consider sensitive. Soviet scholars have treated it only peripherally; foreign scholars wishing to work on it specifically have, to the best of our knowledge, never been accepted as participants in the official exchanges between the Soviet Union and foreign countries (the only way to gain entry into the archives). Certain pertinent Soviet archival materials are, however, available for the use of non-Soviet scholars, and in this study such materials have been very useful for the clarification of important points in regard to the formulation of government policy on nationality during the 1860s.

This study has benefited from the assistance of a number of institutions, libraries, archives, and individuals. The importance of support from the Ford Foundation has already been mentioned. We also appreciate the financial assistance, conference and research facilities, and library, cartographic, and administrative services made available to us by the institutions at which we teach or for which we have worked: the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies; Hamilton College; the California State University, Long Beach, and the CSULB Foundation; Indiana University; Iowa State University; and the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle. The Iowa State University Graduate College provided assistance with preparing the maps, and the chart in Part Three; the University of Illinois, indispensable secretarial and administrative services for the Ford Foundation grant between 1975 and 1978. The International Research and Exchanges

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Board (IREX) made possible research in Soviet archives. In addition, thanks are due to the staffs of many libraries in this country and abroad: The Finnish Literary Society, Helsinki; the Institute of History at Helsinki University; the Institute of History of the Soviet Academy of Sciences; the J. G. Herder Institute in Marburg, Germany; the Hessian State Archives; the Finnish State Archives; the manuscript divisions and reading rooms of the Lenin and Saltykov-Shchedrin libraries and the Pushkinskii dom in Moscow and Leningrad; the Library of Congress; the New York Public Library; and the university libraries at Berkeley, Bremen, Chicago (University of Chicago), Columbia, Göttingen, Harvard, Helsinki, Los Angeles (UCLA), Seattle (University of Washington), and Urbana-Champaign, Illinois.

Professors Alfred Levin of Kent State University, Barbara Sciacchitano of North Central College, Illinois, and Valters Nollendorfs, President of the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, made useful suggestions for revision of the original draft of the proposal we submitted to the Ford Foundation early in 1975. Dr. Marianna Thaden prepared the final version of the proposal and successfully completed the negotiations with the Ford Foundation. Several of us benefited greatly from discussions with Professor Peter Scheibert of Philipps Universität, Marburg, Germany, who brought to our attention collections of Baltic materials in the Hessian State Archives. Problems concerning the period of Alexander III were clarified thanks to discussions with and critical comments received from Professor Theodore Taranovski of the University of Puget Sound. Last but not least, the five authors of this book have helped each other, profiting especially from the analysis of texts and discussion at three meetings that took place during 1976 and 1977 in Chicago, Dallas, and Aspen, Colorado.

In order to avoid possible confusion, something must be said about the transliterations and the place and personal names that will be encountered in this work. Russian names and words have generally been transliterated according to the Library of Congress system. In referring to the three Baltic Provinces we have used, with a few exceptions, the pre-1917 German place names and territorial designations. We have done this largely because of the need for uniformity of usage among four authors dealing with a multilingual Baltic society. With regard to Finland, on the other hand, Finnish place names have been used because they are fairly familiar to today's English-speaking reader and because there is a degree of continuity in Finland's historical development absent in that of the Baltic Provinces.

We have tried to give personal names in the form that the person

Preface

in question would seem to have preferred. Russian names are transliterated, as well as those of persons of foreign origin who clearly considered themselves to be Russians. The names of Baltic Germans, Estonians, Finns, Latvians, and Swedes are given in their original German, Estonian, Finnish, Latvian, and Swedish forms. Baltic Germans in Russian state service who maintained their ties with their native provinces have not been Russified in our text. We do, however, refer to Eduard Frisch, a Riga-born Baltic German, as E. V. Frish; Frish, by all accounts, was a completely Russified tsarist *chinovnik*. On the other hand, Minister of Justice Konstantin von der Pahlen does not become fon der Palen; he retained close ties with his native Kurland and lost neither his German accent nor his Baltic loyalties despite more than fifty years of service in the Russian bureaucracy. F. L. Heiden (or in German: Friedrich Graf von Heyden) really should be F. L. Geiden if we were entirely consistent, for, even though his grandfather is listed in the *Deutschbaltisches biographisches Lexikon*, he did not speak German fluently and was unmistakably a Russian. Here we have deferred to the wishes of our expert on Finland and to common usage in Finnish historical literature.

In certain instances we have given two versions of controversial names (e.g. Heiden-Geiden, Zein-Seyn, Gerard-Gerhard, and Shvarts-Schwarz). The Estonian, Latvian, or Swedish names for the towns and geographical and administrative units we have referred to in their Finnish or German variants can be found in the glossary at the end of Part Five.

In Part Five on Finland dates are given according to the Gregorian Calendar; in the other sections, according to the official Julian Calendar of the Russian Empire (twelve days earlier than the Gregorian in the nineteenth century and thirteen in the twentieth).

Chicago
August 1979

ABBREVIATIONS

For additional details concerning the asterisked archival collections, see Part I of the bibliography. For published books and articles (with the exception of certain journals and reference works listed here), see Part III of the bibliography.

AS Shakhovskoi, S. V., *Iz arkhiva kniazia S. V. Shakhovskogo*, 3 vols.
 BM *Baltische Monatschrift*, Riga, 1859-1913, vols. 1-76. The volumes for 1914-1915 and 1927-1931 are referred to by year of publication, not volume number. The BM was continued under the title *Baltische Monatshefte* between 1932 and 1939.

Brokgauz-Efron *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar'*, 41 vols. in 82 (Leipzig: F. A. Brokgauz; St. Petersburg: I. A. Efron, 1890-1904).

Buchholtz [A. Buchholtz], *Deutsch-protestantische Kämpfe in den baltischen Provinzen Russlands*.

*Bunge "Zapiska naidennaia v bumagakh N. Kh. Bunge," in Harvard Law School Library.

*CAAK C. A. Armfelt collection, in VA.

Chteniia Chteniia v imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei pri Moskovskom universitete, 1846-1918, vols. 1-264.

DBL *Deutschbaltisches biographisches Lexikon 1710-1960*.

Engelhardt Roderich von Engelhardt, *Die deutsche Universität Dorpat*.

Estlander B. Estlander, *Elva årtionden ur Finlands historia*, 5 vols.

*GBL Moscow, Gosudarstvennaia biblioteka imeni V. I. Lenina, otdel rukopisei.

*GorK Ivar Gordie collection, in VA.

*GPB Leningrad, Gosudarstvennaia publichnaia biblioteka imeni M. E. Saltykov-Shchedrina, otdel rukopisei.

*HjK Edvard Hjelt collection, in VA.

*HomK Viktor Theodor Homen collection, in VA.

*IgAn Ignatius, notes on negotiations, 1892, in IgK.

*IgK K. F. Ignatius collection, in VA.

*IgMi Ignatius, notes on political events, 1899-1909, in IgK.

*IgPo Ignatius, notes on several political figures, in IgK.

*IgSj Ignatius, autobiography, in IgK.

IMM *Izglitibas Ministrijas Mēnesraksts* [The Monthly of the Ministry of Education], Riga, 1920-1939.

Abbreviations

- Isakov S. G. Isakov, *Ostzeiskii vopros v russkoi pechati 1860-kh godov*.
- JäK A. A. Järnefelt collection, in VA.
- KanEl *Kansallinen elämäkerrasto*, 5 vols. (Porvoo: Söderström, 1927-1934).
- Katkov M. N. Katkov, *Sobranie peredovykh statei Moskovskikh vedomostei, 1863-1887 gg.*, 25 vols. Referred to as Katkov, 1863 god, 1864 god, etc.
- *KKK Kenraalikuvernöörinkanslian arkisto [Archives of the Chancellery of the Governor-General], in VA.
- KM S. M. Seredonin (ed.), *Istoricheskii obzor deiatel'nosti Komiteta ministrov*, 4 vols.
- Langhoff A. Langhoff, *Sju år såsom Finlands repesant inför tronen*, 3 vols.
- Manasein N. A. Manasein, *Manaseina revizija*.
- *Materialien R. Staël von Holstein, "Materialien zu einer Geschichte des Livländischen Landesstaates," Welding collection, in Bremen, Germany, Universitätsbibliothek.
- *Mek Leo Mechelin collection, in VA.
- Obozrenie rasporiazhenii Kratkoe obozrenie pravitel'stvennykh rasporiazhenii o vvedenii v upotreblenie russkogo iazyka v Pribaltiiskikh guberniakh.*
- *PD Leningrad, Institut russkoi literatury Akademii nauk SSSR, otdel rukopisei (Pushkinskii dom).
- Petukhov E. V. Petukhov, *Imperatorskii Iur'evskii, byvshii Derptskii universitet*, 2 vols.
- Polovtsov A. A. Polovtsov, *Dnevnik gosudarstvennogo sekretaria A. A. Polovtsova*, 2 vols.
- *PoTi Political information collection, in VA.
- *Procopé collection V. N. Procopé collection, in VA.
- PSZ *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii*, 3 series (St. Petersburg: 2-oe Otdelenie Sobstvennoi ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva i Kantseliarii, 1830-1916).
- Rozhdestvenskii S. V. Rozhdestvenskii (ed.), *Istoricheskii obzor deiatel'nosti Ministra narodnogo prosveshcheniia*.
- Samarin Iu. F. Samarin, *Sochineniia*, vols. 1-10, 12.
- *SetK E. N. Setälä collection, in VA.
- SIRIO *Sbornik imperatorskogo istoricheskogo obshchestva*, St. Petersburg, 1867-1916, 148 vols.
- *SoSa Soisalon-Soinen collection, in VA.
- *StaK K. J. Ståhlberg collection, in VA.
- Tobien A. von Tobien, *Die livländische Ritterschaft in ihrem Verhältnis zum Zarismus und russischen Nationalismus*, 2 vols.

Abbreviations

- Toimetised* Eesti NSV Teaduste Akadeemia, *Toimetised*, Ühiskonnateadused [Akademiia Nauk Estonskoi SSR, *Izvestiia*, Obshchestvennye nauki], Tallinn, 1956-.
- TRÜT Tartu, Riiliku Ülikool, *Toimetised* [Tartu, Gosudarstvennyi universitet, *Uchenye zapiski*], 1941-.
- *TsGIAL Leningrad, Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv.
- *TuK Sten Carl Tudeer collection, in VA.
- *VA Helsinki, Valtionarkisto [State Archives].
- *ValAs State documents collection, in VA.
- Valuev P. A. Valuev, *Dnevnik P. A. Valueva ministra Vnutrennikh del*, 2 vols.
- Vēstis* Latvijas PSR Zinatņu Akademija, *Vēstis* [Akademiia Nauk Latviiskoi SSR, *Izvestiia*], Riga, 1947-.
- *VSV Valtionsihteerinvirāstōn arkisto [Archives of the State Secretariat], in VA.
- Wittram R. Wittram, *Baltische Geschichte 1180-1918*.
- *YKK Yrjö-Koskinen collection, in VA.
- Zinātniskie raksti* Riga, Universitāte, *Zinātniskie raksti* [Riga, Gosudarstvennyi universitet, *Uchenye zapiski*], 1949-.

**RUSSIFICATION IN
THE BALTIC PROVINCES
AND FINLAND,
1855-1914**

INTRODUCTION

ONE OF THE EVIDENT GAPS in the historiography of modern Russia is the lack of a thorough and systematic study of Russification in the Baltic borderlands during the period 1855-1914. Without such a study it is difficult to see in proper perspective the complexity of the interaction before World War I of Russians with Germans, Estonians, Latvians, Finns, Swedes, and the other nationalities living in the Baltic area. Historians, in trying to understand the rationale of the Russian government's efforts to integrate these nationalities and to bring them closer to the empire, and resistance of the various nationalities to this process, are still obliged to turn to the emotionally charged terminology and selected facts offered by polemics of sixty to over a hundred years ago concerning the so-called Finnish and Baltic questions. Or they must rely on works written since 1917, which—both inside and outside the Soviet Union—tend to be marred by the excessively national or ideological preoccupations of their authors.

This study of Russification will focus on Finland and, especially, the three Baltic Provinces of Estland, Livland, and Kurland. Until the mid-nineteenth century even Russians generally agreed that the area's level of cultural and social development compared favorably with that of other parts of the empire. Partly for this reason, Russian tsars let it have a considerable degree of autonomy and granted to its traditional elites well-defined rights and privileges. Eventually, this special position of the Baltic Provinces and Finland came to be questioned. Russian attitudes toward the elites of this area changed largely because of fears generated by the unification of Germany and because of the gradual systematization of government and modernization of society in Russia, especially during the period of reform and counterreform that followed the emancipation of the Russian serfs in 1861. German- and Swedish-speaking elites continued, however, to perform many useful services for Russia. Unlike the Polish *szlachta*, clergy, and townsmen of Lithuania, the right-bank Ukraine, and Congress Poland, they remained steadfastly loyal to the Russian throne until the twentieth century. This may explain why the German nobility of the Baltic Provinces retained certain of its special rights and privileges until 1917 and why Finland was never fully integrated with the rest of the Russian Empire.

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Although Poland and Lithuania are Baltic states, they will be considered only incidentally in this study. The Baltic region consists of several areas that are distinct in terms of historico-cultural evolution. In the nineteenth century Russians made a distinction between Poland-Lithuania and the other Baltic areas within the Russian Empire, and they looked at the Polish question as being quite different from that of the Baltic Provinces and Finland. In this study our primary concern will be to examine the impact of Russification on the Baltic Provinces and Finland. Here, in contrast to Poland-Lithuania, the common people were both literate and exposed to a process of comparatively rapid social and economic modernization, and there was no rebellion against Russia. The Polish insurrections of 1830-1831 and 1863-1864, the presence of millions of socially and economically disadvantaged Orthodox Eastern Slavs in historic Lithuania and the right-bank Ukraine, and the dominant position locally of the *szlachta* and Polish civilization influenced Russifying officials to pursue policies in the lands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that differed from those they employed in the Baltic Provinces and Finland. But the lessons Russia learned in Poland-Lithuania had obvious applications to other parts of the empire. Events occurring in Congress Poland and Lithuania will, therefore, be discussed in this study insofar as they help to explain changes in Russian attitudes and in the general direction of official nationality and borderland policy. These events are of intrinsic interest and importance, and we hope that our study of Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland will encourage others to undertake similar studies not only of Poland and Lithuania but also of other parts of the Russian Empire.

The Baltic Provinces and Finland occupied about 2 percent of the land area of the Russian Empire, and by the end of the nineteenth century their 5 million inhabitants accounted for approximately 4 percent of its population. The majority of Finland's 2.5 million inhabitants then lived in coastal regions and in the southwestern section of the country, while the greater part of Finland's 144,253 square miles of territory (located in the center and north) was either uninhabited or very sparsely settled. Finland was mainly of interest to Russia for strategic reasons: the defense of St. Petersburg and naval control of the Gulf of Bothnia. The Baltic Provinces (Estland, Livland, and Kurland), being located on the Baltic Sea between St. Petersburg and Germany, also had strategic importance for Russia. In addition, they were the natural outlet for a vast Russian hinterland connected with the Baltic by the Western Dvina River and (beginning in the 1870s) a railway network terminating in the ports of Riga, Reval (Tallinn), Windau (Ventspils), and Libau (Liepāja). In 1897 Liv-

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land, the largest and most populous of the three Baltic provinces, with 18,160 square miles of land and nearly 1.3 million inhabitants, was among the leading industrialized and urbanized regions of the Russian Empire. Kurland (10,535 square miles and 674,437 inhabitants) and Estland (7,818 square miles and 413,747 inhabitants) were smaller, but they ranked with Livland among the most highly developed provinces of the Russian Empire.

The political frontiers of the Baltic Provinces and Finland were shaped by the conquests, wars, and political rivalries of Scandinavians, Germans, Poles, and Russians over a period of centuries. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the Estonian and Latvian indigenous population of Old Livonia was brought under the rule of the Teutonic Order and of German nobles and townsmen. Successive Polish, Swedish, and Russian domination of the area divided it into three provinces but left the Germans in control of religion, courts, trade and commerce, the land, and institutions of self-government. The physical boundaries of the three provinces did not follow ethnic lines, for the Estonians in Estland were separated from their co-nationals in northern Livland, while the Latvians were divided into three segments: their people lived in southern Livland, Kurland, and Lettgallia,—the Polish province of Inflanty—which in the nineteenth century formed the western part of the Russian *guberniia* of Vitebsk.

The Reformation was an important landmark in the history of the Baltic Provinces. The establishment of Lutheranism as the official religion of Estland, Livland, and Kurland strengthened their ties with Germany and Sweden and tended to cut them off culturally from Orthodox Russia and Catholic Inflanty and Poland (even though Kurland remained part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth until 1795). The extent to which Lutheranism influenced the daily lives and moral outlook of the Baltic peasants is debatable, but there can be no question about the significance of the work of Lutheran pastors in developing the Estonian and Latvian languages and spreading literacy among the peasants. By the 1880s, thanks to the combined efforts of the Lutheran Church, large landowners, and the peasant townships, elementary education was almost universal in the Baltic Provinces. In the rest of the Russian Empire a comparable elementary educational system existed only in Finland.

Until the nineteenth century the overwhelming majority of Latvians and Estonians were serfs living on the estates of the German nobility. The emancipation of the Baltic serfs between 1816 and 1819 left them economically dependent on the German landowners. During the 1850s and 1860s Latvians and Estonians obtained the right to own land. This benefited a minority, who gradually became successful

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peasant proprietors. The bulk of the Latvian and Estonian population remained tenant farmers, landless peasants, or urban workers. In the second part of the nineteenth century about 15 percent of the Baltic peasants lived on lands formerly owned by the Swedish or Polish crown. Until the mid-century the affairs of these peasants, who came to be known as state peasants (*gosudarstvennye krest'iane*), had been controlled by Baltic Germans, but beginning in the 1860s the Russian Ministry of State Domains took a number of measures to promote their welfare. How successful these measures actually were is a matter of interpretation, but toward the end of the nineteenth century conditions among the former Baltic state peasants do not seem to have differed appreciably from those among the former serfs of the German landowners.

Finland was part of Sweden from the thirteenth century until her annexation by Russia in 1809. Unlike the Baltic Provinces, Finland's historic boundaries did more or less correspond to the facts of ethnography. Finnish was spoken or understood in all parts of the country except for the Åland Islands and the narrow strip of Swedish coastal settlements along the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Bothnia. Finland's peasants had never been enserfed. They had independent institutions, local self-government and rights protected under Swedish law, and even sent representatives to the Riksdag in Stockholm. Like the Baltic peasants, they benefited from the efforts of the Lutheran Church to develop for them a written language and to spread literacy. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the use of Finnish was confined largely to the peasants; officials, the nobility, townsmen, and even the clergy generally spoke Swedish. But an increasing number of Swedish speakers, many of whom had descended from Finnish-speaking families, began to view Finland as an embryonic, Hegelian nation-state and to identify themselves with the nationality of the peasant majority of the population. Finland's society was always less rigidly organized than that of the Baltic Provinces; the willingness of a significant number of individuals from the Swedish-speaking middle and upper strata of the population to join forces with the Finnish national movement tended to alleviate national, class, and economic tensions. It made possible at the beginning of the twentieth century the cooperation of Swedes and Finns in a common struggle against Russification. In the Baltic Provinces similar cooperation among Germans, Estonians, and Latvians did not and perhaps could not have occurred.

In the second part of the nineteenth century Finland also differed from the Baltic Provinces and the other western borderlands in being governed separately from the rest of the empire. Thus, in Finland the

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authority of the Russian Ruling Senate, State Council, and ministries was not exercised directly, but indirectly through the emperor and the State Secretariat for Finnish Affairs; internally, Finland was governed by an administrative Senate and a Diet representing all four estates (including the landed peasants); and her religious affairs were not subjected to central bureaucratic control and supervision as had been the case elsewhere in Russia's western borderlands since the first part of the nineteenth century. It was the extent and apparent certainty of Finland's autonomy that made certain measures of administrative Russification—which were mild in comparison with its practice elsewhere—seem so outrageous and unjustifiable at the beginning of the twentieth century to the vast majority of Finns and significant segments of public opinion in western Europe and the United States.

The Baltic Germans reacted with similar indignation when the introduction of Russian reforms and institutions first came under serious consideration during the 1860s. The Baltic Germans feared not so much the actual measures introduced by the government at the time as what seemed to be their long-term implications. Although they did not know exactly what the government intended to do, their publicists of the sixties did not hesitate to ascribe to the government the goal of forcibly making Russians out of non-Russians.¹ By the beginning of the twentieth century this definition of Russification came to be generally accepted by liberal and radical political leaders and journalists. In Soviet times the notion of Russification as a "forcible great-power-colonial policy" (in tsarist Russia only, of course) has been enshrined lexicographically as historical fact.²

But did Russian officials and nationalistic publicists understand the word in this sense? It would not seem so. Until the mid-nineteenth century the intransitive form of the verb Russify (*obruset'*) was generally used, meaning "to become Russian," as contrasted with the later and more active form of *obrusit'*, or "to make Russian."³ Catherine II used the verb *obruset'* as early as 1764, to mean centralizing and unifying the empire's administrative and legal structure to assure government control over society and the interests of the Russian state in the Ukraine and the Baltic Provinces. Nicholas I, who was no nationalist in the modern sense of the word, seems to have meant much the same thing when he asked his son in a testament prepared in 1835 to complete the work of Russification (*obrusovanie*) in Congress Poland.⁴ In the 1860s Russian officials and publicists employed the term sparingly because they realized how well it served the purposes of anti-Russian publicists. Thus, as early as 1864 the leading Russian nationalistic journalist, editor of *Moskovskie vedomosti* Mikhail N. Katkov (1818-

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1887), derisively dismissed as fantasy the talk in the French press about his newspaper's reliance on Moscow merchants who wished to Russify not only Riga, Vilna, and Warsaw but also the entire world.⁵ Toward the end of the sixties the famous Slavophile and Baltic polemicist Iurii F. Samarin (1819-1876) did cautiously advocate the Russification of the Estonians and Latvians, but he made this recommendation defensively and as a means of putting an end to what he considered the alarming and progressive Germanization of these two small peoples, who were "obviously not intended for an independent political development" and who would voluntarily become Russians if only given some encouragement.⁶

Official circles observed similar caution in the use of the word Russification. It was only toward the end of the nineteenth century that it gained wide currency as a convenient expression of the government's desire to extend Russian political and judicial institutions to the borderlands and to make Russian the language of the schools and local officialdom throughout the empire. But no less an authority than Holy Synod Procurator Konstantin P. Pobedonostsev (1827-1907), in speaking of Congress Poland, pointed out that it would be futile to try to transform Poles into Russians. He denied that the Russian government had any such intention, adding that the word Russification had so many different meanings that much confusion and error would be eliminated if it were not used at all.⁷ Another would-be Russifier, Nikolai I. Bobrikov (1839-1904), the Russian governor-general in Helsinki between 1898 and 1904, stated categorically that he had no plans to Russify the Finnish and Swedish-speaking inhabitants of the Finnish Grand Duchy.⁸ If Russian officials were less categorical in their statements about the Estonians and Latvians, they realized by the beginning of the twentieth century that these two small peoples were determined to defend their own national identity. In any case, it is dubious that there was at that time a coherent tsarist policy aiming at making Russians out of the Estonians and Latvians.

In this study we will employ the word Russification in three senses: unplanned, administrative, and cultural. The verb *obruset'*, or "to become Russian," suggests unplanned, voluntary Russification. Since the sixteenth century countless Tatars, Chuvashes, Mordvinians, Belorussians, Ukrainians, and other non-Russians had naturally and voluntarily adopted Russian customs, culture, and language as a result of serving in the army or bureaucracy, marrying Russians, or simply by residing and working where Russian was spoken. In the period inaugurated by the emancipation of the serfs and the Great Reform,

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the rate of unplanned Russification was no doubt accelerated. The building of railways and economic expansion and modernization brought the borderlands closer to the Russian interior. Development of industry and of the internal market and the improvement of communications and of professional and social services created new opportunities for Russians and non-Russians alike. Impressive achievements in literature, the arts, science, and scholarship made the Russian culture, language, and way of life more attractive than ever before. Finland was the least affected by this form of Russification. In the Baltic Provinces, on the other hand, a number of Baltic Germans seem to have responded positively to the allures of Russian nationality. If the Latvians and Estonians who remained in the Baltic Provinces proved to be surprisingly resistant to Russification and insistent on the retention of their own nationality, hundreds of thousands of individuals from among their ranks sought economic opportunity outside the Baltic Provinces. In the interior of the empire, the majority of these Baltic emigrants were, sooner or later, Russified.

Administrative Russification, on the other hand, was a more deliberate and conscious policy and began with the reign of Catherine II. It aimed at uniting the borderlands with the center of the empire through the *gradual* introduction of Russian institutions and laws and extension of the use of Russian in the local bureaucracy and as a subject of instruction in schools. This was the form of Russification that generally prevailed in the Baltic Provinces and Finland.

The advocates of cultural Russification believed that it was not enough for the borderland peoples to be integrated into the political and administrative structure of the empire. Russia, in their opinion, could only become a modern national state if her borderland minorities accepted the language and cultural and religious values of the Russian people. Samarin was the most effective champion of this form of Russification. During the 1860s and early 1870s his sharp criticism of official Baltic policy and his advocacy of the Russification of the Latvians and Estonians, Orthodox proselytizing, and the restructuring of Baltic society greatly disturbed Alexander II and St. Petersburg officialdom. Alexander III disagreed with his father and took Samarin's views on the Baltic question seriously, even trying in the latter part of the eighties to put them into practice.

Problems of definition and sources and the need to work with the six principal languages spoken in the Baltic Provinces and Finland during the nineteenth century (Estonian, Finnish, German, Latvian, Russian, and Swedish) make the study of Russification there a difficult one for the isolated scholar who works by himself. For this reason, the

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five authors of this study decided as early as May 1972, at the Third Conference on Baltic Studies in Toronto, to pool their knowledge of languages and skills in such areas as literature, demography, and the behavioral sciences (we are all historians) to undertake a group study of Russification in the Baltic region.

The nature of the subject and our own respective interests have convinced us that the most appropriate approach to the organization of our study would be one suggested by the German novelist Karl Gutzkow in 1850. In the introduction to the first volume of the novel *Die Ritter vom Geiste*, Gutzkow then referred to two principles for the organization of a novel: *das Nebeneinander* as opposed to *das Nacheinander*. What Gutzkow proposed to do was to write a new sort of novel that would no longer revolve about sequential and unilinear deeds and actions of a single hero (*das Nacheinander*) but would place kings alongside beggars in order to reflect the most varied viewpoints of people from all walks of life (*das Nebeneinander*).⁹

We propose to place Russian bureaucrats and publicists alongside various strata of the German, Estonian, Latvian, Swedish, and Finnish-speaking population of Finland, Estland, Livland, and Kurland. We will endeavor to bring out the manner in which the Baltic peoples were affected by that peculiar combination of reform, Russification, and compromise so characteristic of Russian borderland policy. The response to Russification of each of the Baltic social strata and nationalities was conditioned by its material interests, traditional role in local society, prospects of social mobility, and the level of development it had reached by 1855. These are all factors that must be taken into consideration if one is to understand Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland between 1855 and 1914.

Aware of the perils of the *Nebeneinander*, we have made a special effort to achieve a proper division of labor. Some repetition is unavoidable, for we are dealing with a single subject viewed from a variety of group and national perspectives. The main outlines of Russification as a policy and its impact on privileged groups in the Baltic borderlands are sketched in the first two Parts of this study. In the first Part I discuss the gradual emergence of a policy of administrative Russification before 1855, the duel between advocates of administrative and cultural Russification in the post-emancipation period, and the inconclusive outcome of this contest. Emphasized here is policy formulation (as opposed to policy implementation) in two separate periods: 1855-1895 in regard to the Baltic Provinces and 1890-1910 in regard to Finland. In the second Part Michael H. Haltzel describes the traditional world of the Baltic Germans, shows how a new particularist

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ideology took shape during the 1860s, and concentrates on the Baltic German reaction to the implementation of Russification during the period 1881-1905. Russification was a threat to the dominant position of the Germans in Baltic society. Symbolically, it pointed to the gradual transformation of the old and familiar Russian Empire into a Russian nation-state in which there would be little room for loyal, non-Russian landowners from the Baltic Provinces.

In the third and fourth Parts Andrejs Plakans and Toivo U. Raun view Russification through the eyes of the Latvians and Estonians. The attitudes and objectives of these peoples are somewhat more difficult to document than those of Russian and German publicists and leaders, as they were dominated for centuries by the Baltic Germans and had no political and national elites of their own until the second part of the nineteenth century. But Plakans and Raun, by supplementing textual analysis of contemporary accounts with a prosopographical study of intellectual leaders, have succeeded in showing a wide range of responses to Russification among Estonians and Latvians. Social, cultural, and economic progress produced a new system of social stratification and a greater degree of social mobility, permitting the gradual rise of Estonian and Latvian elites who aspired to a leading role in local Baltic society. They were primarily concerned with the social and economic advancement of their own national communities. Russification (but only of an administrative kind) was first seen as a desirable curb to Baltic German influence and later as something that was irksome but not necessarily a threat to their own cultural and economic future.

Finland was the last important area of the Russian Empire to be affected by Russification. In the fifth Part C. Leonard Lundin discusses in detail the response of the Finns to Russification between 1881 and 1910. By then Finland was a modern country with a high degree of self-consciousness and a set of institutions and values that differed markedly from those of Russia. Russians understandably did not look kindly on the alienation of Finland from the rest of the empire; Finns, in their turn, were disturbed by Russian efforts to alter the special relationship Finland had had with the empire for about a hundred years. The actual impact of Russification on Finland was not great, but before 1914 certain danger signs indicated that those elements in the bureaucracy which had, since the sixties, advocated moderation in the practice of Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland would perhaps no longer prevail. The fear that this would happen helped to unite Finns at a time of considerable internal and national tension.

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1. F. I. Fircks [pseud.: D. K. Schédo-Ferroti], *Etudes sur l'avenir de la Russie*, VIII: *Que fera-t-on de la Pologne?* (Berlin: E. Bock [B. Behr]; Bruxelles and Leipzig: Aug. Schnee, 1864), pp. vii-viii, 151-55; C. Schirren, *Liivländische Antwort an Herrn Juri Samarin* (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1869), pp. 41-42, 110-12.
2. "Obrusitel'nyi," "obrusit'," "russifikatsiia," *Tolkovyi slovar' russkogo iazyka*, ed. B. M. Volin and D. N. Ushakov (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Inostrannykh i Natsional'nykh Slovari, 1938), II, 705; III, 1407.
3. Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Institut Russkogo Iazyka, *Slovar' sovremennogo russkogo literaturnogo iazyka* (Moscow-Leningrad: Akademiia Nauk, 1950-), VIII, 410-11.
4. Catherine II to A. Viazemskii, 1764, SIRIO (see List of Abbreviations), VII (1871), 348; "Zaveshchanie Nikolaia I synu," ed. V. I. Picheta, *Krasnyi arkhiv*, III (1923), 293.
5. Katkov, 1864 god (see List of Abbreviations), p. 551.
6. Samarin (see List of Abbreviations), IX, 468.
7. *Svod vysochaishikh otmetok po vsepoddanneishim otchetam za 1896 g. general-gubernatorov, gubernatorov i gradonachal'nikov* (St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia Tipografiia, 1898), p. 35.
8. *Vsepoddanneishaia zapiska finliandskogo general-gubernatora 1898-1902* ([St. Petersburg]: Gosudarstvennaia Tipografiia, [1902]), p. 13.
9. Karl Gutzkow, *Die Ritter vom Geiste*, I (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1850), pp. 6-8.

PART ONE

THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT

EDWARD C. THADEN

CHAPTER 1

REFORM AND RUSSIFICATION IN THE WESTERN BORDERLANDS, 1796-1855

ESSENTIALLY, the Russian government's relations with the empire's borderlands is to be seen as an aspect of local government. Russia was an undergoverned country, and even in the Great Russian center of the empire the lack of appropriate institutions, the absence of satisfactory legal and administrative order, and the insufficient number of competent and trained officials made it difficult for the government to rule effectively outside St. Petersburg and the *guberniia* capitals. However, Russia, like other European states, often tried to impose her own religious and political norms on national and religious minorities living within her frontiers. This was particularly the case in the eastern borderlands and the left-bank Ukraine, where the local elites were either easily assimilated or had weakly developed institutions of self-government. In the western borderlands, on the other hand, the local administrative, legal, and social institutions often seemed to be superior to those of the Great Russian center. These institutions were the product of a long historical development that had permitted Polish *szlachta*, German burghers and nobles, and Swedish estates either to win new rights and privileges or to defend old ones in a secular struggle with relatively weak Polish or Swedish kings. Russia, a much more powerful monarchy than either Poland or Sweden, initially confirmed these rights and privileges because it was expedient for her to try to assure for herself the cooperation of the Polish, German, and Swedish upper classes in newly conquered areas during wars with Sweden and France in the eighteenth and at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Although no Russian ruler seems to have considered these promises to have been of the binding contractual nature assumed by certain Baltic German and Finnish publicists, a sufficient number of well-educated and competent borderland nobles performed useful services for the Russian state to incline Russian rulers up to Alexander III to confirm the autonomy and special rights of the upper classes in the western borderlands as long as they re-

mained loyal to Russia. Furthermore, because Russian law was neither uniform nor codified before the 1830s and because there was a shortage of trained jurists and officials, defenders of local privileges easily found arguments against the wisdom of introducing Russian laws and institutions. Only after Russian society had been profoundly altered by the reforms of the sixties and seventies did it seem appropriate to proceed systematically with programs of Russification in the western borderlands.

NEITHER RUSSIFICATION nor the reforms of the 1860s and 1870s can be properly understood without some reference to earlier efforts to centralize and rationalize government and to apply in Russia what George Yaney has referred to as "legal-administrative system."¹ These efforts affected the eastern borderlands of the empire and the left-bank Ukraine as early as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Baltic Provinces, Old Finland, and the lands acquired from Poland between 1772 and 1795 were brought directly under the supervision of the central government during the eighteenth century. Interference in the local affairs of the Baltic Provinces began in the mid-eighteenth century, when agents of the central government suggested the introduction of measures based on seventeenth-century Swedish legislation in order to increase government revenues and to protect Estonian and Latvian peasants from arbitrary treatment at the hands of their German masters.² Catherine II, as is well known, viewed borderland privileges with particular suspicion and favored from the very beginning of her reign a basic "Russification" of their administration and political institutions. During the latter part of her reign Russian forms of taxation (especially the head tax) and the Russian *guberniia*, nobility, and town institutions provided for in the Provincial Reform of 1775 and the Charters to the Nobility and Towns of 1785 were introduced throughout the vast area that had been annexed from Poland and Sweden during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.³

In November and December of 1796 five decrees of Paul I set Livland, Estland, Old Finland, and the former Polish lands apart from the rest of the empire, declaring them to be *gubernii* administered on "special foundations according to their rights and privileges."⁴ But Paul believed, no less than did his mother Catherine, in the need to keep the provinces under the control and supervision of the central government and its agents. It was chiefly in the areas of strictly local affairs, courts, and the administration of law that he willingly permitted the western borderlands to deviate from the norms observed elsewhere in the empire. He continued to collect the head tax throughout this region, whereas in the Baltic Provinces he introduced the

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Russian recruitment system—something from which Estonian and Latvian peasants had been spared before 1796. In addition, despite Paul's restoration of privileges, governors-general, civil and military governors, boards of public welfare, and *guberniia* financial and treasury offices continued to represent the authority of the central government in the western borderlands on the basis of Catherine II's Provincial Reform of 1775.⁵

After 1796, however, representatives of the authority of the central government in the western borderlands found it difficult to do anything that affected the interest of the local privileged estates without securing the cooperation of their assemblies of the nobility and town councils and of the German and Polish officials who took care of the everyday administrative, police, and court affairs of this area. To a considerable extent the administrative Russification undertaken by Catherine II seems to have been premature. Officials from the Great Russian center of the empire usually lacked the requisite knowledge and expertise to deal effectively with the local affairs of the western borderlands. This was especially the case in Belorussia, Lithuania and the right-bank Ukraine.⁶ In Estland and Livland the rapid introduction of the head tax and of Russian legislation and institutions that sometimes protected the rights of the lower classes disturbed the equilibrium of a traditional society based on hierarchically arranged estates.⁷

The annexation of Finland in 1809 (augmented by Old Finland in 1812) and of Congress Poland in 1815 created another category of privileged provinces within the Russian Empire. Granting concessions to the wishes of the upper classes in Finland and Congress Poland was one way of securing their support during and immediately following the Napoleonic Wars. Traditional religions, laws, customs, and political institutions were retained, and the Russian Provincial Reform of 1775 was introduced in neither Finland nor in Congress Poland. Alexander I placed Finland directly under his own personal supervision and specifically instructed the Russian ministers and the Senate in St. Petersburg not to interfere in Finnish affairs. At the Porvoo (Borgå) meeting of the Finnish Diet in 1809 Alexander promised to respect Finland's existing laws and "constitutions" and announced the establishment of a Government Council consisting exclusively of inhabitants of the Grand Duchy. The major purpose of this Council, or the Finnish Senate after 1816, was to direct and coordinate the operation of Finland's internal administration. A Committee for Finnish Affairs (the State Secretariat for Finnish Affairs after 1826), staffed largely by citizens of Finland, was established in St. Petersburg as a coordinating office through which all matters pertaining to Finland

had to go.⁸ Similar arrangements were made for Congress Poland after 1815, including a Polish minister secretary who resided in St. Petersburg and served as a representative of Polish interests and as an intermediary between the emperor and Russian officials in Warsaw and St. Petersburg. Furthermore, in one respect Polish autonomy seemed to be more satisfactorily guaranteed than that of the Finns: Alexander I granted the kingdom of Poland a Constitutional Charter that provided for regular meetings of a Polish Sejm, local self-government, a separate army, and civil rights for Polish subjects of the Russian Emperor, who ruled as king of Poland.⁹

Elsewhere in the western borderlands privileged German and Polish elites gained new ground, especially in the areas of peasant reform and education. Peasant reform did not become a serious issue in Lithuania, Belorussia, and the right-bank Ukraine, where the landowning Polish *szlachta* shared many of the social attitudes of Great Russian landowners. But local leaders of Polish society endeavored to use education as a means of isolating these areas culturally and linguistically from the rest of the empire. The Polish Commission of National Education, founded in 1773, had already laid the foundations for a viable network of schools. During the first third of the nineteenth century these schools contributed significantly to the re-Polonization of the middle and upper classes in the very area where Catherine II had recommended Russification in the latter part of the eighteenth century.

In the Baltic Provinces, the emancipation of the Estonian and Latvian serfs between 1816 and 1819 provided an essential point of departure for a social and economic development quite different from that of the Great Russian center of the empire. During the ensuing half century a system of elementary education with Estonian and Latvian as the languages of instruction, a rudimentary form of peasant self-government, and an agricultural economy based on free labor and the principle of private property gradually evolved. By the 1860s the progressive accentuation of the differences separating the organization of the society and economy of the Baltic Provinces from that of the center of the empire had greatly complicated the task of administrators hoping to extend to the region the Russian Great Reforms.

The terms of serf emancipation in the Baltic Provinces were worked out early in the reign of Alexander I by committees representing the local nobility. These committees studied peasant obligations and landholding and compiled new and more reliable inventories of obligations (*Wackenbücher*). Committees representing the Livland *Ritterschaft* were particularly important. Initially, the Russian govern-

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ment exercised some influence over this work, but its attention was soon drawn away from Baltic peasant questions by war and other more pressing affairs, while the few Russian officials attached to the local Baltic committees had little first-hand knowledge about Baltic affairs and generally accepted the advice of the Germans with whom they worked. This advice, of course, usually favored the interests of the local landowners. The peasant was emancipated without land and remained economically and socially dependent on the Baltic German nobility. He was a free man and a member of a self-governing rural community that now elected its own officers; he was called upon to help organize and support rural elementary schools and to participate in the administration of local affairs. However, if he desired to leave his native province he had to obtain permission from the local landowner and from officers of his local peasant community, who carried out their duties and functions under the watchful eye and supervision of the nearby nobility and officials working for the organs of the Baltic *Ritterschaften*. And, to some extent freedom became a mixed blessing, for the landowner no longer had the legal and moral responsibility to take care of the peasants in times of need.¹⁰

For all its shortcomings the emancipation of the Baltic peasant did provide Estonian and Latvian peasants with opportunities for elementary education that existed for few peasants in other parts of the empire during the first part of the nineteenth century. The Russian government of that time did little to promote the dissemination of literacy among peasants, and the social structure and values associated with serfdom discouraged the Russian clergy and nobility from taking the initiative in founding schools. In the Baltic Provinces, however, many peasants had been taught reading under the supervision of the Protestant clergy even before the emancipation. Beginning in 1819 legislation, approved separately in each of the three Baltic Provinces, opened the way for the establishment of an elementary educational system that spread literacy among Baltic peasants several generations earlier than elsewhere in the empire (with the exception of Finland). What was achieved by this educational system, it should be noted, depended on the commitment and supportiveness not only of the German clergy and nobility but also of the Estonian and Latvian peasantry. Local authorities controlled and supervised the rural school. The Russian Ministry of Education, as its official historian sadly commented, "was altogether eliminated from the business of elementary, popular education in the Baltic region."¹¹

In regard to secondary and higher education, the system of national education established in 1802 was a highly decentralized one. The actual administration of school affairs was centered in six educational

regions located in Dorpat (Tartu), Vilna, Kharkov, Kazan, Moscow, and St. Petersburg. Liaison between them and the Ministry of Education was maintained through curators who resided initially in St. Petersburg. In the Dorpat and Vilna regions German and Polish were the respective languages of instruction, and textbooks and educational programs were determined by local German or Polish professors and administrators.¹² The educational affairs of Finland and Congress Poland were then administered in almost complete isolation from those of the rest of the empire. Four of the eight universities in the Russian Empire between 1816 and 1830 were located in the western borderlands, their languages of instruction being Polish (Warsaw and Vilna), German (Dorpat), and Swedish (Åbo/Helsingfors).

A thorough reconsideration of educational and other aspects of borderland policy began under Nicholas I, especially after the Polish insurrection of November 1830. During the 1840s attention was drawn to the Baltic Provinces because of the failure of the local German landowners to prevent serious social unrest among the Estonian and Latvian peasantry. The efforts under Nicholas I to codify Russian law, to draft new municipal legislation, to deal with the problems of the empire's peasant population, and to centralize and standardize bureaucratic controls over society pointed in the direction of lessening the dependence of the Russian government on borderland nobles. Nicholas' minister of the interior during the forties, L. A. Perovskii (1792-1856), advocated for Poland, Finland, and the Baltic Provinces the introduction of Russian laws, administration, and municipal institutions as well as the establishment of Russian as the official language of the local administration and as the language of instruction in schools.¹³ Nicholas I, despite his interest in unifying and centralizing the empire's administrative and legal system, did not accept these proposals in their entirety.

He did, however, act firmly in Congress Poland after the uprising of 1830-1831. Thus, he replaced the Polish Constitutional Charter of 1815 with the Organic Statutes of 1832, which abolished the Polish Sejm and army. Dictatorial power was concentrated in the hands of Prince Field Marshal I. F. Paskevich (1782-1856), the new viceroy of Poland. Paskevich, with the apparent approval of Nicholas I, opposed the introduction of Russian laws and institutions into Poland, arguing that not the slow-moving Russian bureaucracy but an exclusive power that stood outside the law was needed to deal with the special conditions and problems obtaining in Russia's borderlands.¹⁴

Other Russian officials, especially those employed by the Second Section of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancery, worked systematically to prepare the groundwork for the very thing against which

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Paskevich had warned, namely, the introduction of Russian laws and institutions into the borderlands. Within the Second Section, which was concerned with the codification of Russian law, such officials as M. M. Speranskii (1772-1839), D. N. Bludov (1785-1864), and D. V. Dashkov (1788-1839), soon realized that the codification of local laws in the Caucasus, Poland, Finland, and the Baltic Provinces was a necessary step preliminary to the establishment of general legal norms for the entire empire. In the borderland regions existing laws and court procedures represented an extraordinarily complicated mosaic of differing and often conflicting traditions written down in a variety of languages ranging from Latin, German, Polish, and Swedish to Arabic and Georgian. Russian legal experts were obviously not in a position to gain much insight into the nature of the actual legal conditions and laws in the borderlands without simplified and systematized collections of local laws in the original and in Russian translation. Because of the importance attached to bringing local laws into conformity with the general laws of the empire, it was prescribed that all codifications of local laws should be modeled after the Russian *Svod zakonov* and that they should in no way be in conflict with the rights and prerogatives of the autocratic power and with Russian fundamental laws. Work was commenced on law codes for all the major borderland areas, but it was only in the Baltic Provinces that a local code received official sanction, an action which the Baltic Germans interpreted to be a confirmation of their traditional rights and privileges. In the western *gubernii*, on the other hand, the traditional Lithuanian Statute was abolished, and local Polish law was replaced by the Russian *Svod zakonov* between 1831 and 1840.¹⁵

In Finland, in contrast to the Baltic Provinces, Russian-sponsored codification of local laws at the beginning of the forties was seen by Finnish State Secretary Alexander Armfelt (1794-1876) and other Finnish officials as a threat to the Finns' privileged position and rights within the empire. They found an ally in Prince A. S. Menshikov (1787-1869), the Russian governor-general in Finland, who, though not particularly opposed to the codification of Finnish laws, was very concerned about the maintenance of social order and stability in Finland. Having been told about the Finns' apprehensions concerning Bludov's plans and reminded about the role Russia's respect for Finnish traditions had played in making Finland's union with Russia popular, Menshikov used his influence to convince Nicholas I that great caution had to be exercised in dealing with the Finns. As a result, the Second Section's work on the codification of Finnish law was, in effect, suspended by the beginning of the fifties.¹⁶

Peasant problems provided reform-minded Russian officials with

another pretext to intervene in the affairs of the western borderlands. Latvian and Estonian peasants had been emancipated, but they remained dependent on the Baltic German landowners. Between 1842 and 1863 social unrest among the Baltic peasants convinced the three provincial Diets of the need to discuss legislation to permit the former Estonian and Latvian serfs to acquire and own land. Problems of Baltic agriculture were also studied by Russian officials, but the possibility of unilateral intervention on their part in Baltic peasant affairs was practically ruled out through the creation of the Baltic Committee (*Ostseekomitee*). This committee met in St. Petersburg and presented its views on almost all projects of Baltic reform between 1846 and 1876. Consisting as it did of a majority of Baltic nobles or sympathizers, it never seriously challenged the German landowners' control of the Baltic countryside.¹⁷ Nevertheless, Russian officials did exert some influence on Baltic peasant reform during the 1850s and 1860s, as will be discussed in connection with the Russian reforms of the sixties.

The government acted somewhat more vigorously in regard to education, language, and religion. But it only did so in the western *gubernii* and the Baltic Provinces, and not in Poland and Finland. In the western *gubernii*, in particular, the government made every effort to separate this formerly Polish area from Congress Poland, where cultural and educational Russification had been largely limited to abolishing the University of Warsaw and encouraging young Poles to learn Russian and to seek career and educational opportunities in the center of the Russian Empire. In the western *gubernii*, on the other hand, the government made a special effort to Russify law, education, and religion. The former Polish-language university at Vilna was moved to Kiev, where it became the Russian-language St. Vladimir University. Russian replaced Polish as the language of instruction in state-supported elementary and secondary schools, and as much education as possible was taken out of the hands of the Catholic clergy and entrusted to the care of teachers "selected by the government and acting according to its instructions."¹⁸ At the same time, increasing pressure was put on the Uniate clergy to separate from Rome, to remove themselves from the tutelage of Polish Catholicism, and to bring their flocks back into the Orthodox Church that their ancestors had gradually left during several centuries of Polish rule. In 1839 the reunion of 1.5 million Uniates with the Russian Orthodox Church was officially proclaimed.¹⁹

Similar but less drastic measures were taken in the Baltic Provinces. Here new emphasis was placed on the teaching of the Russian language, geography, and history in secondary schools. Competency in

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Russian became a condition for obtaining academic degrees at the University of Dorpat. By the beginning of the forties, all students matriculating there were required to pass a rigorous entrance examination in Russian. In 1850 the use of Russian was decreed obligatory for the official business of all branches of the state bureaucracy in the Baltic Provinces.²⁰ Meanwhile, the Russian government, after some initial hesitations, allowed tens of thousands of impoverished Estonian and Latvian peasants to leave the Lutheran Church and to convert to Orthodoxy so that they could, in the words of Minister of Education Sergei S. Uvarov (1786-1855), "enter into a more intimate union with our faith, with our ideas, our way of life."²¹ Other influential figures in the government, such as Minister of the Interior L. A. Perovskii and Synod Chief N. A. Protasov (1798-1855) shared this view. Nicholas I, however, feared all popular movements among the empire's peasant majority and was easily frightened by Baltic German warnings about the social unrest and confusion likely to result from allowing peasants to leave the Church of their landowners and social superiors.²²

During the fifties official efforts in the Baltic Provinces to promote Orthodoxy and Russian language and culture slackened. For one thing, the revolutions of 1848 in western and central Europe seemed to illustrate the importance of reinforcing traditional order in all parts of the empire. In the Baltic Provinces official encouragement of the conversion movement was abandoned, and the new Germanophile governor-general, Prince Aleksandr A. Suvorov (1804-1882), prevailed upon Nicholas I not to insist on immediate enforcement of the language law of 1850, for otherwise some 300 Germans in Baltic state service, whose knowledge of Russian was inadequate, would have to be forced into retirement. Following the Crimean War, uncertainty about how peasants and landowners would react to emancipation and a general atmosphere of reform and relative liberalism helped Suvorov, who remained governor-general until 1861, to persuade Alexander to agree to further concessions to the Baltic Germans. As a result, less emphasis was placed on Russian-language instruction in Baltic schools, and a high degree of competency in Russian was no longer required for graduation from secondary schools. In 1858, Alexander II agreed to delay indefinitely the implementation of the language law of 1850.²³

The spirit of reform in Russia during the late fifties and early sixties had similar effects in Poland. The western borderlands in general then benefited from proposals for administrative decentralization. Many Russians in intellectual and official circles saw Russia's recent setbacks as the consequence of shortcomings of Nicholas I's rigid, overly centralized, and ineffective bureaucracy. Influential figures in the all-

important Ministry of the Interior accepted this indictment of Nicholas' system and, therefore, took measures to give governors more powers and a greater degree of control over their own provincial bureaucracies.²⁴ Given these new circumstances, it was important for the Poles that after 1856 both the new viceroy in Warsaw, Field Marshal M. D. Gorchakov (1793-1861), and the new general-governor in Vilna, V. I. Nazimov (1802-1874), were on good terms with the *szlachta* and favored leniency in dealing with the Poles. In the Russian capital, there was no agreement about how the Polish problem should be handled, but fear of peasant unrest and the need to concentrate on the central task of reform argued in favor of detente and compromise in the borderlands. This was indeed the policy Alexander II and his advisers pursued during these years, culminating in 1862 with the appointment of Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich (1827-1892) as the viceroy and the Polish Marquis Alexander Wielopolski (1803-1877) as the head of the civil administration of the Kingdom of Poland. This experiment in Polish self-government was, however, a rather short-lived episode in the history of Polish-Russian relations.²⁵

**DILEMMAS OF BORDERLAND POLICY
IN THE ERA OF GREAT REFORMS:
POLAND AND FINLAND,
1855-1881**

DURING THE SIXTIES AND SEVENTIES the Russian government clearly had no fixed and well-articulated plan for the Russification of the empire's western borderlands. Initially, as has been pointed out, pre-occupation with internal reform produced a rather conciliatory policy toward them, a policy continued in regard to Finland throughout these two decades. But the Great Reforms of the sixties and seventies provided Russia for the first time with institutions and laws that seemed to compare favorably with the traditional ones of the western borderlands. Had not, therefore, the time come to introduce into this region zemstvos, reformed courts, and peasant and municipal reforms similar to those that had just been promulgated for the interior provinces of the empire?

High-ranking officials debated how fast and to what extent the Great Reforms should be extended to the western borderlands. This area, Third Section Head Petr A. Shuvalov (1827-1889) once remarked to a marshal of the Livland nobility, was essentially a battleground on which Russian conservative, liberal, and nationalist officials fought over questions of Russian internal state policy.¹ The major combatants were the so-called aristocratic or German party as opposed to the so-called democratic, patriotic, or even anarchistic party. The "German" party, which included Shuvalov, successive Ministers of the Interior Petr A. Valuev (1814-1890) and Aleksandr E. Timashev (1818-1893), and Baltic Governor-General Petr P. Al'bedinskii (1826-1883), tended to doubt the ability of Russian and non-Russian peasants to assume an independent role in society, and supported measures that would assure the continued social and economic predominance of wealthy, landowning nobles in the countryside of both the Russian interior and the borderlands of the empire. Although this "party" favored reform in the western borderlands and their integration with the rest of the empire, it wanted to proceed with such reform and

integration gradually and in a manner that would enable borderland nobles to retain their leading position in local society.²

The "democratic" party, which included the brothers D. A. and N. A. Miliutin, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, and Minister of Education A. V. Golovnin (1821-1886), sought a somewhat broader base of public support for the government than the nobility. The members of this particular group of officials felt that the peasants should be encouraged to play a more independent role in local affairs, disapproved of current projects of "aristocratic" reform, and distrusted the borderland nobles as likely allies of their opponents at home. Viewing the Baltic "barons" with particular suspicion, they wanted the government to deal firmly with problems of social, political, and economic reform in the Baltic Provinces. In regard to Finland and Poland, however, they were willing in the early sixties to allow the leaders of local Finnish and Polish society to operate within the framework of autonomous institutions. In Poland this conciliatory policy lasted only until 1863, when Nikolai A. Miliutin (1818-1872) undertook the laying of the groundwork for the Russification of the Congress Kingdom. This new policy in Poland was not accepted by all members of the democratic party. Konstantin Nikolaevich could not accept it because of the close association of his name with the experiment with Polish autonomy after having so recently served as viceroy in Warsaw during 1862-1863; and after 1863 Golovnin, Konstantin Nikolaevich's friend and former associate in the Naval Ministry, loyally tried to defend the policy the grand duke had followed in Warsaw.³

Two important figures who stood apart from both the German and the democratic parties were Dmitrii A. Tolstoi (1825-1889), the minister of education and chief procurator of the Holy Synod, and Aleksandr A. Zelenoi (1819-1880), the minister of state domains. The democratic party could usually count on their support for Russifying reforms designed to undermine the predominant position of the Germans in the Baltic Provinces.⁴ Otherwise, Tolstoi and Zelenoi did not champion the causes of liberal-minded bureaucrats within the government.

Something also needs to be said about a third party, one that the journalist Katkov liked to refer to as the "national" party. According to Katkov, this party only wanted what was "useful for Russia"; it opposed the "non-Russian" policy and Polonophilism of the cosmopolitan and antinational Russian intelligentsia.⁵ Another influential Russian publicist who insisted on the importance of Russian nationality as the basis of the empire's spiritual unity and of borderland policy was the Slavophile Iurii Samarin. He was N. A. Miliutin's co-worker in Poland during 1863-1864 and the most renowned of Russia's Baltic

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polemicalists of the sixties and seventies. But borderland and western European historians and Russophobic journalists have exaggerated the influence Katkov and Samarin had on official Baltic and Polish policy. On the whole, discussion of sensitive issues was allowed only when the Russian government felt it needed public support. Whenever journalists became bold enough to attack established government policies, Russian officials were quick to take repressive measures against the press.⁶

A borderland policy based on considerations of Russian nationality was, however, no novelty. As we have already seen, there was evidence that such a policy existed at the time of Nicholas I and even earlier. In the western *gubernii*, it is important to note, the government continued during the 1850s and 1860s to follow a more or less Russification policy. The Ukrainian and Belorussian majority of the population of this area was, to be sure, considered by the government to be Russian. Although certain concessions were made to the wishes of its most influential minority—the Poles—Russian remained the official language of its schools and local administration. Its courts and municipal and *guberniia* institutions continued to operate as part of the general legal administrative system of the Great Russian *gubernii* of the empire established by Catherine II's Provincial Reform of 1775. In the early 1860s Russian officials saw no reason not to proceed with plans to extend Russian peasant, judicial, and other reforms to the western *gubernii*.⁷

It was in the western *gubernii* that the reassessment of Russia's conciliatory borderland policy of the 1850s began. Disturbed by the rebellious mood of local Poles at the end of the fifties and in the early sixties, Alexander and his advisers outlined a program to curtail the anti-Russian activities of the Poles and to increase Russian influence in this area. Some of the measures considered were reinforcement of police controls, support of the Orthodox Church and parochial schools, the establishment of Russian landowners in the area, and the weakening of the dependence of local Ukrainian and Belorussian peasants on the Polish *szlachta*. After the January insurrection of 1863 these measures were carried out with ruthless severity by Mikhail N. Murav'ev (1796-1866), the Russian governor-general in Vilna. In addition, Murav'ev, the famous "hangman of Vilna," executed, exiled, imprisoned, and confiscated the estates of thousands of Poles who had been involved in the insurrection.⁸

Between 1863 and 1866 the direction of the Congress Kingdom's affairs lay above all in the hands of N. A. Miliutin, who introduced into that unfortunate province a steadily increasing number of Russian officials for the implementation of social, bureaucratic, and agrarian

reform. These men were known to Miliutin either personally or they were carefully selected by him from among young officials or recent graduates of Russian universities. On the whole, these appointees had very little or no experience with Polish affairs and approached Polish problems from a distinctly Russian point of view. Their control over Polish affairs could only mean that Polish interests would almost always be subordinated to what Russian officials narrowly interpreted to be the interests of the empire.⁹

Since Russians could only function effectively in their own native tongue, in 1868 Russian became the official language of all *uezd* and *guberniia* offices in Poland. At the same time, the procedures and organization of these offices were brought into line with those prevailing elsewhere in Russia. In 1871 the *Dziennik praw*, the bulletin of Polish laws, ceased to be published, being replaced by the Russian-language *Sbornik zakonov*. In 1875 the Russian legal reform of 1864 was extended to Poland. Persons who neither spoke nor understood Russian were still permitted to testify in Polish, but court proceedings were exclusively in Russian.¹⁰

Russian officials, administration, and law meant, in the final analysis, that Russian had to be taught in the schools of Congress Poland, for now the tsar's Polish subjects could neither communicate with the officials who governed them nor understand the laws and administrative rules that so profoundly affected their lives unless they were competent in the official language of the empire. Russian administrators in charge of Polish affairs had little understanding or sympathy for Poles and Polish society. They ignored, or may have been unaware of the sensible advice Miliutin offered in 1864: that it was impractical and futile to force the Russian language of Polish schoolchildren.¹¹ These officials assumed, for example, that since Polish was similar to Russian there was no good reason why Russian should not be made the language of instruction in Polish secondary schools and at the University of Warsaw. Russian officials who controlled elementary schools also began to introduce Russian as the language of instruction in schools for Polish peasants. By the mid-eighties the use of Russian became obligatory in all Polish elementary schools.¹²

Meanwhile, the Finns, located but a few miles from St. Petersburg, retained their autonomy and even gained new concessions from Russia. Clearly, the events in Poland did not mark an unequivocal victory for the so-called national party and bureaucratic centralizers in St. Petersburg. A policy of Russification had been applied to Congress Poland above all because of the crisis in Polish-Russian relations resulting from the insurrection of 1863-1864. Elsewhere in the western borderlands, especially in Finland, Russia was still inclined to pursue a

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more traditional policy based on the cooperation of the non-Russian privileged strata of the population with the Russian Emperor and his officials.

In the years immediately following the Crimean War, Finnish spokesmen urged the Russian Emperor to convoke the Finnish Diet (*lantdag*), which had not met since Alexander I addressed it at Porvoo (Borgå) in 1809. Alexander II first reacted cautiously, because granting Finland the right to have a Diet was likely to provide the Poles with an argument to ask for the convocation of the Polish Sejm. However, the same considerations that had persuaded many government officials in the late 1850s and early 1860s to question the wisdom of continuing a policy of bureaucratic centralism in Poland, the Baltic Provinces, and elsewhere in the empire made them view sympathetically the special needs and desires of Finland. There seemed every reason for them to do so. Both the dominant Swedish-speaking conservative bureaucrats who governed Finland and the so-called Fennomans (who also generally spoke Swedish but desired to build a Finnish nation based on the language and culture of the Finnish-speaking majority of Finland's inhabitants) believed that Finland's future depended on good relations with Russia. Some Russian officials feared that if the Finns were not encouraged by timely concessions, they might soon look in the direction of Sweden for their spiritual—and even political—guidance.¹³

The three men who occupied the post of governor-general in Helsinki between 1855 and 1881—that is, Generals F.W.R. von Berg (1794-1874), P. I. Rokasovskii (1800-1869), and N. V. Adlerberg (1819-1892)—had considerable influence at Court and were well disposed toward Finland. Berg did much to stimulate the development of Finland's economy and society by building railways and supporting Fennoman demands for extending the use of the Finnish language. His popularity, however, declined because of differences of opinion and bad relations with the circle of Suecoman (i.e. pro-Swedish language and culture) liberals and intellectuals in Helsinki.¹⁴ Berg also had difficulties with Alexander Armfelt, the Finnish minister state secretary, and other influential Swedo-Finnish administrators in St. Petersburg. Armfelt scored an early victory over Berg in 1857, when he persuaded Alexander II to restore the Committee for Finnish Affairs in St. Petersburg, an advisory body designed to enable the Finnish minister state secretary to take over some of the functions of the governor-general and to assume a more active role in the relations of central government with Finland than had been the case between 1826 and 1857.¹⁵

It was, however, only in 1861 that Berg's Finnish opponents man-

aged to have him replaced by General Rokasovskii, who had served previously in Finland between 1848 and 1855 and who had been a member of the Committee for Finnish Affairs in St. Petersburg since 1857. During his first three years in the post of governor-general he enjoyed great popularity in Finland as a stalwart and dependable defender of the Finnish point of view, but by 1864-1865 he, too, decided that the plans of Finnish political leaders did not coincide with the interests of the empire. Of particular concern to Rokasovskii was a Finnish project for a new Form of Government, which he labeled a "constitution" and considered to be above all an attempt to limit the power of the governor-general and of the Russian Emperor in Finland. Alexander II replaced Rokasovskii with General N. V. Adlerberg in 1866, but the new governor-general joined his predecessor in opposing the Finnish project.¹⁶

General Adlerberg, the son of Minister of Court V. F. Adlerberg (1791-1884), always took great pride in the Swedish and Swedo-Finnish origins of his family. For fifteen years the cosmopolitan residence of Count Adlerberg and his German-born, Catholic wife was the center of the social life of high-ranking Swedo-Finnish and Russian officials and army officers in Helsinki. Among themselves Russian army officers and administrators in Helsinki, of course, spoke their own native tongue, but the languages of Adlerberg's social and official world were French, Swedish, and—especially—German. Of all the Russian governors-general in Helsinki, Adlerberg perhaps came closest to being an ideal representative of Russian state power in Finland—at least from the rather subjective point of view of Swedo-Finnish political leaders and administrators. Only during his first several years in Finland did Adlerberg continue his predecessors' policy of opposing projects that seemed to diminish the influence of the Russian central government in Helsinki. Later, Finnish political leaders could almost always count on Adlerberg as a friend and as someone who would support their projects for reform and who would present to the emperor all that pertained to Finland in a most favorable light.¹⁷ The Russian nationalist and specialist on Finnish history M. M. Borodkin said of Adlerberg:

During fifteen years he remained the only influential representative of the authority of the Russian government in Finland and was of no benefit whatsoever to the interests of the Russian state. On the contrary, during his administration of the country took place all those major reforms which led to the manifest alienation of Finland from the Empire.¹⁸

The reforms that alienated Finland from Russia had commenced,

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however, several years before Adlerberg arrived in Helsinki. In April 1861, before Berg's departure from the Finnish capital, Alexander II summoned a commission representing the four Finnish estates to enact provisional laws until circumstances would permit a regular Diet to meet. Vociferous elements in Helsinki thereupon protested vigorously, interpreting this action to be a violation of Finnish rights. Alexander gave way before these protests, first by reassuring the Finns concerning his intentions and then, at the height of the Polish crisis in June 1863, by consenting to the convocation of the Finnish Diet. The Diet's powers and functions were defined somewhat later, namely, by a statute passed by the Diet in 1867 and confirmed by the emperor in 1869. The Diet met regularly after 1863, and enacted legislation during the next several decades that accentuated the differences setting Finland apart from the rest of the Russian Empire. Thus, the franchise was gradually extended, the principle of freedom of worship affirmed, and education expanded more rapidly than in any other place in Russia outside the Baltic Provinces. In 1865 the Bank of Finland received the right to issue quarter-ruble notes, or marks. In 1878, when Finland went on the gold standard, she achieved complete monetary independence from Russia. That same year the Finns also received, despite the objections of Minister of War D. A. Miliutin (1816-1912), the right to maintain a separate army, which was to be commanded by Finnish officers and serve only in Finland. Miliutin pointed out quite correctly at the time that a "completely separate, independent [Finnish] army within the empire's borders" was incompatible with general military reform and made it difficult to integrate the Finnish armed forces into the Russian army.¹⁹

An important factor in the Finns' success in achieving their objectives was most assuredly timing. They had obtained from Alexander II the original concession upon which their expanded autonomy depended before Russian political leaders decided definitely to return to the bureaucratic centralism so recently (and ineffectively) practiced by Nicholas I. During the years immediately preceding their uprising, the Poles, too, had briefly benefited from the efforts of certain influential St. Petersburg officials to decentralize administration and to encourage local self-government. However, these officials gradually lost influence in government circles, because between 1861 and 1863 growing tension in Poland coincided with disturbing signs of serious social and political crisis in Russia. Student unrest closed universities and manifestoes urged soldiers, peasants, and the younger generation to prepare for revolution. A Russia-wide revolutionary organization, the first *Zemlia i volia*, was discovered by the police, and a gentry constitutionalist movement aspired to assume a role of political leadership.

P. A. Valuev, minister of the interior, and other high-ranking officials in St. Petersburg reacted to these challenges to their authority by affirming the unity of the Russian state and the need for firm central government control over Russian society. This attitude was already clearly reflected in the zemstvo statutes of 1864 and the censorship law of 1865, and became even more evident after D. V. Karakozov's attempt on the life of Alexander II in 1866.²⁰

This tendency in government circles to reaffirm principles of bureaucratic centralism affected Russian policy in Congress Poland and the Baltic Provinces but not in Finland. Until the 1880s the official evaluation of Finnish affairs continued to depend largely on information obtained from either a Finlandophile general-governor in Helsinki or from two able and successive Finnish minister state secretaries in St. Petersburg, Alexander Armfelt and G.E.K. Stjernvall-Walleen (1806-1890), both of whom were linked by close ties of friendship with Alexander II and other influential figures at court and in St. Petersburg high society.²¹ Even War Minister Miliutin was seldom critical of Finland. It is to be noted that the newspaper his ministry published, *Russkii invalid*, ran in the early sixties an entire series of friendly and informative articles about Finland.²² As a whole, the liberal and Slavophile press approved the convocation of the Diet and the internal reforms proposed by Finnish political leaders at the time. Only M. N. Katkov's *Moskovskie vedomosti* sounded the alarm about Finnish "separatism" in a newspaper debate with the *Helsingfors Dagblad* toward the end of 1863. Few Russians, however, seemed to take the danger of Finnish "separatism" very seriously. The government, disliking newspaper polemics on the Finnish question, resorted in the beginning of 1864 to indirect pressures to put an end to the *Dagblad-Moskovskie vedomosti* debate. From this time until the late 1870s the theme of Finnish "separatism" disappeared from the Russian press. Occasionally during these years Katkov did voice disapproval of Finland's status as a "neighboring state," but he did so carefully and in moderate language. Otherwise, the infrequent references to Finland made by liberal and Slavophile journalists and writers were usually in a friendly tone, and Finland's right to internal autonomy was not questioned.²³

**ADMINISTRATIVE RUSSIFICATION IN
THE BALTIC PROVINCES,
1855-1881**

ALEXANDER II, in addressing the representatives of the Baltic estates at Riga in June 1867, urged them to become an integral part of the "Russian family" and cooperate with his officials in carrying out reforms he considered to be "necessary and useful."¹ By this time Alexander and his principal advisers on Baltic affairs, who consisted mainly of such members of the so-called German party as Valuev, Shuvalov, and Baltic Governor-General Al'bedinskii, had decided on a policy of gradual administrative Russification in the Baltic Provinces. This policy aimed at bringing these provinces closer to the rest of the empire on the basis of the "fundamental principles of the unity of the state."² However, Alexander and his advisers disagreed with certain nationalistic and Slavophile journalists who demanded that Russian land reform be introduced in this area and that the Orthodox Church be used to bring the local Estonians and Latvians into closer contact with the Slavic majority of the empire's population. Alexander and his advisers considered it impractical and unwise to tamper with the existing structure of the agricultural economy and system of land ownership in the Baltic Provinces and felt that Russian interests would be better served by a policy of religious tolerance than one of Orthodox proselytizing. They hoped to bring all elements of the Baltic population closer to Russia through the establishment of Russian as the official language of the local state bureaucracy, the introduction of Russian municipal, judicial, and educational reforms, and the development of railways and economic ties linking this region with the rest of the empire. Organized resistance on the part of the privileged German minority to the government's program of reform was not to be tolerated; the stirring up of national hatreds and animosities through unnecessary newspaper polemics in the Russian press was considered equally undesirable, for such polemics could only, in the opinion of Alexander II's advisers, give birth to misgivings on the part of the Baltic peoples in regard to Russian intentions and impede and delay the work of economic and political integration.³

Such integration, of course, had been already delayed by the policies pursued in the Baltic region from 1848 to the end of 1864 by Riga Governors-General Suvorov and Baron Wilhelm Lieven (1800-1880). Suvorov, as Valuev once aptly put it, was "more the permanent representative of the Baltic region in St. Petersburg than a representative of St. Petersburg in that region."⁴

Lieven, who replaced Suvorov in 1861, was a Baltic German. His continued presence in Riga during the Polish insurrection of 1863-1864 indicates that the government still had not definitely decided on giving a new direction to its Baltic policy. In the first part of 1865, however, Lieven was replaced by an ambitious native Russian, Shuvalov, who immediately began what Valuev has referred to as "almost feverish activity"⁵ in all major areas of Baltic reform. Shuvalov considered the Riga governor-generalship as merely a stepping stone to a higher post in St. Petersburg and remained only briefly in the Baltic Provinces, but the moderately Russificatory program he instituted in 1865 was continued by his successors. Therefore, it is clear that by the end of 1864, when Shuvalov's replacement of Lieven became known, the government had already decided to proceed with one form or another of Russification in the Baltic region.

It would seem that the government made this decision essentially for two reasons: (1) a renewed wave of social unrest in the Baltic Provinces and (2) uncertainty in the minds of Russian leaders after the Polish revolt concerning the security of the empire's western frontier.

In the early sixties the Baltic religious and social unrest of the forties was still a fresh memory for many Russian officials and publicists. Golovnin, Valuev, and Samarin all had served during the forties as young officials in the Baltic Provinces. In the fifties Golovnin was Konstantin Nikolaevich's personal secretary, and in 1852 he had read to the grand duke detailed official reports he had prepared in the latter part of the forties on the historical, economic, and social reasons for peasant discontent in Livland.⁶ Peasant unrest resumed in the Baltic Provinces after the Crimean War, and assumed a particularly alarming character during the so-called Mahtra War of 1858. This began with a bloody encounter between armed soldiers and 700-800 peasants on an estate near Reval (Tallinn), and eventually involved about 20-25 percent of the peasants of Estland *guberniia* in demonstrations and attacks against local German judges, officials, and landowners.⁷ It was, in all probability, these events that influenced V. T. Blagoveshchenskii (1801-1864), a Russian-language teacher and educational administrator who had spent his entire professional career in the Baltic Provinces, to publish anonymously, and abroad, the book *Der Ehste und sein Herr*

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in 1861. In this book he painted a very unflattering picture of the legal, economic, and social situation of the Estonian peasant. The general nature of its contents and conclusions became known to a wide circle of Russian readers at the end of 1862, when the naval officer V. V. Ivanov (1836-?), who was the Reval correspondent of Konstantin Nikolaevich's publications *Morskoi sbornik* and *Kronshadtstkii vestnik*, published his article "The Estonian and his Master" in Ivan Aksakov's newspaper *Den*.⁸

The theme of the dangers of German unity and aspirations for hegemony in central and eastern Europe, and what it meant for Russia, was developed as early as 1863 in a memorandum submitted by Latvian nationalist leader Krišjānis Valdemārs (1825-1891) to Minister of Education Golovnin.⁹ Valdemārs found ample opportunity to sow further seeds of dissension between Russians and Baltic Germans as a contributor to Katkov's *Moskovskie vedomosti* and as one of the editors of the newspaper *Pēterburgas avīzes*, which he and other Latvians managed to publish in St. Petersburg between 1862 and 1865, thanks to the patronage of Konstantin Nikolaevich and other Russian friends. He warned about the threat the progress of Germanization among Latvians and Estonians represented for Russia, and he provided Russian officials with detailed (though perhaps not entirely reliable) statistics concerning the acceleration of Germanization in the Baltic Provinces during the 1860s.¹⁰

In the first part of 1864 Lutheran General Superintendent Ferdinand Walter gave a rather naive sermon before the Livland Diet on the moral responsibility of the Baltic educated classes to Germanize and improve the lot of the local peasant population. This sermon provided Katkov, Valdemārs' Russian ally, with an occasion to discuss publicly the implications of Germanization and "separatism" in an area bordering on Prussia, "that advanced post of German nationality which, in its expansion, has been involuntarily gravitating toward the east."¹¹ During the remainder of the sixties Katkov and other Russian journalists continued to comment on the meaning for Russia of repeated Prussian military victories and of evidence of increasing nationalism and Russophobia in both Germany and the Baltic Provinces.¹²

Government officials did not question that it would be folly to allow local German political leaders to reinforce the separate identity of the Baltic Provinces through the Germanization of the Estonians and Latvians. Nor did they ignore any more than did Russian journalists what Prussian victories and the unification of Germany implied for the security of Russia's western frontier; but until the 1890s it seemed to them to be in the best interest of Russia to base her European diplomacy on friendship with Germany. At the same time, they

were reasonably confident that improvement of Russian-language facilities in the Baltic Provinces would attract the socially mobile, educated minority of Estonians and Latvians to the Russian language and culture. During the 1860s Russian officials do not seem to have had plans to Russify the entire Baltic population. They rejected the advice of extremists like Samarin who recommended a counter-program of Russification as a means of halting Germanization; and they saw no reason why ordinary Estonian and Latvian peasants could not keep their own native languages and popular culture.¹³

The resistance of the Baltic Germans, however, to even moderately Russificatory measures irritated officials in St. Petersburg. They also considered Baltic German attempts to defend and even extend the provinces' privileges and autonomy to be contrary to the general interests of the empire. Consequently, they welcomed at least some affirmation in the press of Russian national interests and critical commentary about what was happening in the Baltic Provinces. As the director of the Ministry of the Interior's Chief Administration on the Press pointed out in 1865, such discussion was useful because it affirmed the "necessity of state unity" and the "inviolability of the state and the rights of Russian nationality." Baltic polemics, however, assumed a too virulent tone for the tastes of Russian officials after the publication in the late sixties of the first issues of Samarin's *Okrainy Rossii*, Woldemar Bock's *Livländische Beiträge*, and Carl Schirren's *Livländische Antwort an Herrn Juri Samarin*. Additionally, they now found themselves accused of not having defended Russian national interests in the Baltic Provinces. In 1870-1871 polemics on the "Baltic question" (or *ostzeiskii vopros*) were halted for a period of about a decade.¹⁴

High-ranking Russian officials in Riga and St. Petersburg were especially offended by the insinuation that they had failed to defend Russian national interests in the Baltic Provinces. In their view these interests had never before been so energetically and effectively defended as during the period 1865-1870.¹⁵ As has already been pointed out, a new Baltic policy began with the arrival of Shuvalov in Riga early in 1865. It aimed at the political, administrative, and economic integration of the Baltic region with the rest of the empire and touched upon almost all major areas of Baltic reform: peasant-landowner relations, peasant self-government, the Baltic state peasants, the use of Russian in the bureaucracy, Russian language instruction in schools, the position of the Orthodox and Lutheran Churches, and the bringing of Baltic municipal and judicial institutions into a greater degree of conformity with those of the other *gubernii* of European Russia.¹⁶ Shuvalov, however, only remained in Riga until the spring

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of 1866, and his immediate successor, Eduard Baranoff (1811-1884), until the fall of the same year. The principal architect of the new policy to be implemented in the Baltic Provinces was P. P. Al'bedinskii, who served as governor-general between 1866 and 1870.

The most sensitive area of reform was the Baltic peasant question. Since the 1840s the provincial Diets and the Baltic Committee in St. Petersburg had been working on legislation that would gradually eliminate the corvée and enable a minority of the Estonian and Latvian peasants to become a class of independent proprietors. By the end of the fifties work on a somewhat more liberal peasant reform for the Russian interior of the empire posed an obvious threat to the existing economic and social status quo in the Baltic countryside. At that time the ministers of the interior, justice, and state domains criticized the final draft of new agrarian legislation prepared by the Livland Diet and the Baltic Committee, arguing that it left the peasants economically dependent on the landowners and made it unnecessarily difficult for peasants to purchase land. When this draft was discussed in the State Council in January 1860, its president, A. F. Orlov (1786-1860), questioned the wisdom of giving final approval to special legislation for the Livland peasants that differed in important respects from the peasant statutes the government was about to promulgate for the rest of the empire. As a result, the proposed Livland legislation was referred to the combined Legal and Economic Departments of the State Council for further study. The representatives and friends of the Livland *Ritterschaft* in St. Petersburg strongly advised, of course, against further delay, and by November 1860 they managed to persuade Alexander II to approve the Livland project. This was only three months before the Russian peasants were emancipated on February 19, 1861. It was a narrow escape for the Baltic nobility.¹⁷

After 1861, therefore, new Baltic peasant legislation continued to be considered by the provincial Diets and the Baltic Committee, separately from the peasant affairs of the rest of the empire. In 1863, it is true, Prince P. P. Gagarin (1789-1872), the chairman of the State Council's Department of Laws, frightened the Baltic nobles by proposing referral of the question of passports for Estonian and Latvian peasants (many of whom wished to emigrate out of the Baltic Provinces in search of land elsewhere in the empire) to the Chief Committee for the Organization of the Agricultural Estate (*Sostoianie*). Until 1882 this committee dealt with carrying out the statutes of February 19, 1861, in the Great Russian and western *gubernii* of the empire. But friends and representatives of the *Ritterschaften* in St. Petersburg successfully opposed referral of the Baltic passport ques-