

ROBERT BIANCHI

# Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey



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ROBERT BIANCHI

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To my father,  
Edward Bianchi,  
and to the memory of my mother,  
Julia Bianchi,  
with love and gratitude



## Preface

IN ITS SIMPLEST TERMS, the aim of this study is to use certain social science concepts to learn about politics in Turkey and then, in turn, to use evidence from Turkey and other systems to improve the concepts themselves. I have attempted to show how ideal types of pluralism and corporatism can sharpen our understanding of Turkish political change. But I also have sought to bring out the more general implications of Turkey's unusual and persistently heterogeneous associational life in order to contribute to ongoing efforts to refashion and refine conventional dichotomous distinctions between pluralism and corporatism and between "state" and "societal" corporatism. In this sense, the study reflects a widespread concern that theory and research inform one another closely in a rapidly expanding field of comparative political inquiry.

In all phases of this project I have been fortunate to enjoy the encouragement of many friends and colleagues in the United States and Turkey. Leonard Binder, Philippe Schmitter, and Aristide Zolberg have provided indispensable support and guidance since my earliest days at the University of Chicago. The late Lloyd Fallers and his wife, Margaret, were two of the earliest supporters of this study, and their personal example taught me much about how to conduct intelligent and sensitive fieldwork in another cultural setting. Frank Tachau and Frederick Frey each had the kindness and stamina to read two different versions of the manuscript. Together they provided an invaluable combination of praise and challenging criticism that allowed me to tighten and clarify some of the major arguments. I would also like to thank Kemal Karpat, Dankwart Rustow, and Walter Weiker for encouraging me to develop viewpoints with which they sometimes disagreed.

Several Turkish friends in Ankara and Istanbul aided my fieldwork and influenced my thinking long afterward. The contributions to this study by such scholars as Mübeccel Kıray, Ahmet Yücekök, Yalçın Küçük, Çiğdem Kâğıtçıbaşı, Bahattin Akşit, and Ayşe Öncü will be obvious to all who are familiar with their writings. The most important assistance came from dozens of leaders of the Turkish labor movement and business world who gave generously and enthusiastically their time and enormous insight into Turkish political life. Their uncommon patience, candor, and cordiality



made this work possible and exciting. I must emphasize, however, that the responsibility for the views expressed in this volume rests exclusively with the author.

My fieldwork in Turkey was supported by the Office of Education through a Fulbright-Hays Research Abroad Grant. The American Research Institute in Turkey, and especially Prentiss de Jesus, exposed me to a wide variety of foreign scholars in Turkey and provided many of us with a home away from home. The Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Chicago financed part of the manuscript preparation and the Department of Political Science was particularly generous with recurrent requests for “more computer time.” Both in Turkey and the United States several friends lent great personal support while struggling with their own projects. I would particularly like to thank David Barchard, John Taylor, Göksel Türk, and Dennis and Lilina Williams.

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## Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey





## Interest Groups, Political Participation, and Political Development

SINCE THE END of World War II, the rapid proliferation of a wide variety of interest groups along with their increasing interaction with one another, with political party organizations, and with various governmental institutions has added an important new dimension to the politics of contemporary Turkey. The rapid emergence and diffusion of this network of groups representing specialized interests suggest that the Turks have been particularly precocious in developing "the art of association" while implementing broad social and economic change within the context of liberal democracy. This confirms the global hypothesis of most students of associational life since de Tocqueville and Durkheim that increasing group organization and activity are the result of the growing division of social labor and the expansion of formal political equality.<sup>1</sup> But one of the most interesting aspects of the development of associability in modern Turkey is that it has so often displayed sharp discontinuities with the general level of socioeconomic development and structural differentiation. In different historical periods, social and economic sectors, and geographical regions, association formation commonly has either lagged behind or surged ahead of other aspects of social change. In other words, one of the most distinctive and striking characteristics of the art of association in Turkey is that historically it has been an independent and highly politicized dimension of modernization.

The highly politicized nature of Turkish associational life is observable not only in the close interconnections between government, party, and group leaders but also in the very different ways in which their relationships have been structured in order to advance or inhibit the representation of different socioeconomic and political interests. The complex and variable nature of interest group politics in Turkey is largely the result of the division of the Turkish associational universe into two different and often overlapping networks—the pluralist network of private voluntary associations and the corporatist network of semiofficial compulsory associations. In certain

<sup>1</sup> Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 2 vols. (New York: Vintage Books, 1954), 2:114–118; Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 1–32.

historical periods and in certain social and economic sectors, pluralist interest groups have been predominant. These have tended to broaden the scope and increase the intensity of interest conflict, to serve as important channels for expanding political participation, and to contribute to the reshaping and invigoration of party-electoral politics. But in other periods and sectors corporatist interest groups have been predominant. These have tended to suppress interest conflict, to constrict political participation, and to serve as instruments of social control.

One of the major objectives of this study is to describe the emergence of both corporatist and pluralist associations as competing means for structuring interest representation and to examine the tensions in Turkish political development that have been produced by historical shifts in the relative importance of these two types of groups. Particular emphasis will be given to analyzing the background and evaluating the consequences of associational policies pursued by recent governments in their attempts to implement central economic planning since the 1960 revolution. These policies have aimed at corporatizing the most important areas of Turkish associational life in order to limit political participation and reduce demands for economic redistribution without abandoning the formal framework of liberal democracy. Regardless of the stated or implicit intentions of these policies, however, they have contributed to a heightened perception of interest conflict between and within several important social and economic sectors and to a rising militancy among several groups in both corporatist and pluralist associational networks. This means that the principal, though unintended, consequence of recent attempts at corporatization has been the creation of simultaneous crises of political participation and distribution that seriously threaten Turkey's attempt to combine ambitious new plans for rapid economic development with the continuation of a democratic regime.

Much of what will be presented in the following chapters will describe and attempt to explain two of the most striking aspects of the development of interest group politics in modern Turkey: first, the common discontinuities between the degree of socioeconomic development and collective action through various associations; and, second, the rising militancy of several long-established and well-organized interest groups, which has contributed to more intense social conflict and to a major realignment of the increasingly fragmented and polarized party system. Both of these important outcomes conflict with some key hypotheses and assumptions concerning the development of interest groups that have become prevalent among the major theorists of political development and group politics.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> This is not to suggest that one can find in the literature on political development or in

Most students of political development and most group theorists appear to agree on two global hypotheses concerning the emergence and development of group politics. The first is that the emergence of a network of specialized agents of interest representation is a basically spontaneous consequence of the growing division of labor in society and the expansion of citizenship. The number and variety of associations and the degree of group organization are generally assumed to be closely related to, if not basically determined by, the level of socioeconomic development. The second hypothesis is that as group organization becomes more highly structured and complex, interest groups tend to become politically less militant. Long-established and well-organized groups are assumed to contribute to a more exclusionary and less conflictive political process whose outcomes favor established elites and reinforce existing social and economic inequalities. While theorists may approve or disapprove of the consequences, there seems to be remarkably wide agreement that as interest group politics becomes more organized and more structured it tends to limit political participation, narrow the scope of interest conflict, and reduce its intensity.

The discussion of interest groups in Turkey will be preceded by a critical and comparative examination of some of the leading theorists of political development and group politics. This will identify and make more explicit the assumptions concerning the nature and consequences of interest group politics in societies at different levels of economic and political development. In particular it will describe different views of the ways in which interest groups structure political participation and thereby contribute to both the creation and possible resolution of different problems or "crises" in political development.

Theorists of political development and group politics generally have not attempted to elaborate frameworks for the comparative analysis of group development that would explain variations in group organization and activity in different societies at similar levels of socioeconomic development or in individual societies over time. Instead they have provided us with what amounts to three different sets of middle-range hypotheses about how interest groups tend to shape and structure political participation in societies at low, intermediate, and advanced levels of economic development and social differentiation. The juxtaposition of these three synchronous views into a unilinear theory of group development has tended to serve as a poor

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the literature on group politics an explicit "middle-range, developmental theory of interest group politics." In fact, while most studies of political development are quite concerned with the general issue of political participation, they indicate little about interest groups as specific channels of participation. Similarly, most studies of interest groups in particular political systems tend to be "snapshot" analyses that provide little insight into the origins and development of groups or about their changing impact on political participation in general.

substitute for a comparative framework that would account for alternative developmental patterns.

Collectively, most developmental and group theorists have provided the following unilinear theory of group development: In the early phases of modernization, the absence of well-organized groups and the unstructured nature of group interaction contribute to potentially excessive levels of interest conflict and political participation. In the intermediate phases of modernization, the emergence of a wide variety of newly organized groups provides a specialized set of channels for managing interest conflict and for expanding participation more gradually and moderately than mass party organizations. And in the advanced phases of modernization, a small number of highly organized interest groups acquire effective control over much of the decision-making process and tend to severely constrict meaningful participation and to suppress interest conflict.

These three views of group politics are prevalent not only among Western social scientists but also among some of the most important participants in contemporary group politics in Turkey. Descriptive generalizations that several social scientists have advanced to explain the nature of group politics in societies at different levels of development are very similar to the conflicting ideological orientations expressed by Turkish associational leaders when they describe their own system of interest politics during a specific historical period. Thus, a better understanding of prevalent political theories can also help to provide a better understanding of the perceptions and values of many key figures in Turkey's current associational life.

### THREE VIEWS OF INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN DEVELOPING SOCIETIES

General treatments of the development of interest group politics can be classified according to the different aspects of political development that seem, implicitly or explicitly, to be the most salient to the authors in question. In attempting such a classification we can benefit from James Coleman's conceptualization of political development as an open-ended process involving a "continuous interaction among the processes of structural *differentiation*, the imperatives of *equality*, and the integrative, responsive, and adaptive *capacity* of a political system" (emphasis added). Coleman argues that differentiation, equality, and capacity are distinct and interdependent dimensions of the "development syndrome" and that variations in political development can be understood in terms of different attempts to prevent or resolve certain political "crises" that can result from the "inherent contradictions" among these three dimensions.<sup>3</sup> In a

<sup>3</sup> James Coleman, "The Development Syndrome: Differentiation-Equality-Capacity," in

similar tripartite conceptualization, Schmitter distinguishes between theorists who identify political development primarily with “the centralization or concentration of authority,” with “the dispersion or distribution of participation,” or with “an ‘integration’ or ‘balance’ ” of these interrelated but antagonistic processes.<sup>4</sup> By approaching the work of developmental and group theorists from this perspective, three theories can be identified: (1) “gap” theory, which focuses on capacity and the concentration of authority; (2) “integration-equilibrium” theory, which focuses on differentiation and the balance between capacity and equality; and (3) “critiques of ‘democratic elitism,’ ” which focus on equality and the dispersion of participation. By distinguishing the clear differences in emphasis that various theorists place on the three dimensions of development, we can observe corresponding differences in their views of the ways interest groups structure political participation and thereby contribute to the creation or potential resolution of various crises in political development.<sup>5</sup>

### *Gap Theory*

The leading representative of gap theory is Samuel Huntington, for whom the key factor distinguishing societies is not the type of regime but the degree of political stability.<sup>6</sup> Stability, Huntington argues, can be conceptualized as the ratio between political participation and political institutionalization. He defines political development as the creation of “civic society,” in which institutionalization exceeds participation, and he defines political decay as the emergence of “praetorian society,” in which participation exceeds institutionalization. The central feature of modernization for Huntington is that rapid social change results in the increasing consciousness and political organization of new groups at a much faster rate

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*Crises and Sequences in Political Development*, ed. Leonard Binder et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 73–100.

<sup>4</sup> Philippe Schmitter, *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), pp. 4–6.

<sup>5</sup> Of course, none of these general political orientations is definitively represented by the work of any single author, and no author can be described accurately as focusing on a single aspect of development to the exclusion of others. In this sense, any attempt to classify the work of a large number of writers on such broad and complex issues as political development and interest groups is necessarily simplified to the identification of common emphases on predominant themes. Most of the authors treated here have produced several notable works, which often vary in their relative emphasis on different dimensions of development as the theorist himself changes his views. Any selection of works can only provide a critical overview of what are generally regarded as some of the most influential recent contributions to developmental and group theories.

<sup>6</sup> Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 1–92.

than the development of strong political institutions and that the net outcome is often violence, instability, and a "corrupt society" incapable of self-government or economic growth.

The dominant theme in Huntington's presentation is what he calls "the dialectical rather than complementary relationship between polity and society" which is exemplified by a series of gaps—between mass and elite, aspiration and capacity, rates of participation and rates of institutionalization, newly mobilized social forces and the state. His preoccupation with such gaps is, in turn, based on an image of an emergent mass society. Modernization tends to produce "alienation, anomie and normlessness" and to increase the consciousness and aggressiveness against the state of the disaffected.<sup>7</sup> The fundamental problem of modernization for Huntington, then, is its tendency to encourage the unlimited and excessive expression of unaggregated demands upon weak government structures.

To combat those aspects of modernization that encourage the emergence of "corrupt" mass society and to turn the tide from political decay to political development, Huntington proposes two interrelated strategic responses for political elites—an increase in the degree of political institutionalization and the control and possible reduction of political participation. Although he phrases the first response in general terms of increasing the strength *and* adaptability of *all* political institutions, Huntington is clearly most concerned with increasing the power of the state, and when he speaks of its "adaptiveness," he appears to employ a kind of vulgar functionalism in which mere persistence is equated with adaptability. Having elaborated at length his view of the "dialectical" nature of the relationship between state and society, Huntington seemingly reverses himself and speaks of a complementary relationship. What is good for the state is regarded as good for society as a whole. "The primary problem [of modernization]," he declares, "is not liberty but the creation of a legitimate public order." Huntington's understanding of legitimacy, however, appears to equate the public interest with the interest of the state. He maintains, for example, that "the legitimacy of government actions can be sought in the extent to which they reflect the interests of the governmental institutions," and that "governmental institutions derive their legitimacy and authority not to the extent to which they represent the interests of the people or any other group, but to the extent to which they have distinct interests of their own apart from all other groups."<sup>8</sup>

In addition to a general increase in the capacity of the state to satisfy demands, Huntington also sees an immediate need to reduce the level of

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., pp. 7, 27.

demands made upon the state through the moderation and restriction of political participation. Huntington argues that in highly developed or “institutionalized” political systems the important task of regulating participation is performed by parties and interest groups. While parties and interest groups are described as ensuring “broad, organized, and structured” participation, they are seen primarily as mechanisms to slow down and control the entry of newly mobilized social forces into politics and to make them less threatening and disruptive by changing their attitudes and behavior. Huntington describes party and group organizations, not as conduits for channeling political demands, but primarily as “filters” that shield the established political leadership from unlimited access by nonelites and that socialize nonelite leaders to preexisting political values and practices.

In a sense, the top positions of leadership are the *inner core* of the political system; the less powerful positions, the peripheral organizations, and the semi-political organizations are the *filters* through which individuals desiring access to the core must pass. . . . These [intermediate] institutions *impose political socialization as the price of political participation*. In a praetorian society groups become mobilized into politics without becoming socialized by [preexisting patterns of] politics. The distinguishing characteristic of a highly institutionalized polity, in contrast, is the price it places on power (emphasis added).<sup>9</sup>

The most striking problems in Huntington's presentation are, first, his narrow and undifferentiated conceptualization of political participation as the expression of frustration and social discontent and, second, his understanding of political institutionalization as involving the concentration of power in the state and the restriction of nonelite access to authoritative decision makers. Because he identifies political participation with the expression of discontent arising from the dislocations of modernization, Huntington presents newly emergent interest group and party organizations as a restriction rather than an expansion of participation. It is this understanding of political participation that leads him to view it as being *inversely* rather than directly related to political institutionalization.

Huntington's concern with the disruptive aspects of social change leads him to rely on de Tocqueville as another theorist of mass society, but his preoccupation with political order causes a complete misreading of de Tocqueville's notion of participation. Huntington asserts the basic similarity of de Tocqueville's injunction that the “art of association” must grow as equality increases with his own injunction that institutionalization

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., pp. 22, 83.



must increase as the level of participation rises.<sup>10</sup> For de Tocqueville, however, the art of association is only secondarily a matter of demand-filtering socialization. It has nothing whatever to do with an increase in the power of the state. On the contrary, he saw the development of intermediate social structures as mechanisms that would allow common men to overcome the powerlessness of fragmentation by engaging in politics collectively and to protect themselves from what he regarded as a dangerous and potentially irresistible tendency toward the centralization of power in the state. De Tocqueville prescribes structures for the promotion and not the restriction of political participation that would protect *both* the individual and the state. But Huntington stands him on his head by identifying the art of association with increases in central authority and *decreases* in participation.<sup>11</sup>

In identifying the development of more and better organized interest groups with a possible constriction of political participation, Huntington's gap theory is similar to Gabriel Almond's functionalist scheme, in which both interest groups and parties are seen as demand-reducing mechanisms.<sup>12</sup> For Almond, the primary task of group and party organizations is to ensure "boundary maintenance" between polity and society in order to prevent what might be called a "performance gap" characterized by the overperformance of "input functions" and the underperformance of "output functions." The demand-reducing role of interest groups is much less obvious in Almond's discussion than in Huntington's because, at least in his earlier writings, Almond focuses attention mainly on the input functions, especially "interest articulation" and "interest aggregation." This implies that development is to be understood more in terms of increases in political participation than in terms of greater output and capacity. But this focus is curiously deceptive since Almond's overriding concern with boundary maintenance (which in plain English amounts to shielding the bureaucracy from political demands) leads him to a subtle redefinition of the function of interest groups in developed political systems. The chief implication of this redefinition is the conceptual alienation of interest groups from interest articulation and of interest articulation from political development.

At first glance it seems that for Almond political development is identified primarily with the emergence of more differentiated structures, which acquire increasingly autonomous responsibility for the performance of specific political functions. While realizing that in reality all structures are

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., pp. 4-5.

<sup>11</sup> de Tocqueville, 2:114-119.

<sup>12</sup> Gabriel Almond, "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, ed. Gabriel Almond and James Coleman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 3-64.

multifunctional, his image of a highly developed political system is one in which a clear division of labor exists, so that interest groups articulate demands and parties aggregate them, and legislatures make policies and independent bureaucracies impartially implement them. Yet Almond appears to argue that the hallmark of a developed political system is not really its sophisticated division of labor but its ability to achieve and preserve boundary maintenance, not the multiplicity of structures performing different functions but rather the common contribution of all structures to the single overriding task of reducing the level of demands and protecting the autonomy of authoritative decision makers. Though the division of labor associated with development is generally seen as improving and increasing the performance of all "universal" functions, interest articulation is not to be augmented but rather modified so that it serves or appears to become the function of interest aggregation.

Although Almond considers all functions to be "universal," he does not appear to consider all functions to be equally important. This in itself is not surprising and would not justify a rejection of functionalist analysis in general. It is certainly possible to imagine a hierarchy of functions in which some are "more vital" than others or in which some are merely desirable but still expendable if they impede the performance of other functions higher up in the hierarchy. Almond himself has retained a functionalist approach while explicitly shifting his general emphasis from input functions in his earlier writings to output functions and governmental capabilities in his later work.<sup>13</sup> But a major problem with all of Almond's functionalist reincarnations is that each leaves the hierarchical nature of the functions implicit and forces us to reconstruct it anew for ourselves.

The greatest source of confusion in this regard is his repeated assertion that "among the input functions, interest articulation is of crucial importance."<sup>14</sup> This strongly implies that Almond considers interest articulation to be a necessary and perhaps vital function. It would seem reasonable to conclude from this and from his earlier encouragement of research on interest group politics in developing systems that political development and increasing interest articulation go hand in hand. Yet, on the basis of Almond's own discussion, it is just as reasonable to conclude the opposite. Like Huntington, Almond identifies higher levels of interest articulation with increasing modernization, but not necessarily with political development. For Almond, interest articulation and interest groups are important, not in their own right, but because, in his view, they pose the greatest potential threat to the performance of the more crucial output functions

<sup>13</sup> Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), chaps. 5, 7.

<sup>14</sup> Almond, p. 33.

(especially “rule application”) and to the strengthening of governmental capabilities (especially “extraction,” “regulation,” and “distribution”).

Among the input functions, interest articulation is of crucial importance since it occurs at the boundary of the political system. . . . The structure and style of interest articulation define the pattern of boundary maintenance between polity and society, and within the political system affect the boundaries between the various parts of the political system—parties, legislatures, bureaucracies and courts.<sup>15</sup>

The concept of boundary maintenance makes no sense without recognizing the implicit hierarchical nature of the functions, which may require some lower-order functions to be restricted or even suspended for the sake of higher-order ones. In Almond’s changing functional hierarchies the most consistent theme has been the primacy of the output functions and the expendability of interest articulation. Interest articulation may be “of crucial importance,” but it is also the most expendable function of all. Both its importance and its expendability appear to stem from its potential for disrupting and impeding the performance of the higher-order output functions.

If development is basically a matter of improving boundary maintenance, and if this in turn requires decreases in interest articulation, then how can political development be identified with the emergence of interest groups? Almond’s answer lies in his distinction between two types of interest groups—those that contribute to bad boundary maintenance and those that contribute to good boundary maintenance. The former type includes what he terms “institutional, non-associational and anomic interest groups,” whose style of interest articulation is characterized as “sporadic, latent, diffuse, particular and affective.” The latter type he terms “associational interest groups,” whose style of interest articulation is characterized as “constant, manifest, specific, general and instrumental.”<sup>16</sup>

What is distinctive about “associational” interest groups is that unlike all other types they play a “regulatory role . . . in processing raw claims . . . and directing them *in an orderly way and in an aggregable form* through the party system, legislature and bureaucracy” (emphasis added).<sup>17</sup> In other words, associational groups transmit demands in such a manner that even a good functionalist would be tempted to describe their function not as demand articulation at all but as demand aggregation or, more accurately, demand reduction. Interest groups other than the associational variety, however, are not seen as processors of demands but as mere

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., pp. 33–38.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., pp. 35–36.

creators and conductors of demands, that is, as interest articulators par excellence. To Almond's mind that is exactly the problem with them. They inject into the political system "the 'raw,' *unaggregated* demands of specific interests, or . . . diffuse, uncompromising, or revolutionary and reactionary tendencies," so that "special interests and ideological tendencies penetrate the bureaucracy and undermine its neutral, instrumental character" (emphasis added).<sup>18</sup>

Despite his use of the terminology of general systems theory, Almond's framework does not resemble a systematic model or even a simpler cybernetics model so much as the notion of a communications net or flow chart in which a series of differentiated and interrelated structures (interest groups, parties, and legislatures) sequentially collect, process, and transform demands in a gradual, steplike demand-reducing process. He implies that this process should be kept as separate as possible from the crucial policy-implementing function of an ideally independent bureaucracy. Thus, if Almond appears to regard rule application as the most important function and interest articulation as the most expendable function, he also treats interest aggregation as the most ubiquitous function. He particularly emphasizes the notion that "interest aggregation can occur at many points in the political system."<sup>19</sup> Indeed, this function seems to be the primary task of all types of nongovernmental structures in Almond's vision of the developed political system.

If Almond tends to describe interest aggregation as a ubiquitous function without a specific structure, he tends even more to describe interest groups as marginal structures without a specific function. Interest groups seem to be excluded from the effects of the prevailing increase in the division of labor and denied any distinctive or unique function, since development requires their transformation from demand producers and transmitters into demand processors and filterers. As other structures supposedly become more unifunctional, interest groups actually become more multifunctional, since they articulate less and aggregate or filter more. As other structures supposedly become more autonomous, interest groups may become less so if the functions of others are considered more important. In fact, there is more confusion about the supposed function of interest groups than about the function of any other structure in Almond's model. "Articulating," "aggregating," "filtering," and "screening" clearly are not the same, yet all are included in the functional repertoire of "boundary-maintaining," "associational" interest groups in developed political systems.

To summarize, then, whereas Huntington understands political devel-

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 38.

<sup>19</sup> Almond and Powell, p. 99.

opment as requiring a closure of the supposedly widening gap between participation and institutionalization, Almond sees development as dependent on preventing the appearance of gaps between the performance of input functions and the performance of output functions. For Huntington the gap is to be closed by promoting institutionalization more rapidly than participation, and for Almond the gaps are to be avoided by improving boundary maintenance through the promotion of interest aggregation and the reduction of interest articulation. Both Huntington and Almond tend to see the major problem of political development as the excessive and unmediated expression of demands on weak governmental structures. Both argue that such demand overloads can be prevented or remedied by increasing the capacity of governmental institutions to satisfy demands and by promoting intermediate structures to control and limit the expression of demands. Accordingly, both maintain that the principal task of interest groups in developing political systems is not to create and transmit demands but to reduce their volume and alter their content. Thus, while both authors hold that interest groups provide an important contribution to political development, that contribution is seen in terms of their limitation rather than expansion of political participation and interest articulation.

### *Integration-Equilibrium Theory*

Whereas gap theorists emphasize the disruptive and destabilizing aspects of modernization, integration-equilibrium theorists see modernization as containing the potential remedies for many of its own ills. Whereas the former see rapid social change mainly as a threat to public order, the latter are more impressed by its overall contributions to greater social and economic adaptiveness. For both types of theorists, political development involves an ongoing tension between antagonistic tendencies toward the concentration of authority and the dispersion of participation. But whereas gap theorists view these tendencies as dialectical and contradictory, integration-equilibrium theorists view them as interdependent and reconcilable. The former are more concerned that development have a clear theme and a regular rhythm, the latter that it have a complex yet pleasing harmony. The former are annoyed at the distractions of polyphony; the latter are intrigued by the depth of well-balanced counterpoint. The former are jarred by dissonant chords; the latter believe that they can be resolved by consonant ones.

Integration-equilibrium theorists are no less concerned with political stability than gap theorists. They see it as attainable not by encouraging one developmental tendency to the detriment of the other, not simply by increasing the capacity of the state to close a series of supposed gaps, but

by maintaining a number of delicate balances—between liberty and order, between social differentiation and subsequent reintegration, and between the various segments of society in relation to one another. For them the chief issue of political participation is not demand reduction but conflict management and resolution. Participation is seen more clearly as a force for moderating conflict as well as increasing it, for achieving greater support for the regime as well as imposing greater demands, and for reintegration under a new consensus if enough social groups are given a stake in the system.

This view of the integrative and stabilizing potential of participation in general (and of interest groups in particular) was expressed forcefully in de Tocqueville's early estimate of the likely consequences of expanding associability in nineteenth-century America.

Freedom of association in political matters is not so dangerous to public tranquillity as is supposed, and . . . possibly, after having agitated society for some time, it may strengthen the state in the end. . . . By engaging [civil associations] more and more in the pursuit of objects which cannot be attained without public tranquillity, [governments] deter them from revolutions. . . . Thus it is by the enjoyment of a dangerous freedom that the Americans learn the art of rendering the dangers of freedom less formidable.<sup>20</sup>

It has become popular to identify both de Tocqueville and Durkheim with the notions of "mass society" and "crisis of authority" because of their common concern with the need for social reintegration during periods of rapid change. Yet, unlike the proponents of gap theory, who frequently cite them as supporting authorities, they are less troubled by a cataclysmic vision of the revolt of the masses than by the threat to individual liberty from a too powerful state. For de Tocqueville and Durkheim the danger of social atomization is not so much the "overavailability" of the masses as their basic powerlessness and defenselessness vis-à-vis centralizing government. Although both recommend the encouragement of secondary associations as stabilizing buffers and intermediary structures between the state and the individual, both are quite emphatic in identifying associational development with the expansion of participation rather than with the concentration of authority. As Durkheim says:

A society composed of an infinite number of unorganized individuals, that a hypertrophied State is forced to oppress and contain, constitutes a veritable sociological monstrosity. For collective activity is always too complex to be able to be expressed through the single and unique organ

<sup>20</sup> de Tocqueville, 2:126.

of the State. . . . A nation can be maintained only if, between the State and the individual, there is intercalated a whole series of secondary groups near enough to the individuals to attract them strongly in their sphere of action and drag them . . . into the general torrent of social life.<sup>21</sup>

Despite their common emphasis on balance and on the long-term contributions of participation through secondary groups to social harmony and adaptiveness, integration-equilibrium theorists tend to divide over the question of whether balance and conflict resolution can be achieved spontaneously through the operation of self-correcting forces or whether it must be ensured by a coordinating political center. For example, Madison, Simmel, Coser, and Truman all believe that under certain circumstances conflict can be structured so that it tends to be self-limiting by virtue of its very ubiquity and multiplicity and tends to bind contending groups in a more or less stable balance of power whose equilibrium will be maintained by a kind of "invisible hand."<sup>22</sup> Basic to these theorists is the notion that political participation through secondary associations can moderate conflict if they can substitute multiple and crosscutting cleavages that involve only peripheral parts of members' loyalties for the supposedly more intractable and all-encompassing cleavages that divide primary groups. All agree that "the violence of faction," as Madison terms it, can be eased not by removing its causes, since this could only be achieved at the expense of liberty, but by controlling its effects, and that this in turn is best achieved by multiplying the causes of faction and relying on their mutual checks and balances or countervailing power as natural guarantees of both stability and equity.

These general assumptions about self-integrating and self-balancing tendencies lead to two further assumptions concerning the concept of the public interest and the nature of the state. Since noble consequences are seen as emerging naturally from selfish motives, it is difficult for such theorists to conceive of a public or general interest that may be different from and in conflict with the interests of the individuals and groups that constitute society. They tend either to dismiss the concept of the public interest entirely by denying any possible distinction between "is" and "ought," or to equate the public interest with whatever emerges from the "group struggle" as a reflection of the "prevailing values" of the com-

<sup>21</sup> Durkheim, p. 28.

<sup>22</sup> Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, *The Federalist Papers* (New York: The New American Library, 1961); Georg Simmel, *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations* (New York: The Free Press, 1955); Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York: The Free Press, 1956); David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953).

munity.<sup>23</sup> This lack of normative standards for evaluating public policy is accompanied by an inclination to deny or minimize the possibility that the state can act disinterestedly on behalf of the entire society. Government coordination and arbitration often are seen as both unnecessary and undesirable. In sharp contrast to the proponents of gap theory, they often regard the state as merely one of several groups constituting society, qualitatively no different from the others and pursuing its own institutional goals, which are inherently no more legitimate or disinterested than those of any competing interest.

In contrast to such notions of homeostatic tendencies, Durkheim, Eisenstadt, and Smelser describe a direct and crucial role for the state in resolving conflict and avoiding what they regard as the real dangers of social breakdown. Each points to the paradoxical effects of the greater division of social labor as involving both improved adaptability and greater fragility. They note that the greater efficiency of newly differentiated structures is accompanied by their greater total interdependence, which increases the potential impact on all structures of a disruption by any one of them. This paradoxical nature of the division of labor means that although complex societies may be more capable of dealing with conflict, they are also more susceptible to its immediate effects. Thus, they argue, balance cannot be assumed to be the spontaneous result of self-regulating group interaction, but must be guaranteed by a central structure with unique responsibility for reintegrating the separate parts of society and coordinating them in the general interest of the whole.<sup>24</sup>

Durkheim, for example, sees the division of labor as leading to the gradual replacement of mechanical solidarity (social solidarity based on similarities) by organic solidarity (solidarity based on interdependent differences). Although he tends to focus on occupational associations as mechanisms for regulating the interaction of individuals and groups whose interests are becoming progressively more diversified during periods of growing social heterogeneity, he sees this role as belonging primarily to the state, which must also remain conscious of the need for solidarity based on similarities.

[In] societies where organic solidarity is preponderant . . . social elements . . . are coordinated and subordinated to one another around the same central organ which exercises a moderating action over the rest of

<sup>23</sup> Richard Flathman, *The Public Interest* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 3–86.

<sup>24</sup> Shmuel Eisenstadt, *Modernization: Protest and Change* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966); Neil Smelser, "Mechanisms of Change and Adjustment to Change," in *Industrialization and Society*, ed. Bert Hoselitz and Wilbur Moore (New York: UNESCO-Mouton, 1966), pp. 33–47.



the organism. . . . There is, above all, an organ upon which we are tending to depend more and more; this is the State . . . [which] is entrusted with the duty of reminding us of the sentiment of common solidarity.<sup>25</sup>

In the same vein Eisenstadt and Smelser emphasize the pivotal role of the state as a balancing-coordinating force, a reintegrative center managing the social disturbances and protests that can result from discontinuities between differentiation and integration on the basis of interdependence. Smelser's treatment of the problem is an especially interesting contrast to gap theory. He argues that in attempting to control the "contrapuntal interplay between differentiation (which is divisive of established society) and integration (which unites differentiated structures on a new basis)," the state must not create imbalances in *political* development. The symbols of solidarity based on similarities must not be used in such a way as to impede the emergence of a more sophisticated solidarity based on interdependent differences, and the response to political protest must not have the effect of preventing the long-term integrative potential of political participation. Like Huntington, Smelser notes that governments can effectively use the symbols of nationalism, the public interest, and state autonomy to enhance their own legitimacy, procure otherwise unobtainable sacrifices, and deal with disruptive protest. But, in contrast to gap theorists, he adds a key warning that is reminiscent of de Tocqueville:

However, these political leaders should not take their claim to legitimacy too literally. They should not rely on their nationalist commitment as being strong enough to enable them to ignore or smother grievances completely. They should "play politics," in the usual sense, with aggrieved groups, thus giving these groups access to responsible political agencies, and thereby reducing the conditions that favor counter-claims to legitimacy. One key to political stability seems to be, therefore, *the practice of flexible politics behind the façade of an inflexible commitment to a national mission* (emphasis added).<sup>26</sup>

### *Critiques of "Democratic Elitism"*

A third view of interest group politics, which focuses on the concept of equality, criticizes interest groups in Western Europe and the United States as restricting effective political participation, reinforcing existing social and economic inequalities, and contributing to what has been called dem-

<sup>25</sup> Durkheim, pp. 181, 227.

<sup>26</sup> Smelser, p. 47.

ocratic elitism. These writers share the integration-equilibrium theorists' belief that expanding participation in general is a key aspect of political development with positive long-term effects for stability and adaptiveness. They have a much less sanguine view, however, regarding interest groups as a particular dimension of participation, since they see these groups as excluding and alienating so many people and interests from the policy-making process that neither integration nor balance is encouraged.

They agree with gap theorists that interest groups serve as conduits for the particularistic demands of specific sectors that tend to blur the distinction between public and private power to the detriment of the public interest. But they argue that this is true only for the interests of a narrow and privileged set of elites who are able to manipulate interest groups successfully and not for the interests of the majority who cannot. Consequently, although the remedies proposed by these critics vary widely, they generally include a call for more equal access to interest group politics and for increased self-government in daily life. In general, gap theorists see interest groups as conduits for the demands of too many and would prefer them to be more efficient gatekeepers for all. Critics of democratic elitism, on the other hand, see interest groups as conduits for the demands of too few and gatekeepers for too many, and would prefer them to be more accessible conduits for all.

Stein Rokkan's work on changing patterns of political participation in Europe is typical of most long-term developmental analyses in identifying increased participation primarily with the extension of suffrage and the rise of mass parties.<sup>27</sup> He sees the expansion of party organizations as the main mechanism for political mobilization of the lower classes soon after the granting of suffrage and as the means through which they gain greater access and representation in decision making. But Rokkan's treatment of political participation differs from that of most developmental theorists in two important respects: he does not regard increased party-electoral participation as necessarily leading to the expansion of political equality, and he indicates that newer forms of associational participation can, in fact, reinforce old inequalities and promote new ones.

Rokkan's chief concern is to explain persistent inequalities in party-electoral participation by examining comparatively the various elite decisions and strategies that led to the extension of suffrage and the differential rates of political mobilization with which various social strata responded to their newly gained rights. But he also describes newer inequalities that have emerged in modern Europe because of the crystallization of two

<sup>27</sup> Stein Rokkan, "Mass Suffrage, Secret Voting, and Political Participation," in *Political Sociology*, ed. Lewis Coser (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 101-131.

distinct channels of participation—the party-electoral and the associational—and the gradual predominance of the latter over the former. He argues that while elites were attempting to draw greater numbers into the political system by making citizenship universal, increasing social differentiation and growing official bureaucracy encouraged the emergence of a network of interest groups, which helped render effective decision making a more covert process restricted to bargaining among well-organized groups, politicians, and bureaucrats. Thus, Rokkan suggests that efforts to achieve full citizenship may ultimately have resulted in recent declines in both the rate and significance of party-electoral participation relative to the more constricted channel of associational participation.

Rokkan's conceptualization of political participation contrasts sharply with that of gap theorists, who view participation as the undifferentiated and excessive expression of demands and frustrations. For Rokkan, participation is a highly differentiated concept, including the expression of demands *and* supports at several levels such as voting, media exposure, party affiliation, active party involvement, interest group affiliation, candidacy, and office holding. The high and sustained participation rates assumed by gap theorists and integration-equilibrium theorists are a matter for empirical investigation for Rokkan, who calls our attention to potential changes in the degree and type of participation of various social strata over time. In particular, he notes that at different times certain social groups may shift their focus of participation from party-electoral channels to associational channels and that other groups may be poorly mobilized in one of the channels or even excluded from both.

Reinhard Bendix deals specifically with this problem in his discussion of the European transformation from the medieval estate societies of the eighteenth century to the modern welfare nation-states of the twentieth century.<sup>28</sup> For Bendix the most important political aspects of this transformation are "the simultaneous trends toward equality and a nationwide, governmental authority." Like integration-equilibrium theorists, he sees the trends of expanding participation and nation building as usually complementary, not always contradictory. But his treatment of the extension of the universal rights of citizenship distinctively centers on the paradox that the attempt to grant equality itself laid the basis for the creation of new inequalities.

This was so, Bendix argues, because citizenship was extended with reference to two conflicting ideals of representation, which had contradictory effects for the ideal of equality: the "plebiscitarian ideal," in which

<sup>28</sup> Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), pp. 33–144.

each individual citizen stands in direct relation to the state and exercises equal rights without intermediate representatives, versus the "functional ideal," in which estates, corporations, or associations enjoy exclusive rights that are in effect unequal privileges. Bendix sees the major problem of political participation since the nineteenth century as an ongoing tension between these conflicting styles of representation, involving "ever newer and ever partial compromises" in pursuit of what de Tocqueville called "the phantom of equality."

Bendix suggests that the initial triumph of plebiscitarianism in modern Europe generally confirmed de Tocqueville's expectation that governments could deter men from revolution and strengthen themselves in the end "by engaging them more and more in the pursuit of objects which cannot be attained without public tranquillity." He argues that originally the rights of citizenship were extended in Europe under the plebiscitarian ideal by central governments that sought to break the inherited privileges of feudalism while integrating the lower classes into expanded political communities under the banner of nationalism rather than socialism. He sees the late eighteenth century as a major break with the medieval tradition of liberty as corporate privilege, because thereafter equality gradually expanded at the expense of functional notions of the *Ständestaat* and its hierarchically ordered constituent groups. He credits the growth of plebiscitarianism with the emergence of a new consensus concerning the authority of national governments and with the decline of socialism by diverting lower-class protest from challenging the social order toward demanding the full rights of citizenship and a larger share of national wealth.

Like Rokkan, Bendix notes that European governments were mindful of the dangers of plebiscitarianism as well as its advantages.

For decades elementary education and the franchise [were] debated in terms of whether an increase in literacy or voting rights among the people would work as an antidote to revolutionary propaganda or as a dangerous incentive to insubordination. . . . Leaders of the established elites became increasingly torn between their fears of the consequences of rapid extensions of the suffrage to the lower classes and their fascination with the possibilities of strengthening the powers of the nation-state through the mobilization of the working class in its service.<sup>29</sup>

Because of this ambivalence, Bendix says, governments devised a number of transitional compromise strategies for controlling the onrush of mass democracy, which often included some initial reliance on traditional estate privileges and delayed the adoption of universal adult suffrage. But unlike

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 94.

Rokkan, who seeks the source of persistent inequalities in political participation in the various historical compromises required of plebiscitarianism and in the different rates at which various social strata continue to make use of it, Bendix sees the roots of modern inequality in two fundamental problems of plebiscitarianism itself. The first of these problems concerns some unanticipated consequences of the growth of plebiscitarianism and the second concerns the fact that the *right* of association is not necessarily the same as the *art* of association, a distinction that de Tocqueville did not draw clearly enough.

According to Bendix, plebiscitarianism, by virtue of its very success, led to a series of basic political transformations that encouraged a revival of functional representation in a new form and of inequalities based on new privileges. Plebiscitarianism affected the general nature of politics by changing it from a struggle over the distribution of sovereign powers into a struggle over the distribution of the national surplus. The content of demands changed from a concern with civil and political rights to a search for greater social and economic rights. And, finally, the concept of the citizen was redefined from the notion of an individual entitled to equal protection under the law to the notion of an individual entitled to public assistance. Bendix believes that each of these changes tended to highlight the advantages of collective versus individual action in dealing with large-scale, modern government, so that functional representation continued to be relevant through newly emergent interest groups, which were formed both as causes and consequences of the proliferation of government.<sup>30</sup>

Under such conditions, Bendix concludes, the chief problem of participation becomes not the equality of rights but the unequal opportunities to take advantage of them. In societies marked by formal, legal equality alone, the political consequences may be merely that all citizens are equally powerless. The granting of civil and political freedoms is an instance of "enabling legislation" conferring merely the potential of power. Translating that potential into real power depends on the *right* of association. Where this basic civil right was withheld or restricted, the abstract principle of equality of individuals was often the direct cause of greatly accentuated inequalities. For example, the notion of the individual work contract as

<sup>30</sup> "The simultaneous development of a nationwide authority and the plebiscitarian tendencies in the political realm are accompanied by the development of functionally defined, organized interests. The efforts of public officials to obtain support, information and guidance from the relevant 'publics' are matched point for point by the efforts of organized interests to influence government actions so as to benefit their members or clients. . . . [Public administrators] look for support of discretionary judgments [and] find such support in the opinions and expert advice which organized interests are only too willing to provide" (ibid., p. 136).

an agreement between legal equals upheld the worker's right to make contracts under the myth of his economic equality with the employer while rendering that right meaningless by denying him the right to combine with other workers. Yet even when the right of association was extended to correct such injustices, plebiscitarianism divided the population in a new way—into the organized and the unorganized—since the ability to develop the *art* of association depended in turn on such unequally distributed attributes as wealth, education, and political experience.

Thus, the plebiscitarian impulse to guarantee equality before the law in fact created new inequalities with each advance it made, at first because in its incomplete form it denied or restricted the right of association without which all other civil rights remained dormant, and later because of the inability of many to develop the art of association even after the formal right was granted. At both points the extension of new rights benefited primarily the advantaged, who had the social and economic independence to use them, while the main burden of economic change fell upon the lower class. Consequently, where the extension of citizenship was accompanied by the growth of capitalism, it provided the foundation of legal equality upon which a structure of social and economic inequality was built or strengthened. The equality of citizenship and the inequalities of social class developed together and plebiscitarianism served as “the architect of legitimate social inequality” reflected by differences in mastering the art of association.<sup>31</sup>

Bendix concludes that in Western Europe the right of association gradually became detached from the plebiscitarian ideal of universal rights and was incorporated into the functional ideal of group-specific privileges. Originally intended as a remedy for the inequalities of partial plebiscitarianism, the right of association gradually promoted the inequalities of growing functionalism, thus indicating the continuing tension between these two basic styles of participation.<sup>32</sup> What Bendix contributes here is a subtle but important revision of de Tocqueville's famous “law of associability.” Writing in the context of the breakdown of feudal society, de Tocqueville warns that as material conditions become increasingly more

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.

<sup>32</sup> In so arguing, Bendix tends to read medieval political patterns into modern conditions by saying that “organizations based on common economic interest perpetuate or re-establish corporate principles analogous to those of the medieval period [because] . . . in effect legal opportunities have turned into privileges.” Medieval privileges based on inherited status and limited by corresponding duties are replaced by modern privileges based on disparities in the ability to organize collective action with no clear social responsibility. In its pursuit of “the phantom of equality,” plebiscitarianism earlier helps to extinguish the former variety of privilege, but then unwittingly serves as the midwife of the latter variety (*ibid.*, pp. 83–84, 86).

equal all men must learn the art of associating together lest they all become equally powerless and lose their freedom before an expanding state. Writing in the context of advancing industrial capitalism, Bendix warns that as material conditions become increasingly more unequal some men have a greater need than others to learn the art of association, but their ability to do so is generally inversely related to their need. Consequently, their freedom often becomes meaningless as universal rights are transformed into special privileges.

Bendix's discussion of the tension between plebiscitarian and functional representation as well as his conclusion that modern associations tend to serve as the architect of legitimate social inequality is similar to the criticisms of interest group politics found in the writings of several American group theorists. Recent group theorists in the United States commonly have altered Bentley's original portrayal of group interaction as a rather formless "process" that underwent such continual fluctuation that definition of the political group as a stable unit was itself problematic. Instead, Bentley's successors have tended to emphasize the patterned and highly structured nature of group politics and to explore its links with formal governmental institutions, stable socioeconomic categories, and enduring aspects of culture.<sup>33</sup>

The closest American counterparts to Bendix's structural analysis of competing channels of representation appear in the ethical critiques of interest group politics made by such antipluralist writers as Schattschneider, McConnell, Lowi, and Bachrach.<sup>34</sup> But they also go beyond Bendix by condemning this tendency as a violation of the open, participatory, and processual democratic ideals to which both they and their pluralist adversaries are committed. For these American critics the emergence of interest groups involves, not simply the development of an alternative and more specialized set of channels of participation, but a clear constriction of meaningful participation in general. In their view, the more limited nature

<sup>33</sup> Even such leading representatives of pluralist theory as Truman and Dahl, who share Bentley's view of group politics as being basically open and ever changing, attempt to specify certain constraints on group activity and identify certain points through which it must flow. For Truman this involves particular attention to how group "access" can vary according to the structure of government institutions and internal group organizations, and for Dahl it involves stressing how group activity and influence are constrained by the norms of the regime in which these institutions are embedded and by the independent initiative of political leaders for whom the regime's norms are especially important.

<sup>34</sup> E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960); Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967); Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1969); Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967).

of participation through associational channels is not a paradoxical and inevitable product of the pursuit of “the phantom of equality” but a direct and remediable result of specific structural rigidities and biases that narrow the range of policy alternatives by systematically underrepresenting or excluding certain types of citizens and interests.

Each American critic focuses on a different structural aspect of group politics to account for its tendency to limit participation and contribute to stable inequality, and each proposes a different set of remedies. For Schattschneider interest groups contribute to a “mobilization of bias” in favor of the status quo, the business community, and established elites. He argues that this bias results from the tendency of group politics to narrow the “scope of conflict” to covert interactions among a small number of well-organized participants in which the poorer and less powerful generally are unable to effect change by taking advantage of their superior numbers in an open and public confrontation.<sup>35</sup>

McConnell relies on Madison’s *Tenth Federalist* to argue that the nature of group demands and specific policy outcomes are basically determined by the size and diversity of group constituencies. He maintains that groups with small and homogeneous constituencies tend to be exclusive and promote policies that favor the privileged and harm the general public, whereas groups with large and heterogeneous constituencies tend to be inclusive and to promote policies that are relatively egalitarian and responsive to the public interest.<sup>36</sup>

Lowi’s identification of various “arenas of power” is an attempt to show how the structure of group activity is determined by the scope of the public policy at issue and especially by the divisibility of the relevant benefits. He argues that organized interest group politics focuses on issues with highly divisible outputs, encouraging a pattern of minimal conflict and particularistic arrangements among entrenched interests. He is far more pessimistic than Schattschneider and McConnell in maintaining that this type of “distributive politics” has become so pervasive that American interest groups will be utterly incapable of taking part in more open and conflictive politics in the future. Lowi not only rejects the notion that American group politics is fluid and processual, but sees it as so rigidified that *all* established groups eventually conform to an “iron law of decadence” in which declining militancy gives way to outright conservatism.<sup>37</sup>

Bachrach criticizes both pluralist and antipluralist writers who concen-

<sup>35</sup> Schattschneider, pp. 1–47.

<sup>36</sup> McConnell, pp. 91–118.

<sup>37</sup> Theodore Lowi, *The Politics of Disorder* (New York: Basic Books, 1971); Theodore Lowi, “American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory,” *World Politics* 16 (July 1964):676–715.



trate only on active, visible groups for overlooking the more subtle of “the two faces of power”—the various forms of coercion and repression that result in crucial “nondecisions” by preventing many interests from being represented in the group process however it may be structured. In fact, he goes so far as to question the value of any system of interest group representation, biased or unbiased, as discarding the ideal of equality of power in favor of the concentration of power in the hands of organized elites who ignore the common citizen’s fundamental interest in participating in decisions that affect his life instead of merely benefiting from favorable policy outputs.<sup>38</sup>

The specific remedies proposed by the earlier American critics of group politics incorporate several important assumptions held by Bendix and by pluralist writers. Like Bendix, both Schattschneider and McConnell view interest groups as constituting an alternative set of channels for participation that coexist in a state of ongoing tension with other channels that are more inclusive, less biased, and less supportive of stable inequality. Both propose remedies that would not substantially alter the nature of group politics, but would instead attempt to increase the importance of other channels that rely on larger, more heterogeneous constituencies and provide a wider, more national scope of conflict. For Schattschneider this involves the emergence of “party government,” whereas for McConnell it involves the strengthening of “presidential government.”<sup>39</sup> In both cases we observe a call to check the supposed predominance of functional, associational channels of participation with the countervailing power of reinvigorated plebiscitarian, party-electoral channels. For Schattschneider and McConnell the checks and balances of a fluid pluralism cannot be expected to arise from the spontaneous interaction of interest groups, but they can be expected to arise from the more general interaction of groups with centralized parties and a strong national executive. It is, in other words, as though traditional Madisonian strategy were to be applied against the network of group politics itself in order to compensate for the failure of its own “rigidified process” to conform to Madisonian principles.

The remedies proposed by the more recent American critics, on the other hand, aim more directly at superseding group politics or at transforming it altogether. Lowi also considers the possibility of countering group influence through the promotion of an alternative channel of participation. Instead of relying on conventional plebiscitarian channels, he turns to what he regards as the creative anarchy of social movements that are animated by a severe sense of grievance and seek substantial change through political

<sup>38</sup> Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” *American Political Science Review* 56 (December 1962):947–952.

<sup>39</sup> E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942), pp. 206–211; McConnell, pp. 336–368.

protest. Yet even these kinds of conflict groups, Lowi fears, would eventually yield to "the iron law of decadence" and, after achieving their initial objectives, become absorbed into a new structure of collusive alliances and compromises. The most effective remedy in Lowi's view is not for "interest group liberalism" to be superseded by the "politics of disorder," but for it to be dissolved and replaced by "juridical democracy" in which government coercion would be employed to enforce clearly stated policies while resisting interest group pressures on behalf of the already privileged.<sup>40</sup>

Bachrach favors an even more thorough transformation involving, not the reassertion of state authority, but the widespread dispersion of power among quasi-syndicalist units of self-government in the work place and the local community. Bachrach, more than any other theorist of group politics or political development considered here, regards political participation as an end in itself rather than as a means of pursuing other goals. He is by far the most emphatic in maintaining that participation contributes not only to the development of the political system but also to "enhancing the self-esteem and development of the individual." He is also the only theorist who discusses the possibility of restructuring associational life itself in order to achieve a devolution of decision making and thereby more closely approximate the ideal of equality of power.<sup>41</sup>

#### A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF GROUP EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT

These three theoretical approaches may be useful in forming global hypotheses concerning the various ways in which interest groups can shape political participation and thereby produce different consequences for political development at different historical periods. They do not, however, specify a clear set of variables and interrelationships between variables that might provide a framework for explaining the wide variety in interest group organization and activity that is observable in different political systems at similar stages of development or in individual systems over time. The contributions of these theorists do not substantially surpass Huntington's notion of "institutionalization" or Lowi's "iron law of decadence." Thus, the principle contributions of developmental and group theorists are summarized in their assertions that, at lower levels of development, relatively unstructured interest groups tend to promote excessive participation, which threatens political stability and economic growth, whereas, at higher levels of development, well-organized groups tend to constrict effective participation, contribute to the stagnation of party-elec-

<sup>40</sup> Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, pp. 287-314.

<sup>41</sup> Bachrach, pp. 93-106.

toral politics, and preserve stable inequality. These shortcomings have been noted and partially corrected by Philippe Schmitter and J. David Greenstone in their recent criticisms of the literature on political development and group theory. Their work has been particularly helpful in this investigator's attempt to frame a description and analysis of the changing nature and consequences of interest group politics in modern Turkey.

Schmitter has argued that the emergence and development of interest groups must be understood, not simply in terms of the varying degrees to which their organizations and activities become more highly structured, but in terms of the different ways in which they become structured. More specifically, he elaborates ideal-typical conceptualizations of "corporatism" and "pluralism" as alternative patterns and strategies for structuring interest representation that have very different consequences for the organization of groups, their modes of interaction with the state, and their degree of political influence. Schmitter distinguishes between corporatist and pluralist associational structures in terms of dichotomies in several interrelated characteristics. Within their respective social and economic sectors they are singular or multiple in number and are monopolistic or competitive agents of representation. Their internal organizations are based on compulsory or voluntary membership and are hierarchically or non-hierarchically ordered. They may be officially recognized, licensed, subsidized, or even created by the state; or the state may exercise control over their selection of leadership and articulation of demands and supports.<sup>42</sup>

Schmitter argues that structural differentiation and economic development are important contributors to, if not necessary conditions for, the emergence of group politics, but that the specific direction of group development according to corporatist or pluralist patterns is more directly determined by two key intervening variables—public policy toward associations and political culture. With regard to the linkages between systems of interest group politics and socioeconomic change, he argues that historical fluctuations between corporatism and pluralism as the predominant mode of representation are understandable in terms of the changing structural imperatives and international context of capitalist development.<sup>43</sup> Thus, Schmitter maintains that two considerations are most obviously missing from general discussions of the emergence and development of modern associations. The first is an understanding of the independent contributions of political and cultural variables as opposed to socioeconomic variables. These include the direct impact of the state in shaping

<sup>42</sup> Philippe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" in *The New Corporatism*, ed. Fredrick Pike and Thomas Stritch (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), pp. 85–131.

<sup>43</sup> Philippe Schmitter, *Interest Conflict*, pp. 3–20; "Still the Century?" pp. 107–125.




FIGURE 1-1. A Framework for the Analysis of Group Development

or even initiating group development and the importance of certain enduring attitudes and values, particularly among the political elite and the associational leadership, in influencing group behavior. The second is an understanding of substructural change and economic development, not in terms of a uniform and universal process, but as a multivaried process that provides different constraints and opportunities to political elites at different historical moments.

Schmitter's conceptual framework is especially useful in ordering an analysis of long-term historical changes in the associational politics of modern Turkey, because Turkish public policy and political culture have promoted the emergence of both corporatist and pluralist types of associations. Furthermore, the relative predominance of these associational types has periodically shifted as successive regimes and political elites have adopted different strategies of economic development and political domination. A more explicit statement of the postulated relationships between the art of association and other relevant variables is outlined in the model given in figure 1-1 which will serve as the general framework of this analysis, most notably in Part I of the study.

Greenstone argues that group theorists generally have been unable to account for situations in which previously quiescent groups suddenly intervene in politics to demand major social transformations or in which previously active groups become increasingly militant rather than conforming to the "iron law of decadence." He maintains that although group theorists have departed from Bentley's original processual view to emphasize the structure provided to group politics by stable social and economic categories such as race and class, they have, nevertheless, retained Bentley's method of identifying politically relevant groups in terms of subjective interests. According to Greenstone, group theorists who define groups in terms of subjective interests can only account for sudden increases in group activity and militancy through a "stability-disruption-protest" model, which assumes that stable subjective goals are upset by an unfavorable change of circumstances and that group political responses seek

to restore a preexisting equilibrium. Greenstone notes, however, that it is often the group goals that change and not merely the circumstances, and that such new goals may include demands for a radical transformation of previous conditions rather than a return to them.<sup>44</sup>

Using American civil rights and labor organizations as examples, Greenstone tries to show that the group theory approach can be developed by incorporating an "objective interest analysis" into its framework. Greenstone argues that the scope and intensity of conflict generated by group activity vary widely according to the subjective recognition or nonrecognition of objective group interests. Instead of assuming a tendency toward greater group conservatism, he maintains that group activity can suddenly and greatly expand the scope and heighten the intensity of political conflict when previously unrecognized objective interests are perceived and pursued by large stable social categories. Greenstone suggests that there is no reason that group theorists cannot account for such outcomes and also include in a group theory analysis "discussions of class or near-class political activity where the facts justify it."<sup>45</sup> He maintains, however, that they must, first, place greater emphasis on large stable social groups as the main units of analysis and, second, distinguish between changing subjective group goals and enduring objective group interests in substantially improving their social and economic conditions, particularly if such groups have been relatively deprived.

Greenstone's introduction of objective interest analysis into group theory as a means of improving its ability to explain class or near-class political activity resembles Nicos Poulantzas's attempt to direct the attention of class analysis toward interest group political activity in order to resolve the conflict between the "historicist" and "empiricist" concepts of class.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>44</sup> J. David Greenstone, "Group Theory," in *The Handbook of Political Science*, ed. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, 2 vols. (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 2:243-318.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 290.

<sup>46</sup> Poulantzas argues that the existence or nonexistence of a social and economic group as a distinct class is determined neither in minimalist terms of its mere presence at the economic level nor in maximalist terms of possessing its own political and ideological organization. Instead, he maintains that a socioeconomic group can be identified as a "distinct and autonomous class" when and only when it has reached "a certain organizational threshold," at which its economic existence is reflected on the political and ideological levels by a "specific presence" that has "pertinent effects" on these noneconomic levels. Poulantzas argues for conceptualizing class organization and the capacity of a class to realize specific objective interests "in the broad sense" in order to distinguish between "a class's practice-with- 'pertinent-effects' " and the more advanced "organization of its power" in an autonomous party. Poulantzas describes the "pertinent effects" of intermediate levels of class organization as "a new element" that "transforms the limits" of existing political and ideological structures and practices and contributes to "important modifications" of them. Specific examples of such pertinent effects include the organization of broad professional