RELIGIOUS EDUCATION and the CHALLENGE of PLURALISM

Edited by
ADAM B. SELIGMAN

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Preface

THE CHAPTERS IN this volume emerged from a series of workshops and conversations run by the *Institute for Culture and World Affairs* (CURA) at Boston University and by *CEDAR—Communities Engaging with Difference and Religion*. The workshops organized by CURA in Boston were devoted to exploring the theme of Religious Pluralism and Civic Peace, and the role of religion in the enculturation of citizens. These workshops were held over the 2010–2012 academic years, with the generous support of the Henry Luce Foundation. The workshops focused on the role of religion in developing an ethics of civic virtue and a commitment in religiously divided, as well as in post-conflict, societies. The conversations—held internationally with volume contributors and others—were all focused around how to "live together differently," and what that entails in the organization of learning, pedagogy, and cultural production.

Much has been written on religious education in the Western European context, especially about such educational initiatives in the United Kingdom, Austria, Germany, and elsewhere in Europe, as well as some initiatives in the United States. While not ignoring these cases, this volume sets out to bring a very different data set to the attention of its readers. We are less interested in covering the ground that scholars, the likes of Robert Jackson, have covered so well, in the British context, especially. Rather, we are interested in exploring and bringing to the readers' attention the results of the work occurring in lesser known contexts. We have thus integrated the studies of more-researched cases (like those of France and the United States) with those devoted to the lesser known cases of Turkey, Cyprus, Israel, Bulgaria, and Malaysia. This volume also contains a broad legal review by Silvio Ferrari on the state of religious education throughout the European Union.

Our avowed aim has been to encourage a dialogue across these different cases, to juxtapose their commonalities and differences, and to bring into the more accepted conversations around pluralism and religious education cases that are often less heard. Such an exercise also highlights unimagined similarities between such disparate cases, such as those in Malaysia and Israel, for example. Thus, simply bringing material from Cyprus, Israel, Malaysia, Turkey, and Bulgaria into the broader context of such discussions is, we feel, an important starting point for the type of comprehensive approach (so sorely needed) to the problems of religious education. Post-Communist societies (especially those that were traditionally associated with Eastern Orthodoxy) present very different scenarios than those of North Atlantic Protestant ones. Countries riven by ethno-religious hostilities—as Israel and Cyprus are—again, present markedly different experiences from those of secular Western European societies. Asian societies, let alone Muslim Asian societies, present yet another dimension that must be considered, as must the phenomenon of private religious instruction in France and the United States.

Most of the cases analyzed in this volume have not been studied at all in the English-speaking world—and in some cases, only marginally in their own countries (Bulgaria, Israel, Cyprus, Malaysia). The empirical data presented here (whether of a statistical or ethnographic nature), is brand new and has not been published in any language. It is a pleasure to be able to make it available in this format. With the exception of the United States and more-general studies of religious education in the EU countries, there is in fact little work on religious education and citizenship, despite the growing importance of this subject, in more and more countries the world over.

Citizenship is the key element in all the studies selected for this volume. More specifically, we have chosen studies that focus on the challenge of articulating the terms of citizenship in a manner that includes religious and ethnic minorities, and not solely those majorities identified with the national project. This is the challenge in Cyprus, Israel, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Malaysia. All are cases, we should note, where the nation-building project differed greatly from that of post-Reformation Christian Europe—given the different developmental trajectories of Eastern Orthodoxy (Cyprus, Bulgaria), Islam (Turkey, Malaysia, TRC), and Judaism (Israel). In the case of Jewish schools in France (studied by Kimberly Arkin), the very terms of shared citizenship are questioned by a state policy of non-engagement with parochial schooling, a

development usefully compared with the types of civic education pro-mulgated in the United States. The marked contrast between the role of parochial schools in civic enculturation in both countries is, in fact, striking.

It is thus by widening the conversation and bringing hitherto unstud-ied cases into the purview of those concerned with the more general prob-lems of citizenship and living with difference, that we hope this volume will find its interested readers.

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Introduction

LIVING TOGETHER DIFFERENTLY, EDUCATION, AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEEP PLURALISM

Adam Seligman

ALL SOCIETIES AT all times face three fundamental challenges. These include the need to (1) organize their division of labor; (2) to expand trust beyond the primordial unit of family (however conceived), that is to generalize the terms of trust beyond the narrowest of circles; and (3) to provide some sense of meaning to both individual lives and collective endeavors (Eisenstadt 1995). All social institutions can be understood ultimately in terms of their reference to one or more of these three sets of challenges. As such, they will always carry with them particularistic, local, and specific characteristics. They will be in some sense different in each and every locale, and so their content will not be fully generalizable. While the division of labor may well be developing on a global scale, it is clear that the generalization of trust and the terms of meaning in different societies are different and likely to remain that way for the foreseeable future. Indeed, many papers in this collection stress precisely the particularistic, local character of those challenges tied to the provision of meaning and the establishment of the basis for social trust in different parts of the world. Many papers go a long way in showing just how circumscribed and ethnically defined communities (of trust and meaning) present a continual challenge to the generalization of the formal aspects of democratic membership as well as a sense of belonging within the nation-state. Local cultures count, and they count most in the formation of citizens who are, after all, the carriers of those ideological programs of trust and meaning around which societies are formed.

The chapters that make up this volume address these issues through the very particular lens of religious education. Religion and religious education have, as Silvio Ferrari points out below, traditionally been seen as the arena par excellence for the inculcation of meaning, a problem exacerbated by the "collapse of the great secular ideologies" of the 19th and early 20th centuries (Ferrari 2008, p. 109). In traditional societies, but increasingly in secular European societies as well, the problems of meaning; of understanding our place in creation, the meaning of good and evil, and the definition of the good life; of virtue and of moral action, are addressed primarily in the religious idiom. Despite the promise of the Enlightenment and of the 19th-century ideology of progress, it seems impossible to come to grips with these issues without recourse to religious language, traditions, and frames of reference. It is therefore not at all surprising that different countries approach religious education differently, in accords with their different understandings of their own religious tradition (or traditions) and the relative saliency of different ethno-religious groups within the polity.

The problem is that in most cases, it is impossible to provide a framework of meaning, let alone religious meaning without, at the same time, invoking a language of community, of belonging (and so also, one of borders, of definitions that consider "who is like me" and "who is not like me," or like "us" and unlike "us"), of who we can trust and who we cannot, and in addition, where the boundary of membership in "our" community runs. Thus, and to take only a few European examples, the Italian Concordat of 1984 emphasizes that "the principles of Catholicism are part of the historical patrimony of the Italian people [and] continues to ensure within the school system the instruction in the Catholic religion in non-university public schools at all levels and types." In Greece (with strong implications for Cyprus) the Constitution, "framed in the name of the Holy Trinity, consubstantial and indivisible," defines the mission of the state, among others as being responsible for the "national and religious consciousness" of the Hellenes peoples. In Baden-Wuttemberg, Germany, education is to take place "in responsibility before God and Christian love" (Willaime 2007, p. 58). The following chapters will present further examples of this connection between peoplehood and religious belonging in the context of a reflection on the very problematic nature of this connection.

Indeed, the specific cases that make up this volume were chosen in no small measure to highlight precisely this issue. The interweaving of ethno-national identities with specific religious meanings, commitments,

and identities in places like Cyprus, Israel, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Malaysia all provide immense challenges to the enculturation of a religiously diverse citizenry. Moreover, and as we shall see, in the case of France, simply leaving religious minorities to develop their own religiously defined curricula does not seem to be a solution either. Paradoxically, we will find that in the United States, civic enculturation seems to be furthered most by parochial schools that invest students with a sense of communal responsibility and belonging, rather than in the state-supported and secular public schools.

If, as in the case of many of the countries studied here, religious belonging is tied to ethnic and national belonging (and so also to very particular terms of trust and collective membership), and if religion is also seen as the realm par excellence of meaning and the inculcation of virtue, and if societies are made up of different communities of meaning and belonging—then the problem of "living together differently" takes on a significant new dimension. In such circumstances, moreover, religious education becomes the critical arena for the making of citizens whose bonds of trust and communal identity are not limited to their own ethnic (or—in some cases such as Israel, Malaysia, and Cyprus—national) collective. Religious education becomes one of the primary realms where an expansive definition of citizenship is either proffered, or revoked. This is the challenge of religious education in deeply plural societies, and this is the challenge studied in the following chapters across a very wide array of cases.

The cases analyzed in this volume range well beyond the often-studied Western European ones, where linguistic and cultural integration developed prior to post-Reformation processes of state formation (Rokkan 1975). Bringing such cases of "late modernizers" into the same framework as countries such as France and the United States (or for that matter, the wider EU survey as supplied by Silvio Ferrari) is one of the very reasons for this volume. The focus on Christian Orthodoxy, Muslim majority, and Jewish cases are meant to highlight the broad ranges of challenges facing different religiously inflected nation-building projects in the contemporary, postcolonial, and post-Communism world, and how they stand in relation to more long-standing democratic nation-states in Europe and North America.

From Cyprus to Malaysia, from Israel to Bulgaria, the terms of meaning are deeply rooted within very particular, often primordially defined communities. In Cyprus, religion—most especially Greek Orthodoxy—is clearly identified with the Greek national community. As Dilek Latif

explains, it was the British who, essentially, turned Orthodox Cypriots into Greeks, and Muslim Cypriots into Turks (though, to be sure, Islam was not traditionally associated with the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus [TRNC], although as she notes, that may be changing). Needless to add, the island is split in two along the lines of these two religio-national entities. In Malaysia, Islam is identified with the Malaysian majority in a manner that provides unending tensions with Tamil and Chinese minorities. Israel is, as is well known, a "Jewish state," and the current Prime Minister even demands that the Palestinians recognize it as such. With Jews accounting for only around 75 percent of the population—and the majority of those, non-religious—serious problems exist along the axis of communal belonging and trust, and who is privy to the dominant terms of meaning and membership in society. In Bulgaria too, the terms of community and trust overlap with those of religious affiliation, and since the first Balkan War at the beginning of the 20th century, the issue of minorities has been a major challenge to the Bulgarian polity (such minorities include Greeks, Jews, Pomaks [ethnic Bulgarian converts to Islam], non-ethnically Bulgarian Muslims, and Roma). Interestingly, three of the four cases listed here—Cyprus, Israel, and Bulgaria—are all successor states to the Ottoman Empire. There is a fourth case studied below by Ahmet (Kuru), of contemporary Turkey—that is, also a successor state to the Ottoman Empire. With the exception of the Kurds (who are Sunni Muslims, like other Turks) and the Alevis (who are not), Turkey does not face the same challenge of ethnic or national pluralism due to the transfer of populations at the time of nation formation and the second great exodus of minorities in the 1950s. Non-Muslims constitute only 100,000 of Turkey's population of 72 million (Kuru 2009, p. 179). Even so, and as Ahmet Kuru's analysis of contemporary Turkey highlights, the difficulties faced by the Turkish state in its attempts to create a "homogenized society" and so deny its ethnic diversity has always been fraught with problems. While the Ottoman Empire certainly had its own very workable system of dealing with the deep pluralism that defines empires—it was not "exportable" to the post-Empire nation-states that emerged in its wake. Its heritage was one of deeply pluralistic societies with no clear mechanisms of accommodation (we will return to this theme in the following section). Modern Turkey, especially, was built on the denial of all ethnic differences and in the marked rejection of the religious heritage and commitments of the preceding Ottoman regime (Kuru 2009, pp. 161–236).

Somewhat overlapping this category (of chapters dealing on the one hand with religious education in successor states to the Ottoman Empire, and on the other with societies where religion is tied to the ethnic or national identity of only one among many social groups) are those chapters that deal with EU countries; Silvio Ferrari's survey of the legal aspects of religious education in the European Union as a whole, Kimberly Arkin's study of Jewish education in France, Dilek Latif's aforementioned study of Cyprus, and Maria Schnitter and Daniela Kalkandjieva's paper on Bulgaria. Cyprus and Bulgaria are both EU member states. There are, in addition two "outlier" cases: that of Malaysia and the United States. Tied neither to the European Union nor, in their pasts, to the Ottoman Empire (though at different times, both were in fact tied to the British Empire)—both are deeply pluralistic, but there the similarity ends. Malaysia reached statehood in the 20th century, the United States in the 18th century. Malaysia has an ethnically and religiously segmented education system, while the United States maintains the myth (if not always the reality) of a "melting pot." Malaysia is a predominantly Muslim country, while the United States is a predominantly Protestant Christian one. Both deal with their pluralistic civil society in very different manners.

Problematizing the Religion/Secular Divide

Fundamental to the ability of these countries to engage with different communities of belonging, to maintain different interests, beliefs, and desiderata among the members of society without the societies tearing themselves apart is thus the provision of a shared sense of meaning that will somehow bridge the different communities of religious, ethnic, and national identities existing within the nation-states. Education provides one of the most important venues for such engagement, and religious education has come to be seen as one critical component of this process in Europe and beyond (Jackson et al. 2007). In essence then, the problem is one of managing different communities of belonging, rather than—as is so often the default of liberal-individualist societies—of "privatizing" these differences and keeping them out of the public space. In fact, in most of the cases presented here, such privatization is not possible, as the very terms of collective belonging are tied up with one particular ethnic or religious group among many. In some cases, such as in Liow's presentation of the educational system in

Malaysia, the rifts of society are reinforced, if not reified in the national educational system. In other cases, such as Bulgaria, there seems to be much more negotiation, and the process is more open and even hopeful. As religious and ethnic differences are thus central to these problems, it is these categories that we should first address before going on to discuss the problematic aspect of most liberal solutions for the cases studied here.

When thinking of civic enculturation, most citizens of Western European and North Atlantic democracies have in mind a markedly secular process, that is to say, a process spearheaded by secular agencies and elites. Many may indeed bear the French model in mind—where the consolidation of the Third Republic was achieved, to a great extent, through the establishment of a nation-wide secular educational system that successfully competed with that of the Catholic Church in the provision of education to generations of school children. Others may think of the type of separation of Church and State, religious and secular spheres that has characterized American national development. Interesting in terms of our cases here, is the seeming divergence between the United States and France—in terms of the role played by parochial and religious schools—in fostering a sense of civic belonging and connection to the broader collective. In the United States, such schools seem to play a very positive role, while in France, the earlier hostility of the Catholic Church and its schools, to the Third Republic and a republican sense of belonging seems to be almost replayed in the attitudes of today's students in Parisian Jewish day schools.

Given the deep bias among many in the West, against even conceptualizing the role of religion and religious elites in the enculturation of a state's citizens, it may be useful to begin by problematizing the very separation we are wont to make between religious and secular ways of life, thought, and indeed, social action. We tend, after all, to use the concepts of religion and secularity or secular culture as if these were objective, universal, and value-free concepts that can be used to characterize aspects of shared social life that are not religious. However, whether approached from the perspective of state education and the use of religion by the state as a form of civic enculturation (Fischer, Liow, Schnitter and Kalkandjieva, Latif, Kuru) or from the perspective of civil society (Berner and Hunter, Arkin) and the more bottom-up engagement of religion in civic affairs— all of the papers in this volume challenge such clearly defined boundaries between secular and religious worlds of action and meaning.

It may then be useful to recall that both religion and secularism are concepts that developed in a very particular and Western Christian context and can be used, helpfully, to describe aspects and periods in the unfolding of that particular Christian civilization, but do not actually serve us well when we come to discuss, analyze, and understand other traditional civilizations or other civilizations within which tradition is changing and being renegotiated. What, for example, is a secular Jew? What of a Jew who observes no commandments, goes to synagogue only on Yom Kippur, and does not otherwise maintain any traditional practices? Is he secular, or partially religious—or neither? How do we characterize China and its 1.3 billion inhabitants? China has been called the most secular country in the world. But when we observe the proliferation of spirit cults and other forms of worship there, we realize that this is not secular in any usual sense of the term. What of the case of Islam? What of the individual or community whose observance of traditional commandments are partial, or almost non-existent? What of the Muslim who eats during Ramadan— but only in private, in hiding, away from communal eyes? Is he secular or hypocritical? What of she who does not eat during Ramadan, but does drink wine occasionally? What of those communities in Central Asia who celebrate the Id by drinking vodka? Are these people secularists or sinners or ignorant? Or are they, as are so many, engaged in the never-ending movements, interpretation, and transformation of their own traditions, always continually being negotiated and negotiated anew by communities and individuals over the course of time?

I would in fact claim that secularism is a very particular moment in the Western Christian process of negotiating its own tradition—as was the Protestant Reformation and as is the phenomenon of Christian fundamentalism. All are particular moments in the way the concrete practice of tradition mediates, transforms, and negotiates the tradition of practices that define any civilizational endeavor. That a particular moment of this negotiation in Western Christianity is understood in terms of secularism has much to do with the privileging of belief over practice, of faith over works, and of *innerlischkeit* over external practice that has been part of Christianity from its origins (as evinced in its rejection of Jewish Law and its unique allegorical way of reading and interpreting scripture) and that received particular emphasis during the Protestant Reformation of the 16th century. Secularism as unbelief is thus the complement of tradition, understood primarily in terms of belief rather than practice. Moreover, the contemporary rejection of tradition in Western Europe is itself intimately

tied up with the overwhelming terms of collective identity. In fact, both
phenomena may very well be related. The Peace of Westphalia and the
concept of *cuius regio eius religio* may be central here. Western Europe,
which was Christian, became rather a continent of nation-states; and in
different ways, traditional practices pertaining to the sacred were sub-
sumed within a new set of practices organized around national identities.
Consequently, the relevance for any binary distinction between secular
and religious realms becomes much more difficult to maintain in Eastern
Orthodoxy, Judaism, Islam, and other religiously oriented civilizations.
This then has significant implications for how religious instruction can
be developed in schools, especially in terms of the relation of religion to
the respective nation-building (and hence civic) projects of countries with
different Eastern Orthodox, Jewish, and Muslim majorities.

These more theoretical or perhaps metahistorical reflections bear on
quite a few of the cases here; whether we think of the ideological position-
ing of religious Zionists in regard to democracy and education as studied
by Fischer; the interweaving of religion and national identities in Cyprus,
studied by Latif; or the role of Islam in Malaysia and the confluence of
ethnic and religious identities that Liow analyzed; as well as the rather
ambivalent and contradictory attitudes taken to Islam and Islamic edu-
cation in Turkey that Kuru presents; or even of those Jewish schools in
France as studied by Arkin—all are examples of traditions negotiating new
realities, with new results in newly emergent forms of civil sociability and
new understandings of the relations between what we so narrowly think
of as religious and secular life in the civic sphere (though of course, not
all of them are salutary). The juxtaposition of Israel and Malaysia is in
fact of particular interest, as both seek to build a civic project around one
particular national and religious collectivity, while still proclaiming liberal
visions of citizenship, though, to be sure, Malaysia also explicitly espouses
a multicultural ideal (though often, as we shall see, falling far behind in
practice), while such an ideal is in fact an anathema to the religious and
national elites currently supervising civic education in the state of Israel.

The point of these remarks is thus to emphasize that religious and civil
identities do and sometimes do not come together in various ways, and we
must be very wary of positing a one-to-one relationship between them, or
of reducing the one to the other. As sacred traditions and civil identities
interweave (or don't) in the contemporary world, the existence of multieth-
nic, multiconfessional states and societies characterized by deep pluralism
presents a challenge to more traditional notions of civic identity. In some

cases, a move toward integrating such religious-based identity claims with the habitus of citizenship does seem possible (if taking unexpected paths and forms). On the other hand, and to take but one salient example, the cases of the Chinese and Indian students in Malaysian schools (discussed by Liow) and the intolerance shown to them clearly expresses both the challenges of such pluralism and the failure of the state to rise to such a challenge. It is, moreover, precisely this challenge that has, to a great extent, come to define our contemporary world. It is this problem, of different communities of belonging and their relation to a shared civic and public sphere, that so many of the contributions to this volume struggle with. In a word, it is the problem of difference.

The Problem of Difference

We should begin by noting that in many ways the problem of difference stands at the root of democratic politics, which are, after all, predicated on a politics of interests—that is on a politics of different individuals and groups pursuing their particular interests (within an agreed upon set of "rules of the game" of course). Democracy in fact tends to highlight difference, to stress what makes us different, at least as far as our interests are concerned.

Democratic regimes exist in an abiding tension between a politics of interest—pushing its citizens to focus on what divides them, and a politics of consent—pushing citizens to affirm what unites them. This tension—or at least the high level of such tension—is not, I hasten to add, a characteristic of all political and social systems. Totalitarian systems, fascist regimes, communist societies, theocracies, and, on the other side of the coin, empires do not all betray the same tensions—the former can abide much less amount of difference, and the last, a much greater amount than democracies. Even within democracies, there are various differences between what have been termed liberal and republican versions, where the former allows a much greater institutional recognition of difference that the latter. The founding fathers of the United States recognized this tension and worked out mechanisms to accommodate it. The famous wall of separation between Church and State in the United States—that most religious of countries—is predicated precisely on the founders' recognition that it is better that peoples' politics be divided by their different material interests (which would then play out in the political sphere

of the legislature), than by their religious differences (which could have potentially ruinous effects on social and political life). If current practice in places like the Balkans, the Middle East, the Indian sub-continent, and parts of the Republican Party in the United States are any guide, people like James Madison were stupendously correct in their assessment. That these accommodations may end up simply exacerbating individual differences, highlighting individual goods (as opposed to shared, public goods), and voiding the polity of a shared sense of belonging is a subject discussed in the paper of Berner and Hunter on civic education in the United States.

We should recall, that while the United States may well be (as Lipset 1964 claimed) the "first new nation," it is also a nation where certain sectarian Protestant assumptions on self and society were allowed to develop relatively free of the effects of the Counter-Reformation, and in general of the need to take into consideration the existence of the Catholic Church. The grand debate (often violent, to be sure) over the terms of Christian tradition that defined the Protestant Reformation and the Counter-Reformation in Continental Europe—and that eventuated in the development of secular polities and societies there—was, to a great extent, simply ignored in the New World and played but a minor role in the later history of the United States. There was no ultramontane party in 19th-century American politics, nor was there a State Church as in Sweden, nor was there a religious requirement for full citizenship rights over the course of the 19th century.

All of which does not mean that the United States was, or is, secular. Or rather it means that it was secular in the classical, circumscribed, and medieval usage of the term—referring to that area of public life that is outside sacerdotal regulation and ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Secularism then, in the United States, must be understood as a constitutional principle, rather than a moral position (as made more than clear in the chapter by Berner and Hunter included here), a principle embodied in that very separation of realms for which it is famous. This distinction, between secularism as moral position and as constitutional principle, is crucial to keep in mind when we come to understand the role of religion in public life, within the different social contexts dealt with by the papers here, especially given the different trajectories of nation formation that we find in Bulgaria, Israel, Cyprus, Malaysia, and Turkey, respectively.

Thus, in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church plays an almost mythic role in the narrative of nation building and freedom from the "Turkish yoke." It is seen by many as being constitutive of national identity, but is also viewed with suspicion, both for its ties with the regime during

the Communist era and also because Bulgaria is a very secular society; on the day-to-day level of lived life, there has always been a high degree of religious syncretism as well as intermarriage between different religious communities. Indeed, what can be seen from Schnitter and Kalkandjieva's paper is how the vicissitudes of nation formation were mirrored both in changing attitudes toward minorities as well as in changing state policy regarding religious education. The religious/secular dichotomy in fact comes to seem almost irrelevant, as religion is so clearly bound up with the sense of national belonging and identity (and hence too, the pervasive problems of minority religious groups therein). In Israel, too, religion and national identity are enmeshed in ways that totally defy the general categories we use for conceptualizing these issues. To be Jewish is, after all, both to be part of a people as well as part of a religious community stretching back for millennia. Eastern Orthodoxy (represented in our volume by the Bulgarian and Greek-Cypriot cases) and Judaism have therefore much in common in this sense, as does Islam. In all, the rather "taken-for-granted" assumptions that we have inherited from Western Christendom do not hold. Ethnic and national identities are tied up with religious histories, texts, traditions, and practices in a manner that makes any discussion of secularism as more than a constitutional principle exceedingly problematic. This is true (maybe even especially true) for a country like Turkey where even a formally secular public realm is highly mediated by the critical roles played by religious commitments and desiderata in defining national identity.

Consequently, what we see from all the papers in this volume is that the problems of dealing with constitutive difference in the public sphere are shared across the board. Moreover, the commonly proposed "liberal" solution to such differences would not seem relevant in most cases. Within the public sphere, according to the liberal reading, boundaries of difference are parsed into razor-thin edges and individuals interact not as members of groups, but as bearers of rights (citizen rights, social rights, human rights, and so on). Group identities have been, in the public sphere, replaced by individual identities, and the problem of tolerance of difference has been replaced by the legal recognition and entitlements of rights. Differences have become functional, rather than constitutive.

We know however that this has not been the case in all modern polities, and one may think of many of the cases presented here—Israel, Cyprus, Malaysia, Bulgaria, and Turkey—as having very different attitudes toward collective belonging. Indeed, as we see from Fischer's paper, in Israel there