



THE THIRD OPTION

This page intentionally left blank.

THE THIRD OPTION

The Emancipation of European Defense, 1989–2000

Charles G. Cogan

Foreword by Lawrence S. Kaplan

Humanistic Perspectives on International Relations

Cathal J. Nolan, Series Editor

PRAEGER

Westport, Connecticut
London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Cogan, Charles.

The third option : the emancipation of European defense, 1989–2000 / by Charles G.

Cogan ; foreword by Lawrence S. Kaplan

p. cm.—(Humanistic perspectives on international relations, ISSN 1535–0363)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0–275–96948–7 (alk. paper)

1. Europe—Defenses. 2. World politics—1989–3. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 4. European Union. I. Title: 3rd option. II. Title. III. Series.

UA646 .C643 2001

355'.03304—dc21 2001032910

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available.

Copyright © 2001 by Charles G. Cogan

All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2001032910

ISBN: 0-275-96948-7

ISSN: 1535–0363

First published in 2001

Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881

An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.

www.praeger.com

Printed in the United States of America



The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984).

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

Series Foreword	vii
Foreword	xi
Preface	xiii
Abbreviations	xv
Introduction	1
1 From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to the Change in the Nature of NATO (November 1989–July 1990)	17
2 From the Gulf War to the New Strategic Concept (July 1990–December 1991)	39
3 From the Bosnian War to France’s Move Toward NATO (1992–December 1995)	61
4 From the AFSOUTH Imbroglio to the Madrid Summit (1996–July 1997)	83
5 The Turn Toward Autonomy: St. Malo to Kosovo to Cologne (July 1997–June 1999)	97
6 The European Union Becomes a Defense Organization (July 1999–December 2000)	117

7	Epilogue	133
	Appendix	153
	Selected Bibliography	161
	Index	167

Series Foreword

International relations is a thoroughly humanistic subject. All its actors are human beings, or they are institutions and organizations built and controlled by human intention and maintained by daily decision-making. Individual states, which emerged as the most powerful and decisive actors on the world stage over the past 350 years, are not reified constructs with an independent will or social reality beyond human ken or volition. Properly regarded, they are wholly human constructs. All states are designed for, and are bent to, the realization of goals and aspirations of human communities. That is true whether those ambitions are good or evil, spiritual or material, personal or dynastic, or represent ethnic, national, or emerging cosmopolitan identities. So, too, is the international society of states a human construct, replete with its tangled labyrinth of international organizations, an expansive system of international law that creates binding obligations across frontiers, ancient norms of diplomacy and ritualized protocol, webs of economic, social, and cultural interaction, and a venerable penchant for disorder, discord, and war.

Immanuel Kant observed with acute accuracy: “Out of the crooked timber of Humanity, no straight thing was ever made.” The endless drama of human affairs thus gives rise to motley events, decisions, and complex causal chains. At the international level, too, we encounter the foibles of human beings as individuals and in the aggregate, and come upon a mix of the rational and irrational in human motivation. All that makes formal “modeling” of international politics a virtual impossibility—a fact that is itself a source of deep frustration to idealistic reformers and social scientists alike. On the other hand, precisely because international relations is so deeply humanistic a subject, it is a rich realm for the exercise of broad political and moral judgment. It is a natural arena for serious ethical reflection by and about those who frame foreign policies and practice

statecraft. It is proper for scholars and informed citizens to praise or censure leadership decisions and actions. In short, as in all realms of human endeavor, moral judgment is not only implicit in every decision or action (or inaction) taken in international relations, it is a core duty of leadership, an apt function of scholarship, and a basic requirement for any educated citizenry.

These facts are clear, and even self-evident. At its classical best, political science understood them, and therefore drew its questions from the conversation across time of the great political thinkers as well as from current policy debates, to examine both in a rich discourse that was historically and philosophically aware, even as it was rigorous and well-grounded empirically. In contrast, much contemporary political science purports to describe and explain international relations through elaboration of objective “laws” of politics or economics, which entirely overlook its humanistic character. At its modern and “postmodern” worst, the discipline is prone to mere methodological preoccupations, striking elaborate poses about arcane topics, and impenetrable prose. For instance, positivism’s search for a “rational choice” model of human conduct assumes that individuals are “rational actors” who purposively seek to maximize their interests. In seeking a universal, deductive theory (broadly modeled on academic economics, where similar methodologies are employed with little explanatory success), too many political scientists eschew historical or philosophically informed case study in favor of a crude reduction of all politics to formal models. These usually engage extreme simplifications, couched in an obscurantist terminology, which model what was already known, or is obvious, or are so generalized that they account for nothing specific. Over that thin substance is then spread a thick veneer of false rigor, packaged in mathematical formulae that are, and are intended to be, intimidating to the uninitiated. Left out is the fact that most things of lasting importance in human affairs may be explained not by “rational choices,” but by ideology and ignorance, blundering and stupidity, courage and self-sacrifice, enlightened vision, fanaticism, or blind chance (what Machiavelli called *fortuna*).

Alternately, the “critical theory” school in political science rejects any epistemology holding that reality exists separately from the academic observer, and is therefore objectively knowable to any real degree. All knowledge about international relations instead merely reflects the biases and power interests of the observer (the usual suspects are racial, class, or economic elites). Scholars are warned against the attempt to achieve objective knowledge of the reality of international relations, which traditionally was the moral and intellectual *raison d’être* of their profession. Rather than seek to impartially map out, explore, and explain the international society of states and its complex subsystems and mores, a feat said to be impossible, scholars are to directly engage and change the world (even though that, too, ought to be impossible, if they are unable to understand it in the first place). Too often, this leads to polemical studies that purport to unmask elites whose pervasive and corrupt power is said to sustain and operate a fatally unjust international system. There is much intolerance and

angry posturing here as well, in calls for “exposure” of “fellow-traveling” academic approaches identified as legitimizing and reinforcing irredeemably illicit power structures. In sum, in its epistemological assertion that all knowledge is radically subjective or merely political, critical theory denies the possibility of objective knowledge or the value of other scholarly traditions.

This series does not support the contention that all significant political action is reducible to rational choice or that it is impossible to acquire objective knowledge about world affairs. Instead, it promotes a classical, humanistic approach to international relations scholarship. It is dedicated to reviving and furthering the contribution to understanding made by classical studies—by knowledge of history, diplomacy, international law, and philosophy—but it is agnostic regarding the narrow ideology or specific policy conclusions of any given work. It supports scholarly inquiry that is grounded in the historical antecedents of contemporary controversies, and well versed in the great traditions of philosophical inquiry and discourse. The series recognizes that, at its most incisive, international relations is a field of inquiry that cannot be understood fully outside its historical context. The keenest insights into the meaning of economic, legal, cultural, and political facts and issues in contemporary world affairs are always rooted in appreciation that international society is a historical phenomenon, not a theoretical abstraction or a radical departure from prior experience. Hence, the series welcomes interdisciplinary scholarship dealing with the evolution of the governing ideas, norms, and practices of international society. It encourages a dialectic rooted in abiding intellectual, ethical, and practical interests that have concerned and engaged intelligent men and women for centuries, as they tried to reconcile the historical emergence of modern states with wider or older notions of political community.

This series is especially interested in scholarly research on the varied effects of differences in power—whether economic, political, or military—on relations between nations and states. The causes of war and the supports of peace, both in general and concerning specific conflicts, remain a core interest of all serious inquiry into international relations. Similarly, there is an enduring need for studies of the core requirements of international order and security, and of international political economy, whether regionally or globally. Scholarship is also welcome that is concerned with the development of international society, both in the formal relations maintained by states and in broader demands for political, economic, social, and cultural justice on the subnational and even individual level. Finally, the series promotes scholarly investigation of the history and changing character and status of international law, into international organization, and any and all other means of decentralized governance that the states have invented to moderate their conflicts and introduce a measure of restraint and equity to the affairs of international society.

Cathal J. Nolan

This page intentionally left blank.

Foreword

It is only in recent years, essentially since the end of the Cold War, that American historians have identified NATO as a subject worthy of study as a significant chapter in the history of United States foreign relations. Inasmuch as the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 marked the first entangling alliance with any European nation since the termination of the Franco-American treaty in 1800, the minimal contribution of historians to our understanding of NATO's role in American history is at first glance surprising. Reasons for their neglect may have been the scarcity of primary materials and the need for more temporal distance from the subject. But a more persuasive explanation has been their subsuming the treaty under the Truman Doctrine and then marginalizing it as a lesser factor in the nation's containment policy.

European historians, by contrast, have taken the alliance and organization more seriously. Important centers of NATO scholarship have developed in most of the Allied countries where NATO studies have been integrated into the history of Western Europe since the end of World War II. Comparable developments may be in store for American centers. Historians have revised their estimate of the alliance's role in American diplomatic history over the past decade, and it is likely that they will consider NATO a key element in the history of the Cold War. Charles G. Cogan's work is a product of this new direction in American scholarship. In his case it has been strengthened by his familiarity with European, particularly French, sensibilities.

Cogan brings a perspective to his studies that has been refined by experience in Europe as chief intelligence officer with the Central Intelligence Agency in Paris. After retiring from the agency a decade ago he began a new career as a scholar, first with his doctoral degree from Harvard University in 1992 and then with a burst of significant publications, concentrated for the most part on Franco-American relations within the Atlantic Alliance. As a senior research associate

at the John F. Kennedy School of Government and as visiting scholar at the John M. Olin Center for Strategic Studies, both at Harvard, he has produced two major publications: *Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends: The United States and France since 1940* (1994) and *Forced to Choose: France, the Atlantic Alliance, and NATO—Then and Now* (1997). Both books reflect an understanding of France's position in NATO and attitude toward the United States not often encountered among American scholars. In his preface to *The Third Option* he identifies his current book as a sequel to his earlier work, carrying the Franco-American relationship from the end of the Cold War to the end of the century.

But Cogan also observes that this book is broader in scope. France and the United States are major actors, but the central questions raised are where Europe is headed in the twenty-first century and, consequently, what places the United States and NATO will occupy in realignments of relationships. Given the obvious difficulties in finding documentary sources the author has made skillful use of interviews with major leaders and of articles and essays from European as well as American journals. He has followed the tortuous course of NATO's history in the 1990s from summit to summit, from crisis to crisis, and has provided a perceptive account of its evolution in a style that should attract a wide readership in the academic community.

It was inevitable that the passing of the Communist threat would alter NATO's functions. It was not simply that the organization would seek new missions, at it did at the Rome summit in 1992. The internal relationships themselves would be changed as Europe moved toward unification and toward achieving a defense identity that could liberate European allies from American domination. In light of the near reality of a United States of Europe, Cogan offers alternative options that the alliance might adopt in future crises. The first would be full use of the NATO machinery in an American-led operation. The second would see that the European Union (EU) would operate with NATO assets under a NATO chain of command but without American participation. This would fit a scenario of "separable but not separate." Cogan foresees a third option as another likely path given the direction a French-stimulated Europe may follow. This would have the European allies function independently of NATO, using their own growing capabilities.

Whether the EU is capable of operating outside NATO is, in the author's judgment, an open question. Britain's concern about maintaining the Atlantic connection and France's concern over an increasingly powerful German role in the EU may serve as a centripetal force limiting the divisions between NATO and the EU. While the outcome of this uneasy relationship is not clear, Charles Cogan provides a compelling and persuasive analysis of Europe's movement toward a credible defense identity.

Lawrence S. Kaplan
Georgetown University
Director Emeritus,
Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center for NATO and European Union Studies,
Kent State University

Preface

This book is a sequel to an earlier work of mine, *Forced to Choose: France, the Atlantic Alliance, and NATO—Then and Now*,¹ which focused on the period of the late 1940s and the origins of Europe's defense relationships. My objective then was to demonstrate how the initial arrangements that were made for the Alliance profoundly affected the ambivalent and reserved way in which the French eventually came to regard NATO.

This present book, by contrast, examines the period since the end of the Cold War, during which France's defense policy has been profoundly, though quietly, altered, with nuclear dissuasion giving way to "projectable" intervention forces as the keystone of that policy. In the same period France's attitude toward NATO underwent a series of swerves, alternating between rapprochement and distancing, as the French sought different ways of coping with the end of the Cold War and the resulting overwhelming strategic position of the United States, or what French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine has dubbed "hyperpuissance."

I would like to thank, in particular, Cathal J. Nolan of Boston University's International History institute for having included this work in the International Relations collection of the institute's new book series, published by Praeger and, as in my previous writing endeavors, Stanley Hoffmann, ready with his unparalleled experience and insight, as well as his unfailing goodwill, to offer advice and encouragement. In addition, there have been many others who have helped me in this project by pointing me in the right direction for research and by imparting what was often direct knowledge. They are too numerous to be included here, but I will cite a few names: Jolyon Howorth of Bath University; Bertrand Lavezarri and Jonathan Daly, fellows at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs during 1999–2000 and NATO experts in France and the U.K. respectively; and in Washington, Ronald Asmus, Ian Brzezinski, Fred Beauchamp, Keith Dunn, Philip Gordon, Gen. George Joulwan, Ambassador

Robert Hunter, Lawrence S. Kaplan, Peter Rodman, Robert Simmons, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Bernard E. Trainor, and Hoyt Yee.

In contrast to my book cited earlier, as well as my initial book on the French-American relationship, *Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends: The United States and France since 1940*,² this work is a contemporary one and is based largely on interviews, secondary sources, and published documents and statements. I wanted to assess where we are in terms of European defense after the tumultuous decade of the 1990s. Also, I wanted to envision what might be the future relationship between Europe and the United States now that the Cold War is over.

This is a book, unlike the two previous ones, which is not just about France but also about the larger Euro-American relationship. Although France is perhaps more emblematic of the European side of this relationship than is any other European country, in this work it is not just a question of examining France and NATO. The book looks as well at the larger Euro-American framework and, extending beyond that, at the Western relationship with Russia.

Due to the near-current nature of the events I am describing and because I have talked to a number of officials of the United States and other Western governments, some of the statements of my interview sources must remain anonymous. In this regard, I would like to salute my sources—American, French, and others—who prize objectivity and accuracy and therefore are willing to give of themselves in order to set the record straight as they see it.

NOTES

1. Charles G. Cogan, *Forced to Choose: France, the Atlantic Alliance, and NATO—Then and Now* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997).
2. Charles G. Cogan, *Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends: The United States and France since 1940* (Westport Conn.: Praeger, 1994). See also *Alliés Eternels, Amis Ombrageux: les Etats-Unis et la France depuis 1940* (Brussels: Bruylant, 1999), (original French version of *Oldest Allies*, with adaptations).

Abbreviations

ACE	Allied Command Europe
AFSOUTH NATO'S	Southern Command at Naples
AMF(L)	Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land)
ARRC	Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CEA	Commissariat for Atomic Energy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CINCLANT	Commander-in-Chief Atlantic
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CVF	Aircraft Carrier of the Future (British terminology)
DPC	Defense Planning Committee
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
ECSDP	European Common Security and Defense Policy
EDC	European Defense Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
EU	European Union

FAR	Rapid Action Force (Force Action Rapide)
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GPS	Global Positioning System
IFOR	Implementation Force
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
IHEDN	Institute of Higher Studies of National Defense
IPSC	Interim Political and Security Committee
JRRF	Joint Rapid Reaction Forces
JSF	Joint Strike Fighter
KFOR	Allied occupation force in Kosovo
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KVM	Extraction force based in Macedonia
MLF	Multilateral force
NA	National Archives
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PSC	Political and Security Committee
QMV	Qualified majority voting
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SDR	Strategic Defense Review
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SRG	Strategy Review Group
STOLV	Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing
UN	United Nations
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
WEU	Western European Union

Introduction

The affirmation of a European strategic identity has in effect represented for 40 years the constant ambition of the diplomatic and strategic action of France, which legitimately believes that the European upheavals of 1989 have increased both its necessity and its possibility.

Frédéric Bozo, writing in 1991.¹

THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY (EDC) AND ITS AVATARS

At the dawn of the new century, with the Cold War having ended more than a decade ago, and with a new world power relationship described as “unipolarity,” the French are closer paradoxically to the realization of the goal cited above by Bozo than ever before. By a curious turn of the wheel of history, the emerging European defense identity is coming to resemble in some ways the European Defense Community that was rejected in the mid-1950s by the French National Assembly in an outburst of nationalist fervor. The difference between the two is that the EDC would have been a *communitarian* or *supranational* (some would use the term *federal*) European institution, whereas the European defense identity, as it is being developed, consists of a capability run conjointly by the member states of the European Union (EU) and is therefore *intergovernmental*.

Had it been allowed to come into existence, the EDC today would have been in Pillar One—the supranational element of the EU—where decisions are taken by a qualified, that is, weighted, majority vote in which the more populous countries count for more than the less populous ones, though not in an overwhelming way. The European defense identity, now known under its new

name—the European Common Security and Defense Policy (ECSDP)—is in an intergovernmental category of the EU (Pillar Two), where decisions, with very few exceptions, have to be arrived at by the unanimous vote of the member governments. European defense officials are emphatic on this distinction, as in this statement by French Defense Minister Alain Richard on June 16, 2000:

We never use the term communitarian...the definition by the European Council of capabilities objectives does not mean that Brussels would take over the determination of what intervention capabilities would be used in crisis management [operations]. Military planning will remain a national competence. Neither does the definition of joint capabilities objectives imply the constitution of a European Army. We have very much in mind the unfortunate experience of the European Defense Community. The rule will remain for the European Union as it is for NATO: [it will be] a national decision to participate or not in an operation. Each nation will fix the nature and level of its involvement.²

The killing of the EDC by the French National Assembly on August 30, 1954, and its rapid replacement by the admission of West Germany into a strengthened NATO, had the effect of suppressing the impulse toward a European defense identity for nearly forty years. Of the two objectives behind the Assembly's vote, only one was preserved: preventing the French Army from being largely subsumed in a supranational entity. The other objective, preventing German rearmament, was quickly overridden in a joint diplomatic effort led by French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France and British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden: West Germany was admitted into the Brussels Pact (along with Italy), and this defensive alliance of 1948 grouping Britain, France, and the Benelux countries was now designated the Western European Union (WEU). At the same time, West Germany was brought into NATO. After some hesitation the French National Assembly approved these new arrangements on December 30, 1954.

The irony of the 1954 rejection of the EDC was not lost totally on French parliamentarians at the time. As Marie-Pierre Subtil noted, “A number of parliamentarians affirmed [after the December 30, 1954, vote] that if they had known, they would have chosen the EDC, and thus Europe. Too late.”³

However, it was too much to expect France to give up part of its sovereignty over French military forces to a supranational or “communitarian” institution.⁴ Although it would have created a European Army separate from the United States (and Britain), the EDC was too far ahead of its time. The wounds of the 75-year-old enmity between France and Germany, and their three wars in that period, hardly had time to heal in the early 1950s. People were not ready at that time for the creation of a “supranational” European Army made up of a majority of German and French troops.

THE FAILURE OF THE WEU EXPERIMENT

During the Cold War, the WEU withered in the face of the all-encompassing presence of NATO as the primary security organization for Europe. In one sense

the Brussels Pact had served its essential purpose: as modified in 1954, it had enabled West Germany and Italy to become members of the WEU, which in turn provided more congruence and rationale for West Germany also becoming a member of NATO. Put another way, and in retrospect, the Brussels Pact served as little more than a cover for the admission of West Germany into NATO.

Though marginalized, the Brussels Pact had nevertheless remained throughout the Cold War as the one European security organization that had escaped integration into an American-led security system. However, although it remained intact, it was in an emasculated state, with no military forces. The bulk of Europe's forces, excepting those of France after its departure from the NATO integrated military command in 1966, were at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (the SACEUR)—as always, an American general. In sum, as long as NATO was around, the WEU was superfluous.

Moreover, the WEU was cast in the form of dependent relationship to NATO. According to the modified Brussels Treaty, which created the WEU in 1954, the latter is supposed to “rely” on NATO, to wit: “In the execution of the Treaty the High Contracting Parties and any organs established by them under the Treaty shall work in close cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the Military Staffs of NATO, the Council [of the WEU] and its agency will rely on the appropriate Military Authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.”⁵

In the 1980s, as a way out of the dilemma of Europe's strategic powerlessness, the members of the WEU, led by the French, attempted to set up through the WEU a European defense identity as an alternate instrument to NATO. The year 1987 saw the emergence of this attempt in the so-called platform declaration of the Council of the Brussels Pact at a meeting in The Hague. The declaration stated in part, “[We] recall our commitment to construct a European Union.... A major instrument in reaching this objective is the Modified Brussels Treaty [of 1954]... which instituted obligations of a considerable import with respect to collective defense [and] constituted one of the first stages in European unity. ... Thus we aim at developing a European identity in the defense area.”⁶

The renewed impulse to create a European defense identity around the Brussels Pact and its clause of “automatic” response by its members to an enemy attack did not, however, spring from nowhere. As indicated by the observation of Frédéric Bozo quoted at the beginning of this introduction, it has been a consistent tenet of French policy for the past half-century. The term “European Security and Defense Identity” (with “policy” now replacing the word “identity”) has for the French come to signify a euphemism for achieving some form of independence from the NATO integrated military command.

Beginning in the mid-1980s, under the aegis of the WEU, European ships took part alongside those of NATO in surveillance activities in the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war. Similar operations took place during the Gulf War and its aftermath and later in the Adriatic in the 1990s during the enforcement of the embargo against belligerents in the former Yugoslavia (e.g., Operation Sharp