

ROBERT C. JOHANSEN

# The National Interest and the Human Interest

*An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy*



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*The National Interest and the Human Interest*  
*An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy*

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and the Human Interest*

*An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy*

ROBERT C. JOHANSEN

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*To Martin Luther King, Jr.,*

WHO HELPED US UNDERSTAND WHAT IT MEANS TO BE A PLANETARY CITI-  
ZEN, AND TO ALL THOSE WHO SEEK TO LIVE ACCORDING TO THIS  
UNDERSTANDING.



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While accepting responsibility for the contents of this book, I happily express gratitude to all of these people.

## *Abbreviations*

ABM	<i>Antiballistic missile</i>
AEC	<i>Atomic Energy Commission</i>
AID	<i>Agency for International Development</i>
CIA	<i>Central Intelligence Agency</i>
DAC	<i>Development Assistance Committee of OECD</i>
IAEA	<i>International Atomic Energy Agency</i>
ICA	<i>International Cooperation Administration</i>
ICBM	<i>Intercontinental ballistic missile</i>
IDB	<i>Inter-American Development Bank</i>
IMCO	<i>International Maritime Consultative Organization</i>
ISRA	<i>International Seabed Resource Authority</i>
ITT	<i>International Telephone and Telegraph</i>
IWC	<i>International Whaling Commission</i>
JCS	<i>Joint Chiefs of Staff</i>
MaRV	<i>Maneuverable reentry vehicle</i>
MIRV	<i>Multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle</i>
MNC	<i>Multinational corporation</i>
NIE	<i>National Intelligence Estimate</i>
NSC	<i>National Security Council</i>
OAS	<i>Organization of American States</i>
OECD	<i>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</i>
OPEC	<i>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries</i>
PDC	<i>Christian Democratic Party (of Chile)</i>
PN	<i>National Party (of Chile)</i>
psi	<i>pounds per square inch</i>
SALT	<i>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks</i>
SALT I	<i>Interim Agreement and ABM Treaty of 1972</i>
SLBM	<i>Submarine launched ballistic missile</i>
UNCTAD	<i>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</i>
V <sub>1</sub>	<i>Peace without national military arsenals</i>
V <sub>2</sub>	<i>Economic well-being</i>
V <sub>3</sub>	<i>Universal human rights and social justice</i>
V <sub>4</sub>	<i>Ecological balance</i>



## *Foreword*

IN truth, Americans have always been ambivalent about foreign policy. In the foreground is the special view of American innocence that has existed since the beginning of the Republic. The United States, it was then widely believed, could only be kept pure by remaining aloof from the entanglements of the Old World. Such aloofness always competed with a contrary vision of the United States as a country with a special mission to create a better world. In many respects, the sensibility and outlook of Thomas Jefferson gracefully embodied this ambivalence that has by now deeply insinuated itself into national political consciousness. It was Jefferson who eloquently defended the virtues of detachment while simultaneously working to realize visions of empire, most tangibly, perhaps, by negotiating the Louisiana Purchase and giving, late in his life, a hearty endorsement to the Monroe Doctrine.

This dual heritage is still alive, although its forms are new. The perils and imperatives of involvement are mainly discussed these days in relation to the Third World, and the weight of debate has shifted from goals to tactics. Yet considerable uneasiness persists; witness the tension between the rhetorical respect given by U.S. leaders to nonintervention, self-determination, and sovereign equality as guiding principles of foreign policy and the actualities of an interventionary, even a counterrevolutionary diplomacy. In recent years, really since the late 1960s when the Vietnam failure became apparent, there has been a domestic mood of despair and discontent about the global role of the United States. Indeed, current attitudes of the American public toward foreign policy waver somewhere between apathy and anger, reflecting both feelings of frustration that nothing effective can be done and resentment about the inability of the government to arrest the relative decline of U.S. power and stature in the world system. As matters now stand United States foreign policy is likely to fail both pragmatic and idealistic tests for most citizens, thereby assaulting that aspect of national character preoccupied with success, as well as that concerned with virtue. Besides, the earlier fear of being drawn into foreign wars is being displaced by the insistence that the United States display

a greater willingness to use military capabilities to uphold overseas interests.

Lurking in the shadows are formidable issues that compose the novel and largely repressed agenda of world order challenges. Underlying these challenges are doubts about the framework of state sovereignty, especially questions about whether the old order can provide a satisfactory basis for the security and prosperity of the American people in the nuclear age. Most fundamental here is whether the deterrence system, including its costly and nerve-wracking arms race, will prove morally acceptable and practically effective as a peace system over time, and whether, of course, there are attainable alternatives.

Pressing more directly on public awareness is a set of demands emanating from the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, summarized by their insistence upon "a new international economic order." Interacting with this North-South confrontation are concerns about "resource diplomacy," about the status of rich countries using a disproportionate share of the planet's stock of nonrenewable resources and injecting into the environment a disproportionate share of pollution in forms and quantities that do ecological and hygienic damage. This novel agenda greatly complicates the global setting. Its tone is best suggested by the emergent eco-equity struggle to devise development paths for countries at various stages of industrialization, development paths that would combine environmental protection with the fulfillment of essential human needs and basic societal aspirations for a good life. Such a vision of positive world order seems remote from the reality of arms races, mass poverty, widespread warfare, demographic pressures, and repressive governing tactics. Where in this tangle of torments can one find first the transnational understanding and then the national will in the major countries of the world, to build, in the phrase of one impressive movement for change active in America, "a strategy for a living revolution"?

It is hardly surprising that the current language of political discourse for foreign policy matters in the United States seems vague, hypocritical, and irrelevant. The inconsistent requirements of servicing an empire while claiming to be the benefactor of human society at home and abroad are at the root of the difficulty, yet the actualities of declining power and the political need to disguise the trend and its consequences from the American people have added to the strain. Of course, other great powers with liberal traditions have faced a similar challenge. The expe-

riences of England and France provide recent examples; both countries have undergone many difficulties while adjusting psychically and materially to the loss of empire.

Yet a difference of utmost significance pertains. The rationale of imperial policies and the adjustment to increases and reduction of power relative to other states has been carried on for several centuries within a relatively secure geopolitical framework. The game of nations has often been waged for high stakes, and yet the survival of the system never seemed at issue. Even in the seventeenth century when the transition from feudalism to statism culminated in the Thirty Years War the outcomes of international conflict did not imperil the destiny of the human species. In our era the circumstances are different. Threats of nuclear war and ecological catastrophe carry with them apocalyptic dangers of irreversible damage, even of total collapse. People have, of course, long wondered before about whether life on this planet was or should be sustainable; religious imagery, especially in the West, has been filled with prophetic anticipations of death, transfiguration, and last judgment since Biblical times. Yet today, with global communications and interactions so prominent, we have a crisis of confidence among the prosperous peoples of the North, growing doubts about whether the future will seem an improvement on the past, and even deeper fears about whether the secular materialism of a technology-based image of progress can sustain the morale of modern, affluent, and liberal states.

Such a crisis provokes fundamental rethinking. It becomes natural to consider as a matter of urgency whether the values, beliefs, and techniques of the past are adequate for the future. Obvious questions about the viability of the sovereign state are inevitably raised and yet the issues are confused by that other dominant political reality of our time, namely that of surging nationalism. The numerous peoples of the South are struggling with enthusiasm to create genuine full-fledged states. Nationalism is also on the rise in the North as evidenced by the flourishing of separatist movements in the most settled of states. Considering the world as a whole as the ground upon which foreign policy is enacted also reveals an extraordinary unevenness and diversity of aspiration, situation, and heritage.

Occasionally, elements of the new world order agenda break into public consciousness, as briefly during the early 1970s when the Club of Rome's report stimulated "the limits to growth" debate. Such a break in the ice is bound to be temporary at this



stage; old patterns of thought quickly reassert themselves, especially if the challenge cannot be handled within orthodox problem-solving frameworks. The leaders of most states are too preoccupied with the short-run management of foreign policy to cast their gaze on longer-term interpretations that are bound to be exceedingly controversial and for some sectors of society, usually those most influential under present arrangements, exceedingly threatening and costly. As a consequence, the more drastic items on an appropriate world order agenda are continually repressed, and the foreign policy process, unless overtaken by war or economic emergency, reverts to short-term managerial maneuvering and blustering self-confidence.

This assessment leads to one further observation. It is a mistake to rely on government for diagnosis or response to the longer-term, underlying, yet very real, world order challenges. It is a mistake easily made as modern governments, and especially ours, claim the allegiance of the citizenry partly because of their supposed omnicompetence. Confusion is increased, also, by the tendency of governments to preempt and harmlessly ritualize much of the rhetoric of global concern, inducing both complacency and cynical disregard of substance. In our culture where the main instruments of this alleged omnicompetence are technology and military prowess, the prognosis is scary. The tension between short-term maneuver and long-term readjustment is illustrated by debates about both the military and civilian aspects of nuclear policy, where the preferences of official elites increasingly collide with the anxieties of the citizenry. Especially in foreign policy, the government feels the growing burdens of omnicompetence at an historical time of apparently diminishing capabilities. Leaders search for ways to provide reassurance and the public grows increasingly restive and narrow-minded as various developments are blamed for erosions of prosperity, security, and serenity. This process of dissolution goes on throughout the trilateral world of North America, Western Europe, and Japan with perhaps its most acute expressions involving recourse to terror as political stratagem and to drugs as private consolation.

Despite the severity of indictment, lines of deeper analysis of our political situation as a nation have so far aroused very little scholarly interest among social scientists. Traditional inquiry into relative economic and political power continues to share the foreign policy scene with an array of modernist methodologies

designed to make interpretation less impressionistic. The focus is mainly on a conventional agenda of foreign policy priorities: maintaining reliable access to sufficient overseas oil, keeping the Soviet Union contained without provoking World War III, and holding back Third World demands for major reforms in the international economic order.

The foreign policy literature continues to be dominated by managerial appraisals and proposals, with some revival of the "classical" inquiry into how to achieve equilibrium under conditions of changing global configurations of power and alignment. Little attention is being given to the gaps between words and deeds, between deeds and needs, and between needs and values as these pertain to U.S. foreign policy. It is one thing to discern the gaps and quite another to depict these gaps concretely enough to suggest what might be an alternative foreign policy based on the longer term imperatives of the country.

Against this background, Robert Johansen's book strikes me as a major achievement. Proceeding on a solid foundation of empirical depth, Johansen demonstrates the character of the first gap between declared ends and performance in U.S. foreign policy. Not only do his carefully constructed cases reveal the extent of the gap, but also its quality, especially the consistent interplay between pious rhetoric and expedient activity. As such, the public justification of American foreign policy sets up a distorting filter between the government and the citizenry that inhibits informed discussion and trivializes public discourse on momentous matters.

Johansen's cases lend both concreteness and structural depth to his argument. Each case is inherently significant as an illustration of a specific set of choices by American makers of foreign policy and suggestive of a recurrent theme that can be reexamined in the light of earlier and later "cases." For instance, the CIA role in Allende's Chile can be considered in relation to Arbenz's Guatemala (1954) or the movement that drove the Shah from power in early 1979. Context, as well as structure, matters. We cannot be sure what has been "learned" from the Chilean case and what results from an analysis of American goals and capabilities in the Iranian case. Has American statecraft shifted? If so, does the shift reflect a new willingness to accommodate revolutionary nationalism in Third World countries or merely the provisional acquiescence by a given group of U.S. leaders to a political outcome beyond their capacity to control? American

foreign policy toward Iran might revert to an interventionary approach as a consequence of either an electoral mandate in the United States or as a result of a further challenge to American interests in the Gulf region. The response of the United States to internal political developments in a foreign country perceived as adverse to American interests is both a structural feature of American foreign policy and a distinctive "instance." By putting his case studies within an overall framework Johansen illuminates our understanding of both policy and structure.

More impressive, still, Johansen links this revealing critique of American foreign policy to the longer term framework of global reform. In the past decade, "world order" has started to supplant "balance of power" as a focus for the ends of foreign policy, and yet this allegedly new perspective is often deceptive. It often seems to mean no more than finding verbal formulations suitable for the expanded scope of a global system to stabilize relations (including economic relations) among sovereign states. Johansen, in contrast, uses world order to mean the realization of those values which he believes necessary to achieve a humane and secure existence for the peoples of the world. Such a program of global reform implies for Johansen a series of structural changes in the framework of international relations, although it doesn't imply or propose shifting from the state system to world government. At root, Johansen associates the dynamic of change with value shifts in the advanced industrial sectors of world society that will spontaneously erode the legitimacy of the highly coercive structures of the modern state. His image of a different future for American foreign policy places as much emphasis on destructuring the state from within as it does on the growth of external central guidance capabilities to achieve the levels of coordination and regulation required for activity that is of planetary scale and significance. In the end, Johansen insists that a mixed moral and prudential challenge calls for the reorientation of American foreign policy. We must do what we say, seek what we need, and affirm what we want for the future.

It is, of course, too soon for policymakers to heed such wisdom. They are too constrained by their own immediate concerns to confront seriously the argument that their cosmology is outmoded. Instead, as with astronomers throughout the ages, they tinker with old beliefs, long after these have been discredited,

devising various ingenious schemes to obscure the realities of their failure, and as with any establishment they will do their best to discredit the new astronomers who propose a different cosmology. Of course, the stakes are higher than achieving a more satisfying apprehension of reality. An inquiry into global reform is, at minimum, a quest for a safer, saner world political system. It involves nothing less than evaluating and influencing the evolutionary destiny of the human race. It also challenges our passivity at a time of danger and turbulence. It is one of the prime opportunities available to scholars in a free society to set forth the unfashionable case for drastic reform, and it is a call to the rest of us to listen and respond as openly as we can. Very few books on American foreign policy have ever set forth so forceful and fundamental a challenge as this one.

Johansen's scholarly inquiry is informed by a citizen's passionate insistence on a foreign policy fit for the American people before it is too late. It is also informed by an understanding that to be a patriotic American late in the twentieth century is indistinguishable from being a loyal citizen of the planet as a whole. In this respect his participation in the World Order Models Project where diverse orientations toward global reform interact gives his outlook a cultural depth that is a happy contrast with the sort of vague globalism that is the sentimental substance of Sunday sermons.

Issuing planetary death warrants is neither novel, nor helpful. At the same time, we require no mysterious or inspired being to warn us that ours is a time of jeopardy for earth and earthlings. The United States, with its awesome capacity to wreck, whether by weapons or its intricate life style, is in an especially responsible position. What we do and don't do in relating to others will seriously, possibly decisively, influence the unfolding of the future.

If Americans are going to stop acting like subjects and start acting like citizens, then they have to become informed and caring about the foreign policy of their nation. Knowledge can be profoundly empowering. Indeed, this conviction underlies Johansen's animating vision of a preferred, alternate world order that is peaceful and just. It can happen, but only if we make it happen, if we move from realms of feeling through realms of thought to realms of actions and activities.

Johansen tells us that by being true to ourselves we will also

*Foreword*

help forge the still uncreated conscience of the human race, embarking thereby upon what may be the most exciting (and perilous) voyage of discovery ever contemplated. Reality is fundamentally encouraging, but only if we act accordingly, out of a sense of urgency, yet with patience and perseverance (the most revolutionary of virtues).

Richard Falk

*The National Interest and the Human Interest*  
*An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy*



# ONE • *The Elusiveness of A Humane World Community*

## PURPOSE

WE live on a planet possessing the potential for peace and fulfillment for all, but societies have been distressingly unsuccessful in achieving these conditions for most of the human race. Why? This book begins to answer this fundamental question by examining two others: What has been the United States role in helping to achieve a secure and humane existence for all people? In pursuit of this goal, what should be the content of U.S. foreign policy now and during the remainder of this century?

In addressing these questions, my purpose is to examine recent U.S. foreign policy in order to clarify its impact on insuring the survival and well-being of U.S. citizens and the entire human race. Does the past conduct of U.S. foreign policy justify confidence that it can meet the unprecedented challenges of the 1980s? This analysis assesses the influence of U.S. policies on the prospects for realizing widely shared humanitarian values and for transforming the international system into one with an improved capacity to implement those values.

The present chapter will (1) illustrate the unprecedented foreign policy problems that will confront political leaders in the last quarter of the twentieth century; (2) explain why the complexity and worldwide dimensions of these problems demonstrate a pressing need for different normative standards for policy making than have been used historically; (3) describe the guidelines which seem essential to insure human survival and to facilitate the realization of other important values, such as the promotion of human rights and the abolition of worldwide poverty; and (4) explain the analytic approach employed in this study.

## THE CHALLENGE TO HUMANITY'S FUTURE

### *Global Problems in a National Context*

Why should scholars, politicians, and ordinary citizens reassess the goals of U.S. foreign policy at this time? The answer is



rooted in considerations of both prudence and morality. First of all, some fundamental policy adjustments will be required to satisfy the basic drive for security and survival in the future. Second, the fulfillment of our most cherished humanitarian values can be greatly facilitated by some modifications in the present national approach to policy decisions.

#### THE THREAT TO SURVIVAL

In the first instance, unprecedented problems that are global in scope increasingly exceed the capacity of traditional diplomatic practices and institutions to resolve. In general, our perception of foreign policy problems and opportunities has failed to stay abreast of rapidly changing world realities. This has meant that many policies have been growing increasingly unrealistic in the sense that they simply cannot achieve the ends sought. To oversimplify only slightly, the political leadership and attentive public apply essentially nineteenth-century diplomatic ideas<sup>1</sup> to the solution of twenty-first-century problems, the technical and social origins of which are in the present. Nineteenth-century diplomatic ideas encourage (1) the continued emphasis on serving the national interest defined largely in terms of military power and sovereign control over a carefully defined piece of territory and segment of humanity; and (2) the assumption that the present system of competing national sovereignties either cannot or should not be fundamentally changed, and that it both can and will respond adequately to the foreseeable problems of national security, widespread poverty and resource shortages, severe ecological damage, and pervasive denial of human rights. Under the influence of old diplomatic habits and strong vested interests in the political and economic system inherited from the past, officials continue diplomacy as usual to confront newly emerging twenty-first century problems. For example, traditional diplomatic ideas and institutions persist even though their inadequacy is obvious for averting misuse of nuclear technology, the consequences of which cannot be confined to a carefully defined piece of territory, layer of the atmosphere, or segment of humanity. Traditional uses of military power and sovereign control, however sincerely and faithfully practiced, are impotent in the face of irresponsible behavior by a relatively small number of people who could affect millions of

others in many countries for decades, centuries, or millennia to come.

A stark reality faces all inhabitants of the earth: through consequences resulting from major war or ecological imbalance, widespread suffering for millions of people and even eventual extinction of the human species are possibilities. Such statements have become commonplace, and thus they have lost their ring of urgency.<sup>2</sup> Yet predicaments mount while time slips away, making remedial action more difficult and perhaps less likely. Even without major war or ecological collapse, existing political institutions prevent a billion of the world's people from having sufficient food, often resulting in permanent mental or physical disability, even though adequate nutrition is technically feasible. In brief, the decentralized structure of world power and authority, distributed among many sovereign states, perpetuates a relatively anarchic international system in which the danger of war, the shortage of food and other resources, and the presence of persistent ecological hazards threaten the survival of many people, if not, in the long run, of all human civilization. The survival question will not be examined in detail here, but a few brief comments about the political impact of nuclear technology and ecological hazards will illustrate the need to consider an alternative approach to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.<sup>3</sup> Subsequent chapters will substantiate this argument in greater detail.

The existence of nuclear weapons without their use in warfare since 1945 has produced a perhaps unjustified confidence that weapons of mass destruction will never be used. Yet, many dangers remain inherent in a strategy of nuclear deterrence.<sup>4</sup> Although the United States is the most powerful nation on earth, it has no effective defense against a nuclear attack. The government can only hope to *deter* an attack. Yet as nuclear weapons technology spreads to additional countries, the likelihood that such weapons will be used in war increases. A well-known group of strategic experts in a Harvard-M.I.T. Arms Control Seminar have predicted that nuclear weapons will be used in combat before the end of the century—most likely by middle-range powers.<sup>5</sup> Other experts have calculated that the probability of a *general* nuclear war is increasing.<sup>6</sup> The danger of nuclear war will grow further as tactical nuclear weapons become smaller, lighter, “cleaner,” and more mobile, because they will be more

easily purchased, transported, and viewed as similar to conventional explosives. Although any single national government may believe that its security is increased if it accumulates more and more advanced weapons, for world society as a whole both the likelihood and the potential destructiveness of future wars are increased by the growth of military equipment and the spread of militarism around the world.

With the dispersal of command and control required by submarine-launched missiles and tactical battlefield weapons, an excessively eager team of officers or a miscommunicated signal could initiate the use of nuclear weapons. While the probabilities for accidental war are no doubt low, the impossibility of eliminating the danger of accidents completely is a rather unsatisfactory condition given the awesome consequences of a mistake.<sup>7</sup>

Nuclear war could also begin through miscalculation by some officials about the anticipated actions of another government. Since deterrence is based on the ability of government X to make government Y believe that X will use nuclear weapons in the face of certain provocations, the only way to insure the credibility of one's posture is to use nuclear weapons occasionally. If the threat to use nuclear weapons is only a bluff by X, then Y could rationally proceed to ignore the threat. Thus the leadership in Y could miscalculate the seriousness of X, and precipitate war.

Furthermore, given the absence of dependable screening procedures in selecting government officials, an emotionally unstable person may, in some country, at some time in the future, exercise decisive power in a government equipped with nuclear weapons. Similarly, political leaders who assume office with normal emotional maturity may, when under political pressure, emotional stress, or fatigue, make decisions with some degree of diminished rationality. President John F. Kennedy deliberately raised the risk of nuclear war to odds he estimated as "even,"<sup>8</sup> because he did not like having Soviet missiles ninety miles away in Cuba, even though nuclear missiles could exist legally as close as twelve miles away, in submarines cruising just outside United States territorial waters.

Although there was no apparent security need to risk nuclear war, U.S. officials executed policies that, by their own admission, brought nuclear war frightfully closer: "Not one of us at any

time believed that any of the choices before us could bring anything but either prolonged danger or fighting, very possibly leading to the kind of deepening commitment of prestige and power from which neither side could withdraw without resort to nuclear weapons.”<sup>9</sup> A key participant in the decisions, Robert Kennedy, reported that, while they hoped to avoid war, “the *expectation* was a military confrontation.”<sup>10</sup> During the discussions, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover informed U.S. officials that the FBI had received information that Soviet personnel in New York were preparing to destroy all sensitive documents in the belief that the United States would “probably be taking military action against Cuba or Soviet ships, and this would mean war.”<sup>11</sup> Robert Kennedy summed up his own and President Kennedy’s feelings: “There was the realization that the Soviet Union and Cuba apparently were preparing to do battle. And there was the feeling that the noose was tightening on all of us, on Americans, on mankind, and that the bridges to escape were crumbling.”<sup>12</sup>

The tension and anxiety accompanying such a crisis often lead to overreactions. Attorney general Kennedy reported that, for a brief time at least, nearly all advisers favored an air attack: “At first there was almost unanimous agreement that we had to attack early the next morning with bombers and fighters and destroy the SAM [surface to air missile] sites.”<sup>13</sup> During the brief time that the President was waiting for a Soviet response to the United States demand for withdrawal of Soviet missiles, Theodore Sorensen reported growing support among Presidential advisers for a direct air strike and invasion of Cuba: “The pressures for such a move . . . were rapidly and *irresistibly* growing, strongly supported by a minority in our group and increasingly necessitated by a deterioration in the situation.”<sup>14</sup> During one day of long, almost continuous discussions in the White House, the crisis produced rising tempers and irritability among the small group of decision makers. “Pressure and fatigue, he [the President] later noted privately, might have broken the group’s steady demeanor in another twenty-four or forty-eight hours.”<sup>15</sup>

Great exhilaration followed the “successful” U.S. testing of Soviet will. Sorensen reported the President “had, as Harold Macmillan would later say, earned his place in history by this one act alone. He had been engaged in a personal as well as national contest for world leadership and he had won.”<sup>16</sup> Contesting for the personal and national leadership of the world (or a region of

the world) through military confrontation is a motivation that other leaders may have in the future and that can hardly avoid questions of human survival.

The possibilities for nuclear war or for terrorist use of nuclear technology are increased by the spread of fissionable materials to additional private organizations and governments. In addition to the six nuclear weapons countries, a score of other states have the resources and technical skills to produce nuclear weapons within one or two years. No existing international organization can prevent even a signatory to the nonproliferation treaty from *deliberately* diverting materials to weapons purposes. Moreover, the purchase of nuclear weapons and delivery systems could become a serious possibility. Even without nuclear weapons a determined group could inflict catastrophe on other states. A few pounds of plutonium distributed as a finely ground powder could devastate a city like New York with lethal radiation lasting for centuries. Such an act might even be committed by persons representing no nation-state against which the United States could retaliate. The destruction of civilian nuclear reactors also could cause the loss of thousands of lives. These conditions make deterrence ineffective because no one can genuinely be defended against a determined opponent.

It may bear repeating that major nuclear war would kill most of the urban populations of the antagonists. It would destroy most industry and commerce. Perhaps more than half of the populations in small towns and rural areas would die from fall-out, depending on weather conditions, wind direction, and the height of detonations. Living standards and life expectancies would be substantially reduced for any persons remaining. Millions of cancer and leukemia deaths would occur outside the territories of the two antagonists. Untold numbers of genetic problems and birth deformities would await those still living. There would be dangerous effects on the atmosphere, the soil, and the water, as well as consequences presently unanticipated. As Herbert York, former director of defense research and engineering for the Department of Defense, has written:

If for any political, psychological or technical reasons deterrence should fail, the physical, biological and social consequences would be completely out of line with any reasonable view of the national objectives of the United States or Soviet Union. . . . [T]here would be a substantial chance that the whole civilized world could go up in nuclear smoke. This is

simply too frightful and too dangerous a way to live indefinitely; we *must* find some better form of international relationship than the current dependency on a strategy of mutual assured destruction.<sup>17</sup>

Given the dangers of nuclear technology, a prudent foreign policy would convey a sense of urgency about establishing the new values and institutions that could make the prohibition of nuclear weapons a feasible, enforceable, compulsory, universal obligation.

Although less dramatic in its immediacy, pollution of the atmosphere and oceans also illustrates a long-range challenge to survival and to the quality of our lives—a challenge that again demonstrates the interconnection of every life on the planet. Although all earthly plant and animal life depends upon the air and the sea, no one exercises sovereignty over or protects vast expanses of the atmosphere and oceans. Nations now pollute them without much regard for long-range consequences to the planet or even for short-range effects outside their national jurisdiction. Yet all ecosystems are part of a delicate ecological balance; all have limits of deterioration beyond which they cannot recover. In many cases we do not know the planetary limits which, if surpassed, would endanger our species.

The consequences of depleting the amount of ozone in the stratosphere illustrate the problem. Without ozone protection, ultraviolet light would break down molecules on earth that are essential to life. Crops, bacteria, and micro-life in general would be affected. Ultraviolet light also causes skin cancer and genetic damage that can severely endanger both animal and plant life. In addition to protecting life from extraplanetary lethal radiation, ozone, by absorbing ultraviolet light, contributes substantially to heating the upper atmosphere surrounding the planet. The depletion of ozone could radically alter the climate of the earth, as well as eventually expose all forms of life to deadly radiation. Even a small drop in density would increase the incidence of birth defects and skin cancer.

Ozone is threatened by some aerosol sprays, nitrogen fertilizers, exhaust gases of supersonic planes, and atmospheric nuclear explosions. Fred Iklé, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has reported that nitric oxides injected into the stratosphere by nuclear war could seriously damage the ozone layer.<sup>18</sup> The effects of some harmful substances will increase for years after their release because of the time required

for them to rise to the stratosphere. All of the threats to the earth's ozone shield produce consequences that obviously transcend national boundaries and exceed the capacity of separate state sovereignties to combat effectively.

A similar conclusion emerges from an examination of marine pollution. The oceans play a vital role in maintaining dependable rainfall, climate, and carbon dioxide levels for the planet. More than a third of the earth's oxygen supply is produced by the process of photosynthesis in plants living in the oceans of the world. Pollutants harmful to these plants could affect the earth's oxygen supply. Even the wastes of landlocked states affect the oceans, because pollutants are transported to the sea through rivers and the atmosphere.

The oceans are a major source of animal protein, the lack of which contributes to malnutrition for one third of the human population. Even though a majority of marine fish remain palatable, nearly all species now contain DDT residues. Pollution diminishes the protein supply by decreasing the reproductive capacity of marine life, killing larvae and untold tons of fish, making some fish unfit for human consumption, and harming marine plant life on which fish feed.<sup>19</sup> Despite more intensive attempts to catch fish, total world harvest has declined since 1970. Overfishing and pollution are the primary causes. Neither is now effectively regulated to produce the maximum sustainable yield.

The preceding discussion of the dangers of unregulated nuclear technology and environmental hazards poses the question whether past foreign policy values, diplomatic habits, and institutions can meet the demands of modern technology and human interaction for global control. We have examined here only two of many possible examples that demonstrate the need for a fundamental reassessment of foreign policy goals and international institutions.

#### THE THREAT TO PREFERRED VALUES

A reassessment is also useful because present goals and institutions make it increasingly difficult to implement our most cherished values and ethical principles. Indeed, the existing international structure of power in itself violates these principles. For example, the globe is presently divided into nation-states with power unsystematically and inequitably related to population. This means that the simple exercise of sovereignty

by a superpower violates the principle of self-determination on a global basis. It is doubtful that any democratic society can long survive with its democratic principles intact if those principles are repeatedly denied in its own conduct. Yet in following the traditional approach to serving the national interest the U.S. government regularly carries out policies that affect millions of people outside its borders who have no control over the making of U.S. policies. When the United States pursues economic policies and consumption patterns that stimulate world inflation, thus decreasing the buying power of non-U.S. citizens, this is a modern, global equivalent of taxation without representation. Similarly, United States citizens are touched directly by the acts of other great powers, although we are unrepresented in their political processes. If other governments put radioactive substances in the atmosphere, American citizens suffer contamination without representation.<sup>20</sup>

Even though he has kept his administration well within the guidelines of traditional diplomacy, President Jimmy Carter seemed to acknowledge part of the representation problem when he delivered a message to the "citizens of the world" immediately after his inaugural address: "I have chosen the occasion of my inauguration . . . to speak not only to my own countrymen—which is traditional—but also to you, citizens of the world who did not participate in our election but who will nevertheless be affected by my decisions."<sup>21</sup>

Rapidly changing technology and patterns of social interaction are making societies inseparable from one another, but the present pattern of international political participation remains relatively unchanged. As long as this system remains constant, it authorizes some people to make decisions that affect other people who are unrepresented in the decision-making process. As this *incongruity between political institutions and social needs* is allowed to deepen, self-government will be undermined in a national context because it will be unable to respond to citizens' needs. It will fail to take root and flourish in a global context because intra- and inter-societal inequities will not diminish, and severe inequities of wealth and power make it impossible to fulfill the democratic principle in which power must be widely shared. Democracy cannot indefinitely survive within a global political structure that prevents people from participating in decisions that affect their own lives.

Consider the capacity of present political institutions to fulfill



a person's most basic need and right—adequate food. The world today faces—for the first time in its history—shortages in each of the four basic agricultural resources: land, water, energy, and fertilizer. No nation can isolate itself from these scarcities or their economic and political consequences. Japan imports more than half of its total cereal supplies. Egypt imports about 40 percent. The farmers of the European Economic Community import 80 percent of their high protein feed for livestock. Nearly all their petroleum is imported. The United States is the supplier of 85 percent of all soybeans on the entire world market, so when in 1973 it ordered an export embargo in order to curb price rises at home, numerous other people, with no opportunity to influence the U.S. decision, were adversely affected. In another example, when Thailand once restricted its rice exports, the action “wreaked havoc with efforts to prevent runaway food prices in other Southeast Asian countries.”<sup>22</sup>

Each year approximately one billion people suffer from malnutrition. Fifteen million children die annually before reaching age five because of insufficient food and infections that become lethal due to malnourishment. That is one quarter of all deaths in the world. Almost all children born to poor parents in the less developed countries suffer some degree of malnutrition at one time or another.<sup>23</sup> In the early 1970s, experts estimated that an average of 10,000 people died weekly from lack of food.<sup>24</sup>

Overpopulation is not the only source of this human tragedy. Because of the petroleum-based fertilizer shortages partially resulting from the oil embargo imposed by the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973-74, the United States suspended its usual fertilizer exports. This action contributed to a 1.5-million-ton fertilizer shortage in the less developed countries, which cost them 15 million tons in lost grain production in 1974. Yet, during the same year, people in the United States used on lawns, cemeteries, and golf courses about 3 million tons of fertilizer—twice the shortage in the poor countries.<sup>25</sup> Obviously, no food grew from this U.S. usage. Moreover, for each pound of fertilizer applied to grain production in the nearly saturated soils of the United States, farmers could increase their yields by an average of only two to three pounds. But in nutrient-starved India, each pound of fertilizer could have yielded an additional production three times as large as the increment derived from U.S. use of the fertilizer.<sup>26</sup> Thus, a slight decrease in U.S. productivity would have yielded a major increase in productivity for fertilizer-poor countries.

Of the total grain produced in the United States, much is fed to cattle, which are inefficient converters of grain into protein. Georg Borgstrom estimates that the world's cattle eat as much food as would be required to feed 8.7 billion people, or twice the world's present population.<sup>27</sup> By including less meat and more grain in their diets, people in the rich countries could enable existing food supplies to extend to far more persons on the globe. In India, where the major source of protein is feed grains, direct and indirect consumption averages about 400 pounds of grain per person per year. In the United States, where much protein is eaten in the form of meat, eggs, or milk, the grain consumed directly or indirectly through production of meat is almost 2000 pounds per person per year.<sup>28</sup> Thus, the average North American consumes five times as many agricultural resources as the average person in India. U.S. average consumption exceeds by two to four times the quantity of protein that the human body can utilize. The remainder is excreted. If Americans were to reduce their meat consumption by only 10 percent, in one year 12 million tons of grain would be freed for human consumption. This amount would feed 60 million people for one year, enough to have prevented famine in parts of India and Bangladesh in 1974.

Sufficient resources exist to feed everyone *if* the resources are shared fairly. Many demographers believe this condition would also cause population growth to decline. However, past policies of food distribution have been governed by traditional diplomatic habits. As the former Secretary of Agriculture, Dr. Earl Butz once explained: "Food is power. Food is a weapon. It is now one of the principal tools in our negotiating kit."<sup>29</sup> A CIA research study, written shortly before the World Food Conference in Rome in 1974, concluded that the world grain shortages in the future "could give the United States a measure of power it had never had before—possibly an economic and political dominance greater than that of the immediate post-World War II years." The report predicted that "in bad years . . . Washington would acquire virtual life-and-death power over the fate of the multitudes of the needy." (Without exaggeration, the hungry might view such a condition as starvation without representation.) The report warned that when societies became desperate the hungry but powerful nations (which possessed nuclear weapons) might engage in nuclear threats or in massive migration backed by force. They might even seek to induce climatic changes, such as "trying to melt the Arctic ice cap."<sup>30</sup> Despite the

exaggerated expression of alarm in the image of a rising tide of poor people engulfing the United States, the report accurately described the power of life and death that can be exerted by the world's largest food exporter.

More effectively than existing international organizations, a global food authority could maximize world production, bank grains for periods of drought or famine, ration and allocate fertilizer for optimal increases in production, encourage less consumption of grain by cattle, and decrease the use of food as a diplomatic weapon to gain political influence over other governments. Without increased global coordination of food policies, resentment, repression, and unnecessary human misery are likely to continue throughout the 1980s.

In summary, the decentralized and inequitable distribution of power among states perpetuates an international system in which the most powerful countries maintain privileged positions at the expense of the weak and poor societies. However, even the citizens of the great powers are unable to escape the consequences of other governments' policies that they have no authority to influence. This arrangement of power and authority denies further realization of global justice and basic human rights. Not only is the denial of justice undesirable in itself, it also contributes to the difficulty and detracts from the desirability of maintaining peace. Thus the present distribution of power threatens both the quality of life for a substantial number of coinhabitants of the globe and ultimately the survival of human civilization. Whether one wants to be politically prudent or morally sensitive or both, modern technology has now made it necessary to consider an alternative basis for making foreign policy decisions.

#### *The Westphalian System in a Post-Westphalian Era*

The previous discussion of several global problems calls into question the widely held assumption that prevailing political responses are equal to the challenges. If profound problems with historic consequences are not resolved, is this due to unwise foreign policies? If so, then foreign policy could be corrected by getting additional information to officials, improving the policy-making machinery, or selecting new leadership in Washington. Alternatively, one may conclude that global challenges are unmet because the international system is poorly structured to meet present political and economic needs. If that is true,

then fundamental structural changes are required to overcome the threats to survival and to preferred values. Finally, the difficulty may be a combination of unwise policies and structural defects, in which case the necessary changes are even more risky to undertake and difficult to bring about.

To increase our understanding of these questions, it is useful to consider the present international system in historical perspective.

#### THE LIMITS OF DECENTRALIZED, TERRITORIALLY-BASED AUTHORITY

The Peace of Westphalia at the conclusion of the last of the great religious wars of Europe is a convenient benchmark for noting the major shift in European political organization which produced the current international system. Although the selection of any particular date to note systemic changes is somewhat arbitrary, the political changes symbolized by the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 stand in sharp contrast to the political organization of the Middle Ages before the religious wars. In medieval society the Christian commonwealth was hierarchically organized and subject to the authority of the Pope and the Holy Roman Empire. The Roman Catholic Church and its appointed representatives exercised centralized authority across the territorial boundaries of feudalism. Although subunits throughout Europe exercised some power, it was on behalf of and subject to the authority of Pope and Emperor. This continental system gradually changed as authority, power, wealth, and loyalties shifted to a subcontinental or state level. The Peace of Westphalia acknowledged the development of independent, secular, sovereign states, no longer subject to the centralized authority of the Pope or Emperor.<sup>31</sup>

In the Westphalian model, political authority was decentralized on the continent and based on territory, thus making boundaries very important. National governments were all-powerful within their boundaries; no outside authority could legally intrude within each national shell. As the Pope's influence declined and there was no overreaching political authority to regulate conduct between sovereigns, there could be no prohibition of war. Because authority was tied to territory, there was little possibility of establishing sovereignty over the oceans.

The existing international system corresponds to the Westphalian model of a decentralized system of independent states, each exercising dominant authority within its territorial domain.

However, mounting evidence of social interpenetration, such as that presented earlier, indicates that we are living during a period pregnant with possibilities for system change. These are similar in significance to the structural transformation registered at Westphalia. This era is marked by rising needs to transform the nation-state or Westphalian system into a new system of order that is in some ways reminiscent of two principal attributes of medieval society. (Of course, one should not assume that the changing world order either should or will develop an authority structure similar to that of the Holy Roman Empire.) First, there is the need to establish a transnational structure of power and authority with increased capacity at the center for coordinating policy and enforcing it on national governments. Second, there is a need for a new structure of authority not limited to a piece of territory for either its sources of legitimacy or the domain of its directives. It must be global in scope and extend its authority even to outer space.

In the emerging system, national boundaries are becoming less important than they were in the nineteenth century. This is illustrated by the growth of multinational corporations and the international regulation of travel, commerce, and communication. The need for additional forms of central guidance is reflected in negotiations about regulating the use of the oceans and the seabed. Incipient supranational institutions are perhaps present in the European economic community. Although governments tenaciously guard their sovereignty, they also advance occasional claims that international organizations may have the right to intervene, such as against apartheid, in areas of traditionally national jurisdiction. In the League of Nations and the United Nations, governments made their first modern effort, although without major success, to control and prohibit aggressive war. The need for international guarantees against war reflects the decline of the invulnerable, impermeable state in the nuclear age.<sup>32</sup>

Yet, the systemic transition now under way reveals a sharp asymmetry. Industrialization and advanced technology have made the earth a post-Westphalian functional unit, but the world remains politically fragmented by Westphalian national divisions of the planet and of human loyalties. Threats posed by the pollution of the atmosphere and oceans, the instability in the supply of food and oil, and the all-encompassing consequences of nuclear war are feebly confronted by a system of sovereign

states that recognize no coordinating authority above their national governments.

#### THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS

The unprecedented scope of the foreign policy problems facing Washington emerges from the incongruity between the *functional unity* and the *political disunity* of the globe. Serving human needs requires cooperative efforts based upon a recognition of the unity of the ecosystem and the universal impact of some political decisions. The Westphalian disunity of political organization encourages self-seeking, competitive efforts. The consequences of this incongruity were illustrated by biologist Garrett Hardin in his well-known discussion of the "tragedy of the commons." He pictured a pasture held in common by a village of cattle herdsman. As rational beings, the herdsman seek to maximize their gains from pasturing their animals. Each herdsman asks himself: "What is the utility *to me* of adding one more animal to my herd?" This utility, Garrett explained, has one negative and one positive component. The positive component is nearly +1 because of the increment of one animal; the negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal. Excessive overgrazing can lead to severe soil erosion and eventual destruction of the pasture. However, unlike the positive component which accrues entirely to the owner, the negative effect of overgrazing is shared by all the herdsman. As a result, the negative utility for any particular herdsman is only a small fraction of -1. After adding the utilities of the positive and negative components, the rational herdsman concludes that the most sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to the herd. Following the same calculation, a second is added—and then a third, fourth, and so on. The same conclusion is reached by all rational herdsman sharing the commons. It makes little sense for any one of them to exercise self-restraint and not add to his herd because the pasture will eventually be destroyed anyway due to the overgrazing by others. As Hardin concluded: "Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit—in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all."<sup>33</sup>

A similar problem was raised much earlier by Jean-Jacques

Rousseau.<sup>34</sup> He described a primitive hunting party in which a small group of hungry men attempted to catch a deer to satisfy their appetites. If, during the hunt, one man noticed a hare which would satisfy the man's hunger, he would pursue it even if his action would provide no food for the rest of the group and would allow the deer to escape because he had left his post. By this simple example, Rousseau demonstrated his belief in a natural inclination to put self-interest above mutual, general interest. Rousseau did not elaborate upon his story, but we might speculate about the alternatives the hunter faced.<sup>35</sup> He might have thought that rational self-interest dictated that he remain faithful to his hunting partners and refuse to pursue the hare. This would be especially true in the long run, because it would establish a precedent for securing future meals. He could have predicted that, by pursuing the hare, his abandonment of the group would enable the deer to escape. He would have regretted that result, but he also knew that if he did not pursue the hare, it would be possible that the second hunter would see the hare, make calculations similar to his own, and then catch the hare for his own meal. In that case also, the deer would escape, leaving many empty stomachs, including that of the first hunter. With these thoughts in mind, the first hunter then left the hunting party to catch the hare.

The story demonstrates that, in the absence of a central administrative system to help coordinate human behavior and make it more dependable, even a sincere, rational actor fails to engage in otherwise desirable cooperation. This is true even though the rational person at first is willing to cooperate to satisfy common needs as basic as food itself. If a central authority existed and required that the captured hare be divided equally among all hunters, then the hunters would ignore the hare as long as there was a reasonable chance of catching the deer.

Today's slow movement toward central, worldwide administration of some aspects of life, such as carried out by multinational corporations and international regulatory organizations controlling transnational air transportation and electronic communication, suggests that the question no longer is: Will there be a worldwide system of order? Instead, the sobering issue has become: What will be its nature? This is true despite the failure of a majority of the world's people to recognize that a global system is in the making. If one acknowledges that, barring

nuclear suicide or ecological collapse, the economic and political structures of the world are becoming enmeshed with one another on a global basis, an issue of high importance is to assess whether the incipient system serves the values that one believes are most worthy of support. Given the value orientations of the dominant actors in today's world, it is possible that new forms of inequity or exploitation may be established.

Because the developing system is global in scope, it is especially important that avoidable errors be averted, since there will be no sanctuaries to which to flee should the evolving system prove tyrannical or inhumane. Therefore, it is imperative to construct a normative basis for international transactions to insure that through inadvertence or moral callousness we do not create a system that eventually destroys our highest values.

In summary, citizens in one state or group of states have no way of assuring that actions of other governments will not be harmful to or catastrophic for the lives of all. Means do not exist to insure that various national interests will harmonize with the human interest. The international structures of power and authority and the prevailing criteria for selecting foreign policies are unable (1) to satisfy the security and survival requirements that a prudent foreign policy must, and (2) to implement the preferred values that a just foreign policy should. The apparent need to establish a system of policy coordination commensurate with the global dimensions of modern human behavior poses two remaining questions: First, what are the most useful standards for assessing whether foreign policies are helping to achieve a more secure and humane global community? These standards will be discussed in the remainder of the present chapter. Second, are U.S. foreign policies in fact implementing the values and transforming the structures without which survival will be in question and human dignity indefinitely denied? The answer to this question is pursued in subsequent chapters which contain detailed analyses of four case studies of U.S. foreign policy.

#### A GLOBAL HUMANIST RESPONSE

In developing a framework around which to build a foreign policy capable of moving safely into the 1990s, it is useful to begin by clarifying the values that one wants to realize. Of course, one's fundamental values are chosen or assumed, not



proven. To be sure, students and practitioners of foreign policy frequently justify one particular policy or another by saying that the national interest “requires” it. A certain policy, they say, is “necessary.” This language conveys the false impression that the policy is a direct outgrowth or an empirical expression of what *is*, rather than a statement of what someone thinks the policy *ought* to be. A policy is “required” or “necessary” only in the sense that its proponents believe it is necessary for serving certain other values which are usually not stated explicitly. The highly acclaimed concept of the national interest is not scientifically determined. It is a cluster of goals and strategies derived from more fundamental values. Traditionally, foremost among these is the preservation of the security and prosperity of the government and its supporters. This includes maintaining sovereign control over a defined territory and population. The competitive accumulation of military power and, secondarily, of economic resources, are the principal means for pursuing the values of security and prosperity.

If one chooses to depart from traditional definitions of the national interest, one is not less scientific or less empirically oriented than the defenders of traditional definitions. An untraditional orientation may simply mean that one endorses a slightly rearranged hierarchy of values.

#### *An Alternative Framework for Decision Making*

The earlier discussion of mounting foreign policy problems called into question the capacity of national societies to provide security and reasonable opportunities for the fulfillment of humanitarian values as long as governments continue acting in accordance with traditional diplomatic precepts. The challenge for policymakers now and in the future will be to bring policies, which in the past have served the national interest as traditionally defined, into harmony with the human interest in abolishing war and poverty and in halting gross denial of human rights and ecological decay. These four problems can also be stated as world order values: peace without national military arsenals ( $V_1$ ), economic well-being for all inhabitants on the earth ( $V_2$ ), universal human rights and social justice ( $V_3$ ), and ecological balance ( $V_4$ ).<sup>36</sup> It is imperative to make progress in achieving these values if we seek to insure the long-range survival of the species and to improve the quality of human life for all people.

Although these values may appear uncontroversial, they pro-

vide a different set of standards for policymaking than are found in traditional understandings of the national interest. Three clarifying principles will establish points of difference between the two approaches. First, the value framework proposed here rests upon the assumption that the human race is the important constituency to consider in policymaking. The world's people should benefit from policy decisions. The traditional approach gives priority to the people of one nation. It also provides more benefits for the governmental elite and its supporters within the nation than for the national population in general. Thus my proposed emphasis on the human interest differs in two ways from traditional diplomacy. First, the scope of human identity extends across national boundaries rather than remains confined to the people within them. Second, human identity expresses bonds of community between those at the top and at the bottom of the class structure. Compared to the traditional foreign policy approach, human community is expanded horizontally to include all nations and vertically to encompass all classes.

A second idea that undergirds the proposed value framework is that the service of human needs should be the guiding principle for major economic and political decisions, rather than the maximization of national power or corporate profit. This does not mean that nationhood or profit are excluded, but only that they should rank lower in the hierarchy of values than service to basic human needs. A corollary of this value orientation is that human transactions based on cooperation and a sense of human solidarity would increase, while transactions that are competitive and based on a denial of community would decrease. Competitiveness among large social groups is less useful when the human race is the subject of concern than when only a national group is the focal point for protection, production, and consumption. If fulfilling human needs is to become the guiding principle for policymaking, then those most in need should be the first to receive attention. A politics of liberation, which the fourfold value framework is designed to advance, is like the practice of medicine at its best: to help first those people who are most in need. It differs sharply from theories of politics that call for triage, the lifeboat ethic, or the trickle-down theory of development.

Third, the *entire* planet, the atmosphere around it, and the high seas are of prime concern. They are to be protected and

conserved for both present and unborn generations. In contrast, the exponents of the national interest place the exercise of sovereignty over one *part* of the planet's territory at the top of their hierarchy of values. They are concerned with securing advantages for "their" segment of the planet and of the human race, and they pay little attention to the needs of future generations.

The four preferred world order values and the three clarifying principles provide the value framework that I call *global humanism* in the course of this analysis. The *human interest* is the collection of goals and strategies that are consistent with and will advance the values of global humanism. The term *humane world community* is used to mean a universal human identity or all-inclusive sense of human solidarity combined with social norms and institutions that aim at achieving a life of dignity for all through an equitable sharing of decision-making powers, opportunities, and resources. *Global populism* refers both to (1) the emphasis on a citizens' movement to mobilize and empower the poor and politically weak and (2) the introduction of structural reforms inspired by the preferred values and designed to help the dispossessed.

In the course of this study, U.S. foreign policy is evaluated by the extent to which it implements or is designed to implement the values of global humanism.<sup>37</sup> In earlier discussion, I have argued that a foreign policy informed by such a value framework is necessary to insure human security and is desirable to achieve other values on which there is a high degree of consensus in our own society. To assess the impact of U.S. foreign policy upon the prospects for preferred world order reform, a representative case study has been selected to illustrate U.S. performance in each of the four value areas. This performance cannot be understood merely by comparing officially professed values with the values of global humanism. As in any political system, a wide gap often exists between rhetoric and reality. To account for this possible discrepancy, the analyses below will distinguish *professed values* from *implicit values*. The former are the goal values expressed in official statements about U.S. foreign policy. Implicit values are the unspoken value preferences that are embedded in actual political behavior and revealed in the value impact of the policy.

With these definitions in mind, the effort to explain the global meaning of U.S. foreign policy will proceed as follows: The first

section of each case study consists of an empirical description of U.S. policy, with an emphasis on revealing the professed and implicit values of U.S. policy. The analysis clarifies whether the real value impact was consistent with the goals proclaimed in the rhetoric. Next, the implicit values are juxtaposed against the values of global humanism to determine whether U.S. policy was helping to realize a humane world community. Fourth, the global humanist value framework is used to develop specific recommendations for future policy in the area of each case study. Finally, some indicators of world order progress are provided in order to enable scholars or political activists to check on future progress in realizing the preferred values.

One purpose of this analysis is to provide a fresh global framework by which to examine the wisdom and utility of U.S. foreign policies. This framework ideally should transcend both the idiosyncracies of this historical era and one's own political culture. I doubtless have been unable to accomplish that fully; thus the framework should be viewed as tentative and subject to refinement and modification.

Before examining U.S. policy itself, it will be useful to look at some implications and applications of the value-centered approach proposed here. We turn now to that discussion.

### *The Utility of a Value-Centered Approach*

This study of foreign policy is a value-centered approach. It delineates the values that guide decision makers in their policy choices and that are expressed in official behavior.<sup>38</sup> A value-centered approach to foreign policy analysis is admittedly a break with the prevailing intellectual tradition. Most foreign policy analysis falls into one of two categories. Some authors treat foreign policy as history. They emphasize a chronological description of events. In contrast, behavioral scientists focus on the processes by which policy is made, negotiated, or executed. They discuss the interactions of officials, the effects of policy-making machinery, the politics of bureaucratic bargaining, or occasionally the psychological origins of policy. In both of these approaches, past scholarship has usually focused on the use of power, without giving much attention to the value impact of policy and to who benefits or should benefit from policies. Traditional approaches have impoverished reality and discouraged use of the imagination by excessive emphasis on the way things are and by inattention to the way they ought to be. In contrast,

when a value-centered approach incorporates a rigorous empiricism with explicit attention to values embedded in policy, it yields several advantages.

In the first place, one's understanding of political events is enhanced if international politics is viewed as a value-realizing process. The observer's focus shifts away from examining the processes of political interaction by themselves and from viewing policy consequences merely as discrete events. For example, the values of officials as expressed in several policies may be compared to the global humanist values that this analysis suggests are useful guides for political action. The value impacts of specific foreign policies then provide intellectual handles by which one may grasp the normative direction in which a changing system of world order is moving.

Moreover, if observers examine foreign policy as a value-realizing process, they are able to see more clearly the recurring values that apparently idiosyncratic policies often are advancing. If similar values are repeatedly served by political leaders, one can extrapolate from this the structure of interests or the classes that benefit from the ruling group's policies. This is particularly important in attempting to define the nature of a more just world polity and in developing strategies to attain one. By assessing the desirability and consequences of political action in light of a set of explicit norms, a value-centered approach facilitates a structural analysis of social problems and remedies. This in turn helps to identify both the structures that need reform and the people who can be expected to resist or to support such change.

Whenever a state executes foreign policy, some values are advanced and others are negated. Every major policy issue contains within it a moral issue. Practitioners of foreign policy often disguise the moral code that a state follows in order to obscure the real beneficiaries of acts by the state. A value-centered approach directly attacks this problem by clarifying the implicit values of the ruling group. This provides information essential for the practice of self-government. Because many ordinary citizens implement the leadership's political values by paying taxes or sacrificing their own lives in war, they understandably want not to be deceived about the value impact of their own government's policies.

A value-centered approach also is useful for establishing preferred goals for future behavior. It encourages imaginative

thinking about the possibility of change in the international system. Because a value-centered approach explicitly emphasizes human preferences, it helps chart action to reform the existing system. If in making foreign policy officials react to crises as they arise, they are unlikely to think about changing the structure of international relations. If instead they ask themselves how to implement preferred values, they would be more likely to develop alternative visions of future world order systems.

Political leaders seldom follow this approach, but when they do the results stand out boldly against the backdrop of routine diplomacy. For example, when Adlai E. Stevenson was U.S. Representative to the United Nations, he once delivered a speech entitled "Working Toward a World Without War." In it he said, "We do not hold the vision of a world without conflict. We do hold the vision of a world without war—and this inevitably requires an alternative system for coping with conflict. We cannot have one without the other."<sup>39</sup>

To emphasize values does not mean that one must proceed with an idealistic or optimistic view of the future. A value-centered approach may lead to a pessimistic assessment of the prospects for world order reform. One might conclude that the prevailing value perspective of officials departs widely from one's own value preferences. In such a case, the tendency of the actors within the system would be to make the future worse than the present in terms of preferred value realization.

Of course, no process of value clarification can eliminate arbitrariness or subjectivity in selecting preferred values. But this approach underscores the need to make deliberate choices and tradeoffs in the interaction of different values. In the short run at least, some preferred values may conflict with others; all cannot be grasped without the right hand knowing what the left hand is doing. To maximize food production, for example, one may need to use chemical fertilizers or pesticides that pollute. An approach that does not emphasize values obscures the choice among conflicting goals.

Moreover, value clarification can diminish unintended consequences of government behavior. The more explicit and accurate a value impact statement is, the more possible it becomes to make behavior implement value preferences. Without a clear statement of the value impact of a given policy, the possible gap between governmental rhetoric and political reality may go un-

noticed. Such a condition could lead citizens to support policies that in practice negate a preferred value that officials have embraced only rhetorically. This could produce citizen behavior that in practice resisted rather than encouraged a desirable change.

A value-centered approach also helps overcome the level-of-analysis problem. That is, by adopting a value framework that can be deliberately constructed so as to reflect planetary rather than strictly national concerns, it is easier to avoid the trap of looking at international relations from a parochial nation-state view. Officials can then give adequate attention to both the total world system and the subsystems within it. Sensitivity to double standards is enhanced by this approach because explicit norms can be universally applied.

It is instructive to examine one example of the level-of-analysis problem that is a central issue in this study and that traditional approaches have seldom clarified. From the nation-state vantage point, diplomacy should protect the interests of the state, usually measured in terms of power. But that is a *laissez-faire* approach to the interests of the *planet*. The nation-state vantage point is the international variant of the “invisible hand” of classical capitalism. Proponents of this doctrine assumed that separate people or businesses each maximizing their private economic advantages would produce desirable results for the entire society. Likewise, proponents of serving national interests assume that separate nations maximizing their national advantages will produce desirable results for world society. Such an approach is sensitive to the needs of the nation but indifferent to the interests of the planet. It oversimplifies reality by assuming that what is good for the nation is good for the world.

The weakness of the *laissez-faire* approach is evident in both economics and international relations. There is often a fundamental contradiction between the pursuit of private profit and the service of human needs. Some things that are profitable ought not to be done; some things that ought to be done are not profitable. Similarly, there is often a fundamental contradiction between the pursuit of national advantage of separate states and the service of global human needs. For example, taking fertile land out of production in Kansas or Iowa may be good for U.S. farmers who want to sell wheat or corn at a higher price, but not for malnourished south Asians who want to buy grain at low