TRANS-PACIFIC RELATIONS

America, Europe, and Asia in the
Twentieth Century

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Yoneyuki Sugita**

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Edited by Richard Jensen,
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PRAEGER

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Series Foreword

Whoever first coined the phrase, "When the siècle hit the fin," described the twentieth century perfectly! The past century was arguably a century of intellectual, physical, and emotional violence unparalleled in world history. As Haynes Johnson of the *Washington Post* has pointed out in his *The Best of Times: America in the Clinton Years* (2001), "since the first century, 149 million people have died in major wars; 111 million of those deaths occurred in the twentieth century. War deaths per population soared from 3.2 deaths per 1,000 in the sixteenth century to 44.4 per 1,000 in the twentieth."[1] Giving parameters to the twentieth century, however, is no easy task. Did it begin in 1900 or 1901? Was it, as in historian Eric Hobsbawm's words, a "short twentieth century" that did not begin until 1917 and end in 1991?[2] Or was it more accurately the "long twentieth century," as Giovanni Arrighi argued in *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times?*[3] Strong cases can be made for all of these constructs and it is each reader's prerogative to come to his or her own conclusion.

Whatever the conclusion, however, there is a short list of people, events, and intellectual currents found in the period between the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries that is, indeed, impressive in scope. There is little doubt that the hopes represented by the Paris Exhibition of 1900 represented the mood of the time—a time of optimism, even utopian expectations, in much of the so-called civilized world (which was the only world that counted in those days). Many saw the fruits of the Industrial Revolution, the application of science and technology to everyday life, as having the potential to greatly enhance life, at least in the West.

In addition to the theme of progress, the power of nationalism in con-

flicts—not only over territory, but also economic advantage and intellectual dominance—came to characterize the last century. It was truly a century of war, from the "little" wars of the Balkans and colonial conflicts of the early 1900s to the "Great" War of 1914–1918 that resulted in unprecedented conflict over the remainder of the century.

Every century has its "great" as well as "infamous" individuals, most often men, although that too would begin to change as the century drew to a close. Great political figures such as Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini, Churchill, the two Roosevelts, de Gaulle, Adenauer, Mahatma Gandhi, Mao Tse-Tung, Ho Chi Minh, and others were joined in the last part of the century by tough competent women like Golda Meir, Indira Gandhi, Margaret Thatcher, and scores of others who took the reigns of power for the first time.

A quick listing of some major events of the century includes World War I, the Russian Revolution, the Rise of Fascism, the Great Depression of the 1930s, the abdication of Edward VIII, Pearl Harbor and World War II, the unleashing of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the long Indochina War, the Cold War, the rise of nationalism (with an increase in nation states from about fifty to almost two hundred), the establishment of Israel, the triumph of the free market, an increasingly strident battle between religious fanaticism and secular preferences, and on and on. At the same time that these events occurred, there was a great creative flourishing of mass entertainment (especially television and the Internet), not to mention important literary, dramatic, cinematic, and musical contributions of all kinds.

These elements incorporate some of the subject matter of this new series focusing on "Perspectives on the Twentieth Century," which strives to illuminate the last century. The editor actively seeks out manuscripts that deal with virtually any subject and with any part of our planet, bringing a better understanding of the twentieth century to readers. He is especially interested in subjects on "small" as well as "large" events and trends, including the role of sports in various societies, the impact of popular music on the social fabric, the contribution of film studies to our understanding of the twentieth century, and so on. The success of this series is largely dependent on the creativity and imagination of its authors.

Edward Beauchamp

NOTES

1. Haynes Johnson, *The Best of Times: America in the Clinton Years* (New York: A James H. Silberman Book, Harcourt, Inc., 2001), p. 3.
2. Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1917–1991* (New York: Pantheon, 1994).
3. Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times* (London: Verso, 1994).

Introduction

The United States and the West in Asia in the Twentieth Century: The Growth and Limits of Power

Jon Davidann

Western influence in Asia extends far back into history. In the sixteenth century, Catholic missionaries from Spain and Portugal made their way to China, Japan, the Philippines, and other areas of Asia. In succeeding centuries, Europeans conquered South Asia, Malaysia, Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Indochina. China was never directly ruled by Europeans, but they gained significant indirect control of major trade centers through "spheres of influence" in the late nineteenth century. The Americans captured control of the Philippines from Spain in the Spanish-American War of 1898. Revolts at the turn of the century in China and the Philippines against foreign domination were failures. Though Japan eventually became a colonial power in Asia, both Siam (Thailand) and Japan itself were initially threatened by European colonialism. They remained the only fully independent nations in Asia by World War I. These demonstrations of Western power in Asia indicated that European influence over Asian affairs was strong. However, European power soon began to recede. After World War II, independence came quickly to British India, Burma, and Malaysia and also to Dutch Indonesia and the two Koreas. Although the Americans gave the Philippines its independence at the same time, in general, as the European empire and later in World War II the Japanese empire peaked and then dwindled in Asia, American influence grew dramatically there.

Many different terms have been used to describe American power in Asia after World War II. From descriptions of the Pacific as an "American lake" to Dean Acheson's notion of an "American crescent" stretching from Japan and ending in the oil fields of the Persian Gulf, some American leaders looked for a zone of control. American dreams of control manifested themselves in new terminology. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal asserted

in 1945, "China is now our Eastern Frontier."[1] Later the more discon-nected term of "client" state was used to discuss the United States' neo-colonial relationship with Vietnam and the Philippines. A military occupation in Japan, a war in Korea, a string of military bases extending across the region including the Philippines, Thailand, Okinawa, Japan, and South Korea—all buttressed by overwhelming economic power in the re-gion—gave concrete expression to the dreams and the words.

Neither the dreams nor the realities were ever static; twentieth-century Asia was much more fluid. The Americans have indeed dominated Asia in the postwar period, but they came late to the Pacific War, they struggled to find a role in East Asia before World War II, and the mastery they sought after the war has eluded their grasp at times.

Before 1941, the United States embraced a very different self-image; it regarded itself as an Atlantic nation. Although they thought of themselves as distinct from Europe, their inheritance was European, not Asian. In Asia before World War II, Great Britain was the foremost Western power, and the influence of the United States in the Pacific was restricted by British influence and shaped by the decline of that influence in the decades leading to World War II. Before the war, therefore, American ambitions in Asia were limited.

After the war, creating constructive relations with the Asians has been difficult. The Cold War had a powerful impact, forcing the Americans into alliance with some Asian nations against other Asians who allied with the Soviet Union or China. As Americans pursued the bogeyman of Commu-nism in Asia, Asians themselves took the opportunity to exploit American commitments there. While the United States dominated the international relations of the region and at times acted in a manner befitting an imperial power, it sought stability more than empire. However, even this limited goal fell through the American grasp. It could not easily control the out-comes of interactions within Asia. The Asians were actors in their own right and determined their own pathway through the thicket of American influence.

Many Asians in the early postcolonial period welcomed an American role. The Philippines, South Korea, and South Vietnam welcomed Ameri-cans. Later in the 1960s and 1970s, Asians became more assertive and resisted American influence or at the least manipulated that influence to serve their own needs.

This collection of essays seeks to sort out the complicated historical re-ality of Western and American influence in Asia in the twentieth century and help put it into clearer historical perspective. This is the primary goal of the book.

LITERATURE

The literature of U.S.–Asian relations has been a point of growth in historical studies in the last two decades. Before the 1980s, as reported by Warren I. Cohen in his edited work *Pacific Passages: The Study of American–East Asian Relations on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century*,[2] many topics had attracted scant scholarship. More recently, Chinese and Japanese scholarship has come of age, post-Soviet scholarship has expanded, and much greater attention has been given to the region. Works on Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines have moved beyond official diplomacy into themes of interactive U.S.–Asian diplomacy, Asian agency, and neo-colonialism. Cultural studies have marked a large part of this growth, and their sensitivity to both sides of the U.S.–Asian dialogue has strengthened the argument for Asian agency and the limits of American power. The current trend toward the internationalization of American history has likewise been a stimulus to scholarship. Globalization in the last quarter-century has drawn younger scholars toward transnational history. Interest in the field has followed travel and cross-cultural experience, as well as the explosive growth in the numbers of Asian and Asian-American students in higher education. Expansion has brought the field to the forefront of historical study.

This new prominence has been clearly demonstrated by important scholarship published by major historians on the region in the last several years. Bruce Cumings, a Korea specialist, gave the field of U.S.–East Asian studies an unorthodox but insightful tour de force in *Parallax Visions: Making Sense of American–East Asian Relations at the End of the Century*.[3] Cumings used his extraordinary knowledge of the field to spotlight the many forms of American power in East Asia throughout the entire century. In this volume the power theme is especially salient—in Yoneyuki Sugita's analysis on the roots of American influence in the Open Door policy, in Mark Caprio's discussion of American and Japanese occupations of Korea, in Julian Madison's postwar sketch of U.S. influence in the Philippines, and in Aaron Forsberg's assessment of the American presence in the Japanese postwar economic miracle. It is implicit in Jennifer Hubbert's chapter on the westward shift of post-Mao rhetoric in China.

Award-winning books by John Dower—*War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* and *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*[4]—both on U.S.–Japanese relations at mid-century—have opened new avenues for analysis. Dower's concepts of American and Japanese wartime racism and American postwar neo-colonialism have been put to use in this volume. Mark Caprio's chapter on the Japanese occupation of Korea to 1945 and the American occupation of South Korea after the war examines these issues, as does Julian Madison's chapter on American postwar domination of the Philippines and Filipino responses. Juliette

Chung's chapter maps thinking about race by Japanese and Chinese intellectuals with her comparative analysis of eugenics movements. However, the issue of "race" is not a catchphrase that can be used universally to describe U.S.–Asian relations. Stanley Sandler's chapter on the U.S.–Korean conflict serves as a caution that the role of race can in some cases be exaggerated and used as an explanation where it arguably played no role. Lastly, as Juliette Chung demonstrates in her study of eugenics, racial theories and assumptions were not the sole domain of Western nations but were studied and practiced by both the Japanese and Chinese in the World War II period. The role of race in U.S.–Asian relations is complex, and the various viewpoints on race in this volume illustrate that complexity.

Diplomatic historian Walter LaFeber's *The Clash: U.S.–Japanese Relations throughout History*,[5] though somewhat less ambitious than the title indicates, synthesizes the literature from 1853 to the present. His emphasis on conflict in U.S.–Japanese relations is reflcted by the themes of several chapters here, including Jon Davidann's analysis of U.S.–Japanese civilizational discourses in the march to the Pacific War, Mark Parillo's comparison of Japanese and American wartime military efficiency, and Aaron Forsberg's investigation of U.S.–Japanese cooperation and contention during the heyday of the Japanese economic miracle.

Robert J. McMahon's *The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II*[6] explores the extent and limits of American power as well as how Asians coped with it. It confirms the enduring dilemma of the United States as a superpower in a postcolonial Asia. This contradictory situation of overwhelming American economic, cultural, military, and diplomatic influence in a region where many nations have only recently become politically independent of the West has created volatile relations. American internal guidance, more welcome in the early postwar period, has at times been accepted only grudgingly and has often been resented and openly resisted. The present volume takes the considerations of Asian agency and American limitations to a new level of importance in U.S.–Asian relations. Both the Korean War and the Vietnam War demonstrated the limits of American power and the reality of Asian agency. In Part III of this volume, Stanley Sandler, Richard Jensen, and Arne Kislenko debate the role of the Korean and Vietnam wars in the context of these issues, adding thought-provoking perspectives. In addition, Julian Madison's study of the role of American military bases in the post–World War II Philippines shows how American influence there evolved from being supported by Filipinos to being despised by the public between 1950 and 1970. Eventually, American bases there were closed because of this strong anti-American feeling.

OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS

   Part I opens with the beginning of American influence in Asia at the turn into the twentieth century. However, even as American power in Asia grew, as Yoneyuki Sugita and Jon Davidann indicate in Chapters 1 and 2, the United States still saw itself as an Atlantic nation with profound European connections and still very weak Pacific contacts. Sugita points to the American Open Door policy as the first step in the transformation of the logic of international relations in China from European to American principles. Davidann studies the struggles of Americans and Japanese to define roles for themselves in the Pacific in the decade before World War II. Both nations began to see themselves as "citadels of civilization," justifying actions abroad as a quest to renew civilization. Notably, Sugita and Davidann portray different sides of the Open Door policy. Sugita looks at the rationality of the Open Door and its focus on free trade, while Davidann confronts the symbolism of the Open Door for the American role in China and growing opposition of the United States to Japan's exclusive sphere there. In Chapter 3, William Voss examines military attachés from the United States and Germany in Japan as they attempted to assess Japanese military strength and strategic goals vis-à-vis their own purposes there. This intelligence-gathering was an extension of the search for a proper role in East Asia that is the focus for Davidann and Sugita. Voss shows that guessing at the other side's strength and intentions was an exercise structured by misperceptions and fraught with difficulty, helping to explain why the Americans were taken by surprise at Pearl Harbor and the British at Singapore. In Chapter 4, Juliette Chung examines eugenics movements in China and Japan in the context of prewar and wartime population policies. Her innovative analysis focuses on Japanese and Chinese conceptions of national survival and strength in the wartime emergency through eugenics ideas and practices.
   Part II of the book examines American influence in World War II and afterward. In Chapter 5, Mark Parillo argues that American military effectiveness derived from its efficient managerial ethos and its open free-market philosophy, while Japanese failures were associated with inefficiencies in its military bureaucracy and its traditional social structure. He suggests that the war was a transforming moment, bringing American influence and ideas to the forefront, as ironically the Japanese were later heavily influenced by the same American managerial approaches that won the war. Mark Caprio and Julian Madison examine the theme of American power from a different viewpoint. Their analyses point to American neocolonialism in both the Philippines and Korea. Their emphasis is on forms of American control after World War II rather than the American victory in the war. It is fair to point out that both the winning of the war and the occupation of Asia afterward were essential aspects of the American role

in Asia in this time period. In Chapter 6, Caprio compares Japanese colonial policy in the period leading up to the war with American policy toward South Korea in its immediate aftermath and finds striking similarities. Neither imperial power was willing to consider independence for Korea; both justified this by arguing that the Koreans were unfit or unready for self-governance. Likewise, Madison indicates that America exercised neo-colonialism through its military bases in the Philippines long after official independence in 1947. Madison's chapter (Chapter 7) also foreshadows the problems the United States began to experience throughout Asia in the postwar period. As the Americans became bogged down in Vietnam, the U.S. government lost respect both at home and abroad and other actors took advantage of this situation. Madison recounts how American military personnel disillusioned with the Vietnam War and their own country collaborated with Filipino black marketeers to spirit away military hardware from American bases located there.

The fallibility of the United States is confirmed in Part III of the book, where the Korean and Vietnam wars are put into the context of national and regional issues and American goals there, instead of being seen as reflections of the Cold War in Europe. In Chapter 8, Stanley Sandler surveys the Korean War to assess American intentions, successes, and mistakes there and looks at the outcome of the war in this regard. In Chapter 9, Richard Jensen surveys the Vietnam War and analyzes the meaning of victory and defeat for the Vietnamese and the Americans, issues that continue to be hotly debated. In Chapter 10, Arne Kislenko explores the growth of the strategic alliance between the United States and Thailand during the Vietnam War. He shows that the Americans, desperate to strengthen their strategic footing in the region, became vulnerable to exploitation by the Thai military leaders in the 1960s, who used the Americans to entrench themselves and their cronies in power. As historian Ernest May has noted in cases such as these, the exploitation was mutual. The Thais gained foreign aid, infrastructure improvements, and the promise of American intervention in case Thailand was threatened, in return for American use of Thai bases for bombing missions and CIA operations. The relationship was unequal but both could benefit. The Americans received the kind of support needed to keep the war in Vietnam from spreading by initiating counter-insurgencies in the areas surrounding Vietnam. The Thai military strengthened its hand within Thailand. Kislenko reveals the limits on American power in Thailand. The Thais acted as free agents throughout, and when the American ship began to sink in Vietnam, the Thais very quickly cut their losses and reduced their ties to the Americans, at the same time moving back toward the North Vietnamese and Chinese. In the end, the Americans had little choice but to accept the Thai decision.

The chapters in Part IV of the book indicate the continuing impact of the American economy and of U.S. and Western ideas in general in Asia.

The Americans underwrote the postwar Japanese economic recovery and influenced in an indirect but significant manner internal Chinese discourses about its place in the world after Mao's death. Aaron Forsberg's chapter on the Japanese economic miracle (Chapter 11) places it within the context of sustained American economic intervention in East Asia and links American influence to the growth of the East Asian regional economies as well as Japan's domestic economic prosperity. Forsberg makes it clear that the Japanese success has at times placed a burden upon the bilateral relationship. Simmering economic tensions have been the result. The same is true of the wider Southeast Asian economy. While the Americans helped build this economy, the recent economic regionalism, the lack of attention to the American free market model, and the cultural autonomy and particularism demonstrated by Japan and the new Southeast Asian tigers have posed problems for the Americans.

Chapter 12 returns the book to the overarching theme of Western influence in Asia. Jennifer Hubbert points to a trend in China of overriding Western influence in Asia. She argues that in the post-Mao period, the Chinese state has had to confront images of the West in the Chinese mind because of the tremendous influence of Western interests in China and in the region of Asia. She analyzes the influence of Western ideas about modernity on the lived experience of the Chinese in society and politics. Unlike Edward Said's approach in *Orientalism*,[7] which argued that Westerners controlled the Orient by defining a base of perceptions about them, Hubbert looks at how those being defined actually used the discourse of the West to situate themselves in the internal debate about modernity in China. The rise of these discourses about modernity in China, both Western and nationalist, are also indicative of American influence in an East Asia where China would clearly like to be in charge.

CONCLUSION

The dilemmas we have sketched in this volume are perhaps even sharper for U.S.–Asian relations after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the failure of Communism in 1989–1990, and the boom and bust of the Asian economies in the 1990s. The United States has had to balance its interests in Asia against even more uncertainty there. The dangers of conflict abound in the region, from a still-divided Korea to an ever-more-assertive China to resurgent Japanese nationalism to domestic political instability in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia caused in part by Islamic militants we have become so familiar with in the post–September 11 period.

Historians generally distrust future predictions; by comparison the past seems a very safe, predictable place. But one can at least venture a general comment on the future of Asia and America's role there. The postcolonial sensibility that Asians are left with will continue to fuel resentments and

animosity there. In the wake of centuries of Western imperialism, a shorter but still memorable time of Japanese imperialism before and during World War II, and American neo-colonial power and wars in Asia afterward, many Asians are understandably defensive when issues of sovereignty and outside interference arise. Some Americans, on the other hand, point to their own sacrifices in three costly wars to stabilize the region in justifying their continuing presence in Asia today. In the 1980s, American fears of imminent Asian economic dominance fueled anti-Asian feelings. Toyotas and Hondas were symbolically burned in anti-Japanese demonstrations that reflected a fear that Detroit could not withstand the challenge. The tensions created by these differing views will continue to make U.S.–Asian relations rocky. Thus, the future of the West and the United States within Asia relations seems to lie well within reach of its tumultuous past in the twentieth century, a past well articulated by this book.

NOTES

1. Quoted in Walter LaFeber, *The Clash: U.S.–Japanese Relations throughout History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), p. 257.

2. Warren I. Cohen, ed., *Pacific Passages: The Study of American–East Asian Relations on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

3. Bruce Cumings, *Parallax Visions: Making Sense of American–East Asian Relations at the End of the Century* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999).

4. John W. Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986) and *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999).

5. See note 1 above.

6. Robert J. McMahon, *The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

7. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).

Part I

The West Turns to Asia: The United States, Europe, Japan, and China, 1880 to World War II

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The Rise of an American Principle in China: A Reinterpretation of the First Open Door Notes toward China

Yoneyuki Sugita

A hierarchical market structure of world capitalism came to fruition in the 1860s. Great Britain placed itself at the summit of this structure. European industrialized nations, arranged under Great Britain, were incorporated into an international free trade system by a network of most-favored-nation clauses. These nations were surrounded by Latin America, the Middle and Near East, and Asia, which became European semicolonies via unequal treaties.[1] However, the Pax Britannica was in a gradual decline after the Panic of 1873. Free trade was giving way to protectionism. The core areas began to subjugate underdeveloped areas via more formal, exclusive measures. At this time, China, the greatest unopened market in the world, had potential that fascinated these core nations. They struggled for dominance in China. As Brooks Adams said, "Eastern Asia is the prize for which all the energetic nations are grasping."[2] The United States issued the first Open Door notes in 1899, when the country encountered the crisis of the division of China by Japan and European nations.

There are three major viewpoints of the historical significance of the U.S. Open Door policy toward China. Scholars with a realist perspective criticize this policy as legalistic and moralistic.[3] Some researchers regard it as a rational policy based upon socioeconomic calculations and cooperation with Great Britain.[4] A third group of historians insists that the U.S. Open Door policy contained both idealistic and realistic aspects.[5]

These three interpretations try to understand the U.S. Open Door policy in the context of America's national history but tend to neglect the connections between American policies and international relations. This chapter examines the historical significance of the U.S. Open Door policy through the lens of late-nineteenth-century international relations. This

chapter concludes that the U.S. Open Door policy was the first step in the transformation of the logic of international relations in China from European to American principles.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Great Britain was the hegemonic power in the mid-nineteenth century. Free trade dominated the world economy. Great Britain established interdependent economic relationships with other core powers, such as the United States, Germany, and France. Great Britain seemed to find unlimited demands for its capital goods in these core areas.[6] These economic relationships were, however, a double-edged sword. On one hand, they helped Great Britain accumulate capital. On the other hand, Great Britain neglected to make improvements in its productive sectors. Moreover, through their relationships with Great Britain, other core powers had easy access to advanced technologies, which helped spark their own industrial revolutions. With the help of these technologies, the core powers expanded their industries at an unprecedented rate from 1850 to 1873.[7] Great Britain, on the other hand, had lost its technological supremacy by the 1860s.[8] The core powers gradually developed the same industrial sectors as those of Great Britain and began to protect their domestic markets.

After the Panic of 1873, the Pax Britannica began its decline; other powers were able to challenge Great Britain as its relative productive efficiency diminished.[9] The core powers were clearly catching up with Great Britain during the period from 1870 to 1895. U.S. exports increased 111%, German exports 43%, and French exports 20%, while British exports increased only 13%. In 1870, Great Britain controlled 25% of the world's commerce; in 1895, its share of the world's commerce had dropped below 18%.[10]

As the other powers adopted and improved their technologies, the world economic structure began to change. The heavy and chemical industries became the most advanced economic sectors. These sectors required mass production, business concentration, and innovative administrative strategies in order to gain competitive power in the world market. The United States became the most productive nation in the world at the end of the nineteenth century.[11]

Great Britain had difficulty adjusting its economic structure to the new situation, primarily because it was too heavily involved with the technology and management systems of the first stage of industrialization. Great Britain found it very difficult to change its economic structure once it was firmly established.[12] Great Britain, however, had an escape valve that allowed it to shift its focus from technology and management systems to finances; the country was still the world's dominant player in finances and

services and could strengthen its ties with the semiperipheral and peripheral countries.[13] During the period between 1856 and 1875, growth of accumulated foreign investment reached its high point. Moreover, this rapid expansion of capital investment enabled Great Britain to secure a favorable balance on current account and to continue foreign investments after 1876. Consequently, Great Britain became heavily dependent on foreign investment activities after the 1870s.[14]

From the 1870s to the end of the nineteenth century, a rapid advancement in technology caused overproduction, and the world economy experienced periodic depressions. Great powers desperately sought to expand markets for their goods both at home and abroad.[15] They challenged British hegemony and resorted to fierce struggles over the division of the shrinking economic pie. In order to challenge Great Britain effectively, the core powers propelled imperialism more vigorously than ever. These powers tended to employ more formal imperialism with their military power, primarily in peripheral zones. In short, a "European principle" became the dominant mode of international relations in China. The European principle refers to a mode of behavior in which each power tries to acquire exclusive spheres of interest, even with the accompanying administrative responsibilities. Traditional balance-of-power thinking based on the zero-sum game was prevalent, where each power regarded a rival power's gains as its own loss. Bruising competition among the powers easily caused chain reactions: one power's imperialistic move precipitated another's similar reactions. The European principle contained irrational aspects of behavior; it was ineffective imperialism. In this sense, the so-called age of imperialism in the late nineteenth century was in fact the process of the rapid spread of the European principle all over the world, which was caused by the relative decline of British hegemony.[16]

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN LATE-NINETEENTH-CENTURY CHINA

Great Britain enjoyed naval, strategic, and economic superiority in East Asia from the 1840s to the 1890s. As the hegemonic power, Great Britain acquired a monopolistic status and preserved a splendid isolation in the region. The country advocated free trade and established the principle of equality of opportunity. Since stability was a prerequisite for profitable economic activities, Great Britain supported the territorial and administrative integrity of China. By the 1880s, under the aegis of British hegemony, an Open Door system prevailed in China based on the most-favored-nation network and cooperation among powers. Open Door liberalism brought the greatest economic profits to Great Britain, but at this same time, it provided the opportunity for other powers to compete in East Asia.

The 1890s marked the dawn of a period of struggle in East Asia when

local developments in China invited European intervention. The Sino–Japanese War was a turning point.[17] When the war began, Great Britain immediately declared its neutrality because it did not want to get involved in the conflict. Moreover, Great Britain earnestly desired to end the war before Russian intervention. On October 8, 1894, P. Le. Poer Trench, new British minister to Japan, visited Japanese Foreign Minister Mutsu and hinted at a mediation between Japan and China. However, Japan decided to prolong the war in order to win greater spoils of war.[18]

This war forced European powers to reconsider the Open Door policy.[19] In April 1895, the Shimonoseki Treaty was concluded. China was to pay around 200 million tael (approximately 350 million yen) to Japan. This sum of indemnity was enormous, being equal to about 70% of the then gross national product of Japan.[20] Since China was in dire financial straits, it had to beg for loans from the imperial powers. These powers willingly provided China with approximately £50 million of loans between 1895 and 1898. They took advantage of their financial influence in order to gain exclusive interests in China, which precipitated fierce competition among them.[21]

Russia requested that France and Germany jointly intervene to make Japan forfeit its territorial claim on the Liaotung Peninsula. The Russians were afraid that the Japanese occupation of the peninsula would lead to Japanese annexation of Korea, which would interrupt Russia's southward advancement. Although France was not critically interested in Chinese affairs, it acquiesced to Russia's proposal because France wanted to maintain the Franco–Russian alliance in Europe. The European situation also affected Germany's decision to accept the Russian offer. Germany sought to turn Russia's attention from Europe toward Asia in order to lighten the Russian military pressure on Germany's eastern border. In addition, Germany regarded its cooperation with Russia in Asia as a means to weaken the Franco–Russian alliance in Europe. Germany also used this opportunity to gain a footing in Asia.[22] It sought to secure at least one harbor in China as a naval base and a coal depot to further its influence in East Asia. The German domestic desire to increase the size of its navy also propelled the nation to move into China.[23] Germany and Russia concluded a secret agreement to occupy the Jiaozhou Bay and Port Arthur, respectively.[24] The German emperor wrote to the Russian emperor: "I look forward to the development of our work with great interest, and I am willing to help you solve the territorial issue [of the Liaotung Peninsula]. In return, I want you to understand that Germany will secure ports somewhere [in China], which will not interfere with your interests."[25] In November 1897, Germany seized Jiaozhou Bay. The German foreign minister explained the reason for this move to the Imperial Parliament: "Politically, since these powers [France, Great Britain, and Russia] secured their footings in East Asia, we

should also follow them. We cannot satisfy ourselves with becoming a second or third rate nation."[26]

Odagiri Makinosuke, the acting Japanese consul general at Shanghai, pointed out the dangerous situation in China, saying that "if the other powers follow Germany in the other areas, Great Britain will never sit back and watch, but it must station its giant ships in the mouth of the Yangtze River and occupy the Yangtze area and Kwangtung."[27] Facing the danger of an international war in China, Japan tried to terminate the issue at China's sacrifice. Japan urged China to accept the German demands in order to maintain a peaceful order. Nishi Tokujiro, the Japanese foreign minister, sent orders to Yano Fumio, the Japanese minister to China: "Take every measure within your official power to make China accept this [German demand] and terminate the incident peacefully."[28]

Contrary to Japan's hope, the German seizure of Jiaozhou Bay opened a Pandora's box in China. After this event, other powers, including Great Britain, employed measures of more formal imperialism in order to restore the balance of power in the region. The Russian ambassador to France held the opinion that "[t]here used to be a tacit understanding among European powers that they would assure the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire. . . . [T]he agreement has been virtually broken so often that European powers no longer have to fulfil the duty and they can do whatever they want to do in China."[29]

Russian influence also penetrated into China. The Imperial Group of the Chinese ruling community (Empress Dowager Tz'u-his and Li Hung-chang, probably the most powerful bureaucrat in the empire, were the leaders) sought the patronage of the imperialistic powers, especially of Russia, since it had initiated the Triple Intervention.[30] Charles Denby, the U.S. minister to China, reported to the State Department that the "entente between China and Russia is becoming day by day stronger."[31] The Russian emperor, understanding that the Imperial Group was the most influential in the ruling community, won over the group by declaring "mutual defense against Japan" and by offering an enormous bribe to Li. On June 3, 1896, China and Russia concluded the Li-Lobanov Treaty, which allowed Russia to build the Chinese Eastern Railway to Vladivostok. In September of that same year, Russia secured another agreement with China, obtaining administrative and judicial powers, the right of military stationing, mining, lumbering, and tax privileges along the Chinese Eastern Railway. Moreover, the Belgium syndicate, supported by Russia and France, secured the right to build the Peking–Kankow Railroad. Thus, Russia laid the foundation for its economic and political domination of Manchuria and steadily expanded its influence southward.[32]

The German seizure of Jiaozhou Bay enabled Russia to resort to similar formal imperialistic measures, with the expectation that Germany would not object to them. When the Russian navy entered Port Arthur, the

German emperor sent a congratulatory telegram to Russia: "Please accept my Congratulation at the arrival of your squadron at Port Arthur. Russia and Germany . . . may be taken as representing . . . the Holy Cross in the Far East and guarding the gates to the Continent of Asia."[33] In short, Russia and Germany helped each other's expansion of influence in China. Kato Takaaki, Japanese minister to Great Britain, correctly pointed out that "the Russian–German entente virtually included France." He insisted that these three powers "show their intention that their agreements will decide the fate of China and exclude Great Britain from the distribution of interests" in China.[34]

Despite German and Russian advancement in China, Great Britain still strongly insisted that it should maintain territorial integrity of China. On behalf of the British government, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach explained the British policy to the Swansea Chamber of Commerce in January 1898: "What we wanted in China was not territorial acquisition. . . . We did not regard China as a place for conquest or acquisition by any European or other Power."[35] The House of Commons passed the following motion without opposition on March 1, 1898: "That it is of vital importance of British commerce and influence that the independence of Chinese territory should be maintained."[36]

In order to protect its own commercial interests in China, Great Britain began to approach other powers with the intention of making a bilateral Open Door alliance. In January 1898, the nation asked Russia for an alliance. In March 1898, Great Britain also asked the United States, Germany, and Japan for alliance. All four powers rejected the British proposals. Russia did so because its principal policy was the securing of an exclusive sphere of influence in northern China, which was quite contrary to Open Door policy. The United States did so because it was busy with preparations for the war against Spain. Moreover and most importantly, Washington desired to maintain freedom of action in China. Japan rejected the proposal because it feared that the alliance might lead to a war with Russia. Germany and France would help Russia militarily, and Japan was too weak financially to take this risk. Germany turned down the British offer because the alliance might tip the unstable balance to the British side, which might turn Russia's attention from the south (Asia) to the west (Europe).[37]

The British leaders recognized that German–Russian aggression had upset the balance of power in China. They felt it necessary to change their strategies so as to restore the balance. As a counteraction, Great Britain considered taking Wei-hai-wei. British Prime Minister Salisbury wrote to British Ambassador to China Sir Claude MacDonald in March 1898, saying that "it seems desirable for us to make some counter-move. The best plan would perhaps be, on the cession of Wei-hai-wei by the Japanese, to insist on the refusal of a lease of that port on terms similar to those granted to Germany."[38] The British government confidentially informed the Japa-

nese government that "the balance of power in the Gulf of Pechili being seriously disturbed in consequence of the possession of Port Arthur by Russia, Her Majesty's Government are compelled to demand from the Chinese Government a lease of Wei-hai-wei on the same terms whenever it is evacuated by Japan."[39]

American Minister Denby correctly anticipated the British actions when he reported that the "action of Russia renders it almost certain that England will follow the example set by Germany, Russia and France, and will in turn demand the cession of territory." Denby, then, feared that "[p]ublic opinion may drive England to war. I regard the situation as very grave."[40] France warned that if both Great Britain and France resorted to measures promoting dismemberment of China, it might lead to a general war among European powers. At the same time, however, France also recognized the importance of participating in competition to gain concessions from China in order to maintain the balance of power in China.[41] Sir N. O'Conor, British ambassador to Russia, anticipated this turn of events: "It was, in my opinion, a most dangerous policy to begin the dismemberment of China. . . . Once fairly started it was hard to say where it would end."[42] MacDonald reminded Salisbury that "if we annex any territory France will follow up our action by annexing Hainan."[43] London, however, thought it imperative to occupy Wei-hai-wei in order to contain Russian expansion to China. Prime Minister Salisbury declared in April 1898 that "we are most anxious not to make territorial demands on China, though in certain eventualities such a policy might become necessary."[44] Joseph Chamberlain clearly proclaimed in November 1898 that Great Britain would not intend to "give anything like a guarantee of integrity and independence of an empire which appeared to be decaying."[45]

In February 1898, Great Britain secured the promise from China that the country would never cede the Chang Jiang area. In February 1898, MacDonald demanded that the Chinese government give "the assurance that no territory in any of the provinces adjoining the Yang-tsze shall ever be alienated to any other Power by China." China replied that the leasing "territory in the Yang-tsze region to another Power is out of the question."[46] MacDonald summarized its meaning in a straightforward way: "Our demand is in effect a declaration to China, and to the other Powers, that we look upon the Yang-tsze region as our sphere of influence."[47] In April 1898, France also obtained a 99-year lease of the Guangzhou Bay, the right to build railroads between Annam and Yunnan, and the promise that China would never cede Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan.

The European powers then began to consolidate their gains. Russia asked about the possibility of establishing a Russian–British agreement in China. Since Salisbury at that time paid much of his attention to South Africa, he was seeking any compromise with Russia. Salisbury thought that "an understanding between this country and Russia would be advantageous to

both Powers."[48] In April 1899, Great Britain and Russia concluded this agreement.

Most of the powers did not have vital interests in China. Consequently, even though the spread of the European principle propelled fierce struggles for concessions in China, the powers tried to avoid any military conflict. Germany insisted that the European powers should pursue common economic interests jointly in China.[49] However, the European principle based on the zero-sum game was unlikely to yield a desirable situation in which the powers would willingly cooperate with each other. Because of distrust toward other powers, each country tried to knock the wind out of the others' sails by resorting to more formal imperialistic measures.[50] Instead of cooperating among themselves, the powers tried to restore balance of power by concluding numerous bilateral agreements to entrench their spheres of influence in China. Open Door liberalism gave way to bilateralism. Because of the difficulty of establishing an objective balance of power, each power's movement inevitably caused another's reaction under the name of "restoration of the balance of power." Competition for concession hunting impregnated the European powers with jealousy and distrust.[51]

In response, the Chinese government purposely resorted to its traditional diplomacy of playing the countries against one another, which deepened conflicts among the powers.[52] Denby feared that China's diplomacy would give the powers an excuse to demand more and more concessions, which would ultimately cause an international war in China. "To my view there is no good for China in foreign intervention. . . . they [Russia, England, and France] will each demand heavy compensation for any services rendered to China."[53] European and Japanese concession hunting stimulated Chinese nationalism and xenophobia. The German minister in China insisted that the division of China would be the only way to contain antiforeign movements in China.[54]

The European powers were at swords' points in China, and none of the core countries on the scene, including Great Britain, could stabilize international relations in China. The United States had to act in order to thrust itself into China's market and to attempt to create a new order in China.

THE FIRST OPEN DOOR DECLARATION: THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN PRINCIPLE

Americans had had an ambivalent attitude toward Europe since the colonial age. They respected the traditional European civilization and desired to imitate its cultured and advanced aspects. At the same time, however, they regarded the European civilization as decadent and praised the greatness of the United States. In short, Americans inherently had simultaneous love-hate feelings toward Europe. This ambivalence was also vividly ap-

parent in the late nineteenth century. Knowledge of Europe was prevalent in elite American society, and American leaders were keenly aware of the latest developments in Europe. European imperialistic activities in the world were one of them, which tended to encourage the United States to expand its influence abroad.[55] Other European ideas, such as social Darwinism, Anglo-Saxon supremacy, and the white man's burden, also had significant impact on the American leaders. They gradually came to believe that the United States should also expand its influence abroad. The American establishment lived in the Atlantic community.[56] Nevertheless, this does not mean that U.S. leaders blindly accepted all of the European ideas. They despised such European traditions as closed-door diplomacy, power politics, balance of power, and network of alliances. Washington leaders did not reject the European principle; instead, they used it to make the European powers accept the American principle. The American principle refers to a mode of behavior in which core nations cooperated with each other to "develop" peripheral areas with informal means as much as possible, leaving the heavy burden of administrative responsibilities to the peripheral areas.

The United States became a world power based on its enormous productive capabilities by the end of the nineteenth century. Consequently, Great Britain emphasized Anglo-American cooperation by allowing the United States predominance in the Caribbean area.[57] Great Britain also provided the maximum assistance to the United States in its fight against Spain and supported the U.S. acquisition of Hawaii and the Philippines. The Spanish-American War became a catalyst for Anglo-American cooperation. By encouraging and aiding the United States' commitment to the Pacific and East Asian issues, Great Britain tried to contain the expansion of European powers in China. Especially after the outbreak of the Boer War, London could not spend many of its resources on the Chinese issue, which in turn necessitated U.S. cooperation in China. Washington, on the other hand, effectively took advantage of the isolated British status in international relations to expand its influence in the Asia-Pacific area.[58]

In the spring of 1899, the United States had to deal with the imminent crisis of the breakup of China. Secretary of State John Hay did not believe that American public opinion would support U.S. participation in the concession-hunting race in China. He confidentially communicated his complex state of mind to Paul Dana, a New York editor, saying, that "we do not think that the public opinion of the United States would justify this Government in taking part in the great game of spoliation now going on. At the same time we are keenly alive to the importance of safeguarding our great commercial interests in that Empire."[59] Because of America's traditional isolationism, the Senate insisted on the minimum commitment to international relations. In particular, the Senate opposed any diplomatic movement to follow Great Britain. Hay indicated that "the senseless prej-

udices in certain sections of the 'Senate and people' compel us to move with great caution."[60]

In August 1899, Russia announced that it would make Dairen Port a free port. Washington regarded this announcement as a sign of Russia's wish to pursue a cooperative policy in China.[61] In September, Hay issued the First Open Door Notes to Great Britain, Germany, and Russia, and, in November, to Japan, Italy, and France. William Rockhill, Hay's adviser on East Asian affairs, and Alfred Hippisley, of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service and Rockhill's close friend, devised a draft of the Open Door Note.

China at the end of the nineteenth century was an unstable country. After the German occupation of Jiaozhou Bay, Minister Denby reported: "It is claimed also that the action by Germany portends the partition of China, that Russia has practically taken possession of Korea and Manchuria, and the other Powers will now seize any territory they want."[62] Denby feared that "if her [German] example of seizing Chinese territory is followed it is not unlikely that war will result among the European powers."[63] The weakness of the Chinese government and the rise of Chinese nationalism also contributed to destabilization of China. Chinese xenophobia fostered criticism against foreign missionaries and foreign powers exploiting China. The Chinese central government could not control local antiforeign upheavals, which precipitated direct intervention from European powers.[64] Imperialism based on the European principle, the weak Chinese government, and xenophobic nationalism caused chaos in China, elements that Hay had to address when he declared the Open Door policy.

The ultimate historical significance of the U.S. Open Door policy is as the first step toward the transformation of international relations in China from European to American principles. The most prominent characteristic of the American principle was its rejection of the European principle. Especially in China, where the European principle was prevalent, the United States emphasized morality in order to highlight the difference between the European and American principles. This behavior reflected the United States' anti-Europe nationalism.[65]

As the first step to promote this transformation from European to American principles, Hay issued five demands in the first Open Door Note:

1. equal treatment in trade;
2. administrative integrity in China;
3. administrative reform in China;
4. cooperation among powers; and
5. the acquisition of international legitimacy for the principle of the U.S. Open Door policy.

These demands included both short-term and long-term requests. The short-term demand was "a sincere desire to insure to the commerce and

industry of the United States and of all other nations perfect equality of treatment within the limits of the Chinese Empire for their trade and navigation, especially within the so-called 'sphere of influence or interest' claimed by certain European powers in China."[66] Indeed, this was one of the most important purposes of the Open Door policy, but it was only a short-term aim; it was an immediate reaction to the rapidly changing situation in China.

The U.S. Open Door policy also contained more important, long-term objectives. One of these objectives was to secure administrative integrity in China. Denby explicitly predicted: "Conflicting interests, jealousies, international collisions cannot be avoided if this populous country is divided among several holders." In order to avoid war, Denby insisted upon the administrative integrity of China: "For the interest of the world it is better that China should be ruled by one power than by any greater number."[67] The territorial integrity of China was, however, a difficult issue. Hippisley wrote to Rockhill: "Of course, if the independence & integrity of China can be safeguarded, too, let that be accomplished. I entirely agree with you as to the value and importance of such a step; but I had not broached it because it seemed to me the Admin. was very lukewarm about taking any action & hence I cut my proposals down to an irreducible minimum."[68] Rockhill also understood the limit of the U.S. policy toward China. He reported that China's territorial integrity was "still such a complex question that I do not think we have it in anything like a shape to discuss it advantageously." This issue was "so awfully big, that I think for the time being we had better not broach it over here."[69]

Nevertheless, the Open Door Notes to Great Britain and Russia contained the integrity of China as one of its aims.[70] The notes to the other powers did not have this phrase. Hay believed that Great Britain would support this aim because London had been seeking cooperation with Washington, and because Great Britain was in the position of receiving maximum profits from the Open Door policy without administrative responsibility. Hay also tried to incorporate Russia into a concert of powers centered around the Anglo–American cooperation so as to manage Russian expansion in China.[71]

In addition to territorial integrity, Hay inserted other long-term demands in the First Open Door Notes, which were to "remove dangerous sources of international irritation, and hasten thereby united or concerted action of the powers at Peking in favor of the administrative reforms so urgently maintaining the integrity of China in which the whole western world is alike concerned."[72] In other words, Washington pursued both cooperation among the powers in China and also the administrative reformation of China. Consul Fowler asserted that the powers should "join together in exerting the necessary pressure for reform, through which alone the re-

quired security for trade can be found, the integrity of the Empire maintained, and the door of trade kept open to all on equal terms."[73]

Denby insisted that administrative reform would bring independence and prosperity to China. "We should urge on China the reform of all evils in her Government which touch American interests, and the adoption of vigorous measures in the lines of material progress. This policy will to her be the surest pathway to independence and prosperity."[74] Rockhill regarded the reform as indispensable for maintaining the administrative integrity. "The establishment of a government at Peking, which is not only strong, but which is in sympathy with the wishes and feelings of the nation at large, is . . . a first necessity if China is to be saved from partition."[75]

The administrative reform of the Chinese government was also important because the upsurge in Chinese nationalism had caused instability. At the end of the nineteenth century, Chinese nationalism was still so nascent, tentative, and quantitatively limited that it turned inward and sought reform and defense of China.[76] Dissatisfaction grew against the government that sold concessions to foreign powers and tyrannized the Chinese people. At the same time, dissatisfaction escalated against foreign powers that imposed economic, political, and cultural pressures upon China by establishing spheres of influence and missionary activities. Mobs and mob violence sporadically appeared throughout China. The rise of Chinese nationalism disturbed U.S. business interests. Taylor, statistical secretary of Customs, reported: "Various parts of the country were disturbed by sporadic rebellions of sufficient gravity to check business. . . . the political situation was full of menace; and in September [1898], the news from Peking completely disorganized the trade of the northern ports."[77] Consul Fowler agreed with Taylor, insisting that one of the main reasons for the slow development of trade with China was "the absence of security for the investment of foreign capital in China anywhere outside of the treaty ports."[78]

Finally, Hay sought to give international legitimacy to the principle of the U.S. Open Door policy. He requested that all the powers respond in writing to the Open Door Notes that they would observe the basic ideas of the U.S. Open Door policy. Washington needed the powers' acceptance of the policy so that international pressure could be placed on any power that might openly challenge the U.S. Open Door policy in the future. The Japanese envoy to France recognized that the main aim of the Notes was to "acquire the formal assurances [to observe the Open Door principle] and record them publicly for future use when the necessity arises."[79] Understanding the fluid conditions in China, Hay tried to make the U.S. Open Door policy as flexible as possible.[80]

Each power reluctantly agreed with the Notes on the condition that the other powers would also give consent to it. Russia, the most aggressive power in China, also agreed to the U.S. demand because it feared the possibility of the strong Anglo–American cooperation and Russia's own iso-

lation in China.[81] In the late nineteenth century, the Anglo–American cooperation became prominent in the Caribbean and the Pacific areas. The United States, with its productive power, might tip the balance of power in China in British favor. Russian leaders feared that if they rejected the American Open Door policy outright, it might force the United States to side with Great Britain. It is not an exaggeration to say that Russia was the major target for the American Open Door policy. Rockhill correctly indicated that the United States had become a balancer among powers in China. Understanding domestic constraints, Hay sought U.S. flexibility and the freedom of action as a balancer in China without concluding any formal alliance with any European nations in order to secure the immediate and future commercial interests of the United States.[82]

In March 1900, Hay regarded each power's response to the Open Door Notes "as final and definitive."[83] All the powers recognized the principle of the U.S. Open Door policy in China. Making the best use of mutual distrust inherent to the European principle, the United States made the first step to establish the American principle as a mode of international relations in China.

NOTES

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