

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF
JOHN DEWEY

1882-1939

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JOHN DEWEY
1882-1939

By MILTON HALSEY THOMAS

With an Introduction by
HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER



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P R E F A C E

THIS volume lists the published writings of John Dewey from his first article, in April 1882, to the first of November 1939, following the plan of the 1929 edition. The arrangement is, as far as possible, chronological by date of publication. Books and parts of books are placed directly after the annual heading, followed by articles. Reviews and translations have been included where known, but this material has not been exhausted. Part II contains selected titles about Dewey, exclusive of book reviews, which are listed with the books.

Brief newspaper reports of addresses by Mr. Dewey have not been included in this book, and letters or statements which he signed as a member of a committee or group have been omitted. No attempt has been made to locate the many reprintings in journals and books of fragments of Dewey's writings. The masters' and doctors' theses listed in Part II are largely unpublished and available only in typewritten form at the institutions where they were submitted.

Nearly all the titles in this volume were examined personally by the compiler or by Professor Schneider, with whom he was associated in the compilation of the 1929 edition. Unfortunately, no institution has brought together a collection, even approaching completeness, of Mr. Dewey's published writings. Research for this book has

been carried on at the university libraries of Columbia, Chicago, Harvard, Yale and Princeton, at the Library of Congress, the New York Public Library and the Boston Public Library, and by correspondence. Grateful acknowledgment is made to the philosophers and librarians who have helped in this compilation, and in particular to Mrs. Iris Wilder Dean of the *Journal of Philosophy*, Miss Clara E. Derring, and Messrs. Corliss Lamont and Joseph Ratner. Miss Gladys Joan Dieseth of Columbia has been most helpful throughout the work.

M.H.T.

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1 November 1939

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DEWEY'S EIGHTH DECADE

A DECADE AGO, at the age of three score and ten, John Dewey was liberated from his professional duties as an educator and given what he might call "effective freedom." Men at that age, when told their duty is done, rarely possess enough physical and intellectual energy to make their brief span of freedom effective. If evidence were needed of Dewey's astonishing productivity during this decade, the increase of the following bibliography over its first edition of 1929 would bear eloquent witness. In these years of laborious leisure Dewey has continued to carry his philosophy from the schoolroom into the larger world of affairs where it has become a public power. Though not conventional, he is in the fullest sense a man of affairs and of the world; he already belongs to world history, his thoughts having become embodied in public opinion and his ideas having borne tangible fruit in social intelligence. Such an achievement would always be a natural occasion for celebration and congratulation, but in the case of John Dewey it is also an appropriate culmination of his philosophy, revealing as it does the consummation of his thought in very overt activity. Those of us who have seen Professor Dewey in action as a teacher know that he has always been alive to what for many professors remains an external world. Especially those who were privileged to hear his

lectures in "Social Ethics" know that many of the ideas and interests which he has published only recently have been developing for years. Nevertheless, this decade has meant for him a more general participation in art, politics, journalism, and the public discussion of public affairs. Out of this broad and intense experience has come a notable series of publications that bring a wealth of concrete meanings to a philosophy whose most systematic and technical expression had been achieved in the preceding decade.

A conventional philosopher and a conventional reader may see in Dewey's recent works merely an application of a system to the chief domains of culture, resulting in a philosophy of history, a philosophy of law, state and society, a philosophy of art, a philosophy of religion, and a philosophy of science. But closer inspection of these works will correct this impression. It may be appropriate in these introductory remarks to point out how Dewey's writings on history, society, art, religion, and science differ from conventional philosophies of these subjects and how they are related to his system as it is expounded in *Experience and Nature* and *The Quest for Certainty*.

In general it may be said that Dewey is always writing of human experience; not because by definition anything written about *ipso facto* enters experience or because he is committed by principle to the idea that "the proper study of mankind is man," but out of love of wisdom. He is not merely a methodological empiricist but also a practical learner from and by experience. His own words well apply to him: "learning is the fuel of warmth of interest." His growth in contacts and insights is at once a habit, a principle, and an end; it is the life of his thought.

I do not recall ever hearing him praise experience or make a fetish of it, but he has an uncanny gift of profiting by it. Professional empiricists have frequently been disconcerted by his turning away from his own "ism," his own school and schools, in order to refresh his ideas with new observations, and many who have sought to use him as an authority have discovered that one employs him in that capacity at the risk of having all authority repudiated. This combined habit and doctrine of getting experience by critical reflection on experiences has made him a radical philosopher, neither pedant nor rebel, but like Socrates a friendly gadfly. For it is fair neither to Socrates nor to Dewey to regard them as mere gadflies; they are themselves in the harness, to carry on the Platonic figure. They do not sting like parasites, but pull, as the "spirited steed" might pull on its sluggish teammate. Dewey's demonstration both in theory and in practice that getting experience is a critical art, not a divine gift, and that reason is neither above nor beneath experience, but in the thick of it, might be a homely commonplace whose repetition becomes tedious, were it not for the fact that Dewey exhibits so much of the kind of intelligence which distinguishes the wise man from the preacher. It is this trait in Dewey's thinking that is chiefly responsible for the continued growth of his mind. Were he primarily a naturalist, a scientist seeking only truth, his philosophy would doubtless be a more rigorous and stable system; being primarily an empiricist, he must participate in a culture whose living patterns elude most minds and whose planning often seems futile. Dewey's plea for an ever-lastingly "planning society" is certainly more radical as well as more liberal than the plea for a planned society,

and few persons would feel as much at home in such a society as Dewey does. If nature did not upset many well-laid plans, Dewey certainly would.

To begin with, Dewey has no philosophy of history in the conventional sense. Instead of seeking to make history intelligible in terms of philosophy, his task is rather to make philosophy intelligible in terms of history. Were he to dismiss, as a mere scientist might, a false idea as soon as he is convinced of its erroneousness, he would be spared much of his critical labor. For some of his most difficult and brilliant analyses arise from his attempt to understand why what now seems incredible was formerly held to be plausible. This respect for the minds of his predecessors and this persistent interest in reconstructing past environments until beliefs now passé again take on life is the price a genuine empiricist pays when he seeks to learn from history. To understand why Aristotle, Newton, Locke, and Adam Smith believed what they did is a problem, not for the philosophy of history, but for the history of thinking. To see these men at work instead of merely examining their products requires an uncommon sympathy and imagination. It may turn out that some of Dewey's historical perspectives are wrong and that in seeking to make others intelligible to himself he may fall victim to the temptation merely to make himself intelligible to others. In any case, there is something modest, honest, and human as well as something intelligent and difficult in this approach to the historical dimension of experience.

Turning next to Dewey's social philosophy, we note that one of his major concerns is to break down the abstractions in the theory of *the* state, *the* law, *the* social

order, *the* individual, and to see social problems in all their empirical complexity both in the historical diversity of cultures and in the contemporaneous plurality of interlocking institutions. Dewey's use of "the public" may appear to be an exception to this rule, but anyone who examines *The Public and Its Problems*, a weighty volume, though small and too much neglected, will discover that there are really many publics. Theoretically, Dewey argues, a public is a relative thing; it exists by virtue of the wider group that is indirectly affected whenever there is a conflict between two individuals, parties, classes, or nations. Every contract, every court trial, every legal enactment, every strike, and every war has its own public, easily forgotten because it is only indirectly part of the total situation which should be taken into account if opinion and government are to be really public and democratic. As a step in this direction Dewey gave his active support to "The People's Lobby," though he realized that "the people" is an abstraction, in the hope that this lobby might become a clearinghouse or clarifying house for those various public interests that are not sufficiently articulate to be effective pressure groups or lobbies. This experiment was in line with Dewey's emphasis on the value of publicity both for democracy and for intelligence—publicity in the intellectual sense of bringing to each citizen's attention the remote as well as the immediate consequences of social issues, conflicts, and relations. It was this same concern for genuine publicity which dominated his participation in the Trotsky case. He was not so much defending an individual or a system or justice as exposing an attempt at concealing what should be public. He did not wish to see a supposedly democratic court—proceeding, which is

the keystone of public right, transformed in Russia into an insidious instrument of party propaganda. This emphasis on publicity is consistent with Dewey's faith in experience rather than with any particular theory of government or law. Similarly his plea for freedom, used as T. H. Green used it to mean the realization of individual capacities, is a plea, not for a particular form of state or for individualism, but for a quality of social experience. In his theory of law Dewey lays stress on the importance of law as a public *statement*, an explicit communication to each member of a community stating the conditions on which the life of the community rests.¹ With the possible exception of law, the various institutions of society are examined by Dewey less in their own interest with a view to an adequate theory of each, than in the interest of empirical method with a view to discovering what each contributes to the growth and enrichment of experience and to the clarification and sharing of meanings.

It may be temerity to make the same assertion of Dewey's treatment of art in view of the fact that he himself says that the subject of *Art as Experience* is "the philosophy of art" and in view of the general recognition this book has received as a contribution to esthetic theory.

¹Incidentally it might be remarked that Dewey has worked out what amounts to a well-rounded philosophy of law, and it is to be regretted that he has not yet published it in anything approaching systematic form. This fact may be added evidence that Dewey takes little interest in systematic philosophies; I suspect, however, that he may be keeping it relatively quiet because it is relatively less original with him than other branches of his thinking, being directly inspired by the work of Holmes, Brandeis, Tufts and others, and being largely what he might spurn as book-learning.

The theme of the work, however, as Dewey announces it, gives the case away:

When artistic objects are separated from both conditions of origin and operation in experience, a wall is built around them that renders almost opaque their general significance, with which esthetic theory deals. Art is remitted to a separate realm, where it is cut off from that association with the materials and aims of every other form of human effort, undergoing, and achievement. A primary task is thus imposed upon one who undertakes to write upon the philosophy of the fine arts. This task is to restore continuity between the refined and intensified forms of experience that are works of art and the everyday events, doings, and sufferings that are universally recognized to constitute experience.¹

Dewey is here concerned primarily, not with the products of art or even with the experience of artist and lover of art as a distinct type of experience; he is concerned with the continuity between such experiences and other aspects of a culture. But, and this is even more to the point, he is primarily interested in proving that the fine arts are merely fine illustrations of reflective experience in general. What is distinctive about art is not its subject matter or its end, but its media. Art, to put it baldly, is socialized intelligence in oil, marble, tone, or rhythm. In one sense, of course, this is a theory of art, but more directly it is a continued exploration of experience, a discovery, not of another form, but of another means of experience. The same general pattern confronts us here that confronts us in all of Dewey's works: an indeterminate situation becomes determinate by the use of signs, symbols and other means of communication, so that having an experience is transformed into sharing and knowing objects,

¹*Art as Experience*, p. 3.

themselves created out of antecedent material in the process of analysis and experimentation.

That *A Common Faith* is not a theory of religion will be obvious to anyone who reads it. Its aim is to define a faith that can be common, and its thesis is that the creeds of religions, though their aim has been to unify and mediate human life, have so sadly failed in this integrating function that anything which today calls itself a religion and can empirically be recognized as such is in fact a divisive, sectarian force, producing schisms and intellectual impasses. The basic trouble, according to Dewey, is the reliance by the various religions on trans-empirical powers and ends. The only faith that can be genuinely catholic and ecumenical is faith, not in a particular beginning or end of creation, but in the creative method of intelligence continuously applied. Had Dewey done for religion something analogous to what he did for art, he would have shown in detail how the religious media and techniques transform frustration into shared enjoyment. But being a realistic empiricist and being disgusted with the contemporary failures of religion to work this transformation, he turns from the activities of religion to faith. The book is largely a justification of his faith in intelligence. In short, *A Common Faith* is a critique of religious creeds from the point of view of their value for the integration of experience.

Turning lastly to a similar critique of science, we are fortunate to have Dewey's crowning exposition of his faith in and analysis of scientific method in *Logic, the Theory of Inquiry*, to which should be added his "*Theory of Valuation* (in the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*), for in this essay he tries to prove the continuity

for logic between so-called factual sciences and so-called normative sciences. Here again we are given not a philosophy of science in the current use of the term, but a description of how and why scientific methods were invented for the integration or mediation of experience. We are told in detail how facts are made. In earlier expositions of "how we think," the analysis was complicated by psychological, pedagogical, and epistemological considerations. In this undoubtedly classic version of Dewey's logical theory the problems of the physiological processes in thought and of the data for thought are practically ignored, and the description is confined to the function of logical operations in transforming experience. The chief complication in this analysis is a characteristic historical digression by which Dewey suggests how inventions in thinking, from the crudest forms of affirmation and negation to the present elaborate machinery of measurement, have made revisions of logic necessary from time to time. The reason Dewey is and always has been fascinated by scientific construction is that in genuine science not only is experience reconstructed but also the method of reconstruction is embodied into the new structure. To know scientifically means not merely to know the answer but also to know how the answer answers. To know is to be able to give evidence, which in turn means to know how to employ the methods of inquiry. Scientific "mediation" (Dewey retains much of his idealist training in logic and uses it effectively against idealist logic) or "determination" is distinctive in that it contains the means for future redetermination. Science more than any other art is self-correcting, auto-responsible, and by nature subject to

reform. This "autonomy" of scientific thinking is at the base of Dewey's faith in it.

These remarks concerning Dewey's recent work are intended neither as a summary nor as a criticism but merely as an orientation, suggesting that Dewey's own participation in his culture and in the general heritage of the literate has enriched his philosophy and at the same time has enriched the culture to which it belongs. Dewey's conception of philosophy as "a culture become critical" is certainly true of his own philosophy. He takes his stand *in medias res* and is content to present patiently and gropingly whatever rhythms and patterns he can detect there, disclaiming any revelation of the meaning of the totality or finality of experience and renouncing the vantage point of detachment. "There is a prophetic aspect to all observations," he remarks, summarizing at the same time his own observations. One might add that such prophecy comes, not from the elevation of the observer above his environment, but from an intimate sharing of its life and fortunes.

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September, 1939

PART I
WRITINGS OF JOHN DEWEY
TO NOVEMBER, 1939

WRITINGS OF JOHN DEWEY
TO NOVEMBER, 1939

1882

THE METAPHYSICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF MATERIALISM, *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, Apr. 1882, XVI, 208-213.

Abstracts in *Johns Hopkins University Circular*, Feb. 1883, II, 59; *Revue Philosophique*, Jan. 1883, XV, 109.

THE PANTHEISM OF SPINOZA. *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, July 1882, XVI, 249-257.

Abstract in *Johns Hopkins University Circular*, Feb. 1883, II, 59.

1883

KNOWLEDGE AND THE RELATIVITY OF FEELING. *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, Jan. 1883, XVII, 56-70.

Read before the Metaphysical Club of Johns Hopkins University, 12 Dec. 1882.

1884

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF KANT.

Dissertation for the PH.D. degree at Johns Hopkins University. This was not published, and no copy is owned by the university. (Title from Johns Hopkins University, *List of Dissertations . . . 1878-1919*, p. 7.)

KANT AND PHILOSOPHIC METHOD. *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, Apr. 1884, XVIII, 162-174.

THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY. *Andover Review*, Sept. 1884, II, 278-289.

Read before the Metaphysical Club of Johns Hopkins University, 11 Mar. 1884.

1885

EDUCATION AND THE HEALTH OF WOMEN. *Science*, 16 Oct. 1885, VI, 341-342.

1886

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT. *Mind*, Jan. 1886, XI, 1-19.

Reply to this article and "Psychology as Philosophic Method" (*ib.*, Apr. 1886), by Shadworth Holloway Hodgson, "Illusory Psychology," *ib.*, Oct. 1886, XI, 478-494. See Dewey's "'Illusory Psychology'" (*ib.*, Jan. 1887), below.

Abstract in *Revue Philosophique*, Apr. 1886, XXI, 436.

HEALTH AND SEX IN HIGHER EDUCATION. *Popular Science Monthly*, Mar. 1886, XXVIII, 606-614.

SOUL AND BODY. *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Apr. 1886, XLIII, 239-263.

PSYCHOLOGY AS PHILOSOPHIC METHOD. *Mind*, Apr. 1886, XI, 153-173.

See note under "The Psychological Standpoint," above.

INVENTORY OF PHILOSOPHY TAUGHT IN AMERICAN COLLEGES. *Science*, 16 Apr. 1886, VII, 353-355.

1887

PSYCHOLOGY. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1887
[^c1886]. xii, 427 pp.

Contents. Introductory: Science and Method of Psychology — Mind and Modes of Activity. Part I, Knowledge: Elements of Knowledge — Processes of Knowledge — Stages of Knowledge-Perception — Memory — Imagination — Thinking — Intuition. Part II, Feeling: Introduction to Feeling — Sensuous Feeling — Formal Feeling — Development of Qualitative Feeling — Intellectual Feeling — Aesthetic Feeling — Personal Feeling. Part III, The Will: Sensuous Impulses — Development of Volition — Physical Control — Prudential Control — Moral Control — Will as the Source of Ideals and of Their Realization.

Reviewed in *American Journal of Psychology*, Nov. 1887, I, 154-159; *Andover Review*, Apr. 1888, IX, 437-441 (Henry Augustus Pearson Torrey); *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Apr. 1888, XLV, 381-383; *Mind*, Apr. and July 1887, XII, 301-302, 439-443 [George Croom Robertson]; *New Englander and Yale Review*, Apr. 1887, XLVI, 387-390; *Revue Philosophique*, Aug. 1887, XXIV, 202-203 (Théodule Ribot).

Abstract in *Johns Hopkins University Circular*, Aug. 1887, VI, 125.

See edition of 1891.

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Reply to Shadworth Holloway Hodgson, "Illusory Psychology," *ib.*, Oct. 1886, XI, 478-494. Rejoinder by Hodgson, "'Illusory Psychology' — a Rejoinder," *ib.*, Apr. 1887, XII, 314-318.

ETHICS AND PHYSICAL SCIENCE. *Andover Review*, June 1887, VII, 573-591.

Abstract in *Johns Hopkins University Circular*, Aug. 1887, VI, 125.

REVIEW of George Trumbull Ladd, *Elements of Physiological Psychology*. *New Englander and Yale Review*, June 1887, XLVI, 528-537.

KNOWLEDGE AS IDEALISATION. *Mind*, July 1887, XII, 382-396.

1888

LEIBNIZ'S NEW ESSAYS CONCERNING THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING. A Critical Exposition. Chicago: S. C. Griggs and Company, 1888. xvii, 272 pp. (Griggs's Philosophical Classics, edited by George Sylvester Morris, No. 7.)

Reprinted in 1902 by Scott, Foresman & Co., Chicago.

Contents. The Man — Sources of His Philosophy — The Problem and Its Solution — Locke and Leibniz, Innate Ideas — Sensation and Experience — The Impulses and the Will — Matter and Its Relation to Spirit — Material Phenomena and Their Reality — Some Fundamental Conceptions — The Nature and Extent of Knowledge — The Theology of Leibniz — Criticism and Conclusion.

Reviewed in *Mind*, Oct. 1888, XIII, 612; *New Englander and Yale Review*, Jan. 1889, L, 66-68; *Science*, 19 Oct. 1888, XII, 188.

THE ETHICS OF DEMOCRACY. Ann Arbor: Andrews & Company, 1888. 28 pp. (University of Michigan. Philosophical Papers. Second ser., No. 1.)

Lecture delivered at the University of Michigan.

1889

APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY. An introduction to the Principles and Practice of Education. By J[ames] A[lexander]

McLellan and John Dewey. Boston: Educational Publishing Company [n. d., pref. 1889]. xxxi, 317 pp.

Contents. Psychology and its Relations to the Teacher: The Educational Importance of Psychology — The Educational Limitations of Psychology — The Treatment of Psychology Adopted. The Bases of Psychical Life: Sensation — Interest — Impulse. The Psychical Processes: Classification and Contents of our Minds — Classification of Processes Corresponding to these Contents — Educational Principles — Apperception and Retention. Forms of Intellectual Development: Principles of Intellectual Development — Stages of Intellectual Development — Training of Perception, Memory, Imagination, Thought. The Forms of Emotional Development: Conditions of Interest — Principles of Emotional Growth — The Forms, or Stages, of Emotional Growth. Forms of Volitional Development: Factors of Volitional Development — Stages of Volitional Development or of Self Control. Mind and Body: Importance of Body for Soul — Structure of Nervous System in Man — Elementary Properties of Nerve Structures — Psychological Equivalents — Localization of Function — Educational Principles. Summary of Principles: Bases of Instruction — Ends of Instruction — Methods of Instruction — Relation of Knowledge, Feeling, and Will — Criticism of Maxims.

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GALTON'S STATISTICAL METHODS. *Publications of the American Statistical Association*, Sept. 1889, n. s. I, 331-334.

Review of Francis Galton, *Natural Inheritance*.

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Describes courses in ethics to be given in 1889-1890.

1890

ON SOME CURRENT CONCEPTIONS OF THE TERM "SELF."
Mind, Jan. 1890, XV, 58-74.

IS LOGIC A DUALISTIC SCIENCE? *Open Court*, 16 Jan.
1890, III, 2040-2043.

Review and criticism of John Venn, *Empirical Logic*. See
note to "The Logic of Verification," below.

REVIEW of Edward Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of
Immanuel Kant*. *Andover Review*, Mar. 1890, XIII,
325-327.

REVIEW of John Pentland Mahaffy and John Henry
Bernard, *Kant's Critical Philosophy for English Readers*.
Andover Review, Mar. 1890, XIII, 328.

REVIEW of Johann Eduard Erdmann, *A History of
Philosophy* (English translation by Williston Samuel
Hough). *Andover Review*, Apr. 1890, XIII, 453-454.

THE LOGIC OF VERIFICATION. *Open Court*, 24 Apr. 1890,
IV, 2225-2228.

Reply and criticism of the position stated in "Is Logic a
Dualistic Science?" above.

REVIEW of James MacBride Sterrett, *Studies in Hegel's
Philosophy of Religion*. *Andover Review*, June 1890,
XIII, 684-685.

PHILOSOPHICAL COURSES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICH-
IGAN. *Monist*, Oct. 1890, I, 150-151.

1891

OUTLINES OF A CRITICAL THEORY OF ETHICS. Ann Arbor:
Register Publishing Company, 1891. viii, 253 pp.

Contents. Introduction. Part I, Fundamental Ethical Notions: The Good — The Idea of Obligation — The Idea of Freedom. Part II, The Ethical World. Part III, The Moral Life of the Individual: The Formation and Growth of Ideals — The Moral Struggle, or the Realization of Ideals — Realized Morality, or the Virtues. Conclusion.

Reviewed in *Andover Review*, July 1891, XVI, 95-98 (James Hervey Hyslop); *Educational Review*, Oct. 1891, II, 297-298 (James Hervey Hyslop); *International Journal of Ethics*, July 1891, I, 503-505 (Josiah Royce); *Mind*, July 1891, XVI, 424; *Monist*, July 1891, I, 600-601; *New Englander and Yale Review*, Sept. 1891, LV, 275; *Philosophical Review*, Jan. 1892, I, 95-99 (Thomas Davidson); *Revue Philosophique*, Jan. 1892, XXXIII, 97 (Georges Rodier).

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For Contents, see edition of 1887.

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Commencement address at Smith College in June 1890. Reports in *Northampton Herald*, 18 June 1890; *Springfield*