

**The Making of the  
“Rape of Nanking”:  
History and Memory in  
Japan, China, and the  
United States**

*Takashi Yoshida*

**OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**

## THE MAKING OF THE “RAPE OF NANKING”

## **Studies of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University**

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*To Tomoko and Yoji Yoshida*

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Throughout the volume, the names of those who live or lived primarily in China, Japan, or Taiwan are written with the surname preceding the given name. For the spellings of Chinese names and places, the Pinyin system is mainly used, though the Wade-Giles system is also adopted for words still commonly used such as “Chiang Kai-shek” instead of “Jiang Jieshi.”

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## THE MAKING OF THE “RAPE OF NANKING”

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# Introduction

## *The Greater East Asian War (Daitō-A Sensō)*

In a 1943 history text, Japan's Ministry of Education presented the following account of the Asia-Pacific War, which dealt *inter alia* with the capture of Nanjing:

Our nation united Korea and the Japanese mainland and contributed to the foundation of peace in the East. In addition, [our nation] has adhered to the policy that Japan and Manchukuo are indivisible and has given East Asia the strength needed to defend itself. It is absolutely necessary for Japan, Manchukuo, and China to have the most cordial diplomatic relations. Our nation has explained this necessity to China and has repeatedly asked China to cooperate [with our nation]. Nevertheless, not only has the Chinese government failed to understand our sincere wishes, but it has also persisted in anti-Japanese activities. With the support of Europe and the United States, it has vigorously reinforced its military capability and has tried to bring pressure to bear both on Japan and Manchukuo.

Finally, on July 7, 1937, at Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing, Chinese soldiers confronted and began shooting toward our army, which was engaged in maneuvers. Furthermore, [some] even went too far by harming our settlers.

Our nation tried to persuade China to cease its lawlessness and to stem the disturbance; however, [the Chinese government] not only continued, but also increased its unjust activities. Thus, [our nation] dispatched the army to punish China for its violence, and the war expanded from northern China to central and southern China.

During the war unswervingly loyal, brave, and courageous Imperial officers and soldiers traveled to different regions and conquered the enemy's bases one after another. On December 13, soon after [the war began], [they] conquered the capital, Nanjing, and planted the rising-sun flag atop of the walls of Nanjing. By October of the following year, or 1938, [they] had captured crucial places such as Guangdong, Wuchang, and

Hankou. As the Navy blockaded the coast and the Army and Navy planes brought the skies under their control, the enemy's government, which had fled to Chongqing, nearly fell apart.

His Imperial Majesty established the headquarters inside the Imperial Palace and worked on military matters day and night. On the first year anniversary of the [China] Incident, [he] issued an imperial rescript and expressed his appreciation for the strenuous efforts of the officers and soldiers and for the support and sacrifices that had been offered on the home front. [He] also encouraged [every Japanese] to [work hard] in order to establish peace in East Asia by cooperating with China as soon as possible. Inspired by the sacred words of His Majesty, our government declared on the Birthday of the Late Emperor Meiji [November 3rd] in 1938 that the goal of the war was to awaken China and to establish new order in East Asia.

Those Chinese who were impressed with our sincere wish founded some new governments in China. This contributed to the eventual establishment of the new Nationalist Government in Nanjing, led by Wang Jingwei. In November, our nation concluded a treaty with the new government and, thereafter, began to work together with Manchuria and China in order to build a new order in East Asia. The Chongqing government, however, survived because of American and British assistance and continued to resist our nation.<sup>1</sup>

In the more than six decades since its occurrence, the Nanjing Massacre has undergone continuous redefinition and reinterpretation in Japan, China, and the United States. Today it is easy to assume that the massacre was always viewed in the three nations as an emblem of Japan's wartime aggression in China and that it has always inspired revulsion like that associated with the Holocaust or Hiroshima. In truth, however, the image of Nanjing as the site of particularly brutal atrocities is a more recent construction. The massacre as it is discussed today did not exist in either national or international awareness until decades after the event. Certainly, Japanese atrocities in Nanjing were reported widely in China and the United States immediately after the fall of Nanjing, and such information, albeit on a limited basis, was available even in wartime Japan. Yet wartime understandings and contemporary reports as to the scale and duration of the atrocities were far less controversial than they later became. In the decades following the Asia-Pacific War (1937–45), the politics of the Cold War dominated historical discourse in East Asia, and the memory of Nanjing was pushed into the background. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, disputes over the facts and significance of Nanjing were virtually nonexistent. It was only after the early 1980s that Nanjing attained a prominent position in the history and memory of the Asia-Pacific War and attracted the attention of a wide range of commentators.

This book demonstrates the shifting understandings of the Nanjing Massacre. It examines how the history of Nanjing has been constructed in Japan, China (including Taiwan), and the United States from 1937 to the present. Both as a historical topic and as an emblem of countless conflicting emotions and

ideas, the Nanjing Massacre has touched these three countries in a startling variety of ways. Nanjing has figured in the attempts of all three nations to preserve and redefine national and ethnic pride and identity, assuming different kinds of significance based on each country's changing internal and external enemies. It has influenced—and in turn been influenced by—foreign policy and diplomatic relations among the four governments considered in this study. Perceptions of it have been used as a barometer of patriotic loyalty, and its memory has been manipulated in order to galvanize such loyalties. It has left its mark on journalism, film, painting, fiction, and museum displays. It has triggered acute controversies among individuals and groups of various political values. It has haunted and influenced the conscience of the world.

Initially an event with primarily local repercussions, the Nanjing Massacre has evolved over decades into a matter of extraordinary international significance. The process of the internationalization occurred in four distinct phases, each of which is treated in a separate three-chapter section. In each of the four phases of this study, one entire chapter is devoted to the history and memory of Nanjing in Japan, China, and the United States, respectively, during the period in question. Part I examines the history and memory of the Nanjing Massacre during the Sino-Japanese and the Pacific Wars (1937–45). Part II discusses the perceptions of Nanjing during the years following World War II, a period dominated by the politics of the earlier phases of the Cold War (1945–71). Part III analyzes the accounts of the massacre between 1971 and 1989, a period when literature concerning Nanjing appeared more frequently than in the previous years. Part IV traces the history and memory of Nanjing during the post-Cold War period, or from 1989 to the present.

Japan, China, and the United States have been studied to the exclusion of other nations. These three nations and their citizens have always taken the lead in internationalizing Nanjing, and memories and histories of Nanjing have influenced the national consciousness of these countries more than they have affected the public awareness of any other nation. For the countries in this study, the question of how to treat the legacy of Nanjing—whether to deplore it, sanitize it, rationalize it, or even ignore it—has mattered most intensely, for that question has touched upon closely held notions of ethics, nationality, and historical identity.

Japanese revisionists, that is, those commentators who have downplayed, excused, or even denied the atrocities in Nanjing, have performed a pivotal role in publicizing Nanjing beyond national boundaries. Had there not been intense challenges from the revisionists, the history and memory of the Nanjing Massacre might have remained a domestic issue rather than becoming an international symbol of Japan's wartime aggression. Vigorous disputes over Nanjing first arose in Japan in the early 1970s. As the revisionists became more visible in the 1980s, their adversaries expanded in number and inspired an increase in commemorative activities in Japan. Toward the mid-1980s, Chinese commentators joined the dispute and condemned the revisionists for their denial of the



massacre. Finally, by the early 1990s, Chinese-American organizations had begun to protest vocally against the claims of the Japanese revisionists.

The story of Nanjing in historic memory only begins with an understanding of chronology. What must also be recognized is the immense variety of interpretations that the event has inspired, as well as the strident disagreements about how the massacre should be remembered. Almost everyone who has attempted to retell or reinterpret the story of Nanjing has wished for her or his version to be accepted as authoritative, and the battle for acceptance has led not only to intense public debate, but also to a seemingly endless generation of written narratives and visual materials. No single account or interpretation of the massacre has emerged as dominant, in part because there is no agreement even as to the basic terms of the debate. Commentators have been unable to agree on the very definitions of the matters they are discussing. They differ as to the proper meaning of words like “victim,” “perpetrator,” “atrocities,” and “civilian.” The number of victims at Nanjing largely depends on how one has defined “victims,” “perpetrators,” “atrocities,” and “Nanjing,” and accordingly, the estimate can go up and down. One may even be able to deny the event altogether by using definitions that serve one’s belief and political motive. Since people have disputed the very boundaries of the victimized city, even the meaning of the word “Nanjing” has sparked dissent.

As the result of the decades-long dispute, numerous accounts on Nanjing are now available not only in Japanese, but also in Chinese and English. Some are analytical and scholarly, while others are emotional and polemical. Some provide complex pictures of the massacre; others present simple, black-and-white depictions of Nanjing. These competing accounts by both scholars and nonscholars, especially those who base their positions on ethnocentric arguments, have tended to speak of the massacre in broadly nationalistic terms, reducing the participants to monolithic words such as “the Chinese” and “the Japanese.”

Yet national consciousness and character are never monolithic. Nations always contain individuals who speak, think, and act contrarily to the majority of their fellow citizens. In keeping with this philosophy, I prefer to avoid using collective nouns like “the Japanese” or “the Chinese,” which tend to reinforce facile generalizations and to obscure the fact that national histories are intrinsically contentious and never garner strict unanimity of opinion or action. Nevertheless, because these collective nouns are rooted in the vocabulary of history, I have been compelled to use them from time to time. My occasional use of this kind of collective noun stems not from my preference, but from a combination of convenience and convention. In historical terms, the various “we’s” and “they’s” have been defined and redefined throughout the six decades analyzed in this work. Those lives regarded as belonging to “us” have often been treated differently from those regarded as belonging to “them.” Similarly, the definition of “atrocities” has also altered since World War II, and the international community today is perhaps less tolerant of gross human rights violations than it was

sixty years ago. During the war, killings of enemy soldiers and civilians alike were probably more acceptable among the belligerents in order to defeat the perceived enemies. The history of the “Greater East Asian War,” quoted at the beginning of this introduction, comes from a 1943 textbook that sixth-graders in Japan were encouraged to regard as an authentic version of contemporary events. It is only one example of the kind of story that a nation could legitimately tell its children at the time of the war.

Though I begin my analysis from the 1930s, I attempt throughout this volume to provide context and to explain why the intensive disputes about the massacre began in the early 1970s and intensified across national boundaries, particularly since 1989. In trying to sift through the complexities of the history and memory of the Nanjing Massacre, one inevitably discovers that these complexities derive not only from the enormity of the event itself, but also from the political, social, and psychological forces that have molded the perceptions of a given commentator. The goal of this study is to demonstrate how and why each individual came to a particular understanding of Nanjing, rather than to judge who or what is right and wrong or true and untrue based on my personal politics and interpretations. The core of the dispute over Nanjing can be largely attributed to the individual predispositions of the participants in the debate. Without an understanding of the varying motives and politics, it is hardly possible to understand why the dispute over Nanjing has lasted more than three decades and is not likely to end in the immediate future.

Throughout this monograph, although individual names are mentioned when possible, I have loosely used the terms “revisionists” and “progressives” to describe the two opposing camps in Japan that have participated in the dispute over Nanjing. The former has tended to reject the history of the Nanjing Atrocities officially introduced to Japan during the American occupation and has attempted to revise or delete it from modern Japanese history. In contrast, the latter faction disapproves the values of Imperial Japan, including its colonialism and aggression. Progressives may or may not endorse the procedures of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, but they tend to see the tribunal as possessing factual merit, and they generally accept its findings with regard to the Nanjing Massacre. In reality, however, individuals within both schools of opinion more or less differ as to the particulars of their positions and views, and the coarse division of the disputants into two opposing camps inevitably ignores existing diversities and complexities among them. Nevertheless, such categorization is useful as it allows us to highlight the very essence of the dispute of Nanjing Massacre and its process of the internationalization.

In this study, I try to include the experiences and ideas of the numerous authors, critics, correspondents, curators, filmmakers, lawyers, politicians, veterans, and victims. It has been my intention to treat all points of view with fairness and respect, even when I strongly disagree with them. Nevertheless, my writing cannot be entirely free from my personal politics, either. I have a high regard for activists, historians, lawyers, schoolteachers, and university profes-

sors in Japan and elsewhere who have ceaselessly worked to preserve and publicize the history and memory of Nanjing as well as other Japanese wartime atrocities. I am critical of nationalists and ethnocentrists in China, Japan, and the United States, who have intentionally or unintentionally based their judgments of history on the supposition that one's nation or ethnicity determines one's value as a human being. I have written this book as a modest protest against those whose views of the world are imprisoned by concepts of nation and ethnicity.

Finally, as to the sources, this study is heavily based on newspapers from the various countries. They offer some of the traceable footprints that one may follow in an effort to understand the memory and history of the Nanjing Massacre across national boundaries. The role of mass media in nationalizing and internationalizing Nanjing is indisputable, and this study intends to demonstrate the way in which these news reports contributed to the making of the "Rape of Nanking."

I

## ALLIES AND ENEMIES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC WAR (1937–45)

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## Japan: Mobilizing the Nation, Sanitizing Aggression

In the immediate aftermath of the fall of Nanjing on December 13, 1937, and the subjugation of Chinese forces, the atrocities in Nanjing did not exist in official Japanese accounts, nor did most Japanese learn of these atrocities which had destroyed hundreds of thousands of lives. Authorized newspaper reports, magazine articles, radio programs, textbooks, and even cartoons all supported the war effort and denounced Chinese leaders who, it was said, were promoting the anti-Japanese movement in China. These accounts emphasized Chinese atrocities in sensational reporting designed to stir public antagonism toward the enemy nation and its people.

In order to control the media and public opinion, the government made full use of its police power. It censored the press and even eavesdropped on street conversations between ordinary citizens. It arrested people who challenged its policies and spied on those whom it regarded as potentially harmful to the government. Especially suspect were Communists, liberals, ethnic minorities, and members of religious organizations.

Even during this period of suppression, however, Japanese society was neither monolithic nor perfectly united. Accounts that escaped censorship—the so-called “rumors and lies,” banned writings, smuggled publications, and personal diaries—did record and condemn the random killings, looting, and rape in Nanjing. Communists and their sympathizers in China and the United States sent their publications to friends in Japan. Missionaries smuggled in written accounts of Japanese atrocities in China. Japanese soldiers recorded their experience in Nanjing in their field diaries. Yet, at the height of hostilities with China, such brutalities seemed almost indistinct from the rest of the fabric of enmity, nationalism, and war. Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the outrages at Nanjing, only the most attentive observers in Japan were aware that they had even happened.

OPENING THE DOOR TO THE ATROCITIES  
IN NANJING: FANNING DOMESTIC HOSTILITY  
TOWARD CHINA

From the beginning of the armed conflict in July 1937, the Japanese government and its supporters, including the mass media, stressed that Chiang Kai-shek had planned and initiated armed struggle. According to the official view, Japan had been seeking peace in Asia, only to be dragged into an unwanted military conflict with China. Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro's decision to dispatch additional forces to China received enthusiastic support from the large national newspaper *Tōkyō asahi shinbun*. In an article titled "Obviously Planned Anti-Japanese Armed Conflict; Firmly Decided to Dispatch to Northern China; Determined Statement by the Government to China and Other Countries," the editor used boldface to emphasize that "this incident was no doubt an anti-Japanese armed conflict that was carefully planned by China" and "[the Japanese government] sincerely hopes that the Chinese side will immediately reflect on its attitude and that peaceful negotiations [will be instituted] in order not to worsen the circumstance."<sup>1</sup>

The media stressed that the Chinese soldiers and guerrillas were recklessly killing innocent Japanese civilians as well as combatants. Japanese casualties inflicted by "unlawful" Chinese shootings at the Marco Polo Bridge and other places were widely reported in the *Asahi*.<sup>2</sup> When approximately 3,000 Chinese troops in Tongzhou attacked Japanese forces as well as civilians and killed some 200 Japanese and Korean residents, the Japanese war correspondents of *Dōmei*, *Ōsaka mainichi shinbun*, *Tōkyō nichi nichi shinbun*, *Tōkyō asahi shinbun*, and other papers described the event in detail and expressed outrage.<sup>3</sup> The *Asahi*, for example, detailed Chinese looting and destruction in the Japanese community as well as the stabbing and killing of women, children, and infants.<sup>4</sup> In another article on the same page, the *Asahi* correspondent Tanaka, who had met survivors of the incident, described his feelings of unprecedented fury and declared that "July 29th must not be forgotten."<sup>5</sup>

On August 10, 1937, *Asahi* readers learned the details of another atrocity by the Chinese peace preservation force in Shanghai. Ōyama Isao, a 27-year-old first lieutenant of the Imperial Navy, was surrounded by Chinese forces and riddled with dozens of bullets.<sup>6</sup> According to those war correspondents who could express their opinions without police suppression, the Japanese forces were, as the government insisted, merely responding to Chinese aggression, and it was the Chinese troops who should be blamed.<sup>7</sup> Typical was the reaction of the war correspondent Itō when Japanese soldiers burned a farmer's house and opened fire on fleeing Chinese guerrillas who had been hiding inside it. Itō observed that the soldiers had done so to avenge Lieutenant Ōyama.<sup>8</sup> In the eyes of many Japanese war correspondents, the Chinese military in Shanghai were merely vicious. "Blood-thirsty" Chinese fighters had dropped bombs and killed not only

Japanese civilians, but also unarmed American, British, Chinese, and French residents in the city.<sup>9</sup>

Even liberal journalists of the time such as Kiyosawa Kiyoshi and Baba Tsunego stood by the government after the so-called China Incident (*Shina jihen*)—the name officially given to the undeclared war between China and Japan—that began at the Marco Polo Bridge in July 1937.<sup>10</sup> At the meeting of the International Association of Poets, Playwrights, Editors, Essayists, and Novelists (PEN) in London in November 1937, Kiyosawa opposed the Chinese request that the association condemn Japanese attacks on hospitals, schools, and museums. Instead, he advocated that PEN should protest Chinese fortifications of these buildings, the action that had incited the Japanese military to attack. As Kiyosawa explained to a Norwegian colleague, the China Incident was the result of Japan's struggle for survival. The United States and Southeast Asia, he argued, were rejecting Japanese immigrants; moreover, Japanese exports were being excluded by high tariff barriers. Other members of PEN, all of whom supported the Chinese request, might have had a hard time understanding Kiyosawa's Japan-centered explanation, but, to Kiyosawa, Japanese nationals were fighting for international justice, and members of the association were unfairly criticizing Japan.<sup>11</sup>

The liberal journalist Baba Tsunego shared the view that Japan was fighting for international justice. Ordinary Japanese, he argued, never expected to fight such a great war against China, and the people of China were, in fact, not the enemy of the Japanese. He rationalized that Japan was fighting out of an obligation to protect Asia from Western aggression. During the Tokugawa period (1600–1868), when the Western powers were expanding their territories, Japan had isolated itself on small islands and immersed itself in martial arts and tea ceremonies. When Japan awoke, all of the prominent lands around the world had already been occupied, and Japan was itself almost swallowed up by these other powers. Russia, he argued, was pressuring China to fight against Japan in order to exhaust Japanese national strength, so that Russia might expand its own influence into China. Baba, who believed in “Asia for Asia,” could not tolerate the possibility of China as a Russian proxy.<sup>12</sup>

The official view of the time was clearly stated in elementary school textbooks. In the fifth-year geography textbook, written for 10- and 11-year-old children, that came into use in 1936, Japan was defined as consisting of the Japanese islands—mainland (Honshū), Hokkaidō, South Sakhalin, Shikoku, Kyushu, Taiwan, Ryukyu islands, the Kurils—and the Korean peninsula.<sup>13</sup> In the sixth-year geography textbook available in 1936, a description of Manchukuo was added in the chapter on Asia. The textbook stressed that relations between Manchukuo and Japan were extremely close and that Manchukuo was Japan's lifeline. According to the textbook explanation, “Our country endorsed Manchukuo's independence as soon as it became independent, then withdrew from the League of Nations, and has been making a substantial effort to de-



velop this nation [Manchukuo] and to maintain peace in Asia.”<sup>14</sup> After the China Incident in 1937, the textbook was again revised. The 1939 sixth-year geography textbook emphasized that Japanese efforts to preserve coexistence and co-prosperity with China, as well as Japanese development and sacrifice, were contributing to the development of Chinese transportation and foreign trade. In addition, the textbook blamed Chinese leaders for their “incorrect attitude” (*ayamatta kangae*) and for their provocative anti-Japanese ideology, both of which had led to the China Incident. Japan, according to the textbook, “has been urging China to reflect on [its mistaken policy toward Japan] and continually carrying out its mission of eternal peace in Asia.”<sup>15</sup>

Just like the geography textbook, national history textbooks were also revised after Japan went to war against China. A 400-word paragraph in the text issued to sixth graders in 1941 offered the following summary:

After the Manchurian Incident was settled, our country (*waga kuni*) concluded a cease-fire agreement with China. Moreover, [our country] pursued the establishment of eternal peace in the East based on the cooperation of Japan, Manchukuo, and China. However, the Chinese government, assisted both by European countries and the United States, did not understand our sincerity and persistently tried to exclude our country. Furthermore, [it] also dispatched troops [to the north] and tried to disrupt the development of Manchukuo. In July 1937, at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing, Chinese troops fired on our army, which was conducting maneuvers. In addition, some even assaulted our residents. Therefore, in the interest of justice, our country decided to send the military to rectify China’s mistaken ideas and to establish eternal peace in the East. Since then our military, both navy and army, has accomplished significant achievements. The people on the home front have sincerely been giving solid support to this campaign and are rushing forward in order to carry out this great mission. The foundation for eternal peace in Asia is gradually being laid.<sup>16</sup>

Also reflecting the trends of the time were readers used in Japanese class in the 1930s. In volume 1 of the newly revised reader issued in 1933, first-year pupils learned to read by mastering phrases like “Forward, forward, soldiers forward” (*susume susume heitai susume*) and “The flag of the rising sun, *banzai*, *banzai*” (*hinomaru no hata banzai banzai*), neither of which had been included in the textbooks used during the previous 15 years.<sup>17</sup> In the second-year reader (vol. 2), stories about the navy and army were introduced: “Elder Brother in the Navy” (*Kaigun no nisan*) and “Enlistment of Elder Brother” (*Nisan no nyūei*).<sup>18</sup> “Elder Brother in the Navy” glorified military technology, with Isamu’s elder brother serving as a sailor on a heavily armed, high-tech aircraft carrier. In “Enlistment of Elder Brother,” family members and neighbors congratulate the elder brother on enlisting, but the story does not tell whether he comes back alive. Other new readings in the revised textbooks included “Submarine” (*Sensuikan*) and “Admiral Tōgō” (*Tōgō gensui*) in the third-year reader; “Great Maneuvers” (*Daienshū*) in the fourth year; “Riding the Asia Express”

(‘Aja’ ni norite) in the fifth year; and “Dogfight” (Kūchūsen), “Japanese Sword” (Nihontō), and “Mechanized Unit” (Kikaika butai) in the sixth year.<sup>19</sup>

Revised editions of ethics textbooks in the 1930s superficially resembled the textbooks in geography, history, and language, in that they were aimed at strengthening loyalty to the emperor and promoting patriotism. However, they continued to stress such universal concepts as benevolence, courage, honesty, international peace, public welfare, and the rule of law. They also included stories of nonmilitary figures as well as Western role models. The sixth-year ethics textbook that became available in 1939, for example, contained a brief biography of Benjamin Franklin and stressed friendship between nations in order to maintain international peace. Loyalty to the throne, the development of the nation, the obligations of the people, and Confucian principles were also emphasized.<sup>20</sup> The fifth-year textbook issued in 1938 featured such historical models as Socrates, Nogi Maresuke (a general who achieved fame in the Russo-Japanese war and later committed suicide in order to follow the Meiji emperor into death), Christopher Columbus, Katsu Kaishū (a Shogunal official and master of Western naval science), and Yoshida Shōin (an imperial loyalist before the Restoration).<sup>21</sup> In the fifth-year ethics textbook, the last chapter, titled “Good Japanese” (Yoi Nihonjin), stated that “it [is] our duty not to forget the kindness of others and to be benevolent and generous to everyone.”<sup>22</sup>

Popular magazines, including comic books, also encouraged their young readers to believe in Japan’s mission in Asia and fostered the desire of male children to become generals or admirals. One of the most popular cartoons among children in the 1930s was Tagawa Suihō’s “Stray Dog, Norakuro” (Nora-kuro), published serially in the monthly magazine *Boy’s Club* (Shōnen kurabu) from 1931 to 1941 and in book form by Dai Nihon Yūbenkai Kōdansha (Kōdansha).<sup>23</sup> The protagonist was a homeless orphan dog, Straydog Kurokichi (Norainu Kurokichi), or Nora-kuro for short, who joined the Regiment of Brave Dogs (Mōken rentai) as a second-class private and received a promotion each year. He battled bears, mountain monkeys, pigs, gorillas, chimpanzees, mythic river monsters (*kappa*), and dinosaurs. The humorous cartoon was an allegory of Japanese foreign affairs and spread a positive image of the military among children. In “Nora-Kuro,” dogs were depicted as brave, strong, righteous, and merciful, whereas their enemies were not. In *Norakuro’s Charge* (Norakuro sōkōgeki), the seventh volume of the series, published in December 1937, dogs fought against the nation of pigs, led by the general called Fried-Pork Cutlet (Tonkatsu), who held power by suppressing and exploiting a nation of powerless sheep.<sup>24</sup> The model for General Fried-Pork Cutlet seemed to be Chiang Kai-shek. At the end of the volume, Norakuro, who had now risen to the rank of lieutenant, cried out: “If you want to fight back, go ahead! I will always fight for peace in order to maintain peace in great Asia.”<sup>25</sup>

By December 1937, cartoons and other authorized mass media had immersed the ordinary public in narratives intended to mobilize the war effort and to legitimize Japan’s aggression in China. Accounts of the Battle of Nanjing were no exception.

## VICTORIOUS NEWS REPORTS OF THE CONQUEST OF NANJING

In the final weeks before the fall of Nanjing, newspapers enthusiastically predicted an imminent, dramatic victory and sought to inspire their readers with national gratitude toward the Japanese military. On November 30, December 4, and December 6, 1937, *Tōkyō nichi nichi shinbun* carried reports of a “killing contest” between two second lieutenants, who were trying to outdo each other in obliterating the Chinese enemy.<sup>26</sup> On December 8, 1937, *Yomiuri shinbun* reported that the Japanese national flag was now waving atop Zijin Mountain and that the capture of Nanjing, which “the entire nation” had passionately awaited, would soon be a reality.<sup>27</sup> The same day the Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai (NHK), Japan Broadcasting Corporation, broadcast a special radio music program “Evening of the Prelude to the Capture of Nanjing” (Nankin kōryaku zensō no yū) to celebrate the Japanese victory.<sup>28</sup> By this date the Japanese Army had completely surrounded Nanjing, and Matsui Iwane, commander in chief of the Central China Area Army, had ordered his pilots to drop leaflets containing an open letter to Tang Shengzhi, the Chinese commander in chief, advising surrender so that the historical buildings of Nanjing might be saved from destruction. However, as Japanese media described it, Tang “ignored Matsui’s generous *bushidō* attitude in a rude manner,” forcing the Japanese troops to attack Nanjing.<sup>29</sup>

Around 9 p.m. on December 10, *Tōkyō asahi shinbun* issued an extra edition of the newspaper announcing that the military had seized all the entrances into the city. With a clever eye to marketing, *Asahi* had the extra distributed among the crowds at a dance hall in Akasaka. An *Asahi* reporter then recorded the ecstatic reactions of the 300 dancers for inclusion in the next day’s paper. *Asahi* also reported festive lantern parades in Tokyo.<sup>30</sup> Newspapers reported that elementary, secondary, and college students and prisoners, too, applauded the capture of the capital and the punishment of Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-Japanese government.<sup>31</sup>

After the fall of the city, these newspapers jubilantly announced the annihilation of the enemy.<sup>32</sup> On December 16, 1937, for example, the press reported that “the Imperial Army [was] now conducting mopping-up operations against stragglers. . . . Reporters estimated that Matsui’s army had captured or killed approximately 60,000.”<sup>33</sup> Two days later, the papers were filled with accounts of the triumphant entry of Japanese troops into Nanjing. As *Tōkyō nichi nichi shinbun* observed, the Japanese flag was now raised over Nanjing, a former capital of the enemy, and “all, officers and soldiers alike, were deeply moved to tears.”<sup>34</sup> In a record-breaking three and a quarter hours, spectacular photographs of the ceremony were carried to Japan in *Asahi*’s own airplane and were printed in the extra of the *Asahi* on the same day.<sup>35</sup>

Longer stories by war correspondents that detailed the capture of Nanjing also appeared in the large-circulation general magazines in early 1938. These included not only the simple “you-savage, we-hero” writings often found in the newspapers, but also narratives that informed readers about the battle in Nan-

jing.<sup>36</sup> Like all other authorized reports at the time, these accounts supported the war effort and the fighting in Nanjing. *Bungei shunjū* correspondent Kosaka Eiichi, for example, rushed from Shanghai to Nanjing on December 8, hoping to witness the dramatic fall of Nanjing. Kosaka vividly described the detritus of battle that he saw on the way from Shanghai to Nanjing. He wrote of the trenches, bullet holes, destroyed houses, exploded bunkers, and countless dead bodies of horses and Chinese soldiers on the side of the road. All attested to the bitterness of the fighting. Kosaka seemed to be embarrassed by what he saw, especially the numerous dead on the road, although he did not comment further on his feelings. Instead, he stated, as if trying to convince himself, that the corpses would later be buried with care by the Japanese troops.<sup>37</sup>

When Kosaka arrived in Nanjing, war fever overtook him. After all, he wrote, if the Japanese troops had dealt a bitter blow to the Chinese defense forces in Nanjing, the defenders had brought this treatment on themselves by ignoring Matsui's ultimatum. Death was the order of the day on the battlefield, and Kosaka himself had almost been killed by Chinese machine-gun fire. He had also observed dead Japanese soldiers being cremated even though there was no Japanese military monk to chant the proper ceremonial sutra. When Nanjing fell, Kosaka was moved to tears of joy, along with many of the soldiers, as he watched the Japanese national flag flying high on the wall.<sup>38</sup>

Ōya Sōichi, a critic and writer who was also in Nanjing at the time, was a more analytical and ironic observer. Whereas Kosaka was merely outraged by anti-Japanese slogans on walls between Shanghai and Nanjing, Ōya was amused to see red posters written in Japanese announcing: "Welcome Imperial Japanese Army" (*kōgun kangei*) and "Welcome Great General of the Land of Rising Sun" (*tōyō dai shōgun kangei*). These posters hung at the entrance of the houses in Wuxi, even though the walls had previously been painted with anti-Japanese slogans. Ōya concluded that residents in Wuxi had tried to appease first the Chinese and then the Japanese troops. As he noticed, these residents, who had suffered a great deal from the turmoil of war, treated the Japanese army just as they might have received another group of Chinese warlords. People in the town were rarely seen because they were hiding, and those who did appear were mostly elderly men with armbands bearing clumsy handmade insignias of the rising sun.<sup>39</sup>

When Ōya examined fortified bunkers immediately after the Japanese military had seized the area around Nanjing, he sometimes smelled perfume and saw women's hair oil and underwear left behind. These items made him imagine young, patriotic Chinese women who did not mind risking their lives to encourage soldiers at the front and who sometimes took up guns themselves. Although he did not see any dead bodies of women in uniform, he found a large white flag stained with blood belonging to "School for Orphaned Daughters" (*joshi izoku gakkō*), which he assumed the women had used to cover the wounded. These abandoned articles, highlighting the tragic situation of Chinese women, moved him very much.<sup>40</sup>