

NATO AFTER 2000

THE FUTURE OF THE
EURO-ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

JOHN BOLWISZ AND
THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG

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The NATO logo.

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**In memoriam
John Borawski
25 August 1957 to 14 November 2000**

For Mishka, Adrien, and Julien
in hopes that their generation is blessed with a better peace

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PREFACE

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) celebrated its fiftieth anniversary in 1999. Regarded by its now nineteen member states as the bedrock of European security and the anchor for maintaining the transatlantic political and military bridge, the alliance continues to perform its “core function” of providing collective defense to its members.

But NATO has always been and is more than a defensive alliance. During the last decade of the last millennium, NATO proved able to promote democratic peace outside its treaty area by reaching out to its former adversaries during the cold war to assist them in bolstering their democratic transition and providing forces capable of working with NATO, and by deploying its tested assets in dynamic crisis management to check crimes against humanity and regional instability. As the only functioning security and political organization in Europe, NATO has demonstrated its ability to adapt to the new environment and continues to serve as a linchpin of the three U.S. national security core objectives: enhancing American security, bolstering economic prosperity, and promoting democracy and human rights abroad.

However, as NATO enters the 21st century and the third millennium, it will confront numerous challenges requiring urgent attention:

- *Command arrangements, force structures, and defense priorities will need to be reviewed.* They must conform less to national and allied politics than to military exigency. Congress must insist that the U.S. administration pro-

vide meaningful, regular progress reports specifically geared to the requirements of the Defense Capabilities Initiative.

- *Europe must do more, with more resources, and within, not outside, the alliance.* A credible, independent European defense identity is a myth, whereas European declaratory aspirations for a robust defense identity “separable but not separate” from NATO remain just that. It is only when the non-U.S. Allies correct key deficiencies in mobility, communications, and sustainability and augment defense budgets where necessary that Washington should review how key NATO responsibilities are allotted among nations. Ending the long delay in implementing the Combined Joint Task Force concept and concluding a NATO-EU (European Union) coordination agreement are priorities. In an era of restrained U.S. resources and growing overseas commitments, Washington must accept that shared responsibilities means shared decision making. Europe must comprehend that the United States requires a reliable and credible partner.
- *NATO may be failing in its core collective defense function* in the delusion that arms control by itself will contain the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Allied inability to address this threat collectively risks public support for NATO and a dangerous lowering of the nuclear threshold should NATO conventional forces fail to prevent or limit attack.
- *The legal justification should be clarified for NATO operations outside the treaty area* if there is an obstacle in the UN Security Council. Governments, parliaments, and the electorate must achieve a new understanding of “what price honor” and “call of duty.” The principle of humanitarian intervention should be elaborated in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
- *The NATO-Russia relationship needs a jump start.* It requires a more imaginative approach to cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management by way of joint operations, units, and defense capabilities. If Russia is, as NATO declares, no longer considered a potential enemy, then the relationship should fully reflect the spirit and substance of partnership.
- *NATO enlargement is riddled with contradictions* as to purpose, the role of geography, timing, and criteria. The dynamics of enlargement after the 1999 entry into NATO of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are flat. There is no reason to link an invitation with admission through arbitrary time scales or on factors other than the merits of the individual candidate. The NATO “Membership Action Plan” must not be allowed to become a delaying device.
- *The purposes of, and relationship between, the forty-five-state Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the fifty-four-state OSCE needs new thinking* to avoid duplication, paralysis, and bureaucratic sterility. Nations should

have a *choice* of organizational responses to security challenges and an *equal sense of participation* in building European security. The United States should not obstruct other organizations from developing their potential vibrancy and relevance because of undue concerns of undermining the alliance.

This volume explores these issues in detail, and counsels that whoever sits in the White House in 2001 and beyond will hold a special responsibility to nurture the indispensable U.S. leadership of the alliance to ensure NATO's relevance to its own members and to Europe as a whole in the overriding interests of arriving at a better peace.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACE	Allied Command Europe
ACTORD	Activation Order
ACTWARN	Activation Warning
AMF	Allied Mobile Force
AN	Antonov (Aircraft)
ARRC	ACE Rapid Reaction Corps
AWACS	Airborne Early Warning and Control System
BENELUX	Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CENTRAZBAT	Central Asian Battalion
CESDP	Common European Security and Defense Policy
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHODS	Chiefs of Defense Staff
CiO	Chairman-in-Office
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force

CMX	Crisis Management Exercise
CR-CAST	Central Region-Chiefs of Army Staff
CRISEX	Crisis Exercise
CSBM	Confidence- and Security-Building Measure
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSS	Combat Service Support
DCI	Defense Capabilities Initiative
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
EADRCC	Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EMOP	Enhanced and More Operational Partnership
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
EU	European Union
EUROCORPS	European Corps
EUROFOR	European Rapid Operational Force
FAWEU	Forces Answerable to the Western European Union
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GUUAM	Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova
HLSG	High-Level Steering Group
HQ	Headquarters
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IFI	International Financial Institution
IFOR	Implementation Force
INTEX	International Warning and Detection Exercise
IPP	Individual Partnership Program
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSRC	Joint Subregional Command
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission

LANDCENT	Allied Land Forces Central Europe
LANDJUT	Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein
LTDP	Long-Term Defense Plan
L-TS	Long-Term Study
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction
MAP	Membership Action Plan
MC	Military Committee
MiG	Mikoyan-gurevich (aircraft)
MJLC	Multinational Joint Logistics Center
MNC	Major NATO Command
MPFSEE	Multinational Peacekeeping Force Southeastern Europe
MSC	Major Subordinate Command
MTW	Major Theater War
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIS	Newly Independent States
NMD	National Missile Defense
NUC	NATO-Ukraine Commission
OOTW	Operations Other than War
OPCOM	Operational Command
OPCON	Operational Control
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PFP	Partnership for Peace
PGM	Precision-Guided Munition
PJC	Permanent Joint Council
PSC	Principal Subordinate Command
PSO	Peace Support Operation
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (also Strategic Commander, Europe)
SECI	Southeast European Cooperation Initiative
SEDM	Southeast Europe Defense Ministerial

SEEI	Southeast Europe Initiative
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SPP	State Partnership Program
SSC	Smaller-scale Contingency
STANAG	Standardization Agreement
TOA	Transfer of Authority
UN	United Nations
UNGA	UN General Assembly
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK	UN Mission (Interim Administration) in Kosovo
UNPREDEP	UN Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force
UNSC	UN Security Council
UNSCR	UNSC Resolution
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WMDI	WMD Initiative
XFOR	Extraction Force

INTRODUCTION

Fifty years after NATO's creation, the destinies of North America and Europe remain inseparable. When we act together, we safeguard our freedom and security and enhance stability more effectively than any of us could alone. Now, and for the century about to begin, we declare as the fundamental objectives of this Alliance enduring peace, security and liberty for all people of Europe and North America.

NATO Washington Declaration
April 23, 1999

U.S. defense efforts in Europe are aimed at achieving a peaceful, stable region where an enlarged NATO, through U.S. leadership, remains the preeminent security organization for promoting stability and security. Further, the United States seeks positive and cooperative Russian-NATO and Ukrainian-NATO relations and strengthened relations with Central and Eastern European nations outside of NATO. The United States desires a region in which all parties peacefully resolve their religious, political, and ethnic tensions through existing security structures and mechanisms. The United States and European nations should also work together to counter drug trafficking, terrorism, and the proliferation of NBC weapons and associated delivery systems.... The broad demands of the strategy require a full array of military capabilities ... of sufficient size and scope to meet the most demanding missions, including defeating large-scale, cross-border aggression in two theaters nearly simultaneously, conducting the full range of

smaller-scale contingency (SSC) operations, and supporting routine shaping activities.
William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense
Annual Report to the President and the Congress
February 2000

Three months after the Warsaw Pact dissolved in July 1991, and two months before the Soviet Union expired in December of the same year, NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner predicted that NATO would become “the core security organization of a future Euro-Atlantic architecture in which all states, irrespective of their size or geographical location, must enjoy the same freedom.”¹ An alliance formed in 1949, four years after the end of World War II, to reintegrate defeated Germany into the Western mainstream, deter and defend against possible aggression or intimidation by the Soviet Union, and formally link the United States and Europe, could now serve as the foundation of a new security system not only for its members, but for the whole of Europe.

For most of NATO’s existence, a basic tenet had been that “The United States cannot counter this Soviet threat by itself. To maintain a strong conventional deterrent, therefore, we participate in a collective defense that incorporates the strength of our allies in the defense of our mutual interest.”² Yet, when that identifiable threat vanished beyond all expectations, NATO moved beyond containment to help reshape the strategic environment itself on democratic lines as the best hope for stability.

True, President Woodrow Wilson had evoked similar thoughts in his “Fourteen Points” of January 1918 regarding international guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity “to great and small nations alike” (although also calling for the “autonomous development” of peoples). His liberal vision was only to be bloodstained beyond the imagination of the generations of the pre-World War II years by powerful members of the League of Nations and later the United Nations. “Realists” could only be reinforced in their skepticism of the usefulness of organizations in promoting peaceful settlement of disputes as advocated by “Neoliberals.”

And yet, perhaps the change of truly Copernican proportions in East-West relations beginning with Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, and spearheaded by regime opponents Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia and Lech Walesa in Poland, had made the time ripe for shaping a civilized Europe free from fear and want among new and old democracies alike. And, if so, NATO could prove a prime contractor for security and stability.

Life itself has in part borne out Wörner’s vision. NATO defied those on both sides of the Atlantic who advocated bringing NATO to the gallows pole, withdrawing U.S. forces from Europe, compelling Western Europe to look after its own defense, preserving a divided Germany, or substituting