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POWERS OF EXPRESSION, EXPRESSIONS OF POWER

Speech Presentation and Latin Literature



ANDREW LAIRD

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namque ferunt fama Hippolytum, postquam arte novercae
occiderit patriasque explerit sanguine poenas
turbatis distractus equis, ad sidera rursus
aetheria et superas caeli venisse sub auras,
Paeoniis revocatum herbis et amore Dianae.

(Virgil, *Aeneid* 7. 765–9)

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David Nicholls will long be recognized for his significant contributions to Caribbean politics and history, political theory and political theology. His wisdom and kindness were conveyed by a sense of humour and a special presence which inspired everyone who met him. This book is dedicated to all the memories of David—of his ponchos, cigars, and disconcertingly erudite parrot, as well as of his writing and thought—and dedicated also to the future of the David Nicholls Memorial Trust. It is a very small way of acknowledging a very big influence.

A.L.

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Introduction

It is characteristic of philosophical writing that it must continually confront the question of representation.

(Walter Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*)

We are aware of three types of poetic expression. In the first, only the poet speaks—this is the case in three books of the *Georgics*. The second type is dramatic in which the poet never speaks—this is the case in comedies and tragedies. The third type is mixed, as is the case in the *Aeneid*. For there, the characters who are introduced speak, as well as the poet.

(‘Servius’, *Commentary on Virgil*¹)

Ismail Kadare is Albania’s best known writer. His novel *The File on H* (*Dosja H*) was first published in 1981. It is about the controversy caused by two Irish-American scholars who travel to rural Albania in the 1930s. Their purpose is to study contemporary oral poetry in order to understand how Homer’s epics came to be composed. Their use of a tape-recorder—a device previously unknown in Albania—to capture poetry and speech arouses particular suspicion and fear. The Irishmen, suspected of espionage, are themselves spied upon. A local governor receives frequent reports, which aspire to be comprehensive, from a man named Dull, the informer responsible for trailing the scholars:

That was the tenor of the first part of the conversation, Dull reported, saying that he had not managed to work out whether the monk Dushan already knew the hermit, or whether this was his first visit to the cave. But the spy was now going to relate the second part of the conversation, in no way comparable to the foregoing, and begged the governor to forgive him

¹ See Ch. 2 nn. 16 and 48 for remarks on the context and significance of these comments from the Servian corpus on Virgil, *Eclogues* 3.1.

for reproducing excerpts in direct speech, a form which in his view would give a more faithful rendering of what was actually said.

‘So now he’s going to write dialogue!’ the governor exclaimed. ‘Not what you’d call an uninventive fellow!’²

The File on H is concerned, in various ways, with the difficulties inherent in reportage: as messages move from speech to the written word, from oral poetry to literature, from one language to another, from an author to a reader. The excerpt quoted here highlights a specific problem which has immense implications. Direct discourse is not as straightforward as it seems—for the spy it is a means of conveying what was said as closely as possible; for the governor it is a characteristic of literary invention.

Problems of this kind are not only apparent to readers of Albanian novels. On 7 September 1994, the *Daily Telegraph* newspaper ran a headline story about a dispute between John Major, then British Prime Minister, and Ian Paisley, head of the Democratic Ulster Unionist Party. This feature offered two competing accounts of a meeting between Paisley and Major. One account is attributed to Paisley himself:

Mr Paisley’s account of his meeting with Mr Major:

‘When we entered the room Mr Major said to me: “Except you now give me a categorical assurance that you believe me, I will not talk with you.” I told Mr Major: “When you hear my submission, you will know what my position is.”

Mr Major: “I will not listen to your submission, except you right now give me a categorical assurance that you believe my word.”

Mr Paisley: “You are the first Prime Minister that ever asked a political opponent in this room, or outside this room, that if he doesn’t swear he believes in your truthfulness, then you will not listen to him.”

He said: “Get out of this room and never come back until you are prepared to say that I speak the truth and do not tell lies.” ’

The newspaper affects to reproduce Paisley’s actual words in direct discourse. Unusually large quotation marks in bold type are supposed to emphasize that *all* the words quoted here are straight from the old warhorse’s mouth. Paisley himself uses direct discourse *within* his own account of the conversation that took place. So Paisley’s account is both rendered by direct discourse, and, in turn, happens to contain embedded direct discourse—as Paisley

² Kadare (1997), 127.

seeks to repeat, verbatim, his own very words and the very words of the Prime Minister. The second account of the same event—attributed to Sir Patrick Mayhew—runs as follows:

Sir Patrick Mayhew's account:

Sir Patrick said Mr Major saw no purpose in answering Mr Paisley's questions if he declined to accept the word of the British Prime Minister [that there had been no secret deal with the IRA]. The Prime Minister invited the DUP leader from the outset to say whether he accepted his word:

‘Dr Paisley declined to answer that question. The Prime Minister reiterated it. Dr Paisley said that would become clear in the course of a submission he wished to make.

The Prime Minister heard the submission and reiterated the question.

The answer was not forthcoming so the Prime Minister said he saw no purpose whatsoever in answering the questions Dr Paisley had put.’

The early part of this second account is given by the *Daily Telegraph* in indirect discourse. The first distended quotation marks, which signal the direct discourse attributed to Mayhew, come halfway down this column. But Mayhew himself uses indirect discourse to recount what was said by Major and Paisley. Different forms of speech presentation are used for, and used by, the two witnesses.

The two accounts stand side by side in a box on the page of the newspaper. They are presented without explicit verbal comment. It would appear that we are not being inclined to prefer either of them as the control, as the true account from which the other deviates. However, the use of direct and indirect discourse does affect us in certain ways. The use of direct discourse for Paisley gives us the sense of having direct access, a window, not to his conversation with Major, but to what Paisley told the paper about the conversation. Almost because these *are* his actual words, we are not so inclined to believe their content: we judge them as we might judge Paisley himself. The indirect discourse reporting Mayhew's utterance is explicitly a version of it rather than a reproduction of it, just as Mayhew's own account of the conversation between Major and Paisley is an epitome, not a word by word rendition of it. For instance, we would never claim Mayhew was lying in saying ‘Dr Paisley said that would become clear in the course of a submission he wished to make’, if Dr Paisley had actually said, as he claims to have done:

'When you hear my submission, you will know what my position is.'

Indirect discourse gives room for manoeuvre to the person reporting the words of others. The use of the word 'invited' in the first paragraph of that second account is an interesting example:

The Prime Minister invited the DUP leader from the outset to say whether he accepted his word.

'Invite' is a curious performative word to find in this sort of exchange. How often do we *invite* people to say whether or not they believe us? One cannot say the use of the word 'invite' is an out and out lie, but the word 'invite' functions rhetorically to make Major's insistence look mild. The quoted words which follow (attributed to Mayhew) indicate that Major began the exchange with a question. Here is a discrepancy with the Paisley account. According to the Paisley version, Major began the exchange not with an invitation, nor with a question, but with a blunt assertion:

Except you now give me a categorical assurance that you believe me, I will not talk with you.

Some other speech act verbs follow in Mayhew's quoted account: 'Dr Paisley *declined* to answer', 'The Prime Minister *reiterated*', and again 'The Prime Minister reiterated'. These are ingenious. They look neutral, but are they? The effect of distance and objectivity is sustained all the way through. It is only in the last sentence that Mayhew creeps, almost unnoticed, out of the closet, and ever so discreetly emits a judgement on the event, a judgement dressed in the ministerial grey of bland, disinterested description:

The answer was not forthcoming, so the Prime Minister said he saw no purpose whatsoever in answering the questions Dr Paisley had put.

The word 'so' is significant here. It looks like an innocent connective, but the words 'then' or 'and' would not incline us to buy into the rationale of the Prime Minister's behaviour in quite the same way. The word 'so' carries the innuendo of 'so for good reason', just as Mayhew's use of the definite article (*the* answer) delicately but firmly conveys 'The *right* answer'. In these respects, indirect discourse appears to allow Mayhew's account more scope for manoeuvre and manipulation. Indirect discourse allows one to gloss other people's words without being held liable for misquoting them. It also looks more sober and restrained: opinion can be disguised as

fact. Paisley's account, on the other hand, exploits the drama of a direct speech rendition—even at the risk of misquoting, and thus being exposed to accusations of misrepresenting, what was said.

Both accounts of the conversation are partial, both accounts are rhetorically coloured; some of the partiality and rhetorical colouring has come from the ways in which direct discourse, indirect discourse, and even performative verbs (like 'invite') are deployed. These modes of speech presentation are deployed on more than one level. They operate within the accounts by Paisley and Mayhew themselves, and they are also used—by the *Daily Telegraph*—to render those very accounts in the first place.

The effects of such modes of discourse being used to construct characters' words, whether spoken or thought, is the subject of this book. The range of texts to be covered is principally drawn from Roman literature. But as these excerpts from *The File on H* and from the newspaper story indicate, this subject has applications for the study of many other kinds of spoken or written expression—in historical, cultural, linguistic, and social scientific investigations. The study of speech presentation is important for two major reasons. First, it can throw light on the themes and stylistic features of particular texts. Second, functions of speech presentation bear on broader concerns including form and content, representation, genre, ideology, and intertextuality. Insofar as it covers issues of wide theoretical interest, this book is addressed not only to readers of ancient literature—Greek as well as Latin—but also to those in other disciplines who are concerned with theories of discourse and narrative. To that end, all the significant passages discussed have been translated. The translations, unless indicated, are my own.

The opening chapter on speech and symbolic power shows how connections between reported discourse and power can be seen as a model for theories of *discourse* in its broader senses. This will be illustrated by examples from a range of authors including Homer, Horace, Suetonius, and Augustine. The relationship between a text and reader offers some important insights, if it is considered in conjunction with the connections between speakers and addressees, as they are presented in the texts we read. Conceiving of texts as utterances affirms the ideological dimension of intertextuality. The final part of the chapter will outline the connections between intertextuality and speech presentation. The second chapter will

then consider the specific importance of speech presentation for the theory of narrative. The realization that narrative itself is a kind of discourse or speech will remain important for understanding the account of speech and poetry in Plato's *Republic*. This discussion will provide a synchronic account of some ancient and modern reflections on narrative: Plato's emphasis on the primary place of speech presentation stands as a useful critique of modern narratological theory.

Once the centrality of speech presentation has been established, the third chapter will explain the functions of 'speech modes'—all the various means by which characters' spoken or thought discourse can be presented in a text. Definition of these speech modes is not always a straightforward business. Moreover, different definitions have different implications for the identity of literary narrative, and for the problem of whether there is such a thing as 'literary language'. These questions remain prominent in the fourth chapter, which is devoted to historical narrative. This examination of discourses within historiography as well as the discourse of historiography itself will show how speech presentation can reveal something about the nature of historical representation. Most exemplary passages will be taken from works of Tacitus, but the chapter will conclude with a fresh consideration of the 'reliability' of the speeches recounted in Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*.

Some insights from these more theoretical essays are then directly applied to Latin narrative texts in the remaining part of this book. Some detailed discussion of linguistic features of particular passages is unavoidable, but the general tenor of my observations should be clear to non-Latinate readers. The fifth and sixth chapters survey speech presentation in Virgil's *Aeneid* and Petronius' *Satyricon* respectively. The discussion of Virgil bears directly on questions which have long been regarded as central to study of the *Aeneid*: these include divine and political authority, characterization, emulation of Homer, and the use of epic conventions. Some issues raised (e.g. the role of speech and silence in the poem) have a more general importance and applicability.

Whilst the *Aeneid* has always enjoyed exceptional prominence, the *Satyricon* is a rare example of Roman prose fiction. But even if prose fiction was a relatively marginal kind of writing in the ancient world, its importance for the history of narrative form has been

amply demonstrated. The *Satyricon* not only pioneers a particular kind of sustained first-person narration. It is also celebrated for appearing to portray a real society, by seeming to caricature the colloquial language of its members. Study of speech presentation in a document like this inevitably raises larger questions about taste and ideology.

Specific techniques of reporting discourse are characteristic of recognized genres. Furthermore, speech presentation can expose striking differences of style between authors working in the same genre, even when they treat similar or virtually identical subjects. The final chapter will home in even more intensely on particular texts in order to illustrate this. It will offer a comparative analysis of speech presentation in scenes which involve the dictation and delivery of messages in epic poetry. As well as reviewing the practices of ancient poets including Homer, Virgil, Ovid, Statius, and Valerius Flaccus, I shall consider significant variations on the form in two later European epics: the *De Partu Virginis* of Iacopo Sannazaro and John Milton's *Paradise Lost*. Other motifs or contexts could be examined profitably, but scenes involving messengers or angels are especially useful because they are bound to employ reported discourse with a considerable degree of complexity. This analysis will involve many of the broader issues discussed earlier: notably ideology, intertextuality, and narratival representation.

But most importantly, the messenger scene itself can be seen as an *allegory* of both discursive representation and of textual interpretation. Readings from a variety of sources—including Plato's *Cratylus*, Coluccio Salutati's *De Laboribus Herculis*, and Umberto Eco's *Theory of Semiotics*—will inform my approach to the examination of this convention. Thus, the final chapter will be a reconfiguration, as well as an application, of the arguments previously presented.

Overall, this study moves gradually from general questions of theory in the earlier chapters to specific critical observations in the later ones. However, theoretical assertions have little value if they are not derived from—or demonstrated by—actual examples. Thus even the early chapters are organized around some key passages of ancient literature which signpost or even shape their arguments. Conversely, close readings of texts are of little use in a project like this unless they raise wider questions: inevitably the later chapters

will engage with theoretical issues as well. It has not been easy to arrange this subject matter into the sequence just described. It was especially hard to decide which of the first three chapters should introduce the rest of the material offered here. I have tried to turn that authorial dilemma to the readers' advantage. Readers should be able to make sense of any one of those first three chapters, without needing to know the other two. Again, each of the last four chapters is self-standing. However, those chapters employ some abbreviations which, for convenient reference, are explained over-leaf. (These basic terms are given full discussion in Chapter 3.) Given that the importance of speech presentation cannot easily be conveyed in a linear manner, each chapter may be regarded as presenting the same state of affairs from a different perspective.

The presentation of characters' words or discourses has often been discussed as an aspect of narrative. But this has not been considered in connection with the awkward fact that words or discourses are also the medium of narrative itself. What narrative often 'represents' is actually made of the same material as the means it uses to 'represent'. That is a basic concern of this book. The realization that narrative and characters' discourse are made of the same stuff opens up several new lines of enquiry. Putting speech presentation at the centre stage does more than offer fresh insights on characterization, genre, ideology, representation and other issues. It also shows, in new ways, how these issues are intimately and inextricably connected.

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations will be used occasionally:

AND	angled narration of dialogue
DD	direct discourse
FDD	free direct discourse
FID	free indirect discourse
ID	indirect discourse
MID	mimetic indirect discourse
RSA	record of a speech act

These terms are discussed in full in Chapter 3.

I

Speech and Symbolic Power: Discourse, Ideology, and Intertextuality

Speech is a great prince

(Gorgias of Leontini,
Helen)

In the first book of Homer's *Odyssey*, Penelope asks the bard Phemius not to sing about the Greeks' return from Troy. She says the subject is too depressing for her because she misses her husband Odysseus. This is the response of her son, Telemachus:

'Mother, why do you begrudge the loyal minstrel giving pleasure in whatever way his spirit moves him. It is not minstrels that are responsible, but Zeus who is to blame, who gives to men that live by toil to each one as he will . . . For yourself, let your heart and soul endure to listen; for Odysseus is not the only one who lost in Troy the day of his return: many others perished as well. But go to your quarters, and busy yourself with your own work, the loom and the spindle, and ask your handmaidens to get on with theirs. But speech (*μῦθος*) shall be for men, for all, but most of all for me; for mine is the authority (*κράτος*) in the house.'

(*Odyssey* 1. 346–9, 353–9)

Penelope respects Telemachus' claim to authority:

She then, seized with wonder, went back to her chamber, for she laid to heart the wise speech (*μῦθον πεπνυμένον*) of her son.

(*Odyssey* 1. 360–1)

This whole passage points to a relation between speech and power which is an inevitable feature of human communication.¹

¹ Verses 356–9, deemed an interpolation by Aristarchus, are not to be found in all ancient editions. This does not adversely affect the tenor of my discussion here. In fact, aspects of the controversy about the inclusion of these verses highlight the importance of speech and power for philological interpretation. The recent commentary of Heubeck *et al.* (1988) *ad loc.* agrees with Aristarchus' verdict and describes Telemachus' claim that speech is not women's business as 'outrageous'

Telemachus here uses speech to assert his right to speak. Penelope acknowledges her subordinate role by silently obeying, and by not speaking in her turn—not even to say that she has heard, agrees and will comply. This passage also suggests that the relation between speech and power has something to do with truth. It is not just that Telemachus gets his way; he is shown to be right about the way things should be: Penelope laid to heart ‘the wise speech’ of her son.² This view of the way things should be can easily become—or become confused with—a view of the way things are. Power shapes and determines knowledge of the truth. It can constitute *authority* in the sense of ‘the correct source of information’ as well as in the sense of ‘the powers that be’.

Speech, power, and claims to knowledge are connected in certain ways by the words of the characters in this passage. These notions might be connected in certain other ways by considering the discourse of the narrator here, in relation not only to the characters, but in relation also to various audiences and readers. In representing this episode, the narrative may be endorsing, opposing, or simply conveying the prevalent assumptions of these various communities of readers and listeners. The interaction between speech (or, in its broadest sense, ‘discourse’), power, and knowledge is the field of ideology.³ Ideas and beliefs about power and knowledge are apprehended through discourses.

and ‘quite contrary to Homeric custom as we see it’. This impressionistic reaction does not offer adequate grounds for excision. Women *do* speak in Homer: but Telemachus might be opining on the way he thinks things ought to be, and not on Homer’s poems. Anyway, the motives Heubeck *et al.* (1988) ascribe for an interpolation—of showing ‘Telemachus’ newly found assertiveness and of explaining Penelope’s withdrawal—offer equally good grounds for regarding these verses as authentic.

² The narrator *more or less* makes it clear that ‘Telemachus is right, because ‘she laid to heart the wise judgement of her son’ could be read as Penelope’s own estimation of ‘Telemachus’ words. However, whether or not the narrator endorses it, ‘Telemachus’ opinion is validated to some extent by Penelope’s acceptance of it. A subsequent utterance from Telemachus to Penelope at 21. 350–3 is interesting in this regard. The verses are a virtual repetition of the formula here with a significant difference: ‘The *bow* shall be for men, but most of all for me, for mine is the authority in the house!’

³ I define ideology as the (examination of) ways in which ideas, beliefs, and discourses are connected with power structures and power relations in society. The term ‘ideology’ has been fraught with controversy since it was first coined by Destutt de Tracy in *Éléments d'idéologie* (1801–5). Bullock and Stallybrass (1977), 298–9 and R. Williams (1988), 153–7 provide summaries of prevalent definitions. J. B. Thompson (1984) and Eagleton (1991) are more extensive discussions. Eagleton

1.1 THEORIES OF DISCOURSE AND SPEECH PRESENTATION

The word 'discourse' has a long history and a broad spread of applications. Deriving from the Latin *discursus* ('running to and fro'), the word in English has at different times connoted reasoning, talk, conversation, narration, and—a sense which is still widely current—a spoken or written treatise on a particular subject.⁴ In Anglo-American linguistics, 'discourse' has come to be a technical term for a continuous stretch of (mostly spoken) language longer than a sentence: a series of utterances which make up a 'speech event' like a sermon, lecture, or conversation.⁵ Generally, discourses are understood as actually occurring instances of linguistic expression. The area of linguistics known as 'discourse analysis' is devoted to examples of everyday communication.⁶ A great deal of discourse analysis adopts a socio-linguistic perspective, in considering the purpose or function of the discourse examined. Such examination of the relations between linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour highlights the potential of discourse analysis for investigating ideology. For example, the discussion of the newspaper article in the Introduction, though it is not 'discourse analysis' in the technical linguistic sense, at least shows that the scrutiny of linguistic features of a text, in conjunction with a sense of some of the text's functions can raise broader issues. One can obtain some impression of just how manifold these issues can be by considering the countless specific types of discourse available for examination: from education, the mass media, advertising, and so on.

A sense of the real potency of discourse for forming society, the personality, and even the unconscious may best be acquired by

(1994) is an anthology of writing on the theory of ideology from the Enlightenment to the present day.

⁴ The *Oxford Latin Dictionary* article on *discursus* gives three broad senses for the word: (1) 'running off in different directions', (2) 'action of running this way and that', (3) 'bustling activity'. The major senses of 'discourse' given by the *Oxford English Dictionary* are mentioned in the main text here.

⁵ Crystal (1985) at 96 provides useful definitions of 'discourse' and 'discourse analysis' in linguistics, and further bibliography. Benveniste (1971) has been a major influence on conceptions of discourse in the humanities and social sciences; Macdonell (1986) examines the role of discourse in cultural and literary theory.

⁶ Brown and Yule (1983) is a standard account. For another view of 'discourse analysis' in relation to ideology, see J. B. Thompson (1984) and Eagleton (1991), 193–220.

thinking about the various relations discourses can have to the world.⁷ The philosopher J. L. Austin drew a distinction between 'constative utterances' which more or less truthfully *describe* a state of affairs, and 'performative utterances' which aim to *bring about* a certain state of affairs.⁸ Austin's speech act theory, which sees language as largely performative can apply to extended discourses, as well as to the shorter sentences it was designed to analyse. Discourses too can inform, clarify, confuse, warn, persuade, endorse, prohibit, praise, blame, welcome, exclude, entertain, or intimidate. Any one kind of discourse is likely to do a number of such things at once—some explicitly, others implicitly. Again, a discourse will accomplish different things for different sets of listeners or readers, and different things again for the agency that has produced or disseminated it. The very existence of a discourse determines, and is determined by, a complex of social exchanges.

There are parallels between the modern studies of discourse and the traditional domain of rhetoric. Indeed, the two have been held to be identical.⁹ Rhetoricians, whether in antiquity or later ages, were not only concerned with the theory of composing political, forensic, or epideictic speeches. They were also concerned with the study of all kinds of previously existing discourses: drama, narrative poetry, history, philosophy, as well as oratory. The purpose of such study was to recognize and imitate techniques of persuasion and argumentation, figures of speech, and features of style. Rhetoric—which has always incorporated literary criticism—was a creative activity which acknowledged the affective capacity of discourses it reviewed. In defending eloquence from the charge that it is affected and superfluous to the ordinary demands of linguistic communication, Quintilian effectively distinguishes between the performative and constative roles of discourse:¹⁰

⁷ The work of Jacques Lacan has been very much concerned with the role of discourse in understanding and conceiving the unconscious. See Lacan (1966). Wright (1986), 151–65 is a clear introduction to Lacanian psychoanalysis and its importance for textual interpretation. Crapanzano (1992) extends Lacan's thought to representation of the self in ethnology and philosophy.

⁸ See J. L. Austin (1971) on performatives and constatives. J. L. Austin (1962) and Searle (1979; 1980) provide standard discussions. Ohman (1971), Petrey (1990) and Pratt (1977) consider implications of speech act theory for theory of literature in different ways. See also Derrida (1967). Cohen (1994) and Kahane (1996) apply speech act theory to particular ancient texts.

⁹ Eagleton (1983), 206. See also Leith and Myerson (1989).

¹⁰ I am grateful to Ahuvia Kahane for alerting me to this passage.

Nam mihi aliam quandam videtur habere naturam sermo vulgaris, aliam viri eloquentis oratio; cui si res modo indicare satis esset, nihil ultra verborum proprietatem elaboraret; sed cum debeat delectare, movere in plurimas animum audientis species impellere, utetur his quoque adiutoriis, quae sunt ab eadem nobis concessa natura.

(*Institutio Oratoria* 12. 10. 43)

For common language seems to me to have one kind of nature, the speech of an eloquent man has another. If it was sufficient for him merely to convey the facts, he might not engage in any elaboration beyond the customary range of what words mean. But since he has to delight, move the mind of his hearer, and induce all sorts of impressions, he is bound to employ those additional aids which are granted to us by that nature already mentioned.

The very conception of discourse here supports the claims of today's speech act theory. Contemporary disciplines and systems of thought have come to consider discourses in terms of the ways in which they represent, enforce, or undermine political, social, and psychological structures. A deliberate preoccupation with these issues has spread from philosophy, literary studies, and linguistics into history, politics, the social sciences, psychology, and many other fields which endeavour to give accounts of the world. The role of discourse theory in enlarging, even constituting, feminism as a system of critique has been especially remarkable.¹¹

A direct and detailed treatment of these broad theories of discourse and their applications is beyond the scope of this study. However, speech is the issue in this book—and these general theories of discourse derive from the specific example of speech. The simple idea of somebody engaged in the act of speaking is not merely a vehicle or microcosm of these theories: it is the basis for them. Just as discourse constitutes social hierarchy and human identity, so speech makes up the organization of a narrative and shapes the identity of characters. The relations I shall discuss between speech and power in narrative texts are part and parcel of the relations between discourse and domination in every area of human activity. Thus the recurrence of the word 'discourse' in labelling speech modes ('direct discourse', 'free indirect discourse', etc.) discussed throughout this book felicitously evokes the larger significances of the term.

¹¹ See e.g. Courtivron and Marks (1980), Kristeva (1984), Moi (1985) and (1986b).

It may look as if I am drawing specious analogies in order to make speech presentation appear to be a grander business than it really is. But these analogies or identifications are not of my own invention. Pioneering work by the Bakhtin Circle in the 1920s heralded the importance of discourse theory and ideology for history, literature, and the social sciences in later decades: some studies were specifically devoted to the study of speech modes in narrative texts.¹² I do not aim to reproduce or directly apply the insights of those studies here—though I will mention them at certain points in this book, as their importance for the subject of speech presentation is considerable.

1.2 SPEECH AS AN INDEX OF POWER

Examples of speech being used to assert or display power are ubiquitous. Telemachus' silencing of Penelope in the *Odyssey* naturally has parallels elsewhere in Homer. I will discuss briefly here an example which has gained the particular attention of scholars. This is the episode involving Thersites, in the second book of the *Iliad*.¹³ The character of Thersites is introduced as follows:

Now the others sat down and stayed disciplined in their places. But one man still railed on, Thersites of measureless speech, who knew in his mind many disordered words (*ἔπεια*), recklessly, and not according to good order, to strive against kings, saying whatever he thought would raise a laugh among the Argives.

(*Iliad* 2. 210–15)

The details of Thersites' unattractive character and physical ugliness given by the narrator (216–23), are followed by a rendering of Thersites' rebuke of Agamemnon in front of the Greek soldiers (225–42). Odysseus' verbal retort (246–64) makes scant reference to

¹² Bakhtin (1981; 1986), Bakhtin and Medvedev (1978), Voloshinov (1973); see also Todorov (1984).

¹³ Thalmann (1988) offers a stimulating account of the political and ideological implications of the Thersites episode. Postlethwaite (1988) compares the heated exchange of speeches between Agamemnon and Achilles over the surrender of Chryses (earlier in *Iliad* 1. 106–92: see the two notes below) and views Thersites' speech as a comment on that quarrel, concluding that Thersites provides a 'value-judgment on the central theme of the poem, the quarrel and *menis*'. There are various discussions of the language used of and by the characters involved in R. P. Martin (1989). My account does not seek to compete with these treatments: it merely aims to highlight some basic issues relevant to my concerns.

what Thersites has said. It is more concerned with the fact that Thersites has spoken in the first place:¹⁴

Thersites, of reckless speech, although you are a clear speaker, restrain yourself and do not try to strive against kings. For I say that there is no mortal worse than you, of all who came to Ilios with the sons of Atreus. So you should not put the names of kings in your mouth as you talk and cast reproaches on them, watching for a return home.

(*Iliad* 2. 246–51)

Odysseus concludes his words with a speech act: an announcement and promise (or threat) which assert and demonstrate verbally his proper right to speak:¹⁵

I will tell you this and it will certainly be fulfilled, if I find you playing the fool like this again, then no longer should the head of Odysseus rest on his shoulders, no longer may I be called father to Telemachus if I do not take you, strip off your clothing, and the cloak and tunic which hide your shame, and send you off to the swift ships, beaten out of the assembly with shameful blows.

(*Iliad* 2. 257–64)

A physical action then reinforces the speech act: Odysseus strikes Thersites with his gold sceptre. But this is emphatically not a fulfilment of the threat in 261–4: Thersites has no opportunity to ‘play the fool’ a further time. Although this actualized assault of Thersites is cruel, it is not as severe as the threat of stripping him naked: the exposure of genitals is especially shameful in epic.¹⁶ The purpose of Odysseus’ violence here is to show the validity of his threat *as a threat*—to show that what he says can be fulfilled. Thus a contrast is drawn with the inefficacy of Thersites’ words which (as is now clear) are futile in urging his fellow soldiers to return home.

Odysseus’ authority, in the fullest sense of the word, is endorsed by the rank and file:

But the men, sorrowful though they were, laughed merrily at Thersites, and thus one would speak with a glance at his neighbour: ‘Well now!

¹⁴ Note the slight echo of Agamemnon’s opening statement to Achilles in *Iliad* 1. 131–2: ‘Godlike Achilles, although you are noble (*ἀγαθός περ ἔών*), do not seek to trick me with your wit.’

¹⁵ Agamemnon’s remarks at the end of his verbal contest with Achilles in *Iliad* 1. 181–7 have some similarities to Odysseus’ threat here. These also come at the close of the final speech of an exchange. The issue at stake is very much one of authority.

¹⁶ See Kirk (1985), 143 on 2. 261–4.

Odysseus has accomplished thousands of good deeds, leading in good counsels and setting battle in array, but this is by far the best deed that he has accomplished among the Argives, to keep this abusive babbler out of the assembly. Never again will his proud spirit set him to contest with kings with words of reviling.'

(*Iliad* 2. 270-7)

Discussions of this episode do not always spell out a rather important detail which shows how intimately Odysseus' physical action is connected with his speech act. The sceptre with which Odysseus hits Thersites is an emblem of power: of kings (cf. 1. 279, 2. 86) and priests (1. 15, 1. 28).¹⁷ More specifically it is an emblem of the power to *speak* in Homer's poetry. Achilles throws a sceptre down to the earth when he finishes an angry speech (1. 245); Odysseus, right after his silencing of Thersites, is again described as holding a sceptre (2. 279) as he addresses the multitude. This detail might serve to show that normal conditions of debate have been restored after some disruption.¹⁸

This episode offers comments from characters which specifically address the relation between speech and power. Members of subordinate groups do speak, but this is not the way most characters seem to want it—even characters who are members of the lower orders themselves. In whatever ideological frames such a sociology of speech was conceived or understood by its audiences, Homer's portrayal of a correlation between social status and the right to speak may have affected subsequent representations. The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* had a pervasive influence on virtually all forms of ancient narrative. In particular, a discreet encoding of the relationship between speech and power in the narrative form of Virgil's *Aeneid* seems to bear this out. That will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. The specific episode involving Thersites has of course its own legacy for later cultural history and political theory.¹⁹

My next example, from Horace's *Satire* 1. 6, is very different.²⁰ It

¹⁷ Compare Hesiod *Theogony* 30 and see West (1966) ad loc., 163-4.

¹⁸ As Kirk (1985) on 278-82 suggests at 145.

¹⁹ Notably Estienne de la Boétie's anti-monarchist tract *Discours de la servitude volontaire* and Johannes Spondaeus' standard edition of Homer (Basle 1583) take up some implications of this episode for statecraft. For discussion of these and related texts in the English Renaissance see Norbrook (1994), at 144f. Lowrie (1991) specifically studies the legacy of Thersites.

²⁰ My comments here were prompted by Duncan Kennedy's analysis of this passage in a paper he gave to the Bristol Classical Seminar in 1989.

presents a more complex set of connections between the status of two speakers and what they are inclined or entitled to say. In this satire, the poet recalls his first meeting with Maecenas who came to be his patron:

nulla etenim mihi te fors obtulit; optimus olim
Vergilius, post hunc Varius, dixere quid essem.
ut veni coram, singultim pauca locutus,
infans namque pudor prohibebat plura profari,
non ego me claro natum patre, non ego circum
me Satureiano vectari rura caballo,
sed quod eram narro. respondes, ut tuus est mos,
pauca: abeo, et revocas nono post mense iubesque
esse in amicorum numero.

(*Satires* 1. 6. 54–62)

Certainly no chance occurrence put me in your way: some time ago the admirable Virgil, and, after him, Varius told you what I was. When I first came face to face with you, I stuttered out a few words; for speechless shame was stopping me from saying more. I could not recount that I was born of a famous father, I could not recount that I rode around country estates on a Satureian steed, but I recount what I was. You reply, as is your manner, in a few words: I depart, and you call me back after nine months and order me to be in the number of your friends.

The complex nature of the power relation between the poet and his patron is strikingly epitomized by the apparent oxymoron in the last two verses of this passage: *iubesque esse in amicorum numero* ‘you order me to be in the number of your friends.’²¹ Shortly before this excerpt, the poet has twice with the same words emphasized his humble origin as ‘a son of a freedman father’ (*libertino patre natum* 45, 46). The preoccupation with his origin is expressed here in 55: Virgil and Varius told Maecenas *what*—not *who*—Horace was.²² That preoccupation pervades the account of the conversation: ‘I recounted what I was’ (60). Evidently it is the shame or modesty (*pudor*) the poet feels about his status which makes him tongue-tied in the company of a famous and important nobleman.

²¹ However, Appendix 3 ‘*Iubere* and Literary Requests’ in P. White (1993), 266–8 is salutary at 267: ‘But what is more important about the use of *iubere* is that (as with “tell” and “bid” in English) the nuance of command which it conveys is significantly weaker than in other Latin verbs meaning “order” or “command”.’ Even so, it is still Maecenas who has the power to initiate the friendship.

²² See the commentary of Lejay (1911) ad loc., 187–8.

Maecenas also speaks 'in a few words'. However, it is emphasized that he is laconic because of his personal inclination (*ut tuus est mos*)—not because of any unease arising from social constraint or inhibition. There is possibly some contrivance here: if Maecenas had in fact been as garrulous as a Homeric hero and Horace had made this clear, the effect would have been much less flattering. Horace says that he departed after hearing Maecenas' words without replying in turn. This reported exchange of words is obviously very different in style from those in the extracts from Homer I have already considered, but the right or inclination to speak is no less clearly an index of power and status. In this passage, exchange of speech is shown to follow certain unstated, perhaps instinctively held, rules of social behaviour; whilst in the passages from Homer, Telemachus and Odysseus explicitly point to such rules, rather as if they were prescriptive laws.

Horace's account places less emphasis on the content of the conversation than it does on the fact that the conversation occurred. No direct or indirect discourse is used; there are only simple records of minimal speech acts. Indeed, Horace elaborates more about what he could not say than what he did say to Maecenas. Nonetheless, there are other ways in which the poet reproduces this exchange quite vividly, even without reference to its verbal content. The alliteration of *p*-, *pr*-, and *pl*- sounds in *pudor prohibebat plura profari* (57) obviously mimics the sound of what the phrase describes: faltering, stuttered speech as a result of social unease. The words *sed quod eram narro* ('I recount what I was') (60) which conclude the description of the poet's part of the conversation come before the caesura—the natural break in a line of hexameter verse. Thus the account of Maecenas' reply (*respondes, ut tuus est mos*) comes in more emphatically than it might otherwise, and helps convey the intrusion of another speaker's utterance.²³ There is also an elision between *pauca* (61)—the last of the five words describing that utterance of Maecenas—and *abeo* (I depart). That elision could suggest the abruptness of Horace's withdrawal after Maecenas has spoken.

These devices draw attention to the *event* of the conversation, as

²³ However Winbolt (1903)—a manual of verse composition—notes at 31: 'In the Latin hexameter, breaks in sense seem naturally to coincide with strong caesuras. Hence the $2\frac{1}{2}$ pause, being near the middle of the line is a favourite pause . . . it seldom has any specific or descriptive meaning . . . Special uses are (i) *speech endings*, and (ii) *speech introductions* . . .' [my emphases].

well as enhancing a sense of the different behaviour of the two speakers as a result of their unequal status. However, there is a further complexity. The satire in general, and the part I have quoted in particular, is not just *about* Maecenas: it is addressed *to* Maecenas. In his present discourse the poet is no longer tongue-tied: he now displays himself as articulate and expressive of his ideas, experiences, and reflections, as he communicates with his patron. There is no inconsistency here: the passage quoted draws a clear contrast between who the poet is 'now' and what he was before. But the change is still immense. If we cease to conceive of Horace's discourse as an inert poem, as a 'closed' work of satire, then Maecenas' silence, or rather, Horace's dramatized loquacity becomes far more astonishing.

Consideration of this text shows two things. First, speech as a token or currency of power cannot adequately be understood in terms of a crude binary system of ownership versus deprivation. Speech, as Horace shows here, is related to power, but the economics of that relation will not be simple. The well-known complexities of the hierarchy between poets and patrons raised here clearly indicate this.²⁴ Other kinds of hierarchy have their own kinds of complexities—and likewise determine, or are determined by, complex relations between speech and power. In spite of the wishful sentiments of characters like Telemachus and Odysseus, it is rarely the case (even in Homer) that superior people have all the discourse and inferior people have none.²⁵

Second, a full account of relationships between speakers cannot be given without considering the text which presents those speakers as a speech (or discourse) in itself.²⁶ This is more obvious in reviewing the excerpt from Horace's *Satire* 1. 5: the poet is presenting his past relationship with Maecenas in the episode he recounts, but we also learn something about his current relationship with Maecenas by looking at his style of recounting it. The

²⁴ West and Woodman (1984) (particularly Duquesnay's discussion, 19–58), Gold (1987) and P. White (1993) deal with the problem of patronage.

²⁵ The examination of the *Aeneid* in Ch. 5 will consider questions of this nature in greater depth.

²⁶ The difficult business of establishing how far a poet who mentions his patron is subordinate to that patron in fact depends considerably on analysis of discourses of the poems the poet himself produced. Thus P. White (1993) concedes at 206, that his thorough study of poetry in Augustan society, which draws from all kinds of discursive evidence, can only offer 'tentative conclusions'.

importance of considering a text like the *Iliad* as discourse is just as great. Our estimations of how the relation between speech and power is portrayed there, and our estimations of the validity of that portrayal actually depend on what we think Homer's audiences or readers are like.²⁷ A more thorough investigation of texts themselves as discourses will follow shortly.

It has often been remarked that the study of ideology is itself ideological. My review of these texts from Homer and Horace certainly bears this out. We cannot regard them as vehicles of ideology, nor even as disinterested presentations of competing ideological systems, without placing ourselves as audience (or our conceptions of other audiences) in some ideological relation to those texts. This chain of reasoning is closely related to the problems raised by speech presentation itself. In simple terms, nobody can report what someone does or says without saying something himself or herself (and thereby saying something *about* himself or herself). Nor can other speakers present that report in turn without saying something about themselves either.²⁸ In presenting this chain of reasoning, I am bound to acknowledge that I can make no claims for the neutrality of the arguments that I will offer here. In order to avoid being hoist by my own petard for failing to reveal the partiality of my own conclusions about speech and power in ancient texts, I will briefly give an explicit statement of my own position.

In studying ancient literature, I am often concerned with social and historical issues in my endeavours to produce images or reconstructions of the past. In my view, some claims about relations between speech and power make an important contribution to our understanding of that past. There are also more personal reasons for my seeking to make conjectures from texts about actual social behaviour and attitudes to the right to speak in the ancient world. I am anxious to show that the presentation and allocation of

²⁷ Compare these remarks on the *Iliad* from Thalmann (1988) at 28: 'Its text should be seen neither as neutral ground for the play of rival ideologies nor as the ideological weapon of a dominant class. It is deeply involved in ideology, but in a complex way that is reflected, in part, by the failure of the Thersites scene to attain genuine closure.'

²⁸ Voloshinov (1973), 115: 'Reported speech is speech within speech, utterance within utterance, and at the same time also *speech about speech, utterance about utterance*.'

characters' discourse in a text are not only of interest as features of form: they also raise questions of a political nature. In alerting readers to these political questions, I also hope to bring those who have been mainly concerned with literary studies into contact with insights from other disciplines, particularly ethnography.²⁹

Social scientists have addressed the problems involved in making conjectures about social behaviour from discursive accounts. Investigation of speech and authority in existing societies is a common theme.³⁰ Such investigation also poses problems of ethnographic method: there are difficulties raised by 'muted groups' (like women or children) whose symbolic weight in a society cannot easily be assessed by the ethnographer simply because such groups 'do not speak'.³¹ On a second level, the potency of the form and rhetoric of narratives which are available to the ethnographer is a related issue, and a prominent one. A social scientist's data may be circumscribed by customary procedures of muting and silencing in the society under scrutiny. But the social scientist's data, unlike that of the historian of antiquity, is always available in unlimited quantity. What is to be done with that data then becomes a more conspicuous problem. Here is one account of the difficulties notions of 'data' and of 'what really happened' raised for a social anthropologist:

²⁹ This is not to overlook the fact that ethnography and other forms of social-scientific writing have themselves, no less than other 'disciplines', been influenced, even shaped, by methods drawn from various fields of enquiry including literary criticism and literary theory. See (e.g.) Geertz (1973) and the other works cited in note 33 below.

³⁰ Consider these observations drawn from fieldwork in Algeria from Bourdieu (1979), 102 n. 6: 'Of a man who takes little thought for his honour, the Kabyles say: "He is a Negro". Negroes do not have and do not need honour. They were kept out of public affairs; though they might take part in collective work, they were not entitled to speak in assembly meetings; in some places they were not even allowed to attend. A tribe which listened to the opinions of a Negro would have covered itself with shame in the eyes of other tribes.' See also Bourdieu (1977), (1991) and (1992). Free (1996) presents a useful critical overview of Bourdieu's anthropology.

³¹ Ardener (1989), 73–85 and 128–30 introduced the notion of 'muted groups'. The extent to which this kind of subject matter hampers (or determines?) the production of ethnographic writing is conveyed by this account of North Lebanese society in Gilsenan (1989) at 215: 'the *fellahin* in the village ("peasant" stratum in the status honour idiom) . . . cannot and dare not speak. Speech, public and challenging would bring violent retribution by these superior forces whose violence is often seen as part of their very nature as much as of the nature of the hierarchical order in practice . . . In the discourse of power they have neither the right nor the capacity to "speak". They have no "word", and no words can properly be spoken by or of them (in that sense my writing here would seem unthinkable to someone local in the village—how do you write about peasants?)'

I suspect that the whole discourse of evidence as distinct from mere anecdote, that powerful tool of the scientist against the non-professional in the defence of boundaries and practices, also made me nervous. For a long time I thus did not wish to take any cognizance of the fact that one crucial element in my fieldwork was that I was being told stories; that . . . manner and matter were indistinguishable, the what and the how were one question. The vividness of the tellings and retellings successfully performed one of their critical functions—to blind the listener, or at least this listener, to the fact that it was these accounts and reports and reminiscences that constituted ‘the event’ of which they were apparently just the vehicle.³²

And third, on the level of the ethnographic text itself, there is the problem of the ethnographer’s rhetoric which Geertz and others have considered: ethnography also performs the action of telling a story.³³ The mediation of ‘data’ by the ethnographer must be determined by his or her own ethnicity, gender, class background and beliefs. How and to what extent should these issues of ‘reflexivity’ be taken into account? So there are (at least) three levels of aporia which are clearly interrelated. However, these difficulties have not brought disciplines like social anthropology to an end. They are more likely to produce a stimulating dialectic between ethnographic theory and ethnographic practice. Another important consideration can be brought into play. The peoples, societies, and cultures scrutinized by the ethnographer cannot be regarded as comparable to flora, fauna, artworks, or written texts which are surveyed by other kinds of specialist. We interact with these peoples and societies in many other complex ways.³⁴

Responses to aporias facing contemporary ethnographers cannot be brought to bear *tout court* on the problems involved in studying ancient texts. The authors and cultures which produced those texts cannot be interrogated or consulted. Ancient historians who regard at least some ancient texts as discourses of evidence, would certainly see problems with making inferences about social practices from portrayals of—or hints about—the relation between speech and hierarchy in historiography which is manifestly literary

³² These remarks are also from Gilsenan (1989), 193.

³³ See Geertz (1973; 1988), Clifford and Marcus (1986). Silverman (1990) is a useful account of Geertz’s writing. Free (1996) attacks Bourdieu’s own ‘intellectualism’.

³⁴ Balandier (1955) and Asad (1973) consider, in different ways, the relationship between colonial politics and anthropology.

and rhetorical. A more orthodox procedure would be to turn to any specific testimonies on the relationship between speech and power that can be found in historical writing.

However, historical testimony is unlikely to present a straightforward picture. A brief chapter in Suetonius' biography of the emperor Augustus which discusses freedom of speech in the senate can serve as an example. Attempting to make sense of this chapter shows the kind of problems posed by historical 'sources' where these issues are concerned:

In senatu verba facienti dictum est: 'Non intellexi,' et ab alio: 'Contra dicerem tibi, si locum haberem'. Interdum ob immodicas disceptantium altercationes e curia per iram se proripienti quidam ingesserunt licere oportere senatoribus de re p. loqui. Antistius Labeo senatus lectione, cum virum legeret, M. Lepidum hostem olim eius et tunc exultantem legit interrogatusque ab eo an essent alii digniores, suum quemque iudicium habere respondit. nec ideo libertas aut contumacia fraudi cuiquam fuit.

(*Divus Augustus* 2. 54)

As Augustus was speaking in the senate someone said to him: 'I did not understand', and someone else said: 'I would contradict you if I had the opportunity.' Several times when he was rushing from the senate house in anger at the excessive bickering of the disputants, some shouted after him that senators ought to have the right of speaking about public affairs. At the selection of senators, when each member chose another, Antistius Labeo named Marcus Lepidus, an old enemy of the emperor who was at the time in banishment: and when Augustus asked him whether there were not others more deserving of the honour, Labeo replied that every man had his own opinion. Yet for all that, none of this freedom of speech or insolence brought harm to anyone.

The last sentence implies that (in the narrator's view) senators enjoyed freedom of speech with impunity—yet in some examples provided of this permissiveness, the senators complain that they are not allowed to say what they please and get a hearing. It is also hinted that Labeo's answer to Augustus' question is insolent—yet for Labeo to claim that each man holds his own opinion is far less insulting than a direct retort to the effect that no others deserved the honour he wished to confer on Lepidus. Altogether we are left with a rather confusing impression: again we see that speech and power are connected, but again our idea of the situation portrayed depends on our response to the discourse portraying it. Other kinds of evidential discourse possibly available to the historian are equally

problematic. Records of procedure in political or judicial assemblies, for example, which might be used to determine who had the right to speak and when, may well give accounts of theory rather than practice. And accounts of what was supposed to happen in the guise of what did happen are still bound to inscribe prejudices, and to present puzzles and ambiguities.³⁵

The realization that historical texts require, at least for my purposes, more open-ended interpretation has some welcome consequences. There might be grounds for drawing tentative conclusions from non-historical writing about speech and power in ancient societies. Literary as well as historical texts provide useful resources for investigating anthropological or cultural categories. Often for the study of Greek and Roman societies, the presentations of basic concepts in literature can be as important as those in 'factual' discourses. In this respect, classicists have been practising forms of 'new historicism' long before the term was ever coined.³⁶ Moreover it is worth emphasising that the *form* of a text, no less than its content, is inevitably conditioned by the society that produced it—conversely the form of a society is constituted by the texts through which that society is perceived.³⁷ The ascription of speech to some characters and not to others is really a formal feature commonly present in all kinds of texts—but which is especially prominent in narratives. The ascription of speech to certain characters obviously leads to the determination of social hierarchies which are conjured up by narratives. Even if some narratives are fictional, I would maintain that the mechanisms of the hierarchies we apprehend through them are worth investigating. There are at least some impressive precedents for making extensions from the realm of myth and poetry to the world outside.³⁸

In short, studying speech and power in all kinds of ancient texts

³⁵ Even such records which might be in documentary form (as opposed to that of formal historical narrative) will include some facts and exclude others; they thus can be shown to have their own rhetoric and partiality. See H. White (1981), and the opening discussion in Ch. 4.

³⁶ For accounts and examples of new historicism (a term coined by Stephen Greenblatt) see Veaser (1989) and (1994).

³⁷ Few literary theorists have really taken into serious consideration this way in which the form of a text is related to the society that produces it. The work of Bakhtin and Voloshinov is a notable exception: see again (e.g.) Bakhtin and Medvedev (1978) and Voloshinov (1973).

³⁸ Dodds (1973) and G. Thomson (1941), 199–346 are commendable examples of this tendency in classical scholarship.

can be useful. No text or discourse will ever represent a state of affairs neutrally. However comprehensive or disinterested a writer or speaker sets out to be, the inevitable determinations of omissions, closure, provenance, and genre will mean that the account produced will be angled, selective, partial, and ideological. Thus, attributing a kind of historical significance to a text's explicit and implicit constructions of the relationships between speech and power can be justified. This is simply because they *are* constructions: they could never faithfully represent a state of things outside the text. Textual constructions of relationships between speech and power configure aspirations which could not ever be directly expressed. Conjectures about these aspirations are of historical interest to the same degree that conjectures about the rhetorical slants or implicit biases of any ancient work might be of historical interest.

It might already be clear that connections between speech and power are also to be found in texts which do not attribute words or thoughts to any characters presented in them. These connections consist in the relations between texts and their readers or audiences: relations which take on an ideological form—as the examples discussed above have shown. This is most easily seen if one considers texts as discourses, or, to put it more accurately, if one can show how texts *are* discourses. Before proceeding with this, it is necessary to give an account of how I will be using the terms 'speech' and 'text'. I use 'speech' to stand for spoken discourse. A 'text' is generally regarded as something written or printed, or as written discourse. Here—so far at least—the word 'text' is mostly used in its traditional sense, to denote what is, effectively, a published work or an excerpt from a published work.³⁹ However, in linguistics, in some literary theories (including those which do not presuppose the notion of literature), and in social science, that conception of text has often been deliberately expanded to denote (like 'discourse') a continuous stretch of language, spoken or written.⁴⁰ A small

³⁹ The notion of 'publication' is far from unproblematic: McGann (1991) considers the effect of the circumstances of publication on literary works. A further set of questions are raised by consideration of ancient texts: the nature of 'publication' in antiquity means that the kind of closure presupposed by the philologist would not apply to texts in the climate of their production. On ancient book production see Blanck (1992); on closure, see D. P. Fowler (1989), and Roberts, Dunn, and Fowler (1997) on closure and the ancient book in general. The entries in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (1996—3rd edn.) by Maehler and Hines, respectively, on 'Books, Greek and Roman' and 'Books, poetic' are also useful.

⁴⁰ See e.g. Bakhtin's essay 'The problem of the text in linguistics, philology and