

The
MORAL
COMPLEXITIES
OF EATING
meat



edited by

BEN BRAMBLE | BOB FISCHER

THE MORAL COMPLEXITIES OF EATING MEAT

THE MORAL COMPLEXITIES OF EATING MEAT

Edited by Ben Bramble *and* Bob Fischer

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America

© Oxford University Press 2016

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
The moral complexities of eating meat / edited by Ben Bramble and Bob Fischer.
p. cm.

Includes index.

ISBN 978-0-19-935390-3 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Meat—Moral and ethical aspects.

2. Meat industry and trade—Moral and ethical aspects. I. Bramble, Ben, editor.

TX373.M67 2015

338.1'76—dc23

2015004578

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper

CONTENTS

<i>Contributors</i>	vii
Ben Bramble and Bob Fischer, Introduction	1
PART I: <i>Defending Meat</i>	
1. Christopher Belshaw, Meat	9
2. Donald W. Bruckner, Strict Vegetarianism Is Immoral	30
3. J. Baird Callicott, The Environmental Omnivore's Dilemma	48
PART II: <i>Challenging Meat</i>	
4. Julia Driver, Individual Consumption and Moral Complicity	67
5. Mark Bryant Budolfson, Is It Wrong to Eat Meat from Factory Farms? If So, Why?	80
6. Clayton Littlejohn, Potency and Permissibility	99
7. Tristram McPherson, A Moorean Defense of the Omnivore	118
8. Ben Bramble, The Case Against Meat	135
PART III: <i>Future Directions</i>	
9. Lori Gruen and Robert Jones, Veganism as an Aspiration	153
10. Neil Levy, Vegetarianism: Toward Ideological Impurity	172

11. Bob Fischer, Against Blaming the Blameworthy	185
12. Alexandra Plakias, Beetles, Bicycles, and Breath Mints: How “Omni” Should Omnivores Be?	199
<i>Index</i>	215

CONTRIBUTORS

Chris Belshaw teaches philosophy at the Open University and also at the University of York. Most of his work is at the theoretical end of applied ethics, concerning the value and meaning of life, the badness of death, and questions about the self, the environment, and the future. He lives mostly in England's Lake District, alongside sheep, cows, deer, rabbits, pigeons, buzzards, and so on.

Ben Bramble received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Sydney in 2014. He is a Postdoctoral Fellow in Practical Philosophy at Lund University. His main research interests are moral and political philosophy.

Donald Bruckner is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Penn State University, New Kensington. His research pursuits are mainly in human well-being and practical reason; he is also interested in animals, food, and the environment. His work appears in such journals as *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Utilitas*, and *Journal of Social Philosophy*. He collects road-killed deer for personal consumption near his small farm in rural Pennsylvania.

Mark Budolfson often works on interdisciplinary issues at the interface of ethics and public policy, especially in connection with dilemmas that arise in connection with common resources and public goods.

J. Baird Callicott is University Distinguished Research Professor and Regents Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Texas. He is the co-Editor-in-Chief of the *Encyclopedia of Environmental Ethics and Philosophy* and author or editor of a score of books and author of dozens of journal articles, encyclopedia articles, and book chapters in environmental philosophy and ethics. Callicott has served the International Society for Environmental Ethics as President and Yale University as Bioethicist-in-Residence. His research goes forward simultaneously on four main fronts: theoretical environmental ethics, comparative environmental ethics and philosophy, the philosophy of ecology and conservation biology, and

climate ethics. He taught the world's first course in environmental ethics in 1971 at the University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point. He is currently Visiting Senior Research Scientist in the National Socio-environmental Synthesis Center, funded by NSF.

Julia Driver is Professor of Philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis. She specializes in normative ethical theory, moral psychology, and Humean accounts of moral agency. She is the author of *Uneasy Virtue* (Cambridge, 2001); *Ethics: The Fundamentals* (Blackwell, 2006); and *Consequentialism* (Routledge, 2012). She has published articles in *Journal of Philosophy*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *Philosophy*, *Ethics*, *Noûs*, *Philosophy & Phenomenological Research*, among other journals. She has received a Laurance S. Rockefeller Fellowship from Princeton University, a Young Scholar's Award from Cornell University's Program on Ethics and Public Life, an NEH Fellowship, and an HLA Hart Fellowship from Oxford University.

Bob Fischer is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Texas State University. He works on issues in applied ethics, moral psychology, and modal epistemology.

Lori Gruen is currently Professor of Philosophy as well as of Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies and of Environmental Studies at Wesleyan University, where she also coordinates Wesleyan Animal Studies and chairs the faculty committee for the Center for Prison Education. She is a Fellow of the prestigious Hastings Center for Bioethics. Professor Gruen has published extensively on topics in animal ethics, ecofeminism, and practical ethics more broadly. She is the author of three books on animal ethics, including *Ethics and Animals: An Introduction* (Cambridge, 2011) and *Entangled Empathy: An Alternative Ethic for Our Relationships with Animals* (Lantern, 2015). She is the editor of five books, including *Ecofeminism: Feminist Intersections with Other Animals and the Earth* with Carol J. Adams (Bloomsbury, July 2014) and the *Ethics of Captivity* (Oxford, May 2014) and the author of dozens of articles and book chapters.

Robert C. Jones is currently Assistant Professor of Philosophy at California State University, Chico. He is also a member of the Advisory Council of the National Museum of Animals and Society and a speaker with the Northern California Animal Advocacy Coalition. Professor Jones has published numerous articles and book chapters on animal ethics, animal cognition, and research ethics, and has given nearly forty talks on animal ethics at universities and conferences across the globe. He was a post-doctoral fellow at Stanford University, a visiting researcher for the Ethics

in Society Project at Wesleyan University in Connecticut, and a Summer Fellow with the Animals & Society Institute. He lives in Chico, California, a small ag community in Northern California, where he spends time arguing animal rights with local cattle ranchers.

Neil Levy is Professor of Philosophy at Macquarie University, Sydney, and Research Fellow at the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford.

Clayton Littlejohn is a Lecturer in Philosophy at King's College London. He works on issues at the interface of ethics and epistemology and is currently finishing a book on metaepistemology.

Tristram McPherson works in ethics and its semantic, metaphysical, and methodological foundations. He has work published or forthcoming in venues including *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*, *Journal of Moral Philosophy*, *Mind*, *Noûs*, *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosopher's Imprint*, *Philosophical Books*, and *Philosophical Studies*. He teaches at Virginia Tech. Before coming to Virginia Tech, he received a BA from Simon Fraser University and a PhD from Princeton University and taught at the University of Minnesota Duluth.

Alexandra Plakias received her PhD from the University of Michigan and is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Hamilton College.

INTRODUCTION

Ben Bramble
Bob Fischer

Peter Singer published *Animal Liberation* in 1975; since then, the ethics of eating meat has been a prominent topic in moral philosophy. It's uncontroversial that the animals we eat are sentient beings; there is "something that it is like" to be them; they can sense the world around them; they can feel pleasures and pains. What's more, they can want things in their environments, form memories, solve problems (sometimes quite sophisticated ones), experience various emotions, and empathize with others of their kind. Nevertheless, each year we bring billions of these sensing, feeling, thinking beings into the world so that we can use their bodies for our own purposes: we cook and eat them; we wear them; we perform tests on them; we make countless products from what's left over. And most of the time, the inner lives of these beings don't register on our collective radar. They are out of sight and out of mind, the nameless backstories to the goods we enjoy. Of course, we don't want these animals to suffer unnecessarily. But judging by standard US farming practices, this desire doesn't run very deep.

The above isn't exactly an argument against industrial animal agriculture—or animal agriculture of any other kind. We've just made some observations. When we lay out the details, will they establish that these practices are morally wrong? And depending on our answer, how should we respond?

The aim of this collection is to explore these two questions. To that end, we've gathered twelve new essays. Some are by ethicists who are theoretically oriented, while others are by those who focus on applied questions; some of them are by philosophers who have written a great deal about these topics, while others bring fresh perspectives to the debates. Our hope is that these essays will advance a pressing moral conversation.

To be clear, none of our contributors defend the status quo in US agriculture. Rather, they take up three issues. First, some wonder how much the arguments against meat-eating establish. Let's grant that, when we consider the meat actually available to us, we should abstain. But perhaps there isn't anything *intrinsically* wrong with eating meat; perhaps the problem isn't with using animals, but with the way we treat them. So we might investigate whether any form of sustained animal agriculture is morally permissible, or whether there are non-agricultural means by which we could eat meat morally. Second, though we might be convinced that the arguments against meat consumption are on the right track, we might doubt that they're correct in their details. Consider, for example, the thin connection between the actions of an individual consumer and the suffering of any particular animal. How does our apparent causal impotence affect our moral culpability? And third, even if we grant that the arguments succeed, we might raise concerns about how we should navigate a carninormative world. How should we understand our identity as abstainers? And how should we relate to those who don't share our values?

Correspondingly, the book has three parts. The first part features essays by philosophers who are running against the grain. These philosophers argue that meat-eating is sometimes morally permissible, and perhaps even in certain cases morally required.

The second part features essays that attempt to improve or build upon existing arguments for vegetarianism, or respond to some of the major arguments against vegetarianism.

The final part of the book features essays that consider the significance of the debate over eating meat. Suppose, for example, that the arguments succeed. What would this mean for the sort of people we ought to become? Alternately, suppose the debate is intractable. Might it be valuable anyway? If so, how?

In the rest of this introduction, we provide a brief overview of the contributions. Part I begins with Christopher Belshaw's "Meat." Belshaw doesn't claim that we benefit animals by bringing them into existence, or that this may form the basis of a duty to create them. But he does argue that it is

permissible to bring certain kinds of animals into existence and then permissible again to kill them. It is permissible to kill them because, while such animals can lead good lives, they cannot want to live these lives. Once these animals are dead, Belshaw claims, it is permissible to eat them.

In “Strict Vegetarianism Is Immoral,” Donald Bruckner tries to turn a standard argument for vegetarianism on its head. Suppose it’s wrong (knowingly) to cause, or support practices that cause, extensive, unnecessary harm to animals. You might think that, given as much, it’s always wrong to eat meat. But as Bruckner points out, some plant consumption causes extensive harm to animals, and it’s unnecessary insofar as we have other dietary options. And some of us *do* have other options: we could eat roadkill. So, he argues, we ought to eat it.

J. Baird Callicott’s “The Environmental Omnivore’s Dilemma” offers an alternative to the standard consequentialist and deontological approaches to animal ethics. Callicott advocates a kind of moral pluralism, with overlapping spheres of moral concern, each of which is organized by different principles and obligations. So in addition to our local, parochial concerns, we are also members of a national community, as well as a larger human community, and ultimately the biotic community as a whole. On his view, we don’t owe exclusive allegiance to any one of these communities, and we have to weigh their demands against one another. Thus, there may well be circumstances in which local relationships make meat-eating permissible (if not required), even though industrial agriculture is problematic.

In Part II, we turn to essays that attempt to improve or build upon existing arguments for vegetarianism, or respond to some of the major arguments against vegetarianism. We begin with three articles focused on the so-called “inefficacy” objection, the worry that we aren’t obliged to become vegetarians since “an individual’s decision to consume animal products cannot really be expected to have any effect on the number of animals that suffer or the extent of that suffering, given the actual nature of the supply chain that stands in between individual consumption decisions and production decisions” (as one of our authors, Mark Budolfson, nicely puts it).

In “Individual Consumption and Moral Complicity,” Julia Driver argues that even though there are circumstances in which one person deciding to eat meat on a given occasion makes no difference to production policies, such an individual can nonetheless participate and so be wrongfully complicit in the harms of meat production by choosing to eat it. One can be blameworthy with respect to a bad outcome even if one did not cause it. Moreover, this position, Driver argues, is perfectly consistent with consequentialism.

Mark Budolfson begins his chapter “Is it Wrong to Eat Meat from Factory Farms? If So, Why?” by painstakingly laying out the evidence for the empirical claim at the heart of the inefficacy objection. He then considers an attempt to respond to the inefficacy objection by appealing to the sort of considerations that explain why we have a reason to vote even though our vote is extraordinarily unlikely to make a difference to the electoral outcome. Finally, he proposes his own solution to the problem, which invokes the notion of *the degree of essentiality of harm to an act*.

In “Potency and Permissibility,” Clayton Littlejohn considers whether there’s anything that can be said in favor of being an “unreflective carnivore.” To that end, he runs a version of the argument from marginal cases, according to which animals deserve whatever moral consideration due to “marginal” humans—infants, the severely mentally disabled, those in comas, and so forth. Even if this argument works, though, it doesn’t show that we shouldn’t eat meat: to reach that conclusion, we need further premises. Littlejohn considers three ways that someone might try to prevent such an argument from getting off the ground. First, he examines the suggestion that while *some* animals meet the bar of moral considerability, the ones we eat don’t. Second, he considers the possibility that there may be circumstances in which an individual’s action makes no difference to whether an animal dies—for example, in a restaurant in which lobster is served, and any lobster that isn’t killed today will just be killed tomorrow. Third, he discusses the same causal-supply-chain worries to which Driver and Budolfson attend, defending a version of the “trigger” solution that they set aside.

In “A Moorean Defense of the Omnivore,” Tristram McPherson shifts the conversation. When confronted with arguments against meat-eating, many people find the conclusion incredible: it seems *obvious* to them that meat-eating is morally permissible. McPherson considers one charitable interpretation of this response: namely, that you might think you have better evidence for omnivory’s permissibility than for all the premises in an argument against it, just as you might think you have better evidence for the claim, “I have hands,” than for all the premises in a skeptical argument. This intriguing move raises difficult questions about how we assess Moorean arguments. To this end, McPherson proposes five criteria that, jointly, we can use to evaluate their strength. As McPherson shows, the Moorean case against the skeptic does fairly well on these criteria. He argues, however, that the case for omnivory fares rather poorly.

Ben Bramble’s “The Case against Meat” rounds out this section. In his chapter, Bramble attempts to shore up an intuitive argument against the

human practice of raising and killing animals for food (i.e., the argument according to which this practice is extremely harmful to animals, but only trivially good for us). He does so by providing new responses to the four main objections to it: (1) that this practice is *not* extremely harmful to animals, (2) that this practice is far *more* than trivially good for us, (3) that animal welfare is less *important* than human welfare, and (4) the inefficacy objection. He discusses the non-identity problem and the pleasures of meat. Central to his responses to (2) and (4) is the idea that our involvement in meat-eating takes a large psychological toll on us.

“Veganism as an Aspiration” opens Part III. Lori Gruen and Robert Jones note that it is problematic to identify as a vegan, since that self-understanding is often taken to imply that you have clean hands, that your actions don’t contribute to animal suffering or exploitation. As they argue, this is mistaken: so many of our actions harm animals, and it is virtually impossible to opt out of them all. If we understand veganism as a kind of moral success, we are setting ourselves up for failure. None of this shows, however, that we can’t pursue vegan ideals. They thus propose that we should understand veganism as a kind of aspiration; and so construed, they think that it can make a difference for the animals it’s designed to serve. In particular, they argue that this type of veganism can serve as a form of resistance to violence, an example to others, and the foundation for political change.

Neil Levy contributes “Vegetarianism: Toward Ideological Impurity.” In it, he takes a page from Jonathan Haidt’s work on how rules become sacred. According to Haidt, when a society marshals disgust to enforce a rule, people tend to lose sight of what makes the rule valuable to the society in the first place. Moreover, when people are disgusted by violations, you become defiled if you are the violator. This threatens your standing in the community. Levy maintains, however, that this is unproductive for vegetarians who are concerned about animal welfare. On the one hand, it can turn an isolated lapse into a reason to abandon your commitment entirely. On the other—and more importantly—it can make you less able to support others in their faltering attempts to lower their meat-consumption. On Levy’s view, then, we should avoid sacralizing our rules. They ought to be strict, so as to more effectively guide action; at the same time, though, they should be held in such a way that we forgive lapses, thereby making us more effective advocates for animals.

In “Against Blaming the Blameworthy,” Bob Fischer assumes that it’s wrong to eat meat, and also that most people are blameworthy for doing so. However, he’s not convinced that we should blame them: on his view, you

shouldn't blame someone for his behavior if it would be unreasonable to demand that he behave otherwise; and in our current context, Fischer argues, it would be unreasonable to demand of most people that they abstain from consuming meat. Fischer's argument is based on the idea that the arguments against meat-eating generalize—that is, if they work, then they show that we ought to live much differently than we do. But since it would be unreasonable to demand that people live up to all these obligations, and arbitrary to insist on any one change without explanation, it's unreasonable to demand that people abstain from eating meat.

We close the book with Alexandra Plakias's "Beetles, Bicycles, and Breath Mints: How 'Omni' Should Omnivores Be?" This chapter is a reflection on the moral significance of the debate about meat-eating, which Plakias takes to be an intractable one. Nevertheless, she argues, it's a valuable debate in which to engage: in so doing, we are also working through questions about the nature of food. As she points out, we can think of different camps in the animal ethics literature as endorsing different theories about what food is: some characterize it in terms of the kind of thing it is (animals aren't food because they're sentient beings), and others characterize it in terms of the process by which it's produced (animals aren't food because they're abused before bringing them to the table). Her hope is that food ethicists can draw on these debates to help us better navigate a world with an ever-increasing number of "food products"—with an emphasis on the second term.

We—the editors of this volume—are vegetarians. This book began with conversations about what could be said against our shared commitment not to eat meat. Those discussions have evolved into the project before you—a mixture of provocation, precisification, and reimagining—all based on the conviction that it matters how we relate to animals. We've gathered these essays together in hopes that they will advance the discussion about what we ought to eat. If they manage to further those exchanges, prompting new conversations and refining existing ones, then they will have served their purpose.



DEFENDING MEAT

1 MEAT

Christopher Belshaw

Introduction

Are we permitted to bring things into existence in order to kill and eat them? Certainly we are. Otherwise we wouldn't, with a clear conscience, eat potatoes. Are we permitted to do the same with animals—start their lives, kill them, and eat them? This is less straightforward. And the major reservations relate not to meat eating¹ as such but to its usual consequence that animals providing the meat thereby live bad lives, or at least worse lives than they would otherwise live. And these lives are bad, or worse, in at least one of two respects. Either they contain more pain than otherwise, or they involve the animal in a premature death. It is allegedly bad for animals to suffer this pain and allegedly bad too for them to die.

1. I mean by meat the fleshy parts of animals, including so-called red and white meat, birds and poultry, fish, shellfish, and so forth. I am not here counting the fleshy parts of nuts, fruit, and vegetables as meat, and am not counting those who use animal bones for gelatine as meat eaters, even though they are in fact not vegetarians. I make this point because it is not uncommon to find that fish eaters are classed among vegetarians. And after making what appears to be, and is said to be, an argument for vegetarianism, David DeGrazia (2009) p. 164 insists that he has “no position” on eating fish and invertebrate seafood. To my mind this is tantamount to having no position on vegetarianism.

I'll say more about death than pain. I'll argue, although not at length, that killing animals is in some circumstances permitted, and in some circumstances required. These claims are, I hope, more or less uncontroversial—controversy starts in detailing the circumstances. And I'll argue—more controversially and at greater length—that killing animals is very often permitted and, further, at least suggest it is very often required. Having killed them, we may as well eat them. So then meat eating is permitted.² Is it also required? I won't claim this. What I will claim, however, is that it is perhaps required that there be in place procedures and practices that have the production and consumption of meat as one of their primary aims. Or at least, that there are good reasons for sustaining such practices. My concerns here are with morality rather than expedience. And the predominant, but not the only, concern is not with what is good or bad for us, or for the universe, but what is good or bad for animals, and particularly for those we eat.

Meat, Pain, and Death

Someone says, I do nothing wrong in eating meat. The animal is dead, was dead when I cooked it, even when I bought it. It's past caring. This is, of course, mere sophistry. Eating, and wanting to eat, meat has many consequences and plays a pretty direct causal role in several of the practices determining the contours of animal lives. How do our proclivities and their fortunes interact? Consider the various ways we might come by meat:

Synthesizing

Perhaps it is, or soon will be, possible to fabricate meat in a laboratory. Producing and eating this meat will have no direct consequences for any animal. There will be indirect consequences, however. Insofar as such a practice takes off there may well be fewer animals living bad lives, and fewer living any kind of life at all.³

2. Or some meat eating is permitted. Even if killing human animals becomes in some circumstances acceptable, eating them is likely still to be proscribed. And this could be the case for some non-human animals also.

3. But won't this synthetic meat encourage a taste for the real thing? Some version of this slippery-slope counter-argument can be made to all the methods of meat production sketched here. Such arguments are, I think, overrated. I know, for example, many fish eaters who are no more tempted to eat poultry or red meat than vegetarians.

Sampling

Suppose it is possible to cut and eat meat from a living animal, which then recovers. Suppose that even when repeated, this practice doesn't hasten death. Still, insofar as it causes the animal some pain (as is likely), such a practice is morally dubious, to say the least.

Scavenging

We might eat animals whose pains and deaths are independent of meat consumption and are caused by traffic, other animals, weather, bad luck. Some think that eating such victims of circumstance is altogether morally innocuous. But there are consequences for other animals. Some are thereby deprived of food. Others may lose the opportunity to grieve or to mourn.

Hunting

Perhaps there are some instances of a clean kill, but typically hunting animals for meat—and I include shooting and fishing here—causes pain as well as death. It brings about, of course, a premature death—the animal dies earlier than otherwise it would. Does it bring about also an increase in pain, causing the animal to suffer more than otherwise it would? Very probably not. Overall lifetime suffering is very likely decreased. Of course, lifetime pleasure will be decreased also. So, in assessing the death, it may be of both interest and importance to know what life had in store.

Traditional Farming

I mean this to cover what is elsewhere referred to as family farming, non-intensive farming, hobby farming, organic farming, and the like.⁴ Meat animals here undergo premature deaths, some pain, and some restrictions on freedom.

Factory Farming

Animals in factory farms suffer a premature death, considerable pain throughout their lives, and considerable, and discomfiting, restrictions on their

4. See DeGrazia (2009) for more on these distinctions, and for an argument that animals from such farms should not be eaten. It should be noted in particular that the production of organic meat reveals a concern for human health, but none especially for animal health.

freedom. I shall say almost nothing more about this. There is little point either in defending the indefensible or in attacking a practice that almost every reader here will already condemn.

Recall the opening. Why is it uncontroversial to claim that we can raise, kill, and eat vegetables? It is because nothing we can do to them, absenting side effects, is of moral concern. Shall we say that what we can do is in no way bad for them? Hardly. Killing, mutilating, confining, force-feeding, and starving plants might, in recognizable ways, be bad for them.⁵ All might interfere with and impede their flourishing. But though it is bad for them, it isn't bad in a way that matters. There is no reason for us to be concerned, just for their sakes, about their well-being. Plants, we might agree, lack moral status.⁶ Similarly, killing, mutilating, confining, and causing pain to animals is bad for them. Does this matter? Surely pain matters. And surely they do have moral status.⁷ There are always reasons, even if defeasible, for not causing animals pain. But it is more complicated with death. This is why the focus lies here.

As we can do things that are bad for plants, so too can we do things that are good for them. They can be harmed, and they can be benefited. And, following from this, I suggest we can talk of plants living bad or good lives. Yet, as they lack moral status, it isn't bad or good in the way that matters that they live these lives. There aren't reasons, for the sake of the plant, to end their lives when their lives are bad, nor to sustain them, when their lives are good. Animals can similarly live bad or good lives. In ways that matter? Often, as I'll explain, there will be reasons to end their lives, when they are bad. But things are less clear, I'll suggest, concerning their good lives.

The Badness of Death

Farming and hunting both curtail animal lives. Is it bad, and in a way that matters, for these animals to suffer a premature death?

5. I claim further that in so acting we harm plants and act contrary to their interests. Against at least some strong implications in Singer (1993) I hold that non-sentient beings can have interests. See for discussion, Belshaw (2001) pp. 126–128.

6. Of course, some will disagree. See, for example, Stone (1972).

7. Or at least, animals that can feel pain have moral status. I believe all mammals and many non-mammals to be included here, but doubt whether most animals, in terms both of numbers and kinds, are, to use Richard Ryder's term, painient.