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RICHARD CAPLAN

Strategies

AND State

Building



EXIT STRATEGIES AND STATE BUILDING

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Exit Strategies and State Building

Edited by Richard Caplan

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EXIT STRATEGIES AND STATE BUILDING

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At what point in a peace process should the Security Council consider closing a mission, or significantly downgrading its involvement in a situation? In the simplest of terms, any such decision would appear to be influenced by success or failure as judged in relation to the mandate given to the operation by the Council. However, it is in the grey area between clear success and failure that a decision becomes complex.

—NO EXIT WITHOUT STRATEGY (2001)

The essential prerequisite for an acceptable exit strategy is a sustainable outcome, not an arbitrary time limit.

—HENRY A. KISSINGER AND GEORGE P. SHULTZ (2005)

1

EXIT STRATEGIES AND STATE BUILDING

Richard Caplan

IN THE PAST two decades, states and multilateral organizations have dedicated considerable resources toward efforts to stabilize peace and rebuild war-torn societies.¹ A partial list of such efforts would include state-building operations in Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, El Salvador, Guatemala, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Cambodia, East Timor, Iraq, and Afghanistan.² These experiences have spawned a very substantial body of literature on peace- and state-building.³ Indeed, as one scholar has observed, few issues in the study of international security since the end of the Cold War have received as much attention as post-conflict state-building.⁴

Despite this prodigious scholarly output, there has been relatively little consideration of critical questions arising specifically from the “end game” of post-conflict state-building operations.⁵ Many of these questions bear directly on matters of public policy. At what point should external parties consider scaling down their involvement or closing an operation? If exit is linked to performance, what are the appropriate benchmarks by which to judge an operation’s success? How can one know if the achievements an operation has attained are sustainable? If fundamental problems persist and there is little prospect of establishing a stable peace, what

courses of action are available to external actors? In the wake of drawdown or disengagement, what measures should be taken to ensure the maintenance of peace? In short, what are the elements of a sound exit strategy?

Not only has the subject of exit strategies received comparatively little sustained attention; it is also fair to say that policy in this area has been more ad hoc than carefully thought out. All state-building operations are conceived with the termination of the operation in mind. No state-building operation is intended to endure indefinitely, even if a number of operations, in actual practice, have been of long duration. In many if not most cases, however, operations are conducted without well-considered exit strategies. “Before we send our troops into a foreign country, we should know how and when we’re going to get them out,” Anthony Lake, Clinton’s national security adviser, intoned in 1996, two years after the precipitate withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia.⁶ Yet rarely has such a requirement been met. Of course, planning for exit as precisely as Lake’s comments would suggest is difficult if not impossible, as the Clinton administration itself would discover in Bosnia and Herzegovina only months after Lake delivered his speech. No one can foresee the circumstances that will obtain, and the course adjustments they may necessitate, once an operation has been launched. However, this is not to say that more informed planning for exit is not possible.

If devising exit strategies is a challenge for all major interventions, it is a particularly difficult challenge for state-building operations that entail extensive external support for, or control of, the principal governance functions of a state or territory—as have many colonial administrations historically and, more recently, complex peace support operations, transformative military occupations, and international territorial administrations (or “neo-trusteeships”). Given the scope of the authority that external parties engaged in state building may exercise, and the anarchical conditions that often prevail in the states or territories under their control, the choices available to international agents regarding exit are frequently suboptimal. On the one hand the withdrawal of international actors may appear to be “premature,” risking to leave behind weak local institutions and unresolved conflicts. On the other hand continued external control threatens to alienate the domestic population and inhibit the development of autonomous governance capacity that is vital to the state’s or territory’s viability ultimately. For U.S. forces in post-Saddam Iraq seeking to balance the need for stability against growing impatience and active resistance on the part of significant sectors of the population, the transfer of power proved to be one of *the* most contentious issues.

Critical to any understanding of the challenges inherent in devising and implementing exit strategies is an appreciation of relevant antecedent experiences. With that aim in mind, this book provides a comparative study of exit with regard to a

wide range of international operations of a state-building nature. The essays focus on the empirical experiences of, and scholarly and policy questions associated with, exit in relation to the four families of experience noted above: colonial administrations, complex peace support operations, international territorial administrations, and transformative military occupations. In all of the cases, state building, broadly conceived, has been a key objective, undertaken most often in conditions of fragility or in the aftermath of armed conflict. The essays offer detailed accounts of practice associated with exit—examining the factors that bore on the decisions by external actors to scale down or terminate an operation; investigating the nature of any planning for withdrawal; exploring whether exits were devised with clear objectives in mind; and assessing the effects of the exit strategies employed, especially in relation to peace and stability. The book also addresses issues of a more thematic nature, notably recent institutional innovations that are intended to help manage transitions; the political economy of exit and peace consolidation; and the competing normative visions of exit from state-building operations. The case studies and the thematic essays combined can be said to capture fairly the key experiences and issues that are most relevant to a study of exit strategies.

Conceptualizing and Contextualizing Exit

It is useful to begin with a clarification of the terms “exit” and “exit strategies,” self-evident though the meaning of these terms may seem. An exit is not a single moment or event. If one assumes a fairly high degree of international involvement, as is generally the case with internationally led state-building operations, then exit is best understood as *a process of transition*. A transition can be from one principal operation to another (e.g., from a predominantly humanitarian or peacekeeping operation to a growing emphasis on peacebuilding and recovery) or a handover of responsibility from international agents to their national counterparts as critical national capacities are established. While an exit may lead to the withdrawal of a particular international agent or agents—UN peacekeepers, for instance—it does not necessarily mark the end of all international involvement. External parties may, and often will, continue to be engaged in state building long after an operation has formally ended.

It follows from the foregoing that an exit strategy is a plan for disengaging and ultimately withdrawing from a state or territory, ideally having attained the goals that inspired international involvement originally. If the goals have been attained, an exit strategy may envision follow-on measures to consolidate the gains—a successor operation, perhaps, or a monitoring role for a regional organization. However, if the

goals have not been attained and, it is concluded, cannot be attained, then a different set of considerations will govern the formulation of an exit strategy. For instance, if there have been partial gains, are these worth preserving and, if so, how can that be achieved? If there are reputational costs associated with exit, such as a perceived loss of credibility, how can these best be contained? If exit will leave others to pick up the pieces, how is the process to be managed without leaving the others high and dry? As these considerations suggest, exit is not merely a technical matter, to be accomplished (ideally) when requirements for sustainability have been achieved. It is also a political matter, whose pace may be determined by a host of domestic and international factors that may have little to do with the achievement of sustainable outcomes.

Exit strategies are distinct from mandate implementation, although the two are very closely related. A good exit strategy obviously depends on a good entrance strategy—including the formulation of clear and achievable mandates—as well as a good intermediate strategy.⁷ By the same token, a poorly conceived exit strategy can jeopardize the achievements of a state-building operation and imperil the viability of a post-conflict state or territory. But an exit strategy cannot compensate, easily or at all, for major deficiencies in the design or execution of a state-building operation. A successful exit, then, is facilitated by successful mandate implementation, if the mandate is suitably designed and resourced. However, an exit strategy is not a surrogate for mandate completion. Indeed, a state-building operation can fail or only partially succeed and the exit still be successful—although a government or organization will likely have a difficult time selling that particular success story to the public.

Notwithstanding major preoccupations with exit strategies, as manifested in the media and in policy debates most recently with regard to Iraq and Afghanistan, the term has not long been part of the political lexicon. “Exit strategy” made its first appearance as a business term: the earliest recorded instance of its use, documented in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, is from 1973.⁸ As a term of art in business, an exit strategy signifies a firm’s plan for departure from an industry or market. One of the earliest applications of the term to foreign and military policy was by Richard A. Falk in his book *A Global Approach to National Policy*, where, commenting on the tenor of political debate in the United States in the late 1960s with regard to U.S. military engagement in Vietnam, he wrote, “prowar sentiment had virtually vanished from the American scene, and the political debate was confined to disagreement over exit strategies.”⁹ The U.S. columnist Joseph Kraft later employed the term in 1984 in relation to the U.S. military intervention in Lebanon. “It is time to think about an exit strategy which can be applied unilaterally to limit the gain that will accrue to radical nationalists and the Soviet Union,” Kraft wrote in the *Washington Post*.¹⁰ According to Gideon Rose, the term only became part of the vernacular in

1993 at the time of the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia, where U.S. (and UN) forces incurred major casualties in their pursuit of rebel leader Mohammad Aided. In the wake of the Somalia debacle, the Clinton administration decried “open-ended commitments” and stressed the need for specific time frames to be agreed in advance for the withdrawal of U.S. troops.¹²

It seems reasonable to suggest, however, that as a concept, “exit strategy” occupied an important place in the U.S.—and, for that matter, the international—public consciousness well before the term came to be widely employed.¹³ There was talk of exit, particularly among pacifists and anti-war activists, during both World Wars I and II. Withdrawal was also one of the major concerns for France’s Mollet government in deciding to launch military operations in Algeria before 1954, as well as during the war itself, and even more so for de Gaulle in considering the options of pacification versus independence of Algeria in 1958. Indeed, in many respects U.S. preoccupations with an exit strategy in relation to Vietnam bore similarity to the concerns that the British, French, Belgian, and other imperial powers harbored, both earlier and later, as they sought to reconfigure their relationships with their colonies.

One would expect security organizations engaged in post-conflict state building to have well-developed policies relating to the planning and implementation of exit strategies, but that does not appear to be the case. There is little explicit discussion of exit strategies in the relevant official publications expounding U.S. military doctrine,¹⁴ although the term is commonly used by senior U.S. military officers. “Operational planning guidance . . . does not integrate exit strategy considerations in the forefront of the planning and execution cycles,” one military analyst, writing in 2002, observed.¹⁵ This may be because for many people, exit strategies, especially since Somalia, are associated with failure.¹⁶ U.S. military doctrine focuses instead on “termination criteria” (“the specified standards . . . that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded”)¹⁷ and “end states” (“the required conditions that, when achieved, attain the strategic and political objectives or pass the main effort to other national or international agencies to achieve the final strategic end state”),¹⁸ notwithstanding some recognition of the importance of planning for “transition and termination.”¹⁹ Clarity about when to terminate military operations and the conditions sought at the end of a campaign or operation are certainly important for an exit strategy, but the formulation of an exit strategy is governed by a distinct set of considerations.

The United Nations has not developed doctrine or guidance with respect to exit strategy either, but it has devoted considerable attention to the question. In an extraordinarily open, daylong debate on November 15, 2000, conducted in light of the many difficult operations the UN had undertaken in the post-Cold War period, the Security Council chose to examine how and why it decides to close various peace operations.²⁰ The Council in turn requested Secretary-General Kofi Annan to submit

his own analysis and recommendations on the subject, which he did in April 2001, in a report titled *No Exit without Strategy*.²¹ The debate and the report reflect increased awareness of, and preoccupation with, the complex challenges of devising exit strategies for UN peace operations. As the Argentine representative on the Council put it during the debate:

The decision to put an end to an operation is more complex than it appears in principle. . . . There are two reasons for this. First, the exit strategy must not be necessarily determined by pre-established timetables but rather by the objectives to be attained, and the latter vary according to the nature of the conflict. Secondly, the objectives may have been only partially attained. In that case, the Security Council would have to evaluate carefully the relationship between the human and financial cost of maintaining any operation and the political consequences of the pullout of such a mission for the States directly involved, as well as for the stability of the region concerned.²²

Several points emerge from these reflections. First, the importance of getting exit strategies right is hard to overstate. As noted in the nonpaper that was circulated prior to the Security Council debate, there have been numerous cases in which the United Nations has either withdrawn a peace operation or dramatically altered its mandate, only to see the situation remain unstable or collapse into renewed violence.²³ Rwanda (1994), Macedonia (1999), and East Timor (2006) are just a few examples. Second, the emphasis that both the debate and the report place on *sustainable* peace as an operation's ultimate objective marks a shift away from singular events or outcomes that in the past, for instance, tended to treat multiparty elections as the culminating point of international involvement in a conflict. Such was the case with respect to the conflict in Angola, where UN-organized elections in 1992 marked the turning point for UN peacekeeping engagement but also prompted the renewal of armed conflict when one of the parties to the conflict refused to accept the outcome of the elections. Third, there is recognition that circumstances can vary quite significantly and that the available options, as well as the strategic imperatives, will vary accordingly. Whether an operation is a complete success, a partial success, or a failure will not only have significant bearing on decisions about whether to exit; it will also constrain choices regarding the nature of the exit. Fourth, the reasons for partial success or failure are germane to the formulation of exit strategies. The implications of failure attributable to warring parties adamantly refusing to cooperate or abide by their commitments, for instance, are quite different from the implications of failure attributable to the inability or unwillingness of members of the Security Council to deliver on what is asked or required of them.

These reflections are beginning to bear fruit gradually with regard to institutional efforts to improve exit planning. The establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in 2005 represents an attempt to focus more attention on the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and, ultimately, to disengagement. Within the PBC, the Peacebuilding Support Office has been concerned increasingly with the challenges of designing and implementing transitional and exit strategies. Among other things, it has been endeavoring to develop a systemwide UN methodology for measuring progress toward sustainable peace and devising tools to plan for reconfiguring assistance in the latter stages of peace operations that involve UN organs and agencies.²⁴ These efforts have not been limited to the United Nations: governments involved in state-building operations have also been seeking to equip themselves with the analytical and other tools required for the formulation of effective exit strategies.

Exit Modes and Mechanisms

There are various modes of transition and numerous exit mechanisms that governments and international organizations involved in state building may employ. These modes and mechanisms are discussed in the context of the cases examined in this book. However, it is useful to present a general overview of them.

Cut and run. Where success is proving to be elusive and continued engagement costly, one option is to cut one's losses and scale back one's engagement significantly or withdraw from an operation entirely. The term is almost always pejorative and, therefore, often used negatively, as with U.S. Secretary of State General Colin Powell's assertion, in relation to the U.S. deployment in Somalia, "I don't think we should cut and run because things have gotten a little tough"—although arguably this is precisely what the United States chose to do in the end.²⁵ Lieutenant General William E. Odom, former director of the U.S. National Security Agency, proposed this particular course of action in May 2006 with regard to U.S. efforts to defeat the insurgency and build a stable state in Iraq in the wake of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion and overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime.²⁶ Suggestions of a similar nature have been made with respect to international efforts in support of the combined counterinsurgency and state-building initiatives in Afghanistan.

Phased withdrawal. Another option is a phased exit, the pace of withdrawal often being commensurate with the achievement of partial results (targets) culminating in the desired end state. Such an approach was employed with some success by the UN in Eastern Slavonia, the last remaining Serb-held region of Croatia in the wars of Yugoslav dissolution, which the UN was entrusted with governing for two years (1996–98) pending its restoration to Croatia. In the first phase of the exit strategy,

the transitional administrator devolved responsibility to the government of Croatia for the major part of the civil administration in the region, maintaining the authority to intervene and, critically, to overrule local decisions if necessary. The devolution of remaining executive functions was, in principle, subject to satisfactory performance on the part of the Croatian government in relation to agreements it had negotiated with the UN and the Croatian Serbs.²⁷ The transfer of responsibility for the maintenance of security in Iraq, facilitating the withdrawal of U.S. and British forces there, was also a phased withdrawal.

Deadlines. The timetable for transition or exit may be determined in advance and stipulated in a peace agreement or a UN Security Council resolution. UNSC Resolution 745, for instance, limited the UN transitional authority in Cambodia to 18 months, and the Erdut agreement between Croatian Serbs and the government of Croatia limited the UN transitional administration in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) to one year (renewable for another twelve months). Fixed timetables can, of course, be problematic. For one thing, they may encourage spoilers to bide their time in anticipation of a specified closure date. Moreover, they make it difficult for external actors to respond to unanticipated obstacles that may arise, thereby jeopardizing the full implementation of a mandate. But fixed timetables also have certain virtues. They introduce predictability into a process that may in turn promote buy-in from the parties to a conflict. The Croatian government only accepted the deployment of UNTAES because it knew that it would not be a mission of indefinite duration, which had not been the case with predecessor UN peace operations on its territory. Fixed timetables can also facilitate planning. With the knowledge that the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) would close in twenty-four months, the UN devised a Mandate Implementation Plan, which served to guide UNMIBH in the completion of its mandate before closure.

Benchmarking. Recent practice has seen the increased use of benchmarking as a mechanism to measure progress toward the achievement of state-building goals in an effort to facilitate the planning and implementation of transitional and exit strategies.²⁸ Benchmarks are preestablished standards of achievement, the attainment of which is expected to contribute to the realization of an operation's objectives. Benchmarking has been employed widely by international authorities in post-conflict state-building operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Iraq, and Afghanistan, as well as other war-torn states. Benchmarks have been used to determine, among other things, the scope and timing of the reconfiguration of the international presence and the handover of authority to national counterparts. To be effective, benchmarks need to be measurable using meaningful indicators of progress. Too often the focus is on outputs (e.g., the number of judges trained) rather than on outcomes (e.g., the establishment of an

independent judiciary). In addition, evaluation of and reporting on progress toward meeting benchmarks need to be protected against the distortion of findings, including the temptation to obscure inconvenient truths.²⁹

Elections. Often used to effect transitions leading ultimately to a drawdown in state-building operations, elections are also an important instrument of peace consolidation. Elections help to identify, and confer legitimacy on, individuals whom external actors can subsequently treat as recognized national counterparts. Moreover, elections are central to the establishment (or reestablishment) of governmental institutions, as they were in occupied Germany after World War II. Elections cannot by themselves consolidate peace, however. In some cases, as noted with respect to Angola, they may even exacerbate a conflict, if at least one of the parties is not willing to accept electoral defeat. Putting undue emphasis on the importance of elections, moreover, contributes to the incorrect impression of transition as a single event rather than a longer-term process needing continued international support. Increasingly, the tendency is to view elections as just one element of a broader transitional strategy rather than as the focal point of a transition.

Successor operations. Consistent with the view that transition is a process and not an event, there has been growing recognition of the importance of successor peace operations and follow-on arrangements to consolidate peace. In Croatia, UNTAES was succeeded by a UN Police Support Group that not only monitored the performance of the Croatian police but also reported regularly to the Security Council on (1) Zagreb's implementation of the UNTAES agreements it had signed, (2) progress in reconciliation, (3) economic reconstruction, (4) refugee returns, (5) the functioning of municipalities, and (6) other developments pertinent to the consolidation of peace following the termination of the UN transitional administration.³⁰ More extensive still was the UN Mission in Support of East Timor, a successor mission to the UN transitional administration in East Timor. Successor operations and follow-on arrangements are a function that regional or subregional organizations can usefully perform, consistent with the view that ownership for peace consolidation can have a regional as well as a national dimension. With the termination of the UN Police Support Group in Croatia, for instance, the UN transferred its monitoring activities to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Organization of the Book

The essays in this book offer a comparative analysis of exit in relation to international operations of a state-building nature. The term "state building" is used broadly to encompass a range of activities within a state or territory undertaken by an external

agent, acting singly or jointly, with the express purpose of building or rebuilding institutions of governance. For the purpose of this book, the focus is on state building in “post-conflict” contexts, that is, in the period following the cessation of major hostilities arising from armed conflict.³¹ The primary operations examined here are complex peace support operations, international territorial administrations, and transformative military occupations, all of which pursue state- or institution-building as one of their chief objectives. Colonial administrations have been included with the aim of adding historical perspective. The colonial precedent is very often invoked in studies of post-conflict state building, yet it is rarely examined. While the context within which colonial withdrawal occurred was very different from those that apply to the three other types of operations, the parallels are notable and arguably instructive. As John Darwin observes (chapter 2 here): “The strategies devised by the colonial powers, and the response of those to whom they sought to transfer power, may allow us to see more clearly both the distinctive features of the contemporary scene and the endemic difficulties of staging an exit.”

In an effort to capture the breadth of experience, the essays are organized around four broad analyses of exit corresponding to the four types of operation, each essay taking into account as wide a range of relevant experience as possible. Drawing largely on the colonial exits of Britain and France, John Darwin examines the compelling similarities between contemporary exit strategies and the transfers of power at the time of decolonization. The decision to leave, he observes, was often hurried and improvised, sometimes requiring very rapid changes of policy. Geopolitical anxieties, the urgency of state capacity-building, and the search for effective successor regimes were among the main preoccupations of the colonial powers once withdrawal was decided on. These preoccupations have a familiar ring when viewed from a contemporary perspective.

In his essay on peace support operations, William Durch discusses how these operations end, the extent to which conscious exit strategies have anything to do with their ending, and what those strategies consist of or fail to contain that other experience shows might have been helpful to them. In many cases, he observes, exogenous factors determine whether an exit strategy is successful, but much still depends on the content of a mission’s mandate, the knowledge and wisdom that went into its preparation, the competence with which a mission executes that mandate, and whether there are opportunities, over time, to refine it to better adapt to circumstances on the ground as they change.

Dominik Zaum’s essay examines the exit experiences and challenges faced by different international administrations in the twentieth century. His essay advances three arguments: that exit is best understood as a process rather than the event of withdrawal; that the exit processes of post–Cold War international administrations

suggest an increasing concern for peace consolidation and state building and a declining concern for state sovereignty; and that exit strategies are as much concerned with legitimizing an extended international presence as they are with facilitating the transition of authority from international to local institutions.

Finally, Gregory Fox examines the nineteen cases of military occupation since 1945 that fit the definition of an occupation accepted by public international law. One would expect that unilateral occupiers would be profoundly interested in quelling conflict in the states they had invaded and so would, on exit, put in place institutions that would diminish the necessity of their return in response to resumed fighting. With several prominent exceptions, however—including the occupation of Saddam Hussein's Iraq—state building, and in particular liberal democratic state building, has not been a prominent feature of military occupations. The essay discusses the factors that have contributed to success in the few cases of transformative occupation and draws lessons for exit from these operations.

These broad analyses are complemented by two in-depth analyses each, in order to gain an appreciation of the particularities of individual cases. The eight cases have been selected not because they are necessarily “representative” but because they are indicative of the various issues and challenges external actors have had to confront and the policy choices they have made in exiting from state-building operations. In relation to colonial administrations, Tony Chafer focuses on the French decolonization in Senegal, which is often portrayed as exemplary insofar as the transition from colonialism to political independence was managed relatively smoothly and without bloodshed. Exit, Chafer shows, is something of a misnomer in this case because decolonization in Senegal was never envisaged by the main political actors on either the French or the Senegalese side as an exit strategy; rather, it was seen as a way of reconfiguring the relationship to enable France to maintain its influence in the newly independent state. By contrast, the Dutch withdrawal from Indonesia, which Hendrik Spruyt examines, was more fraught. Weak governing coalitions in The Hague impeded efforts to achieve a compromise, leading the government to try (unsuccessfully) to defeat the Indonesian nationalists by force. This case demonstrates the role that third parties can sometimes play in determining the eventual outcome, offering mediation at a minimum. In this case the United States and Britain went further, exercising their leverage to force the combatants to compromise.

With regard to complex peace operations, the book concentrates on Sierra Leone and Haiti. Alhaji Sarjoh Bah analyzes the serial exits from Sierra Leone of Nigerian-led forces, followed by the United Kingdom, and then the United Nations. The precipitate withdrawal of the Nigerian-led forces—largely dictated by political developments in Nigeria—stands in stark contrast to the UN's effective use of benchmarking, developed jointly with the government of Sierra Leone and other

stakeholders, and the deployment of a successor mission, both of which helped reduce the chances of relapse significantly. Haiti, which Johanna Mendelson Forman discusses in her essay, has also witnessed a series of exits—eight to date since the early 1990s (six UN peace operations and two multilateral military interventions). The prospect for a “definitive” exit by the UN is diminished by the chronic inability of the government to provide security for its citizens. Under these circumstances, the only viable exit strategy for the UN, Mendelson Forman argues, may be to transfer responsibility to a regional organization that is prepared to remain in Haiti indefinitely.

Two international administrations are analyzed in the book: Kosovo and East Timor. Exit from Kosovo was inextricably bound up with a resolution of the political conflict regarding the future status of the territory (independence v. reintegration into Serbia), as Ben Crampton discusses in his essay. The seeming intractability of the problem, compounded by international unwillingness to confront it, saw the UN and its partners pursue a strategy of “exit through mandate implementation,” followed by a strategy of “exit by development,” then “exit by negotiation,” and finally “exit by replacement,” with the UN’s role being assumed by the European Union, the Kosovo governmental institutions (which the UN built up over its tenure), and the ad hoc International Civilian Office. Anthony Goldstone, in his essay, discusses the development of the strategies for the UN’s exit from East Timor, which faced the prospect of state collapse four years after achieving independence in 2001. He addresses the question why the exit strategies that were adopted failed, suggesting that despite the often stated aversion of the UN and member states to artificial deadlines, the pressures for a rapid withdrawal outweighed calls for a more measured approach that would have taken into account more fully the complexities of the post-conflict environment.

The final pair of cases is concerned with exit and military occupations. Joel Peters examines Israel’s unilateral disengagement from Gaza in 2005. He evaluates the political motives and strategic thinking behind Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon’s disengagement plan and assesses why Israel’s withdrawal did not lead to a more stable strategic environment. He inquires into whether this failure arose from inadequate planning and faulty implementation or whether it reflected a fundamentally flawed strategic vision. Toby Dodge, in his essay, examines the changing nature of both British and U.S. policy toward Iraq between 2003 and 2011, where, having initially overestimated the transformative capacity of military power, each government struggled to reduce the costs, in terms of blood and treasure, of its presence in the country. The chapter examines four discrete sets of policies that were designed to produce an eventual exit from Iraq while sustaining influence at greatly reduced expense. The move from one policy approach to

another was triggered by the unsustainable cost, both in Iraq and at home, of maintaining previous approaches.

The balance of the book is devoted to an examination of three thematic issues. First, Ralph Wilde discusses two competing normative visions as to the basis on which foreign territorial administration—whether colonialism, occupation by states, or territorial administration by international organizations—should be brought to an end. The first is the “trusteeship” model, whereby foreign territorial administration is understood in terms of remedying some kind of deficiency in local governance and exit is contingent on improvements in local conditions. The second idea is the “self-determination” model, which arises out of the post–World War II self-determination entitlement understood as a repudiation of foreign territorial administration, regardless of whether it is or is not operating on a trust basis. This essay discusses the contrasting fortunes of each normative vision in mediating the treatment of foreign territorial administration over the course of the twentieth and into the twenty-first century, and what is at stake in choosing between them when determining the basis for exits from foreign territorial administration operations today.

Second, Michael Pugh focuses on the political economy of exit from post-conflict state building operations. The pivotal contention of his analysis is that economic impacts in war-torn societies of a large military, police, and international aid presence can bring patchy windfall gains for local populations, often overly concentrated in large cities and around military bases. Exits do not necessarily leave sustainable local political economies behind. The exit paths generally fail to protect populations from the economic stresses of neoliberalism introduced by donors, development agencies, and international financial institutions and do not forge the social contracts that liberal peacebuilding envisages for war-torn societies. And while engagement with peace missions by locals often involves coincidences of interest, war-torn economies face considerable strains in adopting imported economic models.

In the third thematic essay, Richard Ponzio examines the new UN peacebuilding architecture—consisting of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Fund, and the Peacebuilding Support Office—in relation to the challenges faced by the termination of UN peacekeeping operations and the requirements for the maintenance of peace in the period following exit. With the unprecedented number of UN peacekeeping operations placing huge financial, political, and other pressures on member states, the PBC was established to facilitate the exit of costly peacekeepers while supporting the transition and reconfiguration of assistance by other parts of the UN and international system that remain involved in post-conflict states. This essay considers how the UN Security Council has used the PBC, from its outset, to help facilitate the drawdown and withdrawal of UN peacekeepers and to sustain international attention on states recovering from conflict.

In a final concluding essay, I discuss some of the policy implications of the contributors' analyses. I draw lessons from both key empirical findings that capture some of the more salient characteristics of the experiences examined on these pages and prescriptive lessons that suggest policy measures that, if they were adopted, might enhance effectiveness in the planning and implementation of exit strategies.

The Prussian military analyst Carl von Clausewitz wrote about the uncertainty and ambiguity that plague planning in wartime. Yet, as the experiences examined in this book make clear, the "fog of peace" at times may be no less opaque than the "fog of war." Indeed, in some respects, the stakes may be just as high, given that between one-third and one-half of all violent conflicts reignite within five years of the establishment of a peace.³² The importance, therefore, of understanding the dynamics of conflict transformation, including the requirements for the maintenance of peace, cannot be overstated. It is hoped that the experiences analyzed in this book contribute to this understanding.

Notes

1. The first epigraph to this chapter is from *No Exit without Strategy: Security Council Decision-Making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (Report of the Secretary-General), UN Doc S/2001/394, April 20, 2001.

2. The second epigraph to this chapter is from Henry A. Kissinger and George P. Shultz, "Results, Not Timetables, Matter in Iraq," *Washington Post*, January 25, 2005.

3. See, for instance, Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Simon Chesterman, *You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Frances Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004); Richard Caplan, *International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); and David Chandler, *International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-liberal Governance* (London: Routledge, 2010).

4. David M. Edelstein, review of *Enforcing the Peace* (Marten), *Political Studies Quarterly* 120:4 (2005), 679.

5. Notable exceptions are Kevin C. M. Benson and Christopher B. Thrash, "Declaring Victory: Planning Exit Strategies for Peace Operations," *Parameters* 26:3 (autumn 1996), 69–80; Gideon Rose, "The Exit Strategy Delusion," *Foreign Affairs* 77:1 (January–February 1998), 56–67; Jeffrey Record, "Exit Strategy Delusions," *Parameters* 31:4 (winter 2001–2), 21–27; Frederic S. Pearson, Marie Olson Lounsbery, and Loreta Costa, "The Search for Exit Strategies from Neo-colonial Interventions," *Journal of Conflict Studies* (winter 2005), 45–74; and Richard Caplan, "After Exit: Successor Missions and Peace Consolidation," *Civil Wars* 8:3–4 (September–December 2006), 253–267.

6. Anthony Lake, "Defining Missions, Setting Deadlines," *Defense Issues* 11:14 (1996), available at <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=898>, accessed January 31, 2012.
7. *No Exit without Strategy*, para. 6.
8. Stephen A. Wakefield of the U.S. Department of the Interior announced that Phase IV controls on oil and gas were "intended as an exit strategy from the whole wretched, frustrating business over the free exchange of goods and services." See "Exit," *Oxford English Dictionary*, online version, Oxford University Press, available at <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/66274?redirectedFrom=exit%20strategy#eid5024848>, accessed January 31, 2012.
9. Richard A. Falk, *A Global Approach to National Policy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), 146.
10. "Recovering the Initiative in Lebanon," *Washington Post*, February 2, 1984.
11. Rose, "Exit Strategy Delusion," 57.
12. Mats Berdal, *Whither UN Peacekeeping?*, Adelphi Paper no. 281 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993), 73. Not wishing to be "doctrinaire," Lake did acknowledge that "when it comes to deterring external aggression, as in the Persian Gulf or the Korean Peninsula, or fighting wars in defense of our most vital security interests, a more open-ended commitment is necessary." Lake, "Defining Missions, Setting Deadlines."
13. I am grateful to Marshall Worsham for his contributions to this paragraph.
14. Notably, FM 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40, "Peace Ops" (April 2009); U.S. Department of the Army, FM 7-0, "Training for Full Spectrum Operations" (December 2008); U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-07, "Stability Operations" (October 2008); and earlier, U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-23, "Peace Operations" (December 1994).
15. Gregory C. Johnson, "Exit Strategy: Where Does It Fit into Operational Planning?," unpublished report, Naval War College, February 4, 2002, 5.
16. Rose, "Exit Strategy Delusion," 63.
17. Joint Publication JP-5, "Joint Operation Planning" (December 2006), III-5.
18. FM 100-23, "Peace Operations," 16.
19. FM 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40, "Peace Ops," I-6.
20. Provisional verbatim transcript of the 4223rd meeting of the UN Security Council, UN Doc S/PV.4223 and S/PV.4223 (Resumption 1), November 15, 2000.
21. *No Exit without Strategy*.
22. UN Doc S/PV.4223, 12.
23. "Letter Dated November 6, 2000 from the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General," UN Doc S/2000/1072, November 7, 2000, annex, para. 1.
24. "Measuring Peace Consolidation and Supporting Transition," Inter-Agency Briefing Paper prepared for the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (New York: United Nations, March 2008).
25. Powell cited in William Safire, "On Language: Cut and Run," *New York Times*, May 2, 2004.
26. Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, "Cut and Run? You Bet," *Foreign Policy* (May-June 2006), 60-61.
27. Caplan, "After Exit," 255-257.
28. For a discussion of benchmarking in the context of peace implementation, see George Downs and Stephen John Stedman, "Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation," in *Ending Civil*

Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, ed. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 45–47.

29. Richard Caplan, “Managing Transitions: Exit Strategies and Peace Consolidation,” in *Managing Complexity: Political and Managerial Challenges in United Nations Peace Operations*, ed. Caty Clement and Adam C. Smith (New York: International Peace Institute, 2009), 36–39.

30. See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Police Support Group, UN Doc S/1998/500, June 11, 1998.

31. For a discussion of these and other relevant terms, see Vincent Chetail, ed., *Post-conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

32. Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom, “Post-conflict Risks,” *Journal of Peace Research* 45:4 (2008), 461–478.

Colonial Administrations

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2

EXIT AND COLONIAL ADMINISTRATIONS

John Darwin

WHAT LIGHT CAN the pattern of colonial “exits”—the transfers of power that lay at the heart of the decolonizing process—throw on the contemporary problem of fashioning exit strategies for state-building operations? There is an obvious parallel between the two cases. In both, the occupying or administering power(s) face a critical challenge. They must foster successor regimes that will satisfy international criteria of legitimacy and good government while also being able to exert effective control over political units whose internal cohesion is often fragile at best. Of course, the parallel cannot be exact. Indeed, part of the aim of this chapter is to highlight the peculiar contexts—geopolitical, ideological, and political—in which the colonial transfers of power were, for the most part, actually undertaken. Nonetheless, identifying their peculiarities, the strategies devised by the colonial powers, and the response of those to whom they sought to transfer power, may allow us to see more clearly both the distinctive features of the contemporary scene and the endemic difficulties of staging an exit. Whether colonial experience offers a promising blueprint is another matter entirely.

This chapter draws mainly on the colonial exits of Britain and France, with most attention on the former.¹ There is some method in this. Britain had much the largest and most varied of imperial systems, and was also the most exposed to the range of global pressures that were brought to bear against colonial rule after 1945. Having described the international and ideological setting in which decolonization occurred, the chapter considers the extent to which the stability of the colonial state was a function of the “illusion of permanence.” Indeed, the exit strategies of the colonial powers might well be seen to originate not in deliberate decisions to withdraw

but in the search for ways to exert their influence more “cheaply.” The critical stage that offers the closest comparison with certain contemporary cases occurred when what was intended as an orderly process of increasing self-government got out of control, suddenly raising the costs of external authority. Finessing the exit from what was potentially a quagmire of unwanted commitments required, among other things, a more or less ruthless Realpolitik; the skilful deployment of rhetorical “cover”; and the deliberate use of constitutional legitimacy as a bargaining counter in the political settlement that preceded independence. We will also observe that exit had costs—some that were seen at the time, some that only became apparent later. It would be naïve to expect that the change of regime to which any exit strategy must lead can be accomplished without losses as well as gains, without victims as well as victors. That certainly was the case with decolonization.

The International Context

The international context might well be seen as the most critical variable affecting the timing and outcome of an exit strategy designed to create a credible, legitimate successor government. In an ideal world, there would be a more or less complete international consensus on the need for an exit, the timing of departure, and the constitutional structure of the emergent state. Just as desirable would be collective agreement on its ideological orientation, recognition of its optimal economic connections, and a general self-denying ordinance against the pursuit of excessive commercial advantage in the fledgling regime. All this is counsel for perfection in a very imperfect world. At most times and in most places, we are likely to see a much less benign international setting in which to carry out the delicate tasks of regime transition.

Indeed, some of the following sources of friction are likely to be present. (We will see in a moment how they affected colonial transfers of power.) First, it may well be the case that if serious differences exist between major powers in the international system, any prospective regime change may present itself as an opportunity for gain, or as the risk of a loss, in the struggle for influence and geopolitical advantage. Under conditions of great power rivalry, territorial control becomes a possible bargaining counter, even if the territory concerned has no intrinsic value. Of course, in some cases, it may be of considerable value to one or other of the major international actors—although not necessarily symmetrically. Where a territory contains or abuts what are seen as geostrategic strongpoints, or commands a strategic highway on land or sea, then it is likely to attract the attention of actual or aspirant great powers. For much the same reasons, its fate will be of concern to its regional neighbors. The nature of the successor regime will be of intense interest to many others besides the administering authority.