EDITED BY
LEONIE HUDDY
DAVID O. SEARS
JACK S. LEVY

The Oxford Handbook *of* POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

SECOND EDITION

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

This page intentionally left blank

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

SECOND EDITION

Edited by

LEONIE HUDDY, DAVID O. SEARS

and

JACK S. LEVY

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide.

Oxford New York
Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi
New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto

With offices in
Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece
Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore
South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam

Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press
in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by
Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016

© Oxford University Press 2013

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior
permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law,
by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization.
Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights
Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
The Oxford handbook of political psychology/[edited by] Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears,
and Jack S. Levy. — Second edition.
pages; cm
ISBN 978–0–19–976010–7 (pbk.: alk. paper) 1. Political psychology. I. Huddy, Leonie.
JA74.5.O94 2013
320.01'9—dc23
2013003195

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper

Contents

About the Contributors ix

1. Introduction: Theoretical Foundations of Political Psychology 1
   Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy

PART I THEORETICAL APPROACHES

2. Personality Approaches to Political Behavior 23
   Gian Vittorio Caprara and Michele Vecchione
3. Childhood and Adult Political Development 59
   David O. Sears and Christia Brown
4. Degrees of Rationality in Politics 96
   Dennis Chong
5. Behavioral Decision-Making 130
   David P. Redlawsk and Richard R. Lau
6. Emotion and Political Psychology 165
   Ted Brader and George E. Marcus
7. Toward an Evolutionarily Informed Political Psychology 205
   Jim Sidanius and Robert Kurzban
8. Genetic Foundations of Political Behavior 237
   Carolyn L. Funk
9. Political Rhetoric 262
   Susan Condor, Cristian Tileagă, and Michael Billig

PART II INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

10. Psychology and Foreign Policy Decision-Making 301
    Jack S. Levy

11. Perceptions and Image Theory in International Relations 334
Richard K. Herrmann

12. Threat Perception in International Relations 364
Janice Gross Stein

13. Crisis Management 395
Stephen Benedict Dyson and Paul 't Hart

14. Personality Profiles of Political Elites 423
David G. Winter

15. Psychobiography: "The Child is Father of the Man" 459
Jerrold M. Post

16. Conflict Analysis and Resolution 489
Ronald J. Fisher, Herbert C. Kelman, and Susan Allen Nan

PART III MASS POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

17. Political Information Processing 525
Charles S. Taber and Everett Young

18. Political Communication: Form and Consequence of the Information Environment 559
Nicholas A. Valentino and Yioryos Nardis

19. Political Ideology 591
Stanley Feldman

20. Social Justice 627
Tom R. Tyler and Jojanneke van der Toorn

21. Networks, Interdependence, and Social Influence in Politics 662
Robert Huckfeldt, Jeffery J. Mondak, Matthew Hayes, Matthew T. Pietryka, and Jack Reilly

22. Political Deliberation 699
C. Daniel Myers and Tali Mendelberg

PART IV INTERGROUP RELATIONS

23. From Group Identity to Political Cohesion and Commitment 737
Leonie Huddy

24. Social Movements and the Dynamics of Collective Action 774
Bert Klandermans and Jacquelien van Stekelenburg

25. Prejudice and Politics 812
Donald R. Kinder

26. Migration and Multiculturalism 852
Eva G. T. Green and Christian Staerklé

27. Discrimination: Conditions, Consequences, and "Cures" 890
Ananthi Al Ramiah and Miles Hewstone

28. The Psychology of Intractable Conflicts: Eruption, Escalation, and Peacemaking 923
Daniel Bar-Tal and Eran Halperin

Index 957

This page intentionally left blank

About the Contributors

Ananthi Al Ramiah is Assistant Professor of Social Science (Psychology) at Yale-NUS College, Singapore. She works in the area of intergroup social psychology and has written articles on the role of intergroup contact and social identity in reducing prejudice, the antecedents of intergroup contact, and the impact of diversity on intergroup relations.

Daniel Bar-Tal is Branco Weiss Professor of Research in Child Development and Education at the School of Education, Tel Aviv University, Israel. He has published 20 books and over 200 articles and chapters in major social and political psychological journals, books, and encyclopedias. He served as President of the International Society of Political Psychology and received various awards for his work, including the Lasswell Award of the International Society of Political Psychology for "distinguished scientific contribution in the field of political psychology."

Michael Billig is Professor of Social Sciences at Loughborough University, UK. He has written books on a number of different subjects, including nationalism, psychoanalytic theory, rhetoric, ideology, and attitudes towards the British royal family. His latest book is *Learn to Write Badly: How to Succeed in the Social Sciences*" (published by Cambridge University Press, 2013).

Ted Brader is Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, USA, and Research Professor in the Center for Political Studies at the Institute for Social Research. He is the author of *Campaigning for Hearts and Minds* and currently serves as Associate Principal Investigator for the American National Election Studies and Associate Principal Investigator for Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences. His research focuses on the role of emotions in politics, political partisanship, media effects on public opinion, and other topics in political psychology. He serves on the Governing Council of the International Society of Political Psychology and has served on the editorial board for the journal *Political Psychology.*

Christia Brown is an Associate Professor of Psychology and Director of Children at Risk Research Cluster at University of Kentucky, USA. She has written numerous articles on children's gender and ethnic stereotypes, understanding of politics, and perceptions of discrimination. She had been awarded a major grant from the Foundation for Child Development for her research with Mexican immigrants in elementary schools.

Gian Vittorio Caprara is Professor of Psychology at the "Sapienza" University of Rome, Italy. His primary research interests focus on personality development

and assessment, psychosocial adjustment, and personality and politics. He was President of the European Association of Personality Psychology from 1990 to 1992 and is a member of the Governing Council of the International Society of Political Psychology.

Dennis Chong is Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Southern California, USA. He studies American national politics and has published extensively on issues of decision-making, political psychology, social norms, rationality, tolerance, and collective action. He is the author of *Rational Lives: Norms and Values in Politics and Society*, a study of value formation and change, group identification, and conflict over social norms and values. He also wrote *Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement*, a theoretical study of the dynamics of collective action as well as a substantial study of the American civil rights movement and the local and national politics that surrounded it. This book won the William H. Riker Prize, given by the Political Economy Section of the American Political Science Association. Professor Chong's current research on the influence of information and framing in competitive electoral contexts has received several national awards, including the APSA's Franklin L. Burdette / Pi Sigma Alpha Prize. An active member of the profession, Professor Chong has been elected to the Executive Council of the American Political Science Association, and he is coeditor of the book series Cambridge Studies in Public Opinion and Political Psychology, published by Cambridge University Press.

Susan Condor is Professor of Social Psychology in the School of Social Political and Geographical Sciences, at Loughborough University, UK. She has written numerous articles on vernacular political understanding. Her empirical work combines survey methodology with close textual analysis of the content and structure of political reasoning in formal political debate and unstructured everyday talk. She has held major research grants to study national framing in the British press, and identities, policy attitudes, and constructions of citizenship in the context of regional, English, UK, and European Union governance.

Stephen Benedict Dyson is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut, USA. He is the author of *The Blair Identity: Leadership and Foreign Policy* and numerous articles on political leaders, political psychology, and foreign policy. He serves on the editorial board of the journal *Foreign Policy Analysis*.

Stanley Feldman is Professor of Political Science at Stony Brook University, USA. He is the President of the International Society of Political Psychology from 2013 to 2014. He has published numerous papers on the structure and determinants of public opinion and ideology, values and politics, and the political effects of emotions.

Ronald J. Fisher is Professor of International Peace and Conflict Resolution in the School of International Service at American University, Washington, DC, USA. His primary interest is interactive conflict resolution, which involves informal third-party interventions in protracted and violent ethnopolitical conflict. His publications include

a number of books at the interface of social psychology and conflict resolution as well as numerous articles in interdisciplinary journals including *Political Psychology*.

Carolyn L. Funk was an associate professor in the L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs at Virginia Commonwealth University, USA. She has written numerous articles using twin studies to examine the genetic and environmental influences on political behavior.

Eva G. T. Green is Senior Lecturer in Social Psychology at the University of Lausanne in Switzerland. Winner of several grants from the Swiss National Science Foundation, she has extensively published on prejudice and immigration attitudes, national identity, and social representations.

Eran Halperin is Senior Lecturer at the new school of psychology at the IDC, Herzliya, Israel. He got his PhD from the University of Haifa in 2007 (summa cum laude) and completed postdoctoral training (through a Fulbright Scholarship) at the Department of Psychology, Stanford University, in 2008. His work integrates psychological and political theories and methods in order to explain different aspects of intergroup (mostly intractable) conflicts. Dr. Halperin's main line of research focuses on the role of emotions and emotion regulation in determining public opinion about peace and equality, on the one hand, and war and discrimination, on the other. In addition, he is interested in the psychological roots of some of the most destructive political ramifications of intergroup conflicts (e.g., intolerance, exclusion, and intergroup violence). The unique case of Israeli society in general, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular, motivates his work and inspires his thinking. Hence, most of his studies are conducted within the context of this "natural laboratory."

Paul 't Hart is a Professor of Public Administration at the Utrecht School of Governance and Associate Dean at the Netherlands School of Government in The Hague, the Netherlands. His research interests include political and public sector leadership; elite behavior and group dynamics in government; policy evaluation and policy change; and the political psychology of crisis management. His recent books include *Dispersed Democratic Leadership*, *Framing the Global Meltdown*, *The Real World of EU Accountability*, *How Power Changes Hands*, *Prime-Ministerial Performance*, and the *Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership*. He is a coeditor of *Political Psychology* and recipient of the Erik Erikson Prize of the International Society for Political Psychology.

Matthew Hayes is an assistant professor at Indiana University, Bloomington, USA. Professor Hayes's research and teaching interests primarily focus on political behavior and racial and ethnic politics, with a particular interest in issues of representation and how institutions can shape individual political behavior. His current research investigates how citizens evaluate representation and whether substantive and descriptive representation can maximize satisfaction both for minorities and for whites. In addition to his primary research in race and representation, Professor Hayes has also conducted collaborative research with Professors Jeff Mondak and Damarys Canache examining

the role of personality in shaping political attitudes and behaviors using survey data from across Latin and North America. Professor Hayes received his AB from the University of Chicago in 2006 and his PhD from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in 2013.

Richard K. Herrmann is Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the Ohio State University, USA. He has published numerous pieces on the role perceptions play in international relations and for five years coedited the *International Studies Quarterly*. He has served on the policy planning staff at the US Department of State and from 2002 to 2011 was Director of the Mershon Center for International Security Studies.

Miles Hewstone is Professor of Social Psychology at the University of Oxford and Fellow of New College, UK. He has published widely in the field of social psychology, focusing on prejudice and stereotyping, intergroup contact, the reduction of intergroup conflict, sectarianism in Northern Ireland, and segregation and integration. He is a co-founding editor of the *European Review of Social Psychology*. He has presented his work to various public policy bodies and reviews and was recipient of the 2012 Kurt Lewin Award from the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues.

Robert Huckfeldt is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Davis, USA. He has written several books and a series of articles on the roles of social contexts and social networks for diffusion, persuasion, and conflict in politics.

Leonie Huddy is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Survey Research at Stony Brook University, USA. She has written numerous articles and book chapters on political psychology, with a focus on the politics of intergroup relations. Huddy's research has been funded by the National Science Foundation. She is past editor of the journal *Political Psychology*, past president of the International Society for Political Psychology, and serves on the American National Election Studies (ANES) Board of Overseers and numerous editorial boards in political science.

Herbert C. Kelman is the Richard Clarke Cabot Professor of Social Ethics, Emeritus, at Harvard University, USA. A pioneer in the development of interactive problem solving, he has been engaged for some 40 years in efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. His publications include *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis* (editor and coauthor, 1965) and *Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and Responsibility* (with V. Lee Hamilton, 1989). He is past president of the International Studies Association, the International Society of Political Psychology, and several other professional organizations.

Donald R. Kinder is the Philip E. Converse Collegiate Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, USA. A Fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford, the Guggenheim Foundation, and the American

Academy of Arts and Sciences, Kinder is the author of *News That Matters* (1987), *Divided by Color* (1996), *Us against Them* (2009), and *The End of Race?* (2012), among other works.

Bert Klandermans is Professor in Applied Social Psychology at the VU University, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. He has published extensively on the social psychology of political protest and social movement participation. His *Social Psychology of Protest* appeared with Blackwell in 1997. He is the editor and coauthor (with Suzanne Staggenborg) of *Methods of Social Movement Research* (University of Minnesota Press, 2002) and (with Nonna Mayer) of *Extreme Right Activists in Europe* (Routledge, 2006). With Conny Roggeband he edited the *Handbook of Social Movements across Disciplines* (Springer, 2007). He is the editor of Social Movements, Protest, and Contention, the prestigious book series of the University of Minnesota Press and of *Sociopedia.isa*, a new online database of review articles published by Sage in collaboration with the International Sociological Association. He is coeditor of Blackwell/Wiley's *Encyclopedia of Social Movements*.

Robert Kurzban is Associate Professor in the Department of Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania, USA, and currently occupies the Rasmuson Chair of Economics at the University of Alaska, Anchorage, USA. His research primarily focuses on human social behavior from an evolutionary perspective. He serves as co-editor-in-chief of *Evolution and Human Behavior*, the flagship journal of the Human Behavior and Evolution Society.

Richard R. Lau is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Experimental Study of Politics and Psychology at Rutgers University, USA. His research focuses on information processing, political advertising, and voter decision-making. His research has been supported by the National Science Foundation, the National Institute of Health, the Carnegie Corporation, and the Ford Foundation. His most recent book (with David Redlawsk), *How Voters Decide* (Cambridge University Press, 2006), won the 2007 Alexander George Award from the International Society of Political Psychology for the best book in political psychology published in the previous calendar year.

Jack S. Levy is Board of Governors' Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, USA. He is past president of the International Studies Association and of the Peace Science Society. Levy studies the causes of interstate war and foreign policy decision-making, including prospect theory, misperception and war, intelligence failure, learning from history, and time horizons. His most recent books include *Causes of War* (2010) and *The Arc of War: Origins, Escalation, and Transformation* (2011), each coauthored with William R. Thompson.

George E. Marcus is Professor of Political Science at Williams College, USA. He, with his colleagues, have written a number of books, among them, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy*, *With Malice toward Some: How People Make Civil Liberties Judgments*, and *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*. He is also the author of *The Sentimental Citizen* and *Political Psychology: Neuroscience, Genes, and Politics*. He

has published in many political science journals and has received grants from the National Science Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Sloan Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the Carnegie Corporation, and held a residency at the Rockefeller Foundation Center in Bellagio, Italy.

Tali Mendelberg is Professor of Politics at Princeton University, USA. She is the author of *The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality* (Princeton University Press, 2001), winner of the American Political Science Association's Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award for "the best book published in the United States during the prior year on government, politics or international affairs." She received the APSA Paul Lazarsfeld Award for the best paper in Political Communication, the APSA Best Paper Award in Political Psychology, the Carrie Chapman Catt Prize for Research on Women and Politics (honorable mention), and the Erik H. Erikson Early Career Award for Excellence and Creativity in the Field of Political Psychology. She has published articles in the *American Political Science Review*, *American Journal of Political Science*, *Journal of Politics*, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *Perspectives on Politics*, *Political Behavior*, *Political Psychology*, and *Political Communication*. Her work has been supported by grants and fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the University of Pennsylvania, Harvard University, and the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. She holds a PhD from the University of Michigan. Her areas of specialization are political communication; gender; race; public opinion; political psychology; and experimental methods.

Jeffery J. Mondak is the James M. Benson Chair in Public Issues and Civic Leadership in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois, USA. His research has appeared in numerous journals, including the *American Political Science Review*, the *American Journal of Political Science*, the *British Journal of Political Science*, and the *Journal of Politics*. His most recent book is *Personality and the Foundations of Political Behavior* (Cambridge University Press).

C. Daniel Myers is a Robert Wood Johnson Scholar of Health Policy at the University of Michigan, USA. In the fall of 2013, he will start as Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, USA. His research focuses on the political psychology of democratic deliberation and other forms of political communication. His dissertation, "Information use in Small Group Deliberation," won the American Political Science Association's Experimental Research Section 2011 Best Dissertation Award.

Susan Allen Nan is Associate Professor of Conflict Analysis and Resolution and Director of the Center for Peacemaking Practice at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University, USA. Her main focus is on reflective practice and research that emerges from practice contexts. She has substantial expertise in intermediary roles and coordination among intermediaries, evaluation of conflict resolution initiatives, and theories of change and indicators of change in conflict resolution practice. She has engaged long term in conflict resolution in the Caucasus, as well as contributing to a

variety of conflict resolution initiatives in the United States, eastern Europe, Eurasia, the Caribbean, South America, and Africa.

Yioryos Nardis is a PhD candidate in Communication Studies at the University of Michigan, USA. His research focuses on political communication from a comparative perspective. He is currently examining citizen apathy toward European Union integration and the role of the media in fostering engagement in EU politics.

Matthew T. Pietryka is a lecturer and postdoctoral fellow at the University of California, Davis, USA. He studies political communication and the role of social networks in political behavior.

Jerrold M. Post, M.D., is Professor of Psychiatry, Political Psychology, and International Affairs, and Director of the Political Psychology Program at George Washington University, USA. He was the founding director of the CIA's Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior, where he took the lead in preparing the Camp David profiles of Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat. Dr. Post is author and/or editor of 11 books, including *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders*, and *Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World*.

David P. Redlawsk is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Eagleton Center for Public Interest Polling at Rutgers University, USA. His most recent book with Caroline Tolbert and Todd Donovan is *Why Iowa? How Caucuses and Sequential Elections Improve the Presidential Nominating Process* (2011, University of Chicago Press). With Richard Lau he is the author of *How Voters Decide: Information Processing in Election Campaigns* (2006, Cambridge University Press) winner of the 2007 Alexander L. George Best Book Award from the International Society of Political Psychology. His research has been supported by multiple research grants from the National Science Foundation. He currently coedits the journal *Political Psychology*.

Jack Reilly is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of California, Davis, USA. He studies social networks and political discussion, with a focus on the political behavior and communication patterns of socially isolated individuals.

David O. Sears is Distinguished Professor of Psychology and Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, USA. He is a coauthor of *Obama's Race: The 2008 Election and the Dream of a Post-racial America* (2010) and *The Diversity Challenge* (2008). He received his PhD in Psychology from Yale University and is a former president of the International Society for Political Psychology and a former Dean of Social Sciences at UCLA.

Jim Sidanius is Professor in the departments of Psychology and African and African American Studies at Harvard University, USA. He received his PhD at the University of Stockholm, Sweden, and has taught at several universities in the United States and Europe, including Carnegie Mellon University, the University of Texas at Austin, New York University, Princeton University, the University of Stockholm, Sweden, and

the University of California, Los Angeles. He has authored some 270 scientific papers. His primary research interests include the interface between political ideology and cognitive functioning, the political psychology of gender, institutional discrimination and the evolutionary psychology of intergroup conflict.

Christian Staerklé is Associate Professor of Social Psychology at the University of Lausanne in Switzerland. He has widely published on intergroup attitudes, cultural beliefs, and political legitimacy and has obtained many research grants from national and international research organizations. Staerklé is codirector of the social psychology graduate school of the universities of Geneva and Lausanne.

Janice Gross Stein is the Belzberg Professor of Conflict Management and the Director of the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto, Canada. Her recent research focuses on the psychological dimensions of security and the changing meanings of humanitarianism.

Charles S. Taber is Professor of Political Science and Dean of the Graduate School at Stony Brook University, USA. He has written several books and many articles on political psychology and computational modeling in the social sciences. Winner of nine research grants from the National Science Foundation, Taber is a past editor of the journal *Political Psychology* and serves on numerous editorial boards in political science.

Cristian Tileagă is Lecturer in Social Psychology and member of the Discourse and Rhetoric Group at Loughborough University, UK. His research focuses on developing critical approaches for researching social and political life. He has written extensively on political discourse, the critical psychology of racism, collective memory, and social representations of national history. He is the author of *Political Psychology: Critical Perspectives* (forthcoming, Cambridge University Press) and *Discourse Analysis and Reconciliation with the Recent Past* (Romanian). He is coediting *Psychology and History: Interdisciplinary Explorations* (with Jovan Byford, Open University) and serves on editorial and advisory boards of international journals in Romania, Brazil, and Germany.

Tom R. Tyler is the Macklin Fleming Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology at Yale University, USA. His research explores the dynamics of authority in groups, organizations, and societies. In particular, he examines the role of judgments about the justice or injustice of group procedures in shaping legitimacy, compliance, and cooperation. He is the author of several books, including *The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice* (1988); *Social Justice in a Diverse Society* (1997); *Cooperation in Groups* (2000); *Trust in the Law* (2002); *Why People Obey the Law* (2006); and *Why People Cooperate* (2011).

Nicholas A. Valentino is Professor of Political Science and Research Professor in the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, USA. He specializes in political psychological approaches to understanding public opinion formation, political

socialization, information seeking, attitude change, and electoral behavior. His work employs experimental methods, online and laboratory surveys, and content analyses of political communication. His previous work has focused on the intersecting roles of racial attitudes and emotion in support for public policies related to race. He is currently exploring the causes of public opinion on issues related to globalization including immigration, terrorism, and job transfers in the United States and around the world.

Jojanneke van der Toorn is Assistant Professor in the Department of Psychology at Leiden University, the Netherlands. She holds MA degrees in Organizational Psychology and Cultural Anthropology from the Free University of Amsterdam and a PhD in Social Psychology from New York University. Her research focuses on processes of legitimation and the social psychological mechanisms implicated in social change and resistance to it. Her work has appeared in the *American Sociological Review*, the *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *Political Psychology*, and *Social Justice Research*.

Jacquelien van Stekelenburg (PhD, VU University Amsterdam, 2006) is Associate Professor of Sociology at the VU University, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. She researches the social psychological dynamics of protest, with a special interest in identification, emotions, and ideologies as motivators for collective action.

Michele Vecchione is a researcher in psychology at the "Sapienza" University of Rome, Italy. His research interests focus on political psychology, multivariate statistics in the field of personality and social psychology, personality assessment, socially desirable responding and response biases, the role of individual differences in predicting individuals' preferences and performance, the issue of measurement invariance across cultural contexts and administration modes, and the longitudinal investigation of stability and change in personality.

David G. Winter is Professor of Psychology at the University of Michigan, USA. Within the field of personality and social psychology, his research focuses on power and power motivation, the motivational bases of leadership, and the psychological aspects of conflict escalation and war. He is the author of *Personality: Analysis and Interpretation of Lives*, as well as numerous articles in professional journals. He has been President and Councilor of the International Society of Political Psychology, and has received the society's Lasswell Award for scientific contributions.

Everett Young received his PhD in political science from Stony Brook University, USA, in 2009. He has taught courses in political psychology, American politics, and methodology at Florida State University and Washington University in St. Louis. He resides in Tallahassee, FL.

This page intentionally left blank

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

theoretical foundations of political psychology

LEONIE HUDDY, DAVID O. SEARS, AND JACK S. LEVY

Political psychology, at the most general level, is an application of what is known about human psychology to the study of politics. It draws upon theory and research on biopsychology, neuroscience, personality, psychopathology, evolutionary psychology, social psychology, developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, and intergroup relations. It addresses political elites—their personality, motives, beliefs, and leadership styles, and their judgments, decisions, and actions in domestic policy, foreign policy, international conflict, and conflict resolution. It also deals with the dynamics of mass political behavior: voting, collective action, the influence of political communications, political socialization and civic education, group-based political behavior, social justice, and the political incorporation of immigrants.

Since the publication of the first edition of the *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology* in 2003, the field of political psychology has grown significantly. Research has been fueled by a mix of age-old questions and recent world events as social psychologists and political scientists have turned to psychology to understand the origins of political conservatism (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), the historic election of an African American president in the United States (Tesler & Sears, 2010), spectacular acts of international terrorism such as the 2004 Madrid and the 2005 London train bombings and the September 11 attacks in the United States (Crenshaw, 2000; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003; Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003), anti-immigrant sentiment (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007), the failure of expert judgment (Tetlock, 2005), and the underpinnings of collective action (Simon & Klandermans, 2001).

Enlivened interest in the topics addressed by political psychologists goes hand in hand with a strong and increasingly global organization, the International Society of

Political Psychology (ISPP), and the growing circulation of *Political Psychology*, its well-respected journal. The journal has grown in stature in recent years. It ranked 12th in political science and 19th in social psychology in terms of its two-year impact factor in the 2011 Journal Citation Reports database, and was ranked even more highly in terms of its five-year impact (9th in political science and 14th in social psychology in 2011). There are also vibrant political psychology sections of major national and regional organizations such as the organized section of the American Political Science Association (APSA) and the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Standing Group.

There is also an increased number of textbooks devoted to the field. Since the first version of this *Handbook* several good undergraduate texts devoted solely to political psychology have been published, including textbooks by Cottam, Dietz-Uhler, Mastors, and Preston (2010), Houghton (2009), Marcus (2012), a reader by Jost and Sidanius (2004), and a graduate-level text by McDermott (2004) on political psychology and international relations. Several major presses, including Cambridge, Oxford, and Routledge, now have book series in political psychology. There is also a steady stream of monographs published in the field each year, leading to the existence of three annual book prizes dedicated to political psychology: the Robert E. Lane book prize awarded by the Political Psychology Section of the American Political Science Association, and the Alexander George and David O. Sears prizes awarded by the International Society for Political Psychology.

The current edition of the *Handbook* takes stock of the past decade's developments in political psychology, building closely on the 2003 *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology* (Sears, Huddy, & Jervis, 2003), and more loosely on two previous volumes: *Handbook of Political Psychology* (Knutson, 1973) and *Political Psychology* (Hermann, 1986). In this second edition of the *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology* widely respected political scientists and psychologists summarize what psychology has contributed to our understanding of the political behavior of both political elites and ordinary citizens, and the insights into basic psychology obtained from research on political behavior. The chapters in the *Handbook* provide an overview of key terms, major theories, and cutting-edge research within both psychology and political science and will be an essential reference for scholars and students interested in the intersection of these two fields.

We designed the *Handbook* to provide a comprehensive and expertly distilled account of research in many subfields of political psychology for both the beginning graduate student and the more advanced scholar who may be new to a specific subfield or topic. But we should note that the original *Handbook* will remain a useful reference because it contains topics and discussions that are omitted from the current volume. Moreover, political psychology is a diverse and growing subfield and by necessity not all topics could be included in a single volume. We thought long and hard about a number of chapters that did not make it into this volume, including neuropolitics, the political psychology of terrorism, political impression formation, and the political psychology of obedience. These topics are touched on within different chapters but may constitute distinct chapters in a future edition of the *Handbook*.

In compiling this volume, we acknowledge the growing international flavor of contemporary political psychology, which explores topics as diverse as the dynamics of

American presidential elections, resistance to immigration in a globalized economy, and the role of emotion and threat in the decisions of political leaders. Where possible, authors of chapters in this volume have chosen examples of good political psychology research from around the globe, demonstrating the broad explanatory power of common psychological forces within different polities. Cognitive biases, authoritarianism, patriotism, ethnocentrism, and social conformity are not constrained by geographic boundaries but seem evident throughout the world, albeit in interaction with specific cultures and political systems.

1. What Is Political Psychology?

At its core, political psychology concerns the behavior of individuals within a specific political system. Psychology alone cannot explain the Holocaust, intractable conflicts, war, or most other behavior of states or collective political actors in complex environments. Individuals do not act within a vacuum. Their behavior varies with, and responds to, differences in political institutions, political cultures, leadership styles, and social norms. As Levy notes in his chapter in this volume, psychology influences foreign policy behavior primarily through its interaction with specific aspects of the international system, national governments, and distinct societies. The same logic applies to a wide range of different phenomena. Consider research on authoritarianism. Do we look to the behavior of leaders or their followers to understand why citizens in the 1930s and 1940s followed fascist leaders who persecuted and killed millions of people? Were the atrocities committed in Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia a function of political leadership, the support (acquiescence) of the public, or both? Some scholars attribute the Holocaust squarely to the psychology of authoritarian followers (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950); others view it as a function of leadership and the pervasive human propensity to obey authority (Milgram, 1974); still others view it as the reaction of authoritarian individuals to social and political discord (Feldman & Stenner, 1997). In the end it is difficult to believe that someone with authoritarian tendencies will behave in exactly the same way under a fascist regime as in a liberal democracy.

A complex mix of individual psychology and political context also shapes public reactions to terrorism. Public support for anti-terrorism policies depends on how a threatened government reacts, the government's perceived competence and effectiveness in combatting terrorism, and a person's felt vulnerability to a future terrorist event. External forces such as the strength of government national security policy or terrorist determination and capabilities vary over time and across contexts, and they influence, in turn, whether a citizen feels anxious or angry in response to a terrorist event. Powerful terrorists and a weak government tend to generate anxiety among a threatened population, whereas a powerful government and weak terrorists will likely generate feelings of anger. Moreover, not everyone responds to threat in the

same way, and individual psychological dispositions play an added role in determining whether someone reacts to terrorism with anger or anxiety. In general, a society dominated by feelings of anger may support aggressive antiterrorism action, whereas a population dominated by feelings of anxiety may oppose aggressive action that exacerbates the risk of terrorism (Huddy & Feldman, 2011; Lambert et al., 2010). Neither individual psychology nor political circumstances alone is likely to fully explain these reactions.

In a more general sense, questions about public reactions to terrorism or an authoritarian response to fascist rule are closely linked to one of the perennial questions raised by political psychology: how well are citizens equipped to handle their democratic responsibilities (Le Cheminant & Parrish, 2011)? Can they deliberate over the issues of the day fairly to arrive at a reasoned judgment, or conversely do they succumb to internecine enmities and fall victim to irrational intolerance? Many of the chapters in this *Handbook* grapple with such issues, underscoring the democratic capabilities of the citizenry while highlighting ways in which leaders and citizens fall short of the democratic ideal. The question of a citizenry's democratic competence is addressed very directly in the chapter by Myers and Mendelberg as they consider the psychology of political deliberation and the conditions under which it conforms to the democratic ideal of free, equal, and open dialogue. In reality, both citizens and leaders exhibit distorted reasoning and a slew of cognitive and emotional biases that are well cataloged in this volume. Partisan resistance to new information, ethnocentric reactions to immigrants, automatic and preconscious reactions to a political candidate's facial features, greater risk-taking in the face of losses than gains—the list goes on. Many of these same processes are at work among political leaders for whom partisan loyalties loom large, threat impairs their ability to deliberate rationally, and emotions such as humiliation and anger affect their political decisions. In that sense leaders are vulnerable to emotional and cognitive psychological biases similar to those observed within the electorate.

Yet democratic societies work, more or less, and political psychology has focused in recent years on individual differences among citizens to explain why a characterization of the public as biased, ethnocentric, fearful, or any other singular characterization is erroneous. Individual differences grounded in early socialization, genetic makeup, social context, and personality generate liberals and conservatives, Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, tolerant and intolerant individuals, more and less well informed citizens, and sectarian partisan elites. Politics emerges from such individual differences, leading to political disagreements that are visible and widely debated within well-functioning democratic societies. Even if citizens engage in biased reasoning, competing arguments are pervasive and difficult to avoid completely; the passionate are free to make their case, and the dispassionate can evaluate their efforts and arguments. The democratic process may be messy, unsatisfying, and frustrating, but it is inherently psychological. As scholars we need to know something about both a political system *and* human psychology to make sense of it. The interplay of psychology and politics, especially within democratic processes, is a central theme of this volume and lies at the core of many of its chapters.

2. Intellectual Underpinnings of Political Psychology

As we noted in the earlier edition of this *Handbook*, there is no one political psychology (Sears et al., 2003). Rather, researchers have employed a number of different psychological theories to study political behavior and attitudes. Some theories are more appropriate than others for analyzing certain political phenomena, as seen in many of the chapters in the *Handbook*. For example, in contemporary political psychology Freudian psychodynamics is commonly applied to questions concerning the psychology of political leaders, and discourse theory is applied specifically to the analysis of political rhetoric and communications. But some of the psychological approaches employed across these chapters are marshaled to understand diverse political phenomena. For example, the influence of cognitive and emotional processes on elite and citizen decision-making is discussed in a number of chapters. Basic aspects of the affective and cognitive system such as the link between anger and risk seeking or the limits of working memory and attention have broad ramifications for the study of political behavior across diverse political topics. To deepen insight into the intellectual underpinnings of political psychology, we lay out the major classes of psychological theories that have been applied to the study of political behavior (see also Cottam et al., 2010; Marcus, 2012; Sullivan, Rahn, & Rudolph, 2002). Each of the broad approaches we discuss contains several different theories and concepts yet are brought together by their focus on broadly similar psychological processes and mechanisms.

2.1. Rational Choice

Over the last five to six decades, rational choice theory has been a major influence on political science models of both elite and mass political behavior. This is understandable since democratic theory is predicated on the notion of a well-informed citizenry capable of handling and digesting information on issues of the day to arrive at well-informed decisions. As Chong explains in this *Handbook*, rational choice theory is built on a set of basic assumptions about human behavior that resemble the requirements for a well-functioning citizenry: first, individuals have consistent preferences over their goals, which are often defined as the pursuit of economic self-interest; second, individuals assign a value or utility to these goals; and third, probabilities are assigned to the different ways of achieving such goals. This culminates in Chong's definition of rational choice as "choosing the course of action that maximizes one's expected utility." If utilities, or goals, are equated with economic self-interest, as they often are, a rational choice model predicts that an individual will be motivated to act in ways that are most likely to pay the highest financial dividend. In politics, this translates into support of candidates and policies that are most likely to improve voters' economic bottom line

and benefit them personally. Expectancy-value theory was formalized in psychology as an early version of the rational choice idea (Edwards, 1954; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).

As Chong notes in this *Handbook*, however, pure rationality is something of a fiction when applied to human behavior. Downs (1957) was the first to identify the paradox of voting, a major problem for rational choice theory, in which the costs of voting far exceed its expected benefit to one's self-interest, suggesting that it is irrational even though frequently practiced (see also Green & Shapiro, 1994). Since Downs, it has become increasingly clear that neither leaders nor citizens make entirely rational political decisions. Nonetheless, in many branches of political science, researchers are only slowly moving away from a rational model of human behavior. At the forefront of this effort lies pioneering research by social psychologists on systematic biases in human decision-making (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).

In the *Handbook*, Stein provides a succinct account of a rationalist approach to threat in the field of international relations and highlights its inadequacy to fully explain elite behavior and decision-making. She documents a number of cognitive, motivational, and emotional biases that distort elite threat perceptions and reactions to threat. Herrmann attributes elites' images of other nations, in part, to similar cognitive and emotional biases; these images shape, in turn, elite responses to the actions and perceived intentions of other nations in which friend and foe are clearly distinguished. Levy develops this theme further and summarizes prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) as an alternative to rationalist expected utility as a theory of choice under conditions of risk. In something of an exception, however, Dyson and 't Hart caution against an excessive focus on cognitive and emotional biases among elite decision-makers and argue instead for a more pragmatic view of rationality, which they define as the best decision possible under current resource constraints.

At the level of mass politics, among the earliest challenges to rational choice were observations that major political attitudes were in place well before adults began contemplating the political arena, in studies of political socialization and voting behavior (see the chapter by Sears and Brown). Later challenges came from Kahneman and Tversky's findings on cognitive heuristics and biases, which blossomed into the subfield of behavioral decision theory and behavioral economics (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Rabin, 2004), fields that intersect quite closely with political psychology. Behavioral economics and other well-documented psychologically based deviations from rationality are discussed at some length in the chapter by Redlawsk and Lau on citizen political decision-making. Tyler and van der Toorn also note in their chapter that justice considerations often lead citizens to make political decisions that are at odds with their rational self-interest.

In conclusion, it is difficult to overstate the importance of rational choice theory as a foundational basis for democratic theory and a stimulus to political psychology research. Its emphasis on the structure of information, careful deliberation, and weighting of one's interests as essential to the formation of informed positions on political matters continues to serve as a baseline for much political psychology research. Rational choice theory may provoke political psychologists to document the ways in which

human behavior fails to conform with its stringent expectations, but even in that role it is highly influential. Moreover, even to political psychologists the public's democratic shortcomings are cause for consternation no matter how well explained psychologically, suggesting some lingering desire for the normative standard of rational deliberation and well-informed political decisions.

2.2. Biopolitics

Over the last decade or so, social scientists have begun to view human behavior through the prism of biology with intriguing results: neuroscience sheds light on information processing and emotion, evolutionary psychology underscores the biologically adaptive role of various social behaviors, and behavioral genetics uncovers the heritability of many social and political behaviors (Hatemi & McDermott, 2011). Political psychology is also beginning to adopt this perspective, leading to a key focus on biological reasoning and evidence in several chapters in the volume, and a passing reference to biological evidence in many others.

At one level an explanation of human behavior grounded in evolutionary thinking seems entirely consistent with a focus on rationality since human behavior is functional within evolutionary theory, geared toward enhanced reproductive fitness via the process of natural selection. In the *Handbook*, Sidanius and Kurzban outline the basic principles of evolutionary psychology, examining the adaptive biological and reproductive benefits of many social and political behaviors, including cooperation and coordination. But whereas classic rational choice theory is focused on individual goal seeking and reward, evolutionary psychology grapples increasingly with the benefits of social and political behavior to the collective linked to the controversial theory of group selection (Wilson & Wilson, 2008). In that vein, Sidanius and Kurzban state succinctly and somewhat provocatively that "adaptations for political psychology are driven by the possibility of fitness gains through coordinated, cooperative activity with conspecifics." Such deviations from individual rationality are of central interest to political psychology.

Evolutionary psychology focuses on attributes of psychology common to all members of the species, but some questions tackled by biopolitics deal with marked individual variation in human behavior. Why are some people open to experience and others closed, or some conscientious and others not? In her chapter, Funk picks up where Sidanius and Kurzban leave off, providing an overview of major approaches to the study of genetic influences on political behavior that explain individual differences. She evaluates the degree to which different facets of political behavior can be traced back to genes and concludes that genes have extensive influence on political behavior, with heritability shaping a range of fundamental political orientations and behaviors, including political ideology, partisan identity, strength of partisanship, and political participation. This work raises many intriguing questions about the biological mechanisms through which

genes influence political behavior, and Funk notes a number of studies in which political behavior is traced to specific genetic alleles that govern known biological processes.

Other chapter authors allude in passing to the growing field of biopolitics. Brader and Marcus discuss developments in the neural understanding of emotions, and Stein considers similar research in reference to the perception of threat among political elites. Huddy notes biological evidence in support of the primacy of in-group attachments, the speed with which in-group and out-group distinctions form in the brain, and the power of hormones such as oxytocin to generate positive in-group feelings. Kinder considers the possible genetic bases of racial prejudice. Dyson and 't Hart note research in which loss activates fear centers of the brain, helping to uncover the biological bases of loss aversion. Attention to the biological bases of political behavior will hopefully reinforce existing insights into political behavior, and help to identify basic biological pathways that may be central to an understanding of political psychology.

2.3. Personality and Psychodynamics

Many political psychologists have examined an individual's personality or characterological predispositions to explain the behavior of political leaders and the ideological choices of citizens. Personality is usually defined as a collection of relatively persistent individual differences that transcend specific situations and contribute to the observed stability of attitudes and behavior. In the last 10 years, political psychologists have shown renewed interest in stable personality traits and their effects on political attitudes and behavior based, in part, on growing consensus on the basic structure of personality traits.

Psychologists commonly identify five basic clusters of personality characteristics or traits—neuroticism, openness to experience, extraversion, conscientiousness, and agreeableness—commonly referred to as the five-factor or Big Five framework of personality. These dimensions are described in some detail and their links to political ideology examined in the *Handbook* by Caprara and Vecchione. The five-factor model has broad influence in political psychology and is touched on in *Handbook* chapters by Feldman, Funk, Taber and Young, Huckfeldt, and colleagues, and Winter. Caprara and Vecchione go beyond conventional accounts of personality within political psychology, however, to suggest that personality is broader than just traits and incorporates political values, such as egalitarianism and the need for security. These basic political values explain individual differences in political attitudes to an impressive degree, as discussed in the chapter on ideology by Feldman. Winter takes a similarly broad view of personality in his chapter on political elites, drawing on social context, personality traits, cognitions, and motives to analyze individual differences in elite behavior and decision-making.

Sigmund Freud had a great deal of influence on early political psychologists because his psychoanalysis of specific individuals lent itself well to the analysis of the personalities of specific political leaders. Harold Lasswell, in his *Psychopathology of Politics* (1930),

was a pioneer in analyzing the personalities of political activists in terms of the unconscious conflicts that motivated their political activities. This approach led to numerous psychobiographies of famous leaders, such as the analysis of Woodrow Wilson by George & George (1956), or of Martin Luther by Erik Erikson (1958). Post employs an idiographic approach to perceptively analyze the personality of political leaders from a psychoanalytic perspective. This idiographic approach to personality and politics can be contrasted with the nomothetic approach discussed by Carprara and Vecchione, which statistically places large numbers of people at various positions on specific dimensions of personality.

Feldman adds an important caveat to the study of personality and politics, underscoring the critical interplay between personality traits and political systems. As he notes, political ideology is not simply a proxy for personality. Conservatives may be less open to experience than liberals, but how personality traits map onto political ideology within a given political system also depends on the structure of political parties, their number, strategically adopted issue positions, and additional religious-secular, racial, and other powerful cleavages within a society. In the end, personality is an important recent addition to the study of political psychology, but it cannot be considered in isolation from political context.

2.4. Cognitive and Affective Psychology

Cognitive psychology and neuroscience have had profound influence on political psychology through their discovery of key features of the cognitive system: limited attention and working memory, implicit attitudes that lie outside conscious awareness, the rapid formation of habitual mental associations, and the interplay of affect and cognition. In essence, the cognitive system is highly efficient, processing a great deal of information with relatively little mental exertion. Under appropriate conditions, individuals can override the human tendency toward fast and efficient decision-making (Kahneman, 2011). But political decision-making is often beset with biases that privilege habitual thought and consistency over the careful consideration of new information. This is not always bad. Indeed, in the realm of consumer and other choices such fast gut-level decisions are often superior to reasoned thought. But in the realm of politics, reliance on this form of reasoning privileges consistency through the process of motivated reasoning in which disagreeable or challenging information is quickly rejected. This can lead, in turn, to biased and suboptimal political decisions (Bartels, 1996).

In myriad ways, cognitive psychology has undermined the rational choice model of elite and public decision-making, and we briefly describe how awareness of each aspect of the cognitive system has shaped the study of political psychology over the last decade. Much of this research is dedicated toward understanding how well (or poorly) democratic citizens function and the degree to which they deviate from the normative ideal of rational decision-making.

2.4.1. Cognitive Economy

Clear limits on human information-processing capacity underlie the widespread use of cognitive heuristics or shortcuts, which can distort the decision-making of elites (Jervis, 1976; Larson, 1985) and members of the public. These limits often lead to what Simon (1957) refers to as "bounded rationality," discussed at some length in the *Handbook* chapter by Chong.

Levy discusses the impact of cognitive biases on foreign policy decision-making. He distinguishes between "cold," cognitive biases and "hot," affective biases. Cold biases are based on the application of straight cognitive heuristics such as anchoring, in which prior probability assessments exert a disproportionate weight and in which the updating of priors based on new information is slow and inefficient. Hot motivated biases, such as wishful thinking and cognitive consistency, help to preserve the integrity of one's belief system. Such biases in adulthood force an examination of the origins of attitudes and beliefs that require such vigorous defense, as developed in the chapter on childhood and adult development by Sears and Brown. Elite reliance on efficient cognitive biases is further developed in the chapter by Herrmann, in which he discusses the underpinnings of enemy images held by one nation's leaders of another.

Redlawsk and Lau turn to the use of cognitive heuristics among citizens and review work on behavioral decision theory, contrasting normative models with behavioral descriptions of how ordinary people make political decisions. Here too the cognitive limits on rationality lead to a variety of problem-solving strategies that involve cognitive shortcuts. The use of mental shortcuts is not necessarily pernicious, however. The chapters by Taber and Young and by Redlawsk and Lau suggest that the use of cognitive shortcuts for reasoned political deliberation may not be as bad for mass political decision-making as once feared (also see Lau & Redlawsk, 1997). Dyson and 't Hart make a similar point, underscoring the benefits of heuristic reasoning for elite decision-makers facing a crisis.

The need for cognitive efficiency and an awareness of the low priority of politics for many citizens leads to a particular focus within political psychology on information: citizens' depth of knowledge, how political information is acquired, and the sources to which citizens turn to acquire it. In the *Handbook,* Valentino & Nardis discusses Americans' relatively low levels of political knowledge. Huckfeldt, Mondak and colleagues explore in considerable detail the role of everyday conversation partners in conveying political information (and influence). They specifically discuss the role played by politically expert discussion partners and find that conversation with such knowledgeable individuals is reasonably common and influential, even if their arguments are not necessarily held in high regard. This provides an example of how citizens can reduce the effort involved in acquiring knowledge by obtaining political information from others within their immediate social circles.

2.4.2. *Implicit Attitudes and Automaticity*

Conscious cognitive activity is a limited commodity, and decisions are often made, and opinions influenced, by information outside conscious awareness. In reality, the brain is largely devoted to monitoring the body, and most of its activity lies outside consciousness, reserving conscious thought for important higher-level activities. Political psychologists might regard political decisions as a high-level activity warranting conscious deliberation, yet political attitudes can be influenced by information of which someone may be unaware. Taber and Young discuss this phenomenon most fully in their chapter, focusing on implicit attitudes that exist outside conscious awareness, and the automaticity of preconscious attitude activation. They characterize implicit attitudes as affective in nature, fast to take effect, and as interacting with explicit attitudes in various ways that deserve further research scrutiny. Several chapters discuss the widely used Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Kinder extends this discussion to implicit racial attitudes, examining their nature and political effects. In their chapter, Al Ramiah and Hewstone note the influence of implicit attitudes on intergroup discrimination, including racially discriminatory behavior. Overall, the political influence of implicit attitudes and automaticity has been examined in a growing number of research studies concerned with racial attitudes, candidate choice, and the effects of political campaign ads.

Valentino and Nardis weave a discussion of preconscious attitudes into their chapter on political communication, in which they assesses the power of campaign ads, news media content, and other media coverage to sway the public. They regard preconscious attitudes as a source of consistency in political belief, concluding that "what we think of as political deliberation is mostly the post-hoc rationalization of pre-conscious evaluations." In other words, preconscious attitudes serve as attitudinal ballast that prevents someone from being readily persuaded by any one political message; in essence, contrary information is coded as disagreeable and rejected even before it is consciously considered. In that sense, preconscious attitude activation serves as a useful counterweight to persuasive political rhetoric.

The notion of automaticity shares an intellectual link with behaviorist theories that were much in vogue in the middle half of the 20th century. One version of behaviorist theories emphasizes the learning of long-lasting habits, which in turn guide later behavior. They were inspired by the classical conditioning studies of Pavlov, who showed that dogs could be conditioned to salivate at the sound of a bell if it were always followed by food; by the instrumental conditioning studies of Watson and Skinner, who showed that animals could develop complex habits if their behavior proved instrumental to the satisfaction of their basic needs such as hunger or thirst; and the imitative learning examined by Bandura, who showed that children would engage in imitative behavior without any involvement of need satisfaction. Such theories long dominated the analysis of mass political attitudes. The field of political socialization, as described in the chapter by Sears

and Brown, developed from the assumption that children learned basic political attitudes (such as party identification and racial prejudice) from their families and friends, and that the residues of these early attitudes dominated their later political attitudes in adulthood, such as their presidential vote preferences, triggering a host of automatic associations not readily subject to conscious scrutiny.

2.4.3. Spreading Activation and Habitual Association

The process of automaticity is linked to the axiomatic notion, developed by Hebb (1949), that neurons that fire together, wire together. The simultaneous pairing of two objects in the environment leads to the firing of their relevant neurons. If this pairing persists, the brain associates the two objects habitually and recalls the second when primed with the first in a process of spreading activation. For example, if the word *liberal* is frequently associated in popular conversation with loose-living, pot-smoking, intellectual, or impractical dreamers, or the media depict African Americans in settings that emphasize their poverty, unemployment, and drug-related crimes, the terms will become connected mentally. This set of mental associations may lie at the heart of implicit racial, gender, and other group stereotypes discussed in the *Handbook* by Donald Kinder.

The existence of habitual associations in the brain results in consistent thought patterns that link, for example, abortion and liberal-conservative ideology, or positive feelings about capitalism and support for government fiscal austerity measures. In general, such associations anchor policy positions and contribute to attitude stability over time, especially among those who connect policies to stable political attitudes such as political ideology or other basic values. But habitual mental associations also vary among individuals; political sophisticates with strongly anchored political beliefs show stronger habitual mental associations than those with few or weakly held beliefs. The existence of consistent mental associations helps to explain why reframing a political issue—discussing a tax cut in terms of reduced government waste rather than growing inequality, for example—will be effective for citizens for whom the concept of a tax cut is not anchored by other stable political beliefs, but will be less successful among political sophisticates.

Understanding the factors or situations in which someone will scrutinize their habitual mental associations is of critical interest to political psychology and the study of a democratic citizenry more generally. In their *Handbook* chapter on political emotion, Brader and Marcus present evidence that habitual thought is less common when individuals feel anxious. Under those circumstances, citizens seek out new information, process it carefully, and are motivated to reach the "right" decision. The distinction between more and less effortful information processing is captured within dual-process models that posit both a superficial and more deliberate path to attitude change. The delineation of conditions under which citizens engage in careful political deliberation and are open to new information remains of key interest to political psychologists and will continue to stimulate research in both psychology and political science.

2.4.4. *Interplay of Affect and Cognition*

Contemporary political psychology draws heavily on affective processes. The previous volume of the *Handbook* was published at a time when individual information-processing and research on cognitive biases were popular topics within the study of political behavior. In the last decade, research on affect and emotion has increased exponentially in the social sciences, leading to a far more emotional and affect-laden view of political behavior that is manifestly apparent in the current volume. There was one chapter devoted to political emotions in the previous version of the *Handbook*, but few other chapters devoted much space to the topic. That has changed dramatically in the current volume, in which it is difficult to find a chapter that does not make at least passing reference to the role of political emotions in research on citizens or political elites.

In addition to Brader and Marcus's detailed discussion of political emotions, emotions surface in numerous ways in this edition of the *Handbook*. Stein discusses in considerable detail the influence of emotions on elites' perceptions of, and responses to, external threats. She builds on Brader and Marcus's discussion of the origins and cognitive consequences of different classes of emotions to explain the likely consequences of fear, humiliation, and anger for elite decision-making. Levy, Herrmann, and Dyson and 't Hart also touch on the role of emotion within elite decision-making. Positive and negative affect are integral components of implicit attitudes, as noted by Taber and Young, and in that sense emotion plays a very central role within modern attitude research in both psychology and political science. Al Ramiah and Hewstone consider evidence that members of minority groups react more strongly to negative implicit than explicit attitudes held by a majority group member, underscoring the power of implicit attitudes to shape interpersonal encounters. Kinder discusses the importance of affect to the study of racial prejudice. Huddy underscores the contribution of intergroup emotions to the development of group cohesion and political action. Bar-Tal and Halperan evaluate the importance of anger, hatred, fear, and humiliation to the development of intractable conflicts.

Brader and Marcus review research on political emotions in considerable detail. Their chapter underscores a fourth crucial aspect of the cognitive system, the intricate interplay between affect and cognition. Hot cognition underscores the degree to which motivational and affective states influence decision-making, and is discussed at some length by Taber and Young. Motivated reasoning serves as a pervasive example of hot cognition in which individuals are motivated to preserve their beliefs, oppose challenging or contradictory views, and dismiss the other side's arguments as far weaker than one's own. In essence, it produces rapid (and perhaps preconscious) dismissal of opposing views. The existence of motivated reasoning generates a paradox, however, when it comes to political sophisticates, who turn out to be most subject to automaticity and motivated reasoning. In Chong's words, "the beliefs of the best informed may reflect an ideologically distorted perspective rather than the objective state of the world," raising real questions about the rational basis of public opinion. If those with the information needed to make

a fully informed decision are also the most biased in their reasoning, rational deliberation seems like an unattainable political ideal.

2.5. Intergroup Relations

In tandem with a growing interest in biology and emotions, contemporary political psychology is also increasingly focused on collective behavior and theories of intergroup relations as explanations for political behavior. The previous version of this *Handbook* contained four chapters linked to intergroup relations focusing on in-group identity, collective action, group prejudice, and intractable group conflict. In the current volume, the chapters explicitly devoted to intergroup relations have been expanded to additionally include conflict management, interpersonal social influence, small-group deliberation, immigration and multiculturalism, and discrimination. Moreover, the growing focus over the last 10 years on group-based political behavior is entwined with other changes that have occurred within the field of political psychology. Intergroup research is increasingly international in focus, drawing on common frameworks such as social identity theory to explain political behavior in numerous regions of the world. It also builds on an integrated model of affect and cognition, with affect playing an especially important role in motivating collective action and driving responses to societal and personal threat.

The field of intergroup relations does not embody a single theoretical approach; rather it draws on diverse psychological theories. But it is fair to say that many, if not most, analyses of collective behavior deviate from a rational choice account of human behavior. For instance, Sidanius and Kurzban note the power of collectives within human evolution and conclude that the need to cooperate is a basic and functional aspect of human society (even if not always completely rational for an individual). Early research on intergroup relations, conducted in the 1950s and 1960s, stressed the biased and emotional nature of out-group animosity, especially toward Jews and Negroes (Allport, 1954). Much attention was paid to the childhood socialization of prejudice and stereotyping, as indicated in the chapter by Sears and Brown. Research on the authoritarian personality, a highly influential study of prejudice, emphasized the importance of interrelated and emotionally motivated aspects of personality such as authoritarian submission and authoritarian aggression in the development of racial prejudice and anti-Semitism (Adorno et al., 1950).

More recent research on racial prejudice and intergroup relations has drawn on a mix of cognitive and affective factors to account for political group conflict, cohesion, and conformity. The limitations of the cognitive system, as discussed in numerous chapters of the *Handbook*, lead to the formation of simplistic group stereotypes that shape intergroup political behavior, as noted by Kinder, influence enemy images, as discussed by Herrmann, and affect the process of conflict resolution, as described by Fisher and colleagues. Group identities are linked to powerful emotions that generate anger and hatred and play a central role in accounts of international and domestic politics in

Handbook chapters by Stein, Huddy, Klandermans and van Stekelenburg, and Bar-Tal and Halperan.

Some accounts of intergroup behavior, such as realistic conflict theory, are consistent with rational choice and are often pitted against symbolic accounts of group political cohesion and conflict. Huddy highlights the distinction between social identity theory, which stresses social prestige and intergroup respect as motives for intergroup behavior (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), and realistic interest theories, which place emphasis on shared material interests and conflict over tangible resources (Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Tuan, 2006; Levine & Campbell, 1972; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). A similar distinction between realistic and affective responses to members of an out-group surfaces in research on racial attitudes in Kinder's discussion of prejudice and Green and Staerklé's chapter on immigration and multiculturalism. On balance, there is greater support for symbolic than realistic sources of political group cohesion and conflict.

Threat plays a special role in the political life of a collective. It can galvanize and unify an in-group while leading to vilification of an out-group, and is thus particularly potent politically. Threat is widely discussed in *Handbook* chapters dealing with the political psychology of mass politics, including Huddy's chapter on in-group identities, Green and Staerklé's consideration of immigration and multiculturalism, Kinder's overview of racial prejudice, and Bar-Tal and Halperan's overview of intractable conflicts. The concept of threat has long dominated research on conflict within international relations, as noted at some length by Stein. Research on both mass and elite politics assesses the rationality of threat reactions and generally rejects that interpretation, at least in broad stroke. Highly distorted subjective judgments often influence elites' perception of threat, as noted in chapters by Levy, Stein, and Herrmann. Moreover, economic threats are typically less politically potent than cultural and other less tangible noneconomic threats in mass politics, as discussed in chapters by Huddy, Kinder, and Green and Staerklé.

Finally, humans' impressive capacity for cooperation, a topic discussed at length by Sidanius and Kurzban, leads us back to consider the political psychology of a collective. Tyler and van der Toorn consider the origins of societal justice in social and moral values that can govern cooperation and societal defection. They mention a provocative argument advanced by social psychologist Donald Campbell that values such as humanitarianism have arisen over time through social evolution as a way to curb more base instincts linked to self-interest. This raises an important consideration about the key role of social norms in political psychology. As social animals, humans are profoundly affected by social norms. Those norms are often learned early and well in the socialization process, as indicated by Sears and Brown. Such norms hold the potential for good as well as evil. Indeed some even argue that life in modern democratic societies is remarkably peaceable, that international violence is now at an all-time low, and that the horrors that were commonplace in the past, such as the widespread use of torture, are now widely condemned (Pinker, 2011). The globalization of economic life reflects international cooperation on a scale unimaginable in times past.

Have the scales tipped toward a more humane and cooperative world? Such a claim would undoubtedly be disputed by scholars of indigenous oppression, economic

inequality, and other societal ills. Nonetheless, research on values and social justice opens political psychology to the positive forces of cooperation, tolerance, and respect on which modern democratic societies pivot. Adherence to a norm of cooperation may not be rational for an individual (if defined as the pursuit of self-interest) but can have clear advantages to human groups. The positive forces in human society are touched on only lightly in this *Handbook* but may come to play a larger role in future political psychology research (see Aspinwall & Satudinger, 2002; Monroe, 1996).

3. Organization of This Volume

We begin this volume with a section on broad psychological theories. This section includes basic psychological theories that concern personality, early childhood and adult development, rational choice, decision-making, the study of emotion, evolutionary psychology, genetics, and political rhetoric. Then we move to the substantive focus of different areas of political psychological research, which tend to cut across theoretical approaches. We start with elite behavior, first in the area of international relations and then in the area of domestic politics. The next section focuses on mass political behavior, including an analysis of political reasoning, political ideology, social justice, social influence, political communications, and political deliberation. The final section considers collective behavior, including identities, social movements, racial prejudice, migration and multiculturalism, discrimination, and intractable conflict.

We characterize political psychology as the application of psychology to politics, but we would like to see greater two-way communication between disciplines. Indeed, the study of political psychology provides potential insight into basic psychology, as is clear from the chapters in this volume. For example, Feldman discusses at some length the multidimensional nature of political ideology and conservatism that is at odds with their popular unidimensional conception in social psychology. Numerous chapters underscore the complexity of political sophistication, which cannot simply be equated with expertise and the efficient assimilation of new information but focuses instead on strong political biases, powerful partisan identities, and extensive motivated reasoning. While processes such as motivated reasoning are well known in psychology, they deserve even greater research attention within political psychology because of their political heft. Although many political psychologists, including authors in this volume, are drawn from the disciplines of psychology and political science, they also include historians, sociologists, anthropologists, psychiatrists, communications researchers, educators, and lawyers.

Before closing, we also want to refer the interested reader to several other recent volumes with different goals from our own but with somewhat similar titles. This *Handbook* is intended as a comprehensive statement of the current state of knowledge in political psychology. There are several other volumes in the *Oxford Handbooks* series that touch on similar aspects of political behavior but take a less explicitly psychological approach.

Handbooks edited by Russell Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (*The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, 2007) and Robert Shapiro and Lawrence Jacobs (*The Oxford Handbook of American Public Opinion and the Media*, 2011) discuss topics such as political socialization, political communication, trust, and political emotions. The current volume goes more deeply into original psychological research, includes authors from both psychology and political science, and is unique in combining research on both elite and mass politics. The three handbooks provide excellent complementary reviews of political behavior research.

One other recent volume presents an interesting collection of individual research in political psychology. Borgida, Federico, and Sullivan edited *The Psychology of Democratic Citizenship* (2009), with chapters devoted to citizens' democratic capabilities. The volume includes scholars presenting their own research on political knowledge, persuasion, group identity, political tolerance, and the media. Topics and approaches overlap with those in the current *Handbook* but describe a single research enterprise rather than review a body of work, and are less singularly focused on psychological research and theory. Howard Lavine is the editor of the four-volume set *Political Psychology* (2010). The series includes reprints of classic articles in political psychology and is organized into four broad themes: theoretical approaches, public opinion, international relations, and intergroup relations. This series serves as an important reference work for students and scholars who wish to become acquainted with canonical writing and research studies in political psychology.

The current *Handbook* is a companion to these volumes in political psychology and political behavior that has a somewhat different purpose. This *Handbook* is the place to go to find out what is currently known about the many different fields in the umbrella topic of political psychology and learn more about psychology, political science, and their vibrant intersection.

References

Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). *The authoritarian personality*. New York: Harper & Row.

Allport, G. W. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor.

Aspinwall, L. G., & Staudinger, U. (Eds.). (2002). *A psychology of human strengths: Fundamental questions and future directions for a positive psychology.* Washington, DC: APA Books.

Bartels, L. M. (1996). Uninformed voters: Information effects in presidential elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, *40*(1), 194–230.

Blumer, H. (1958). Race prejudice as a sense of group position. *The Pacific Sociological Review*, *1*(1), 3–7.

Bobo, L. D., & Tuan, M. (2006). *Prejudice in politics: Group position, public opinion, and the Wisconsin treaty rights dispute.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Borgida, E., Federico, C. M., & Sullivan, J. (2009). *The political psychology of democratic citizenship*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Camerer, C. F., Loewenstein, G., & Rabin, M. (Eds.) (2004) *Advances in behavioral economics*. New York: Russell Sage.

Cottam, M. L., Dietz-Uhler, B., Mastors, E., & Preston, T. (2010). *Introduction to political psychology* (2nd ed.). New York: Psychology Press.

Crenshaw, M. (2000). The psychology of terrorism: An agenda for the 21st century. *Political Psychology*, *21*, 405–420.

Dalton, R., & Klingemann, H. D. (2007). *The Oxford handbook of political behavior*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Downs, A. (1957). *An economic theory of democracy*. New York: Harper & Row.

Edwards, W. (1954). The theory of decision-making. *Psychological Bulletin*, *51*, 380–417.

Erikson, E. H. (1958). *Young man Luther: A study in psychoanalysis and history.* New York: Norton.

Feldman, S., & Stenner, K. (1997). Perceived threat and authoritarianism. *Political Psychology*, *18*, 741–770.

Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). *Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior: An introduction to theory and research*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

George, A. L., & George, J. L. (1956). *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A personality study*. New York: Dover.

Green, D., & Shapiro, I. (1994). *Pathologies of rational choice theory: A critique of applications in political science*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *74*, 1464–1480.

Hatemi, P. K., & McDermott, R. (2011). *Man is by nature a political animal: Evolution, biology, and politics.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hebb, D. O. (1949). *The organization of behavior.* New York: Wiley.

Hermann, M. G. (1986). *Political psychology*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Houghton, D. P. (2009). *Political psychology: Situations, individuals, and cases*. New York: Routledge.

Huddy, L., & Feldman, S. (2011). Americans respond politically to 9/11: Understanding the impact of the terrorist attacks and their aftermath. *American Psychologist*, *66*(6), 455–467.

Jervis, R. (1976). *Perception and misperception in international politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. *Psychologcial Bulletin*, *129*, 339–375.

Jost, J. T., & Sidanius, J. (2004). *Political psychology*. New York: Psychology Press.

Kahneman, D. (2011). *Thinking, fast and slow*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.

Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (Eds.) (1982). *Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. *Econometrica*, *47*, 263–291.

Knutson, J. N. (Ed.). (1973). *Handbook of political psychology*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Lambert, A. J., Scherer, L. D., Schott, J. P., Olson, K. R., Andrews, R. K., & O'Brien, T. C. (2010). Rally effects, threat, and attitude change: An integrative approach to understanding the role of emotion. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *98*, 886–903.

Lasswell, H. D. (1930). *Psychopathology and politics*. New York: Viking.

Larson, D. (1985). *Origins of containment*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Lau, R. R., & Redlawsk, D. P. (1997). Voting correctly. *American Political Science Review*, *91*, 585–598.

Lavine, H. (2010). *Political psychology.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Le Cheminant, W., & Parrish, J. M. (2011). *Manipulating democracy: Democratic theory, political psychology and mass media*. New York: Routledge.

Lerner, J. S., Gonzalez, R. M., Small, D. A., & Fischhoff, B. (2003). Effects of fear and anger on perceived risks of terrorism: A national field experiment. *Psychological Science*, *14*, 144–150.

LeVine, R. A., & Campbell, D. T. (1972) *Ethnocentrism: Theories of conflict, ethnic attitudes, and group behavior*. New York: Wiley & Sons.

Marcus, G. E. (2012). *Political psychology: Neuroscience, genetics, and politics.* New York: Oxford University Press.

McDermott, R. (2004). *Political psychology in international relations*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Milgram, S. (1974). *Obedience to authority*. New York: Harper & Row.

Monroe, K. R. (1996). *The heart of altruism: Perceptions of a common humanity*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Pinker, S. (2011). *The better angels of our nature: Why violence has declined*. New York: Viking.

Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., & Greenberg, J. (2003). *In the wake of 9/11: The psychology of terror*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Sears, D. O., Huddy, L., & Jervis, R. (Eds.). (2003). *Oxford handbook of political psychology*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Shapiro, R., & Jacobs, L. (2011). *The Oxford Handbook of American Public Opinion and the Media*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Sidanius, J. & Pratto, F. (1999). *Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Simon, B., & Klandermans, B. (2001). Politicized collective identity: A social psychological analysis. *American Psychologist*, *56*(4), 319–331. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.56.4.319

Simon, H. A. (1957). *Models of man: Social and rational*. New York: Wiley.

Sniderman, P. M., Hagendoorn, L., & Prior, M. (2004). Predispositional factors and situational triggers: Exclusionary reactions to immigrant minorities. *American Political Science Review*, *98*(1), 35–49.

Sniderman, P. M., & Hagendoorn, L. (2007). *When ways of life collide*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Sullivan, J. L., Rahn, W. M., & Rudolph, T. J. (2002). The contours of political psychology: Situating research on political information processing. In J. H. Kuklinski (Ed.), *Thinking about political psychology* (pp. 23–47) Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Tajfel, H. (1981). *Human groups and social categories: Studies in social psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel & W. G. Austin (eds.), *Psychology of intergroup relations* (2nd ed., pp. 7–24). Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

Tesler, M., & Sears, D. O. (2010). *Obama's race: The 2008 election and the dream of a post-racial America.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Tetlock, P. (2005). *Expert judgment: How good is it? How can we know?* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Wilson, D. S., & Wilson, E. O. (2008). Evolution "for the good of the group." *American Scientist*, *96*, 380–389.

This page intentionally left blank

PART I

THEORETICAL APPROACHES

This page intentionally left blank

CHAPTER 2

PERSONALITY APPROACHES TO POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

GIAN VITTORIO CAPRARA AND
MICHELE VECCHIONE

1. What Is Personality?

1.1. Introduction

Personality is both a familiar and complex psychological concept, which refers to habitual and distinct patterns of physical and mental activity that distinguish one individual from another. Today personality is a popular explanatory concept in the domain of politics, due to the pervasive influence of the modern news media and their focus on the personality of political leaders. This has led political candidates to become more concerned with conveying favorable personal images and appealing narratives that are capable of attracting potential voters beyond the appeal of traditional political ideology. Voters' personality is no less important than leaders' personality within the analysis of contemporary political behavior. Voters' political preferences depend increasingly on their likes and dislikes of political candidates, and voter personality factors and related judgmental heuristics guide their political decisions to a greater degree than previously influential factors such as voter education, gender, and age.

In the present chapter we will address current views of personality to provide the conceptual frame within which to address the role of personality in contemporary politics. Then we will focus on the contribution of personality to an understanding of political behavior, highlighting how different components of personality, like traits, needs, values, self-beliefs, and social attitudes, shape citizens' ideological preferences and participation and leaders' perceived personality.

Personality can be viewed from two distinct perspectives that lead to a focus on different, although interdependent, courses of inquiry. One may view personality subjectively,

from individuals' perspective, focusing on their private feelings, thoughts, and narratives about themselves and their life and thus on the enduring collection of personal qualities, attributes, and inclinations that convey a sense of personal identity. From this perspective, personality is a self-referential agentic system capable of self-regulation with a significant impact on the environment. Alternately, an objective view takes the perspective of an observer, from which personality may be viewed as the entire architecture of psychological characteristics that distinguish individuals one from another. From this perspective, personality is largely a social construction involving systems of beliefs about the qualities of individuals that dictate how individual differences in observed behaviors should be acknowledged and treated.

These two perspectives capture the way in which personality has been examined in the political domain. The first perspective has been adopted when the focus is on voters' and politicians' predispositions, beliefs, values, expectations, and behavior. The second perspective has been used to account for citizens' perceptions and impressions of political leaders' personal characteristics.

In this chapter, we address both of these views, first by reviewing major research contributions of the past, and second by pointing to current studies that attest to the effect of personality on political preferences and participation.

1.2. Personality as a Self-Regulatory System

Personality can be thought of as a dynamic system of psychological structures and processes that mediates the relationship between the individual and the environment and accounts for what a person is and may become. The overall organization of this complex system results from synergistic interactions among multiple subsystems (cognitive, affective, and behavioral), which convey, foster, and preserve a sense of personal identity (Caprara & Cervone, 2000).

Looking at the transactions of personality as a whole, we can either focus on its basic structure, or on the adaptive functions of its various components. As people exhibit consistent, stable patterns of experience and action that distinguish them one from another, some personality psychologists point to internal structures that set an individual's initial potential and dictate the kind of person one may become under given conditions. Other personality psychologists point, instead, to the processes through which people adapt to the environment, and they focus on the dynamic organization of components from which each individual's unity, coherence, and continuity derive.

Most personality psychologists would agree that personality science should address the entire psychological functioning of individuals and thus account for both the structure and dynamics of the system and how structures and processes act on one another (Caprara, 1996).

If we focus on psychological qualities that allow us to distinguish among people, personality can be viewed as consisting of traits or dispositions (e.g., extraversion), namely endogenous basic tendencies to exhibit consistent, stable patterns of experience and

action across situations (McCrae & Costa, 2008). However, traits alone cannot account for the entire architecture of personality nor for its functioning: how predispositions generate stable patterns of behavior, how different behavioral tendencies operate in concert, and ultimately for the distinctive experience of each person. Personality should address the processes and mechanisms from which consistency, directionality and the sense of one's own individuality derive. This leads beyond the study of individual differences in traits to a comprehensive model of personality functioning that incorporates trait activation and orchestration under given physical and sociohistorical conditions.

In this regard, social learning theories have paved the way to a more comprehensive account of personality by pointing to the influence that social environment exerts in setting the conditions for the construction and functioning of personality. Such social cognitive approaches to personality have moved beyond a social learning model in pointing to the influence that individuals may exert on the environment as active agents that construe, select, and change the environments in which they live. From this social-cognitive perspective, needs, values and self-beliefs are just as important as traits in accounting for the internal organization of personality and individual differences that may significantly influence political behavior. Ultimately, conceptualizing personality as a self-regulatory system in the service of individual development and well-being has provided a common ground for reconciling different research traditions under broad assumptions, as we will discuss below.

It is a common assumption that genes and the brain form the remote basis of personality distinctive properties and characteristics by providing a vast amount of potential. Likewise it is a common assumption that people develop and function in ongoing processes of reciprocal interaction with their environment. Likely internal factors, in the form of cognitive, affective, and biological events, behavior, and the environment all operate as interacting determinants of what personality is at any moment within a network of reciprocal causation, and of what personality may become within the boundaries set by biological and social constraints. Finally, most would agree that unique capacities for self reflection, learning from one's own and from others' experience and forethought, accord people the power to regulate their behavior in accordance with their own aims and standards, to extend their control over the environment, and to contribute proactively to their own development. All this leads to a view of personality as a selective, generative and proactive system, not just reactive and adaptive. People do not consist of a set of tendencies that progress in a predetermined sequence toward inevitable end states. Although both cultural and biological factors contribute to the development of personality, people are not passive vessels who merely store genetic endowments and absorb environmental influences They, instead, are active agents who causally contribute to sign their course of life. In viewing personality as a complex system of psychological structures and processes through which people regulate their actions and experiences, one can identify three main sources of influence on personality development: nature, nurture, and the agentic person (see Funk, chapter 8, this volume; Sears and Brown, chapter 3, this volume).

Over the last several decades, personality psychologists have come to recognize that the development and functioning of personality cannot be properly understood without

addressing its biological roots. Recent years in particular have witnessed enormous progress in our understanding of the genetic factors that function as distal determinants of personality, and of the brain systems that are more proximal determinants of personality functioning and development. At the same time similar progress has been made in understanding how social environments and interpersonal relations set the conditions for the expression of individuals' endowments and potentials.

In reality development involves continuous and reciprocal interactions between the person as a bio-psychological system and the social context in which they live. Genetic endowment equips people with a vast array of potential whose actualization is conditional on their experiences. Early contexts set the conditions for activation of processes and deployment of mechanisms that establish cognitive structures, emotional patterns, and habits that provide an individual with unity, continuity, coherence and agentic power.

Viewing personality as a dynamic and self-regulating system which develops and functions in an ongoing process of reciprocal interactions with the environment allows one to capture its multiform expressions and to appreciate the value of both behavioral stability and change. Stability is critical for preserving one's own identity, as well as for establishing and maintaining relations with others. Change on the other hand is no less critical over the entire life course to continuously respond to the environmental and to grant the full expression of one's own individuality. A person's actualization, in fact, depends upon their capacities to align their behavior to their values and to continuously adjust their strivings to the opportunities and constraints of their environment. Ultimately, both stability and change can be fully appreciated only by looking at the person as a whole in continuous transition toward new forms of organization across the life span.

Along this line of reasoning, caution is recommended when examining recent findings that point to the stability of political choices, and to the heritability of political attitudes and preferences (Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005; Bouchard & Lohelin, 2001; Hatemi, Medland, Morley, Heath, & Martin, 2007; Hatemi et al., 2010). Genes likely set the potential for inclinations that under given conditions may turn into values, social attitudes, and political preferences (Smith, Oxley, Hibbing, Alford, & Hibbing, 2011). Although available findings are encouraging, we warn against premature conclusions about either the causes of political stability, or the pathways through which genes may affect political choices, both directly and indirectly via traits, values, and attitudes. One should also not underestimate variability in genetic expression that may stem from the impact of family environments and idiosyncratic experiences (see Funk, chapter 8, this volume).

1.3. Personality in Politics

Several basic and major features of personality are relevant in the political domain, including traits, needs and motives, self-beliefs, values, and social attitudes. Together

they form layers of a hypothetical architecture of personality that operates at different levels and whose elements interact to various degrees. These features address different aspects of personality that shed light on its functioning.

Traits refer to the basic dispositions that predispose one to consistent patterns of thought, feeling, and action (McCrae & Costa, 2008). Needs concern people's conscious or unconscious wishes, desires, or goals (Winter, John, Stewart, Klohnen, & Duncan, 1998). Self-beliefs concern pervasive evaluations and expectations individuals hold about themselves and their life, including self-esteem and life confidence, one's ability to cope with challenging tasks and situations, such as self-efficacy. Values are cognitive representations of desirable, abstract, transsituational goals that serve as a guiding principle in everyday life. Social attitudes are dispositional evaluations, such as likes and dislikes of specific social objects, events, and behaviors that attest to an individual's social bonds and identity.

Traits are related to executive-behavioral functions and concern habitual behaviors, whereas needs, values, and self-beliefs are related to evaluative-motivational functions as they concern people's views of themselves and what they cherish in life. Within a comprehensive and thereby inclusive conception of personality, basic traits have been viewed as distal causes or potentials that precede and predispose one to adopt specific self-beliefs, values, and social attitudes that emerge under the influence of social experiences. Alternatively, basic needs have been viewed as antecedent to basic traits (Winter et al., 1998). Yet causal primacy cannot be easily assumed, since both traits and needs represent inherited features that are set early in life. We are thus inclined to view basic traits and needs as reflecting different, although linked, intrapersonal systems that operate in concert to account for an individual's course of action in manifold domains of functioning, including politics.

One may question whether needs, traits, self-beliefs, values, and social attitudes are sufficient to offer a comprehensive view of personality, and in particular whether intelligence, cognitive abilities, and cognitive styles should be included among the major features of personality. Likewise, most would agree that emotional intelligence, social intelligence, and wisdom should be included within a comprehensive view of personality features, because the notion of intelligence has been extended in the last several decades to include people's capacity to orchestrate their talents and take opportunities that will further their happiness and success. In this regard, we do not doubt that intelligence could enhance political knowledge, foster engagement, and promote leadership. Yet, to our knowledge, empirical support for this claim is less consistent than one would expect.

1.4. Differing Theoretical Approaches to the Study of Personality and Politics

Discussion regarding the influence of personal qualities in politics is long-standing if one includes the seminal intuitions of classic writers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes. In particular, concern for the role that temperament, character, and passion play in the

fortune of leaders and in the behavior of followers precedes the inquiry of psychologists among prominent social scientists (Durkheim, 1933; Le Bon, 1895; Marx, 1844; Tarde, 1903; Weber, 1904). Earlier contributions of psychology go back to the early 1930s and developed over the next several decades in accordance with the approaches that dominated the field of personality at the time: first psychoanalysis, then social learning, and finally cognitive psychology.

Most of these earlier studies were conducted in North America, thus raising questions about the generality and applicability of their research findings to different cultures. Brilliant reviews focusing on the history of personality and politics research can be found in Knutson (1973), Sniderman (1975), Greenstein (1975), and Simonton (1990), and as a consequence we limit our discussion to the major contributions of this research over the last millennium. In the decades that precede and follow World War II, psychoanalysis seemed to provide a reasonable basis for selecting and organizing empirical findings relating personality types to political orientation (see also Post, chapter 15, this volume). For theorists who embraced psychoanalytic theory, political preferences and choices of leaders and followers were interpreted by making reference to unconscious drives and mechanisms. Classic examples based on this approach are the studies of Harold Lasswell (1930, 1948) on the motives behind political engagement (see Winter, chapter 14, this volume) and research under the lead of Theodor Adorno that focused on the authoritarian personality. The study by Adorno and colleagues (1950) was largely influenced by Freudian ideas about the role of drives and of defense mechanisms in the functioning of personality. The revisions of Marxian theory made within the Frankfurt school of social theory (Fromm, 1941; Horkheimer, 1936) about the role of family in the formation of individuals' character and in the reproduction of society, and a more or less explicit commitment to left ideals of the time, were also influential. Psychoanalytic concepts related to unconscious strivings, escape mechanisms, and psychodynamic conflicts were used by Adorno and colleagues (1950) to account for power motives, mass submission to authority, and uncritical adherence of people to totalitarian movements and regimes. Ultimately, nine tightly interrelated traits, including authoritarian aggression, authoritarian submission, conventionalism, anti-intraception, superstition and stereotypy, destructiveness and cynicism, projectivity, concerns over sexuality, and power and toughness, were regarded as distinctive of the authoritarian personality.

From a political standpoint, people with an authoritarian personality were described as those inclined to prejudice and an intolerance of diversity (authoritarian aggression), to follow strong leaders, to admire strength and toughness, to submit to symbols of power (authoritarian submission), and to prefer traditional and conventional values (conventionalism). The hierarchical structure of the patriarchal family, characterized by harsh, punitive parental discipline, was posited at the root of the deference toward authorities and thus at the core of a diffused mentality functional to the maintenance of past regimes whose totalitarian devolution lead to fascism and Nazism.

The authoritarian personality can be considered the first systematic study of the personality determinants of prejudice, and its impact spread much beyond psychology. A number of criticisms, however, followed earlier enthusiasm, leading to a progressive

loss of confidence in the heuristic validity of the theory and its constructs (Brown, 1965; Sanford, 1973). Some criticisms were related to the unidimensionality of authoritarianism and to the psychometric properties of measures (Allport, 1954; Christie & Cook, 1958; Wilson, 1973). Others concerned the ideological biases of authors that led them to view authoritarianism as prototypical of right but not left ideologies (Eysenck, 1954; Rokeach, 1954). Eysenck (1954), in particular, noted considerable similarities between the personalities of National Socialists and Communists, despite their opposite positions on a traditional ideological continuum. He found that extremists on both the political Left (communists) and Right (fascists) were more tough-minded (e.g. highly authoritarian and aggressive) than moderates (conservatives and liberals).

In reality, authoritarian personality features were most common among those on the right of the political spectrum, although various psychological attributes of authoritarianism could also be found among supporters of left-wing ideologies. Rokeach (1956), for instance, found that extremists on the left and right shared a dogmatic personality and rigid thinking that led them to be more resistant than moderates to change and more receptive to closed-minded belief system. Thus other constructs, like dogmatism, intolerance of ambiguity, mental rigidity, closed-mindedness, and alienation, came to the fore as cognitive counterparts to authoritarianism (Budner, 1962; Rokeach, 1956; Seeman, 1959, 1966).

Among the few authors who have had direct access to the personality of political elites, Di Renzo (1963) found that members of the Italian neofascist Social Movement (MSI) scored higher in dogmatism than members of the Communist Party. Similar findings were found by Barker (1963) on a sample of US student activists. There are also sophisticated, in-depth case studies, employing psychobiography and historiographical analyses, that focus on the personalities of prominent politicians, using memoirs, archival documents, and available historical data. The studies by Erikson on Martin Luther (1958) and Mahatma Gandhi (1969), as those of George and George (1956) on Woodrow Wilson, represent classic examples of qualitative approaches to personality and political leadership that have captured the uniqueness of the single case and, at the same time, underscored the limitations in reliability and generalizability of such qualitative single-case studies. Earlier psychodynamic approaches were gradually replaced by new approaches focusing on a leader's worldview (Barber, 1965, 1972), interpersonal traits (Etheredge, 1978), motivations (Hermann, 1977; Winter, 1973; Winter & Stewart, 1977), cognitive styles (Suedfeld & Rank, 1976; Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977), and leadership style (Simonton, 1986, 1988) (see Winter, chapter 14, this volume). Most leadership studies relied on indirect measures to assess personality, either adopting at-a-distance scoring systems or relying upon experts' evaluations.

Costantini and Craik (1980), however, achieved a direct description of members of California's presidential delegation slate across five US presidential campaigns, from 1968 to 1976. Self-reports on a standard personality inventory—the Adjective Check List (Gough & Heilbrun, 1965)—made possible comparisons between politicians and the general public and among politicians of opposite parties. Politicians reported a higher tendency than the general public to seek and maintain a role as leader in groups

(*dominance*), to be assertive, outgoing, ambitious (*self-confidence*), and determined to do well (*achievement*). On the other hand, they showed a lower tendency than the general public to solicit sympathy, affection, or emotional support (*succorance*), to express feelings of inferiority through self-criticism, guilt, or social impotence (*abasement*), and to seek and sustain subordinate roles in relations with others (*deference*). Several differences were also discovered between politicians, reflecting their ideological positioning. Republican showed a higher tendency than Democrats to express optimism and positivity toward life, to be cheerful, interested in others, and ready to adapt (*personal adjustment*), to be tidy, neat, well organized (*order*), diligent, responsive to their obligations (*self-control*), and persistent in the activities undertaken (*endurance*). On the other hand, Democrats showed a higher tendency than Republican to act independently (*autonomy*), to avoid stability (*change*), to be flexible, spontaneous, and unconventional (*liability*), to maintain personal friendships (*affiliation*), to seek the attention of others (*exhibition*), and to solicit their sympathy or support (*succorance*). These findings were among the first to document systematic differences in personality between large groups of politicians from opposite sides of the political divide. However, only at the turn of the 1990s did the growing consensus on general systems to describe personality traits (Big Five) and values (Schwartz's model) give impulse to nomothetic studies and open new avenues to understand the links between personality and politics, and the psychological pathways by which personality influences political preferences and engagement.

2. Personality Determinants of Political Preference

2.1. Basic Personality Traits and Their Political Effects

An impressive body of research has been accumulated in the last three decades positing five basic factors, the so-called Big Five (McCrae & Costa, 1996, 2008), at the roots of major individual differences in personality traits. The Big Five represent the meeting point of two traditions of research, based respectively on analysis the terms laypeople use to distinguish people one from another (i.e., the lexicographic tradition), and on analysis of questionnaire self-reports that assess major interindividual differences in personality (i.e., the factorial tradition). Findings from both research traditions identify five factors as the cornerstone of individual personality in virtually all cultures (McCrae & Allik, 2002). Despite some divergence among various authors regarding the name to be given to these various factors across cultural contexts (Digman, 1990; Goldberg, 1990; John, 1990), there is substantial agreement on the basic five traits: (1) extraversion (or energy), (2) agreeableness, (3) conscientiousness, (4) neuroticism (or emotional stability), and (5) openness to experience (or intellect). Extraversion refers to individuals' tendency to behave and react vigorously in different situations and is usually conveyed

by adjectives such as dynamic, active, and sociable. Agreeableness refers to individuals' concern for altruism, generosity, and loyalty and is usually conveyed by adjectives such as kind, honest, and sincere. Conscientiousness refers to individuals' tendency to pursue order and meet one's own obligations and is usually conveyed by adjectives such as diligent, reliable, and precise. Emotional stability refers to the control of impulses and emotions and is usually conveyed by adjectives such as calm, patient, and relaxed. Finally, openness to experience refers to an interest in culture and curiosity about new experiences and is conveyed by adjectives such as innovative, imaginative, and creative.

Despite having been the target of various criticisms because they do not provide a fine-grained description of a single personality and account even less well for their functioning, at present the Big Five represent the most widely accepted model to address major individual differences in behavioral tendencies in manifold contexts, including politics (Mondak, 2010). Within this framework, numerous studies conducted in a variety of samples drawn from different countries focused on different political outcomes of these traits, including ideological left-right self-placement (Jost, 2006), voting choice (Caprara, Barbaranelli, & Zimbardo, 1999; Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2006; Schoen & Schumann, 2007), political candidate preference (Barbaranelli, Caprara, Vecchione, & Fraley, 2007), political party affiliation (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, & Dowling, 2012), and public policy preferences (Riemann, Grubich, Hempel, Mergl, & Richter, 1993; Schoen & Schumann, 2007).

Findings from the United States (Barbaranelli et al., 2007; Carney, Jost, Gosling, Niederhoffer, & Potter, 2008; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, & Ha, 2010; Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003; Jost, 2006; McCrae, 1996; Mondak & Halperin, 2008; Trapnell, 1994) and several European countries, such as Germany (Riemann et al., 1993; Schoen & Schumann, 2007), Italy (Caprara et al., 1999; 2006), Poland, and Belgium (Van Hiel, Kossowska, & Mervielde, 2000) have shown that individuals high in openness to experience tend to prefer parties and ideologies located in the left wing of traditional ideological cleavages. People high in conscientiousness instead tend to prefer right-wing and conservative ideologies, parties, and issues. Overall, the contribution of conscientiousness to political preference is smaller in magnitude than that of openness to experience. Thus, both in the United States and Europe, liberals and left-wing voters tend to present themselves as more open-minded, creative, and novelty seeking than conservatives and right-wing voters, who in turn tend to present themselves as more orderly, conventional, and organized than liberals and left-wing voters.

Findings regarding the political effects of energy/extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability are less robust and consistent across countries. In some studies, energy/extraversion was found to be associated with a preference for the rightist and conservative ideologies (Caprara et al., 1999; 2006; Gerber et al., 2010; Mondak & Halperin, 2008). Agreeableness was found to be related to a preference for liberal ideologies in some European countries, such as Italy and Germany, whereas results are mixed in the United States. Likely the relation of agreeableness with political orientation is complex and may vary through different cultural contexts and political systems, different facets of the trait (Jost, 2006), and different dimensions (social and economic)

of political ideology (Gerber et al., 2010). Emotional stability predicted ideological self-placement in both Germany and the United States, although in the opposite direction. Whereas people high in emotional stability showed a preference for liberal parties in Germany (Schoen & Schumann, 2007), the inverse relationship was found in the United States, where people with high levels of emotional stability were more oriented toward conservative policies (Mondak & Halperin, 2008) and political parties (Gerber et al., 2010).

The average variance in ideological self-placement accounted for by the Big Five is roughly from 5% to 20%, whereas basic demographic variables such as gender, age, income, and educational level, typically used as predictors of political behavior by political scientists, do not account for more than 10%. A similar pattern is found in research on politicians: personality traits account for greater variance in their political behavior than do demographic characteristics.

In Italy, Caprara and colleagues conducted a first study on a sample of 103 male politicians equally distributed among members of the European Parliament, the Italian Parliament (Chamber and Senate), and three Italian provincial councils (Caprara, Barbaranelli, Consiglio, Picconi, & Zimbardo, 2003). A second study was conducted on a sample of 106 female members of the Italian Parliament, 70% of the entire population of female members (Caprara, Francescato, Mebane, Sorace, & Vecchione, 2010). In both studies politicians completed a standard questionnaire—the Big Five Questionnaire (BFQ, Caprara, Barbaranelli, Borgogni, & Perugini, 1993)—to assess their personality traits. Political orientation was operationalized as the affiliation with center-right or center-left coalitions. Results corroborated the pattern of differences found in the general population, with right-wing politicians scoring higher in energy/extraversion and conscientiousness than did left-wing politicians. No significant differences were found in agreeableness, openness to experience, and emotional stability. Findings from these studies also revealed that self-reported traits contribute to political affiliation of politicians far more than among voters (the percentage of variance accounted for was 36% among politicians and 5% among voters). This pattern of findings is consistent with early intuitions of Converse (1964), who found that a highly involved group of US politicians exhibited higher levels of intercorrelation among ideas and attitudes on various political issues than did the vast majority of Americans.

The political attitudes of politicians are likely to be highly constrained and tightly linked to ideological orientation, because of their high levels of education, political expertise, and sophistication, as suggested in Converse's (1964) seminal study. All these factors contribute to a politician's ideological coherence, and the congruence between their ideas and behavior. Thus, it is not surprising that the polarization in self-presentation between political elites of opposite ideological orientations is higher than among voters (Jost, 2006; Zaller, 1992).

Another interesting line of research has extended the analysis of the link between personality and political preference from individuals to communities, showing that geographical differences in voting patterns reflect differences in self-presentation among citizens living in different states (Rentfrow, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2009). Significant

differences in openness to experience and conscientiousness have been found between red (Republican) and blue (Democratic) states, with higher levels of conscientiousness and lower levels of openness to experience observed in red than blue states.. Common living conditions and social influence may account for similarity in personality traits among inhabitants of the same region, at least in part. Further investigation is needed to establish whether certain states attract certain kind of personalities or whether living in certain states leads, through comparison, contagion, and social desirability, to conformity to styles of thinking, feeling, and behaving that ultimately affects citizens' self-presentation and vote choice.

While the above findings attest to stable and consistent patterns of relations between personality dispositions and ideological preferences, at least among citizens of Western established democracies, it is still possible that traits merely accompany political choice but do not causally influence them. In this regard other findings suggest that personality differences between liberals and conservatives begin in early childhood and affect political orientations throughout life (Block & Block, 2006), and that political ideologies may be shaped by genetic inheritance (Alford et al., 2005; Bouchard & Lohelin, 2001; Hatemi et al., 2007). Thus one might guess that the more preference and engagement rest upon genetic characteristics, the less they change over the course of life. Yet it is unlikely that heredity dictates preferences. Rather it is likely that genes set potentials that largely turn into habits and preferences through experiences that are socially situated. It has been argued (Franklin, 2004) that one's first encounter with voting has an effect over the entire course of life, with voters and abstainers repeating their original choices in future elections. After all, one may guess that early choices, whatever their distal determinants, tend to repeat over the course of life quasi-automatically as habits that attest to both the expressive and objective value of voting.

In reality, voting confronts citizen with a paradoxical dilemma: on the one hand voting has a highly symbolic value as an expression of citizens' right to voice their views; on the other hand it has very little practical value as single votes are somewhat irrelevant to the outcome of an election.

Ultimately the habit of voting or not voting is far from irrational, having both a symbolic function and negligible impact. Thus it would be unwarranted to conclude that stability arises to a greater degree from heredity than experience. In this regard the metaphor of elective affinities used by Jost, Federico, & Napier (2009) provides an elegant solution to the traditional dilemma about the primacy of person or situation, pointing to political choices as a result of the concerted action of individual proclivities and situational opportunities. Likely people whose genes and socialization experiences predispose them to certain political views vote in accordance with contingent political offers.

2.2. Needs

Needs and motives have been used interchangeably and often as synonymous to account for social behaviors; we define them as internal states or forces experienced as wishes

and desires that lead to the achievement of specific goals. Among earlier taxonomies of needs, McClelland (1985) pointed to three basic motives, namely achievement, affiliation, and power, and attributed their relative dominance to early experiences and socialization processes. In this tradition Winter devised an at-a-distance scoring system that allowed researchers to assess these three motives in specific political leaders (Winter, 1987; 1998; 2002; 2003; 2005).

Later contributions, along the line of the "motivated social cognition" movement (Kruglanski, 1996), traced political reasoning and action to epistemic needs for knowledge and meaning (e.g., needs for order, structure, and closure), existential needs for safety and reassurance (e.g., needs to reduce and manage uncertainty and threat), and relational needs for affiliation and social identification (see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a, for a review). Political conservatism in particular has been viewed as a belief system associated with the epistemic need for closure, serving an existential need for safety. It has been reasoned that people with high safety needs tend to be particularly sensitive to threats that may derive from change and uncertainty, and thus process information and organize knowledge in ways that tend to maximize stability, avoid change, and reduce uncertainty (Chirumbolo, 2002; Jost, Kruglanski, & Simon, 1999; Kemmelmeier, 1997; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996).

Yet it is unlikely that only people high in needs for safety and closure are attracted to conservative ideologies. In reality the influence that various needs exert on political decision and action rests upon individual predispositions as well as upon situations and events that in various ways challenge and make salient those needs. Thus even people low in safety needs may be sensitive to security appeals in times of uncertainty and danger, and even those with a moderate need for safety are attracted to conservative ideologies under conditions of great insecurity. In this regard empirical studies have shown that stimuli and situations of danger, threat, and loss can foster a preference for ideological conservatism: the more people are exposed to stimuli and events that elicit safety needs, the more conservative ideologies become appealing (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Jost et al., 2007).

2.3. Basic Values and Core Political Values

Among personality features, basic values form a bridge between the functioning of individuals and of society. On the one hand, values attest to the pervasive influence that socialization practices and memberships in families, groups, class, and communities exert on individuals' development, identity and functioning (see Sears and Brown, chapter 3, this volume). On the other hand values underscore the crucial role individuals play in preserving and changing the guiding principles and the functioning of social systems (Caprara & Cervone, 2000; Hitlin, 2003). The importance of values for political behavior has been championed by the seminal contribution of Rokeach (1973, 1979) and later acknowledged by a number of scholars, who pointed to the central role of values in politics as major organizers of political judgments and preferences (Feldman,

2003; Feldman, chapter 19, this volume; Knutsen, 1995; Mitchell, Tetlock, Mellers, & Ordonez, 1993; Schwartz, 1994).

In the last decades the contribution of Schwartz and his colleagues led to a comprehensive theory on the nature, organization, and function of basic values (Schwartz, 1992; 2005; 2006; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987), which paved the way for systematic research and comparisons among countries on the impact that values exert on both ideological self-placement (Piurko, Schwartz, & Davidov, 2011) and voting behavior (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Caprara et al., 2006). Schwartz's theory identifies 10 different motivational priorities common to people of many cultures and societies, which can be grouped into four higher-order dimensions: Openness to change values (self-direction, stimulation, hedonism) encourages independence of thought, feeling, and action, and receptiveness to change; conservation values (conformity, tradition, security) call for submissive self-restriction, preserving traditional practices, and protecting stability; self-transcendence values (universalism, benevolence) emphasize accepting others as equals and concern for their welfare; self-enhancement values (power, achievement) encourage pursuing one's own relative success and dominance over others.

Studies conducted in several countries showed that Schwartz's values discriminated significantly among voters of different political parties, and that the relevance of particular types of values to voting is a function of the ideological content of the political discourse (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998). In the 1988 Israeli elections, for instance, voters for liberal parties (e.g., MAPAM, Civil Rights Movement, Shinui, and Labor) attributed higher priority to self-direction (autonomy and self-actualization) and universalism (acceptance of others as equal). Voters for conservative parties (e.g., Moleet, Tehiya) gave higher priority to security values, which endorse protection of the social order and status quo (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998).

In the 2001 Italian elections, voters for the center-left attributed higher priority to the self-transcendence values of universalism and benevolence; voters for the center-right gave higher priority to the self-enhancement and conservation values of power, achievement, security, and conformity (Caprara et al., 2006). These results accord with the traditional view in Western democracies pointing to right and conservative ideologies as mostly concerned with individual success and social order, and to liberal ideologies as mostly concerned with equality and social justice.

Results from a sample of Italian politicians corroborated this pattern of relations (Caprara et al., 2010). Like traits, values have a stronger relation with political preference among political elites than among the general electorate. This further attests to the earlier reasoning of Converse (1964) about the constraints that lead sophisticated politicians to hold consistent attitudes. Findings demonstrate that basic values account for a greater portion of variance in voting than do traits (Caprara, Schwartz, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2008), while demographic variables related to voters' social location, such as income and education, have no additional impact once values and traits have been taken into account. We view this finding in accordance with our idea of personality as a proactive self-regulating, agentic system operating in the pursuit of one's goals (Bandura, 1997, 2000; Caprara & Cervone, 2000). As people weigh alternative

aspirations and goals in light of their personal priorities, values account for more variance than traits in predicting choices such as voting, the more their choices rest on conscious deliberation of alternative options (Caprara et al., 2006).

Longitudinal findings help to further clarify the pathways through which traits and values contribute to political preference. Traits measured during late adolescence, before the age of voting, contribute indirectly to later political orientation, through the effect of basic values (Caprara, Vecchione, & Schwartz, 2009). In particular, security and universalism values fully mediate the relations of openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness traits to voting choice and left-right ideology. These findings demonstrate the causal primacy of basic traits over basic values in the pathway to political orientation and choice, in accordance with the vast literature attesting to a significant genetic component of basic traits (Jang, McCrae, Angleitner, Riemann, & Livesley, 1998; Loehlin, McCrae, Costa, & John, 1998), and the importance of socialization experiences in channeling individual dispositions toward values.

Values operate as more proximal determinants of political choices than traits, orienting toward certain ideologies the more politics is instrumental to the pursuits of one's existential priorities. People who differ in their inherited trait dispositions may indeed be differently inclined to endorse basic values linked to liberal or conservative ideologies.

However, even basic values do not directly influence vote choice. Values that are mostly associated with the political domain may act as more proximal determinants of political choice than less overtly political values. Along this line of reasoning a number of authors (e.g., Converse, 1964; Feldman, 1988; Jacoby, 2006; McCann, 1997) have identified a set of core political values (also called "core political attitudes"), which refer to "overarching normative principles and belief assumptions about government, citizenship, and society" (McCann, 1997, p. 565), such as traditional morality (traditional religious and family values versus newer, permissive lifestyles), equality (egalitarian distribution of opportunities and resources), free enterprise (the noninterference of government in the economic system), civil liberties (freedom for everyone to act and think as they consider most appropriate), blind patriotism (unquestioning attachment to, and intolerance of criticism of, one's country), economic security (guarantee of job and income).

Differences in political attitudes have been extensively used to account for variations in policy preferences, voting behavior, and ideological identification. Pollock, Lilie, and Vittes (1993), for example, related core political attitudes to policy preferences regarding nuclear power. McCann (1997) demonstrated that voters for George Bush in the 1992 American elections scored higher on moral traditionalism and lower on egalitarianism than voters for Bill Clinton. Feldman (1988) showed that both equality and individualism correlate significantly with liberal-conservative ideological identification. Liberals attributed most importance to equality of opportunities, whereas conservatives valued most economic individualism.

Many studies have examined the political values of the general public, how they relate to one another, and which underlying set of principles accounts for their structure (Feldman, 1988; Judd, Krosnick, & Milburn, 1981; Zaller, 1992). It has been argued

that basic values and core political values in concert may account for political choices much better than previous left and right, and liberal and conservative distinctions. Only recently, however, has the relation between basic values and core political values been addressed empirically. Schwartz, Caprara, and Vecchione (2010) have shown that core political values account for a substantial portion of variance (54%) in vote choice, largely mediating the contribution of basic values. Whereas basic values account for most of the organization of core political values, these in turn account for most of political preferences. The pursuit of basic values leads people to favor specific political attitudes and ideologies that can promote these basic values in particular political contexts. People who attribute high priority to security, for example, are likely to adopt nationalist political values in political contexts in which nationalism appears to promise greater security.

It is likely that core political values are the characteristic adaptations of basic values to specific political contexts. Yet one should not exclude significant variations across political contexts either in the relations among basic values and core political values or in the pathways conducive to political preference. It has been found, for instance, that basic values explain left-right political orientation more in European countries that share a long political tradition of liberal democracy (i.e. Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) than in countries that have converted to democracy after a long totalitarian regime, like the post-Communist countries, where the left-right dimension has little coherent meaning (Piurko et al., 2011).

2.4. Social and Political Attitudes

Much research in recent years has focused on Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA, Altemeyer, 1996), and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO, Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) as major and proxy determinants of political orientation (Feldman, chapter 19, this volume; Sidanius & Kurzban, chapter 7, this volume). However, it is still a matter of contention as to whether individual differences in RWA and SDO should be traced to personality dispositions or to social attitudes.

The persistent and current interest of political psychologists in the authoritarian personality, despite criticisms of the approach, is due to the contributions of Altemeyer (1988, 1996, 1998), who abandoned earlier ideological and psychodynamic underpinnings of authoritarianism to develop the concept of RWA. According to Altemeyer RWA is a personality characteristic that includes three major features: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism (1981, 1998). High-authoritarian individuals submit uncritically to authorities, carry aggressive feelings against people who deviate from the norms, and conform rigidly to conventional values.

Among social psychologists Pratto and colleagues originally conceived Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) as a "general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers such relations to be equal versus hierarchical" and the "extent to which one desires that one's in-group dominate and be superior to out-groups" (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994, p. 742).

Duckitt and Sibley (2010), finally, view RWA and SDO as two ideological attitude dimensions, which express distinct sets of motivational goals or values, namely "the respective competitive-driven motivation for group-based dominance and superiority (SDO), and threat-driven motivation for collective security and social cohesion (RWA)" (Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002) (p. 546). RWA entails "beliefs in coercive social control, in obedience and respect for existing authorities, and in conforming to traditional moral and religious norms and values" (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009, p. 100), and is mostly related to religiosity and valuing order, structure, conformity, and tradition, and the belief that the social world is dangerous and threatening. In contrast, SDO concerns "beliefs in social and economic inequality as opposed to equality, and the right of powerful groups to dominate weaker ones" (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009, p. 100), and is related to valuing power, achievement, and hedonism, and with the belief that the world is a ruthlessly, competitive jungle in which only the strong survive.

An extensive body of research from North America, New Zealand, and Europe, including ex-Communist countries, identifies both Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance as robust predictors of a number of sociopolitical outcomes usually associated with right-wing ideologies, such as social and economic conservatism, generalized prejudice, intergroup hostility, nationalism, ethnocentrism, and antidemocratic sentiments (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Pratto et al., 1994; Sibley, Robertson, & Wilson, 2006; Roccato & Ricolfi, 2005; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Few investigations, however, have addressed the links between RWA and SDO and other personality features like basic traits and basic values to disentangle their relationships and to clarify the pathways through which they contribute to political preferences. Some authors have posited that conscientiousness and a lack of openness to experience are at the root of RWA. A lack of agreeableness and a lack of openness to experience have been posited, instead, as at the root of SDO (Akrami & Ekehammar, 2006; Ekehammar & Akrami, 2007; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). Others have found that conservation values (security, conformity, and tradition) correlate with RWA, whereas self-enhancement values, above all power, correlate with SDO (Altemeyer, 1988).

Ultimately, Duckitt and Sibley (2010) have advocated a dual-process motivational (DPM) model in which individual factors and social experience in concert contribute to political preferences. In the posited model, personality traits influence ideological preference indirectly through the mediation of RWA and SDO (see also Duckitt, 2001; 2003). As argued by the authors, "RWA and SDO represent two basic dimensions of social or ideological attitudes, each expressing motivational goals or values made chronically salient for individuals by their social worldviews and their personalities" (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009, p. 298). High conscientiousness and low openness to experience may elicit the belief that the social world is an inherently dangerous and threatening place (as opposed to safe and secure), which predisposes individuals to become more authoritarian. Low agreeableness leads people to the belief that the world is competitive, which causes stronger endorsement of social dominance attitudes (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). Social circumstances in their turn may further affect people's beliefs about the world, and thus their level of authoritarianism and social dominance, whose expression may

vary to the degree to which social and economic contingencies lead people to perceive societal threat and danger (RWA), or intergroup inequality and competition (SDO) (Duckitt, 2006). Recent findings, for instance, indicate that the perception of threat from terrorism may activate more "authoritarian" views that result in support for restrictive government policies promoting order and safety (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011).

Despite diverse findings, research on SDO and RWA is largely consistent with the reasoning of Caprara, Schwartz, and colleagues about the influence of traits, values, and core political values on political attitudes (Caprara et al., 2006; Schwartz et al., 2010), as well as with the reasoning of Jost et al. (2009) about elective affinities between a person's proclivities and situational challenges and opportunities. People's predispositions and needs are turned into habits and values, depending on their early socialization and personal experiences. Likewise, situations provide the challenges and opportunities that allow values to turn into habits and action.

2.5. Cognitive Abilities and Styles

Cognitive abilities are generally referred to as an individual's propensity to comprehend complex ideas, adapt successfully to diverse environments, learn from experience, engage in reasoning, and use skills to solve a variety of problems. Although cognitive abilities are important features of a person's total functioning, little research has systematically addressed their influence on political preferences (see Van Hiel, Onraet, & De Pauw, 2010).

In a world in which most people achieve a relatively high level of education and in which success at school and at work largely depends on aspects of intelligence other than IQ, much of the impact of cognitive abilities and education on political preference is mediated by individual differences like traits and values, and their effects are likely to differ across social and political systems. In reality, cognitive styles, namely characteristic ways of conceptually organizing the environment, have long been associated with political preferences of both citizens and political elites (Tetlock, 1983, 1984, 1985; Tetlock & Suedfeld, 1988).

Earlier studies on authoritarianism (Adorno et al., 1950), intolerance of ambiguity (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949), dogmatism (Rokeach, 1960), and uncertainty avoidance (Wilson, 1973) have demonstrated that political conservatives are less flexible than liberals in their way of thinking.

Integrative complexity has become a popular notion in recent research focused on the thinking and reasoning of voters and politicians (Suedfeld, Tetlock, & Streufert, 1992). Integrative complexity refers to the capacity of people to differentiate and integrate multiple points of view when addressing political matters. Whereas differentiation leads people to acknowledge and distinguish all the various aspects of an issue or a decision, integration leads people to make connections among various ideas and elements of judgment.

Earlier studies in Great Britain have shown that right-wing voters and political officials (members of the British House of Commons) report lower levels of integrative

complexity than their left-wing counterparts (Sidanius, 1985, 1988; Tetlock, 1983, 1984). Content analysis of interviews with UK politicians and their policy statements have shown that liberal parliamentarians managed policy issues in more integratively complex ways than their conservative colleagues (Tetlock, 1983, 1984). Similar results were replicated in different political and cultural contexts, such as the Soviet Union (Tetlock, 1988), corroborating the so-called "rigidity of the Right" hypothesis, namely that conservative and right-wing ideological beliefs are associated with mental rigidity and low cognitive complexity.

Other studies, however, have found that extremists from both sides of the political spectrum show lower integrative complexity (e.g., Tetlock & Boettger, 1989) than their more moderate counterparts, in accordance with the ideological extremity hypothesis, namely that traces any extremism to low cognitive sophistication and high mental rigidity (see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003b; Greenberg & Jonas, 2003 for a review).

3. Personality Determinants of Political Participation

In many established democracies, the decline of voter turnout is viewed as a serious symptom of political disengagement (Dalton, 2004; Franklin, 2004). It is difficult to imagine a form of democracy that does not imply some form of active citizenry and responsible participation, and it is difficult to imagine a more reliable and succinct indicator of political engagement, although minimal, than voting. Even where democracy could fully rely on the effective functioning of institutions, lack of political participation would represent a *vulnus* for both individual and society (Allport, 1945; Lanning, 2008).

More than 40 years ago, Milbrath (1965) claimed there was a need to consider the role of personality in models of participation. Yet the lack of consensual theories and methods has represented a major limitation to the accumulation of knowledge in this case. Recent findings, however, attest that significant progress can be made in this domain. Traits, values, and perceived political self-efficacy beliefs, in particular, represent major features of personality that can contribute to understanding and promoting citizens' engagement in politics.

3.1. Traits, Values, and Political Participation

Studies conducted using the Big Five Model have found significant relations between basic traits, such as openness to experience and energy/extraversion, and various forms of political participation, like voting, contacting political representatives, campaigning for candidates, attending political meetings and rallies, attempting to persuade

others on how to vote, contributing to organized political events, displaying yard signs and bumper stickers, donating money to political associations, movements or parties, distributing leaflets, and signing petitions (Anderson, 2009; Gerber et al., 2010; Mondak & Halperin, 2008; Mondak, Hibbing, Canache, Seligson, & Anderson, 2010; Steinbrecher & Schoen, 2010; Vecchione & Caprara, 2009). The effect of these traits is consistent across several countries from different continents (e.g., the United States, Germany, Italy, Venezuela, Uruguay), and persists even after other well-known determinants of civic engagement, like income and education, have been taken into account (Milbrath, 1965; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). It is likely that both openness to experience and energy/extraversion account for individual differences in behavior, communication, and relational styles that are crucial for being successful in the political arena. Important ingredients of political activity such as keeping up to date with main political events, being receptive to a large variety of ideas and points of views, and interacting with a large diversity of people, may benefit from a genuine openness toward others and the world. In addition, several facets of energy/extraversion such as assertiveness, persuasiveness, and dominance, are crucial to participating and being successful in politics. Previous results suggest that extraversion is consistently related to leadership across study settings and leadership criteria (Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt, 2002). Other findings have shown that politicians score higher than the general population on energy/extraversion (Best, 2011; Caprara et al., 2003).

These results are in accordance with those of Silvester and Dykes (2007), who focused on personal determinants of electoral success among a large sample of political candidates. Their study is unique in that it uses data from an assessment center set up by a major UK political party for selecting prospective parliamentary candidates. It has been found that both critical thinking and communication skills are significantly associated with candidates' political performance, as assessed through the percentage of votes achieved in the 2005 UK general election. As argued by Silvester (2008), "politicians must be able to shift through large amounts of information quickly, identify key arguments, balance conflicting demands and formulate responses" (p. 128). On the other hand, they must be able to communicate effectively across different audiences and communication media, as well as be able to persuade potential voters of their intentions (Silvester, 2008). It is likely that much of the capacity needed to analyze, organize, and integrate information and needed to convince and persuade people can be traced to basic traits like energy/extraversion and openness to experience, although not only these traits, and not directly.

Recent contributions have pointed to the role of personal values in affecting citizens' decision to vote. Although voting is the minimal expression of political participation, people have no reason to vote unless they perceive that voting serves to promote their personal priorities to a certain degree. Conversely, the more people perceive political programs as irrelevant to or incongruent with their values, interests, and priorities, the less voting is perceived as mandatory and the more people are inclined to abstain. Based on this reasoning, a recent study addressed the influence of personal values on electoral participation (Caprara, Vecchione, & Schwartz, 2012). In the Italian context,

people who did vote assigned relatively high priority either to universalism values or to security values, namely the values appealed to by the two major political coalitions. Nonvoters, by contrast, attributed less importance than voters to values like universalism and security that were decisive in allocating left and right preferences, and assigned greater importance to values like stimulation and hedonism that have no impact on political preference. As neither coalition was associated with promoting the pursuit of excitement or pleasure, voting offered little payoff for reaching these goals that motivated nonvoters.

3.2. Perceived Political Efficacy

Political efficacy has been a popular and relevant concept in political science. First, Campbell, Gurin, & Miller (1954) conceptualized political efficacy as the "feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, namely, that it is worthwhile to perform one's civic duties" (Campbell et al., 1954, p. 187). Although initially conceived as a unitary construct, it soon became clear that political efficacy included both judgments people make about their own capacities and their attitudes toward the political system. Then a number of authors suggested distinguishing between internal and external political efficacy, pointing respectively to two components of people's beliefs regarding their contribution to change in society (Converse, 1972; Craig, 1979; Gurin & Brim, 1984; Lane, 1959): people's beliefs regarding their ability to achieve desired results in the political domain and people's beliefs that the political system is amenable to change through individual and collective influence.

While a number of studies have shown that internal political efficacy plays an important role in promoting political participation and civic engagement (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982; Finkel, 1985; Madsen, 1987; Milbrath & Goel, 1977; Zimmerman, 1989), external political efficacy has been found to be associated with general trust in the functioning of the political system and institutions (Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991).

A major limitation of the above findings is that most studies are not grounded in a comprehensive theory of personality functioning capable of accounting for why and how people's beliefs in their efficacy influence their political behavior. Social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986; 1997) makes a useful contribution in this respect, placing political efficacy within a broad theory of human agency. The theory focuses on perceived political efficacy, which is defined as the judgments people make about their capacities to perform effectively in the political domain, and views this as a major determinant of political engagement. The theory states that (*a*) people are self-organizing, proactive, and self-regulating agents because of the self-reflective and forethoughtful properties of the human mind; (*b*) people's self-directive capacity operates through structures and mechanisms that grant control over the environment and set the course of people's own life; (*c*) people learn from their own and others' experience, infer their sense of efficacy from dealing successfully with challenging situations, engage in activities that give them satisfaction and self-worth, avoid behaviors that carry self-censure, and accord their

behavior to the values they cherish while pursuing goals that they perceive as within their reach; (*d*) people make judgments about their capacities, namely self-efficacy beliefs, that are the most influential determinants of their efforts and accomplishments.

A broad literature documents the pervasive influence of perceived self-efficacy on cognition, motivation, learning, and performance, while diverse lines of research attest to the role that self-efficacy beliefs exert in sustaining intellectual development, social adjustment, and well-being while promoting academic achievement, work performance, and healthy habits. The judgments people make about their capacity to be effective in the realm of politics are critical to inclining them to devote the time and effort needed to stay informed and participate actively. Lacking a sense of personal efficacy may nurture both feelings of distance and alienation conducive to disenchantment and ultimately to withdrawal from politics.

A study by Caprara, Vecchione, Capanna, and Mebane (2009) illustrates the close link between political engagement and perceived efficacy. Italian politicians reported higher perceived political efficacy than political activists who, in turn, reported higher political self-efficacy than voters who were not political activists. This finding held regardless of the political orientation or ideology of the people involved. Other findings verify the mediational role that political self-efficacy beliefs play in linking openness to experience and energy/extraversion traits to political engagement (Vecchione & Caprara, 2009). Personality traits provide the potential for political activity, but they do not necessarily turn into political action. Likely values are crucial to channel traits, but values are not sufficient to grant that people will invest their talents and virtues in politics, unless properly equipped for the political arena. People can be extremely energetic and open-minded, but, whatever their value priorities, it is unlikely that they will get actively involved in politics unless they feel capable of doing what politics contingently requires.

4. Navigating Political Waters through Personality Compass

4.1. Dispositional and Likeability Heuristics: The Role of Traits in the Impressions and Evaluations Voters Draw from Politicians

Modern politics presents voters with an enormous amount of information from multiple sources. The media saturates the voting population with images designed to reflect, portray, invent, construe, and sometimes denigrate the personalities of political candidates. Given the enormous amount of information people have from multiple media sources about issues, candidates, parties, appeals, and negative campaigns, the task of

making judgments about political personalities would seem to be a rather challenging one. Cognitive theorists argue that individuals navigate through the complexity of their political environments by using heuristics as efficient mental shortcuts for organizing information and simplifying political choices (Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991). Likewise scholars of political reasoning have pointed to a variety of strategies that people use to make reasonable choices, given their bounded rationality (Delli Carpini, Huddy, & Shapiro, 1996; Popkin, 1991; Simon, 1985). One of these is a dispositional heuristic that anchors impressions and inferences about politicians' intentions to traits that are habitually used to describe oneself and others and that are most important within politics (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004). Dispositional inferences about politicians may be spontaneously activated, as for any other person (Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996), may summarize a variety of feelings and perceptions, and may carry specific attributions about politicians' motives and intentions. People are able to make judgments about a politician's competence after only a brief exposure to their visual image (Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, & Hall, 2005). Dispositional constructs provide a parsimonious way to organize knowledge and to extend voters' control over politicians' future performance on the common assumption that personality dispositions are relatively stable.

A number of studies have shown that voters process information about candidates in a schematic fashion (Conover & Feldman, 1986); and that traits play an important role in organizing political knowledge preferences (Funk, 1999). Findings from several studies conducted in the United States and Italy have shown that voters' judgments of politicians can typically be traced back to two clusters of traits, which have been referred to as *integrity*, which represents a blend of agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional stability, and *leadership*, which represents a blend of energy/extraversion and openness to experience (Caprara, Barbaranelli, & Zimbardo, 1997; 2002). These dimensions largely overlap with the two personality features of politicians that have been frequently reported as being the most important among electorates in several democracies of the Western world (Popkin, 1991). Thus, when voters appraise the personalities of leading politicians, the typical five-factor structure collapses into two broader categories, that is, energy/extraversion and friendliness, which serve as the main anchors or *attractors* for evaluating politicians' personality and subsume the other dimensions of the Big Five. These are also the factors in which politicians report higher scores than nonpoliticians (Caprara et al., 2003).

The same simplified solution has been replicated in Italy for voter judgments of politicians with different degrees of political leadership, and with the major coalition leaders serving in different roles (Caprara, Barbaranelli, Fraley, & Vecchione, 2007). Replicating earlier findings from the United States (Miller, Wattenberg, & Malanchuk, 1986), this result suggests that judgmental categories used to evaluate politicians' personalities tend to remain remarkably stable over years, despite changes in their political responsibilities. The use of this kind of dispositional heuristic allows voters both to simplify the personal information that is made available about candidates and to anchor their judgments to personality traits that are most relevant for holding political offices.

As the media expose citizens to a huge amount of contrasting information, the simplified perceptions of the personalities of political leaders can be instrumental to a cognitively efficient strategy that leads voters to focus on what they care for and expect most from politicians at a given time in a given context. In doing so, they may sacrifice a more detailed, informative, fine-grained evaluation of the candidates' personalities. Yet a functional trade-off can take place between distinctiveness and comprehensiveness as latent factors become restricted in number but broadened in latitude.

Another form of judgmental heuristic at work in the political domain is a kind of likeability heuristic by which choices between people are weighted on the basis of the sympathy and positive affect they may elicit (Sniderman et al., 1991). The more a candidate is liked, the higher is his or her probability of attracting votes. A well-documented literature supports the hypothesis that individuals are most attracted by people who are similar to themselves (Byrne, 1971; Fiske, 2004; Klohnen & Luo, 2003). This attraction may serve a series of needs, such as personal coherence, belonging, and control over the environment. Both familiarity and a kind of egocentric favoritism may contribute to liking those who are perceived as similar to oneself (Byrne, Bond, & Diamond, 1968; Zajonc, 1980). People may like others who share the same preferences, proclivities, and aversions in order to be consistent and maintain a balanced state of feelings and cognitions (Heider, 1958), or because these shared attributes reaffirm and validate one's own (Fiske, 2004).

The similarity-attraction relationship has gradually gained support in different domains of political preferences. Physical similarity, for instance, proved influential in increasing candidate support in an experiment in which the degree of candidate-voter facial similarity was manipulated. People showed higher preference for facially similar candidates, even though participants were not aware of the similarity manipulation (Bailenson, Iyengar, Yee, & Collins, 2008).

Other studies have pointed to the role that personality traits may exert in anchoring and fostering similarity judgments. Findings drawn from the 2004 presidential election in the United States and from the 2006 Italian national elections have shown that voters generally perceive politicians for whom they vote as being most similar to themselves with respect to a variety of personality characteristics, while those they do not vote for are judged to be most different (Caprara, Vecchione, Barbaranelli, & Fraley, 2007). As traits allow voters to organize their impressions of politicians in a coherent fashion and to link politicians' perceived personalities to their own personalities, it is likely that traits are among the major elements through which the similarity-attraction principle operates in politics.

Whatever the source of similarity, whether physical or moral, whether real or just attributed, one cannot doubt the function that it exerts in building and keeping consensus. As people tend to like people whom they perceive as similar to themselves, voters will like and therefore vote for candidates they consider most similar. Thus, similarity promotes likeability, which in turn affects political judgments and choices. The more voters acknowledge in their leaders the same personal qualities that they use to

characterize themselves, the easier it will be for voters to infer that their leader will act on their behalf and in accordance with a shared worldview.

4.2. A Congruency Model of Political Preference and Participation

Congruency between emotions, cognitions, and actions corresponds to a kind of necessity that marks our lives. Individuals feel uneasy when behavior does not fall in line with feelings and reasoning, and when emotions, thoughts, and actions are not in accordance with one another. In reality, it is a property of our self-system and a necessity of our social life to preserve a certain level of congruency between what we declare and what we do and between how we feel and how we present ourselves. Patterns of congruity between thoughts, emotions, and actions are at the core of our identity; they get associated with the experience of unity and continuity, allow us to make sense of others' behaviors, feelings, and thoughts on the assumption that what accounts for oneself also accounts for others, and, finally, contribute to the stability of the relationship among people, by conferring a sense of stability, predictability, and controllability to their exchanges.

Several findings support the view that a powerful congruency principle is functioning at different stages of political transactions, with personality evaluations playing a crucial role in making sense of both voters' preferences and politicians' appeals (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004).

The congruency principle accounts for how the distinctive personality characteristics reported by leaders and followers can be traced back to common ideals that supply the emotional glue that bonds them together. The same principle operates in allowing voters to equate congruency in their habits, values, and preferences as diagnostic of a politician's ideological orientations. Next, it operates in how voters appraise politicians' personality, selecting those attributes that they believe to be most relevant to the political office and that they personally value most. Finally, it operates in how voters perceive politicians as similar to themselves, either because politicians and voters of the same coalition share similar values and habits, or because politicians tend to convey images that highlight traits that are most congruent with the political views they advocate. While the image that people have and cultivate of themselves serves as a compass to navigate the world of politics, congruency attests to the commonality of feelings, thoughts, habits, and ideals among partisans, while accentuating the distinctiveness among opponents.

Just as there is a match between what people report about themselves in the sphere of habits, needs, values, and political orientations, there is a similar match between the self-reported personality of voters and the perceived personality of preferred politicians. The same congruency principle may contribute to individuals' political engagement. The more voters' preferences meet political offerings that are congruent with the values that most account for their personal and social identity, the more they feel committed to vote and draw a sense of self-actualization from voting. The more voters acknowledge in other voters the same personal qualities that they use to characterize themselves, and

the more they expect others will behave like them, the more they derive a sense of inclusion and collective efficacy. The more voters acknowledge in their leaders the same personal characteristics that they use to characterize themselves, the more they will draw a sense of control over their actions, and the easier it will be for them to make sense of their leader's choices. The more citizens feel close to their representatives, the more they have reason to believe that their own opinions count, and the more reason they have to pay the cost of political engagement.

As congruency is crucial in matching individuals' preferences and political offerings, personal and collective efficacy beliefs are crucial in sustaining political participation. Ultimately, congruency and efficacy go hand in hand in sustaining political participation: the more politics is perceived within the reach of their understanding and pursuits, the more people will have reason to invest in politics. Conversely, incongruency between leaders' behaviors, political programs, and citizen's priorities may fuel feelings of distance, alienation, and powerlessness conducive to various forms of democratic disenfranchisement, no matter whether due to self- or social exclusion. This may be the case when voters face a world of politics whose functioning is incomprehensible or beyond their control, when issues seem irrelevant, or when political programs are disjoined from people's priorities and values. Common sense dictates that people's engagement does not matter when leaders operate like members of a caste apart from other citizens.

5. Conclusions

The findings reported above demonstrate the contribution of personality science to an understanding of the psychological processes and structures that account for one's ideological orientation and level of political participation. They also highlight the contribution of personality science to an understanding of the personal determinants that are at the core of democratic consensus and a well-functioning democracy.

Democracy may be defined as the form of government that aims for the realization of self-determination and ultimately for the actualization of the potentials of self-reflective agents (Dahl, 2007; Post, 2006). In reality, the traditional ethos of democracy requires members to see themselves and treat each other as socially equal in their capacities to express their opinions and preferences in the pursuit of conditions that may maximize public welfare. Equality and freedom are ideals crucial to democracy, and granting citizens the best conditions to express their talents and potentials is crucial for the realization of those ideals.

People, in fact, are not just beings endowed with talents that predispose them to react in particular ways when confronted with particular stimuli or tasks, but beings endowed with a vast array of unexpressed capacities that are realized within appropriate environments. Potentials draw attention to the fact that personal qualities develop and express themselves through dynamic interactions between people and their sociocultural

environment, assigning them a proactive role in selecting and changing the situations they encounter, and ultimately setting the course of their life. In this regard, understanding the development and functioning of personality is no less important than knowledge regarding the functioning of social institutions and government. Likewise, addressing the personality features that account for political behavior is no less important that addressing the processes and mechanisms that account for its development and change. This leads to research that extends beyond a study of needs and abilities to capture self-regulatory mechanisms that are at the core of human agency.

Ultimately we believe that the growth of personality and the growth of democracy are conditional and reciprocal. The growth of democracy should grant the conditions for the full expression of citizens' potentials and thus for the most knowledgeable political participation, while citizens' major engagement in politics should contribute to the democratization of the entire political process. To this aim further research is needed to identify the experiences and pathways conducive to the endorsement of worldviews and lifestyles that are most congenial to democracy and the policies that may promote and sustain those experiences.

Our reasoning draws upon knowledge and ideals of Western democracies, and one should be aware that the same reasoning may not apply to the same degree and in the same fashion to other social and cultural contexts where notions like human agency, personal and social identity, ideology, and political rights are expressed in different ways. In reality, one may doubt that the same principles apply in societies where women have no voice, dissenters are prosecuted, and power does not belong to the people.

References

Abramson, P. R., & Aldrich, J. H. (1982). The decline of electoral participation in America. *American Political Science Review*, *76*, 502–521.

Adorno, T., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D., & Sanford, R. (1950). *The authoritarian personality*. New York: Harper.

Akrami, N., & Ekehammar, B. (2006). Right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation: Their roots in Big Five personality factors and facets. *Journal of Individual Differences*, *27*, 117–126. doi:10.1027/1614-0001.27.3.117

Alford, J. R., Funk, C. L., & Hibbing, J. R. (2005). Are political orientations genetically transmitted? *American Political Science Review*, *99*, 153–167. doi:10.1017/S0003055405051579

Allport, G. W. (1945). The psychology of participation. *Psychological Review*, *52*, 117–132.

Allport, G. W. (1954). *The Nature of Prejudice*. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Altemeyer, R. A. (1981). *Right-wing authoritarianism*. Manitoba: University of Manitoba Press.

Altemeyer, R. A. (1988). *Enemies of freedom: Understanding right-wing authoritarianism*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Altemeyer, R. A. (1996). *The authoritarian specter*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Altemeyer, R. A. (1998). The other "authoritarian personality." In M. P. Zanna (ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (vol. 30, pp. 47–91). New York: Academic Press.

Anderson, M. R. (2009). Beyond membership: A sense of community and political behavior. *Political Behavior*, *31*, 603–627. doi:10.1007/s11109-009-9089-x

Bailenson, J. N., Iyengar, S., Yee, N., & Collins, N. A. (2008). Facial similarity between voters and candidates causes influence. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *72*, 935–961. doi:10.1093/poq/nfn064

Bandura, A. (1986). *Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Bandura, A. (1997). *Self-efficacy: The exercise of control*. New York: Freeman.

Bandura, A. (2000). Exercise of human agency through collective efficacy. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *9*, 75–78. doi:10.1111/1467-8721.00064

Barbaranelli, C., Caprara, G. V., Vecchione, M., & Fraley, R. C. (2007). Voters' personality traits in presidential elections. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *42*, 1199–1208. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2006.09.029

Barber, J. D. (1965). *The lawmakers: Recruitment and adaptation to legislative life.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Barber, J. D. (1972). *The presidential character: Predicting performance in the White House*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Barker, E. N. (1963). Authoritarianism of the political right, center, and left. *Journal of Social Issues*, *19*, 63–74. doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.1963.tb00439.x

Barnea, M. F., & Schwartz, S. H. (1998). Values and voting. *Political Psychology*, *19*, 17–40. doi:10.1111/0162-895X.00090

Best, H. (2011). Does personality matter in politics? Personality factors as determinants of parliamentary recruitment and policy preferences. *Comparative Sociology*, *10*, 928–948.

Block, J., & Block, J. H. (2006). Nursery school personality and political orientation two decades later. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *40*, 734–749. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2005.09.005

Bouchard, T. J., Jr., & Lohelin, J. C. (2001). Genes, personality, and evolution. *Behavior Genetics*, *31*, 23–73.

Brown, R. (1965). The authoritarian personality and the organization of attitudes. In R. Brown (ed.), *Social Psychology* (pp. 477–546). New York: Free Press.

Budner, S. (1962). Intolerance of ambiguity as a personality variable. *Journal of Personality*, *30*, 29–59. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.339

Byrne, D. (1971). *The attraction paradigm*. New York: Academic Press.

Byrne, D., Bond, M. H., & Diamond, M. J. (1968). Responses to political candidates as a function of attitude similarity-dissimilarity. *Human Relations*, *22*, 251–262. doi:10.1177/001872676902200305

Campbell, A., Gurin, G., & Miller, W. (1954). *The voter decides*. Evanston, IL: Row Peterson.

Caprara, G. V. (1996). Structures and processes in personality psychology. *European Psychologist*, *1*, 14–26. doi:10.1027/1016-9040.1.1.14

Caprara, G. V., Barbaranelli, C., Borgogni, L., & Perugini, M. (1993). The Big Five Questionnaire: A new questionnaire to assess the five factor model. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *15*, 281–288.

Caprara, G. V., Barbaranelli, C., Consiglio, C., Picconi, L., & Zimbardo, P. G. (2003). Personalities of politicians and voters: Unique and synergistic relationships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *84*, 849–856. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.84.4.849

Caprara, G. V., Barbaranelli, C., Fraley, R. C., & Vecchione, M. (2007). The simplicity of politicians' personalities across political context: An anomalous replication. *International Journal of Psychology*, *42*, 393–405. doi:10.1080/00207590600991104

Caprara, G. V., Barbaranelli, C., & Zimbardo, P. (1997). Politicians' uniquely simple personalities. *Nature*, *385*, 493. doi:10.1038/385493a0

Caprara, G. V., Barbaranelli, C., & Zimbardo, P. (1999). Personality profiles and political parties. *Political Psychology*, *20*, 175–197. doi:10.1111/0162-895X.00141

Caprara, G. V., Barbaranelli, C., & Zimbardo, P. (2002). When parsimony subdues distinctiveness: Simplified public perception of politicians' personality. *Political Psychology*, *23*, 77–96. doi:10.1111/0162-895X.00271

Caprara, G. V., & Cervone, D. (2000). *Personality: Determinants, dynamics and potentials*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Caprara, G. V., Francescato, D., Mebane, M., Sorace, R., & Vecchione, M. (2010). Personality foundations of ideological divide: A comparison of women members of parliament and women voters in Italy. *Political Psychology*, *31*, 739–762. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00780.x

Caprara, G. V., Schwartz, S. H, Capanna, C., Vecchione, M., & Barbaranelli, C. (2006). Personality and politics: Values, traits, and political choice. *Political Psychology*, *27*, 1–28. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2006.00447.x

Caprara, G. V., Schwartz, S. H., Vecchione, M., & Barbaranelli, C. (2008). The personalization of politics: Lessons from the Italian case. *European Psychologist*, *3*, 157–172. doi:10.1027/1016-9040.13.3.157

Caprara, G. V., Vecchione, M., Barbaranelli, C., & Fraley, R. C. (2007). When likeness goes with liking: The case of political preference. *Political Psychology*, *28*, 609–632. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2007.00592.x

Caprara, G. V., Vecchione, M., Capanna, C., & Mebane, M. (2009). Perceived political self-efficacy: Theory, assessment, and applications. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *39*, 1002–1020. doi:10.1002/ejsp.604

Caprara, G. V., Vecchione, M., & Schwartz, S. H. (2009). Mediational role of values in linking personality traits to political orientation. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, *12*, 82–94. doi:10.1111/j.1467-839X.2009.01274.x

Caprara, G. V., Vecchione, M., Schwartz, S. H. (2012). Why people do not vote: The role of personal values. *European Psychologist*, *17*, 266–278. doi:10.1027/1016-9040/a000099

Caprara, G. V., & Zimbardo, P. (2004). Personalizing politics: A congruency model of political preference. *American Psychologist*, *59*, 581–594. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.59.7.581

Carney, D. R., Jost, J. T., Gosling, S. D., Niederhoffer, K., & Potter, J. (2008). The secret lives of liberals and conservatives: Personality profiles, interaction styles, and the things they leave behind. *Political Psychology*, *29*, 807–840. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00668.x

Chirumbolo, A. (2002). The relationship between need for cognitive closure and political orientation: The mediating role of authoritarianism. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *32*, 603–610. doi:10.1016/S0191-8869(01)00062-9

Conover, P. J., & Feldman, S. (1986). The role of inference in the perception of political candidates. In R. R. Lau & D. O. Sears (eds.), *Political cognition* (pp. 127–155). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Converse, P. E. (1964). The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In D. E. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and discontent* (pp. 206–261). New York: Free Press.

Converse, P. E. (1972). Change in the American electorate. In A. Campbell & P. E. Converse (eds.), *The human meaning of social change* (pp. 263–337). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Costantini, E., & Craik, K. H. (1980). Personality and politicians: California party leaders, 1960–1976. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *38*, 641–661. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.38.4.641

Craig, S. C. (1979). Efficacy, trust, and political behavior: An attempt to resolve a lingering conceptual dilemma. *American Politics Quarterly*, *7*, 225–239. doi:10.1177/1532673X7900700207

Christie, R., & Cook, P. (1958). A guide to published literature relating to the authoritarian personality through 1956. *Journal of Psychology*, *45*, 171–199.

Dahl, R. (2007). *Sull'uguaglianza politica* [About political equality]. Rome: Laterza.

Dalton, R. (2004). *Democratic challenges, democratic choices: The erosion of political support in advanced industrial democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Delli Carpini, M. X., Huddy, L., & Shapiro, R. (1996). *Research in micropolitics: Rethinking rationality*. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Di Renzo, G. (1963). *Personalità e potere politico* [Personality and political leadership]. Bologna: il Mulino.

Digman, J. M. (1990). Personality structure: Emergence of the five-factor model. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *41*, 417–440. doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.41.020190.002221

Duckitt, J. (2001). A cognitive-motivational theory of ideology and prejudice. In M. P. Zanna (ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (vol. 33, pp. 41–113). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Duckitt, J. (2003). Prejudice and intergroup hostility. In D. Sears, L. Huddy, & R. Jervis (eds.), *Oxford handbook of political psychology* (pp. 559–600). New York: Oxford University Press.

Duckitt, J. (2006). Differential effects of right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation on outgroup attitudes and their mediation by threat from and competitiveness to outgroups. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *32*, 1–13. doi:10.1177/0146167205284282

Duckitt, J., & Sibley, C. G. (2009). A dual process model of ideological attitudes and system justification. In J. T. Jost, A. C. Kay, & H. Thorisdottir (eds.), *Social and psychological bases of ideology and system justification* (pp. 292–313). New York: Oxford University Press.

Duckitt, J., & Sibley, C. G. (2010). Personality, ideology, prejudice, and politics: A dual process motivational model. *Journal of Personality*, *78*, 1861–1894. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2010.00672.x

Duckitt, J., Wagner, C., du Plessis, I., & Birum, I. (2002). The psychological bases of ideology and prejudice: Testing a dual process model. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *82*, 75–93. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.83

Durkheim, E. (1933). *The division of labor in society*. New York: Free Press.

Ekehammar, B., & Akrami, N. (2007). Personality and prejudice: From Big-Five personality factors to facets. *Journal of Personality*, *75*, 899–926. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2007.00460.x

Erikson, E. H. (1958). *Young man Luther*. New York: Norton.

Erikson, E. H. (1969). *Gandhi's truth*. New York: Norton.

Etheredge, L. S. (1978). Personality effects on American foreign policy, 1898–1968: A test of interpersonal generalization theory. *American Political Science Review*, *72*, 434–451.

Eysenck, H. J. (1954). *The psychology of politics*. New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall.

Feldman, S. (1988). Structure and consistency in public opinion: The role of core beliefs and values. *American Journal of Political Science*, *32*, 416–440.

Feldman, S. (2003). Values, ideology, and structure of political attitudes. In D. O. Sears, L. Huddy, & R. Jervis (ed.), *Oxford handbook of political psychology* (pp. 477–508). New York: Oxford University Press.

Finkel, S. E. (1985). Reciprocal effects of participation and political efficacy: A panel analysis. *American Journal of Political Science*, *29*, 891–913. doi:10.2307/2111186

Fiske, S. T. (2004). *Social beings: A core motives approach to social psychology*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley.

Franklin, M. (2004). *Voter turnout and the dynamics of electoral competition in established democracies since 1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Frenkel-Brunswik, E. (1949). Intolerance of ambiguity as an emotional and perceptual variable. *Journal of Personality*, *18*, 108–143. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.1949.tb01236.x

Fromm, E. (1941). *Escape from freedom*. New York: Rinehart.

Funk, C. L. (1999). Bringing the candidate into models of candidate evaluation. *Journal of Politics*, *61*, 700–720. doi:10.2307/2647824

George, A. L., & George, J. L. (1956). *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A personality study*. New York: Day.

Gerber, A. S, Huber, G. A., Doherty, D., & Dowling, C. M. (2012). Personality and the strength and direction of partisan identification. *Political Behavior*, *34*, 653–688. doi:10.1007/s11109-011-9178-5

Gerber, A. S, Huber, G. A., Doherty, D., Dowling, C. M., & Ha, S. (2010). Personality and political attitudes: Relationships across issue domains and political contexts. *American Political Science Review*, *104*, 111–133. doi:10.1017/S0003055410000031

Goldberg, L. R. (1990). An alternative "description of personality": The Big-Five factor structure. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *59*, 1216–1229. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.59.6.1216

Gough, H. G., & Heilbrun, A. B. (1965). *The Adjective Check List manual*. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.

Gurin, P., & Brim, O. G. (1984). Change in self in adulthood: The example of sense of control. In P. B. Baltes & O. G. Brim (eds.), *Lifespan development and behavior* (vol. 6, pp. 281–334). New York: Academic Press.

Heider, F. (1958). *The psychology of interpersonal relation*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Hetherington, M., & Suhay, E. (2011). Authoritarianism, threat, and Americans' support for the war on terror. *American Journal of Political Science*, *55*, 546–560. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00514.x

Horkheimer, M. (1936). Studien über Autorität und Familie. *Schriften des Instituts für Sozialforschung*, *5*, 947.

Gosling, S. D., Rentfrow, P. J., & Swann, W. B., Jr. (2003). A very brief measure of the Big Five personality domains. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *37*, 504–528. doi:10.1016/S0092-6566(03)00046-1

Greenberg, J. & Jonas, E. (2003). Psychological motives and political orientation—the left, the right, and the rigid: Comment on Jost et al. (2003). *Psychological Bulletin*, *129*, 376–382. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.376

Greenstein, F. I. (1975). Personality and politics. In F. I. Greenstein & N. W. Polsby (eds.), *The handbook of political science* (vol. 2, pp. 1–92). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Hatemi, P. K., Hibbing, J. R., Medland, S. E., Keller, M. C., Alford, J. R., Smith, K. B., Martin, N. G., & Eaves, L. J. (2010). Not by twins alone: Using extended family design to investigate genetic influence on political beliefs. *American Journal of Political Science*, *54*, 798–814. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00461.x

Hatemi, P. K., Medland, S. E., Morley, K. I., Heath, A. & Martin, N. C. (2007). The genetics of voting: An Australian twin study. *Behaviorial Genetics*, *37*, 435–448. doi:10.1007/s10519-006-9138-8

Hermann, M. G. (Ed.). (1977). *A psychological examination of political leaders*. New York: Free Press.

Hitlin, S. (2003) Values as the core of personal identity: Drawing links between two theories of the self. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *66*, 118–137. doi:10.2307/1519843

Jacoby, W. G. (2006). Value choices and American public opinion. *American Journal of Political Science*, *50*, 706–723. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00211.x

Jang, K. L., McCrae, R. R., Angleitner, A., Riemann, R., & Livesley, W. J. (1998). Heritability of facet-level traits in a cross-cultural twin sample: Support for a hierarchical model of personality. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *74*, 1556–1565. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.6.1556

John, O. P. (1990). The "Big Five" factor taxonomy: Dimensions of personality in the natural language and in questionnaires. In L. A. Pervin (ed.), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (pp. 66–100). New York: Guilford Press.

Jost, J. T. (2006). The end of the end of ideology. *American Psychologist*, *61*, 651–670. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.61.7.651

Jost, J. T., & Banaji, M. R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the production of false consciousness. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *33*, 1–27. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8309.1994.tb01008.x

Jost, J. T., Banaji, M. R., & Nosek, B. A. (2004). A decade of system justification theory: Accumulated evidence of conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo. *Political Psychology*, *25*, 881–919. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00402.x

Jost, J. T., Federico, C. M., & Napier, J. L. (2009). Political ideology: Its structure, functions, and elective affinities. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *60*, 307–337. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163600

Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003a). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. *Psychological Bulletin*, *129*, 339–375. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.339

Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. (2003b). Exceptions that prove the rule: Using a theory of motivated social cognition to account for ideological incongruities and political anomalies. *Psychological Bulletin*, *129*, 383–393. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.383

Jost, J. T., Kruglanski, A. W., & Simon, L. (1999). Effects of epistemic motivation on conservatism, intolerance, and other system justifying attitudes. In L. Thompson, D. M. Messick, & J. M. Levine (eds.), *Shared cognition in organizations: The management of knowledge* (pp. 91–116). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Jost, J. T., Napier, J. L., Thorisdottir, H., Gosling, S. D., Palfai, T. P., & Ostafin, B. (2007). Are needs to manage uncertainty and threat associated with political conservatism or ideological extremity? *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *33*, 989–1007. doi:10.1177/0146167207301028

Judd, C. M., Krosnick, J. A., & Milburn, M. A. (1981). Political involvement and attitude structure in the general public. *American Sociological Review*, *46*, 660–669.

Judge, T. A., Bono, J. E., Ilies, R., & Gerhardt, M. (2002). Personality and leadership: A qualitative and quantitative review. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *87*, 765–780.

Kemmelmeier, M. (1997). Need for closure and political orientation among German university students. *Journal of Social Psychology*, *137*, 787–789. doi:10.1080/00224549709595501

Klohnen, E. C., & Luo, S. (2003). Interpersonal attraction and personality: What is attractive: Self similarity, ideal similarity, complementarity, or attachment security? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *85*, 706–722.

Knutsen, O. (1995). Value orientations, political conflicts and left-right identification: A comparative study. *European Journal of Political Research*, *28*, 63–93. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.1995.tb00487.x

Knutson, J. (1973). *Handbook of political psychology*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Kruglanski, A. W. (1996). Motivated social cognition: Principles of the interface. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (eds.), *Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles* (pp. 493–520). New York: Guilford Press.

Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M. (1996). Motivated closing of the mind: "Seizing" and "freezing." *Psychological Review*, *103*, 263–283.

Lane, R. E. (1959). *Political life*. New York: Free Press.

Lanning, K. (2008). Democracy, voting, and disenfranchisement in the United States: A social psychological perspective. *Journal of Social Issues*, *64*, 431–446. doi:10.1002/9781444307337.ch1

Lasswell, H. D. (1930). *Psychopathology and politics*. New York: Viking.

Lasswell, H. D. (1948). *Power and personality*. New York: Norton.

Le Bon, G. (1895). *The crowd: A study of the popular mind*. London: Transaction Publishers.

Loehlin, J. C., McCrae, R. R., Costa, P. T., & John, O. P. (1998). Heritabilities of common and measure-specific components of the Big Five personality factors. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *32*, 431–453. doi:10.1006/jrpe.1998.2225

Madsen, D. (1987). Political self-efficacy tested. *American Political Science Review*, *81*, 571–582.

Marx, K. (1844). Economic and philosophical manuscripts. In *Early Writings* (R. Livingstone & G. Benton, trans.). New York: Vintage, 1975.

McCann, J. A. (1997). Electoral choices and core value change: The 1992 presidential campaign. *American Journal of Political Science*, *41*, 564–583.

McClelland, D. C. (1985). *Human motivation*. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.

McCrae, R. R. (1996). Social consequences of experiential openness. *Psychological Bulletin*, *120*, 323–337. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.120.3.323

McCrae, R. R., & Allik, J. (2002). *The five-factor model of personality across cultures*. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.

McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T., Jr. (1996). Toward a new generation of personality theories: Theoretical contexts for the five-factor model. In J. S. Wiggins (ed.), *The five-factor model of personality: Theoretical perspectives* (pp. 51–87). New York: Guilford.

McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (2008). The five-factor theory of personality. In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, & L. A. Pervin (eds.), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (3rd ed., pp. 159–181). New York: Guilford Press.

Milbrath, L. W. (1965). *Political participation: How and why do people get involved in politics?* Chicago: Rand McNally.

Milbrath, L. W., & Goel, M. L. (1977). *Political participation* (2nd ed.). Chicago: Rand McNally.

Miller, A. H., Wattenberg, M. P., & Malanchuk, O. (1986). Schematic assessments of presidential candidates. *American Political Science Review*, *80*, 521–540.

Mitchell, P. G., Tetlock, P. E., Mellers, B. A., & Ordonez, L. (1993). Judgments of social justice: Compromise between equality and efficiency. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *65*, 629–639. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.65.4.629

Mondak, J. J. (2010). *Personality and the foundations of political behavior.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mondak, J. J., & Halperin, K. D. (2008). A framework for the study of personality and political behaviour. *British Journal of Political Science*, *38*, 335–362. doi:10.1017/S0007123408000173

Mondak, J. J., Hibbing, M. V., Canache, D., Seligson, M. A., & Anderson, M. R. (2010). Personality and civic engagement: An integrative framework for the study of trait effects on political behavior. *American Political Science Review*, *104*, 85–110. doi:10.1017/S0003055409990359

Niemi, R. G., Craig, S. C., & Mattei, F. (1991). Measuring internal political efficacy in the 1988 national election study. *American Political Science Review*, *85*, 1407–1413.

Piurko, Y., Schwartz, S. H., & Davidov, E. (2011). Basic personal values and the meaning of left-right political orientations in 20 countries. *Political Psychology*, *32*, 537–561.

Pollock, P. H., Lilie, S. A., & Vittes, M. E. (1993). Hard issues, core values and vertical constraint: The case of nuclear power. *British Journal of Political Science 23* (1): 29–50.

Popkin, S. (1991). *The reasoning voter*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Post, R. (2006). Democracy and equality. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *603*, 24–36. doi:10.1177/0002716205282954

Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A personal variable predicting social and political attitudes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *67*, 741–763. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.67.4.741

Rentfrow, P. J., Jost, J. T., Gosling, S. D., & Potter, J. (2009). Statewide differences in personality predict voting patterns in U.S. presidential elections, 1996–2004. In J. T. Jost, A. C. Kay, & H. Thorisdottir (eds.), *Social and psychological bases of ideology and system justification* (pp. 314–347). New York: Oxford University Press.

Riemann, R., Grubich, C., Hempel, S., Mergl, S., & Richter, M. (1993). Personality and attitudes towards current political topics. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *15*, 313–321. doi:10.1016/0191-8869(93)90222-O

Roccato, M., & Ricolfi, L. (2005). On the correlation between right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. *Basic & Applied Social Psychology*, *27*, 187–200. doi:10.1207/s15324834basp2703

Rokeach, M. (1954). The nature and meaning of dogmatism. *Psychological Review*, *61*, 194–204.

Rokeach, M. (1956). Political and religious dogmatism: An alternative to the authoritarian personality. *Psychological Monographs*, *70* (18, Whole No. 425), 43.

Rokeach, M. (1960). *The open and closed mind*. New York: Basic Books.

Rokeach, M. (1973). *The nature of human values*. New York: Free Press.

Rokeach, M. (1979). *Understanding human values: Individual and social*. New York: Free Press.

Sanford, N. (1973). Authoritarian personality in contemporary perspective. In J. N. Knutson, (ed.), *Handbook of political psychology* (pp. 139–170). San Francisco: Jossey Bass.

Schoen, H., & Schumann, S. (2007) Personality traits, partisan attitudes, and voting behavior: Evidence from Germany. *Political Psychology*, *28*, 471–498. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2007.00582.x

Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. In M. Zanna (ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (vol. 25, pp. 1–65). New York: Academic Press. doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60281-6

Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Are there universal aspects in the structure and contents of human values? *Journal of Social Issues*, *50*, 19–45. doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.1994.tb01196.x

Schwartz, S. H. (2005). Basic human values: Their content and structure across cultures. In A. Tamayo & J. Porto (eds.), *Valores e trabalho* [Values and work]. Brasília: Editora Vozes.

Schwartz, S. H. (2006). Les valeurs de base de la personne: Théorie, mesures et applications [Basic human values: Theory, measurement, and applications]. *Revue française de sociologie*, *42*, 249–288.

Schwartz, S. H. & Bilsky, W. (1987). Toward a universal psychological structure of human values. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *53*, 550–562. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.53.3.550

Schwartz, S. H., Caprara, G. V., & Vecchione, M. (2010). Basic personal values, core political values and voting: A longitudinal analysis. *Political Psychology*, *31*, 421–452. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00764.x

Seeman, M. (1959). On the meaning of alienation. *American Sociological Review*, *24*, 783–791.

Seeman, M. (1966). Alienation, membership, and political knowledge: A comparative study. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *30*, 353–367. doi:10.1086/267429

Sibley, C. G., & Duckitt, J. (2008). Personality and prejudice: A meta-analysis and theoretical review. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *12*, 248–279. doi:10.1177/1088868308319226

Sibley, C. G., Robertson, A., & Wilson, M. (2006). Social dominance orientation and right wing authoritarianism: Additive and interactive effects. *Political Psychology*, *27*, 755–768. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2006.00531.x

Sidanius, J. (1985). Cognitive functioning and sociopolitical ideology revisited. *Political Psychology*, *6*, 637–661.

Sidanius, J. (1988). Political sophistication and political deviance: A structural equation examination of context theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *55*, 37–51. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.55.1.37

Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). *Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Silvester, J. (2008). The good, the bad, and the ugly: Politics and politicians at work. In G. P. Hodgkinson & J. K. Ford (eds.), *International review of industrial and organizational psychology* (vol. 23, pp. 107–148). Chichester: John Wiley and Sons. doi:10.1002/9780470773277.ch4

Silvester, J., & Dykes, C. (2007). Selecting political candidates: A longitudinal study of assessment centre performance and political success in the 2005 UK general election. *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, *81*, 11–26. doi:10.1348/096317906X156287

Simon, H. A. (1985). Human nature in politics: The dialogue of psychology with political science. *American Political Science Review*, *79*, 293–304.

Simonton, D. K. (1986). Presidential personality: Biographical use of the Gough Adjective Check List. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*, *51*, 149–160. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.149

Simonton, D. K. (1988). Presidential style: Personality, biography, and performance. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *55*, 928–936. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.55.6.928

Simonton, D. K. (1990). Personality and politics. In L. Pervin (ed.), *Handbook of personality* (pp. 670–692). New York: Guilford Press.

Smith, K. B., Oxley, D. R., Hibbing, M. B., Alford, J. R., & Hibbing, J. R. (2011). Linking genetics and political attitudes: Reconceptualizing political ideology. *Political Psychology*, *32*, 369–397. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00821.x

Sniderman, P. M. (1975). *Personality and democratic politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Sniderman, P. M., Brody, R. A., & Tetlock, P. E. (1991), *Reasoning and choice: Explorations in political psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Steinbrecher, M., & Schoen, H. (2010). Personality and turnout in Germany: Evidence from the 2009 federal election. Typescript, University of Mannheim.

Suedfeld, P., & Rank, A. D. (1976). Revolutionary leaders: Long-term success as a function of changes in conceptual complexity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *34*, 169–178. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.34.2.169

Suedfeld, P., & Tetlock, P. E. (1977). Integrative complexity of communications in international crises. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *21*, 169–184. doi:10.1177/002200277702100108

Suedfeld, P., Tetlock, P. E., & Streufert, S. (1992). Conceptual/integrative complexity. In C. P. Smith (ed.), *Motivation and personality: Handbook of thematic content analyses* (pp. 393–400). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tarde, G. (1903). *The Laws of imitation*. New York: Henry Holt.

Tetlock, P. E. (1983). Cognitive style and political ideology. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *45*, 118–126. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.45.1.118

Tetlock, P. E. (1984). Cognitive style and political belief systems in the British House of Commons. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *46*, 365–375. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.46.2.365

Tetlock, P. E. (1985). Integrative complexity of American and Soviet foreign policy rhetoric: A time-series analysis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *49*, 1565–1585. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.49.6.1565

Tetlock, P. E. (1988). Monitoring the integrative complexity of American and Soviet policy rhetoric: What can be learned? *Journal of Social Issues*, *44*, 101–313. doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.1988.tb02065.x

Tetlock, P. E., & Boettger, R. (1989). Accountability: A social magnifier of the dilution effect. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *57*, 388–398. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.57.3.388

Tetlock, P. E., & Suedfeld, P. (1988). Integrative complexity coding of verbal behavior. In C. Antaki (ed.), *Analyzing lay explanation: A casebook of methods* (pp. 72–87). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Todorov, A., Mandisodza, A. N., Goren, A., & Hall, C. C. (2005). Inferences of competence from faces predict election outcomes. *Science*, *308*, 1623–1626. doi:10.1126/science.1110589

Trapnell, P. D. (1994). Openness versus intellect: A lexical left turn. *European Journal of Personality*, *8*, 273–290. doi:10.1002/per.2410080405

Uleman, J. S., Newman, L. S., & Moskowitz, G. B. (1996). People as flexible interpreters: Evidence and issues from spontaneous trait inference. In M. P. Zanna (ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (vol. 29, pp. 211–279). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60239-7

Van Hiel, A., Kossowska, M., & Mervielde, I. (2000). The relationship between openness to experience and political ideology. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *28*, 741–751. doi:10.1016/S0191-8869(99)00135-X

Van Hiel, A., Onraet, E., & De Pauw, S. (2010). The relationship between social-cultural attitudes and behavioral measures of cognitive style: A meta-analytic integration of studies. *Journal of Personality*, *78*, 1765–1800. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2010.00669.x

Vecchione, M., & Caprara, G. V. (2009). Personality determinants of political participation: The contribution of traits and self-efficacy beliefs. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *46*, 487–492. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2008.11.021

Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. (1995). *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Weber, M. (1904). *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

Wilson, G. D. (Ed.). (1973). *The psychology of conservatism*. London: Academic Press.

Winter, D. G. (1973). *The power motive*. New York: Free Press.

Winter, D. G. (1987). Leader appeal, leader performance, and the motive profiles of leaders and followers: A study of American presidents and elections. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *52*, 196–202.

Winter, D. G. (1998). Toward a science of personality psychology: David McClelland's development of empirically derived TAT measures. *History of Psychology*, *1*, 130–153. doi:10.1037/1093-4510.1.2.130

Winter, D. G. (2002). Motivation and political leadership. In L. Valenty & O. Feldman (eds.), *Political leadership for the new century: Personality and behavior among American leaders* (pp. 25–47). Westport, CT: Praeger.

Winter, D. G. (2003). Measuring the motives of political actors at a distance. In J. M. Post (ed.), *The psychological assessment of political leaders: With profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton* (pp. 153–177). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Winter, D. G. (2005). Things I've learned about personality from studying political leaders at a distance. *Journal of Personality*, *73*, 557–584. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2005.00321.x

Winter, D. G., John, O. P., Stewart, A. J., Klohnen, E. C., & Duncan, L. E. (1998). Traits and motives: Toward and integration of two traditions in personality research. *Psychological Review*, *105*, 230–250. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.105.2.230

Winter, D. G., & Stewart, A. J. (1977). Content analysis as a technique for assessing political leaders. In M. G. Hermann (ed.), *The psychological examination of political leaders* (pp. 27–61). New York: Free Press.

Zaller, J. R. (1992). *The nature and origins of mass opinion*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Zajonc, R. B. (1980). Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences. *American Psychologist*, *35*, 151–175. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.35.2.151

Zimmerman, M. A. (1989). The relationship between political efficacy and citizen participation: Construct validation studies. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, *53*, 554–566. doi:10.1207/s15327752jpa5303_12

CHAPTER 3

CHILDHOOD AND ADULT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

DAVID O. SEARS AND CHRISTIA BROWN

If the study of history considers human affairs through the lens of time as an independent variable, the study of human psychological development views individuals in terms of their life histories, employing the tool of time within the human life span. Accordingly, this chapter examines the life histories of political orientations as they evolve from early childhood through old age (for an earlier version, see Sears & Levy, 2003).

The life history perspective has a unique niche in political psychology in a variety of respects. It addresses the constant tension between continuity and change as played out throughout an individual's life span. Such an historical emphasis contrasts with more ahistorical approaches such as the rational choice theories drawn from the field of economics, or the behavioral decision theories drawn from psychology, or cognitive psychology more generally. Moreover, it helps us to understand the origins of orientations that are politically consequential among adults, whether concerning politics specifically (see Taber and Young, chapter 17, this volume; Feldman, chapter 19, this volume) or intergroup relations (see Huddy, chapter 23; Kinder, chapter 25; and Hewstone and Al-Ramiah, chapter 27, all in this volume). At a more practical, or ultimately perhaps impractical, level, the utopian spirit ranges far and wide among humans, including such disparate types as liberal social scientists, Jesus Christ, Adolf Hitler, and Vladimir Lenin, and sometimes centers on the hope that human progress might be aided by early intervention.

Time appears as an independent variable most often in three ways. One concerns the persisting effects of *early experiences*. Early studies of political socialization documented the appearance in childhood and adolescence of racial prejudice, national and other identities, party identification and ideology, and support for political leaders, regimes, and systems (see Renshon, 1977; Sears, 1975). Such youthful attitudes were generally assumed to be meaningful and to have lasting influence throughout the life span.

A second focus is upon "*the times*." Individuals' life histories are inextricably connected to what happens in the broader environment. Sometimes "the times" show

dramatic changes, such as during the French Revolution, the emancipation of African American slaves, World War II, China's Cultural Revolution, or the abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union. More often change is significant but gradual, as in the slow changes since the New Deal in the American party system. Or sometimes change is so glacial it appears nonexistent, as in the American polity's commitment to freedom of speech and worship.

A third general approach looks for politically distinctive features of different *life stages*. Young children may have difficulty cognitively linking various aspects of their experience, delaying their appreciation of abstract concepts such as Congress or the Supreme Court. Adolescents may be especially vulnerable to "storm and stress" and drawn to unconventional behavior and to political rebellion, such as in the old French adage, "He who is not a revolutionary at 20 has no heart; he who is a revolutionary at 40 has no head." Young adults may be especially concerned about their own independent identity and be somewhat unmoored in society, and so more open to influence. Mature adults, embedded in work, home, and family, may show a stronger sense of self-interest. The elderly may flag in mental and physical energy, with consequences for the consistency and stability of their attitudes and for their level of political participation.

Previous review essays in handbooks of political psychology have been titled "political socialization" and have focused largely on the childhood acquisition of specifically political orientations (Merelman, 1986; Niemi, 1973). The application of preadult developmental approaches to political psychology has undergone considerable cycling in popularity. A generation ago, Greenstein (1970, p. 969) felt that "political socialization is a growth stock," and Sears (1975, p. 94) noted that "research output has increased at a geometric rate." A reaction then set in, characterizing political socialization as in a "bear market" (Cook, 1985) and challenging two often overly enthusiastic assumptions: of a "primacy principle," the staying power of early-acquired predispositions, and a "structuring principle," that early-acquired predispositions had special political power in adulthood (e.g., Searing, Schwartz, & Lind, 1973; Searing, Wright, & Rabinowitz, 1976). Some called for recognition of more openness to change through the life course; for example, that "change during adulthood is normal" (Sapiro, 1994, p. 204), and others that "learning and development are [not] completed by adulthood; rather they [constitute] a lifelong process" (Sigel, 1989, p. viii). Some trends in political science more generally also contributed to de-emphasis on preadult experience, especially economic theories focusing on the rational choices made by adults. Then, in some eyes, political socialization research experienced a "rebirth" (Niemi & Hepburn, 1995).

In contrast to that early focus on preadults, we broaden our scope to the full life span. We begin with a discussion of the preadult acquisition of basic political predispositions, with particular focus on the paradigmatic case of party identification in America, as well as on ethnic and racial prejudices and identities. We then consider the later life history of such predispositions, with particular attention to their persistence, and to the related "impressionable years" model postulating particular susceptibility to change in late adolescence and early adulthood, with applications to political

generations. We conclude with some attention to the competing role of contextual changes in adulthood.

1. Childhood and Adolescence

1.1. Party Identification

The paradigmatic case of the development of political attitudes among preadults has been Americans' party identifications. In large part that is because party identification is by far the strongest and most consistent predictor of voting preferences in the world's oldest democracy. The early conventional wisdom was that "a man is born into his political party just as he is born into probable future membership in the church of his parents" (Hyman, 1959, p. 74).

The more complex theory then developed in *The American Voter* (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960) is perhaps the most influential in the study of American political behavior, based on a sequence of two questions asked of each survey respondent (see Huddy, chapter 23, this volume, for the exact wording). It described party identification as an attitudinal predisposition typically acquired in preadult life, often from the parental family; as highly stable over the life span; as the most powerful single factor in determining candidate evaluations and voting choices in partisan elections, and often issue preferences as well; as usually acquired and maintained without an elaborate accompanying ideological understanding about the positions of the two parties; with the *strength* of party identification (or its "crystallization") being thought to increase through the life cycle as the individual accumulated experience with the partisan electoral system, at least in periods of a stable party system (Campbell et al., 1960).

This early theory relied on less direct empirical assessment of these propositions than has later research. It relied on adults' recall of their earlier lives to establish early acquisition, familial influence, and stability over the life span; on cross-sectional correlations to establish its influence over candidate and issue preferences; on the paucity of adults' ideological thinking to establish that early acquisition of partisanship was not usually informed by larger ideological understandings; and only later on empirical tests of the strengthening of party identification with age (Converse, 1969; 1976).

Later research tested for the crystallization of preadults' party identifications directly (Sears & Valentino, 1997), using the criteria originally suggested by Converse (1964) for detecting belief systems (constraint across related attitudes, stability over time, and power over attitude formation toward new attitude objects), and found that adolescents' party identifications had crystallized almost to adult levels by the end of a presidential campaign. A similar study found that the party identifications of a large sample of entering college students had already crystallized approximately to adult levels, and that the adult demographic and value correlates of partisanship were largely in place already (Sears, Haley, & Henry, 2008).

The original hypothesis of preadult *family transmission* was later directly tested by Jennings and Niemi (1974; 1981), in their classic "Michigan socialization study," interviewing a national sample of high school seniors and their parents in 1965, with both samples again in 1973 and 1982, and with the student cohort along with children of the former students in 1997. They found substantial, though not perfect, parental transmission of party identification to their adolescent children, and lesser transmission of other political attitudes (Jennings, Stoker, & Bowers, 2009; also see Kroh & Selb, 2009, for evidence of successful parental transmission in the German multiparty system). Parent-child similarity of partisanship declined through the offsprings' early adulthoods (though not thereafter), as their own issue preferences had increasing influence (Beck & Jennings, 1991; Niemi & Jennings, 1991).

But plainly families vary considerably in their ability to pass their partisanship on to their offspring. The most politicized parents, and those with the most stable attitudes themselves, are consistently the most successful (Beck & Jennings, 1991; Jennings et al., 2009). Similarly, parental political interest produces greater influence, at least while the offspring continue to live with their parents (Fitzgerald, 2011). Wolak (2009) found greater crystallization of preadults' partisanship among adolescents who converse more politically with their parents. In the words of the authors of *The American Voter Revisited*, a recent reassessment of *The American Voter*, adolescents from politically uninvolved homes find themselves "largely adrift in partisan terms" (Lewis-Beck, Norpoth, Jacoby, & Weisberg, 2008, p. 141).

Politicized parents seem to be particularly successful because they most accurately communicate their political positions to their children (Niemi, 1974; Tedin, 1980). Variations in the quality of parent-child relationships, such as rebellions against parents, seem generally not to be central in success of transmission (Jennings & Niemi, 1974). Accuracy of perception of parental positions also helps to explain differences in transmission across attitude domains: parental attitudes are communicated more clearly in some (e.g., candidate choices in hotly contested elections) than others (e.g., political efficacy). Nevertheless, working in favor of parental transmission of partisanship is that it usually displays one of the strongest correlations of any attribute between spouses, suggesting that it plays a relatively important role in mate choice (Alford, Hatemi, Hibbing, Martin, & Eaves, 2011).

But the child's own political interest plays a role, suggesting that preadults are sometimes not mere passive recipients of political socialization but active participants (see similar findings from England and Germany; Zuckerman, Dasovic, & Fitzgerald, 2007). Interestingly, Fitzgerald and Curtis (2012), analyzing panel surveys in several countries, found that parental discord over politics tends to produce higher levels of political engagement over time in their offspring. And offspring sometimes influence parental attitudes, especially in domains in which they introduce more "modern" attitudes to their families (Sapiro, 2003; also see Fitzgerald, 2011 regarding nontraditional "rising parties" in Switzerland; or Zuckerman et al., 2007, in England and Germany).

The centrality of family transmission was originally proposed in an era of more frequent intact two-parent families than is the case now, with higher rates of divorce and

never-married mothers, and in an era seemingly marked by more ritualized parent-child contact than today. Even so, the extension of the Michigan socialization study to the children of the original students shows quite convincingly that parent-child transmission in those families shows very much the same pattern as it did in the original families (Jennings et al., 2009). Indeed in some attitude domains it is even higher, such as in political ideology and racial attitudes. Nevertheless, parental absence, especially divorce (more than death, oddly) weakens preadults' political involvement (Sances, 2013).

"The times" are also implicated in the preadult acquisition of party identification. The original theory implied that it was transmitted in piecemeal fashion in the course of daily life. But if the key to successful political socialization is clear communication of stable parental attitudes, vivid *political events* might be important catalysts because their heavy information flows could provide occasions for such communication. Indeed Sears and Valentino (1997) found that the crystallization of adolescents' partisanship increased dramatically, almost to parental levels, through the course of a presidential campaign. No such increase occurred in adults' partisanship, which was already at high levels; nor toward attitudes objects peripheral to the campaign; nor during the less information-intense postcampaign year. Crystallization increased most among adolescents most engaged in interpersonal political communication (Valentino & Sears, 1998). Indeed longer-term interest in politics may be sparked if preadults enter the age of political awareness at times of heightened activity in the political arena (Wolak and McDevitt, (2011; also see Fitzgerald, 2011). Another study showed that highly visible female candidates produced more political involvement among adolescent girls due to greater political discussion within the family (Campbell & Wolbrecht, 2006). Other political events, such as 9/11, have also been shown to contribute to adolescents' political socialization (Gimpel, Lay, & Schuknecht, 2003).

1.2. Role of Government

At one time, childhood political socialization was thought to be a key element in installing a sense of government legitimacy and diffuse system support in mass publics. One vehicle for accomplishing that goal was to develop children's admiration for the most visible and personal symbol of government, the chief of state (Easton & Dennis, 1969). This line of research has been less active in recent years, perhaps due to questions about the durability of those early attitudes, and with recognition that children's supposed idealization of the American president was partly a function of the popularity of the incumbents when that early research was done (for a review, see Sears, 1975).

In the United States, most children learn about their presidents in the early school years (Easton & Dennis, 1969; Hess & Torney, 1967; Picard, 2005). At this age, children have a basic sense of the president being the leader of government. Their understanding of the methods, purposes, and effects of government increases across elementary school (Abraham, 1983). Across countries, children around age 8–10 tend to be quite positive about their government and its symbols (Sears, 1975).

Indeed some research indicates that children and early adolescents believe the government should play a larger role than do adults (Lopez & Kirby, 2005). For example, Brown, Mistry, and Bigler (2007) found that American children between the ages of 6 and 14 believed that the government should have played an important role in aiding the victims of Hurricane Katrina by providing houses, jobs for families, and money. A majority of ninth-graders in a national sample reported that the government should be responsible for providing free basic education and healthcare for everyone, and a sufficient standard of living for the elderly (Baldi, Ferie, Skidmore, Greenberg, & Hahn, 2001).

However, adolescents are less generally positive toward their government and its symbols than are younger children. They also begin to mirror adults' sometimes negative attitudes, such as in the case of the disgraced President Nixon. Affect toward less controversial symbols of the nation generally remains positive, however, such as toward the American flag and British monarchy (see Sears, 1975).

1.3. Civic Engagement

The early adolescent years mark the formation of attitudes toward civic engagement (Metz & Youniss, 2005). This is important because civic engagement in youth may be an important predictor of voting in adulthood (Youniss, McLellan, & Yates, 1997). At least having civic knowledge in high school is associated with whether youth think they will vote in the future (Krampen, 2000)

One challenge is defining civic engagement in a population too young to vote. Descriptions of civic engagement used in large international studies include social responsibility, loyalty, patriotism, a sense of political efficacy, trust in the government, participation in political discussions, knowledge of democracy, and having a concern for the welfare of others beyond oneself (Sherrod, Flanagan, & Youniss, 2002). Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, and Schultz (2001) go further and argue that developing citizenship should also include awareness of human rights, including respect for the political rights of women and ethnic minorities.

Not surprisingly, civic engagement increases across adolescence, in some respects attaining adult levels and in others falling short. For example, Moore, Lare, and Wagner (1985) found that most adolescents (90%) believe adults should vote and obey the law, though only half believed adults should be affiliated with a political party. About half of American adolescents in another study gave a correct definition of "democracy," divided among mentions of the freedoms and rights of the individual, majority rule, and the promise of civic equality (Flanagan, Gallay, Gill, Gallay, & Nti, 2005). Correct responses increased with age. Youth whose parents were more educated, and who engaged in family discussions of current events, were more likely to give a correct definition of democracy, paralleling the evidence on family political socialization cited earlier. Cognitive development may be involved as well: 14-year-olds have greater ability to view multiple sides of social problems and consider others' opinions than do 10-year-olds (Gallatin & Adelson, 1971).

Many point to the youthful socialization process as an important means of increasing civic engagement. Adolescents' subjective civic engagement, such as feeling politically competent and influential in shaping others' political views, is associated with greater participation in political activities in everyday life, such as having political discussions and watching political news reports (Krampen, 2000). Youth with civically engaged parents are more likely to be civically engaged (Flanagan, Bowes, Jonsson, Csapo, & Sheblanova, 1998). Civic education in youth settings (e.g., Torney-Purta et al., 2001) may also be important spheres in which youth can increase their civic knowledge, feel a sense of social responsibility, and increase their political self-efficacy.

1.4. Race and Ethnicity

In a diverse society, ethnicity and race are important social categories, influencing individuals' social attitudes and identities, among other things. Although there are important distinctions between race and ethnicity, children rarely make the distinction, so racial and ethnic attitudes and identities develop similarly and have similar implications. We will discuss the findings of race and ethnicity together.

1.4.1. Prejudice and Stereotyping

Most early research on the development of racial prejudice examined American and Canadian children (see Aboud, 1988 for a thorough review). More recent work with international samples has shown very similar findings. It indicates that children endorse racial stereotypes and show racial biases very early, before age 3, even before they can correctly identify their own race or ethnicity. In one American study, when children age 2½ were asked to choose photographs of unfamiliar peers they would like to play with, a majority of white and black children picked a same-race face (Katz & Kofkin, 1997).

By age 3, however, a majority of American white and black children alike began to choose a white peer (Katz & Kofkin, 1997). For white children, a bias favoring whites continues to increase until approximately age 7 or 8. Among black children, however, this white preference typically continues until about age 6, after which point they begin to show an own-race preference when picking a potential playmate. Kelly and Duckitt (1995) found a similar white preference among black South African children up to age 10. Originally it was argued that this early white preference shown by young black children was due to poor self-esteem (Clark & Clark, 1939). Contemporary researchers argue instead that it reflects children's recognition that being white is desirable because it is associated with higher social status (e.g., Aboud, 1988). In any case, by around age 10, white, black, Asian, and Latino children's attitudes have become more similar, with most children showing a slight preference for their own racial group (Aboud, 1988; Brown, Alabi, Huynh, & Masten, 2011; Katz & Kofkin, 1997).

Even when children show preferences for members of their own racial group, however, they do not necessarily express dislike or derogation toward members of other racial or ethnic groups. In one study, American children attributed positive traits

and qualities to their own racial group and were neutral toward other racial groups (Cameron, Alvarez, Ruble, & Fuligni, 2001). However white children were more likely to endorse racial stereotypes than were children from other racial backgrounds (e.g., Aboud & Skerry, 1984). And in social contexts with more explicitly negative intergroup relations, such as Israel, children have been shown to endorse negative attitudes about the out-group (Bar-Tal, 1996; Brenick et al., 2010).

Although children show prejudices and stereotypes very early, their understanding of them develops more slowly, perhaps dependent on their cognitive development. In interviews with Mexican American and black children, Quintana (2007) found that children's understanding of ethnic prejudice is related to their more general perspective-taking abilities. For example, young children (ages 3–6) attributed prejudice to physical and observable preferences, such as, "They don't like their color." This parallels young children's general tendency to attend to observable, rather than abstract, characteristics of the environment. Even slightly older children (ages 6–8) attributed prejudice to literal, nonsocial reasons, such as "They may not like Mexico."

A big leap forward in the understanding of race, prejudice, and stereotypes occurs around ages 8 to 10. Children at this age now generally accept the view common among American adults that race is stable and inherited (Alejandro-Wright, 1985). They also often recognize the social components of prejudice, even suggesting that others might be prejudiced because of what they are taught at home (Quintana, 2007). Further, across this developmental period, children's knowledge of group differences in stereotyping increases steadily (e.g., "White people think black people are not smart"; McKown & Weinstein, 2003, p. 5). Children also become increasingly aware through the elementary school years of the implications of these stereotypes for group status. For example many black children rate occupations as lower status (i.e., earn less money, require less education) if performed by blacks rather than whites (Bigler, Averhart, & Liben, 2003).

Although culturally often confounded with race and ethnicity, social class is a more complex and abstract construct (i.e., with somewhat less visible and concrete markers compared to skin color). Children's understanding of social class, therefore, develops more slowly than their understanding of race, developing first in elementary school. Yet the two domains show striking parallels, at least in research on American children. Qualitative research with children living below the poverty line has shown that poor children often assume society views the poor as "troublemakers," "dirty," "stupid," and "disgusting" (Weinger, 1998, p. 108). They believe that the poor are not welcome in wealthier neighborhoods, that the poor are social outcasts, and that more affluent children are happier and more worry-free. Other research (Emler & Dickinson, 1985) has shown that middle-class children perceive greater income discrepancies than do working-class children between manual (e.g., road sweeper) and nonmanual labor jobs (e.g., teachers). Regardless of their own social class, however, children typically perceive income discrepancies on the basis of occupation to be justified (Emler & Dickinson, 1985).

Poor children's perceptions of negative stereotypes directed toward the poor parallel perceived racial stereotypes. For example, adolescents aged 11–16 consider poor

people to be less intelligent and less able to make friends than wealthy people (Skafte, 1989). With age, stereotypes about the poor become more differentiated. For example, fourth-graders considered wealthy individuals to be better at sports, academics, and music relative to poor individuals. Sixth- and eighth-graders considered poor people advantaged in sports and disadvantaged in academics compared to wealthy people, while music tended to be a stereotype-neutral domain (Woods, Kurtz-Costes, & Rowley, 2005). American adolescents' explanations for, and evaluations of, poverty and economic inequality mirror those about racial differences, more often attributing poverty to such personal characteristics as work ethic and effort than to structural factors such as job availability, government supports, and discrimination (Leahy, 1990). Black or biracial children are more likely than white children to mention unemployment or lack of employment opportunities as the cause of poverty (Chafel & Neitzel, 2005).

Despite the continuing general preference for own-race members, racial stereotypes typically start to decline at around age 10, as demonstrated with a variety of methods (Aboud, 1988; Aboud & Skerry, 1984; Brown & Johnson, 1971; Katz, Sohn, & Zalk, 1975; Williams, Best, & Boswell, 1975) and in a variety of nations (Monteiro, de França, & Rodrigues, 2009; Augoustinos & Rosewarne, 2001; Boulton & Smith, 1996).

Why do children show an increase and then a decline around age 10 in own-race biases? A cognitive developmental theory of prejudice argues that young children are necessarily biased at a young age because of their cognitive limitations, but as they become more cognitively sophisticated, their racial attitudes become more tolerant (Aboud, 1988; Bigler & Liben, 1993). For example, children gradually develop multiple classification skills, such as the ability to recognize that people can simultaneously belong to two different categories. As a result they may begin to understand that children from different ethnic groups can look different from them externally but be similar to them internally, such as in interests and tastes (Aboud, 1988). Indeed, children who were taught to classify stimuli along multiple dimensions within an experimental paradigm showed lower levels of stereotyping after the acquisition of this cognitive skill (Bigler & Liben, 1993).

A different explanation for this age-related shift is that children become more familiar with social norms about the expression of racial biases. If so, explicit racial attitudes might show more reduced bias with age than would implicit attitudes (e.g., more quickly associating positive qualities with white faces than with black faces, and vice versa for negative qualities). Some preliminary research indicates that white children at age 6 have equivalent explicit and implicit racial biases, but by age 10 show reduced explicit racial bias along with continued implicit associations favoring whites over blacks (Baron & Banaji, 2006).

Although this shift with age could be due to children's growing awareness of social norms, it could also be due to their growing cognitive complexity such that they can hold both unbiased conscious and biased subconscious attitudes simultaneously. These two arguments are often pitted against one another, but they are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

In any case, by adolescence, youths typically understand prejudice at a broader, societal level and can compare their attitudes about their group to how their group is portrayed in the media (e.g., "If one [Mexican] did something, it's like all the Mexicans in the world did everything bad"). In addition, adolescents begin to be aware of structural forms of racism and cultural differences in the endorsement of stereotypes (Brown & Bigler, 2005).

Similarly, adolescents begin to develop attitudes about specific social policies that mirror those of adults. Substantial racial differences in attitudes about race-conscious social policies, such as affirmative action, emerge in late (e.g., 16- to 17-year-olds), rather than early (14- to 15-year-olds), adolescents (Hughes & Bigler, 2011). In addition, support for affirmative action became more closely linked to knowledge about historical racism among black youth. Similarly, white youth were less likely to support affirmative action if they held implicit antiblack biases. Support for school desegregation became more closely related with age to awareness of racial disparities and attributions of disparities to racism for both racial groups.

1.4.2. Racial and Ethnic Identity

Not only do children show preferences for some racial and ethnic groups and develop an awareness of prejudice, they must also place themselves *within* a racial or ethnic group and come to terms with their own group membership. Research has shown that children can label their own and others' race correctly by age 6 (Aboud, 1988; Katz & Kofkin, 1997). Racial and ethnic minority children are more likely to mention their ethnicity than are white children, however, and consider it more central to their sense of self (Ruble et al., 2004).

This early-acquisition point should be qualified, however. Although elementary school-age children are capable of identifying themselves by race, they may not consider race to be a salient aspect of their identity. Indeed, few young children mention race or ethnicity when describing themselves. Moreover, this early racial and ethnic identification is not necessarily terribly stable. One of the most important factors affecting ethnic identification seems to be context, particularly the school context. In one study, 85% of the youth who identified themselves as black /African American at sixth grade did so again when asked in eighth grade, but only if they attended a black majority school (the other students changed their identification to multiethnic). If they attended a Latino majority school, only 65% of such early black identifiers did so again later (one-third identifying as multiethnic and the others as Latino; Nishina, Bellmore, Witkow, & Nylund-Gibson, 2010).

Middle to late childhood (toward the end of elementary school) appears to be an important developmental period in which ethnic minority individuals think about and explore their ethnic identity (e.g., Marks, Szalacha, Lamarre, Boyd, & García Coll, 2007). Following this period of searching, adolescents achieve and make a commitment to an ethnic identity (Phinney, 1990), so well-developed ethnic identities only emerge in adolescence. In the United States, ethnic identities develop earlier among Latinos, Asians, and blacks than among whites (Brown et al., 2011). Studies consistently show ethnic

group differences, such that the ethnic identity of European American adolescents is typically less salient, less developed, and less positive than that of ethnic minorities (i.e., African American, Latino, Native American, and Asian American; e.g., Roberts, Phinney, Masse, & Chenet, 1999; Sears, Fu, Henry, & Bui, 2003). Some research suggests that this ethnic difference is not apparent from the beginning, but only becomes evident among children in early adolescence (DuBois, Burk-Braxton, Swenson, Tevendale, & Hardesty, 2002).

Regardless of the exact age of development, the attainment of a well-developed ethnic identity is thought to be an important developmental milestone for racial or ethnic minority adolescents (Phinney, 1990; Quintana, 2007). It is a primary aspect of adolescents' developing self-concept and directly impacts a wide range of factors central to adolescents' daily lives (see Brown & Chu, 2012; Chao & Otsuki-Clutter, 2011). By college age, minorities' ethnic identification has become quite stable (Sears et al., 2003). It has been shown to be a complex and multidimensional component of the self-concept (see Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004 for a review; also Sellers, Rowley, Chavous, Shelton, & Smith, 1997).

1.4.3. Perceptions of Discrimination

Research psychologists have started to focus increasingly on racism from the targets' perspective, specifically on perceived racial or ethnic discrimination. Among very young children, exclusion of others based on social group membership appears to be the most recognizable form of discrimination (e.g., Killen & Stangor, 2001). During the elementary school years, children develop a more detailed and nuanced awareness of discrimination. In one study, most Dutch children (92%) were familiar with the meaning of discrimination by the age of 10, with name-calling being the most frequently cited example, followed by an unequal sharing of goods and social exclusion (Verkuyten, Kinket, & Van Der Wielen, 1997). Children avoided classifying negative behavior as discriminatory, however, if they considered either the target to be responsible for the negative behavior, or the perpetrator to have acted unintentionally. By age 10, the majority of children (90%) inferred that it was individuals' stereotypic beliefs that led them to engage in discrimination (McKown & Weinstein, 2003).

Peer discrimination seems to be the most common type perceived by children and adolescents (Brown et al., 2011; Fisher, Wallace, & Fenton, 2000). For example, one study found that the majority of black 10- to 12-year-olds reported having experienced at least one instance of racial discrimination from a peer, with verbal insults and racial slurs reported as the most common (Simons et al., 2002). Fisher et al. (2000) report similar findings with their sample of black, Latino, South Asian, East Asian, and white adolescents. Many children also reported being excluded from activities because of their race, and a small number of children reported being threatened with physical harm (Simons et al., 2002).

Children and adolescents also perceive discrimination within institutions and in public settings (Brown et al., 2011). More than half of one sample of black and Latino adolescents perceived themselves to have been hassled by store clerks and to have received

poor service at restaurants because of their race (Fisher et al., 2000). Many children and adolescents also reported being suspected of wrongdoing (Simons et al., 2002) and more than a quarter reported being hassled by the police (Fisher et al., 2000). Children and adolescents also perceive discrimination by teachers in educational settings (Brown et al., 2011; Rosenbloom & Way, 2004). Half of one sample of black and Latino adolescents reported that they had been graded unfairly because of their race, and approximately a quarter felt they had been discouraged from joining advanced-level classes and disciplined wrongly by teachers because of their race (Fisher et al., 2000). Another study found adolescents perceiving discrimination by teachers to occur at least a couple of times a year (Wong, Eccles, & Sameroff, 2003).

Although perceptions of peer-based discrimination remain stable across adolescence, perceptions of adult-based discrimination (which can include educational and institutional discrimination) seems to increase with age (Greene, Way, & Pahl, 2006; Fisher et al., 2000). For example, eighth-grade black students, but not fourth- or sixth-grade students, blamed the government's response to Hurricane Katrina on race and class discrimination (Brown et al., 2007). Not surprisingly, youth of color and those with a strong ethnic identity perceive more discrimination than white youth and/or those with a less important ethnic identity (e.g., Fisher et al., 2000; Romero & Roberts, 1998).

Despite having a generally positive and optimistic view of the government, as indicated earlier, children do perceive inequalities in the presidency. In 2005, well before the formal candidacy of Barack Obama, Bigler, Arthur, Hughes, and Patterson (2008) found that most 5- to 10-year olds were aware of the lack of gender and racial diversity among past presidents. Older and black children were especially attentive to the lack of racial diversity. The most common explanation the children gave for this lack of diversity was that the dominant group (e.g., men or whites) wouldn't vote for anyone else, with only one-quarter of children attributing it to a lack of leadership abilities among women and minorities. A majority of girls and black and Latino children felt that boys and whites were happy that no woman, black, or Latino had ever been president.

1.4.4. Conclusions

In general, children hold biases about social groups from an early age. With age and cognitive development, these biases lessen, albeit never disappear entirely. Children continue to hold biases and make internal attributions, however, about socioeconomic status. With increasingly complex cognitive abilities, children begin to understand how biases, such as discrimination, can contribute to social inequalities in contexts such as presidential elections. As children enter adolescence, they can better understand the role of institutions (because of more advanced perspective-taking abilities). Thus, adolescents have distinct attitudes about government and their role in the political process. Some groups of adolescents (e.g., African Americans) are particularly supportive of the government playing a role in addressing social inequalities, and these early differences seem to foreshadow party identification differences in adulthood.

2. Adult Life History

The American Voter's (Campbell et al., 1960) theory of party identification described earlier, with its focus on early learning, persistence, and later influence on voting behavior, provided a clear paradigm of lasting importance. Is it a useful model for thinking about political life histories more generally? Building on the various ways of thinking about time that we started with, four alternative models of the full political life cycle have been contrasted: (1) *persistence*: the residues of preadult learning persist through life; its variant, (2) *impressionable years*: orientations are particularly susceptible to influence in late adolescence and early adulthood, but tend to stabilize thereafter; its major alternative, (3) *lifelong openness*: individuals remain open to influence throughout later life, including by "the times"; and (4) *life cycle:* people show life stage-specific propensities (Alwin, Cohen, & Newcomb, 1991; Jennings & Niemi, 1981; Sears, 1975; Sears, 1983).

2.1. Persistence

2.1.1. *Stability within Individuals*

What is the plasticity of important political and social attitudes through the life span? From a political perspective, if the most important attitudes are essentially static after early life, public opinion would always be frozen in anachronisms. Modernizing change would occur primarily by replacement of older individuals by younger ones with fresher attitudes, rather than by conversion of adults based on the intrinsic merits of new views.

The most straightforward method for assessing persistence measures a given orientation in the same set of respondents at multiple points in time, in "longitudinal" or "panel" studies. The most representative samples come from several four-year panel studies conducted by the American National Election Studies (ANES). Party identification was the most stable attitude measured in those studies and indeed was almost perfectly stable with some correction for measurement unreliability (Converse & Markus, 1979). Similar conclusions have emerged from other such studies in the United States, Canada, Britain, and Germany (Green, Palmquist, & Schickler, 2002).

Three other studies yield evidence of stability across much longer periods of adulthood, though in less representative samples. The long-term Michigan socialization study of the student and parent cohorts described earlier found that party identification was highly stable through the mature adult years (Stoker & Jennings, 2008). The appraisal of its findings by Lewis-Beck et al. (2008, p. 143) was that in the parent cohort, "the degree of persistence over a nearly 20-year span is impressive, while in the student cohort, spending its youth in a particularly turbulent time in American politics and society," party identification "proves less stable" (p. 143) between the first two interviews, but highly stable through mature adulthood.

The classic "Bennington study" tracked a cohort of women who had attended Bennington College during the 1930s for nearly half a century afterwards (Alwin et al., 1991). Their partisanship showed extremely high stability from college graduation through adulthood: "The stability coefficient linking a latent attitude variable over roughly 50 years of the life-span is in the .70 to .80 range" (Alwin, 1993, p. 68; also see Alwin et al., 1991). The long-term Terman Study of Gifted Children tested the partisanship of a considerably larger and more heterogeneous sample, selected from high-IQ children in California public elementary schools after World War I, from 1940 to 1977 (approximately ages 30 to 67). Their party identifications were quite stable through the period, with a coefficient of .65 corrected for measurement error (Sears & Funk, 1999). The overall conclusion drawn from these panel studies is that party identification is "firm but not immoveable" (Lewis-Beck et al., 2008, p. 142).

The party identification of Americans, then, has become the paradigmatic case for attitudinal persistence. One caveat should be mentioned, however. The customary indicator of stability, a high test-retest correlation, can be somewhat misleading if the marginal frequencies have changed; individual attitudes may have changed even though relative rank orders may not have. The conclusion that party identification is highly stable required both high stability coefficients and a period in which basic party divisions remained more or less constant (Converse, 1976).

Some other attitudes show considerable stability over time. The conventional wisdom is that racial attitudes and basic ideological position are also among the most stable of Americans' political attitudes, though less than party identification (Converse & Markus, 1979; Stoker & Jennings, 2008; Sears, 1983; Alwin et al., 1991). For example, only 13% changed from "liberal" to "conservative," or vice versa, from about age 30 to retirement age in the Terman gifted children study (Sears & Funk, 1999). Moral attitudes, such as those toward abortion and marijuana, have also been found to be highly stable in some of these studies (Converse & Markus, 1979; Stoker & Jennings, 2008).

Political engagement is another product of preadult socialization that seems to be quite stable across the life cycle. Prior (2010) analyzed numerous panel surveys in four different countries and found adolescents' self-reported political interest highly stable well into adulthood. Men tend to be more psychologically involved in politics in adulthood than women are, and Wolak and McDevitt (2011) found that that gap exists already in adolescence. They also found that the occurrence of a political campaign season bolsters adolescents' political engagement, but does not eliminate the gender gap.

One potential general challenge to the persistence model is the pervasive correlation of higher education with political orientations. If those correlations are the products of higher education influencing the residues of preadult socialization, the impressionable years model might offer a better explanation for them. For example, political engagement is generally greater among the better educated. The association is typically strong, and the conventional inference is causal, that a college education contributes to various skills and interests that promote political sophistication, participation, and so on. Alternatively, selection effects may explain the association: perhaps the college-bound are more politically engaged even before attending a single class (Highton, 2009; Kam

& Palmer, 2008). As might be expected, unraveling the causal flows among such closely related variables both inspires debate and has led to the use of increasingly sophisticated methodologies (see Henderson & Chatfield, 2011; Kam & Palmer, 2011).

On the other hand, attitudes in many other policy domains intensely debated by political elites seem to show much less stability over time in the mass public (Converse, 1964; Converse & Markus, 1979). Rather than one model of the political life cycle fitting all, the trajectories of both individuals and aggregates are likely to vary across orientations. Why do some preadult orientations persist for so long when others are more open to change? The evidence on family transmission is a suggestive parallel. Persistence may stem from a high-volume and/or one-sided flow of communication in the individual's microenvironment. The opportunity to practice the orientation in conversation and behavior may also facilitate it. The meaning of the political object may need to be constant as well. For example, Americans' party identifications and racial attitudes are cases of relatively high levels of information flow, and so presumably are sources of conversation and opportunities for behavioral practice, conditions favorable to persistence (Valentino & Sears, 1998). But many policy issues scarcely come to public attention at all and so may involve considerably lower levels of such favorable conditions (Sears, 1983). And the cognitive meaning of the two parties, in terms of their positions on racial and other issues, changed dramatically in the 1960s, with the result that massive changes have occurred in white southerners' party identifications (Green et al., 2002; Osborne, Sears, & Valentino, 2011).

Persistence also should be greater for orientations toward attitude objects salient in early life than for those that only become salient later in life, even if in the same general domain. Here election campaigns as occasions for the socialization of partisanship may serve as a model, as indicated earlier. White adults' migration between the racially conservative South and the more racially liberal North is another example. Region of origin dominated whites' adult attitudes about older issues such as racial intermarriage, while region of adult residence had a stronger effect on issues that became prominent in later years, such as busing for school integration or affirmative action (Glaser & Gilens, 1997).

Many policy attitudes, however, do not show high levels of stability over time (Converse, 1964; Converse & Markus, 1979). Converse (1964; 2000) speculated that many were "non-attitudes," that many people simply had no fixed attitude toward issues they were only vaguely familiar with. Alternatively, Achen (1975) suggested that much observed attitude instability may simply be due to measurement error, perhaps due to ambiguous survey items. Yet a third possibility is that it reflects respondent ambivalence about the issue. If different and conflicting considerations come to mind in two different interviews, unstable summary responses may result (Zaller & Feldman, (1992). These issues remain somewhat unresolved (Converse, 2000; Kinder, 2006).

2.1.2. Aggregate Stability

Longitudinal studies are expensive and difficult to execute. The long-term studies often examine just one period and/or birth cohort, limiting their ability to distinguish persistence from cohort or period-specific effects. *Cohort analysis* can assess aggregate-level

persistence using cross-sectional surveys conducted at different times with different samples. Indirect evidence of individual-level persistence is provided if each birth cohort maintains the same distribution of opinion as it ages, and individual-level change can be inferred if cohorts change over time. For example, the greatly increased support for general principles of racial equality among white Americans in the half-century after World War II (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997) is likely to be due primarily to a mixture of cohort replacement (more prejudiced older cohorts were gradually replaced by less prejudiced younger ones) and some liberalizing individual attitude changes within cohorts (period effects; Danigelis & Cutler, 1991; Firebaugh & Davis, 1988). These liberalizing trends within cohorts began to slow by the 1980s, especially on newer racial issues (Steeh & Schuman, 1991; Wilson, 1996; for similar analyses on broader ranges of attitudes, see Davis, 1992; Danigelis, Hardy, & Cutler, 2007).

Natural experiments also can provide indirect evidence about individual-level persistence by testing the resistance to change of presumably early-acquired attitudes when people are placed in altered attitudinal environments. For example, migration between congressional districts dominated by opposite parties influences adults' voting preferences and party identification (Brown, 1988). Some direct personal experiences in adulthood might also be expected to produce change. One common expectation is that the emergence of economic interests in adulthood will influence individuals' political attitudes. However, extensive research has found surprisingly limited evidence that self-interest has much effect on adults' political attitudes, as if earlier-acquired sociopolitical attitudes resisted such influences in adulthood (Citrin & Green, 1990; Sears & Funk, 1991; but see Chong, 2000).

Most of the literature has interpreted persistence, when it occurs, as a product of the psychological strength of the orientation. An alternative is that hereditary transmission dominates potential environmental influences (see Funk, chapter 8, this volume). Any impact of the direct indicators of family political socialization described earlier, such as clear parental attitudes and strong family communication, is inconsistent with the hereditary account. A nuanced version of the hereditary hypothesis has been offered by Hatemi et al. (2009), however. They too found convincing evidence of the family's role into early adulthood. But from age 21 on, cross-twin correlations begin to be larger for monozygotic (identical) twins than for dizygotic (fraternal) twins, a key finding for the hereditary view. Perhaps family influences get replaced by inherent hereditary tendencies when the individual leaves the parental nest. This is an area of research that will no doubt grow in the future.

2.2. The Impressionable Years

The "impressionable years" hypothesis (Sears, 1975) is a variant of the persistence hypothesis, suggesting a "critical period" in early adulthood when political orientations are especially open to influence. Mannheim (1952) speculated that the period might be approximately from ages 17 to 25. Three psychological propositions are involved. One

is that core orientations are still incompletely crystallized as the individual enters that period, contrary to the persistence model, and gains may be seen through early adulthood. Second, that process should be complete as the individual enters mature adulthood, so crystallization should show only modest gains thereafter. And third, people may experience political life as a "fresh encounter" during that critical period, one that can seldom be duplicated later (Mannheim, 1952). In Erikson's (1968) terms, young adults are becoming more aware of the social and political world around them just when they are seeking a sense of self and identity. As a result, they may be especially open to influence at that stage.

On the first point, even attitudes that may be relatively highly crystallized by late adolescence may still show increased crystallization in early adulthood. Party identification followed that pattern in the Michigan socialization study, both showing greater stability than almost all other attitudes when the student sample left adolescence, and impressive gains through early adulthood (Jennings & Niemi, 1981). More recent studies show similar gains in early adulthood in racial attitudes, religiosity, and social dominance orientation (Henry & Sears, 2009; Sears & Henry, 2008; Ho et al., 2012).

Second, core orientations should be more stable over time once the individual is past the impressionable years. Data from two four-year NES panel studies show that all older cohorts had substantially more stable party identifications than did the youngest cohort (Alwin et al., 1991; Sears, 1983). The youngest cohort in the earlier study also showed greatly increased stability when re-sampled in the later study, when it was 16 years older, suggesting that the increased stability with age was an aging rather than a period effect (Alwin, 1993). The Michigan socialization study cited earlier also showed that high school seniors had substantially lower levels of attitude stability across early adulthood than did their parents in later adulthood. After the students reached their thirties, though, their attitudes had become as stable as their parents' attitudes (Lewis-Beck et al., 2008; Stoker & Jennings, 2008).

On the other hand, orientations that are subjected to strong information flows and regularly practiced might simply become stronger with age with no sharp discontinuity in early adulthood (Converse, 1969; Sears, 1983). Indeed cohort analyses in the United States show that each cohort expresses stronger party identifications as it ages, at least during what Converse (1976) described as the "steady state era" of roughly constant partisan divisions prior to the 1970s (Lewis-Beck et al., 2008; Miller & Shanks, 1996). Such aging effects have been obtained in the UK as well (Cassel, 1999).

If indeed attitudes that are well practiced become stronger with age, one might expect that the elderly would show the least change of all. Surprisingly enough, there is some evidence that the relationship of age to attitude stability follows an inverted-U pattern. Racial prejudice among whites in the 1972–1976 ANES panel study was least stable over time for the youngest (under 30) and oldest (over 60) age groups (Sears, 1981). Moreover, in a period of liberalizing racial attitudes, the oldest cohort actually liberalized the most. These findings held up with education controlled, and measurement reliability showed no slippage in the oldest cohort. Similar decreases in the stability of party identification occurred in two ANES panel studies, even with corrections for measurement unreliability (Alwin et al., 1991; Alwin, 1993). Why these attitudes might

become more unstable in old age is unclear. However many of the ways in which people are socially embedded often do change in old age, in terms of work, residence, family, and other social networks, which may destabilize political attitudes.

The third implication is that core attitudes ought to become more resistant to influence as the individual ages. Three surveys analyzed by Visser and Krosnick (1998) yielded such effects. Another found that changes in one's youthful social environment, as indexed by demographic location, had considerably greater influence on levels of racial tolerance than changes later in life (Miller & Sears, 1986; also see Glaser & Gilens, 1997). In another study, migration between congressional districts dominated by opposite parties influenced adults' voting preferences and party identification, with greater change among those migrating earlier in life (Brown, 1988). However, another extensive cohort analysis of tolerance-related attitudes found as much intracohort change over time among older (60-plus) as among younger (under 40) adults (Danigelis et al., 2007).

An excellent case study of the impressionable years hypothesis examined the long-term effects on draft-eligible young men of being subjected to the draft lottery during the Vietnam War (Erikson & Stoker, 2011). A process for randomly assigning young men to draft-eligible status was instituted in 1969 to replace the system of college deferments that had been criticized as class-biased. Low lottery numbers, based on the individual's date of birth, made men more vulnerable to the draft. The Michigan socialization panel study was used because its youth cohort was exactly of the age to be included in the lottery. Those who had had the college deferments that were expiring were vulnerable; the noncollege members of the youth cohort were not, having already passed through exposure to the draft. Erikson and Stoker found that having low lottery numbers in the college group was much more strongly associated with opposition to the war than was the case among those whose military status had already been resolved one way or another. Moreover, the anticipation of vulnerability to the draft led to more antiwar attitudes than did actual past military service.

The impressionable years hypothesis is a good fit for what happened thereafter. In the 1973 interviews, lottery number trumped prelottery party identification as a predictor of preferences for the antiwar presidential candidate, George McGovern, reflecting the continuing influence of a significant event occurring in that earlier critical period. And in 1997, when the original student sample was middle-aged, lottery number still strongly predicted their attitudes toward the Vietnam War. Moreover, postlottery party identification dominated prelottery party identification in predicting key political attitudes among the lottery-vulnerable, but not among their counterparts who had been spared. The attitude changes that had occurred in the impressionable years were highly persistent, as was their continuing influence.

2.3. Political Generations

The impressionable years hypothesis focuses on the particular susceptibility to influence of individuals' attitudes in late adolescence and early adulthood. But if "the times"

(AKA the *zeitgeist*) embody compelling new ideas, sometimes people in that life stage can be influenced in common, producing generational differences. Mannheim (1952) suggested, more narrowly, that "generational units," or subsets of those in that impressionable stage (which, as indicated above, he arbitrarily defined as ages 17 to 25), may share powerful experiences that will mark them as distinctive for life. Either way, producing such generational effects requires both that individuals have a particular psychological openness at that life stage and that a cohort be exposed to unique and evocative political experiences in common.

Several such generational effects have received intensive empirical study. One is the "New Deal generation" in the United States. Youthful new voters who first entered the electorate during the 1930s remained substantially more Democratic into the 1950s, both in voting behavior and in party identification, than were earlier cohorts at similar ages (Campbell et al., 1960; Centers, 1950; Elder, 1974). The young protestors in the United States and Europe in the 1960s became another quite self-conscious generational unit. Most evidence indicates that their left-liberal distinctiveness persisted for many years thereafter, especially among those who actively engaged in protest. For example, the students in the Michigan socialization study who said they had been active as protestors in 1973 continued to be considerably more liberal than were college-educated nonprotestors, even as late as 1997 (Jennings, 1987; also see Fendrich & Lovoy, 1988; Marwell, Aiken, & Demerath, 1987; McAdam, 1989). Interestingly enough, their offspring were more liberal than the offspring of nonprotestors (Jennings, 2002). Even "engaged observers"—those who were attentive to the movements but not very active in them—showed lasting political effects years later (Stewart, Settles, & Winter, 1998).

Partisanship in the generation that immediately followed is another case in point. A number of issues divided both parties internally in the mid-1960s to mid-1970s, such as civil rights, conflict over the Vietnam War, and the Watergate scandal. Disenchantment with the parties ensued among many of their normal supporters, reducing the strength of partisanship in the generation then entering the electorate. Debates continue today over whether partisan strength among incoming youthful cohorts subsequently turned back up (Miller & Shanks, 1996), or whether that era foreshadowed a more lasting dealignment (Dalton, 2013; Hajnal & Lee, 2011; Wattenberg, 1998). Much turns on the seemingly arcane, but politically crucial, treatment of "leaning independents," those who declare they are "independent" rather than aligned with either party, but who also say they lean toward one party; specifically whether they are really "closet partisans" or more closely resemble dealigned independents. A related debate is whether the American public is now more politically polarized than ever (Abramowitz, 2010; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009) or remains mainly ideologically moderate but has simply "sorted" itself into more ideologically homogeneous parties (Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 2011; Levendusky, 2009).

Finally, a potentially rich line of investigation concerns persisting possible generational effects of political or social traumas, though much of this work has been left to nonquantitative historians. Loewenberg (1971), for example, suggests that the unusually powerful support for the Nazi regime among Germans born from 1900 to 1915 can

be ascribed in part to the many traumas they had experienced in early life, including malnutrition and starvation, disease, parental neglect and permanent father absence, and hyperinflation. Direct exposure to political violence has been shown to increase the likelihood of psychopathology in studies from Israel and South Africa (Slone, Adiri, & Arian, 1998; Slone, Kaminer, & Durrheim, 2000). Even exposure to distal violence, such as the assassination of a popular leader, can have profound emotional effects in the short run (Raviv, Sadeh, Raviv, Silberstein, & Diver, 2000; Wolfenstein & Kliman, 1965), and perhaps long-term political effects as well (Sears, 2002).

However occasional generational effects more usually appear in the midst of a cloud of generational similarities. For example, Harding and Jencks (2003) found that premarital sex has become more morally acceptable in America since the early 1960s. They also found that younger cohorts have been more liberal throughout. But that may not be a generational effect. They found that the sharpest liberalizing changes occurred in *all* cohorts during a narrow window of time from 1969 to 1973. Current age differences, with older adults more conservative than the young, may therefore reflect aging rather than generational effects (also see Danigelis et al., 2007). Osborne et al. (2011) found both generational and within-cohort changes as southern whites moved from the Democratic to the Republican Party following racial liberalization of the national Democratic Party. Tessler, Konold, and Reif (2004) did find a lasting generational distinctiveness in attitudes toward the Boumedienne regime among Algerians who came of age in the 1960s and 1970s, but less clear differences in other orientations and/or other cohorts. And finally, Davis (2004) cautions against expecting both broad and sharp generational differences in social and political attitudes in the aftermath of the 1960s (also see Danigelis et al., 2007).

Another set of generational effects is reflected in *collective memory*, defined as "memories of a shared past that are retained by members of a group, large or small, that experienced it," especially "shared memories of societal-level events" (Schuman & Scott, 1989, pp. 361–362; also see Halbwachs [1950] 1980). Howard Schuman (e.g., Schuman & Corning, 2012) has extensively tested whether "national or world changes" occurring in one's impressionable years are especially likely to be recalled later as "especially important." The age cohort most likely to select World War II had been 20, on average, in 1943; the Vietnam War was selected by those averaging age 20 in 1968. Elderly Germans and Japanese in 1991 were especially likely to mention World War II (Schuman, Akiyama, & Knauper, 1998). Ascribing great importance to the assassination of JFK peaked among those who had been in childhood and adolescence in 1963. Even simple pieces of information, such as FDR's party, or the New Deal program called the WPA, have shown marked generational differences years later.

Collective memories, of course, can be the stuff of intense political debate. The period after 1880 is sometimes known as the "Second Civil War," as former Confederates and Unionists struggled to control the dominant narrative history of the original Civil War, including the role of slavery in causing the conflict, whether Grant or Lee was the superior general, which army was the more courageous, and whether the outcome was due to superior soldiering or to mere material wealth (Fahs & Waugh, 2004; Waugh, 2009).

Respondents were asked in 1990 whether the best analogy for the conflict in the Persian Gulf created by the Iraq leader Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait was the incumbent President G. H. W. Bush's "Hitler" metaphor of a voracious dictator, or the opposition Democrats' "Vietnam" metaphor of a Third World quagmire. Those over 40 strongly preferred the Hitler analogy, whereas those under 40 were split evenly between the two analogies (Schuman & Rieger, 1992). Tellingly, once the American coalition went to war against Iraq, the Hitler metaphor became the overwhelming favorite, and generational differences disappeared. The collective memories held by ordinary people may sometimes not correspond to those of the political classes, as seen in Palestinians' beliefs about the 1948 Palestinian exodus from what is now Israel (Nets-Zehngut, 2011). The political classes emphasized Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Israeli efforts to expel Palestinians from what became Israeli territory, a theme less common in ordinary Palestinians' collective memories.

Robert Jervis (1976) has applied this notion of collective memory to the question of how foreign policy decision-makers "learn from history." Political leaders who have dramatic and important firsthand experiences in politics when they are in the "impressionable years" may later apply those "lessons" to issues they must deal with as public officials. For example, Harry Truman, confronting the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, and Lyndon Johnson, facing the Vietnam War, both recalled that the buildup to World War II had taught them the danger of not facing up to aggressors at an early stage. Colin Powell and other military leaders who had been young officers in the 1960s later applied the lesson of Vietnam to, among other things, the Persian Gulf War: don't go to war half-heartedly, they said; either stay out or go in with overwhelming force. The danger of those early-learned "lessons," as with any persisting generational effects, is of course that they are long out of date by the time the young person becomes a mature adult, as in the cliché that the military is always "fighting the last war."

2.4. Life Cycle Effects

These questions about the persistence of early learning, as opposed to the continuing openness to new experience, by no means exhaust the possible contributions of a lifespan development approach to political psychology. Correlations of age with political orientations can logically reflect cohort, period, or life cycle effects. While these cannot be rigorously distinguished in cohort analyses (Mason, Mason, Winsborough, & Poole, 1973), given only two pieces of information (age and time of measurement), sometimes other information can help.

One common life cycle hypothesis is that people become more conservative with age. However, cohort analyses show that is not necessarily true either for partisanship or racial conservatism. In the 1950s, age was positively correlated with Republicanism, when the elderly came from pre–New Deal cohorts, a period of Republican dominance. In a later era, when the elderly were predominantly from the

"New Deal generation," they tilted toward the Democrats (Crittenden, 1962). And young voters moved sharply toward the Republicans during the Reagan era (Lewis-Beck et al., 2008; Miller & Shanks, 1996). These reflect generational rather than life cycle effects on partisanship. Danigelis et al.'s (2007) extensive cohort analyses comparing older and younger cohorts' trajectories found quite a mixture of intracohort changes, most in the direction of greater tolerance with age; but older cohorts never overshot younger ones.

Age also correlated positively with support for Jim Crow racism among whites in the decades after World War II (Schuman et al., 1997). However, as noted earlier, cohort analyses have shown waning support for it within cohorts of white Americans as they aged during that period, reflecting period and cohort, not life cycle, effects on racial conservatism (Sears, 1981; Firebaugh & Davis, 1988; Danigelis & Cutler, 1991). Indeed, life cycle effects on attitudes have generally been difficult to pin down (Alwin, 1993; Danigelis et al., 2007).

Young Americans usually show relatively low levels of political engagement, for example, in political information, newspaper reading, political interest, and voting turnout. Part of this is a life cycle effect, as young people generally have been less politically engaged than mature adults through most periods. But today it is partly a generational effect as well, surprisingly so since educational level is almost always correlated with more political engagement, and recent generations have received much more formal education (e.g., Delli Carpini, 2000). Putnam (2000) famously found declines in voter turnout, communal and organizational participation, and trust in people among more recent generations, arguing that they reflect a generational decline in "social capital." He suggests that the rise of television has disrupted such communal activities, though evidence for its role is necessarily somewhat indirect. Others implicate declines in newspaper reading and/or reduced perceived duty to vote in reduced voter turnout among the young (Dalton, 2008; Wattenberg, 2008). Still others conclude that the generational decline in turnout has generally largely resisted efforts at explanation (e.g., Highton & Wolfinger, 2001; Miller & Shanks, 1996).

Finally, the chronically low voting turnout of young people may indeed be a life cycle effect, but may perhaps reflect sociological as well as psychological processes. A psychological interpretation would be that consistent turnout develops through greater experience with the political system. A sociological alternative is that young people are distracted from civic duties by the press of various transitions into adult roles, such as leaving home, leaving school, entering the workforce, getting married, owning a home, and, often, moving geographically. If so, turnout might increase with age merely because people ultimately mature past such obstacles. Comparing these two views, Highton and Wolfinger (2001) found that successfully transitioning into such adult roles had quite mixed effects on turnout, whereas aging all by itself greatly increased it: having accomplished all six such adult tasks increased voting turnout by only 6%, a small fraction of the 37% turnout gap between the young and those over age 60. The authors prefer the more psychological explanation that "pure learning" may be responsible (p. 208).

3. Contextual Changes

3.1. Lifelong Openness

The challenges to the persistence and impressionable years models driven by researchers arguing for more lifelong openness have often provided valuable evidence, even if perhaps sometimes interpreted overly enthusiastically. An influential line of work argues that adults' partisanship is in fact responsive to "the times." The theory of "retrospective voting" suggests that party identification is constantly being modified by new information about the parties' performances (Fiorina, 1981). The notion of "macropartisanship" (Erikson, MacKuen, & Stimson, 2002) describes fluctuations over time in the aggregate distribution of party identification, sometimes over just a few days. Other research shows the influence of changes in candidate images, issues, or events (Niemi & Jennings, 1991; Dalton, 2013).

Beyond that, we simply wish to put up some cautionary flags. An impressive series of studies collected by Sigel (1989) examines the political effects of discontinuities within adulthood, such as entering the workplace, serving in the military, immigrating to a new country, participating in social movements, entering college, getting married, or becoming a parent. Each of these cases, as she notes, incorporates three elements that potentially can affect political attitudes: the crystallization of an individual's own unique identity, assumption of new roles, and coping with the novel and unanticipated demands of adulthood. However, all these specific discontinuities also occur most often in late adolescence and early adulthood, again suggesting such findings may better fit the impressionable years model. And even the mostly youthful but clearly evocative personal experience of military service in Vietnam was found by the Michigan socialization study to have only "modest" lasting political effects (Jennings & Markus, 1977).

Another caution involves the findings cited earlier that mature adults change their attitudes when they encounter major discontinuities in their attitudinal environments. But relatively few people are exposed to such discontinuities after early adulthood. For example, migration from an area dominated by one political party to an area dominated by its opponents does affect partisanship, but is almost three times as likely among young adults as among their elders (Brown, 1988). Migration between North and South affected white adults' racial attitudes, but only about 10% of them had engaged in such migration in both directions combined (Glaser & Gilens, 1997). The microenvironments represented by individuals' social networks also tend to be politically supportive, and indeed disagreements are underrecognized (see Huckfeldt, Mondak, Hayes, Pietryka, and Reilly, chapter 21, this volume). Normally environmental continuity is quite great, and when it breaks down, change may occur, but both environmental change, and any subsequent attitudinal change, are more common in the "impressionable years."

Nevertheless the broader political context can set conditions that facilitate such individual-level processes producing change in adults. For example, the polarization of

party elites on racial issues led to a substantial shift of southern whites to Republicans beginning in the 1960s, though the exact mixture of cohort replacement and individual-level change is not clear cut (Osborne et al., 2011; Green et al., 2002; Miller & Shanks, 1996). The shift away from Jim Crow racism in the white public after the civil rights era (Schuman et al., 1997) was presumably facilitated by elite rejection of the southern segregation system, apparently resulting in a mixture of between- and within-cohort changes (Firebaugh & Davis, 1988).

Similarly, the life-cycle-based strengthening of party identification with age should partly be dependent on the stability of the party system itself. As noted earlier, in the United States, intraparty disputes in the period around the early 1970s resulted in reduced strength of partisanship in most cohorts as they aged, contrary to its usual trajectory. More generally, Converse (1969) found that age was associated with stronger party identifications in the mature democratic systems of the United States and UK, but considerably less so in the interrupted democratic systems in Germany and Italy and in the immature electoral system of Mexico. Even Russia, in the aftermath of the demise of the USSR, has yielded some evidence of nascent partisanship that is stable across elections and with meaningful underlying attitudinal cleavages (Brader & Tucker, 2001; Miller & Klobucar, 2000). In general the persistence model seems to work best for parties that are large and/or old, consistent with the notion that people are most likely to acquire and hold strong attitudes about visible and stable attitude objects (Converse & Pierce, 1992; Sears, 1983).

3.2. Immigration

As with many areas of political psychology, the available evidence about childhood and adult development rests heavily on the American political experience. It is not obviously the most typical case, given, among other things, its highly stable party system, even compared to other developed democracies. As noted above, examining people only in a stable political context risks overestimating the psychological basis for continuities within individual life histories. As one check, we can look at immigrants, who have experienced a variety of changes in their lives, including the political system they live in.

We start with the trajectory of national and ethnic identities after childhood. The persistence hypothesis would suggest that identification with the original nationality group might follow the dominant pattern of the European immigrants of a century ago, being stable within immigrants' life spans, and even passed on to their children, generating a strong ethnic group consciousness in politics (Alba, 1990; Alba & Nee, 2003; Wolfinger, 1965). On the other hand, contemporary youthful immigrants might later in life replace their original national identity (e.g., "Mexican") with an American ethnic identity (e.g., "Latino"), a process consistent with the impressionable years model. Perhaps in later generations the American ethnic identity might become secondary to identification with the destination nation (e.g., "American"), following acculturation through intermarriage, residential and occupational integration, and/or socioeconomic mobility.