Alison Brysk

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The Kindness of Strangers

Over water, more than lust, we thirst
To tell our stories: I was beaten, I traveled, my mother—
We are all the same.

I come bearing questions—strange carried
Through tumbled cities, thickets of
Meaning/rice/soup/coffee.

The legend tucked, like a slip of prayer,
between my withered roots;
The dozen Just in every generation.

I trumpet a many-splendored legion—
Samaritans slouching towards the line of scrimmage
On the muddy, bloody playing fields of hope.

—Capetown, October 30, 2006

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Acknowledgments

This project has been an experience as well as a study of many forms of generosity. Five years of research on five continents has renewed my faith in humanity, and taught me many important lessons far beyond the scholarly endeavor. Hundreds of strangers have shared with me their time, resources, work, wisdom, and comforts—and some strangers have become friends. I am profoundly grateful, and can only hope this contribution justifies in some small measure their efforts, despite its inevitable shortcomings (for which I bear sole responsibility).

Every phase of this research benefited from generous and timely financial support. In the summer of 2003, I traveled to Costa Rica with the support of the University of California's Latin American Studies program, under a U.S. Department of Education grant. The following year, I participated in a UCI Study Abroad program at Lund University, and received supplementary funding for summer research from my university's Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies. My 2005 multisited summer trip to Canada was underwritten by the Canadian Consulate's Canadian Studies program. The research in Japan, the Netherlands, and South Africa was all completed during a 2006 sabbatical, generously funded by the Abe Foundation/SSRC Fellowship in Global Issues (which also provided support during my stay in Japan via CGP, the Center for Global Partnership). In 2007, I was honored to receive a Fulbright Fellowship at the Centre for International Governance Innovation (Waterloo), which enabled me to return to Canada to complete the research on that country as well as the chapter on intergovernmental networks.

I was also fortunate in receiving early and sustained academic feedback, which contributed immeasurably to the development of the project. The research on Costa Rica was presented at the 2004 Latin American Studies Association conference, whereas preliminary findings on Sweden and Costa Rica were discussed at the University of Ottawa in 2005. The Canada research was refined further in a 2006 presentation at the John F. Kennedy Institute at the Free University of Berlin, as well as the 2007 International Studies Association, and a 2007 roundtable at CIGI. South African colleagues at UNISA (National University of South Africa) helped to develop that portion at a presentation concluding my 2006 stay in that country. The Japan chapter was presented at an Abe Fellowship Retreat in January 2007, and ably commented upon by Hiroshi Fukurai. Later on,

colleagues in each country provided detailed and constructive comments on chapter drafts from afar, especially Peter Baehr on the Netherlands, Rhoda Howard and Don Hubert on Canada, Paul Graham and Patrick Bond on South Africa, and Magnus Jerneck on Sweden.

Versions of two chapters have been previously published in revised form. A prior discussion of chapter 2 was published in Germany as "Making Values Make Sense: The Social Construction of Human Rights Foreign Policy," *Journal for Human Rights* [Zeitschrift für Menschenrechte] 2 (2007). Chapter 5 appeared as "Global Good Samaritans?: Costa Rica's Human Rights Foreign Policy," in *Global Governance* 11, no. 3 (Summer 2005). My thanks to those journals for permitting revised use of this material.

During the design and academic development of the project, Gershon Shafir, Richard Falk, Jack Donnelly, Sanjeev Khagram, and Wayne Sandholtz offered extraordinary inspiration, analysis, and advice. To implement that vision, I was privileged to receive extensive and extremely able research assistance from graduate students who participated in preparing the introductory comparative data and the intergovernmental networks profiles (Brodie Ross, CIGI), refining the research on Costa Rica (Madeline Baer, UCI), completing the data on Sweden (Ted Svensson, University of Warwick), and updating the chapter on Sweden and overall references (Daniel Wehrenfennig, UCI). Upon completion, I have been blessed to find a home for the manuscript with Angela Chnapko of Oxford University Press, whose professionalism and editorial support are unparalleled.

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In Costa Rica, I received networking support and advice from the University of Costa Rica Political Science Department. This was followed by extremely helpful pre-, post-, and onsite research assistance from UCR Master's student Patricia Guevara. During my stay, professor/diplomat/party leader Luis Guillermo Solìs very graciously oriented me and arranged critical connections for interviews.

In Sweden, colleagues at the University of Lund kindly referred me to interviews, sources, and literature. Professor Magnus Jerneck played an extraordinary role. Master's student Ted Svensson moved from logistics to translation to conducting independent interviews after my departure, with great aplomb.

Prior to my first trip to Canada, I was privileged to meet former foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy in an academic setting. *Global Good Samaritans* achieved critical mass in 2005 when this historic figure opened his heart and his Rolodex to a younger colleague's vision. During my 2007 stay in Canada, I was hosted by Waterloo's Centre for International Governance Innovation, which provided very generous research support and facilities as well as a national network. From many valued colleagues there, I must single out postdoctoral fellow Andrew Thompson of CIGI for his outstanding contributions as a collaborator, host, and friend. Canadian scholars Claude Denis and Rhoda Howard have supported the project and its author in ways too numerous to name, but deeply appreciated.

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In the Netherlands, I was a visiting scholar at the Van Vollenhoven Institute of Leiden University. My academic and personal affiliations in Holland were fostered by friend and Leiden colleague Willem Assies. Among the new friends I discovered in Amsterdam, the late Frank Buijs (Free University of Amsterdam) was extraordinarily kind and resourceful, during what turned out to be the last summer of his life.

Professor Gay Seidman (University of Wisconsin) provided helpful guidance and referrals before my trip to South Africa. Once I arrived there, Garth LePere (Institute for Global Dialogue) and Adam Habib (Social and Human Science Research Council) were astoundingly generous with contacts and referrals, their own publications, and their time. On another note, Professors Josie Van Wyck of UNISA and Janis van der Westhuizen of Stellenbosch University each quickly moved from colleagues to boon companions.

First, last, and always, my friends and family have sustained me to this season. My parents and grandparents raised me to ask Hillel's question: *if I am only for myself, what am I?* In one sense, this project is a search for exemplars of that spirit. My daughters Miriam and Ana each accompanied me on some of the journeys of this book, and waited patiently through my absences. With typical esprit, Ana expressed one of the core findings as a youthful observer: "there are no small countries, only small governments." Their father, Mark Freeman, also supported my solo journeys and vision and cared ably for the home team, even when we no longer shared a destination. From my family of friends, I learn and relearn the larger lesson of hope—another world is possible. Thank you so much, my band of angels: Carol, Claude, Gershon, Robert, Teivo. Hobbes and Gandhi were both right; life *is* nasty and short—and compassion *can* change the world, and our hearts.

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THE PARABLE OF THE GOOD SAMARITAN

—Luke 10:25–37 (New International Version)

On one occasion an expert in the law stood up to test Jesus. "Teacher," he asked, "what must I do to inherit eternal life?"

"What is written in the Law?" he replied. "How do you read it?"

He answered: "'Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your strength and with all your mind'; and, 'Love your neighbor as yourself.'"

"You have answered correctly," Jesus replied. "Do this and you will live."

But he wanted to justify himself, so he asked Jesus, "And who is my neighbor?"

In reply Jesus said: "A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, when he fell into the hands of robbers. They stripped him of his clothes, beat him and went away, leaving him half dead. A priest happened to be going down the same road, and when he saw the man, he passed by on the other side. So too, a Levite, when he came to the place and saw him, passed by on the other side. But a Samaritan, as he traveled, came where the man was; and when he saw him, he took pity on him. He went to him and bandaged his wounds, pouring on oil and wine. Then he put the man on his own donkey, took him to an inn and took care of him. The next day he took out two silver coins and gave them to the innkeeper. 'Look after him,' he said, 'and when I return, I will reimburse you for any extra expense you may have.' Which of these three do you think was a neighbor to the man who fell into the hands of robbers?"

The expert in the law replied, "The one who had mercy on him."

Jesus told him, "Go and do likewise."

1

Introduction

States as Global Citizens

When and why do some states protect helpless foreigners from the abuses of their own governments, distant wars, and global crises? Dozens of Canadian peacekeepers have died in Afghanistan, defending humanitarian reconstruction in a shattered faraway land with no resources or ties to their own. Each year, Sweden contributes over $3 billion to aid the world's poorest citizens and struggling democracies, asking nothing in return. A generation ago, Costa Rica defied U.S. power to broker a peace accord that ended civil wars in three neighboring countries. Now, that small developing country has joined with principled peers like South Africa to support the United Nations' International Criminal Court, the body established to bring global justice to gross human rights violators—despite U.S. pressure and aid cuts. The Netherlands has led campaigns of condemnation that have shattered the impunity of torturers around the world. Hundreds of thousands of refugees are alive today because they have been sheltered by one of these nations, even at economic, political, and social costs to the host country.

In a relentlessly troubled world, some states are part of the solution. Humanitarian internationalism is more than episodic altruism—it is a pattern of persistent principled politics. Although global Good Samaritans are clearly a minority of states, they add up to more than scattered exceptions, and the small circle of like-minded states can be key initiators or swing votes on important humanitarian developments, from the antiapartheid campaign to the land mines treaty. The struggle for international human rights standards, monitoring, and implementation is often depicted as a problem of increasing the influence of transnational civil society over international institutions—and thus, indirectly affecting state policies (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). However, some states directly support human rights in global institutions and project human rights in their foreign policies. Their influence can be critical for framing and ratifying treaties, creating and staffing multilateral institutions, monitoring and sanctioning offenders, assisting victims, directing resources, implementing peace processes, catalyzing transnational initiatives on emerging issues, and introducing new understandings of rights to the global agenda (Forsythe 2000).

The existence of such states, from diverse origins and along varied pathways, shows that more could follow. Understanding their transformation and challenges can help to expand the vision of political possibility that is the first step in all social change. A rich tradition of foreign policy analysis maps the performance of leading countries as value promoters, often focusing on the potential and shortfalls of the United States (Johansen 1980, Sikkink 2004, Mertus 2004). Such studies often focus on strategic, ideological, and institutional barriers to global good citizenship. But the positive record of a diverse set of small and middle powers suggests that such barriers can be overcome, even during eras of wavering hegemonic promotion.

The metaphor of the "global Good Samaritan" highlights the critical elements of human rights foreign policy. The defining principle of a Good Samaritan is that s/he identifies with the interests of the Other: "Love your neighbor as yourself." Similarly, human rights promoters identify national interest with global interests. The expert in the law seeking guidance in the parable is not born loving his neighbor, but rather aspires to learn from the Good Samaritan, in order to fulfill a set of norms believed to bring both personal salvation and universal benefit. In a similar fashion, most good citizen states seek to support the global system and foster global principles as much as to succor specific victims. The transformative element of the parable is cosmopolitanism: when the teacher pushes the seeker to define the suffering stranger as part of a community of fate ("Who is your neighbor?"). And it is not the hegemonic authority figure of the priest or the Levite bureaucrat who administers aid, but rather a member of the stigmatized Samaritan minority group, who has secured a modicum of resources and fosters diffuse reciprocity (paying the innkeeper to care for the victim with a future promise). This emphasizes the power and responsibility of nondominant members of the system to provide aid, and the promulgation of modeling ("Go forth and do likewise").

At the international level, human rights foreign policy is more than guilt or charity—it is a constructive form of identity politics. Principled foreign policy defies the realist prediction of untrammeled pursuit of national interest, and suggests the utility of constructivist approaches that investigate the role of ideas, identities, and roles as influences on state action. Even in a world of security dilemmas, some societies will come to see the linkage between their long-term interest and the common good—at some times and places, states can overcome their bounded origins as sovereign security managers to act as "global citizens." The activities of global Good Samaritan states help to construct and expand the international human rights regime, the thin layer of international understandings, institutions, and exchanges that seek to protect individual human dignity from abuses of power. As such principled states build global governance, they reshape the meaning of sovereignty to implant a slowly emerging legitimacy norm—universal human rights.

Humanitarian internationalism is an umbrella term for a variety of cooperative, value-oriented foreign policies involving aid, diplomacy, the use of force, and sometimes migration. The values being promoted may be labeled human rights, democratization, building civil society, protection of civilians, peace promotion, global humanism, or human security. These goals will have the meaning and effect of "human rights foreign policy" for this analysis when such policies seek to protect and empower citizens of other countries in order to secure the fundamental rights and core freedoms outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two International Covenants (Civil and Political Rights, as well as Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights). While these widely subscribed standards entail a broad set of interconnected security and social rights, in practice most international and state action concentrates on acute threats to life, liberty, and bodily integrity. Although most countries at most times pursue policies for a mix of reasons, and often reap unintended consequences, an international activity will qualify as a human rights policy when (1) its primary announced goal is humanitarian protection or empowerment and (2) the resources and strategies used correspond to a reasonable outside observer's standard of humanitarian orientation. This study will analyze why and how countries adopt such policies, deferring the question of the ultimate impact and effectiveness of humanitarian policies on human rights conditions to the many able observers who have examined this issue (on impact assessment, see Landman 2006, Cardenas 2007; on contradictory impacts, see Kennedy 2004).

In terms of social science methodology, this is a theory-driven empirical study, using a combination of case comparisons and process tracing within single cases. Although the remainder of this chapter will present some global numerical information to map what the cases chosen for in-depth study represent from the wider universe, those numbers are simply indicators of country characteristics—we will note associations, but will not engage in systematic techniques of quantitative inference. The case comparisons combine several logics. Sweden and the Netherlands are most-likely cases, whereas Costa Rica and South Africa are least-likely cases. In the comparative strategy suggested by John Stuart Mill, Sweden and South Africa are "most different systems" leading to a roughly common outcome of human rights promotion, whereas implicitly Japan is a "most similar" case that departs from the OECD norm, as Canada is implicitly compared to the "most similar" United States—with disparate levels of human rights promotion. Within the single cases, process tracing combines a macro-historical analysis of policy with interview-based discourse analysis (see Landman 2006 for an overview of these methodological strategies).

What kinds of countries are equipped to become humane internationalists? Candidate states are usually globalized, democratic, moderately developed, and secure middle or regional powers. Although this

book will argue that many more countries could participate, it is the global middle states that are most likely to promote global democracy. Countries struggling for survival are not in a position to promote principle, and conversely the modal position of dominant powers is to provide only selective collective goods that reinforce their own position. Hegemons are not usually global reformers; they tend to prefer stability and the export of dominant values, rather than transformation and empowerment. As a rising power and emerging sponsor of multilateralism, the United States promoted universal human rights to war-weary Europeans; once the power positions reversed, Europeans invested in international institutions for global governance, whereas the United States now prefers unilateral democracy promotion to more universal human rights (Kagan 2003).

In the case of the United States, this generic preference of the current phase of hegemony is exacerbated by weak globalization, thinly democratic foreign policy making, and ideological exceptionalism (detailed in the concluding chapter). Nevertheless, the proliferation of motivated middle powers provides sufficient scope for global humanitarian efforts, and even the basis for a potential counter-hegemonic movement. And even states less likely to be global good citizens may have moments or issues of humane influence, when strong transnational linkages, normative fit, and openings in foreign policy structures align (see Klotz 1995 on the United States and South Africa).

Thus, we turn to profiling "states most likely to succeed." The discussion and charts that follow simply map relevant characteristics, using available numerical indicators to compare widely diverse places. They are not a correlation, proof, prediction, or regression. The overall purpose is to identify like-minded potential promoters, and to place the focus cases in a broader comparative framework. The case studies are configurative (Eckstein 1975), and the current discussion provides a context for assessing their generalizability.

INPUTS: STATES "MOST LIKELY TO SUCCEED"

Humanitarian promoters are usually open societies in all senses. For Good Samaritan states, *globalization* creates the means and motive for internationalism. Globalization is a combination of economic, political, and cultural integration; each provides a channel for human rights projection, and each dimension of interdependence becomes a national interest that flourishes in a stable and principled global environment (Brysk 2002). Economic globalization is measured by the competitiveness index, which incorporates trade, finance, and other forms of exchange. Cultural integration may be seen in the density of international information exchange.

Domestic *democracy* provides an incentive, model, and rationale for global human rights promotion. The Freedom House democracy score is

a quick indicator of the basic form of government and freedoms that is deliberately not fully equivalent to a country's own domestic human rights performance (which I argue below influences, but is not perfectly aligned with, foreign policy promotion). This is supplemented by an indication of how many years a country has been a stable democracy, which allows time for the development of human rights policies. Finally, to assess the depth of democratic performance and access by polities with formal democratic institutions, we consider the level of rights and citizenship enjoyed by a universal historically disadvantaged group that comprises half of the population of all states—women, via the Gender Equity Index.

For aspiring internationalists, a moderate threshold of *development* and a modicum of *security* ensure that state survival and welfare needs are sufficiently satisfied to allow the pursuit of long-term cosmopolitan visions. Development is measured by the World Bank's Human Development Index. Security may be gauged by the absence of a recent interstate war or invasion. Because secure countries may adopt disparate neutralist, pacifist, or sheltered strategies, the size or budget of their militaries is not a good measure.

Another positive factor increasing the probability of internationalism is a *middle power* international niche. Middle (and regional) powers play an international role as system builders, alternatives to hegemony, and carriers of collective interests. Middle power status is quickly assessed by population and GDP (or proportion of regional GDP), although politically relevant middle power self-perceptions may linger for decades or even centuries beyond the country's objective position in the world system. Qualitatively, a middle power is defined as much by its niche, technical capacity, and coalition building as by size, military prowess, or geography (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1993: 7).

Table 1.1 shows the level of input characteristics for all countries. All data is the most recent available. Countries that pass the threshold for potential global good citizenship are highlighted in light gray. This analysis yields dozens of states with the *necessary* conditions for humane internationalism. The specific focus cases profiled below in the case chapters are shown in medium gray. The discussion of country cases will outline additional inputs that comprise *sufficient* conditions for global Good Samaritan policies (such as leadership, civil society, and ideology). The countries highlighted in dark gray are contrast cases that have been internationally active and make some claims to promote humanitarian values, but do not pass the thresholds for democracy or development.

The next step is to screen and assess this global set. The input measures that are most broadly predictive of baseline promoter potential are development and democracy. Although capability, globalization, and security input indicators readily account for variance in output, their impact is not universal, so it will be assessed as it pertains to specific cases and regions. Thus, the country list for output assessment is initially filtered to show states that surpass their regional average on the Human

Table 1.1 Inputs: Humanitarians "Most Likely to Succeed"

| Country | Middle Power | | | | Globalization | | Democracy | | | Security (Years Since Major Interstate War[8]) | Development (HDI[9]) |
	Population (millions)[1]	GDP (billions)[2]	% of Region GDP	GPI[3]	# of Internet Users (X1000)[4]	% of pop. with internet	Freedom Rating[5]	Free for more than 10 years[6]	GEI[7]		
Africa											
Algeria	31.889	$ 90.00	11.4	3.90	30	0.09	5.5	N	48	46	0.728
Angola	12.260	$ 28.61	3.6	2.50	172	1.40	5.5	N	52	61	0.439
Benin	8.000	$ 4.60	0.6	3.37	425	5.31	2.0	Y	41	61	0.428
Botswana	1.825	$ 9.76	1.2	3.79	60	3.29	2.0	Y	66	61	0.570
Burkina Faso	14.320	$5.82	0.7	3.07	64	0.45	4.0	N	50	61	0.342
Burundi	8.390	$0.77	0.1	2.59	25	0.30	4.5	N	63	61	0.384
Cameroon	18.060	$ 16.27	2.1	3.30	167	0.92	6.0	N	47	61	0.506
Cape Verde	0.423	$1.13	0.1		25	5.91	1.0	Y	61	61	0.722
Central African Republic	4.369	$1.55	0.2		9	0.21	4.5	N	41	61	0.353
Chad	9.885	$ 4.96	0.6	2.61	35	0.35	6.0	N	41	20	0.368
Congo (DR)	65.751	$ 7.98	1.0		140	0.21	5.5	N	47	61	0.391
Congo (Republic of)	3.800	$ 5.16	0.7		36	0.95	5.5	N	44	61	0.520
Djibouti	0.496	$ 0.70	0.1		9	1.81	5.0	N	48	61	0.494
Eritrea	4.906	$ 1.24	0.2		70	1.43	6.5	N	45	7	0.454
Ethiopia	76.511	$ 13.32	1.7	2.99	113	0.15	5.0	N	51	7	0.371
Gabon	1.454	$ 6.90	0.9		67	4.61	5.0	N	51	61	0.633
Gambia	1.688	$ 0.46	0.1	3.43	49	2.90	4.5	N	50	61	0.473
Ghana	22.931	$ 10.20	1.3		401	1.75	1.5	N	58	61	0.532

Guinea	9.947	$ 3.80	0.5		46	0.46	5.5	N	52	61	0.445
Guinea-Bissau	1.472	$ 0.29	0.0		26	1.77	4.0	N	49	61	0.349
Kenya	36.913	$ 17.43	2.2	3.57	1055	2.86	3.0	N	60	51	0.491
Lesotho	2.125	$ 1.40	0.2	3.22	43	2.02	2.5	N	62	61	0.494
Liberia	3.195	$ 0.90	0.1		1	0.03	3.5	N		61	
Libya	6.036	$ 34.20	4.3		205	3.40	7.0	N		20	0.798
Madagascar	19.448	$ 5.05	0.6	3.27	90	0.46	3.5	N	62	60	0.509
Malawi	13.603	$ 2.20	0.3	3.07	52	0.38	3.5	Y	60	61	0.400
Mali	11.995	$ 5.84	0.7	3.02	60	0.50	3.5	Y	52	61	0.338
Mauritania	3.270	$ 1.57	0.2	3.17	14	0.43	4.5	N		49	0.486
Mauritius	1.250	$ 7.17	0.9	4.20	180	14.40	1.5	Y	54	61	0.800
Morocco	33.757	$ 58.07	7.3	4.01	4600	13.63	4.5	N	42	49	0.640
Mozambique	20.905	$ 6.32	0.8	2.94	138	0.66	3.5	N	65	61	0.390
Namibia	2.055	$ 5.33	0.7	3.74	75	3.65	2.0	Y	72	61	0.626
Niger	12.894	$ 3.64	0.5		24	0.19	3.0	N	47	61	0.311
Nigeria	135.031	$ 83.36	10.5	3.45	5000	3.70	4.0	N	45	61	0.448
Rwanda	9.907	$ 1.97	0.2		38	0.38	5.5	N	84	61	0.450
Seychelles	0.081	$ 0.71	0.1		20	24.69	3.0	N		61	0.842
Sierra Leone	6.144	$ 1.23	0.2		10	0.16	3.5	N	39	61	0.335
Somalia	9.118	$ 2.48	0.3		90	0.99	7.0	N		61	
South Africa	43.997	$ 201.40	25.4	4.36	5100	11.59	2.0	Y	70	61	0.653
Sudan	39.379	$ 25.50	3.2		2800	7.11	7.0	N		61	0.516
Swaziland	1.113	$ 2.19	0.3		36	3.23	6.0	N	49	61	0.500
Tanzania	39.384	$ 13.13	1.7	3.39	333	0.85	3.5	N	72	61	0.430
Togo	5.701	$ 2.08	0.3		300	5.26	5.5	N	41	61	0.495
Tunisia	10.276	$ 33.29	4.2	4.71	953	9.27	5.5	N	51	46	0.760
Uganda	30.262	$ 8.53	1.1		500	1.65	4.5	N	64	61	0.502

(*Continued*)

Table 1.1 (*Continued*)

Country	Middle Power Population (millions)[1]	GDP (billions)[2]	% of Region GDP	GPI[3]	Globalization # of Internet Users (X1000)[4]	% of pop. with internet	Democracy Freedom Rating[5]	Free for more than 10 years[6]	GEI[7]	Security (Years Since Major Interstate War[8])	Development (HDI[9])
Zambia	11.477	$ 5.79	0.7	3.16	231	2.01	3.5	N	58	61	0.407
Zimbabwe	12.311	$ 31.50	4.0	3.01	1000	8.12	6.5	N	56	61	0.491
Regional Average	17.447	$ 16.51	2	3.38	530	3	4.3		54	56	0.503
North America											
Canada	33.390	$ 1,088.00	7.2	5.37	21900	65.59	1.0	Y	75	6[10]	0.950
Mexico	108.700	$ 743.50	4.9	4.18	18622	17.13	2.5	N	61	61	0.821
United States	301.139	$13,210.00	87.8	5.61	205327	68.18	1.0	Y	74	4[10]	0.948
Regional Average	147.743	$5,013.83	33	5.05	81950	50	1.5		70	24	0.906
Latin America											
Antigua and Barbuda	0.069	$ 0.91	0.5		20	28.99	2.0	N		61	0.808
Bahamas	0.305	$ 6.15	3.2		93	30.49	1.0	Y	75	61	0.825
Barbados	0.280	$ 3.14	1.7	4.70	160	57.14	1.0	Y	80	61	0.879
Belize	0.294	$ 1.14	0.6		35	11.90	1.5	N	62	61	0.751
Costa Rica	4.133	$ 21.39	11.3	4.25	1000	24.20	1.0	Y	66	61	0.841
Cuba	11.394	$ 40.00	21.1		190	1.67	7.0	Y	66	61	0.826
Dominica	0.072	$ 0.28	0.1		20	27.78	1.0	Y		61	0.793

Dominican Rep.	9.365	$ 20.55	10.9	3.75	938	10.02	2.0	N	65	61	0.751
El Salvador	6.948	$ 15.16	8.0	4.09	637	9.17	2.5	Y	69	38	0.729
Grenada	0.089	$ 0.45	0.2		19	21.35	1.5	Y		24	0.726
Guatemala	12.728	$ 35.25	18.6	3.91	756	5.94	3.5	N	50	61	0.673
Haiti	8.706	$ 5.90	3.1		500	5.74	4.5	N		61	0.482
Honduras	7.483	$ 8.48	4.5	3.58	223	2.98	3.0	Y	61	38	0.683
Jamaica	2.780	$ 9.23	4.9	4.10	1067	38.38	2.5	Y	61	61	0.724
Nicaragua	5.675	$ 4.87	2.6	3.52	140	2.47	3.0	N	52	50	0.698
Panama	3.242	$ 16.47	8.7	4.18	300	9.25	1.5	Y	69	61	0.809
Regional Average	4.598	$ 11.84	6	4.01	381	18	2.4		65	55	0.750

South America

Argentina	40.301	$ 210.00	12.4	4.01	10000	24.81	2.0	Y	70	25	0.863
Bolivia	9.119	$ 10.33	0.6	3.46	480	5.26	3.0	Y	68	61	0.692
Brazil	190.010	$ 967.00	57.2	4.03	25900	13.63	2.0	N	73	61	0.792
Chile	16.284	$ 111.80	6.6	4.85	6700	41.14	1.0	Y	62	61	0.859
Colombia	44.379	$ 106.80	6.3	4.04	4739	10.68	3.0	N	75	61	0.790
Ecuador	13.755	$ 32.73	1.9	3.67	616	4.48	3.0	N	72	61	0.756
Guyana	0.769	$ 0.84	0.0	3.24	160	20.81	2.5	Y	60	61	0.725
Paraguay	6.669	$ 7.75	0.5	3.33	200	3.00	3.0	N	61	61	0.757
Peru	28.674	$ 77.14	4.6	3.94	4600	16.04	2.5	N	65	61	0.767
Suriname	0.470	$ 1.40	0.1	3.45	30	6.38	2.0	N	66	61	0.759

Table 1.1 (*Continued*)

Country	Middle Power			Globalization			Democracy			Security (Years Since Major Interstate War[8])	Development (HDI[9])
	Population (millions)[1]	GDP (billions)[2]	% of Region GDP	GPI[3]	# of Internet Users (X1000)[4]	% of pop. with internet	Freedom Rating[5]	Free for more than 10 years[6]	GEI[7]		
Uruguay	3.460	$ 14.50	0.9	3.96	680	19.65	1.0	Y	68	61	0.851
Venezuela	26.023	$149.90	8.9	3.96	3040	11.68	4.0	Y	67	61	0.784
Regional Average	31.659	$ 140.85	8	3.81	4762	15	2.4		67	58	0.783
Asia											
Afghanistan	31.889	$ 8.80	0.1		30	0.09	5.0	N		6	
Bangladesh	150.448	$ 69.34	0.6	3.46	300	0.20	4.0	N	52	61	0.530
Bhutan	2.327	$ 0.84	0.0		25	1.07	5.5	N		61	0.538
Brunei	0.374	$ 9.53	0.1		56	14.97	5.5	N		61	0.871
Burma (*Myanmar*)	47.373	$ 9.60	0.1		78	0.16	7.0	N		61	
Cambodia	13.995	$ 6.60	0.1	3.39	41	0.29	5.5	N	61	30	0.583
China	1321.851	$ 2,518.00	22.8	4.24	123000	9.31	6.5	N	61	61	0.786
East Timor	1.084	$ 0.35	0.0		1	0.09	3.5	N		61	
India	1129.866	$ 804.00	7.3	4.44	60000	5.31	2.5	N		8	0.611
Indonesia	234.693	$ 264.70	2.4	4.26	16000	6.82	2.5	N	53	61	0.711
Japan	127.433	$ 4,883.00	44.2	5.60	86300	67.72	1.5	Y	60	6*	0.949
Kazakhstan	15.284	$ 53.60	0.5	4.19	400	2.62	5.5	N	64	61	0.774
Korea (south)	49.044	$ 897.00	8.1	5.13	33900	69.12	1.5	Y	56	4*	0.912
Kyrgyzstan	5.284	$ 2.26	0.0	3.31	280	5.30	4.5	N	57	61	0.705
Laos	6.521	$ 2.77	0.0		25	0.38	6.5	N	53	61	0.553

Malaysia	24.821	$ 132.30	1.2	5.11	11016	44.38	4.0	N	58	61	0.805
Maldives	0.369	$ 0.91	0.0		19	5.15	5.5	N	64	61	0.739
Mongolia	2.591	$ 1.54	0.0	3.60	268	10.34	2.0	Y	66	61	0.691
Nepal	28.901	$ 6.95	0.1	3.26	175	0.61	4.5	N	44	61	0.527
Pakistan	164.741	$ 124.00	1.1	3.66	10500	6.37	5.5	N	42	8	0.539
Philippines	91.077	$ 116.90	1.1	4.00	7820	8.59	3.0	Y	76	61	0.763
Russia	141.377	$ 733.60	6.6	4.08	23700	16.76	5.5	N	71	6*	0.797
Singapore	4.553	$ 122.10	1.1	5.63	2422	53.20	4.5	N		61	0.916
Sri Lanka	20.926	$ 27.40	0.2	3.87	280	1.34	4.0	N	58	61	0.755
Tajikistan	7.076	$ 2.07	0.0	3.50	5	0.07	5.5	N		61	0.652
Thailand	65.068	$ 197.70	1.8	4.58	8420	12.94	5.5	N	73	61	0.784
Uzbekistan	27.780	$ 10.83	0.1		880	3.17	7.0	N		61	0.696
Vietnam	85.262	$ 48.43	0.4	3.89	13100	15.36	6.0	N	66	28	0.709
Regional Average	135.786	$ 394.83	4	4.16	14251	13	4.6		60	47	0.716

Europe

Albania	3.600	$ 9.30	0.1	3.46	75	2.08	3.0	N	57	61	0.784
Armenia	2.971	$ 6.60	0.0	3.75	150	5.05	4.5	N	58	61	0.768
Austria	8.199	$ 310.10	2.1	5.32	4650	56.71	1.0	Y	72	61	0.944
Belarus	9.724	$ 28.98	0.2		3394	34.90	6.5	N	66	61	0.794
Belgium	10.392	$ 369.60	2.5	5.27	5100	49.08	1.0	Y	74	61	0.945
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4.552	$ 9.22	0.1	3.67	806	17.71	3.0	N		14	0.800
Bulgaria	7.332	$ 28.60	0.2	3.96	2200	30.01	1.5	Y	74	61	0.816
Croatia	4.493	$ 37.42	0.3	4.26	1451	32.29	2.0	N	73	61	0.846
Cyprus	0.788	$ 16.37	0.1	4.36	298	37.82	1.0	Y	65	33	0.903
Czech Republic	10.228	$ 118.80	0.8	4.74	5100	49.86	1.0	Y	69	61	0.855
Denmark	5.468	$ 257.30	1.8	5.70	3763	68.82	1.0	Y	79	61	0.943

Table 1.1 (*Continued*)

Country	Population (millions)[1]	GDP (billions)[2]	% of Region GDP	GPI[3]	# of Internet Users (X1000)[4]	% of pop. with internet	Freedom Rating[5]	Free for more than 10 years[6]	GEI[7]	Security (Years Since Major Interstate War[8])	Development (HDI[9])
		Middle Power			**Globalization**		**Democracy**				
Estonia	1.315	$ 13.89	0.1	5.12	690	52.47	1.0	Y	74	61	0.858
Finland	5.238	$ 199.00	1.4	5.76	3286	62.73	1.0	Y	84	61	0.947
France	63.713	$ 2,149.00	14.6	5.31	29945	47.00	1.0	Y	64	6*	0.942
Germany	82.400	$ 2,872.00	19.6	5.58	50616	61.43	1.0	Y	80	6*	0.932
Greece	10.706	$ 223.80	1.5	4.33	3800	35.49	1.5	Y	67	61	0.921
Hungary	9.956	$ 113.20	0.8	4.52	3050	30.63	1.0	Y	70	51	0.869
Iceland	0.301	$ 13.71	0.1	5.40	258	85.71	1.0	Y	79	61	0.960
Ireland	4.109	$ 204.40	1.4	5.21	2060	50.13	1.0	Y	69	61	0.956
Italy	58.147	$ 1,785.00	12.2	4.46	28870	49.65	1.0	Y	63	6	0.940
Latvia	2.259	$ 16.50	0.1	4.57	1030	45.60	1.0	Y	76	61	0.845
Liechtenstein	0.034	$ 2.49	0.0		20	58.82	1.0	Y		61	
Lithuania	3.575	$ 30.20	0.2	4.53	315	8.81	1.0	Y	77	60	0.857
Luxembourg	0.480	$ 34.53	0.2	5.16	315	65.63	1.0	Y	60	61	0.945
Macedonia	2.055	$ 6.23	0.0	3.86	392	19.08	3.0	N	68	61	0.796
Malta	0.401	$ 5.45	0.0	4.54	127	31.67	1.0	Y	59	61	0.875
Moldova	4.320	$ 2.57	0.0	3.71	406	9.40	3.5	N	74	61	0.694
Montenegro	0.684	$ 2.27	0.0		50	7.31	3.0	N		61	
Netherlands	16.570	$ 612.70	4.2	5.56	10806	65.21	1.0	Y	77	6*	0.947
Norway	4.627	$ 264.40	1.8	5.42	3140	67.86	1.0	Y	83	61	0.965
Poland	38.518	$ 337.00	2.3	4.30	10600	27.52	1.0	Y	72	6*	0.862
Portugal	10.642	$ 176.80	1.2	4.60	7783	73.13	1.0	Y	73	34	0.904
Romania	22.276	$ 80.11	0.5	4.02	4940	22.18	2.0	Y	71	61	0.805
San Marino	0.029	$ 1.05	0.0		14	48.28	1.0	Y		61	

Serbia	10.150	$ 19.19	0.1	3.69	1400	13.79	2.5	N		14	
Slovakia	5.447	$ 47.72	0.3	4.55	2500	45.90	1.0	N	70	61	0.856
Slovenia	2.009	$ 37.92	0.3	4.64	1090	54.26	1.0	Y	72	61	0.910
Spain	40.448	$ 1.048.00	7.1	4.77	19205	47.48	1.0	Y	77	61	0.938
Sweden	9.031	$ 373.20	2.5	5.74	6800	75.30	1.0	Y	89	61	0.951
Switzerland	7.554	$ 386.10	2.6	5.81	5098	67.49	1.0	Y	67	61	0.947
Ukraine	46.229	$ 82.36	0.6	3.89	5278	11.42	2.5	N	72	57	0.744
United Kingdom	60.776	$ 2,346.00	16.0	5.54	37600	61.87	1.0	Y	74	4[10]	0.940
Regional Average	14.089	$ 349.50	2	4.71	6392	43	1.6		72	49	0.882

Middle East

Azerbaijan	8.120	$ 14.25	1.0	4.06	678	8.35	5.5	N	62	61	0.736
Bahrain	0.708	$ 12.14	0.8	4.28	152	21.47	5.0	N	46	61	0.859
Egypt	80.335	$ 85.37	5.7	4.07	5000	6.22	5.5	N	45	34	0.702
Georgia	4.646	$ 5.23	0.3	3.73	175	3.77	3.0	N	65	61	0.743
Iran	65.397	$ 193.50	12.9		7500	11.47	6.0	N	54	19	0.746
Iraq	27.499	$ 40.66	2.7		36	0.13	6.0	N		4	
Israel	6.426	$ 140.30	9.4	5.38	3700	57.58	1.5	Y	73	1	0.927
Jordan	6.053	$ 12.52	0.8	5.60	629	10.39	4.5	N	47	6[10]	0.760
Kuwait	2.505	$ 60.72	4.1	4.41	700	27.94	4.0	N	49	16	0.871
Lebanon	3.925	$ 19.89	1.3		700	17.83	4.5	N	48	1	0.774
Oman	3.204	$ 27.25	1.8		245	7.65	5.5	N	43	61	0.810
Qatar	0.907	$ 30.76	2.1	4.55	219	24.15	5.5	N	48	61	0.844

(*Continued*)

Table 1.1 (*Continued*)

Country	Middle Power Population (millions)[1]	GDP (billions)[2]	% of Region GDP	GPI[3]	Globalization # of Internet Users (X1000)[4]	% of pop. with internet	Freedom Rating[5]	Democracy Free for more than 10 years[6]	GEI[7]	Security (Years Since Major Interstate War[8])	Development (HDI[9])
Saudi Arabia	27.601	$ 276.90	18.5		3200	11.59	6.5	N	42	61	0.777
Syria	19.314	$ 24.26	1.6		1100	5.70	6.5	N	48	34	0.716
Turkey	71.158	$ 358.50	24.0	4.14	16000	22.49	3.0	N	47	6*	0.757
Turkmenistan	5.097	$ 15.18	1.0		36	0.71	7.0	N		61	0.724
United Arab Emirates	4.444	$ 164.00	11.0	4.66	1397	31.44	5.5	N	48	61	0.839
Yemen	22.230	$ 15.07	1.0		220	0.99	5.0	N	31	61	0.492
Regional Average	19.976	$ 83.14	6	4.49	2316	15	5.0		50	37	0.769
Oceania											
Australia	20.434	$ 644.70	77.9	5.29	14664	71.76	1.0	Y	76	4*	0.957
Fiji	0.918	$ 2.05	0.2		61	6.64	5.0	N	56	61	0.758
Kiribati	0.107	$ 76.40	9.2		2	1.87	1.0	Y		61	
Marshall Islands	0.061	$ 0.14	0.0		2	3.28	1.0	Y		61	
Micronesia	0.107	$ 0.23	0.0		14	13.08	1.0	Y		61	
New Zealand	4.115	$ 98.39	11.9	5.15	3200	77.76	1.0	Y	78	50	0.936
Papua New Guinea	5.795	$ 4.17	0.5		170	2.93	3.0	N		61	0.523
Samoa	0.214	$ 0.40	0.0		6	2.80	2.0	Y	51	61	

Solomon Islands	0.566	$ 0.29	0.0		8	1.41	3.5	Y	50	61	0.788
Tonga	0.116	$ 0.24	0.0		3	2.59	4.0	N		61	0.815
Tuvalu	0.011	$ 0.01	0.0		1.3	11.82	1.0	Y		61	
Vanuatu	0.211	$ 0.34	0.0		7.5	3.55	2.0	Y	56	61	0.670
Regional Average	2.721	$ 68.95	8	5.22	1512	17	2.1		61	55	0.778

Light gray = Countries that pass the threshold for potential global good citizenship.

Dark gray = Countries that are internationally active and have made claims to promote humanitarian values, but that do not pass the thresholds for democracy or development.

Medium gray = Specific cases profiled in this volume.

[1] CIA, *The World Factbook 2007*, June 19, 2007, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2119.html.

[2] CIA, *The World Factbook 2007*, June 19, 2007, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2195.htmlGDP.

[3] The Global Competitiveness Index is a composite indicator that provides a holistic overview of factors driving productivity and competitiveness including institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomics, health and education, market efficiency, technological readiness, business sophistication, and innovation. A higher score denotes greater competitiveness. World Economic Forum, "Global Competitiveness Index 2006," http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Global_Competitiveness_Reports/gcr2006_rankings.xls.

[4] CIA, *The World Factbook 2007*, June 19, 2007, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2153.html.

[5] A score of 1–2 shows a free nation, 3–5 are partly free and 6–7 are authoritarian regimes. Freedom House, "Freedom in the World Country Ratings 1972–2007," http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw/FIWAllScores.xls.

[6] Ibid. This category was determined by examining the countries' freedom ranking in 1996. Countries rated as free in this year are marked with a "Y" and those that were only partly free or authoritarian are marked with a "N."

[7] Scores are ranked 0–100, with 100 being complete gender equality. Social Watch, "Gender Equity Index 2007: Progress and Regression," http://www.socialwatch.org/en/avancesyRetrocesos/IEG/tablas/GEIvalues2007.htm.

[8] This category spans the time period 1946–2007. All countries are considered to have engaged in interstate conflict during WWII.

[9] The Human Development Index is a composite indicator that includes considerations of life expectancy, education, literacy, and economic variables. A higher score indicates a greater level of development. UNDP, "Human Development Report 2006," http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/.

[10] Countries committing more than 1000 troops to Iraq are considered to have engaged in interstate war in 2003, and countries participating in the multinational force in Afghanistan are credited with engaging in interstate war in 2001. Only major interstate wars were considered in this category. Centre for the Study of Civil War, "Armed Conflicts 1946–2005," http://www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict/current/Conflict_List_1946-2005.pdf.