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European Identity in the Context of National Identity

*Questions of Identity in Sixteen European Countries
in the Wake of the Financial Crisis*

Edited by Bettina Westle and Paolo Segatti

European Identity in the Context of National Identity



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OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
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First Edition published in 2016

Impression: 1

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Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Data available

Library of Congress Control Number: 2015953284

ISBN 978-0-19-873290-7

Printed in Great Britain by
Clays Ltd, St Ives plc

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Series Editors' Foreword

Maurizio Cotta and Pierangelo Isernia (CIRCaP—University of Siena)

At a time when the European Union is facing a number of important social, economic, political, and cultural challenges, and its legitimacy and democratic credentials are increasingly questioned, it seems particularly important to address the issue of *if* and *how* EU citizenship is taking shape. This series intends to address this complex issue. It reports the main results of a quadrennial Europe-wide research project, financed under the Sixth Framework Programme of the EU. That programme has studied the changes in the scope, nature, and characteristics of citizenship presently under way as a result of the process of deepening and enlargement of the EU.

The IntUne Project—Integrated and United: A Quest for Citizenship in an Ever Closer Europe—is one of the most recent and ambitious research attempts to empirically study how citizenship is changing in Europe. The Project lasted four years (2005–9) and involved thirty of the most distinguished European universities and research centres and more than a hundred senior and junior scholars, as well as several dozen graduate students. It had as its main focus an examination of how integration and decentralization processes, at both the national and European level, are affecting three major dimensions of citizenship: *identity*, *representation*, and *scope of governance*. It looked in particular at the relationships between political, social, and economic elites, the general public, policy experts, and the media, whose interactions nurture the dynamics of collective political identity, political legitimacy, representation, and standards of performance.

In order to address these issues empirically, the IntUne Project carried out two waves of mass and political, social, and economic elite surveys in eighteen countries, in 2007 and 2009; in-depth interviews with experts in five policy areas; extensive media analysis in four countries; and a documentary analysis of attitudes toward European integration, identity, and citizenship. The book series presents and discusses in a coherent way the results coming out of this extensive set of new data.

The series is organized around the two main axes of the IntUne Project, to report how the issues of identity, representation, and standards of good governance are constructed and reconstructed at the elite and citizen levels, and how mass–elite interactions affect the ability of elites to shape identity, representation, and the scope of governance. A first set of four books will examine how identity, scope of governance, and representation have been

changing over time respectively at elite, media, and public level. The next book presents cross-level analysis of European and national identity, by comparing data at both the mass and elite levels. A concluding volume will summarize the main results, framing them in a wider theoretical context.

Contents

<i>List of Figures</i>	ix
<i>List of Tables</i>	xi
<i>Biographical Information</i>	xv
<i>Preface</i>	xvii
1. An Exploration of Europeans' Identities <i>Paolo Segatti and Bettina Westle</i>	1
2. National Elites' Conceptions of National and of European Identity <i>Borbála Göncz and György Lengyel</i>	31
3. Subnational and National Territorial Identification <i>Christian Schnaudt, Stefanie Walter, and Sebastian Adrian Popa</i>	63
4. National and European Identification—Their Relationship and its Determinants <i>Bettina Westle and Roman Graf Buchheim</i>	93
5. Meanings of National and European Identities <i>Simona Guglielmi and Cristiano Vezzoni</i>	140
6. Unpacking the Components of National Identity and Their Effects on Identification with Europe <i>Paolo Segatti and Simona Guglielmi</i>	165
7. The Relationship between European Identity and National Identity, Party Identification, and Ideological Orientation <i>Radosław Markowski and Michał Kotnarowski</i>	192
8. A Sword or a Shield? Globalization, European Integration, and Public Opinion <i>Pierangelo Isernia and Maurizio Cotta</i>	211
9. Trust towards Other People: Co-nationals, Europeans, People outside Europe <i>Bettina Westle and Tuuli-Marja Kleiner</i>	236

Contents

10. The Consequences of European Identity	272
<i>Fabio Serricchio and Paolo Bellucci</i>	
11. Conclusions	291
<i>Bettina Westle and Paolo Segatti</i>	
<i>References</i>	299
<i>Name Index</i>	333
<i>Subject Index</i>	339

List of Figures

2.1a. Importance of meanings of national identification in 2007 and 2009 (averages shown on a 1–4 scale)	43
2.1b. Importance of meanings of European identification in 2007 and 2009 (averages shown on a 1–4 scale)	44
3.1. The distribution of local, regional, and national identification across sixteen European countries (mean values)	70
3.2. The distribution of local, regional, and national identification across sixteen European countries (percentages)	71
3.3. The distribution of exclusive local, regional, and national identification across sixteen European countries (percentages)	73
3.4. The strength of correlations between local, regional, and national identification across sixteen European countries (Spearman's correlations)	74
3.5. Inspection of invariant item ordering for territorial identification scales across sixteen European countries (H^T coefficients)	81
5.1. Model 1.1 with four substantive components and two instrument factors	149
5.2. Model 2.1 with five substantive components and two instrument factors	152
6.1. Path diagram of Full Structural Equation model, model 1	173
6.2. What drives identification with Europe? Direct effects (standardized B) of ancestry and Christianity latent constructs in sixteen countries and over the two years	184
6.3. What drives identification with Europe? Direct effects (standardized B) of the latent constructs based on citizenship rights and Europe as a mosaic of cultures, languages, and institutions in sixteen countries and over the two years	185
6.4. What drives identification with Europe? Direct effects (standardized B) of identity meanings based on national 'civility' code and of emotional attachment to the nation in sixteen countries and over the two years	186
6.5. The net marginal effects on feeling Europe as the most prominent identity across sixteen countries in both years	189
7.1. Relationships between European identity and national identity moderated by party identification separately in each country-wave	200

List of Figures

7.2. Relationships between European identity and national identity moderated by left–right self-orientation separately in each country-wave	201
8.1. The globalization-scope of governance causal chain	218
8.2a. Attitudes towards globalization and EU support	223
8.2b. Attitudes towards globalization and EU support	223
8.3a. Attitudes towards globalization and EU support	224
8.3b. Threat perception of globalization and support for the EU	224
8.4. Perception of threat by dimension of threat (in %)	227
8.5. Increase EU powers by nature and seriousness of threat (% of those who want to increase EU powers)	228
8.6. Probability of supporting a strengthening of the EU by threat perception, for European and national identity	232
10.1. The distribution of European support among countries (mean value on a 0–10 scale): 2007 and 2009	282
10.2. IntUne countries in a space defined by European support and European identity	284

List of Tables

1.1.	Countries and waves of the mass surveys: cases	19
1.2.	Conceptualization and operationalization: European identity in the context of support for the political community of the European Union (EU)	23
1.3.	Conceptualization and operationalization of meanings of collective identity	29
2.1.	Sample size by countries and waves	40
2.2.	Attachment to different territorial levels in 2007 and 2009 by countries (country averages shown on a 1–4 scale)	41
2.3a.	Importance of different meanings of national identity in 2007 and 2009 by countries (country averages shown on a 1–4 scale)	45
2.3b.	Importance of different meanings of European identity in 2007 and 2009 by countries (country averages shown on a 1–4 scale)	46
2.4.	Meanings of national and European identity (factor loadings)	48
2.5.	Correlations of the components of national and European identity meanings	49
2.6.	Components of national and European identity meanings in the different countries in 2009	52
2.7.	Factors explaining identity components in 2009 (multilevel regression, random intercept models)	55
2.8.	Factors explaining attachment to Europe in 2009 (multilevel ordered logistic regression, random intercept models)	56
3.1.	The structure of territorial identification across sixteen European countries (factor analysis)	76
3.2.	The structure and order of territorial identification across sixteen European countries (Mokken scale analysis)	78
3.3.	The structure of territorial identification in selected parts of Spain and the United Kingdom (Spearman's correlations)	84
3.4.	The structure of territorial identification in selected parts of Spain and the United Kingdom (factor analysis)	85

List of Tables

3.5.	The structure and order of territorial identification in selected parts of Spain and the United Kingdom (Mokken scale analysis)	86
4.1.	Attachment to country, to Europe, and to the European Union—means	100
4.2.	Correlations between attachment to country, to Europe, and to the European Union	106
4.3.	Typology of attachments—2007 and 2009 cumulated	109
4.4.	Typology of national and European attachments in comparison	122
4.5.	Pseudo R-squared statistics and model fitting information	122
4.6.	Determinants of the change from solely national attachment to dual national and European attachment	123
4.7.	Determinants of the change from dual national and European attachment to solely European attachment	125
4.A1.	Attachment to country, to Europe, and to the European Union—percentages and means	128
5.1.	Goodness of fit indexes for the models based on the ethnic vs civic dichotomy (model 1.0 and model 1.1; listwise)	150
5.2.	Goodness of fit indexes for the five factors models (model 2.0 and model 2.1)	152
5.3.	Goodness of fit indexes for the equivalence models across time and countries for each model	155
5.4.	Descriptives for ‘civility’ at national and European level and for the ethnic component (N = 27,403, after listwise deletion)	156
5.5.	Correlations between the three components (N = 27,403, after listwise deletion)	156
5.6.	Operationalization and descriptives of the individual characteristics considered	158
5.7.	Coefficients and directions of the effects of individual characteristics on national and European ‘civility’ and on ‘ancestry’ (N = 27,403, after listwise deletion)	159
5.8.	Operationalization and descriptives of the additional indicators	162
5.9.	Correlations of the additional indicators with national and European ‘civility’ (N = 26,263, after listwise deletion)	162
6.1.	Mean and standard deviation of three items related to identification with Europe across countries and over time (N about 1000, except Austria 2007 around 500)	179
6.2.	Percentages of respondents who see themselves as only national, national and European, European and national, only European, or don’t know, don’t want to, or don’t answer (N about 1000, except Austria 2007 around 500)	180
6.3.	Fit measures of the MGCFA across time and countries	181

6.4.	Fit measures of full SEM, model 1 by country and year	182
6.5.	Fit measure of full SEM, model 2 by country and year	183
7.1.	Correlations between European identity and other identities tested	199
7.2.	The impact of national, partisan, and ideological identities on European identity—normative dimension of nation included as control variable (multilevel regression model)	199
7.3.	Significance of independent variables of interest in regression models with sociodemographic characteristics included as control variables	204
7.4.	Regression models with contextual country-level variables	206
8.1.	Correlation coefficients between support for EU and views about globalization	225
8.2.	Model support for increased EU powers (Robust Sandwich estimator of variance) Odds ratio (identity discrete; q29 uncertain excluded)	230
8.3.	Predicted values probability to strengthen EU by level of threat and identity	232
9.1a.	Trust in people—all countries pooled and country specific	245
9.1b.	Trust in people—all countries pooled and country specific, 2007 and 2009 cumulated	248
9.2.	Trust in people: internal correlations—all countries pooled and country specific	249
9.3.	Trust in people: internal links—all countries pooled, 2007 and 2009 cumulated	250
9.4a.	Combination typology 1 of trust in people—all countries pooled, 2007 and 2009 cumulated	251
9.4b.	Combination typology 2 of trust in people—all countries pooled, 2007 and 2009 cumulated	252
9.4c.	Difference index of trust in people of own country minus other European countries—all countries pooled, 2007 and 2009 cumulated	253
9.5.	Links between indicators of trust in people and identification—all countries pooled, 2007 and 2009 cumulated	253
9.6.	Factorial structure of indicators of trust in people and identification—all countries pooled, 2007 and 2009 cumulated (oblimin rotation)	254
9.7.	Links between indicators of trust in people and meanings of national and European identity—all countries pooled, 2007 and 2009 cumulated	254
9.8a.	Missing values of trust in other Europeans according to indicators of European identification (percentages)	255
9.8b.	Indicators of European identification according to trust in other Europeans (means)	255

List of Tables

9.9a.	Multivariate links between indicators of trust in people and determinants on individual level—all countries pooled, 2007 and 2009 cumulated	258
9.9b.	Multivariate links between indicators of trust in people and determinants on individual level: reduced models—all countries pooled, 2007 and 2009 cumulated	260
9.10a.	Multilevel regressions on trust in people of own country—all countries pooled, 2007 and 2009 cumulated	263
9.10b.	Multilevel regressions on trust in people of own country—all countries pooled, 2007 and 2009 cumulated	265
9.11.	Links between trust in people and attitudes towards the EU's legitimacy and future	267
9.12.	Attitudes towards the EU's legitimacy and future according to types of trust in people	268
9A.1.	Documentation of macro-variables	270
10.1.	Descriptive statistics on dependent variable	283
10.2.	Bivariate correlations with European support (2007 and 2009 pooled)	285
10.3.	European identity as predictor of European support, 2007 and 2009 (OLS regression)	286
10.4.	Individual and contextual determinants of European support	287
10.5.	Descriptive statistics of employed variables (IntUne 2007 and 2009 pooled)	288

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Preface

This book, the fifth in the series on the IntUne project, is about European identity and how it relates to national identity in member states of the European Union. The analyses rest on data collected by the mass and elite surveys conducted in 2007 and 2009 as part of IntUne, and also draw on data collected as part of the European Commission's Eurobarometer (EB) public opinion surveys.¹

The IntUne surveys covered sixteen member countries of the European Union, among them countries of all accession waves and West and East.² In each country and both years around 1,000 respondents were surveyed (except for 2009 in Austria, with around 500) on the basis of a representative sampling procedure (two additional countries surveyed, Serbia and Turkey, have been excluded from the analyses because they are not members of the European Union and their questionnaire was different).³

The various chapters of this book cover different aspects of European and national identity. Chapter 1 sets the scene, discussing some of the theoretical underpinning and the concepts that arise in the analysis. Chapter 2 deals with the level of identification with Europe and the structure of the meanings of national and European identity for elite people.⁴ All subsequent chapters look at the population as a whole. Chapter 3 focuses on the relationship between subnational and national identities. Chapter 4 analyses the individual and contextual characteristics of those who identify with Europe and with the nation. Chapter 5 deals with the structure of the meanings attached to European and national identity. Chapter 6 builds on Chapter 5, and explores which of the latent representations of Europe and the nation promote or inhibit identification with Europe. Chapter 7 expands Chapter 6 by testing which individual and contextual determinants may condition the link between identification with the nation and with Europe. Chapter 8 explores the power of external threats for identification with Europe and the nation

¹ For more about Eurobarometer see <ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm>.

² The sixteen countries are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The IntUne survey data for the United Kingdom exclude Northern Ireland. Where appropriate, therefore, this book refers to Great Britain rather than the United Kingdom.

³ The surveys, conducted by TNS Sofres, were mostly computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI), except for Bulgaria and Slovakia which were paper-and-pencil interviews (PAPI).

⁴ The analyses in Chapter 2 are based on survey data relating specifically to elites (national parliamentarians), mainly in the same countries as for the main survey, except that the Czech Republic and Lithuania are included in the elites survey and Estonia and Slovenia are excluded.

by documenting the effects on the perception of Europe as an agent of globalization or a shield against it. Chapter 9 analyses the individual and contextual determinants of trust towards others, particularly fellow nationals and Europeans. Chapter 10 explores how far support for the European Union is motivated by instrumental reasons and by European identity. Chapter 11 summarizes the main findings.

Finally, the editors thank all contributors for their engagement, and additionally we thank the student helpers Clara Süß and Pascal Anstötz for their intensive work on the integrated list of references in this book.

1

An Exploration of Europeans' Identities

Paolo Segatti and Bettina Westle

1.1 European Identity: What is at Stake?

When the European Coal and Steel Community was founded in the early 1950s, one of the motives was to improve relationships between those European countries which had formerly been enemies in the two world wars. Thus, at the very beginning of today's European Union, national identity was felt as a silent presence that could undermine, if awakened, the hope for a new era of peace and welfare. During the early years, many equated that hope with the expectation that nationalism and national identity would slowly lose their power and that a common European identity would emerge (Haas 1958; Galtung 1973; see also Bull 1993, Shore 1995, Kourvetaris and Kourvetaris 1996; Kaelble 2009). Regarded as a milestone along this road was the 1973 'Declaration on European Identity', which thought that 'European identity will evolve as a function of the dynamic of the construction of a united Europe' (Tindemans 1976, Commission of the European Communities 1973). The Tindemans Report, with its idea of a 'citizen's Europe', preceded new strategies pursued in the 1980s to gain popular support for the European Community. The dominance of the common market was now accompanied by an emphasis on a common culture (see also Fontaine 1993, Shore and Black 1994). Resolutions of the European authorities illustrate this emphasis: for instance 'European culture is marked by its diversity. But underlying this variety there is an affinity, a family likeness, a common European identity' (Commission of the European Communities 1983: 1); and 'the integration of Europe... must be built on the common foundations of European culture' (European Parliament 1988: 207). Initially, these elite expectations were also echoed in the academic interest in what ordinary people thought of the European institutions. Identities received only scant attention. This changed

with the deepening of European integration. A first impetus to considering the population of the member countries was imparted by the first direct elections of the European Parliament held in 1979 (see Reif 1985; Reif and Inglehart 1991; Sinnott 1995). The received wisdom was that the transformation of the primarily economic European Community into a political European Union required the involvement and active support of the national populations greater than the hitherto observed 'permissive consensus' (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). A democratic supranational system would presuppose at least the willingness of all to act according to the common political 'rules of the game'. It would also presuppose the trust of being able to count on the solidarity and help of others in times of national problems instead of being left alone or even excluded. And in the case of common problems, it would presuppose the confidence that all would try to find a common solution instead of leaving the common enterprise. In short, a common collective identity was deemed necessary on the assumption that identity was the means to fulfil such requirements.

In 2012 the European Union received the Nobel Peace Prize for having 'for over six decades contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe'. The award came in the midst of a severe financial crisis and after a period in which the European Union had expanded to include twelve Eastern European countries, blocking the spread of national conflicts triggered by the wars in the former Yugoslavia and muting the political activation of deeply divided national memories. Although the Nobel Prize seemed welcome confirmation that peace had been achieved, the birth of a European identity at the expense of national identities has not materialized. The steps towards a political European Union—Maastricht in 1992/3, the treaties of Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon in 1997, 2001, and 2007, and the waves of Eastern enlargement with ten new Member States in 2004 and two more in 2007—did not produce overwhelming EU-enthusiasm. The process even backfired in EU founder countries, in some of which the majority of citizens rejected the constitutional proposals. The diagnoses varied from the 'end of the permissive consensus' (Reif 1993a), through a 'post-Maastricht-blues' (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007), the 'end of the European Union' (Taylor 2008), to the question 'Is the EU doomed?' (Zielonka 2014).

In any case, increasing EU-scepticism seemed to spread through all the member countries in diverse forms (see e.g. Wessels 2007); the permissive consensus was said to have changed into a 'constraining consensus' (Hooghe and Marks 2009). This altered the perspective from which to look at the relationship between national and European identity. The proponents of the European Union have now downsized aspirations for a European identity and talk of a 'unity in diversity'; and the idea of absorbing the European nation states into a supracountry has become ever more utopian (see

e.g. Delanty 1995; Castiglione and Bellamy 2003; Frevert 2003; Habermas 2003; Delanty and Rumford 2005; Katzenstein 2006; Checkel 2007; Müller 2007). Viewing European identity as a replacement for national identities has also become relatively rare; instead, their coexistence is *en vogue* (Hermann, Risse, and Brewer 2004), and the expectation is that all member nations should develop their own and different typical identifications with Europe based on their specific historical experiences and national values (see e.g. Díez Medrano 2003; Eder 2010; Risse 2010). Therefore so-called 'bounded-integrationists' suggest an autonomy-protective process, which means that European integration should be slowed down and limited to those issues where national policies are truly ineffective until the formation of European identity catches up (Scharpf 1999; Gustavsson 1997; Cederman 2001a). Yet who is to decide the effectiveness of policies and the status of identity? Moreover, if nations are perceived as bounded, why should it be unlikely that some individuals imagine a European identity as a set of bounded nations?

However, identity may be a popular topic only for symbolic politics. But in spite of (or because of?) this, it is still a vague term and denotes a very broad, unclear concept. As a consequence, some have proposed discarding it in scientific research (see e.g. Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Niethammer 2000; Gerhards 2003) and replacing it with more precise concepts such as identification. Most scholars agree that identity is a vague or at least very complex phenomenon; but they do not want to relinquish it, because it seems to be a psychological as well as a sociological and political constant, an indispensable fact of human life (see e.g. Greenfeld 1999; Calhoun 2007). From a psychological perspective it is seen as unavoidable, something that no human being can do without (see e.g. Erikson 1995[1950]; Leary and Tangney 2012). Without common identities no groups would exist (see e.g. Tajfel and Turner 1979, 1986; Howard 2000; Stryker and Burke 2000; Huddy 2001). Moreover, identities have historically proved to be powerful and consequential constructs, for good and evil. They are seen as the social 'glue' necessary for the integration of groups and societies; but they can also form the basis for conflicts with other groups or societies (Giesen 2002, 2004; Tilly 2003; Kocka 2007; Eder 2009). Therefore, it does not help to banish the concept from social science. Instead one should consider which aspects of collective identity can be researched by which part of the discipline, and how this can be done. In this regard, it is not only the questions of intensity and inclusiveness or exclusiveness towards others interested in becoming members that are important, as in the case of national identity. Equally important are the questions of singularity or multiplicity between different collective identifications (national and European, regional, or local), as well as questions concerning the content or meanings of identity.

What, then, is at stake? Any step towards deeper EU integration—especially majority rule, redistribution policies, and a common foreign policy—needs a European demos with its own Europe-wide identity in order to secure loyalty and solidarity among the members—as many scholars argue (see among others Kielmansegg 1996; Scharpf 1999; Höreth 1999; Zürn 2000; Offe 2003; Hermann and Brewer 2004; Risse 2004; Bach, Lahusen, and Vobruba 2006; McLaren 2006; Green 2007; Cerutti 2003, 2008; Kaina 2009).

Yet, what demos does the EU need? How can it be constructed? What resources are needed to form a European identity? Many studies have addressed these questions. Some assume that a European demos is not possible in the foreseeable future, because of too strong national identities, different histories and cultures, and no Europe-wide media, public, or political parties of any significance (see e.g. Kielmansegg 1996, Deflem and Pampel 1996, Tenscher 2005, Mittag 2011). Other studies emphasize the European common cultural identity (see e.g. Delgado-Moreira 1997; Schlesinger 2000; Sassatelli 2002) or put forward ideas concerning a civic or exclusively political identity, constitutional patriotism or postnational identity (see e.g. Delanty 1997, 2002; Habermas 1998a, 2003; Cerutti 2001, 2010; Laborde 2002; Lacroix 2002; Cronin 2003; Meyer 2004, 2009; Kantner 2006; Payrow Shabani 2006). Yet other studies evaluate these concepts sceptically, or even reject them as either not viable or not strong enough to show the needed integrative functions (see e.g. Brown 1999; Brubaker 1999; Shulman 2002; Baumeister 2007; Rile 2007).

Yet in the literature on European identity it is hard to find a study that compares how elites and ordinary citizens connect their national and European identities, and at the same time examines how different dimensions of national and European identity (meanings, intensity, cognitive representation, emotions, trustworthiness) interact with each other and with other types of identities, including the effects of individual and contextual determinants (with some exceptions: for instance, Bruter 2004, 2005 and Ruiz Jiménez et al. 2004, who examine identity meanings).

The aim of this book is to fill this void. It looks at what induces Europeans, ordinary people as well as elites, to identify with Europe. It contributes to the general debate in two ways. First, the data were collected at a time when it was becoming clear that the popular attitude to the European integration process was changing. Moreover national identities, supposedly superseded by an encompassing European identity, were no longer silent—quite the contrary. We are unable to determine whether the relationship between national and European identity has been worsened by the Great Recession and reactions against the austerity policies enacted by EU institutions. But our results can provide a picture of the state of elite and mass opinion at what seemed to be the beginning of a historical change when friendship bonds perhaps began to

fall apart. Second, we consider many identity dimensions, thus remedying some previous shortcomings of individual-level identity research.

Individual-level approaches have conspicuous merits. Yet we feel it necessary to outline how our analyses relate to what macro approaches have found on the relation between national and European identity. Macro approaches are not usually very much concerned to decompose entities that they tend to conceive as integrated wholes. That said, macro approaches to nationalism and European identity have often set out the big questions to which individual-based inquiries refer, explicitly and often implicitly, when they consider the dynamics of collective identification. They offer a useful means to raise central questions that look at the similarities and differences between European identity and national identity.

We will focus here on three related questions. Is European identity as a principle of political integration similar to national identity? Is European identity similar to national identity as a distinct source of political obligation? Is European identity similar to national identity in the way that the latter was able to 'ennoble' mass culture and attitudes?

In what follows, we will selectively review some aspects of the debate in which theories of nationalism and European identity have engaged with these three topics. Within this framework, we present the questions addressed by the individual chapters. Finally, a discussion of the survey measurements of the key concepts of collective identities will close this introduction.

1.2 Theories of Nationalism and European Identity and the Questions the Book will Address

We begin with the last of the three topics: the dignity that nationalism aimed to give to individuals who were considered the populace. In this regard, the elective affinities between nationalism and populism are telling. Greenfeld (1992:7) argues that the 'tremendous' change of attitudes determined by nationalism rests on the idea that in a nation every member of the people 'partakes in its superior, elite quality'. Ideas of peoplehood may differ between what Hermet (2005) calls nation-state populism of a Western type and national populism of an Eastern type. However, according to Greenfeld (1992: 7), the elevation of people to elite status is '[a] principle [that] lies at the basis of all nationalisms and justifies viewing them as expressions of the same general phenomenon'. The rampant populist appeals to national dignity seem to show that a chasm is reopening between elites and masses (Taggart 2000; Mény and Surel 2002; Martinelli 2014). Elites are often perceived as less rooted in the nation than ordinary people, as occurred in the early stages of the nation building process (Gellner 1983). Europe may be one of the causes.

A vast amount of literature shows that the European integration process has been an elite process. Elites are often more positive towards Europe than ordinary people are (Fligstein 2008). The gap between high-educated and low-educated people as regards attitudes towards Europe has been widening over the years, especially since Maastricht (Hakhverdian, van Elsas, van der Brug, and Kuhn 2013). Moreover, public discourses on European identity tend to emphasize cosmopolitanism and reject populist appeals to the cultural roots of Europeanness, whatever that may mean. Not surprisingly, therefore, in many countries European issues are generating a new cleavage between winners and losers, a divide able to reshuffle domestic ideological divisions and in which appeals to national dignity play a crucial role (Kriesi et al. 2012). In this context, what is less clear is how the structure of the national and European identity of the elite differs from that of ordinary people. This is an important issue, for if the elite and the mass do not differ in how they connect their national identity with a European one, it is likely that Europe as a political cleavage will be a divide within the elite as well as the mass. Lengyel and Goncz address this question in Chapter 2. Not only do they examine the extent to which political elites are Europhile or Europhobic, but they offer an inside view on the structure of the national and European identity of parliamentarians as well. Their results can be compared with the strength of European identification and the structure of identity of the mass public, which is analysed in other chapters.

We should also consider the power of events to influence collective identity genesis and change. Nationalism is quite often approached from a developmentalist perspective, while it is also ‘something that happens’, as Brubaker (1996: 19) observes. In particular, ideas of nationhood may crystallize under the effects of contingent events more than developing slowly over time.¹ Events can moderate the difference between elite and mass perceptions of their nation and of its relation with Europe. We do not know how Greece’s dramatic economic crisis has already crystallized new or different ideas of how Greek people see their nation and Europe. We know, however, that several studies have examined the extent to which Europe may be seen as either an agent of globalization or a shield against it. Cotta and Isernia deal with this problem in Chapter 8. After discussing the state of the art of theories on popular reaction to globalization in connection with Europe, they examine,

¹ The Austrian case provides a well-known example of the power of events. In 1918, the vast majority of Austrian citizens would have preferred to join Germany, as the result of the referendum showed, except for the Vorarlberg inhabitants, who seemed to prefer Switzerland. Thus, Austria was for many German-speaking Austrians not a nation but only a state. The attitudes changed dramatically after the catastrophe of World War II (Linz and Stepan 1996). In 1918, the situation had been even more complicated, since the majority of the Slovene-speaking minority in Carinthia opted to stay in Austria and not to join the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

on the basis of a survey experiment, the circumstances under which Europe or the nation state may be seen as a shield against cultural and economic globalization.

For a century, there have been as many ideas of Europe as there have been different cultural visions of Europe developed in the course of European history (Duroselle 1965; Chabod 1967; Delanty 1995). In the context of European integration, slowly before the 1990s but progressively since Maastricht, the central issue of many debates on the European project has been the extent to which ideas of Europe can be transformed into a European identity, a principle of political integration as are the national identities (Delanty 2003). In the case of national identity, the question has been approached from two different analytical perspectives. Both of them adopt the view that nationalism—the movement that creates a nation—is a ‘positive force’ able to integrate and empower the masses in a modern political entity. When nationalism turns bad and violent, this is because it has been absolutized (Gellner 1998; Joas 2003). The two perspectives, however, differ on a point important for understanding the extent to which European identity can be similar to national identity as a source of political integration. In analysing how nation building has come about, the first focuses on the role of political institutions, while the characteristics that make national identity a modern collective identity remain in the background. The second considers these characteristics and connects them to the social structure of a modern society. In brief, the first may be labelled a political perspective, and the second a sociological one.

According to the first perspective, national identity as a principle of political integration presupposes a coincidence between the territorial boundaries of the state and the linguistic-cultural boundaries of group membership, as Breuilly (1993), Rokkan (1999) and Bartolini (2005) among others argue. The transition from what Weber called a ‘people of a state’ to a nation was a long and conflictual process, in which the politics of language and identity enacted by the state institutions played the leading role. The process required removing intra-state cultural boundaries and forcing territorial identities to bow to the new national identity promoted by the political and cultural centre. In some Western countries, like France, the mass nationalization phase ended just before the First World War (Weber 1976). In others, like Italy, only after the Second World War did all Italians adopt the standard form of Italian, thanks to mass education and the mass media (De Mauro 2011). In Central and Eastern European countries, where new states were created after World War I on the ashes of empires, policies of linguistic and cultural homogenization tended to destabilize democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996) and to increase international instability, thus triggering the ‘irrendenta triangle’ between national minority, kin state, and the state whose policies targeted the

minority (Brubaker 1996).² In the end, the problem was ‘solved’, at least in Central and Eastern Europe, as a ‘by-product’ of World War II. Eberhardt (2003) estimates that, from the beginning of World War II to its immediate aftermath, roughly 35 million human beings were forced to move or resettled in Central and Eastern Europe. The population transfer contributed to creating states more internally homogenous than the previous ones, and the European integration project might have benefited from it by solving the problem of linguistic fractionalization and national minorities that undermined democracy in the World War I successor states during the interwar period.³ The point we want to stress is twofold. In cases when national identity became a principle of political integration, it was because of cultural policies enacted by a political entity—the territorial state. Yet the European Union is not a state, and at least in the near future it is unlikely to become one, since even limited steps towards a more political union have backfired. Secondly, the existing proliferation of territorial political organizations that aspire to be nation states demonstrates that this type of organization still attracts many political entrepreneurs wanting to exploit the cultural heterogeneity of large and weak existing states to build their own state, as Wimmer shows (2013). However, the nation states’ proliferation might indicate that building a large-scale collective identity has become a goal difficult to achieve in mass-mobilized societies. The failed nationalization of the cultural peripheries in a democratic context in many Eastern European countries after World War I, and the growth of nationalist-motivated wars (Wimmer 2013) seem to suggest that this is the case.⁴ Thus European identity cannot be a principle of political integration as national identity has been, not only because there is no European centre willing or able to do what some European states did before World War I, but also because today mass nationalization policies seem to fail in large and heterogeneous polities.

The political approach to nation building suggests that European identity is not, and probably will not become, the kind of integrated political identity that the nation is. That said, we might conceive a backwash effect of the European integration process on the nation state. The European institutional architecture based on multilevel governance may be undermining the superordinate role of national identity over the other intra-national territorial

² On the politics of language see the detailed and fascinating analysis by Kamusella (2012). See also Judt and Lacorne (2004).

³ The problem remains however in some EU member states such as those of the Baltic, in the relation between Hungary and some of its neighbour countries, and—as the case of Ukraine seems to show—beyond the borders of the European Union. In addition, cultural heterogeneity within the EU member states is increasing due to the effects of immigration flows (Joppke 1998).

⁴ There is a need for fresh thinking on how societies with high cultural heterogeneity can be adjusted in democratic polities organized differently from the nation-state ideal type (Stepan, Linz, and Yogendrav 2011).

identities. In fact, some West European countries (for instance the United Kingdom, Belgium, Spain, and France) have seen the rise of historical regional identities with demands for acceptance as nations; others have experienced the emergence of new regionalisms, for example driven by economic inequality within countries (see e.g. Keating 1988, 1998, 2004). The European Union may also have provided more mobilization opportunities for ethno-regionalist parties (De Winter and Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro 2002). Schnaudt, Walter, and Popa will address this issue in Chapter 3 by examining the relations among local, regional, and national identities.⁵ Investigating the structure of territorial identity within the nation state, they analyse the extent to which national identity is still superimposed on subnational identities.

The second approach to nationalism as a principle of political integration focuses more on how Western social modernization has changed the contents of group loyalties. It was Kohn who inaugurated this approach.⁶ Already in the 1940s he argued that the idea of nationalism developed as a consequence of the decline in loyalties based on interpersonal relations and the growth of social interactions whose roles are not defined by descent or localism, but rather are chosen and contracted. Considering mainly the cases of Great Britain and the USA, Kohn argued that 'nationalism—our identification with the life and aspirations of uncounted millions whom we shall never know, with a territory we shall never visit—is qualitatively different from the love of family or of home surroundings. It is qualitatively akin to the love of humanity or of the whole earth' (Kohn 1944: 9)⁷. He thought that in some countries, like the Western European ones, the division between modern national and pre-modern interpersonal loyalties was larger because prevalent in those countries was the idea that individual freedom, rational contract, and political willingness are at the basis of national feelings. In other countries, like the Eastern ones, ideas representing the nation as an organic community based on cultural roots unlikely to be transcended crippled the modernity of nationalism. Kohn's dichotomy between a Western and an Eastern type of nationalism was highly influential. It developed through opposed qualifications, civic vs ethnic, patriotic vs chauvinist, pacifist vs aggressive, and so on. It is impossible

⁵ This is only one of the potential effects of the European integration process on the nation state. Ferrera (2005) shows how the process of integration has changed the boundaries of the domestic system of social security. Bickerton (2012) argues that the nation state's economic sovereignty has been eroded by the EU institutions. Van der Eijk and Franklin (1996) explored how the European elections may alter how people perceive their own national elections, and they showed a potential for European issues to impact on domestic politics (1996).

⁶ We follow here Calhoun's reading of Kohn (Calhoun 2005).

⁷ According to Kohn, the French case was similar, but only to a partial extent. The reasons why Kohn thought that the French case was only partially similar are explained by Calhoun (2005). Political approaches to nation-state building argue that building a nation does not require a transcendence of interpersonal loyalties. In non-European countries, nation-state building was promoted by coalitions whose social roots were in many cases clientelistic bonds (Wimmer 2013).

here to provide even a short summary of this debate, except to note its influence on the understanding of the relationship between national and European identities. The usual argument is that liberal and political ideas of nationhood define group boundaries that can be transcended into a larger and superordinate European identity. By contrast, organic, cultural, and essentialist representations of the nation are deemed to have the opposite effect, since they tend to define the group's boundaries as mutually exclusive. As Calhoun (2005: p. xxxiv) noted, Habermas's concept of post-nationalism (1994) rests on Kohn's description of the liberal type of nationalism. For example, Habermas (2001a: 102) claimed that if liberal nationalism is based on transcendence of pre-political loyalties, 'why shouldn't the learning process be able to continue' at European level? But at the same time, Habermas (1998a: 115) seems also to think that the cultural roots of nations limit the chances of constitutional patriotism. In sum, there seems to be quite broad agreement on the idea that liberal or civic/political ideas of nationhood can host a European identity, while pre-political or ethnocultural ideas determine thresholds too high or too thick to be easily transcended into a European identity (Smith 1992). According to the social modernization perspective on nation building, European identity may be a principle of political integration. It may be so in two ways. The first is normative: a post-national European identity should emerge free of any cultural idiosyncrasies from a rational public sphere. The second is empirical: a European identity is likely to emerge among those national identities that weaken their parochial cultural burden and incorporate the liberal and cosmopolitan European values. If this is the case, European identity or Europeanized national identities may indeed promote a sense of community among Europeans in the context of a multi-level polity (Gillespie and Laffan 2006: 140). From this it follows that—contrary to the political approach to nation building—the different ideas of nationhood matter for European identity.

Is the distinction between the civic/political and ethnic/cultural ideas of nationhood able to detect what makes national identities more or less open? We have some doubts in this regard.

First, the dichotomy refers to the difference between legal regimes of citizenship, *jus soli* vs *jus sanguinis*. However, through a comparison between France and Germany, Brubaker (1992) demonstrated that the choice of *jus soli* in France and of *jus sanguinis* in Germany after the French Revolution was only in part motivated by the different ideas of nationhood that developed in the two countries. Demography had an influence, as did correlated military defence considerations. In an extensive study analysing 162 countries over the post-war period until 2000, Bertocchi and Strozzi (2010) show a process of increasing restriction of regimes of citizenship as an effect of immigration. If the previous legal regimes can be conceived as a proxy for earlier ideas of

nationhood, they also show that those earlier ideas might indeed have had an effect on the current citizenship laws. Yet in Europe there has been a convergence towards a model that combines elements of *jus sanguinis* with *jus soli*. Thus, if there is parallelism between citizenship regimes and ideas of nationhood, one ought to conclude that, at least in Europe, the distinction between the civic and ethnocultural ideas of nationalism tends to blur.

Second, the scheme counterposing the civic/political and ethnic/cultural ideas of nationhood seems unable to account for the historical reality. This has to do with the uncertain place of culture in the distinction, as Brubaker claims (2004: 139). Cultural elements were and are in fact ubiquitous in any representation of a nation, even in Renan's oft-quoted definition of the French nation as an 'everyday plebiscite' (Hermet 2005). In addition, from the analytical point of view, culture is neither a primordial, untouchable legacy nor exclusively the outcome of elite invention. It is most of the time the product of active creation within the limits of cultural trajectories whose agencies are not only those internal to the boundaries of the nation state (Calhoun 2007).⁸ Thus, the dichotomy between civic/political and ethnic/cultural ideas of nationhood is not a particularly useful tool with which to understand what makes national identities more or less resistant to being matched with European identity.

Psychologists (e.g. Huddy 2001) have suggested that collective identities may vary between ascribed and achieved meanings attributed to the group boundary. It would be misleading to think that the ascribed vs achieved scheme simply reflects the ethnic vs civic dichotomy. Both schemes use the metaphor of thin or thick boundaries, but beyond that the differences are large. According to the civic/political vs ethnic/cultural scheme, identity transcendence simply depends on how thin or thick the cultural background is, regardless of how the in-group and out-groups perceive it. The ascribed vs achieved distinction takes into account these perceptions, so that a collective characteristic like language or religion, or even ethnicity, may therefore be qualified as ascribed or as achieved—depending on how the collective identity is self-defined or defined by others.⁹

⁸ Calhoun (2002: 284) also argues that those who agree on the dichotomy between civic vs ethnic or try to build a post-national European identity on the civic idea of nationhood 'neglect the extent to which agreement and common culture alike are neither rationally chosen nor simply inherited, but produced and reproduced in social action'.

⁹ The role of self- vs other-definition of identity within the ascribed vs achieved scheme is underscored by Calhoun referring to Hanna Arendt's dictum that 'when one is attacked as a Jew, one must respond as a Jew' (Calhoun 2001: 47). Other examples are the various linguistic policies intended to integrate national minorities in the interwar states (e.g. Poland), policies which varied according to the perceived identity of the targeted minority. If the latter belonged to a supposed *Kultnation*, like the German one, policies did not aim to assimilate Germans. They were 'dissimilationist', for the assumption was that the differences between minority and majority were 'given', and language was conceived as ascribed. If the minority was perceived to be of low

In order to understand variation between any collective identity (not only national ones), Eisenstadt and Giesen (1995) proposed an approach that considers identity boundaries resulting simultaneously from how in-groups define themselves and how they conceive the identity of the others. The approach is based on the notion of 'symbolic codes'. Eisenstadt and Giesen identify three such codes associated with distinctive social structures and forms of in-group solidarity, and which can concur in shaping a collective identity. The first is what they call 'primordial'. This is based on a definition of the boundaries between in-group and out-group, which are experienced as 'given', 'unchangeable', and 'objective' because the others are perceived as so distant that any interaction is excluded. The second is the civic (or civil) code, which Eisenstadt and Giesen define as 'link[ing] the constitutive difference between "us and them" to the difference between the routine and the extraordinary.... [T]he routines, traditions, and institutional or constitutional arrangements of a community are regarded as the core of its collective identity.... On the daily level they tend to be exempted from argumentation, communication and debates' (1995: 80). The others can join only through a slow process of assimilation into the in-group's social routine and practices. The civil code combines cultural traditions with ways of life and ways of thinking incorporated into institutions, and it closely resembles the characteristics of the banal nationalism described by Billig (1995), where national identity not only concerns the emotions felt in special circumstances but is embedded in any act of everyday social life. The third code relates the boundaries between in- and out-groups 'to a particular relation... to the Sacred' (Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995: 82). Like religious identities, national identities have a missionary and universalistic attitude, as Kohn noted. The out-groups are perceived as inferiors, but they may be converted to the extent that they accept the inner values which the in-groups think are universal. To sum up, in-group solidarity promoted by religious symbolic code is not based on primordial similarity as in the case of the first symbolic code, nor is it invoked by undisputed traditional social routines; rather, it is inspired by transcendental values that project the group into the future beyond the individual lives of its members. Both approaches (the ascribed/achieved scheme and the symbolic codes) conceive identity boundaries as social constructs. How the others are defined by the in-groups and what the former think of the latter are crucial variables in identity formation.

We believe that the three symbolic codes, as well as the ascribed/achieved scheme, may influence the relations of national identities with European

cultural standing, such as the non-Polish-speaking people living in Poland's eastern borderlands, policies were culturally assimilationist. Hence the majority language was implicitly considered as achievable (Brubaker 1996).

identity in multiple ways. One of the effects of European integration may have been the transfer of a symbolic code related to the sacred from the national level to the European level. In the past, any nation, especially the *Kultur Nation*, cultivated its own 'providential' mission as the vanguard of mankind, to which on some occasions individuals should sacrifice their lives. The peace guaranteed by the European Union and the subsequent taboo on war may have freed nations from such ambitions.¹⁰ This means that we may have a sort of pan-nationalism, expressed by the EU documents and treaties, according to which Europe has indeed a mission to accomplish, this time pacific and universalistic, but as providential as the one that nations thought they had in the past. It remains to be seen whether what European institutions say about the European mission in world affairs will become a value similar to the values that (some) individuals believed their nations had in history. We are unable, however, to deal with these topics in our book. What we suggest is that the transformation of war into a taboo has had obvious positive effects, but the consequential side-effects have perhaps weakened the religious-like symbolic code of the nation. Today, people may indeed feel that their traditional or national ways of life are threatened. It remains to be seen how much they are worried that world competition may in the future jeopardize the prestige and greatness of their nation, as some of their ancestors used to feel in the age of (bad) nationalism.

The idea of a 'Fortress Europe' may stem from the 'cocooning' of the primordial code of the nation (or the ascribed one) into the same code at European level. This is a perspective, usually called 'ethnic pan-nationalism', according to which the boundaries separating a Christian Europe from Islam—the latter supposed to be alien to European history—are perceived as given, unchangeable, and objective. Finally, the civil code is the one that probably best describes what for most citizens a national identity in European states has become: an undisputed tradition in the Weberian sense or, put differently, the power of the everyday social reproduction of the past. Through the lens provided by this code, the distinction between *demos* and *ethnos* fades into the idea of peoplehood. The intergovernmental approach to European integration sees national identities in a similar way (Gillespie and Laffan 2006). According to this perspective, a national identity cannot be transcended into a European identity, because citizens perceive both interests and culture as vested in and represented by how the national institutions work. National identities are bounded not because their cultural backgrounds differ but because of the everyday workings of their institutions in providing the cultural and material resources that people need—primarily social rights

¹⁰ Max Weber (1978: 926) argued that 'Cultural prestige and power prestige are closely associated. Every victorious war enhances the cultural prestige (Germany [1871], Japan [1905], etc.).'

(Gustavsson 1997; Scharpf 1999; Cederman 2001a). Yet this perspective seems to understate the fact that although some individuals conceive their peoplehood as bounded, others can still share the same idea of their nation but at the same time imagine Europe as a set of bounded nation states. This image may be at the origin of identification with Europe. Consequently, Lepsius (1991) may have been right when he thought that the EU may develop towards a *Nationalitätenstaat* rather than a *Nationalstaat*.

Macro approaches are not interested in unpacking collective identity. But, as we argued at the beginning, they offer valuable suggestions on how to explore the extent to which different ideas of nationhood can relate to other identity dimensions, such as collective identification with Europe.

Several chapters in this book deal with some of these issues. In Chapter 4, Westle and Graf Buchheim explore how dual attachment to the nation and to Europe is shaped by individual characteristics, including how people think of their nation and Europe in terms of ascribed and achieved meanings attributed to their nations. In Chapter 5, Guglielmi and Vezzoni analyse the multiple ways in which the meaning attributes of national identity and European identity may be integrated. They assess which ideas of Europeanness are correlated with similar ideas of nationhood and how they blend into an indistinct marble-cake-like structure. In Chapter 6, Segatti and Guglielmi build on the findings of the previous chapter and analyse how the identity meanings' structure, which partly replicates Eisenstadt and Giesen's scheme, influences identification with Europe. In Chapter 7, Markowski and Knotarowski seek to determine the extent to which the bond between attachment to the nation and European identity remains unchanged even when controlling for other political identities like partisanship and ideological identity.

The third topic that we want to deal with concerns the extent to which European identity may be a principle of political obligation to the EU institutions in the same way as is national identity. In the context of the national state, political legitimacy is deemed to have two components: objective and subjective. The objective component refers to the legal procedures through which political decisions are taken so that they are accepted also by those who disagree with their content (Bartolini 2005).¹¹ National identity regards the subjective dimension of political legitimacy. Easton (1975) considered national identity—or 'sense of community', as he called it—to be a type of political support whose characteristics (being diffuse and independent of short-term outputs) are also common to the support for the political regime. Yet national identity is a source of support different from attitudes towards a political regime. Nationalism is a principle of political legitimacy which is

¹¹ See Føllesdal (2006) for a detailed survey of the concept and theories of legitimacy from a normative point of view.

superordinate to and conditions the support of any other political institution. Its underpinnings consist in a sense of belonging to the same demos, or at least to the same 'people of the state'. The locus of this belief is the state. For Linz and Stepan (1996), individuals who do not feel themselves part of the same state are unlikely to accept a regime as legitimate, especially a democracy whose policy rulings are made through temporary majorities. In the context of nation states, national identity is a political identity to the extent that it helps self-definition of the group's membership boundaries, stimulates a sense of common fate or interdependence among the members, encourages reciprocal trust, and promotes the idea that members can shape their future thanks to their collective membership. These mechanisms are usually activated by a shared cultural background (Miller 1995). Is this the case of a European identity?

Some scholars maintain that in relatively young polities like the EU it is unlikely that European identity can have a role clearly distinct from other types of political support (see e.g. Inglehart, Rabier, and Reif 1987; Niedermayer and Westle 1995; Duchesne and Frogner 1995; Gabel 1998a; Luedtke 2005; Roose 2007). In such polities, the perceptions of the regime, and of its institutions, politicians, and political outputs, may influence the development of identification, and especially of political identification (see also Lepsius 2004, 2006; Laffan 2004; Risse 2004; Kaina 2009). Moreover, at present European identity can hardly be a self-standing principle of political legitimacy like national identity because there has not yet developed a demos, based on common values and a common culture, able to support unavoidable conflicts about majority rule, redistribution politics, and a common foreign policy.

Contrary to this approach, more recent studies tend to separate the topic of identity sharply from the topic of support for the European Union; and European identity is supposed to precede and influence attitudes like support for the EU institutions (Jacoby 1991, Jolly 2005; Scheuer 1999; Risse and Maier 2003; Deutsch 2006; Berg 2007).

We are inclined to think that European identity as a principle of political legitimacy is still far from being as solid as national identities within Europe. European identity cannot be equated to national identity as a source of political legitimation independent from other instrumental sources of political support. However, this does not prevent verifying the extent to which identification with Europe based on perceptions of interdependence, trustworthiness, or mutuality among Europeans is promoting political support for the EU institutions and the EU itself.

In Chapter 9, Westle and Kleiner deal with the trustworthiness dimension of identity. They examine the extent to which Europeans differentiate among trust in co-nationals, other European people, and extra-European people, and

what determines these different aspects of trust. In Chapter 10, Bellucci and Serricchio explore how European identity—indexed as a sense of mutual interdependence and common fate—is related to support for ongoing European integration.

In sum, what is at stake regarding European identity? Macro-approaches to nation and Europe, however different they may be, seem to agree that, for various reasons, European identity cannot follow the path of national identities if it is to develop into a principle of political integration and legitimacy. Macro-approaches also suggest that European identity does not have the populist connotation that national identities have had since their beginnings. Although Europeans share many of their cultural roots, these are not as strong as those embedded in the social practices that individuals experience in their daily lives. Therefore, in the near future, Europeans are unlikely to develop a sense of European peoplehood similar to their sense of nationhood. In short, European identity is not an integrated whole like national identities are. On the other hand, since European identity is not the integrated whole that national identity is, one may expect the latter to intertwine in many ways with the former (Risse 2010). We agree with both expectations, and we intend to qualify both of them. Individual-level analyses like those performed in the following chapters can distinguish between the subdimensions of identity, differentiating the emotional from the cognitive components. Distinctions can be drawn between identification with a group and the meanings attributed to the group's boundaries. Individual and contextual determinants can be unravelled. The factors more likely to transform a collective identity into a source of political support to the EU can be unpacked, while controlling for other, more instrumental types of consensus. This can be done by means of concepts and theories of identity and identification which refer to social psychology, political science, and sociology.

1.3 Identity in Survey Research—Limitations and Possibilities

Survey research is sometimes deemed unable to deal adequately with the topic of identity. Typical arguments are that survey questions cannot capture deep-seated cultural values and meanings; that they lack the necessary depth (see e.g. Smith 1992; Lucarelli, Cerutti, and Schmidt 2010; Eder 2010); or that they are not open for different outcomes but create the answers and interpretations by themselves (see e.g. Checkel and Katzenstein 2009a; Hansen 2000). We disagree with this opinion, although we think that survey research approaches can benefit from macro approaches, especially in the case of collective identity.

We are convinced that, first, the level of the individual citizen is important when dealing with questions of European and national identity. It is important from a normative point of view because individual citizens are the subjects of political legitimacy in a democracy, whether a national democracy or—at least in a future perspective—the European Union. It is also important in empirical terms because collective identity (regardless of the type) is an intrinsic characteristic of human beings in any social context, and as such it is not without consequences, both for other characteristics and for people's behaviour. Of course, any mass identity is a construction; it has variable contents, and it may be strongly influenced by societal elites. But, even in non-democratic countries, elites alone do not make a society; and elites alone can neither constitute a nation, implement international cooperation or conflicts, nor form a durable supranational polity. Moreover, individuals (regardless of their status) never identify with a group in a vacuum but in linguistic, cultural, institutional, and political environments moulded by memories, national narratives, symbols, and elite, party, and media discourses, all of them mediated by several agencies. Thus, one should not contrast elites with the mass, or the macro perspective with the micro, but rather encourage a contextual turn in identity studies able to gauge how contextual as well as individual determinants intervene in individual attitudes. In some chapters we move in this direction by using macro data at country level, although the limited number of second-order cases restricts the potential of full multilevel models.

Second, we are convinced that the representative mass-survey is the most suitable method for dealing with the collective identities of citizens. This is so because such surveys are the only approach able to reach nearly all kinds of citizens and enable realistic estimations of their attitudes and opinions. Other methods, qualitative and experimental, can only deal with smaller parts of the population. Hence they are usually not free from distortion in regard to the distribution of the citizenry as a whole. Of course, this is not to say that comparative survey research is free from shortcomings. Two are often mentioned. Does survey research produce its own answers already in the questionnaire? And does it really grasp cross-cultural invariant attitudes, and not just context-dependent styles of response?

The first allegation has been known, at least since the work of Converse (1964, 1970), as the problem of 'non-attitudes'. The problem arises when topics are new, strange, and difficult for citizens. In its earliest years, survey questions about the European Union may have produced such ad hoc answers. Knowledge about the functioning of the European Union has to date been rather modest in many member states (see e.g. Westle and Johann 2010; Maier and Bathelt 2013; Westle 2015). Thus the expression of non-attitudes on EU issues may still occur today, especially in regard to complex issues which seem distant from day-to-day experiences. This impression has

already led to the assumption that many citizens use so-called 'heuristics' to deal with EU issues, especially their knowledge, experiences, and attitudes concerning national political systems which they transfer to the EU (see e.g. Franklin et al. 1995; Martinotti and Stefanizzi 1995; Anderson 1998; Ehin 2001; Rohrschneider 2002; Kritzinger 2003). Other authors instead speak of an independent development of national and European attitudes (see e.g. Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998b; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000; Munoz, Torcal and Bonet 2011). However complicated it may be to ascertain the collective identity of a citizen, the individual person him or herself is still the best—if not the only competent—informant. Moreover, survey research has developed an array of analytical methods to detect non-attitudes: for example, tests on the consistency of answers. In addition, non-survey approaches in which survey questions are validated through carefully designed experiments may also be helpful.

In comparative survey research, the second allegation is at the centre of increasing attention. The problem of comparability of survey results is usually approached from two related perspectives. Both share the notion that attitudes are latent dimensions connected in different ways to the verbal expressions captured by survey research. The first perspective focuses on the equivalence of the concepts used to analyse the attitudes. This means highlighting the theoretical frameworks that validate the different concepts and then clarifying the measurement operationalization (van Deth 1998b). The second perspective focuses on the empirical assessment of the cross-cultural invariance of the survey items used to tap the latent attitudinal dimensions (Harkness, van de Vijver, and Mohler 2003; Billiet 2003). The following section describes the identity concepts that we adopted, and their subsequent operationalization. A few of the book chapters will address the estimation of the cross-cultural invariance of the survey items used to capture the different dimensions of national and European identity.

1.4 Data, Concepts, and Instruments

All country-specific analyses in this book are based on nationally weighted samples, which leaves their total numbers of respondents nearly unchanged (see Table 1.1). All pooled analyses are based on the samples weighted according to their proportion of population-size within the European Union. The questionnaires of both waves were nearly identical. In so far as the chapters show distributions of the identity variables, both points in time are compared; and if the values are stable enough, any further analyses proceed with the cumulated data of both waves.